A China perdeu a paciencia com seu enfant terrible? - Financial Times

China banks rein in support for North Korea

By Simon Rabinovitch in Dandong, China

Financial Times, 14/05/2013

Top Chinese banks have halted most dealings with North Korea, an unprecedented move to use financial leverage against Pyongyang that reflects Beijing’s exasperation with Kim Jong-eun’s regime.

The Chinese financial blockade against North Korea goes beyond what Beijing had agreed to implement in UN resolutions, with several leading banks saying they have stopped all cross-border cash transfers, regardless of the nature of the business. A UN resolution this year only called for sanctions in cases where money might contribute to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

Nevertheless, the blockade is far from watertight. A smaller bank based in northeastern China across the border from North Korea said it was still handling large-scale cross-border transfers, an indication that Beijing is not willing to entirely cut off North Korea.

China is overwhelmingly North Korea’s most important economic partner. Trade between the two countries has grown rapidly in recent years, providing a vital cash lifeline to the isolated, impoverished state.

But diplomatic relations between the two neighbours have suffered over the past year. Mr Kim has yet to visit China since taking power at the end of 2011 and has rebuffed Chinese entreaties to refrain from nuclear bomb and missile tests.

Concerned about the consequences for regional security and also angered by Mr Kim’s disregard for China, Beijing has started to use the financial sanctions to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea.

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China – China’s three biggest banks – said they had suspended all financial dealings with North Korea.

“CCB strictly adheres to all decisions taken by Chinese regulators and the UN Security Council,” CCB said. “At present, CCB has no business contact whatsoever with North Korean banks and all representative accounts [of North Korean] banks are closed.”

Bank of China, the country’s primary institution for foreign exchange transactions, said last week that it had closed the account of Foreign Trade Bank, North Korea’s main foreign exchange bank. However, asked whether it had also frozen other financial dealings with North Korea, Bank of China declined to comment.

Cai Jian, an expert on North Korea at Shanghai’s Fudan University, said it appeared to be the first time that Chinese banks had taken such co-ordinated action against Pyongyang.

“Previously even when China signed on to sanctions against North Korea, there was still a lot of economic activity between our two countries,” he said. “This time, I think, China’s banks received orders from the government to cut ties.”

Among China’s smaller banks, the picture is more mixed. A manager at the Bank of Dalian branch in Dandong on the border with North Korea said transfers to the country were still possible. “As long as the company is doing normal trade, not sensitive goods like arms, we can process the transfer,” he said.

China is estimated to account for nearly 90 per cent of North Korea’s overall exports and imports, but North Korea accounts for less than 0.2 per cent of China’s exports and imports. The bank sanctions threaten to undermine the financial architecture that keeps goods moving between the two countries.

Additional reporting by Emma Dong

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2013. You may share using our article tools.

A atividade bancaria e o Estado - Thorsten Polleit (Mises Daily)

Banking and the State
by Thorsten Polleit
Mises Daily, February 1, 2013

“It had come to be accepted that the pigs, who were manifestly cleverer than the other animals, should decide all questions of farm policy, though their decisions had to be ratified by a majority vote.”
Orwell, G. (1989 [1945]), Animal Farm, S. 34.

The Starting Point: Civilization Begins

The founder of the Medici banking dynasty, Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici (1360–1429), said to his children on his death bed: “Stay out of the public eye.”[1] His words raise the question, "How much do bankers know about the truth of modern money and banking?"

To develop a meaningful answer to this question in the tradition of the Austrian School of economics, one has to start right at the beginning, and that is with the process of civilization.

Civilization denotes the development through which man substitutes the state of the division of labor and specialization (that is, peaceful and productive cooperation) for the state of subsistence (that is, a violent hand-to-mouth existence).

In his magnum opus Human Action (1949), Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) put forward a praxeological explanation of the process of civilization, which helps us understand the course of its evolution.[2]

To Mises, two factors are at the heart of the process of civilization: (1) There must be an inequality of wants and skills among people. This is a necessary condition for people to want to seek cooperation.

(2) Man must recognize that higher productivity is possible through a division of labor. Mises thus assumes – as a necessary condition – a minimum intelligence among human beings and a willingness to use this intelligence in practical life.

Money Emerges – Carl Menger's Theory of the Origin of Money

The inequality of skills and wants, accompanied with the assumption of a minimum intelligence, leads people to engage in the division of labor and specialization. This, in turn, brings about the need for interpersonal exchange.

The primitive form of an exchange economy is barter. Barter has limitations, however. For instance, under barter, exchange opportunities depend on a double coincidence of wants.

Sooner or later, people (assuming a minimum of intelligence) will realize that using an indirect means of exchange is economically beneficial.

Using an indirect means of exchange increases the opportunities for exchange, as the double coincidence of wants is no longer a requisite for making trading possible.

The indirect means of exchange that becomes universally accepted is called "money."

In Principles of Economics (1871), Carl Menger (1840–1921) theorizes that money emerges spontaneously from market activities, and that free market money emerges out of a commodity (such as precious metals).[3]

Mises later showed with his regression theorem that this must indeed be so, for praxeological reasons: Money must have emerged out of a market; and it must have started out as a commodity.[4]

Money Warehousing

Money is an economic good like any other. As such, it will be economized, like any other good.

People will demand convenient ways of holding and exchanging their money proper.

With people differing in individual time preference, there will be savers (those who hold excess balances of money proper) and investors (those who demand money proper in excess of their actual holdings).[5]

It is against this backdrop that two kinds of money businesses would emerge in the free market: deposit banking (or money warehousing) and loan, or credit, banking.[6]

Deposit banking offers custodian, safeguarding and settlement services to holders of money proper. For instance, holders of money proper can deposit their commodity money with a deposit bank against receiving a money certificate (in the form of a banknote or a sight deposit).

Credit banks would refinance themselves by obtaining genuine savings, that is by issuing interest-bearing bonds. Savers will willingly exchange their money proper against such return-yielding bonds.

The market interest rate will be determined by the supply of and demand for money proper, and so the equilibrium market interest rate will reflect the societal time preference rate. In other words, In a free market, there will quite naturally be a profession which we may call “bankers”: some bankers will work in the money warehousing business (or deposit banking), some in credit banking.

To be sure: In a free market deposit banking and credit institutions will represent legally separate entities, and so we would have the deposit banker, and we would have the credit banker.

The Incentive for Aggression

In a free market, there are only three ways of acquiring property (that is, in a non-aggressive way): homesteading (which actually denotes the “first-user-first-owner principle”), production, and voluntary contracting.

In reality, however, things may be somewhat different.

Franz Oppenheimer pointed out that “There are two fundamentally opposed means whereby man, requiring sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying his desires. These are work and robbery, one's own labor and the forcible appropriation of the labor of others.” [7]

The logic of human action tells us that there is – in fact, there must be – for the individual an economic incentive to aggress against other peoples’ property. Two interrelated praxeological insights explain this.

First, we know for sure that an earlier satisfaction is preferred over a later satisfaction of wants; we also know for sure that a satisfaction of wants associated with low costs is preferred over a satisfaction of wants associated with high costs. In other words, individuals try to achieve their ends with as little input as possible and in the shortest period of time.

Second, the process to civilization does not extirpate man’s inclination to aggression. Individual A can be expected to aggress against B (that is against B’s property) if and when he gets away with it—that is, if the (expected) benefits for A from aggressing against B will be higher than the (expected) costs he has to bear by doing so.

It is the individual’s economic incentive to aggress against other peoples’ property that is at the heart of the emergence of what is typically called "government."

A government can be understood as a territorial monopolist of compulsion: an agency that engages in institutionalized property rights violations and the exploitation – in the form of expropriation, taxation, and regulation – of private property owners.[8]

To answer the question, "What do bankers know about the truth about money and banking?", it is necessary to take a closer look at the various forms of government.

To start with, one can make a distinction between governments with a low time preference and governments with high time preference.

At one end of the spectrum is, to borrow a criminal metaphor from Mancur L. Olson (1932–1998), the roving bandit.[9] The roving bandit represents a form of government that has a limited interest in the welfare of society and, as a result, his theft typically approaches 100 percent of society’s income.

The roving bandit does not have to share in the damage his aggression causes to society (in terms of lost income). The time preference of the roving bandit is therefore relatively high. He takes as much from his victims as possible, and there is next to no economic incentive to restrain his stealing.

At other end of the spectrum is the stationary bandit. Like the roving bandit, he also holds the monopoly of coercion over his victims.

However, the stationary bandit has an encompassing interest in society’s welfare. He wishes to keep his victims producing: the more his victims produce, the more there is to take for the stationary bandit.

Sharing in society’s losses, the stationary bandit will make sure that his thievery is limited. The higher the losses in production from thievery are, the lower will be the level of aggression at which the stationary bandit’s take is maximized. The stationary bandit’s time preference will therefore be lower than the time preference of the roving bandit.

Taking a closer look at the stationary bandit, one can make a distinction between private ownership of government (feudalism/monarchy) and public ownership of government (democratic-republicanism).[10]

The caretaker of a privately held government maximizes the present value of the total income which results from expropriating the property of the ruled.

A monarch, for instance, holds the monopoly of expropriation over his victims, and his time preference will be, due to his encompassing interest, relatively low.

In contrast, the caretaker of a publicly owned government will maximize his current income. His time preference will therefore be relatively high.

Public ownership of government means majority voting. The majority of the people decides about who will serve as the temporary caretaker of public ownership of government.

The average voter will support those politicians who are expected (rightly or wrongly) to improve the voter’s economic situation. A voter has every economic incentive to act in this way – irrespective of the fact that the income he may obtain in this way results from expropriating fellow citizens.

The caretaker of public ownership of government, in turn, has an incentive to secure the majority of the voters. He will favor policies of expropriating the (typically few) high income producers to the benefits of the (typically large group) of less productive or nonproductive people.

The important insight here is as follows: public ownership of government will lead to an ongoing erosion of the encompassing interest of the majority of the people in the market income of society, or in other words, society’s time preference will increase.

Government Brings Fraudulent Banking

The rise in society’s time preference is the central explanatory factor for explaining the emergence of fraudulent banking, which is epitomized by a pure fiat money regime.

We know that the caretakers of publicly owned government wish to expropriate resources from the public at large. This can be done most conveniently by (1) obtaining control over money production, (2) replacing commodity money with fiat money, and (3) producing money through credit expansion.

The banking industry and the bankers are therefore the natural ally for government’s planned thievery. In fact, those in government and the bankers will, and logically so, collude for establishing a pure fiat money system.

Bankers realize that they would earn additional revenue if and when they are allowed to issue new money balances through credit expansion (or ex nihilo): making loans beyond the amount of money proper available to them.

They understand that such fractional reserve banking is a fairly profitable undertaking to them, and so the deposit as well as the loan banker will be in favor of merging deposit banking with loan banking.

The temporary caretakers of publicly owned governments are very much in favor of fractional reserve banking, too. Being a first receiver of the new money, government can expropriate resources from the natural owners of things.

Having monopolized the law, it will be relatively easy for government to declare fractional reserve banking legal.

Engaging in fractional reserve banking, however, is risky for the banker. He knows that if and when his counterfeiting is detected, a bank run may ensue, and he would be forced out of business, or worse.

For government, bank failures are fairly undesirable, too. It would bring severe political and economic problems. Most important, defaulting banks endanger access to credit and money on easy terms.

Government will therefore, greatly supported by the bankers, set up a central bank, which will enable and greatly encourage all banks to inflate the quantity of money in a combined effort.

Even with a central bank in place, however, the risk of a bank run is not entirely eliminated. What is needed is for the central bank to have a monopoly over money production.

This is why sooner or later commodity money will be replaced by irredeemable paper, or fiat, money; and fiat money will be granted legal privileges (such as, for instance, legal tender status). To this end, government will make it legal for bankers to suspend the redeemability of outstanding money certificates into money proper.

Collective Corruption

One may wonder: How do government and bankers get away with this – that is fraudulently extracting resources from producers and contractors via issuing inflationary money?

Is it a lack of knowledge on the part of those who are on the losing end of the counterfeiting money regime? Or are the costs of revolting against a pure fiat money regime prohibitively high from the viewpoint of the individual?

An economically reasonable, that is praxeological, answer to this question can be found with (what I call) “collective corruption.” [11]

Once government intervenes in society’s (monetary) affairs, individuals will increasingly develop a disposition for violating other peoples’ property.

By taking advantage of governmental coercive action, an individual can reap the benefits from aggressing against the property of others, while he has to bear only a fraction of the damage his action does to society as a whole.

He has every incentive to act in this way; he would have to bear the losses of whatever opportunity for violating other’s private property he passes up.

A pure fiat money system, once it has set into motion, will lead to collective corruption on the presumably grandest scale.

As is well known, government can secure its support by letting the public at large (actually parts of it) share in the enjoyment of the receipts fraudulently extracted from natural owners of things.

For instance, government will offer reasonably-paid jobs (in particular for the intellectuals and second-hand dealer of ideas). It will also provide firms with public contracts (such as, for instance, for construction and building projects).

With growing government handouts, a growing number of people and businesses will become economically and socially dependent on the continuation (or even further expansion) of government activity.

Quite naturally, resistance against a further expansion of government and the fiat money regime – which necessarily means further violation of individuals’ property rights – will decline.

Clearly, bankers play an important role in spreading collective corruption. It may suffice here to say that a growing number of people will start investing their lifetime savings into fiat-denominated bank deposits and bonds.

Sooner or later people will develop a great interest in supporting government and upholding the fiat money regime – by whatever means deemed necessary.

It Will End in Hyperinflation

Collective corruption, once it has become sufficiently widespread, will lead to hyperinflation – meaning an accelerating increase in the quantity of money, leading to an erosion, or even a total destruction, of the purchasing power of fiat money.

Of course, those in government and bankers have a common interest in avoiding hyperinflation. They prefer a kind of inflation that goes on basically unnoticed, a form of inflation that won't spin out of control.

However, once collective corruption has become widespread and the banking and financial industry has become highly important in terms of financing government and serving as an important hoard for individuals' lifetime savings, the pendulum has already been swung toward hyperinflation.

From praxeology, we know for sure that a fiat money boom will ultimately end in depression. We also know that efforts to escape depression by increasing the quantity of fiat money even further will only postpone the day of reckoning, and that it will raise the costs of the depression in the future.

How will the majority of the people respond to an approaching depression? If and when people can expect to rank among the first receivers of the newly created money (which is actually the case once collective corruption has become sufficiently widespread), the answer appears to be obvious.

The majority of the people may expect to benefit from running the electronic printing press, and they will prefer the running of the electronic printing press over letting government and banks default. Under such an incentive structure the fiat money system would end up in hyperinflation.

In view of what has been said above we can conclude: (1) If and when public ownership of government takes hold, commodity money will be replaced by fiat money. (2) Fiat money leads to collective corruption on a grand scale. And (3), once collective corruption has become sufficiently widespread, the fiat money regime will be destroyed by hyperinflation.

From what has been said above it follows that we know that once a fiat money system has been put in place, banks and bankers have joined – some of them willingly and knowingly, some of them unknowingly – the vast criminal enterprise that is the state.

Being self-interested human beings, bankers can, and must, be expected to know a lot about money and banking. In view of a rather dismal monetary history, such a conclusion would also do much to explain Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici’s dying words to his children: “Stay out of the public eye.”

Thorsten Polleit is chief economist of the precious-metals firm Degussa Goldhandel GmbH. He is also an honorary professor at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. He is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and was awarded the 2012 O.P. Alford III Prize in Libertarian Scholarship. His website is www.Thorsten-Polleit.com. Send him mail. See Thorsten Polleit's article archives.

You can subscribe to future articles by Thorsten Polleit via this RSS feed.

Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.

Notes

* A similar version of this paper was held at the 7th annual meeting of the Property and Freedom Society on 29 September 2012 in Bodrum, Turkey.

[1] Parks, T. (2006), Medici Money, Banking, Metaphysics and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence, Profile Books Ltd, London, p. 3.

[2] "If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than isolated labor, and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact, human action itself tends toward cooperation and association; man becomes a social being not in sacrificing his own concerns for the sake of a mythical Moloch, society, but in aiming at an improvement in his own welfare. Experience teaches that this condition—higher productivity achieved under the division of labor—is present because its cause—the inborn inequality of men and the inequality in the geographical distribution of the natural factors of production—is real. Thus we are in a position to comprehend the course of social evolution.“ Mises, L. v. (1996), Human Action, 4th ed., p. 160-1.

[3] See Menger, C. (2007 [1871]), Principles of Economics, Chapter 8, pp. 257 – 285, esp. 261 – 262: “The origin of money … is, as we have seen, entirely natural and thus displays legislative influence only in the rarest instances. Money is not an invention of the state. It is not the product of a legislative act. Even the sanction of political authority is not necessary for its existence. Certain commodities came to be money quite naturally, as the result of economic relationships that were independent of the power of the state.”

[4] See Mises, L. v. (1996), Human Action, p. 408 – 410; Mises, L. v. (1953), The Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 97 – 123.

[5] On the issue of time preference see Mises, L. v. (1996), Human Action, 4th ed., pp. 483 –

490; also Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "On Time Preference, Government, and the Process of Decivilization", in: Democracy, The God That Failed, pp. 1 – 43.

[6] In this context see, for instance, Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "How is Fiat Money Possible? – or, The Devolution of Money and Credit", in: The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, 2nd ed., pp. 175 – 204.

[7] Oppenheimer, F. (1922), The State, p. 24.

[8] See, for instance, Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "On Monarchy, Democracy, and the Idea of Natural Order", in : Democracy, The God That Failed, p. 45; also Rothbard, M. N. (2002 [1973]), For a New Liberty, Chapter 3, "The State", pp. 45.

[9] See Olson, M. (2000), Power and Prosperity, Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, Basic Books, esp. pp. 1 – 24.

[10] In this context see Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "On Monarchy, Democracy, and the Idea of Natural Order", in: Democracy, The Gold That Failed, pp. 45 – 76, esp. 46 – 48. On democracy see Rothbard, M. N. (2004 [1970]), Power and Markets, Government and the Economy, 4th ed., Chapter 2, 2.B., pp. 19 – 21, and pp. 233 – 245.

[11] See Polleit, T. (2011), Fiat Money and Collective Corruption, in: The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 397 – 415.

Bancos brasileiros: ainda por cima da carne seca - The Economist

Brazilian banks

No more free lunch

As interest rates fall, spreads and profits are coming under pressure

The Economist, Oct 20th 2012 | São Paulo | from the print edition

ON OCTOBER 10th Brazil’s Central Bank cut its policy interest rate for the tenth time in just over a year, to 7.25%. The move surprised analysts, since rates were already historically low and inflation above the centre of the monetary-policy committee’s 2.5-6.5% target. Neither economic growth, likely to finish the year at an anaemic 1.5%, nor the currency, which tends to rise with rates as return-seeking foreign investors pile in, are supposed to play a part in its deliberations. But most analysts now believe that its decisions are taken with an eye to boosting growth and weakening the currency, and that unless inflation threatens to break the 6.5% barrier, rates will stay low for some time.
For now, subdued global demand means that inflation is unlikely to slip its leash. But in the longer term the government will have to rein in public spending and push through difficult reforms if it wants Brazil to grow faster than 3-4% a year without fuelling inflation. Recent moves to cut payroll taxes, limit public-sector pay rises, reduce energy costs and improve a woeful transport infrastructure should help to raise this distinctly modest economic speed limit. They have also convinced many that the president, Dilma Rousseff, will do whatever it takes to save the bank from having to hike again.

In this section

• Pray as you go
• The real deal
• Remembrance of things fast
• Turning from green to red
• Proof of life
• On His Holiness’s public service
• An isolated carcass
• »No more free lunch
• Game, set and match

Reprints

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Related topics

• Business
• Brazilian Economy
• Latin American economy
• Economies
• Brazil

Permanently lower interest rates would be the most positive economic development in Brazil since hyperinflation was vanquished almost 20 years ago, says Enestor dos Santos of BBVA, a Spanish bank active in the region. Firms would invest more—and making a decent return would mean funding productive projects, not just parking cash in government bonds.
Returns to lender
But some industries will see profits fall. When investors realised that electricity firms would have to accept much lower returns from early next year, or else be ineligible to rebid for concessions that run out between 2015 and 2017, share prices slumped. Masha Gordon of PIMCO, a fund manager, praises the government for blocking its ears to vested interests and calling time on Brazil’s “free lunch”. Toll-road and energy concessionaires who signed deals when rates were much higher benefited hugely as they fell, she points out, leaving some low-risk projects earning real returns approaching 20%. That could hardly be expected to last.

But it is banks that will have to do most to adapt to Brazil’s new low-interest environment, says Ms Gordon. Their net interest margins have been falling for years as the rates they charge on loans fall in line with the policy rate, and the room to cut the rates they offer on deposits reduces. That has eaten into returns (see chart). The pressure on profits has built recently as the government has pushed banks to pass on lower rates to customers, faster.
The two big state-controlled banks, Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco do Brasil, have slashed rates at the government’s behest. Private banks have had to follow suit or lose market share. According to Anefac, an accountants’ trade body, the average rate paid by Brazilian retail borrowers in September fell below 100% for the first time. Rates for business loans are also at an all-time low—48% a year.
By Brazilian standards such rates may be low; by international ones, they are eye-watering. The biggest reason, says Sergio Furio of bankFacil, a start-up that offers consumer-finance information online, is the inefficiency of Brazilian banks. Although their revenues per employee are broadly in line with other large economies, their low productivity is masked by very high prices. They need twice as many staff to generate the same volumes as banks in Europe or America, he points out—but are still profitable because margins are two or three times as high, too.
“Brazilian banks have been relying on the last gasp of outrageous interest rates,” says Mr Furio. Instead they should be trying to become more efficient and to attract a better class of customer. High-cost loans put off numerate, well-heeled types who could be relied on to repay them. That adverse selection means rates must be pushed up even higher to cover frequent defaults. BankFacil hopes to make money by breaking this cycle, referring newly educated, creditworthy users to financial institutions which can then charge them less.
The highest interest rates of all are on credit cards, which in Brazil are mostly used to buy goods in “interest-free” instalments. Retailers offer self-financed payment plans over up to 18 months. They hide their own financing costs inside the sticker price and only request payment from the customer’s card issuer month by month. Banks make little money from this peculiar “credit on credit”, which makes up 70% of total credit-card loans in Brazil. Only when a cardholder misses a payment does the card issuer finally get to charge interest. But the chance of default among such late payers is a hefty 28%, meaning rates must be astronomical if banks are to make a profit at all.
Last month Itaú Unibanco, Brazil’s largest privately controlled bank, let it be known that it would like to put an end to credit cards being used this way. But the government worries that Brazilian consumers are so used to paying for everything from clothes to white goods to cars in supposedly interest-free instalments that they might then stop spending altogether, nipping a nascent recovery in the bud. Any move will have to be gradual.
The good news is that Brazilian banks have lots of fat to cut before they reach the bone. They have also acquired plenty of new customers during the past decade, says Franklin Santarelli of Fitch Ratings, an expensive process that should reap rewards during the next one. Brazil is “just moving into the mainstream,” says Ceres Lisboa of Moody’s, another ratings agency. Its banks, like those elsewhere, have to work out how to make money with lower margins and higher volumes.

Uruguai: um paraíso financeiro? - Bob Bauman (Sovereign Investor)

Os EUA estão "apertando" -- para usar um termo moderado -- a Suíça, em razão de suas regras laxistas em matéria fiscal e tributária e, sobretudo, por causa de seu regime bancário, baseado no segredo bancário e no anonimato das contas individuais dos estrangeiros. Ou seja, a Suíça já não é mais o que era...
Os investidores americanos se voltam, assim para o Uruguai, um recurso já conhecido de evasores argentinos, brasileiros e vários outros na região, com muitas facilidades financeiras e total segredo de valores e transações envolvidas.
A matéria abaixo, de um consultor que quer uma comissão sobre o seu dinheiro, pretende ensinar os americanos a recorrer aos bancos uruguaios, em lugar dos suíços. Sorte deles...
 Paulo Roberto de Almeida

As Swiss Banks Close Their Doors, Look to Uruguay
By Bob Bauman JD, Offshore and Asset Protection Editor

The “Switzerland of Latin America” – that’s the phrase I used six months ago when I wrote to you from Punta del Este, Uruguay. I was referring to the delightful South American country I was visiting for the first time.

But that catchy phrase was not mine: 61 years ago, in the shattered wake of World War II, Uruguay was described as the "Switzerland of the Americas" in a 1951 New York Times article.

Uruguay earned that unusual name because of its popularity as a safe haven for capital and precious metals fleeing Europe at the time, and for its adoption of careful, Swiss-inspired banking laws and customs.

When I wrote about Uruguay back in March, I got some serious grief from good friends in Switzerland, claiming I had abandoned their country, which I had always called the world’s leading offshore financial center. Well, my friends, I still say that … but Switzerland and the Swiss have got some major problems of their own making – and anyone planning personal financial activities has to keep them in mind.

Money Taking Flight

In the three years since the tawdry UBS-American tax evasion scandal was exposed, Swiss government politicians have tried to shield UBS and other threatened Swiss banks by capitulating to U.S. IRS pressures, too often at the expense of American clients. Thousands of U.S. names have been turned over to the IRS.

In effect, this has all but repealed the 1934 Bank Secrecy Law, ironically even as Swiss courts have upheld that law. As a self-serving byproduct of this, thousands of innocent Americans with Swiss bank accounts suddenly found themselves dumped in a wave of unjustified financial ethnic cleansing by nervous Swiss banks.

The truth is, there are still very solid Swiss banks that do welcome American clients. We know who they are, and we can arrange accounts with very little trouble for our Sovereign Society members.

But Swiss banking experts themselves openly now say that Swiss banks must lure affluent clients from emerging markets or face a slow death as the pursuit of tax dodgers by the U.S. IRS and European tax-collection hounds results in more fleeing assets.

Western Europeans may pull as much as US$139 billion, or 15% of their holdings, from Swiss banks, claims Herbert Hensle of Cap Gemini SA. Bank Sarasin & Cie AG reported last week that private clients withdrew US$308 billion from Swiss locations in the 12 months leading up to June 2012.

Switzerland built the world’s biggest offshore wealth center during an era of “black money” that ended when the U.S. sued UBS three years ago. Many of the highest fee-generating European and U.S. customers are withdrawing funds as the hunt for tax evaders widens.

As many as 100 Swiss banks will vanish, according to Vontobel Chief Executive Officer Zeno Staub. (Vontobel is one of the cooperative Swiss banks with which we work).

Solid and Confidential

By comparison, Uruguay’s banking system is solid, appealing to investors and depositors from around the world who seek a safe haven that also offers tax advantages. Since January 1, 2008, almost 400 banks have failed in the United States … meanwhile, Uruguay’s banks have operated without problems. While the U.S. GDP has shrunk, Uruguay’s continues to grow.

Unlike too many other offshore banks around the world, banks in Uruguay welcome American clients. Most banks offer e-banking, but a personal visit is required to open an account.

Uruguay’s financial reputation has made it an important regional financial center for all Latin America. There are 11 private banks, plus the government central bank, Banco de la República (BROU), that strictly supervises all banks in the country.

The private banks are totally or partially owned by leading American or European financial institutions. Banco Itaú and Lloyds TSB in Montevideo usually accept non-resident American clients in their retail banking branches. In addition, attesting to its regional banking role, there are over 30 representative offices of foreign banks.

Financial Privacy Guaranteed By Law

Unlike the United States, where the PATRIOT Act has destroyed financial privacy, Uruguay’s protection is based on a bank secrecy statute (Law #15,322, 1982) that forbids banks to share information with anyone – including the government of Uruguay and foreign governments.

The only exceptions allowed are in cases involving issues of alimony, child support, or alleged crimes such as foreign tax evasion and fraud. Even then, information can be shared only after obtaining a local court order.

The country does not automatically exchange tax or bank account information with the U.S., Canada or any other government. Uruguay does comply with Article 26 of the Organization for Economic and Community Development’s (OECD) model standards for tax information exchange requests. That is, banks may exchange information upon proof of foreign tax evasion or tax fraud.

In keeping with current international “political correctness,” Uruguay’s government does not want the country labeled as a “tax haven.” Nevertheless, Uruguay is, in fact, an offshore tax haven that imposes very few taxes on foreign residents living here.

Banco chines autorizado a operar no Brasil

Fazem mais de dez anos que um banco estrangeiro não é autorizado a operar no Brasil: os últimos foram os espanhóis, me parece, em meados e no final da década de 90, para participar dos processos de privatização dos bancos estaduais falidos.
Que o processo tenha sido retomado agora, com um banco chinês, é emblemático do estado das relações bilaterais.
Mas, fica a pergunta: por que nenhum outro banco ocidental foi autorizado a funcionar no Brasil desde os último dez ou quinze anos?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasil autoriza al banco chino ICBC a operar en el país

Infolatam Efe

El Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), considerada la mayor institución financiera de ese país, podrá comenzar operar en Brasil, de acuerdo con una decisión del Gobierno brasileño publicada hoy en el Diario Oficial.
“Es de interés del Gobierno brasileño la participación extranjera de un cien por ciento en el capital social del banco múltiple a ser constituido por el Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited”, indica la publicación.
La necesaria autorización del Gobierno brasileño consta en un decreto firmado por la presidenta Dilma Rousseff, el ministro de Hacienda, Guido Mantega, y el titular del Banco Central, Alexandre Tombini, que fue publicado en el Diario Oficial.
El ICBC, que también se propone operar en Perú, anunció la semana pasada que comprará participaciones en la filial del Standard Bank Group en Argentina y en otras dos empresas de esa firma en el país, en el marco de una estrategia de expansión global que tiene a América Latina entre sus principales intereses.
La institución ha anunciado la apertura este mismo año de dos grandes centros de gestión en Europa y América del Norte, para atender a las empresas chinas que operan en esas regiones.
Según cálculos del mercado internacional, actualmente el ICBC es el mayor prestamista del mundo en términos de valor de activos. EFE

BC da Argentina quer controlar envio de lucros - Ja comecou o desespero com deficit em transacoes correntes?

A Argentina, brilhante exemplo, para os companheiros, de país que de um "calote bem merecido" nos especuladores estrangeiros, encontra-se, como se sabe, há mais de dez anos à margem dos mercados internacionais de capitais, sem possibilidade de fazer grandes operações comerciais, inclusive porque tem pendências não resolvidas com dezenas de empresas e centenas de particulares em função de moratória unilateral e diversas outras patifarias econômicas.
Ela cresceu, é verdade, assim como se pode crescer cometendo diversas bobagens econômicas, que acabam acumulando distorções e desajustes que um dia vão cobrar o seu preço. Por exemplo: fuga de capitais. Nenhum argentino, nenhuma empresa -- nacional ou estrangeira -- confia no governo, por isso, legal e ilegalmente vêm remetendo um volume inacreditável de dinheiro para o exterior.
As reservas do país -- extremamente beneficiadas com a alta das commodities exportadas pelos argentinos  -- começam a se exaurir, e o governo quer manter os dólares no país, pois tem necessidade deles.
Não existe volatilidade internacional, ou ela é a que sempre foi, com capitais circulando de um lado a outro, em busca de oportunidades de ganhos, o que sempre se fez e sempre se fará.
A volatilidade, no caso, é interna, é a de políticas econômicas inconstantes, erráticas e contraditórias, que visam objetivos diversos, até opostos, aos que são expressamente declarados pelos governos, mentirosos como sempre, todos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

BC da Argentina quer controlar envio de lucros

DCI, 30/01/2012
A diretoria do Banco Central da República Argentina (BCRA) decidiu impor um limite à distribuição de lucros dos bancos com o objetivo de evitar a saída de dólares do país epreservar o nível de suas reservas. Em comunicado distribuído na última semana, o BC disse que a medida consiste em ampliar de 30% a 75%, a partir de quarta-feira, o requisito adicional de capital que as instituições financeiras devem cumprir depois de distribuir seus dividendos. O propósito da nova norma, segundo o órgão regulador da Argentina, "é fortalecer os padrões de solvência e liquidez do sistema financeiro diante de um contexto internacional de alta volatilidade"

A decisão da autoridade monetária argentina foi tomada apenas duas semanas depois da publicação dos resultados anuais dos bancos, nos quais definiram o pagamento de dividendos aos seus acionistas. Segundo fontes oficiais do Banco Central, a medida pretende impedir que os bancos estrangeiros enviem dólares ao exterior, como fizeram nos últimos anos. No ano passado, segundo informação do Instituto de Mercado de Capitais (IAMC), somente os espanhóis BBVA e Santander enviaram mais de US$ 1,6 bilhão ao exterior.

Em momentos de saída de dólares das instituições financeiras e de pressão no mercado de câmbio, o objetivo do governo é manter mais dólares no país. "Quanto mais dólares tiver o banco, mais disponibilidade de crédito terá", disse a fonte.