Estado, governo, partidos e Itamaraty: quão juntos ou quão separados? - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Estado, governo, partidos e Itamaraty: juntos, separados, divididos?

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Nota sobre a “osmose” entre o serviço diplomático e o governo e seus partidos de apoio, distinguindo a intromissão do PT e do bolsonarismo na política externa, de maneira ideológica e personalista.

Brasília, 1 de agosto de 2024

 

Dá para separar o governo do seu partido suporte e ambos da política do Itamaraty? Com base em minha experiência de 44 anos de diplomacia, desde a ditadura até Bolsonaro, posso afirmar que sob o lulopetismo isso é impossível, como também o foi no bolsolavismo diplomático. Segui de dentro as nuances e matizes da diplomacia em cada governo e já escrevi muito sobre isso, a mais recente neste livro: Apogeu e Demolição da Política Externa (2021).Transcrevo, in fine, o índice desse livro, que contém vários capítulos que podem demonstrar amplamente a contaminação da política externa e da própria diplomacia por governos ideológicos e sectários, como o foram Lula 1 e 2, Dilma (mas parcialmente, por total incompetência dela em assuntos externos), Bolsonaro (mais Ernesto Araujo do que Carlos França) e agora Lula 3. Mas tratarei de algumas questões de como isso se faz.

Já em 2006, portanto ainda na vigência do primeiro governo Lula – e eu estive afastado, por razões políticas, de qualquer cargo na Secretaria de Estado, durante os TREZE ANOS E MEIO dos governos petistas –, eu já me permiti fazer uma primeira reflexão sobre a questão chave desta nota: como separar, ou quão juntos estão, os papeis respectivos do corpo profissional da diplomacia das injunções, pressões, determinações do governo de ocasião, que acaba sendo o decisor máximo, em nome do Estado, pelas posturas assumidas pela diplomacia profissional no plano internacional (em alguns casos até deformando posições tradicionais de Estado), sem deixar de lado eventuais pressões partidárias sobre essas políticas, e que foram muito mais intensas sob o lulopetismo. O bolsonarismo (que ainda não existia quando escrevi essa reflexão) não tinha partido, só amadores incultos e despreparados para assuntos internacionais, inclusive o seu guru principal, Olavo de Carvalho. Este é o trabalho feito naquela ocasião: 

1693. “Uma reflexão pessoal sobre as relações entre Estado e governo (que também pode ser lida como uma declaração de princípios)”, Brasília, 2 dezembro 2006, 3 p. Sobre os dilemas do funcionário público em face de governos partidários. Publicado no Via Política (Porto Alegre, 3.12.06). Remanejado sob o título “O Estado, o Governo e o burocrata: alguns dilemas do serviço público” e publicado no site do Instituto Millenium (26.12.2006). Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (28/05/2011; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2011/05/uma-reflexao-pessoal-sobre-as-relacoes.html). Incorporado ao volume Via Política (uma coletânea de artigos nesse blog político, publicado em formato Kindle em 2017). Relação de Publicados ns. 724 e 735.

 (...)

Ler a íntegra nest link: 

https://www.academia.edu/122508445/4715_Estado_governo_partidos_e_Itamaraty_juntos_separados_divididos_2024_

Sobre a eterna questão dos papéis respectivos do Estado e dos mercados na dinâmica social - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Seis anos atrás, questionamentos de alunos e debates nas redes sociais me levaram a redigir pequena nota sobre a eterna questão dos papéis respectivos do Estado e dos mercados na dinâmica social.

=============

8 de janeiro de 2017:

Algumas postagens, iniciadas ou não por mim, acabam criando vida própria, e se prolongam em discussões paralelas, altamente interessantes. Uma dessas discussões, recorrente (mesmo em aulas que dou), é a suposta oposição, ou equação binária, entre ESTADO e MERCADOS, com todas as consequências que podemos imaginar para a definição de políticas públicas. 

Por isso mesmo redigi um comentário numa dessas postagens, que transcrevo abaixo, pois pretende acabar com essa identidade que NÃO EXISTE, mercados de um lado, Estado de outro.

Percebo, mesmo entre certos "liberais", uma incompreensão muito grande sobre o que seja o Estado e o que sejam os mercados, geralmente colocando-os num mesmo patamar de intervenção teórica sobre a realidade, quando são duas coisas muito diferentes, ainda que aparentemente situadas numa mesma equação (mas isso é racionalização teórica). 

Economia de mercado é o que existe, naturalmente, em suas diversas formas, inclusive essa fração superior, mais sofisticada, que é o capitalismo. Sociedades desenvolvem naturalmente os mercados, pois esta é a tendência natural dos cidadãos, a divisão do trabalho e os intercâmbios. 

Estados são construções sociais, contratos coletivos, com todas as suas falhas. Governantes, ou seja, os que ocupam temporariamente o Estado, pretendem atuar como demiurgos, controlando essas relações de intercâmbio entre os agentes econômicos, e com isso podem deformar instituições que de toda forma se submetem ao direito, à força, à demagogia, a todo tipo de influência. 

Gostaria que as pessoas não falassem dos mercados como se fossem coisas controláveis pelas mãos do homens. Não, não são, e as tentativas nesse sentido acabam sempre redundando em menor eficiência dos mercados, ou em fenômenos tais como contrabando, mercado negro, elisão e evasão fiscal, etc.

Concluo dizendo que uma sociedade de mercados livres será sempre, sempre, SEM EXCEÇÕES, infinitamente superior a uma sociedade controlada pelo Estado, qualquer Estado, mesmo o mais democrático, o que geralmente não é o caso, por uma razão muito simples. 

A lógica de funcionamento dos mercados é totalmente oposta à lógica de funcionamento do Estado. Este costuma ser mais eficiente concentrando poder, monopolizando várias esferas da vida cidadã, e tentando fazer com que todos se comportem de maneira "adequada", seja lá o que isso queira dizer. A lógica dos mercados não é a concentração, e sim a atomização, a dispersão de iniciativas, a fragmentação de ofertas, a total multiplicidade de vontades, enfim, a famosa "mão invisível" de Adam Smith.

Por isso mesmo, mercados livres sempre vão produzir uma melhor situação de bem estar do que um Estado aparentemente ordenado. 

E a concentração econômica? Ela existe (monopólios, cartéis, etc.), mas não é feita pelos mercados, e só pode existir com a mão visível do Estado, como resultado de um complô entre capitalistas e príncipes. Ponto!

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Mini-reflexão sobre essa dicotomia mercados-Estado (ou interesses individuais e coletivos) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mini-reflexão sobre essa dicotomia mercados-Estado (ou interesses individuais e coletivos)

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Volta e meia, dando meias voltas nas redes sociais, eu me deparo com essas críticas furibundas à “ditadura dos mercados”, à ideologia “neoliberal”, às desigualdades e à concentração de renda que seriam “típicas”, ou “inerentes” ao capitalismo desumano, que seria contrário aos valores “verdadeiramente humanos” da solidariedade, da fraternidade, da própria humanidade, ao privilegiar os interesses puramente materiais de acumulação de riquezas, de lucro individual, de ambições mesquinhas e egoistas. 

Não é só em determinadas academias — as faculdades de Humanidades — que se usa, e se ousa, tal tipo de retórica: até o Papa Francisco, um homem profundamente piedoso, integralmente bom, preocupado com a situação dos mais humildes, exibe esse tipo de preocupação.

Pois eu pergunto: quem são os “adoradores do Deus mercado”? Apenas os endinheirados, os donos do capital? Todos os demais acreditam em quem? Nos detratores do mercados? Nos “adoradores do Estado”? 

Quando se é maniqueísta se chega a esse tipo de pensamento binário. 

Mas o mundo se reduz a isso? 

Acredito que exista muita pobreza de pensamento ao se raciocinar de modo simplisticamente binário. 

Mercados são formados por indivíduos e não existem fora das fugazes interações que se estabelecem entre eles.

As condições sob as quais indivíduos entram e saem dos mercados são determinadas por um determinado estoque de realizações (patrimônio) e de conhecimento, que só existem socialmente, mas que podem ser mudados no plano individual, pela força da vontade, pela necessidade, pelo tino individual. 

Liberdade é essencial na realização de determinados objetivos individuais e sociais. Sociedades defensoras e promotoras de liberdades são em geral mais prósperas e mais felizes.

Acredito que se deva valorizar a liberdade humana. Acredito, também, que ela se encontra mais do lado dos mercados do que do lado da administração central, ou Estado.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 23/02/2021

Mistura de religião com política, fazendo do Estado laico um Estado religioso: O Itamaraty degrada o sentido do Estado (Revista Forum)

 Em conferência religiosa, Ernesto Araújo diz que “politicamente correto” é tão grave “quanto a violência física”

Sem citar dados, ministro das Relações Exteriores falou em "cristofobia", acusou Maduro de perseguir cristãos e afirmou que o materialismo "não é compatível com sociedades livres"
Marcelo Hailer 

Revista Fórum, 19 nov 2020 - 10:30

O ministro das Relações Exteriores, Ernesto Araujo, participou esta semana do encontro da International Religious Freedom of Belief Alliance (em português, Aliança para a Liberdade de Religião ou Crença) e, sem apresentar dados e fontes, afirmou que “oito cristãos são mortos por dia no mundo” e que são a parcela religiosa mais perseguida.

Araújo falou a respeito de perseguição contra as minorias religiosas e que estas são “oprimidas em todo o mundo”, mas, em momento algum falou sobre os ataques contra as religiões de matriz afro dentro do Brasil. “Nenhuma fé está a salvo da intolerância e da perseguição e os cristão estão entre suas principais vítimas”, declarou Araújo.

Ao misturar a concepção de Estado e democracia com fé, o ministro afirmou que “a liberdade religiosa não é algo que a sociedade democrática deveria apenas tolerar, como se a religião fosse apenas um corpo estranho. Religião, fé e vida espiritual devem ser consideradas fundamentais para a democracia”.

Também fez ataque a outras concepções de mundo, como a materialista, ao dizer que esta é incompatível com a liberdade. “As pessoas só podem ser livres na medida em que preservam a dimensão espiritual interior. O materialismo não é compatível com sociedades livres. A concepção materialista do mundo e da vida encerra o ser humano em uma prisão de impulso e satisfação sem nenhuma aspiração mais elevada, tornando-o presa fácil dos ditames políticos do momento”, criticou o ministro.

Para Araújo, apenas a comunicação com Deus pode livrar as pessoas da opressão. “Somente se puder se comunicar com o que está acima e além, o ser humano poderá escapar do ciclo de controle e opressão”, disse.

Na sua fala, Araújo afirma que o presidente Bolsonaro defende “ativamente a liberdade religiosa no Brasil e no exterior”. Destacou, como uma das ações de Bolsonaro, em defesa da liberdade religiosa, de que os cultos religiosos não fossem interrompidos durante o lockdown, método realizado no mundo para evitar a propagação do coronavírus.

Ao dizer que o governo brasileiro defende a liberdade das religiões, o ministro disse que “ao mesmo tempo, também reconhecemos nossa fé religiosa predominante, o cristianismo como fundamento e pilar de nossa identidade nacional”. Além disso, Araújo resgatou a fala de Bolsonaro na abertura da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, de que é preciso uma aliança internacional para “combater a cristofobia”.

Novamente, sem citar fontes, o ministro volta a dizer que os cristãos são perseguidos e que enfrentam “dificuldades e desafio para expressar sua fé e viver e e praticar suas religiões no mundo de hoje”. E, como é de praxe do ministro, voltou a atacar “a cultura dominante” e o “politicamente correto”.

“A cultura dominante, formada em torno do politicamente correto, não reconhece o devido lugar da religião e da dimensão espiritual na vida humana. Ela trata a fé com desprezo e hostilidade. Isso talvez não seja menos sério do que a violência física e a perseguição. É mais sutil e pernicioso do que a violência porque deslegitima a fé nas mentes das pessoas”, analisou.

O ministro também aproveitou a sua fala para atacar o governo de Nicolás Maduro. “Na Venezuela, os crimes de Maduro contra a humanidade não poupam os fiéis. Cardeais denunciaram seu uso de leis anti-ódio para processar católicos que se manifestaram contra ele”, criticou.

Ao término de seu discurso, o ministro Ernesto Araújo anuncia que o Brasil vai sediar, em 2021, A Reunião Ministerial para a Promoção da Liberdade de Religião ou Crença e o Fórum de Ministros da Aliança Internacional para a Liberdade de Religião ou Crença.

Abaixo, confira a fala do ministro na íntegra (vídeos)

https://revistaforum.com.br/noticias/em-conferencia-religiosa-ernesto-araujo-diz-que-politicamente-correto-e-tao-grave-quanto-a-violencia-fisica/

Aumento o peso do Estado nas economias - The Economist

Building up the pillars of state
Rich countries try radical economic policies to counter Covid-19

History suggests that the effects will be permanent

The Economist, March 26, 2020

Editor’s note: The Economist is making some of its most important coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic freely available to readers of  The Economist Today, our daily newsletter. To receive it, register here. For more coverage, see our coronavirus hub

“The government intervention is not a government takeover,” the American president argued. “Its purpose is not to weaken the free market. It is to preserve the free market.” The imf pointed to the “unprecedented policy actions undertaken by central banks and governments worldwide”. The economic response to the financial meltdown of 2007-09 was big enough. But in answer to the Covid-19 pandemic policymakers are launching even bigger, more radical interventions. Putting the economy on a wartime footing is supposed to be temporary. A look at 500 years of governmental power, however, suggests another outcome: the state is likely to play a very different role in the economy—not just during the crisis, but long after.

The policy response has been swift and decisive. Globally central banks have cut interest rates by more than 0.5 percentage points since January and have launched huge new quantitative-easing schemes (creating money to buy bonds). Politicians are throwing open the fiscal spigots to support the economy. As The Economist went to press, America’s Congress was set to pass a bill that boosts spending by twice as much as President Barack Obama’s package in 2009 (see article). On top of that, Britain, France and other countries have made credit guarantees worth as much as 15% of GDP, seeking to prevent a cascade of defaults. On the most conservative measure, the global stimulus from government spending this year will exceed 2% of global GDP, a much bigger push than was seen in 2007-09 (see chart 1). Even Germany, whose fiscal rectitude is the punchline of economists’ jokes, is spending more (see article).

The upshot is that the state is swelling. Last year overall government spending accounted for 38% of GDP across the rich world. The stimulus effort, combined with a fall in nominal GDP in the next few months, will push that ratio well above 40%, perhaps to its highest-ever level.

To focus just on the numbers misses something crucial, though. There are important qualitative changes under way in how policymakers manage the economy—the responsibilities they have seized for themselves, what is seen as a legitimate action and what is not, and the criteria used to judge policy success or failure. On these measures, the world is in the early stages of a revolution in economic policymaking.

Central banks have in effect pledged to print as much money as necessary to keep down government-borrowing costs. The European Central Bank is promising more or less to buy everything that governments might issue; this should reduce the gap in borrowing costs between weaker and stronger euro-zone members, which widened in the early days of the pandemic. On March 23rd America’s Federal Reserve promised to buy unlimited quantities of Treasury bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities, if necessary. The rise in borrowing caused by America’s stimulus may be matched, at least initially, by bond purchases by the Fed, which smells a lot like money-printing to finance deficits. The central bank also announced new programmes to support the flow of credit to companies and consumers. The Fed is now the direct lender of last resort to the real economy, not just the financial system.

Politicians, too, are ripping up the rulebook. In a standard recession firms are allowed to go bust and people to become unemployed. Even in normal economic times, roughly 8% of businesses in OECD countries go under each year, while 10% or so of the workforce lose a job. Now governments hope to stop this from happening entirely. President Emmanuel Macron does not speak only for France when he vows that no firm will “face the risk of bankruptcy” as a result of the pandemic. Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister, contrasts his government’s response with the one during the last financial crisis: “everybody said we bailed out the banks and we didn’t look after the people who really suffered”. Larry Kudlow, the director of America’s National Economic Council, calls America’s fiscal stimulus “the single largest Main Street assistance programme in the history of the United States”, comparing it favourably with Wall Street bail-outs a decade ago.

To that end, governments across the rich world are channelling vast sums to firms, providing them with grants and cheap loans in an attempt to preserve jobs and prevent them from going bust. In some cases the government is paying the wages of people who cannot work safely: the eu in particular has embraced this policy, while the British state will pay up to 80% of the wages of furloughed workers. The American package includes loans to small businesses that will be forgiven if workers are not laid off. Households across the rich world are being given temporary relief on mortgages, other debts, rent and utility bills. In America people will also be sent cheques worth up to $1,200.

The vast majority of economists support these measures. Nominally they are temporary, designed to hold the economy in an induced coma until the pandemic passes, at which point the world is supposed to revert to the status quo ante. But history suggests that a return to pre-covid days is unlikely. Two lessons stand out. The first is that governmental control over the economy takes a large step up during periods of crisis—and in particular war. The second is that the forces encouraging governments to retain and expand economic control are stronger than the forces encouraging them to relinquish it, meaning that a “temporary” expansion of state power tends to become permanent.

The sinews of power

In recent centuries government spending across the capitalist world has leapt. In the 1600s the outlays of the entire English state accounted for about 5% of gdp, with practically no spending on public health or education, nor much regulation of economic life, save for crude contract enforcement (see chart 2). That began to change in the 18th century, and from the end of the 19th century Britain and other capitalist countries saw increased state intervention, with more government resources being devoted to public goods such as welfare and education and commensurate increases in taxes (see chart 3).

Governments have had some lean periods. In Victorian Britain state spending fell as a share of gdp—though that was largely because economic growth was so rapid, and the measure in chart 2 excludes spending by local governments, which became exceptionally powerful over the period. In the 1980s Ronald Reagan succeeded in stabilising America’s day-to-day federal spending. His reforms, as well as those of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, reduced the role of government in fixing prices; privatisations encouraged profit-making firms to provide formerly state-run services such as power and transport. Yet even during Reagan’s presidency the number of pages of federal regulations rose by 14%.

A back-of-the-envelope calculation finds that, of the more than 50 countries for which there are long-run fiscal data, two-thirds saw their government-spending-to-gdp ratio increase between 1988 and 2018. America’s ratio of day-to-day public spending to gdp is eight percentage points higher than it was in 1962, when Milton Friedman wrote “Capitalism and Freedom”, a book which warned of the dangers of socialism.

Historians argue over why the public sector has a tendency to expand. In the 19th century Adolph Wagner, a German economist, suggested that as places got richer, demands on government grew. An increasingly complex production process needed more regulation and contractual enforcement. Wealthier people would also demand more public welfare provision, the theory goes, perhaps because they worried less about their own material situation and could thus turn their attention to others.

Wagner’s theories also pointed to what economists call “hysteresis” in fiscal policy. Governments may intend to boost spending only for a short while. But then expectations change, making such expansionism hard to undo. It is now common sense that the state should provide education to children at no cost to parents, or support people who are out of work. American governments have in recent decades cut the share of public spending devoted to welfare. However, it remains politically impossible to bring it down to anywhere near its level in the mid-1960s, before President Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty” was launched. The upshot is that while it is easy to ratchet state spending up, it is much harder to push it down.

Perhaps the most important lesson of 500 years of history, however, is that nothing has helped boost state power in Europe and America more than crises. Historians broadly agree that the growing fiscal capacity of capitalist countries from the 1700s onwards was linked to the need to fight increasingly sprawling and expensive wars, especially those using navies and where the field of battle was far from home. (The Seven Years War of 1756-63 is widely considered to be the first global war because it involved a large number of countries, often fighting in foreign theatres.)

To win, countries required increasingly complex, well-resourced administrations which could supply fighters with weapons that worked and food that had not rotted. They also needed the money to pay for it, whether by levying more taxes or by becoming a reliable borrower in markets—which called for yet more bureaucracy. Growing state capacity, in turn, allowed for the emergence of the capitalism we know today, with properly regulated markets, efficient telecoms and transport, and healthy and educated citizens.

The winners of those wars also seized control of resources, from sugar and spices to linens, which proved integral to industrialisation. So it is no surprise that historians contend that wars and other crises have been an engine of economic development. It is no coincidence that the Netherlands, the first country to embrace capitalism, in the 17th century, was also at the time the world’s pre-eminent naval power, fighting and winning numerous wars over the period; or that Britain, which came to dominate the seas in the 18th century, then became the world’s largest economy. According to Larry Neal of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the Industrial Revolution “occurred precisely during and because of the Napoleonic wars” of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

The responses to crises since then have further consolidated the power of the state. France’s top rate of income tax was zero in 1914; a year after the end of the first world war it was 50%. Canada introduced income tax in 1917 as a “temporary” measure to finance the war. During the second world war income tax in America turned from a “class tax” to a “mass tax”, with the number of payers rising from 7m in 1940 to 42m in 1945 (today more than twice as many Americans are caught in the net). The second world war also led to calls for the introduction of cradle-to-grave welfare systems. So did the dynamics of the cold war: governments across the capitalist world wanted to forestall a communist rebellion. The state-led model pursued in Europe from the 1950s to the 1970s, in which bureaucrats controlled services from power networks to transport systems, would have been unimaginable without wartime experience, where the state managed practically everything and ordinary people made tremendous sacrifices, whether on the battlefield or at home.

The new ideology

What will be the lasting effects of the covid-19 pandemic? Start with the size of the state. Over the next year government debt will rise sharply, as spending jumps and tax revenues collapse. When the economy recovers, attention will turn to paying it down. “Capital and Ideology”, a new book by Thomas Piketty, a French economist, shows that after the first and second world wars many governments in the West turned to heavier taxation of the incomes and wealth of the richest to achieve that goal. Another option is “financial repression”, where governments force citizens to lend to them at below-market rates (see article).

Central banks’ innovations will also have lasting consequences. Few economists believe that the explicit co-operation between the fiscal and monetary authorities risks creating runaway inflation, as it has done in Venezuela and Zimbabwe, any time soon. (If anything, the bigger worry right now is deflation, not least because of a collapse in oil prices.) However, just as the use of quantitative easing in 2008-09 opened the door to more of the same down the road, it will become harder to make the argument that the “magic money tree” does not exist. Politicians in the future may lean on central banks to peg interest rates at zero to support government borrowing, even during times of economic growth and low unemployment. If central banks promised to fund the government during the coronavirus pandemic, they might ask, then why shouldn’t they also fund it to launch an expensive war against a foreign enemy or to invest in a Green New Deal?

The final impact of the current interventions relates to policymakers’ tolerance for risk. No one cheers when a firm goes bust, but often the process helps shift resources from less efficient to more efficient uses, thus raising productivity and average living standards over time. The novel notion that the government needs to preserve firms, jobs and workers’ incomes at practically any cost may endure, especially if the intervention proves successful in narrow terms. The policy will formally end once the pandemic has passed, but political pressure for similar support schemes—from the nationalisation of tottering firms to the provision of a universal basic income—may well be higher the next time a sharp downturn comes along. If politicians are able to preserve jobs and incomes during this crisis, many people will see little reason why they should not try again in the next one.

Calls for a more activist fiscal-monetary government will come against a backdrop of structurally higher demand for state spending. The public sector tends to provide labour-intensive services in which productivity improvements are difficult, such as health care and education. It must match the salaries of workers in other sectors in order to retain its own, even as they become less productive relative to the overall economy—a phenomenon which raises the cost of provision. Long before the coronavirus pandemic, fiscal wonks argued that government spending would soar during the 2020s, even in the absence of a crisis. That was not only or even primarily because an ageing population would raise demand for health care, but because health systems would be able to treat a wider range of illnesses more effectively, which would push up costs.

The likely economic effects of the pandemic reach far beyond the role of the state. Countries could become even less welcoming to immigrants—the better, they may believe, to reduce the likelihood of infection from foreign arrivals. On the same logic, resistance to the development of dense urban centres could mount, thereby limiting construction of new housing and raising costs. More countries may seek to become self-sufficient in the production of “strategic” commodities such as medicines, medical equipment and even toilet roll, contributing to a further rollback of globalisation. But the redefined role of the state could prove to be the most significant shift. The rules of the game have been moving in one direction for centuries. Another radical change is looming.■

Dig deeper:
For our latest coverage of the covid-19 pandemic, register for The Economist Today, our daily newsletter, or visit our coronavirus hub

This article appeared in the Briefing section of the print edition under the headline "Building up the pillars of state"

O Estado do Progresso e o Progresso do Estado (1986) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um amigo, Tulio Ferreira, descobre entre os seus guardados, esquecidos e novamente achados, um exemplar de um velho suplemento cultural do Estadão -- dos tempos que isso existia -- que publicou um longo ensaio sociológico-político que eu escrevi mais de 30 anos atrás, ainda refletindo leituras para minha tese de doutorado.
Fui buscar o trabalho em meu computador, e não achei, o que significa que ele precede a aquisição do meu primeiro computador, um MacIntosh Plus, dos primeiros modelos (sem disco rígido interno), que comprei na Suíça, meados de 1987.
O trabalho é este aqui:

140. “O Estado do Progresso e o Progresso do Estado: desenvolvimento e democracia em perspectiva histórica”, Brasília, 13 dezembro 1986, 12 pp. Digressão sobre a natureza do progresso e o papel do Estado na mudança social. Publicado no suplemento cultural do jornal O Estado de São Paulo, semanário Cultura (São Paulo, Ano VII, nº 382, 24/10/87, pp. 8-9). Relação de Publicados nº 044.

Tulio me envia uma copia da primeira página da versão publicada, que transcrevo acima.
Quem tiver interesse, vai ter de aumentar o tamanho do arquivo para ler.
A mim, tenho de ir buscar na pasta de originais as folhas datilografadas do texto de 1986, e scannerizar para tê-lo na integra. Por enquanto a imagem é só da primeira parte; também estou curioso para ver o resto...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 27/02/2017

Mapa mundial do funcionalismo publico -The Economist

Daily chart

Taking the king's coin

Jan 22nd 2014, 14:51 by K.N.C. and J.C.

Surprising national differences in the number of government employees

IN THE past few decades many countries have tried to roll back Leviathan, the expanding state. A look at the share of government workers in the labour force—either employed directly or via “public corporations”—reveals dramatic differences. In Norway and Denmark the proportion of people living off the public till is more than double that in Germany and Spain. In most cases, western European countries put public employees on the payroll directly. In the east, a legacy of communism is the huge number employed at public corporations: in Poland and the Czech Republic more people get a paycheque from these entities than from the state directly. Between 2001 and 2011 the share of government employees fell in most countries, but not in Britain and Canada, places more associated with reducing the state's influence on the economy. In America (not listed for lack of data), the share of government workers is 15%, just below the OECD average.

Um debate sobre a educacao superior: seria ela dominada pelo mercado?

Tenho mantido, no espaço pouco adequado de "notas de rodapé", ou "notas de final de livro", ou seja, os comentários eventualmente recebidos neste blog -- um "debate", entrecortado, com o leitor Luiz Espíndola, sobre as peculiaridades do nosso sistema de ensino.
Embora o tema inicial fosse a meritocracia, e a oposição das máfias sindicais de professores estaduais (do RJ) a qualquer sistema de avaliação por desempenho dos seus caros afiliados, o debate acabou se concentrando na situação do ensino superior.
Os comentários do Luiz foram feitos a propósito desta minha postagem:

"Professores sao contra a meritocracia; eles preferem a mediocracia... - artigo de Jose Goldemberg"

Permito-me, sem remeter a todos os meus comentários, transcrever aqui o comentário mais recente recebido do Luiz: 

Prezado Paulo,
Entendi seus comentários em relação à gestão universitária que, segundo você, prejudica a produtividade, os resultados etc. 
Apesar de entender de forma um pouco distinta - a visão mercadológica é presente nas universidades e faz surgir um excesso de produção de qualidade questionável e que nunca são revisitados -, concordo que deva haver na reitoria gestores capacitados.
Não obstante, isso não é o bastante. A insuficiência reside na seguinte questão: por que o mercado deve ser referência quando se trata de educação? 
O reitor-gestor, no meu ponto de vista, ou deve ter suas origens na área de educação e ter especialização na área de gestão ou, quando não, o vice-reitor deve ser um economista nato.
O que quero dizer com isso. Compreendo que as bases epistemológicas das áreas do conhecimento (no exemplo aqui: pedagogia e economia) são distintas e sua seara de atuação deve ser bem definida. Com o objetivo principal de uma universidade? Educação. Então, as diretrizes devem ser pautas por concepções educacionais, com as ponderações (assessoramento) do especialista em economia ou gestão. O que não pode é um economista, a frente de uma reitoria, querer utilizar sua base para gerir o campo educacional. Quando isso acontece, distorções prejudiciais acontecem. A louvada, pelo professor Goldemberg (o do pitaco acima), meritocracia torna-se um câncer se não bem desenvolvida no âmbito educacional: no ensino básico, existe manipulação de números para receber os ganhos; no ensino superior, os Currículos Lattes se enchem de “produção improdutiva” para que as verbas continuem a correr pelos corredores universitários, oriundas dos órgãos de fomento à pesquisa.
Por fim, existe, ainda como reflexo positivista, uma hierarquia nas áreas de conhecimento, na qual as humanas são preteridas. Na prática, ninguém dá pitaco, com se fundamentado fosse, em uma obra de um engenheiro de qualquer área ou em um trabalho de física quântica – no primeiro caso, pode matar alguém e, no segundo, é muito distante do “pitaqueiro”. Entretanto, quando se trata de sociedade ou educação, qualquer um tem uma solução na ponta da língua, por se achar o assunto próximo ao “pitaqueiro”. Contudo, um olhar desnaturalizado já constrói uma complexidade que não se vislumbra na “ponta do iceberg”.
Essa hierarquização que gera muita incoerência: o que se mais vê encabeçando as secretarias de educação pelo Brasil são economistas ou administradores. Por que não vemos educadores ou sociólogos como secretários de fazenda?
Novamente, volto a minha ideia de que “cada um no seu quadrado”! 
Desculpe-me pelo tamanho do texto!
Com respeito,
Luiz Espindola

Acrescento agora meus comentários (PRA):

Caro Luiz, 
Sem tempo para fazer um comentário mais elaborado, peço desculpas por apenas comentar topicamente algumas afirmações suas: 
1) "... a visão mercadológica é presente nas universidades e faz surgir um excesso de produção de qualidade questionável e que nunca são revisitados..."
   PRA: Que existe uma imensa produção de baixa, e muito baixa qualidade, saindo aos borbotões dessas coisas que respondem (muitas indevidamente) pelo nome de universidades (tanto privadas, quanto públicas, mas especialmente nessas coisas que passam pelo nome de "humanidades"), disso eu não tenho nenhuma dúvida, mas o que é que o mercado tem a ver com isso???
   Ao meu ver, absolutamente NADA, e de fato nada. Isso é quantitativismo, REGULADO pelos órgãos dinossáuricos da (des)educação brasileira. Mercado seria se os escrevinhadores dessas coisas inúteis tivessem de disputar espaço num MERCADO definido pelas preferências do consumidor, ou seja, as demandas de outros cientistas ou acadêmicos. Mas não é, nem nunca foi o caso: essas coisas saem por revistas institucionais pagas pelo dinheiro público, depois de passaram por uma avaliação complacente dos "pares", segundo o velho princípio: "me publica que eu te publico".
   Você está confundindo quantitativismo -- estatísticas -- impostas pelo MEC-Capes, ou CNPq, ou seja, o Estado, com o mercado, que não tem nada a ver com isso.

2) "por que o mercado deve ser referência quando se trata de educação?"
    PRA: O Mercado, esse deus absoluto segundo os companheiros -- que adoram viver dos frutos do mercado, sem jamais contribuir com um grama de riqueza para ele -- não tem ABSOLUTAMENTE NADA A VER COM A EDUCAÇÅO. Ele só existe em função da incapacidade do poder público em prover escolas suficientes e de qualidade para todos, nos primeiros níveis, e da demanda da população por algo melhor do que as coisas oferecidas nas escolas públicas, de qualquer nível. Mas todas as regras, inclusive no ensino privado, são determinadas pelo ESTADO, inclusive essas excrescências ridículas que são a obrigatoriedade de ensino de "estudos afrobrasileiros" e de "espanhol" no primeiro ciclo, e a compulsoriedade de estudos de "Sociologia e Filosofia" no ciclo médio. 
   Seria bom se o mercado fosse realmente uma referência na educação, mas infelizmente não é o caso. O mercado somos todos nós, que queremos profissionais competentes para nos servir sob a forma de produtos ou serviços, e não profissionais incompetentes dotados de um diploma aceito por essa coisa horrorosa que se chama MEC. O mercado filtra imediatamente a competência ou incompetência dos egressos do sistema educacional, tanto é que se paga mais a alguém que tem diploma de uma universidade pública -- supostamente melhor -- do que a outro que tem um diploma de uma Faculdade Tabajara. isso é mercado, e acho que está certo. Mas deveria ser mais, não menos. Ou seja, se o mercado funcionasse, esses diplomas reconhecidos pelo MEC seriam filtrados pela competência específica do ofertante de mão-de-obra. Hoje em dia temos milhares de funcionários públicos fazendo cursinhos vagabundos, em faculdades Tabajara, apenas para, com os certificados fornecidos, inclusive por professores complacentes de instituições públicas, para que eles possam ganhar adicionais de salários por títulos. Isso é mistificação e fraude.

3) "O reitor-gestor, no meu ponto de vista, ou deve ter suas origens na área de educação e ter especialização na área de gestão ou, quando não, o vice-reitor deve ser um economista nato."
   PRA: Sou totalmente contrário. A área da educação no país é a que concentra o maior número de deformações, besteirol, ideologices e outros absurdos desse universo paulo-freire, que só forma as saúvas que estão acabando com o Brasil atual. A maior parte da educação é um lixo, e poderiam ser totalmente fechadas as faculdades de educação sem nenhum prejuízo da educação dos brasileiros, até com alívio.
Reitor tem de ser um administrador, ponto, de qualquer área, de qualquer especialização, desde que competente e munido de um programa de trabalho, de metas, e de resultados esperados, cobráveis por um conselho autônomo e independente. Professores, de educação ou não, podem até servir, mas isso não deveria ser o critério, e sim o pleito do candidato a reitor. As universidades americanas anunciam a vacância do cargo em jornais (leio sempre na Economist) e que se apresentem os candidatos, munidos de seus planos de administração. Ponto.
A economia ajuda, mas depende: um keynesiano de botequim, armado de suas loucuraas econômicas, pode fazer mais mal a uma universidade, do que um literato ou filósofo armado apenas de bom senso, e sentido de contas simples: dá para fazer?, quais são as alternativas para o uso desse dinheiro?; o Conselho (independente, e não apenas de professores) aprova? OK, vamos fazer.

4) "volto a minha ideia de que “cada um no seu quadrado”! "  
   PRA: Não acredito nesse tipo de enquadramento, de um nicho reservado a alguém. Acredito, por exemplo, que o diretor de um hospital não precisa ser médico, sequer entender de qualquer operação cirúrgica. Ele precisa ser um bom administrador, para que todas as áreas de funcionamento-fim tenham os meios necessários, com base em avaliações técnicas, não influenciadas pelo "médico-catedrático, que é uma sumidade" coisa e tal. Administração é administração, e o conselho deve, sim, ter pessoas competentes para aprovar o plano de trabalho e as metas.

Termino por aqui: infelizmente, a educação brasileira vai continuar afundando, lenta e seguramente.
Nem acredito que a prioridade seja o ensino superior. 
Eu concentraria os recursos nos dois primeiros níveis e nas escolas técnicas, ponto.
Universitários, vocês são bem grandinhos, virem-se, apelem ao mercado, ponto.
Sinceramente,
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

A atividade bancaria e o Estado - Thorsten Polleit (Mises Daily)

Banking and the State
by Thorsten Polleit
Mises Daily, February 1, 2013

“It had come to be accepted that the pigs, who were manifestly cleverer than the other animals, should decide all questions of farm policy, though their decisions had to be ratified by a majority vote.”
Orwell, G. (1989 [1945]), Animal Farm, S. 34.

The Starting Point: Civilization Begins

The founder of the Medici banking dynasty, Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici (1360–1429), said to his children on his death bed: “Stay out of the public eye.”[1] His words raise the question, "How much do bankers know about the truth of modern money and banking?"

To develop a meaningful answer to this question in the tradition of the Austrian School of economics, one has to start right at the beginning, and that is with the process of civilization.

Civilization denotes the development through which man substitutes the state of the division of labor and specialization (that is, peaceful and productive cooperation) for the state of subsistence (that is, a violent hand-to-mouth existence).

In his magnum opus Human Action (1949), Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) put forward a praxeological explanation of the process of civilization, which helps us understand the course of its evolution.[2]

To Mises, two factors are at the heart of the process of civilization: (1) There must be an inequality of wants and skills among people. This is a necessary condition for people to want to seek cooperation.

(2) Man must recognize that higher productivity is possible through a division of labor. Mises thus assumes – as a necessary condition – a minimum intelligence among human beings and a willingness to use this intelligence in practical life.

Money Emerges – Carl Menger's Theory of the Origin of Money

The inequality of skills and wants, accompanied with the assumption of a minimum intelligence, leads people to engage in the division of labor and specialization. This, in turn, brings about the need for interpersonal exchange.

The primitive form of an exchange economy is barter. Barter has limitations, however. For instance, under barter, exchange opportunities depend on a double coincidence of wants.

Sooner or later, people (assuming a minimum of intelligence) will realize that using an indirect means of exchange is economically beneficial.

Using an indirect means of exchange increases the opportunities for exchange, as the double coincidence of wants is no longer a requisite for making trading possible.

The indirect means of exchange that becomes universally accepted is called "money."

In Principles of Economics (1871), Carl Menger (1840–1921) theorizes that money emerges spontaneously from market activities, and that free market money emerges out of a commodity (such as precious metals).[3]

Mises later showed with his regression theorem that this must indeed be so, for praxeological reasons: Money must have emerged out of a market; and it must have started out as a commodity.[4]

Money Warehousing

Money is an economic good like any other. As such, it will be economized, like any other good.

People will demand convenient ways of holding and exchanging their money proper.

With people differing in individual time preference, there will be savers (those who hold excess balances of money proper) and investors (those who demand money proper in excess of their actual holdings).[5]

It is against this backdrop that two kinds of money businesses would emerge in the free market: deposit banking (or money warehousing) and loan, or credit, banking.[6]

Deposit banking offers custodian, safeguarding and settlement services to holders of money proper. For instance, holders of money proper can deposit their commodity money with a deposit bank against receiving a money certificate (in the form of a banknote or a sight deposit).

Credit banks would refinance themselves by obtaining genuine savings, that is by issuing interest-bearing bonds. Savers will willingly exchange their money proper against such return-yielding bonds.

The market interest rate will be determined by the supply of and demand for money proper, and so the equilibrium market interest rate will reflect the societal time preference rate. In other words, In a free market, there will quite naturally be a profession which we may call “bankers”: some bankers will work in the money warehousing business (or deposit banking), some in credit banking.

To be sure: In a free market deposit banking and credit institutions will represent legally separate entities, and so we would have the deposit banker, and we would have the credit banker.

The Incentive for Aggression

In a free market, there are only three ways of acquiring property (that is, in a non-aggressive way): homesteading (which actually denotes the “first-user-first-owner principle”), production, and voluntary contracting.

In reality, however, things may be somewhat different.

Franz Oppenheimer pointed out that “There are two fundamentally opposed means whereby man, requiring sustenance, is impelled to obtain the necessary means for satisfying his desires. These are work and robbery, one's own labor and the forcible appropriation of the labor of others.” [7]

The logic of human action tells us that there is – in fact, there must be – for the individual an economic incentive to aggress against other peoples’ property. Two interrelated praxeological insights explain this.

First, we know for sure that an earlier satisfaction is preferred over a later satisfaction of wants; we also know for sure that a satisfaction of wants associated with low costs is preferred over a satisfaction of wants associated with high costs. In other words, individuals try to achieve their ends with as little input as possible and in the shortest period of time.

Second, the process to civilization does not extirpate man’s inclination to aggression. Individual A can be expected to aggress against B (that is against B’s property) if and when he gets away with it—that is, if the (expected) benefits for A from aggressing against B will be higher than the (expected) costs he has to bear by doing so.

It is the individual’s economic incentive to aggress against other peoples’ property that is at the heart of the emergence of what is typically called "government."

A government can be understood as a territorial monopolist of compulsion: an agency that engages in institutionalized property rights violations and the exploitation – in the form of expropriation, taxation, and regulation – of private property owners.[8]

To answer the question, "What do bankers know about the truth about money and banking?", it is necessary to take a closer look at the various forms of government.

To start with, one can make a distinction between governments with a low time preference and governments with high time preference.

At one end of the spectrum is, to borrow a criminal metaphor from Mancur L. Olson (1932–1998), the roving bandit.[9] The roving bandit represents a form of government that has a limited interest in the welfare of society and, as a result, his theft typically approaches 100 percent of society’s income.

The roving bandit does not have to share in the damage his aggression causes to society (in terms of lost income). The time preference of the roving bandit is therefore relatively high. He takes as much from his victims as possible, and there is next to no economic incentive to restrain his stealing.

At other end of the spectrum is the stationary bandit. Like the roving bandit, he also holds the monopoly of coercion over his victims.

However, the stationary bandit has an encompassing interest in society’s welfare. He wishes to keep his victims producing: the more his victims produce, the more there is to take for the stationary bandit.

Sharing in society’s losses, the stationary bandit will make sure that his thievery is limited. The higher the losses in production from thievery are, the lower will be the level of aggression at which the stationary bandit’s take is maximized. The stationary bandit’s time preference will therefore be lower than the time preference of the roving bandit.

Taking a closer look at the stationary bandit, one can make a distinction between private ownership of government (feudalism/monarchy) and public ownership of government (democratic-republicanism).[10]

The caretaker of a privately held government maximizes the present value of the total income which results from expropriating the property of the ruled.

A monarch, for instance, holds the monopoly of expropriation over his victims, and his time preference will be, due to his encompassing interest, relatively low.

In contrast, the caretaker of a publicly owned government will maximize his current income. His time preference will therefore be relatively high.

Public ownership of government means majority voting. The majority of the people decides about who will serve as the temporary caretaker of public ownership of government.

The average voter will support those politicians who are expected (rightly or wrongly) to improve the voter’s economic situation. A voter has every economic incentive to act in this way – irrespective of the fact that the income he may obtain in this way results from expropriating fellow citizens.

The caretaker of public ownership of government, in turn, has an incentive to secure the majority of the voters. He will favor policies of expropriating the (typically few) high income producers to the benefits of the (typically large group) of less productive or nonproductive people.

The important insight here is as follows: public ownership of government will lead to an ongoing erosion of the encompassing interest of the majority of the people in the market income of society, or in other words, society’s time preference will increase.

Government Brings Fraudulent Banking

The rise in society’s time preference is the central explanatory factor for explaining the emergence of fraudulent banking, which is epitomized by a pure fiat money regime.

We know that the caretakers of publicly owned government wish to expropriate resources from the public at large. This can be done most conveniently by (1) obtaining control over money production, (2) replacing commodity money with fiat money, and (3) producing money through credit expansion.

The banking industry and the bankers are therefore the natural ally for government’s planned thievery. In fact, those in government and the bankers will, and logically so, collude for establishing a pure fiat money system.

Bankers realize that they would earn additional revenue if and when they are allowed to issue new money balances through credit expansion (or ex nihilo): making loans beyond the amount of money proper available to them.

They understand that such fractional reserve banking is a fairly profitable undertaking to them, and so the deposit as well as the loan banker will be in favor of merging deposit banking with loan banking.

The temporary caretakers of publicly owned governments are very much in favor of fractional reserve banking, too. Being a first receiver of the new money, government can expropriate resources from the natural owners of things.

Having monopolized the law, it will be relatively easy for government to declare fractional reserve banking legal.

Engaging in fractional reserve banking, however, is risky for the banker. He knows that if and when his counterfeiting is detected, a bank run may ensue, and he would be forced out of business, or worse.

For government, bank failures are fairly undesirable, too. It would bring severe political and economic problems. Most important, defaulting banks endanger access to credit and money on easy terms.

Government will therefore, greatly supported by the bankers, set up a central bank, which will enable and greatly encourage all banks to inflate the quantity of money in a combined effort.

Even with a central bank in place, however, the risk of a bank run is not entirely eliminated. What is needed is for the central bank to have a monopoly over money production.

This is why sooner or later commodity money will be replaced by irredeemable paper, or fiat, money; and fiat money will be granted legal privileges (such as, for instance, legal tender status). To this end, government will make it legal for bankers to suspend the redeemability of outstanding money certificates into money proper.

Collective Corruption

One may wonder: How do government and bankers get away with this – that is fraudulently extracting resources from producers and contractors via issuing inflationary money?

Is it a lack of knowledge on the part of those who are on the losing end of the counterfeiting money regime? Or are the costs of revolting against a pure fiat money regime prohibitively high from the viewpoint of the individual?

An economically reasonable, that is praxeological, answer to this question can be found with (what I call) “collective corruption.” [11]

Once government intervenes in society’s (monetary) affairs, individuals will increasingly develop a disposition for violating other peoples’ property.

By taking advantage of governmental coercive action, an individual can reap the benefits from aggressing against the property of others, while he has to bear only a fraction of the damage his action does to society as a whole.

He has every incentive to act in this way; he would have to bear the losses of whatever opportunity for violating other’s private property he passes up.

A pure fiat money system, once it has set into motion, will lead to collective corruption on the presumably grandest scale.

As is well known, government can secure its support by letting the public at large (actually parts of it) share in the enjoyment of the receipts fraudulently extracted from natural owners of things.

For instance, government will offer reasonably-paid jobs (in particular for the intellectuals and second-hand dealer of ideas). It will also provide firms with public contracts (such as, for instance, for construction and building projects).

With growing government handouts, a growing number of people and businesses will become economically and socially dependent on the continuation (or even further expansion) of government activity.

Quite naturally, resistance against a further expansion of government and the fiat money regime – which necessarily means further violation of individuals’ property rights – will decline.

Clearly, bankers play an important role in spreading collective corruption. It may suffice here to say that a growing number of people will start investing their lifetime savings into fiat-denominated bank deposits and bonds.

Sooner or later people will develop a great interest in supporting government and upholding the fiat money regime – by whatever means deemed necessary.

It Will End in Hyperinflation

Collective corruption, once it has become sufficiently widespread, will lead to hyperinflation – meaning an accelerating increase in the quantity of money, leading to an erosion, or even a total destruction, of the purchasing power of fiat money.

Of course, those in government and bankers have a common interest in avoiding hyperinflation. They prefer a kind of inflation that goes on basically unnoticed, a form of inflation that won't spin out of control.

However, once collective corruption has become widespread and the banking and financial industry has become highly important in terms of financing government and serving as an important hoard for individuals' lifetime savings, the pendulum has already been swung toward hyperinflation.

From praxeology, we know for sure that a fiat money boom will ultimately end in depression. We also know that efforts to escape depression by increasing the quantity of fiat money even further will only postpone the day of reckoning, and that it will raise the costs of the depression in the future.

How will the majority of the people respond to an approaching depression? If and when people can expect to rank among the first receivers of the newly created money (which is actually the case once collective corruption has become sufficiently widespread), the answer appears to be obvious.

The majority of the people may expect to benefit from running the electronic printing press, and they will prefer the running of the electronic printing press over letting government and banks default. Under such an incentive structure the fiat money system would end up in hyperinflation.

In view of what has been said above we can conclude: (1) If and when public ownership of government takes hold, commodity money will be replaced by fiat money. (2) Fiat money leads to collective corruption on a grand scale. And (3), once collective corruption has become sufficiently widespread, the fiat money regime will be destroyed by hyperinflation.

From what has been said above it follows that we know that once a fiat money system has been put in place, banks and bankers have joined – some of them willingly and knowingly, some of them unknowingly – the vast criminal enterprise that is the state.

Being self-interested human beings, bankers can, and must, be expected to know a lot about money and banking. In view of a rather dismal monetary history, such a conclusion would also do much to explain Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici’s dying words to his children: “Stay out of the public eye.”

Thorsten Polleit is chief economist of the precious-metals firm Degussa Goldhandel GmbH. He is also an honorary professor at the Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. He is an adjunct scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute and was awarded the 2012 O.P. Alford III Prize in Libertarian Scholarship. His website is www.Thorsten-Polleit.com. Send him mail. See Thorsten Polleit's article archives.

You can subscribe to future articles by Thorsten Polleit via this RSS feed.

Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.

Notes

* A similar version of this paper was held at the 7th annual meeting of the Property and Freedom Society on 29 September 2012 in Bodrum, Turkey.

[1] Parks, T. (2006), Medici Money, Banking, Metaphysics and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence, Profile Books Ltd, London, p. 3.

[2] "If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than isolated labor, and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact, human action itself tends toward cooperation and association; man becomes a social being not in sacrificing his own concerns for the sake of a mythical Moloch, society, but in aiming at an improvement in his own welfare. Experience teaches that this condition—higher productivity achieved under the division of labor—is present because its cause—the inborn inequality of men and the inequality in the geographical distribution of the natural factors of production—is real. Thus we are in a position to comprehend the course of social evolution.“ Mises, L. v. (1996), Human Action, 4th ed., p. 160-1.

[3] See Menger, C. (2007 [1871]), Principles of Economics, Chapter 8, pp. 257 – 285, esp. 261 – 262: “The origin of money … is, as we have seen, entirely natural and thus displays legislative influence only in the rarest instances. Money is not an invention of the state. It is not the product of a legislative act. Even the sanction of political authority is not necessary for its existence. Certain commodities came to be money quite naturally, as the result of economic relationships that were independent of the power of the state.”

[4] See Mises, L. v. (1996), Human Action, p. 408 – 410; Mises, L. v. (1953), The Theory of Money and Credit, pp. 97 – 123.

[5] On the issue of time preference see Mises, L. v. (1996), Human Action, 4th ed., pp. 483 –

490; also Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "On Time Preference, Government, and the Process of Decivilization", in: Democracy, The God That Failed, pp. 1 – 43.

[6] In this context see, for instance, Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "How is Fiat Money Possible? – or, The Devolution of Money and Credit", in: The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, 2nd ed., pp. 175 – 204.

[7] Oppenheimer, F. (1922), The State, p. 24.

[8] See, for instance, Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "On Monarchy, Democracy, and the Idea of Natural Order", in : Democracy, The God That Failed, p. 45; also Rothbard, M. N. (2002 [1973]), For a New Liberty, Chapter 3, "The State", pp. 45.

[9] See Olson, M. (2000), Power and Prosperity, Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, Basic Books, esp. pp. 1 – 24.

[10] In this context see Hoppe, H.-H. (2006), "On Monarchy, Democracy, and the Idea of Natural Order", in: Democracy, The Gold That Failed, pp. 45 – 76, esp. 46 – 48. On democracy see Rothbard, M. N. (2004 [1970]), Power and Markets, Government and the Economy, 4th ed., Chapter 2, 2.B., pp. 19 – 21, and pp. 233 – 245.

[11] See Polleit, T. (2011), Fiat Money and Collective Corruption, in: The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 397 – 415.