What Xi must tell Putin now - Mike Mullen, Sam Nunn and Ernest J. Moniz (WP)

Uma SUPER opinião, o establishment militar, congressual e acadêmico dos EUA.

Opinion 

What Xi must tell Putin now

By Mike Mullen, Sam Nunn and Ernest J. Moniz

Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen, former U.S. senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and former U.S. energy secretary Ernest J. Moniz serve on the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s board of directors.

The Washington Post, September 29, 2022 at 8:10 a.m. EDT

The terrible concoction of conscription, annexation and nuclear weapons that Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered last week presents a crucial test to every major world leader. Global outrage is needed, but the spotlight now shines brightest on China’s President Xi Jinping. He needs to step forward in pressing Putin to de-escalate and end this war, especially since Russian miscalculations are forcing major geopolitical decisions, specifically security challenges in Asia.

In his Sept. 21 speech, Putin desperately sought to align Russia’s military and political objectives into a coherent, albeit misguided, whole. He announced Russia’s call up of reservists to hold the Donbas region of Ukraine, where Russian forces have withdrawn to more defensible lines after being pummeled by the Ukrainian counterattack near Kharkiv. Putin again threatened the use of nuclear weapons to protect Russia’s “territorial integrity,” including new claims of large parts of Ukraine. Politically, Putin is carrying forward with sham referendums in four Ukraine regions now under Russian control, presumably leading to their eventual incorporation into Russia — a repeat of the illegal playbook he used in Crimea in 2014.

The “annexed” territory would presumably then fall under Russia’s nuclear umbrella. When both the military and political components are in place, Putin may believe he will be in a stronger position militarily and diplomatically.

Instead, Ukraine will likely escalate militarily to contest and regain lost territory, while deferring diplomacy. More Russian reservists might need to be called up, exacerbating growing Russian domestic opposition. All of this raises the very real risk that Putin will follow through on his misguided threat to use nuclear weapons to try to salvage the Russian military position and his position as president.

The course Putin has threatened would be a global disaster, with unique implications for China. That’s likely why Beijing has moved from a rhetorical “no limits” friendship to now urging the Kremlin to de-escalate. Much more is needed to influence Putin.

If Putin uses nuclear weapons against Ukraine, it could lead nonnuclear weapon states in Asia to the dangerous conclusion that acquiring their own nuclear weapons is the only way to guarantee their security against a nuclear-armed China. No one has to remind the Chinese that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have significant nuclear technology expertise and are quite capable of quickly developing their own nuclear deterrents, in particular if trust in the United States is also weakened.

The most sensible policy choice for China is to wield its unique position of influence to encourage more “rational” decision-making by Putin. In particular, President Xi must make clear to Putin that nuclear use is a line he must not cross, and nuclear saber-rattling itself threatens the global nuclear order.

We saw last week that Putin is sensitive to Xi’s public position on the war, going out of his way to say he would address China’s questions and concerns. Given Russia’s increasing economic and geopolitical reliance on Beijing, Putin cannot afford an irreparable rift with Xi. A public statement by Xi regarding the unacceptability of nuclear use by Russia in Ukraine would certainly have an impact on Putin. Xi could underline the point by reminding Putin of China’s continuing importance as the No. 1 destination for his energy exports, noting this would have to be reassessed if Putin were to use nuclear weapons.

At the beginning of 2022, Putin joined with the leaders of China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States to declare that a “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Xi must now hold Putin to that statement and make clear that any use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict is unacceptable.

President Biden should also urge Xi to reassess China’s great power alignments, including Beijing’s relationship with Moscow. Less-threatening, more predictable partners would offer greater stability for Asia than a Russian president intent on an increasingly irrational course while presiding over a weakened and isolated state.

A nuclear war is certainly not inevitable, but the risk of Russian nuclear escalation is real and would be ignored at our collective peril. There is wisdom in restraint in the face of Putin’s nuclear threats. China and the international community, including India, must use all the diplomatic tools they can muster to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and dissuade Putin from compounding the grievous mistake of starting this war by further escalating it.

The United States and China can — and must — now work together with Europe and other nations to help end this war on the “just terms” called for by Biden in his speech to the United Nations. Cooperation is essential to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being threatened, or used, by any state. The nightmare scenario of nuclear weapon use in the war in Ukraine is relentlessly coming into sharper focus, and a decision by any country to stand on the sidelines should be viewed as an act of complicity.

War in Ukraine: What you need to know

The latest: Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilization” of troops in an address to the nation on Sept. 21, framing the move as an attempt to defend Russian sovereignty against a West that seeks to use Ukraine as a tool to “divide and destroy Russia.” Follow our live updates here.

The fight: A successful Ukrainian counteroffensive has forced a major Russian retreat in the northeastern Kharkiv region in recent days, as troops fled cities and villages they had occupied since the early days of the war and abandoned large amounts of military equipment.

Annexation referendums: Staged referendums, which would be illegal under international law, are set to take place from Sept. 23 to 27 in the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk regions of eastern Ukraine, according to Russian news agencies. Another staged referendum will be held by the Moscow-appointed administration in Kherson starting Friday.

Photos: Washington Post photographers have been on the ground from the beginning of the war — here’s some of their most powerful work.

How you can help: Here are ways those in the U.S. can help support the Ukrainian people as well as what people around the world have been donating.

Read our full coverage of the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for updates and exclusive video.

 

Seguranca nuclear: um mundo sem armas nucleares? - Kissinger, Schultz, Perry, Nunn (WSJ, 2007)

A despeito de ser um artigo de opinião de janeiro de 2007, a matéria ainda guarda seu valor, tanto para os EUA, cuja política o artigo visa influenciar, quanto para o mundo, contexto no qual não haverá entendimento a respeito. Em todo caso, cabe a reflexão responsável sobre um assunto que também interessa à diplomacia brasileira. Esta reclama, desde sempre, que os detentores de armas nucleares cumpram com suas obrigações sob o TNP, o que é compreensível, mas ao mesmo tempo recusa as inspeções abrangentes de suas instalações nucleares, que estão a cargo da AIEA, o que é menos compreensível (pois as justificativas são suposições, não fatos).
Mas o Brasil não é exatamente um problema ou um obstáculo nessa questão.
Meu argumento é outro, e está contemplado no artigo: terrorismo.
Observando as coisas claramente, constato que o Paquistão, por exemplo, um Estado nuclear, é, tecnicamente, socialmente, politicamente, um Estado falido, por mais que digam que seus militares controlam adequadamente os equipamentos e materiais nucleares. Militares não são imunes a loucuras individuais.
Constato que a Coreia do Norte é um Estado falido e delinquente, capaz de matar sua própria população de fome, por políticas de suas elites dirigentes. Se o problema do Paquistão são os conflitos étnicos, religiosos, raciais e tribais dos povos que integram o país, o problema da Coreia do Norte é a delinquência moral de seus dirigentes.
Poderia falar de outros países -- alguns felizmente revertidos na loucura nuclear, como Líbia, do coronel Kadafy -- mas estes dois já bastam para indicar o perigo real do terrorismo nuclear.
O Brasil deveria refletir sobre a questão.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A World Free of Nuclear Weapons

Opinion

By  GEORGE P. SHULTZ,  WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER and SAM NUNN

The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium -- potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges.

Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

* * *

Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution."

Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness."

Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents.

Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles.

What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

Strong non-proliferation efforts are under way. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Additional Protocols are innovative approaches that provide powerful new tools for detecting activities that violate the NPT and endanger world security. They deserve full implementation. The negotiations on proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran, involving all the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and Japan, are crucially important. They must be energetically pursued.

But by themselves, none of these steps are adequate to the danger. Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev aspired to accomplish more at their meeting in Reykjavik 20 years ago -- the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Their vision shocked experts in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, but galvanized the hopes of people around the world. The leaders of the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons discussed the abolition of their most powerful weapons.

* * *

What should be done? Can the promise of the NPT and the possibilities envisioned at Reykjavik be brought to fruition? We believe that a major effort should be launched by the United States to produce a positive answer through concrete stages.

First and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise. Such a joint enterprise, by involving changes in the disposition of the states possessing nuclear weapons, would lend additional weight to efforts already under way to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran.

The program on which agreements should be sought would constitute a series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat. Steps would include:

·       Changing the Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons to increase warning time and thereby reduce the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon.

·       Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces in all states that possess them.

·       Eliminating short-range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed.

·       Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.

·       Providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons, weapons-usable plutonium, and highly enriched uranium everywhere in the world.

·       Getting control of the uranium enrichment process, combined with the guarantee that uranium for nuclear power reactors could be obtained at a reasonable price, first from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and then from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other controlled international reserves. It will also be necessary to deal with proliferation issues presented by spent fuel from reactors producing electricity.

·       Halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally; phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and rendering the materials safe.

·       Redoubling our efforts to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will also require effective measures to impede or counter any nuclear-related conduct that is potentially threatening to the security of any state or peoples.

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal, beginning with the measures outlined above.

Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A conference organized by Mr. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell was held at Hoover to reconsider the vision that Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik. In addition to Messrs. Shultz and Drell, the following participants also endorse the view in this statement: Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Michael Armacost, William Crowe, James Goodby, Thomas Graham Jr., Thomas Henriksen, David Holloway, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Rozanne Ridgway, Henry Rowen, Roald Sagdeev and Abraham Sofaer.