Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Asia Pacific
Q. and A.: David Shambaugh on ‘China’s Future’
David Shambaugh
is a professor of political science and international affairs at George
Washington University and the author or editor of more than 30 books on
China, covering its military, foreign relations, the Communist Party and portraits of Chinese leaders. His latest book, “China’s Future,”
is a short but provocative look at events that could determine China’s
direction. In an interview, he discussed China’s internal weaknesses,
its parallels with other Leninist states and the reasons behind a
growing disenchantment with China among American policy makers and
analysts.
Q. Since Napoleon, the world has been awash with predictions about China. Do we need another?
A.
Nobody has a crystal ball, but China specialists should at least try to
unpack and understand these dynamics. It is particularly important at
this juncture in China’s development, as there are so many uncertainties
and unprecedented challenges.
Q. Would
it be fair to say that you believe that Leninist parties are incapable
of maintaining power in the long run? It seems that either they hold
power through repression, as in the Soviet Union, and thus settle into terminal decline, or they open up and end up reforming themselves out of existence, as in Taiwan.
A.
I believe that the record shows that Leninist regimes possess fewer
sources of legitimacy, power and longevity than liberal states.
Moreover, as you note, the only Leninist-type regime that reached the
status of a newly industrialized economy that China has today was Taiwan
in the 1980s. Taiwan politically liberalized and democratized — as did
South Korea and other Asian authoritarian states — and it powered the
island’s economy to a fully developed level. That is precisely China’s
challenge today: politically liberalize and become a developed economy
or remain stuck in “hard authoritarianism” and stagnate economically.
Q. Does
this mean foreign countries needn’t worry too much about China’s rise?
Perhaps all they need is a bit of military and foreign policy vigilance
to prevent adventurism and the Chinese Communist Party system will do
itself in in the long run?
A. That’s correct. I argued in my last book [“China Goes Global”]
that China is a “partial power” — lacking in many categories of
national power. That book looked at China externally, whereas this new
book looks at China primarily internally. When one carefully examines
China’s sources of power, I find multiple weaknesses instead of
strengths. As a result, I have been uncomfortable for some time with the
“China rise” narrative, because I think it falsely exaggerates China’s
strengths and underplays its weaknesses.
Q. The
Communist Party appears to be intensely aware of the Soviet Union’s
history and initially tried to reform to avoid stagnation and decline.
When did this period of reform begin and end?
A. I argue in this book, as well as a previous one, “China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation,”
that political decline is an inevitable and protracted process in
Leninist regimes. It took the Soviet Union 27 years of decline after
Brezhnev overthrew Khrushchev in 1964 before it finally collapsed
altogether in 1991. Khrushchev had been trying to reform the Stalinist
system, but Brezhnev led the country back into a period of protracted
bureaucratic stagnation. By the time Gorbachev tried to initiate reforms
again, it was too late.
Deng
Xiaoping understood this, and that is what he, Zhao Ziyang and Hu
Yaobang were trying to fix in the 1980s. It wasn’t until 1998 that the
reformers began again — a period of reform that lasted a decade until
2008-09, when the regime abandoned relative liberalization. Since then,
atrophy has accelerated. This does not mean China is about to collapse.
But it does mean that China is now stagnating, relatively speaking.
Q. So it ended before Xi Jinping took power? If so, why is he often portrayed as the boogeyman?
A.
It definitely began before Xi assumed the top positions in 2012. Of
course, he was part of the senior leadership that decided in 2008-9 to
end the decade-long managed political opening. Since 2012, however, we
have witnessed Xi intensifying controls at all levels and across all
sectors, while concentrating power in himself.
Q. You noted early on that Xi wasn’t likely to be a reformer. What led you to that conclusion?
A.
It had to do with my understanding of Chinese bureaucratic politics
more than of Xi Jinping himself. But I also had the sense that Xi
himself had no liberal genes in his DNA. That his intellectual and
political orientation harked back to an earlier era, rather than the
21st century. There has been a theory circulating in China-watching
circles that Xi is cracking down before he opens up, but I don’t buy it.
There are certainly many frustrated reformers within the party
apparatus and government. But Xi and the leadership remain deeply
insecure and convinced that opening up is a certain path to the system’s
demise.
Q. There seems to be a general disenchantment with China among American China-watchers.
A.
China is simply not turning out as many had expected and have worked so
long and hard to realize — a liberal China. That has been, I would
argue, the underlying operative assumption of American policy ever since
the 1980s. It sounds simplistic, perhaps naïve, but the United States
has been working towards that end for several decades.
There
are many other reasons for the recent disenchantment as well: problems
that the foreign business community is experiencing, China’s expanding
military power, island-building and militarization in the South China Sea, its diplomatic truculence, crackdown on NGOs and religion, pressure on Hong Kong
and other negative trends. Taken together with the illiberal
orientation of the regime, this has caused a real disenchantment with
China in the U.S.
Q. You’ve been coming to China every year since 1979. What period of time is the current period closest to?
A.
I’ve been experiencing China firsthand for 37 consecutive years and
have lived there several times as well. Many of these were very good
years, particularly during the 1980s. The situation in China today is
definitely similar to 1989-92, right after Tiananmen
[the 1989 military crackdown on protests in Beijing]. But it’s not as
bad as it was then. I lived in Beijing then. The city was under martial
law, and the repression was far greater than now. But it is trending in
that direction today.
Q. Could one then also hope for a big reform push now, as with Deng’s 1992 “Southern Tour” to revive economic liberalization?
A.
That is exactly what China needs now, but I do not anticipate it
happening. The massive reform package unveiled at the Third Plenum in
2013 is largely stillborn. There are various reasons for this. Unlike
1992, the regime cannot just flick a switch and unleash a new wave of
economic reforms. That is going to require political reform —
significant and sustained political reform and liberalization. Unless
the Communist Party does this — and I see near-zero possibility as long
as Xi Jinping is in power — the qualitative economic reforms outlined at
the Third Plenum will never be achieved.
The
key variable in China’s future is political. The Communist Party must
learn how to share power in order to maintain its power. Political
hegemony is a certain recipe for relative economic stagnation,
increasingly acute social stresses and accelerated political decline of
the regime and system.
