A esquerda latino-americana continua com os velhos cacoetes e manias - Christopher Garman, entrevista a José Fucs

‘A ESQUERDA ESTÁ DE MÃOS ATADAS NA AMÉRICA LATINA’!

José Fucs

O Estado de S. Paulo, 18/08/2022

O cientista político Christopher Garman, não “compra” a ideia de que o avanço da esquerda na América Latina se deve a uma guinada ideológica dos eleitores, como dizem por aí políticos e militantes do grupo. Segundo ele, o que está levando a esquerda a vitórias em série na região é “um profundo sentimento desencanto com o sistema e de revolta contra o status quo”. Nesta entrevista, que faz parte da série sobre o avanço das esquerdas na América Latina lançada pelo Estadão, ele afirma também que, no atual cenário regional e global, os governantes do grupo na região “estão de mãos atadas” e terão dificuldade para cumprir as promessas de campanha.

Como o sr. analisa a atual onda de governos de esquerda na América Latina? O que está levando a esta guinada para a esquerda na região? 

Isto não está acontecendo por causa de uma predisposição em favor de plataformas de esquerda. É um movimento de revolta contra o status quo. Quando a gente olha as pesquisas, a América Latina aparece no topo do ranking global de desencanto. A geologia da opinião pública está podre. Estamos vivendo um ambiente de insatisfação muito grande com a qualidade dos serviços públicos, com falta de confiança no sistema de forma mais ampla. A confiança nas lideranças políticas, nos partidos, no Judiciário, na mídia, está num nível muito baixo.

 

Na sua visão, a que se deve este alto grau de desencanto? 

É fruto de uma expansão brutal da classe média no período de alta dos preços das commodities, do início dos anos 2000 até 2011, 2012. Milhões de famílias saíram da miséria. Isso levou a uma mudança nas demandas eleitorais. A preocupação passou a ser mais segurança, saúde, educação. O eleitor associou a corrupção à má qualidade dos serviços públicos. Antes da pandemia, a corrupção havia se tornado o primeiro ou o segundo tema mais relevante no Brasil, no Chile, na Colômbia, no México, no Peru, e houve esse descrédito total no sistema. No fundo, o que a gente está vendo é uma combinação deste choque de falta de confiança com novas demandas de uma classe média emergente que são difíceis de entregar num contexto de crescimento econômico mais baixo.

 

Como a pandemia se encaixa neste cenário?

A pandemia pegou a América Latina, em termos epidemiológicos, com mais força do que outras regiões. Então, houve uma queda mais acentuada do PIB (Produto Interno Bruto), a desigualdade aumentou e a capacidade de os governos atenderem a essas demandas caiu. Isso exacerbou esse mal estar. Para completar, veio o choque de inflação global que reforçou a queda de renda das famílias mais pobres. Este é o caldeirão de revolta que está elegendo a esquerda na região. Como mais governos de direita e de centro estavam no poder, eles estão sentindo mais. A esquerda estava mais bem posicionada para navegar nesta onda.

 

Em que medida esta nova onda de esquerda é diferente da que se propagou pela América Latina do início dos anos 2000 até meados da década passada?

O quadro atual é muito diferente. A primeira onda aconteceu em meio ao boom das commodities e a um superciclo econômico e político que proporcionou uma abundância de recursos e levou a taxas de aprovação muito altas dos governantes. Agora, este ambiente de desencanto vai impactar a esquerda politicamente. Os governantes vão ter uma lua de mel curta e uma taxa de aprovação estruturalmente baixa. A capacidade de os governantes se reelegerem também deve diminuir estruturalmente.

 

Agora, hoje também está ocorrendo uma alta das commodities. Isto também não pode ter um impacto positivo para os atuais governantes latino-americanos? 

Sim, isto ajuda o governo do lado da arrecadação. Mas, em termos de trocas, não está ajudando muito, porque o valor das importações, dos insumos, também subiu muito. Os preços das commodities estão elevados, mas a renda caiu no Brasil e em outros países. A sensação de bem estar não está acompanhando este ciclo. Os ganhos políticos, portanto, não são os mesmos que os da primeira onda. Além disso, há um cenário de recessão nos Estados Unidos, na Europa, e de desaceleração na China. Isso deverá conter esta alta das commodities. Todos os países da América Latina aumentaram os juros para tentar controlar a inflação. A conta vai chegar nos próximos 12 meses. 

Que efeito isso deve ter? 

Os mesmos fatores que estão levando líderes da esquerda a ganhar as eleições vão dificultar seus governos e colocar restrições no que podem entregar e fazer. Por isso, o potencial de estrago da esquerda hoje está mais limitado, porque eles não vão ter capacidade de se reeleger, de encaminhar medidas mais ambiciosas, até porque muitas vezes não têm apoio parlamentar e terão de compor com o centro. Então, os governos de esquerda estão com as mãos atadas.

Eleicoes 2014: uma analise da disputa presidencial a partir dos EUA - Eurasia Group

 Concordo amplamente com a análise, embora fatores objetivos talvez possam contar menos, nesta etapa final, do que certas impressões subjetivas que os eleitores possam ter com respeito aos dois candidatos. E muito vai se desenvolver nos dois ou três debates que os colocarão face a face, com aquilo que aparece rapidamente aos espectadores: essa ou esse candidato é sincero, dá para acreditar nele ou nela?
    Acho que é isso que vai determinar, no momento decisivo, o voto dos indecisos, que é o que vai fazer a balança pender para um dos lados, nessa contagem muito próxima como de fato indicado no artigo.
    Meus parabéns aos autores.
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Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Rousseff and Neves are headed for a close finish
Eurasia Group, 13 October 2014 03:15 PM EDT

• A Sensus poll released over the weekend shows Rousseff down 17 points against Aecio, but that number should be taken with a huge grain of salt given more reputable polls put Aecio's lead in the low single digits.

• But Rousseff is facing stronger than anticipated headwinds given a Petrobras scandal that continues to receive ample media coverage and, although less important, endorsements that Aecio received over the weekend.

• We still consider Rousseff likely to win and expect her campaign to make up some ground by the end of the week, but these headwinds put a downward bias on our 60% assessment and suggest the 26 October vote will be extremely close.

Sensus released its first national public opinion poll over the weekend, but its survey should be taken with a huge grain of salt. According to the polling company, opposition candidate Aecio Neves is leading Rousseff by a margin of 17 points with 52.4% of the vote against 36.7% support for Rousseff. The poll, however, stands in sharp contrast with IBOPE and Datafolha, both of which are traditionally more reliable and show Rosseff down by only 2 points (51% vs. 49%). While Sensus was released over the weekend, it is important to note that its poll was conducted in roughly the same time period as IBOPE and Datafolha--Sensus's field was from 7-10 October while IBOPE's and Datafolha's was from 7-9 October. There is much debate over whether IBOPE and Datafolha show a "PT-bias" given how they weight their results, but if there is one, it is unlikely to be more than a couple percentage points. In addition, it is also important to flag that while in the last three elections both polls have overstated the PT candidate's support by roughly 4 points in the first round vote, there has been no discrepancy in the second round vote. As a result, one should probably assume that Aecio's lead stands at roughly 2-6 points, not in the double digit range.

Rousseff's campaign is on the defensive

Rousseff's campaign, however, is fighting stronger headwinds than we anticipated, and as such, is clearly on the defensive. As we highlighted last week, Aecio's strong start in the second round campaign was probably driven by two factors. First, by very favorable media coverage following his surprising performance in the first round on 6 October that occupied most headlines during a "lull" in the campaign which ran from the day of the election to when the TV campaigning re-started on 9 October. Second, by the fact he got a "free pass" in the first round of the election with the PT campaign focused exclusively on going negative against Marina Silva.

But the fact the Petrobras scandal took a new and negative twist right when the TV campaign re-started has clearly put Rousseff's campaign on the defensive. While the allegations which were levied by Petrobras's ex-director Paulo Roberto da Costa don't reveal anything "new", the fact they were levied through hours of audio tape has made a difference. The news media has been giving ample coverage to the tapes, and replaying segments of it on the nightly news in recent days detailing da Costa's account of how a supposed corruption racquet in Petrobras benefitted the PT and its allies in congress. Looking forward, it won't come as a surprise if additional segments of Roberto da Costa's deposition get leaked to the press by dribs and drabs to keep the story alive. Add the endorsements that Aecio Neves received from third party candidate Marina Silva, and equally if not more important, from Eduardo Campos's family in the state of Pernambuco, it is safe to say the news flow has been very negative to the PT's campaign. We remain of the view that third party candidate endorsements don't have much of an impact on voting behavior, and that remains the case for Marina Silva's endorsements. But from a news flow perspective, it contributes to what was already a positive momentum for Aecio amidst a negative news flow for Rousseff.

The end result has been a defensive posture of Rousseff's campaign. Rather than attack Aecio and the PSDB for all the vulnerabilities which have proven effective in the last three elections (party of the elite, risk to the economic gains accrued under PT etc.), Rousseff's campaign focused a bit more on shoring up her attributes on fighting corruption and on her positive agenda. The intent was probably to insulate a very negative news flow and prevent a downward spiral in her negative attributes. The TV ads have been relatively light on attacks against Aecio. In the campaigning, Rousseff also focused her time in the Northeast-her bastion of support.

All of the above makes this second round much more competitive and difficult to call than we anticipated, and as a result, we now view Rousseff as only a slight favorite to win. We already lowered the probability of her winning last week from 70% to 60%, and we would even put a downward bias to our existing probability assessment given the trend described above.

What are we looking for this week?

But it would still be early, in our view, to conclude Aecio is now favored to win. With Rousseff on the defensive late last week, her campaign has yet to fully explore the liabilities Aecio Neves and the PSDB, as they have done successfully in the last three elections. That means the PT will most likely pivot to a more aggressive stance this week, and Rousseff will probably start that posture in tomorrow night's first presidential debate. In other words, this will be the week in which Aecio's image and electoral vulnerabilities will be stress tested in a manner they haven't yet been. The fact such a "stress-testing" of Aecio's vulnerabilities has begun later in the second round than anticipated certainly makes this election harder to call.

As a result, we will be looking at two signposts. The first is how Rousseff performs in this week's debates. While Aecio is seen as a better debater, in a one-on-one format the president has proven to hold her ground reasonably well (that was the case last election). Even if she doesn't come across as the clear winner, she needs to effectively jumpstart a more negative swing to her campaign this week in tomorrow night's debate. While the appraisal of who "won" will matter, the PT campaign will look to Tuesday's debate as a means to help jumpstart a more offensive swing. Alternatively, if Aecio comes across much better than Rousseff, and as seen as the clear winner, it will be all the harder for Rousseff to gain momentum this week.

Second, we will be looking at the polls by the end of this week. Aecio most likely has kept the average lead he held by the end of last week. So we expect the Vox Populi, IBOPE, and Datafolha polls by mid-week to show him still ahead-most likely within the 2-6 point range. But if polls by the end of this week show Rousseff still down by a similar average deficit, it could be the first strong indicator that the PSDB's liabilities are not coming out as we expected-be it because of tactical flows in the campaign or because the desire for change in segments of the middle class are more robust than we appreciated. Independently, we view this week as critical to our assessment over who in fact is likely to win on 26 October.

Joao Augusto de Castro Neves, PhD
Director, Latin America

Christopher Garman
Deputy Head of Research

Cameron T. Combs
Researcher, Brazil

OK, pessoal, mostre as bandeiras e vamos todos para a frente... para onde, mesmo? - Christopher Garman, Clifford Young

A análise é da melhor qualidade, embora alguma coisa falte: além de todos esses dados, seria preciso contar com o ativismo de alguns grupos, para colocar todo esse povo na rua. Mas, os aprendizes de feiticeiro (e os não amadores, os profissionais das trapaças políticas) esperavam uma coisa: acabou acontecendo outra...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brazil’s protests are not just about the economy

By Christopher Garman and Clifford Young

 Reuters

JUNE 21, 2013

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BRAZIL | DILMA ROUSSEFF | WORLD CUP

More than a million Brazilians have taken to the streets this past week in the largest mass demonstrations since the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992. It began as a modest protest movement in Sao Paulo against a seemingly routine 20 cent bus fare increase, but has quickly transformed into a broader and more diffuse protest against a range of grievances: political corruption; the dismal performance of public services such as transportation, health and education; and even excessive spending in preparation for the World Cup. The mostly peaceful protests have spread to dozens of cities across the country while capturing the world’s attention.

Explanations for this outburst of angst are varied. Some analysts point to Brazil’s economic woes and suggest that two and a half years of low growth, and signs that the consumption-led credit boom is coming to an end, are finally catching up politically, prompting popular discontent. Otherssee the protests as a manifestation of the government’s inability to meet basic needs, and potentially, as an indication that governance challenges are on the rise in Brazil in a more meaningful way.

All of these explanations have a kernel of truth but are ultimately incomplete. To be sure, the current macroeconomic cycle has generated an environment more prone to discontent, but that doesn’t explain the outburst on the streets. Something deeper and more structural is going on, and it has to do with how a cycle of economic enrichment over the past ten years is changing the public’s expectations of its politicians.

Delivering on growth and employment is no longer good enough. Voters will increasingly hold their leaders accountable to improve the quality of public services such as health, education, transport and crime prevention. The good news for President Dilma Rousseff is that such a trend, and even the current protests, don’t pose an immediate governance challenge. Nor are her prospects for re-election next year in serious jeopardy. The bad news, however, is that delivering on these new demands won’t be easy, and they will only intensify in years to come.

While the current economic environment doesn’t explain the recent bout of protests, it does enable them. The general mood in Brazil is one of growing pessimism and unease. To understand this sentiment, it’s important to remember that Brazil has undergone profound social changes over the last decade. The best example is the expansion of Brazil’s so-called “C” class, which is how Brazilian economists describe the equivalent to the American lower middle class. In 2005, it represented only 21 percent of the population, but in the ensuing years it has jumped to 54 percent. The rise of the C class has already had profound effects on Brazilian society, from politics to consumer products to the content of Brazilian telenovelas. Much of this demographic’s growth was due to the explosion in access to personal credit and the ability of lower-income Brazilians to buy goods and services in installments.

But now the C class’ growth has plateaued. Economic growth has stalled due to a combination of lower demand for Brazil’s exports, government policy that has stressed investor confidence, and even a credit cycle that has made it harder for families to accumulate debt. Government policies, which attempted to counteract these trends, have helped keep inflation uncomfortably high.

The end result is rising default rates and mounting debt for the C class. Since 2012, for example, the lower middle class and lower classes (C, D and E) no longer have extra income left over to purchase additional goods. With their average disposable income on a monthly basis dipping under zero, families are now merely focused on paying off debt or replacing existing goods. Below, note the red line of the C class’ disposable income dip over time.

Source: Ipsos Pulso 2005-2013

The slowdown in consumer-driven growth combined with higher inflation and lower overall growth has also muted consumer optimism. Only a few years ago, Brazilians were among the global leaders in consumer confidence; now they have become increasingly more pessimistic about the economy. Recent polls by IBOPE and Datafolha indicate similar declines in optimism.

 

Source: Ipsos Global Advisor 2007-2013

But does decaying optimism associated with a slowdown in Brazil’s demand-driven growth really explain why more than a million people have taken to the streets in the country’s major metropolitan regions? On the one hand, it’s no coincidence that the protesters tend to be more from the upper middle class. It is precisely this segment of society that has been hit the hardest with the escalating cost of living in large cities. Yet in a context in which unemployment remains at near historic lows, something else must be going on.

We view the outburst of protests as a symptom of radically shifting demands, driven in great measure by Brazil’s economic success. With the expansion of the C class, citizens’ priorities, and what they want from their government, have changed. From 1994, when measures were taken to stabilize the economy, to the mid-2000s, Brazilians have been most concerned about two very basic issues: jobs and the economy. Policy makers, in turn, have crafted solutions to meet these needs.

But with heightened prosperity voters have turned their attention to other priorities, most linked to quality of life issues such as healthcare, education, transportation and public safety. No longer do Brazilians need to worry about putting rice and beans on the table; they are instead focused on providing their children with a good education and living healthy lifestyles, in addition to their personal safety and reliable transit. Such a trend is evident in polling data. In 2005 nearly 60 percent of the public considered issues surrounding jobs and income to be their main concern. The sum of issues surrounding quality of life issues, like healthcare, transport, crime and education, were front and center for only a bit over 20 percent of the population. By 2013 the tables turned entirely, with concern over jobs dropping to 30 percent, and issues of the quality of life surpassing that of jobs and income.

Source: Ipsos Pulso 2005-2013

The quality of life agenda is apparent in Brazilians’ rallying cry these past few days — Menos Corrupção, mais saude, educação, transporte e segurança (Less corruption, more health, education, transport and security). What we are seeing in Brazil is a symptom of how the political landscape changes with economic enrichment. Put differently, if the bus fare hike was the catalyst, then the lukewarm economic conditions are the context, and the public’s shifting priorities are the drivers. No one fact can explain the protests, but taken together they do.

Rousseff can be confident that the street protests are unlikely to generate a near-term challenge to governance or to the president’s bid for re-election in 2014. In contrast to the protests in Turkey, the grievances of Brazil’s protesters aren’t directed against a single leader or even the national government. They in fact place more pressure on local and state authorities. Brazil is a large federal democracy, with mayors and governors on the frontlines to deliver basic services such as education, health and urban transport.

We believe Rouseff’s polling numbers will continue to tumble, but not so far as to undermine her re-election chances. According to the latest CNI/IBOPE poll, the president’s approval ratings have dropped from 79 percent to 71 percent since March. Her numbers can probably fall another 20 percentage points before her re-election is earnestly at risk. Our analysis shows that incumbents with approval ratings exceeding 50 percent six months prior to an election win re-election more than 80 percent of the time. Rousseff’s numbers will suffer, but pundits under-appreciate the heights of her starting point.

In the longer term, we see the rising quality of life agenda — meeting citizen demands with meaningful policy solutions — as the ultimate political kingmaker. Gone are the days of populist politicians. Now it’s the savvy, management-oriented politicians who can run large multifaceted organizations. Rousseff’s track record of sacking government officials who are political appointments in favor of those with stronger technocratic credentials fits with that trend. There’s hope yet.

PHOTO: Demonstrators carry a banner made of Brazilian national flags during a protest against the Confederations Cup and President Dilma Rousseff’s government, in Recife City June 20, 2013. REUTERS/Marcos Brindicci