Sobre a eterna questão dos papéis respectivos do Estado e dos mercados na dinâmica social - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Seis anos atrás, questionamentos de alunos e debates nas redes sociais me levaram a redigir pequena nota sobre a eterna questão dos papéis respectivos do Estado e dos mercados na dinâmica social.

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8 de janeiro de 2017:

Algumas postagens, iniciadas ou não por mim, acabam criando vida própria, e se prolongam em discussões paralelas, altamente interessantes. Uma dessas discussões, recorrente (mesmo em aulas que dou), é a suposta oposição, ou equação binária, entre ESTADO e MERCADOS, com todas as consequências que podemos imaginar para a definição de políticas públicas. 

Por isso mesmo redigi um comentário numa dessas postagens, que transcrevo abaixo, pois pretende acabar com essa identidade que NÃO EXISTE, mercados de um lado, Estado de outro.

Percebo, mesmo entre certos "liberais", uma incompreensão muito grande sobre o que seja o Estado e o que sejam os mercados, geralmente colocando-os num mesmo patamar de intervenção teórica sobre a realidade, quando são duas coisas muito diferentes, ainda que aparentemente situadas numa mesma equação (mas isso é racionalização teórica). 

Economia de mercado é o que existe, naturalmente, em suas diversas formas, inclusive essa fração superior, mais sofisticada, que é o capitalismo. Sociedades desenvolvem naturalmente os mercados, pois esta é a tendência natural dos cidadãos, a divisão do trabalho e os intercâmbios. 

Estados são construções sociais, contratos coletivos, com todas as suas falhas. Governantes, ou seja, os que ocupam temporariamente o Estado, pretendem atuar como demiurgos, controlando essas relações de intercâmbio entre os agentes econômicos, e com isso podem deformar instituições que de toda forma se submetem ao direito, à força, à demagogia, a todo tipo de influência. 

Gostaria que as pessoas não falassem dos mercados como se fossem coisas controláveis pelas mãos do homens. Não, não são, e as tentativas nesse sentido acabam sempre redundando em menor eficiência dos mercados, ou em fenômenos tais como contrabando, mercado negro, elisão e evasão fiscal, etc.

Concluo dizendo que uma sociedade de mercados livres será sempre, sempre, SEM EXCEÇÕES, infinitamente superior a uma sociedade controlada pelo Estado, qualquer Estado, mesmo o mais democrático, o que geralmente não é o caso, por uma razão muito simples. 

A lógica de funcionamento dos mercados é totalmente oposta à lógica de funcionamento do Estado. Este costuma ser mais eficiente concentrando poder, monopolizando várias esferas da vida cidadã, e tentando fazer com que todos se comportem de maneira "adequada", seja lá o que isso queira dizer. A lógica dos mercados não é a concentração, e sim a atomização, a dispersão de iniciativas, a fragmentação de ofertas, a total multiplicidade de vontades, enfim, a famosa "mão invisível" de Adam Smith.

Por isso mesmo, mercados livres sempre vão produzir uma melhor situação de bem estar do que um Estado aparentemente ordenado. 

E a concentração econômica? Ela existe (monopólios, cartéis, etc.), mas não é feita pelos mercados, e só pode existir com a mão visível do Estado, como resultado de um complô entre capitalistas e príncipes. Ponto!

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Mini-reflexão sobre essa dicotomia mercados-Estado (ou interesses individuais e coletivos) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mini-reflexão sobre essa dicotomia mercados-Estado (ou interesses individuais e coletivos)

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Volta e meia, dando meias voltas nas redes sociais, eu me deparo com essas críticas furibundas à “ditadura dos mercados”, à ideologia “neoliberal”, às desigualdades e à concentração de renda que seriam “típicas”, ou “inerentes” ao capitalismo desumano, que seria contrário aos valores “verdadeiramente humanos” da solidariedade, da fraternidade, da própria humanidade, ao privilegiar os interesses puramente materiais de acumulação de riquezas, de lucro individual, de ambições mesquinhas e egoistas. 

Não é só em determinadas academias — as faculdades de Humanidades — que se usa, e se ousa, tal tipo de retórica: até o Papa Francisco, um homem profundamente piedoso, integralmente bom, preocupado com a situação dos mais humildes, exibe esse tipo de preocupação.

Pois eu pergunto: quem são os “adoradores do Deus mercado”? Apenas os endinheirados, os donos do capital? Todos os demais acreditam em quem? Nos detratores do mercados? Nos “adoradores do Estado”? 

Quando se é maniqueísta se chega a esse tipo de pensamento binário. 

Mas o mundo se reduz a isso? 

Acredito que exista muita pobreza de pensamento ao se raciocinar de modo simplisticamente binário. 

Mercados são formados por indivíduos e não existem fora das fugazes interações que se estabelecem entre eles.

As condições sob as quais indivíduos entram e saem dos mercados são determinadas por um determinado estoque de realizações (patrimônio) e de conhecimento, que só existem socialmente, mas que podem ser mudados no plano individual, pela força da vontade, pela necessidade, pelo tino individual. 

Liberdade é essencial na realização de determinados objetivos individuais e sociais. Sociedades defensoras e promotoras de liberdades são em geral mais prósperas e mais felizes.

Acredito que se deva valorizar a liberdade humana. Acredito, também, que ela se encontra mais do lado dos mercados do que do lado da administração central, ou Estado.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 23/02/2021

O mito do 1pc contra os interesses dos 99pc: nada mais do que um mito; mercados redistribuem mais eficazmente que Estados

O mito do 1% de ricos, que estariam extraindo (ou "roubando" na linguagem de alguns) "riqueza" dos outros 99%. Além de mito é uma bobagem que não é confirmada pelos dados, como este estudo de Jonathan Rothwell demonstra. De resto, se alguns estão ganhando (ou "extraindo") mais do que deveriam, tal se deve às restrições impostas pelas guildas profissionais (a tal "conspiração de comerciantes", ou de quaisquer outros grupos profissionais, de que falava Adam Smith), que restringem o acesso de concorrentes a seus mercados protegidos, ou à ação do próprio Estado (ou do príncipe) que atua para manter carteis e monopólios, os "happy few" que os financiam. Por isso que as soluções "pikettyanas", que são as de interferir nos mercados e promover uma redistribuição forçada via Estado, são erradas e só podem redundar em menor criação de riqueza. A "solução" (sempre imperfeita no mundo dos humanos) é a expansão dos mercados, quebra de carteis e monopólios, e permitir a mais ampla concorrência. Eu começaria pelo mercado de dinheiro...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

SERIES: Long Memos | Number 19 of 19 « Previous

Jonathan Rothwell |  

Brookings Institution, March 25, 2016 9:50am

Make elites compete: Why the 1% earn so much and what to do about it

• Income Distribution
• Inequality
• Labor Policy

The spectacular economic rise of the top 1 percent is now common knowledge, thanks in large part to the work of Thomas Piketty and his collaborators. The top 1 percent of U.S. residents now earn 21 percent of total national income, up from 10 percent in 1979.
Curbing this inequality requires a clear understanding of its causes. Three of the standard explanations—capital shares, skills, and technology—are myths. The real cause of elite inequality is the lack of open access and market competition in elite investment and labor markets. To bring the elite down to size, we need to make them compete.

Myth 1: Capital vs. labor share

In his recent and otherwise valuable book, Saving Capitalism: For the Many, not the Few, Robert Reich claims that the share of income going to workers has fallen from 50 percent in 1960 to 42 percent in 2012. Meanwhile, corporate profits have risen. In short: trillions of dollars have gone to capitalists instead of workers. The sensible policy responses, as Reich and others have stressed, are to increase taxes on corporate income and capital gains, and widen capital ownership.
These might be a good idea for other reasons, but the basic facts currently being used to justify them are wrong. Between 1980 and 2014, corporate profits actually represented a lower share of GDP (4.9 percent) than between 1950 and 1979 (5.4 percent).
Income from the main four capital sources— dividends, interest, rental income, and proprietor income—has nudged upwards as a share of GDP by just one percentage point between these two periods, and entirely because of higher interest income, which mainly goes to retirees who own Treasury bonds.
So, what’s going on here? The simple explanation is that wages and salaries are an inadequate measure of the share of economic benefits flowing to labor. Wages and salaries have declined as a share of total income, largely for two reasons. First, total national income includes government transfer payments, which are rising because of an aging population (e.g., Social Security and Medicare). Second, companies have greatly increased non-salary compensation (e.g., healthcare and retirement benefits). Total worker compensation plus transfer payments have actually slightly increased as a share of total national income, from 79 percent between 1951 and 1979, to 81 percent for the years from 1980 to 2015:

Myth 2: Super skills lead to super riches

In his “defense of the one percent,” economist Greg Mankiw argues that elite earnings are based on their higher levels of IQ, skills, and valuable contributions to the economy. The globally-integrated, technologically-powered economy has shifted so that very highly-talented people can generate very high incomes.
It is certainly true that rising relative returns to education have driven up inequality. But as I have written earlier, this is true among the bottom 99 percent. There is no evidence to support the idea that the top 1 percent consists mostly of people of “exceptional talent.” In fact, there is quite a bit of evidence to the contrary.
Drawing on state administrative records for millions of individual Americans and their employers from 1990 to 2011, John Abowd and co-authors have estimated how far individual skills influence earnings in particular industries. They find that people working in the securities industry (which includes investment banks and hedge funds) earn 26 percent more, regardless of skill. Those working in legal services get a 23 percent pay raise. These are among the two industries with the highest levels of “gratuitous pay”—pay in excess of skill (or “rents” in the economics literature). At the other end of the spectrum, people working in eating and drinking establishments earn 40 percent below their skill level.
Using data from an OECD cognitive test of thousands of Americans and adults from around the world (the PIACC), I find that workers in the financial and insurance sector get a pay bump equivalent to a decile of the earnings distribution (e.g., pushing them up from the 80^th to 90^th percentile). This is the largest premium aside from the quasi-monopolistic mining and utilities sectors:

At the occupational level, CEOs are paid 1.5 deciles above their “IQ.” Health professionals also receive a very large boost in earnings.

Using microdata from the Census Bureau, I find that the “gratuitous pay” premium in certain industries has increased dramatically since 1980. Workers in securities and investment saw their excess pay rise from 41 percent to 60 percent between 1980 and 2013. Legal services went from 27 percent to 37 percent. Hospitals went from 21 percent to 39 percent. Meanwhile, those working in eating and drinking establishments consistently hovered around negative 20 percent:

Myth 3: Technology

Some entrepreneurs grow enormously rich as a result of founding a company with an innovative product. This applies to Mark Zuckerberg, as well as to Bill Gates and other mega-stars of the tech sector. Venture capitalist Paul Graham has recently written about this as an important aspect of inequality, and he’s correct. It is. But again, it has little to do with the rise of the 1 percent.
Take some of the most important tech industries: software, internet publishing, data processing, hosting, computer systems design, scientific research and development, and computer and electronics manufacturing. Combined, they represent just 5 percent of workers in the top 1 percent of income earners.
So, if they're not in Silicon Valley making awesome stuff, where are the 1 percent working? Top answer: doctor’s offices. No industry has more top earners than physicians’ offices, with 7.2 percent. Hospitals are home to 7 percent. Legal services and securities and financial investments industries account for another 7 and 6 percent, respectively. Real estate, dentistry, and banking provide a large number, too:

Computer systems design is the only tech sector among the top contributors. There are five times as many top 1 percent workers in dental services as in software services.
CEOs are of course more likely to be in the top tier, especially if they are in certain privileged industries: 28 percent of CEOs from the financial sector, for instance, and 26 percent of those in hospitals. (But 15 percent of college presidents are in the top 1 percent, too.)
So if technology, skills, and capital shares can’t explain the rise of the top 1 percent, what does? And what can we do about it?

A non-elitist investment market

One way that the top 1 percent cements their position is by occupying the financial sector, and accessing above-market returns on their investments.
The large and growing prominence of the financial sector in terms of excess pay has a great deal to do with hedge funds, which barely existed before the 1980s but are now integrated into mainstream investment banks like Goldman Sachs and hold over a trillion dollars in assets from pension funds, university endowments, and other institutional and private investors.
A hedge fund is a loose term referring to an investment portfolio that is less regulated than other funds, because only very rich individuals or approved institutions (accredited investors or qualified purchasers) can participate in it. This regulatory distinction allows hedge funds to take more risk, borrowing levels of money that greatly exceed their assets (and avoid many onerous reporting requirements). These regulatory advantages have allowed hedge funds to consistently outperform stocks and other assets by roughly 2 percentage points each year.
The accredited investor rule has mostly been ignored by scholars of inequality. But legal scholars Houman Shadab, Usha Rodrigues, and Cary Martin Shelby are an exception. They have each written persuasively about how the rules contribute to inequality by giving the richest investors privileged access to the best investment strategies. Shadab points out that other countries (with less inequality) allow retail investors to access hedge funds.
The law has also inflated the compensation of hedge fund workers—roughly $500,000 on average—by restricting competition. Mutual funds—which charge tiny fees by comparison—are currently barred from using hedge fund strategies because they have non-rich investors. If the law was changed to allow mutual funds to offer hedge fund portfolios, hundreds of billions of dollars would be transferred annually from super-rich hedge fund managers and investment bankers to ordinary investors, and even low-income workers with retirement plans. A House committee recently approved a bill that would slightly ease the accredited investor rule. Even if it became law, the bill would be a modest step—but at least one in the right direction.

A non-elitist labor market

At the same time, we need more competition at the top end of the labor market. As economist Dean Baker points out, politicians and intellectuals often champion market competition—but what they mean by that is competition among low-paid service workers, production workers, or computer programmers who face competition from trade and immigration, while elite professionals sit behind a protectionist wall. Workers in occupations with no higher educational requirements see their wages held down by millions of other Americans denied a high-quality education and competing for relatively precious vacancies.
For lawyers, doctors, and dentists— three of the most over-represented occupations in the top 1 percent—state-level lobbying from professional associations has blocked efforts to expand the supply of qualified workers who could do many of the “professional” job tasks for less pay. Here are three illustrations:

1. The most common legal functions—including document preparation—could be performed by licensed legal technicians rather than lawyers, as the Washington State Supreme Court decided in 2012. These workers could perform most lawyer-like tasks for roughly half the cost. Unsurprisingly, legal groups opposed it. A few brave souls from the Washington State Bar Association board resigned in protest, and issued this statement:  “The Washington State Bar Association has a long record of opposing efforts that threaten to undermine its monopoly on the delivery of legal services.” Proportion of lawyers in the top 1 percent? 15 percent.
2. Many states allow nurse practitioners to independently provide general and family medical services, freeing up physicians to provide more specialized services. But most larger states do not. Again, typical nurse practitioner salaries are roughly half those of general practitioners with an MD. But, of course, physician lobbies stridently oppose the idea. Proportion of physicians and surgeons in the top 1 percent? 31 percent.
3. Dental hygienists can perform many of the functions of more far expensive dentists, but regulations vary by state and in all but a few states, it is not possible for hygienists to own and operate their own practice. My analysis shows that just 2 percent of hygienists are self-employed compared to 63 percent of dentists. Proportion of dentists in the top 1 percent? 21 percent.

Recently, the head of the Federal Trade Commission testified before the U.S. Senate on how state occupational licenses, such as these, often hinder competition and harm consumers, though her agency has very little authority to intervene.

Less Karl Marx, more Adam Smith

The modern left still too often sees the world through a Marxist lens of capitalist owners trying to exploit people who sell their labor for a living. But that doesn’t help explain rising top incomes. On the other hand, many on the modern right wrongly infer that great earnings must only be generated by great people.
Progressive thinkers tend to revert to an anti-market stance, which means they reach for the wrong solutions in terms of policy. Conservatives, meanwhile, are often keen to remove regulatory barriers to competition, but still defend the financial sector and other elite earners.
Before Marx, Adam Smith provided a framework for political economy that is especially useful today. Smith warned against local trade associations which were inevitably conspiring “against the public…to raise prices,” and “restraining the competition in some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise…occasion a very important inequality” between occupations.
For earnings to be distributed more fairly, our goal is not to stand in the way of markets, but to make them work better.

• 

  Jonathan Rothwell

  Fellow, Metropolitan Policy Program
  Jonathan Rothwell was a fellow at the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings. His research focused on labor market economics, social mobility, access to education, and the sources of economic growth.
  
  More Posts from Jonathan > | View Expert Page >

Academicos estao sempre demonizando os mercados, ate inconscientemente

Leio um artigo jurídico sobre processos criminais no Brasil, de boa argumentação, mas logo no começo encontro esta afirmação:

"Embora vivamos numa sociedade em que o mercado produz constantes desigualdades econômicas, isso não deveria reproduzir-se no tratamento político-jurídico dos cidadãos."

Permito-me comentar este argumento em particular, num artigo que de resto me pareceu bom.
Creio que seu autor revela, até inconscientemente, suas "deformações de formação", ao afirmar que os mercados criam desigualdades, o que é uma bobagem reveladora da prevenção contra os mercados geralmente encontrada nos meios acadêmicos.
Minha pequena lição:
    Mercados são espaços absolutamente neutros, até intangíveis, para interações entre duas ou mais partes. Se as partes são diferentemente dotadas em informação, bens e outros ativos, o mercado não pode fazer nada para corrigir essa condição de origem, ele apenas oferece a oportunidade para um intercâmbio, que deve ser sempre voluntário. Se existem restrições, monopólios e outras condicionalidades, elas não foram criadas nem impostas pelos mercados, mas por regras de governos, ou de coalizões poderosas, mas cada um é livre para interagir e intercambiar conforme sua vontade.
    Acadêmicos em geral exibem uma prevenção contra os mercados por motivos errados e preconizam medidas para “equalizar as partes”, que só podem ser aplicadas pelos Estados, ou governos, e com isso começam as deformações, que geralmente criam mais desigualdades que se os mercados fossem deixados livres.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 31 de janeiro de 2016

Os mercados e o governo companheiro: desafinidades eletivas? - Paulo Roberto de Almeida e Reinaldo Azevedo

Desde sempre, com seus economistas esquizofrênicos e seus ideólogos stalinistas (pelo menos em intenção, e ainda bem que sem Gulag, como digo sempre), o governo dos companheiros tem um problema com os mercados.
Um só não, tem vários, ou melhor dizendo: os mercados incomodam os companheiros. Eles sabem disso, e eles têm aquela conversa de que os mercados não podem "dominar" a sociedade, que cabe ao governo "disciplinar" os mercados porque eles seriam inerentemente concentradores, desiguais, injustos e sabe-se lá o que mais.
Sabemos, nós, o que essa hostilidade marxiana, marxista, leninista, cubana e companheira, aos mercados produziu ao longo da história: só miséria, opressão, desastres econômicos e sociais, mas fundamentalmente falta de liberdades, e em consequência, sociedades miseráveis, como a cubana, por exemplo.
Os companheiros sabem disso, e é por isso que, mesmo não gostando dos mercados -- para eles, os mercados são aqueles capitalistas de cartola e charuto, explorando trabalhadores, ou então os especuladores de Wall Street, os tais "loiros de olhos azuis", de que falava o Guia Genial dos Povos, que ocorreu de também ser presidente de um paíseco neste nosso planetinha redondo -- mesmo eles não gostando dos mercados, dizia eu, eles sabem que têm de "suportar" os mercados. Do contrário, de onde é que sairia a grana dos capitalistas que os sustentam, e até fazem alguns ficar muito ricos (não é, chefe da quadrilha?).
Por isso, de vez em quando, ou sempre, eles dizem que não querem ir contra os mercados, apenas construir, no Brasil, um "grande mercado de massas", como se houvesse alguma diferença, para o capitalista, entre mercado interno e mercados externos (por isso que o comércio exterior também está essa porcaria, é porque eles estão construindo o tal de "mercado interno de massas").
Mas, enfim, os tais mercado se vingam dos companheiros, e ai está a soberana tendo de amargar esse lado bisonho do nosso panorama eleitoral: cada vez que sai uma pesquisa desfavorável aos companheiros, e à soberana sua candidata, os mercados se "excitam" (se ouso dizer).
Um pouco como se os capitalistas e os tais de especuladores de Wall Street dissessem:
"Oba, a soberana caiu mais um pouco. Ótimo, vamos ver se conseguimos reverter nossas perdas!" (e aqui entra não só as ações da Petrobras, mas todos os outros ativos que são negociados, e que já perderam muito valor por causa da política econômica esquizofrênica dos companheiros).
Eles vão aprender?
Provavelmente não, mas vão tentar ser bonzinhos e dizer: "Olha pessoal, nós não somos contra os mercados, só estamos tentando redistribuir um pouco em favor dos pobres."
Claro que nesse "só tentando" entram todas as tentativas de "pikettyzação" da política redistributiva, à la Robin Hood, tirar dos ricos para dar aos pobres.
Isso, eles não vão perder. São os Robin Hoods de circo, incompetentes em economia, e sempre vão tentar tirar um pouco mais dos ricos (eles redistribuem primeiro para eles, claro) e da classe média.
Bem, eu só acho que os mercados já se vacinaram contra os companheiros.
O único problema é que o eleitorado brasileiro é muito diferente dos "mercados"; num certo sentido, eles são anti-mercado, e pró-Estado. Todo mundo quer favores, ou até uma boquinha no Estado (que paga mais, exige pouco, promete tranquilidade, estabilidade, boa aposentadoria, essas coisas).
É isso, justamente, que está afundando o Brasil, ou pelo menos deixando-o para trás, relativamente a outros países de crescimento dinâmico.
Pior para nós, que só veremos a renda dobrar em três gerações, ou seja, para os nossos netos...
É isso que queremos?
Não creio, mas é isso que temos.
Que tal mudar um pouco?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Hartford, 19/07/2014

Mercado reage bem à possibilidade de derrota de Dilma; é parte da reação da sociedade a um governo caduco
Reinaldo Azevedo, 18/07/2014

Vou aqui fazer algumas considerações que, creiam, nada têm de campanha eleitoral ou de expressão de afinidades eletivas, embora eu, como toda gente, faça as minhas opções. Na democracia, desde que os candidatos transitem no escopo democrático e se coloquem na defesa dos valores que essa democracia pode abraçar, todas as escolhas são igualmente legítimas, como legítimas são as divergências ideológicas. Em ciências humanas, e a economia também é uma ciência humana, quase nunca se tem uma resposta única para um problema. Mas é certo que essa resposta tenderá a ser ineficaz ou mesmo contraproducente se contrariar a matemática, a lógica, a história e, eventualmente, a experiência.

Já há algum tempo estamos diante de um dado eloquente. Aquilo a que chamamos “mercado” tem reagido muito bem à queda da presidente Dilma Rousseff nas pesquisas eleitorais e à possibilidade de a oposição vencer a disputa em 2014. Às vezes, para rimar os números com a esperança de mudança, nem se precisa do fato; basta o boato. E não foi diferente nesta sexta. Como a pesquisa Datafolha apontou um empate técnico no segundo turno entre o tucano Aécio Neves e a presidente — 40% a 44% para ela —  e uma diferença de apenas sete pontos entre a petista e Eduardo Campos — 38% a 45% —, o Ibovespa passou a operar em alta. Às 15h1o, estava aos 57.175 pontos. Na máxima do dia, o índice chegou a 3,31%. Os destaques, vejam vocês, ficaram com as estatais: a Petrobras, por exemplo, exibia ganhos de 5,56% nas ações ON (as ordinárias nominativas), aquelas que dão direito a voto, e 5,6% na PN, a preferencial nominativa, a que não dá e é a mais negociada por investidores não profissionais.

Por que é assim? Ninguém precisa ser deste ou daquele partido para saber que, infelizmente, hoje e há muito tempo já, o governo usa as estatais brasileiras não apenas para fazer política de desenvolvimento, não apenas para cuidar do interesse nacional. Ele as utiliza também para cuidar de interesses bem mais mesquinhos, partidários, e como elemento de ajuste — precário e temporário — dos desacertos da política econômica. É sabido, por exemplo, que as tarifas estão represadas para evitar uma elevação da inflação, que já ultrapassa o teto da meta. Como malefício adicional, seguem intocados os fatores que causam a elevação do índice inflacionário.

É claro que isso tem um preço. Até agora, a presidente Dilma e o PT não deram sinais de que vão mudar essa política caduca caso obtenham mais quatro anos de mandato. Ao contrário até: aqui e ali, lideranças do partido, como o próprio Lula, têm preferido atacar o tal “mercado”, como se ele fizesse um mal ao Brasil. Ao contrário. Felizmente temos um mercado relativamente forte no país, que serve de radar e de advertência. A cada bobagem ou medida atabalhoada que o governo toma na economia, ele reage. Mais importante: reage também a expectativas, a partir de alguns indícios. Isso serve de freio à tendência autocrática dos governos. Sabem quem não tem mercado? Cuba! Sabem quem praticamente não tem mercado? A Venezuela! Já a tirania chinesa tem um, sim, e é gigantesco! A existência de um mercado, em suma, não garante a democracia. Mas só existe democracia onde ele atua e serve de instrumento de leitura da realidade.

Quando os investidores reagem bem à perspectiva de alternância de poder, é preciso que o governo ponha a mão na consciência. Em vez de sair por aí demonizando os agentes econômicos e mesmo seus adversários, talvez fosse o caso de tomar medidas efetivas para mudar de rumo. O que vemos, no entanto, infelizmente, são escolhas que caminham no sentido contrário. Além de tentar atrelar a administração pública federal e seus entes a conselhos formados por militantes políticos, o governo já pensa abertamente em estatizá-los, subordinando ainda mais o interesse público às militâncias organizadas.

A reação do mercado é, na verdade, a reação de uma fatia considerável e legítima da sociedade, que contribui de modo efetivo para gerar as riquezas com as quais se administra a máquina pública e que, inclusive, geram os bens necessários para as políticas de compensação e de distribuição de renda. Atacar os seus fundamentos também corresponde a atuar contra os interesses dos mais pobres.

A reação dos mercados é parte importante da reação de uma sociedade que quer mudar porque sente que, hoje, o estado e o governo viraram seu adversário.

Mercados se vingam de quem vai contra os mercados

Ah, esses mercados suscetíveis, manhosos, perversos, vingativos...
Curioso que, neste caso, são as próprias ações das estatais que melhoram de cotação quando a suprema administradora vai mal. Pode-se talvez traçar duas curvas inversas, o que seria graficamente dramático...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Dilma cai no Datafolha, e ações de estatais comandam euforia na Bolsa de Valores

VEJA.com, 6/06/2014

Depois de encerrar o pregão de quinta-feira com queda de 0,57%, a BM&FBovespa disparou nesta sexta-feira e fechou a sessão com alta de 3,04%, maior variação desde a escalada de 3,5% de 27 de março deste ano. Assim como aconteceu no final de março, a Bolsa foi impulsionada pela queda das intenções de voto na presidente Dilma Rousseff e pela piora na avaliação do governo. Uma pesquisa divulgada pelo instituto Datafolha nesta sexta-feira mostrou que Dilma caiu três pontos porcentuais em relação à última pesquisa do instituto – a petista oscilou de 37% para 34%. Mas seus adversários na disputa ao Palácio do Planalto não subiram na preferência do eleitor. Aécio Neves (PSDB) tinha 20% e agora soma 19%, enquanto Eduardo Campos (PSB) aparece com 7%, ante 11% na pesquisa anterior.
A piora na avaliação da presidente se refletiu nas ações das empresas estatais listadas na Bolsa. Lideraram as altas do pregão desta sexta as ações ordinárias (ON, com direito a voto) da Eletrobras, que subiram 9,33%, cotadas a 7,15 reais; seguidas pelo papel preferencial da Petrobras, que subiu 8,15%, a 17,65 reais. Também registraram alta as ações do Banco do Brasil, de 5,31%, fechando em 24,40 reais
Desde o final de março tem sido assim. A cada piora de Dilma nas pesquisas eleitorais o principal índice da Bolsa de São Paulo, o Ibovespa, sobe, impulsionado pela alta dos papeis das estatais. Da mesma forma, o movimento inverso da Bolsa é visto toda vez que a petista mostra melhora nas intenções de voto. A oscilação já chamou atenção do xerife do mercado financeiro, a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), que vê se repetir no mercado financeiro um movimento especulativo semelhante ao visto em 2002, influenciado pela corrida ao Palácio do Planalto.
Dólar
A divulgação da pesquisa também provocou nova pressão no mercado de câmbio. O dólar fechou em queda nesta sexta-feira pela segunda sessão seguida, ficando abaixo de 2,25 reais, com os investidores reagindo aos dados positivos do mercado de trabalho dos Estados Unidos e à pesquisa eleitoral que mostrou queda na intenção de votos de Dilma. A moeda norte-americana perdeu 0,50%, a 2,2496 reais na venda, após chegar a 2,2392 reais na mínima da sessão. Segundo dados da BM&F, o volume ficou em torno de 1,1 bilhão de dólares.
O dólar encerrou a semana ainda em leve alta de 0,39%, mas deixa para trás o patamar de 2,30 reais que se aproximou na quarta-feira, quando fechou a quarta sessão em alta, acumulando valorização de 2,68% no período. “A pesquisa (eleitoral) causou a movimentação inicial no mercado”, afirmou o diretor de câmbio da Pioneer Corretora, João Medeiros, acrescentando que a queda do dólar perdeu fôlego na reta final do pregão porque entraram compradores aproveitando a cotação mais baixa da semana.

Mudancas no mercado mundial de energia - The Economist

World energy markets

A year of change

The Economist, Jun 14th 2012, 10:33 by S.W.

THE world's energy markets in 2011 are like one of those pictures where, depending on how you tilt it, you see two different images. According to BP's annual statistical review of world energy, released on June 13th, all was calm. The world economy grew by 3.7%, roughly the average of the previous decade's expansion. Energy consumption, closely linked to economic activity, grew by 2.5%, much as it has over the past ten years.

But looked at from a different angle, energy markets went through a year of much change, the report also points out. Natural disaster and politics conspired to buffet energy supplies. The Fukushima disaster shut down Japan's nuclear power generators. Oil prices averaged more than $100 a barrel for the year as Libya's civil war and fears over the spread of the Arab Spring hit or threatened supplies. And shifts in the global economy changed consumption patterns. Rich countries again consumed less; so energy demand declined for the third out of the past four years. Developing countries continued to grow fast; the Chinese added an extra 8.8% in GDP—growth which increased the country's energy demand by as much as Britain's entire energy use.

In the BP report, Christof Rühl, the firm's chief economist, describes how the markets responded. Saudi Arabia pumped more crude to make up for Libya, liquefied gas (LNG) bound for Europe went to Japan (where it fetches a far higher price, to make up for the nuclear shortfall) and coal from across the Atlantic plugged Europe's energy gap (where high prices and a warm winter had suppressed demand). America's shale-gas bonanza has led to the rapid substitution of gas for coal in the power sector, freeing up plenty of the black stuff for export.

These shifts show how powerless governments are in the face of big shifts in international energy flows. The European Union, at pains to reduce carbon emissions to preserve the environment, saw them shift down only slightly despite a big drop in energy consumption; cleaner gas disappeared to Japan and power generators were forced shovel more dirty coal from America and Colombia into their furnaces. America, with no such commitments to greenery, saw carbon dioxide emissions fall by 450m tonnes over the past five years, more than in any other country. This was thanks to a rapid switch from coal to gas in power stations, which simply happened because the latter has become dirt cheap. Abundant gas from shale beds is America's golden goose.

Governos vs Mercados: a eterna batalha

O último boletim do The Globalist tem uma série dedicada a essa clássica questão.
Um dilema de todas as épocas, em todos os lugares, e que nunca vai terminar.
Governos são concentradores de poder; mercados são disseminadores de riqueza, e o conflito nasce exatamente daí...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Battle of Markets Vs. Governments

The Globalist, June 15, 2012

http://www.theglobalist.com/storyid.aspx?storyid=9656

In light of the momentous events in financial markets this week, we present a special series of essays by Ravi Menon, managing director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the country's central bank. He has a dual message for would-be reformers: Yes, Europe, governments need markets — and yes, America, markets need governments. The key is that markets and governments need to do what they do more effectively.

Markets and Governments: A Historical Perspective

From the Washington Consensus to a Singapore Consensus?   Dateline Singapore: Market Economies and Social Inclusion   Why Supervising the Financial Sector Really Matters Markets and Governments: A Historical Perspective   By Ravi Menon | Wednesday, June 13, 2012   As debates in the United States and other countries have shown, there is no clear consensus as to what role of governments should play in regulating financial markets. This tension, writes Ravi Menon of Singapore's central bank, is not new. In fact, it has been a central issue in the evolution of political economy over the last 200 years. conomic policy is at an inflexion point. The financial crisis of 2008-09 has altered the way we perceive markets. The idea that competitive markets are sufficient to ensure efficient outcomes and stable economies is under heavy intellectual fire. What kind of new economic ideas will emerge from the crisis? Getting the balance between markets and government right will be key to improving the people's standard of living and overall welfare. This question is not just about economics. The crisis has prompted a fundamental re-think of the relationship between markets and governments. The contest is not just between economic theories, but between competing systems of political economy and models of governance. Striking the right balance between markets and government is the central issue in policy debates over economic development — and, thus, is of vital importance to people all over the world. Accordingly, the two key questions currently being asked by policy makers around the world are:   What is the role of governments in promoting economic growth?   What can governments do to seize the opportunities of globalization, while minimizing its downsides? Despite the pressing nature of these questions, we have to recognize that the tension between markets and government is not new. In fact, it has been the central issue in the evolution of political economy over the last 200 years. There have been three distinct phases in this evolution. Phase One: The rise of the market The "rise of the market" began in the late 18th century, shaped by the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The "invisible hand" of the market guided supply and demand toward equilibrium and efficiency. Free trade promoted specialization along the lines of comparative advantage and fostered economic growth. There was no need for central planning, beyond providing public goods like law and order. There was no macroeconomics as such — no monetary policy, no fiscal policy. This phase came to an end in the 1930s, when the concept of self-correcting markets collapsed under the weight of the Great Depression. Falling prices, instead of bringing demand and supply into equilibrium, locked the world into a deflationary spiral. Thus began the second phase. Phase Two: The rise of government It was John Maynard Keynes who argued that markets were inherently unstable. Left on their own, they may not always self-correct. Government intervention was necessary to boost aggregate demand during periods of high unemployment. From these observations, modern macroeconomics was born. In a more globalized and complex economy, governments have fewer levers to pull, and these levers are less potent than before. The rise of government went beyond managing aggregate demand. The 1940s also saw the advent of the welfare state. Following the Beveridge Report, the United Kingdom — and soon, the rest of Europe — embarked on providing social insurance for health care, education, employment and social security. The welfare state was enabled through redistributive taxation and government regulation. Across the Atlantic in the United States, Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" of the 1960s expanded the role of the state in the pursuit of social justice. Phase Three: The return of the market This phase began with growing disenchantment with government's ability to deliver and was driven forward mainly by U.S.-based economists — although the problems they sought to address manifested themselves all over the developed world. The stagflation of the 1970s — persistently high inflation and unemployment — called into question the ability of governments to fine-tune the economy. Meanwhile, the welfare state began to impose an unsustainable fiscal burden, not to mention a creeping entitlement mentality among the people. Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman led the charge against "Big Government." They argued eloquently how an overreaching government dulled the fundamental human instincts that power the capitalist system: initiative, enterprise and the competitive spirit. The idea that markets — for all their faults — were more effective than governments in allocating resources and driving structural change, gained ascendancy. In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reduced taxes, deregulated industries, privatized state-owned enterprises, curbed union power, and scaled back welfare programs. The global economy boomed. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of China seemed to vindicate the triumph of market capitalism. The Washington Consensus held sway from Bangkok to Budapest. Phase Four: Balancing markets and governments The third phase ended in 2009 with the onset of the global financial crisis and recession. We are once again at an inflexion point, but with no clarity on the paradigm going forward. The choice is not between biggovernment andsmall government. What matters is what governments do, not how big they are. The financial crisis has revealed significant imperfections in market mechanisms: information asymmetry, moral hazard, systemic risks and behavioral or nonrational motivators of choice. It has also revealed the inherent limitations of government: In a more globalized and complex economy, governments have fewer levers to pull, and these levers are less potent than before. Neither market fundamentalism nor central planning has worked. Yet one thing is certain: The choice is not betweenbig government and small government. It is about creating effective government. What matters is what governments do, not how big they are. The size of governments may well have to shrink. (The revenue base in most countries will be capped by competition and demographics.) But the responsibilities of government may well have to expand — to enable, regulate, stabilize and legitimize markets so they can work better. Getting the balance between markets and government right, then, will be key to improving the people's standard of living and overall welfare. From the Washington Consensus to a Singapore Consensus?   By Ravi Menon | Thursday, June 14, 2012   While the global financial crisis has prompted a reexamination of the roles of markets and governments, there is no clear agreement as to the proper balance between the two. Ravi Menon makes the case that yes, Europe, governments need markets — and yes, America, markets need governments. The key is that both be effective in what they do. he key fallout of the global financial crisis is a battle between markets and governments. This is no idle matter. It is one of the bigger and most consequential battles of our time. Yet we may find that there is no universal balance between markets and governments that applies at all times and in all places. The ideological conflict over the role of governments vis-à-vis markets is a false choice. Governments need markets and markets need government. Each country may have to find its own balance. The balance between markets and government may have to calibrated and re-calibrated continually, adapting to circumstance and context. This has been the central insight of Singapore's experience. And while Singapore is a small nation compared to most others, it potentially offers insights that could be relevant elsewhere. Singapore's approach to policymaking is not based on any of the usual "isms" so beloved of intellectuals. The two "isms" that perhaps best describe Singapore's approach are pragmatism (an emphasis on what works in practice rather than abstract theory) and eclecticism (a willingness to adapt to the local context best practices from around the world). The ideological conflicts over the role of governments vis-à-vis markets often present a false choice. For that reason, public policy in Singapore has been guided by a deep appreciation of the critical interdependence between markets and government. Indeed, Singapore's approach can be summed up as follows: Governments need markets and markets need government. Yes, Europe, governments need markets That the market plays a central role in Singapore is well-known. According to the World Bank, Singapore is the easiest place in the world to do business. According to the Heritage Foundation, Singapore is the second freest economy in the world, after Hong Kong. There are virtually no import tariffs, no export subsidies, no exchange restrictions, no price ceilings, no minimum wage, no rent control. Income tax rates are among the lowest in the world, and government expenditures as a percentage of GDP are well below most countries. Equally — if not more importantly — government policies have been strongly guided by the application of market principles. Be it in industrial policy, medical insurance, congestion pricing, social security, regulation of utilities, or allocation of land, Singapore has assiduously applied market mechanisms and price signals. A key feature of Singapore's approach has been a shift towards lighter regulation, accompanied by a more intense focus on risk-based supervision. "Getting the economics right" has been a hallmark of governance in Singapore. Yes, America, markets need governments Economic development does not occur naturally. It needs preconditions, and if these do not exist, government needs to create them. Markets function best under some rather exacting conditions — rule of law, perfect information, absence of coordination failures, and no monopoly power. But the irony is that governments sometimes have to be in markets to enable these conditions. This is where free marketers become disenchanted with Singapore. The government has never hesitated from guiding the development process or intervening in markets where it believes such intervention will lead to superior outcomes. The objective of government intervention is neither to suppress nor to supplant markets, but to support and sustain them. In Singapore, government intervention has sought to harness the power of the market to manage and grow the economy. Not all of the Singapore government's interventions have worked, but that is a reason to scale back, modify or even withdraw the intervention — not to reject the role of government altogether. Adapting from a framework first proposed by Dani Rodrik to describe the role of institutions, we can illustrate four key aspects of how Singapore's government has intervened to try to make markets work better:   First, the government has sought to "enable" markets. This includes ensuring rule of law, property rights, and public infrastructure — functions that most governments perform. But in Singapore, enabling markets has also included industrial policy and capability development — subjects of continuing controversy in policy circles around the world. Both markets and governments have been found wanting. What we need is not more of one and less of the other. We need both to be more effective.   Second, the government has sought to "regulate" markets. This includes supervision of the financial sector, competition regulation, and taxation of negative externalities. A key feature of Singapore's approach has been a shift towards lighter regulation, accompanied by a more intense focus on — and practice of — risk-based supervision.   Third, the government has sought to "stabilize" markets. This is the bread-and-butter of macroeconomic management. Singapore's basic approach in monetary and fiscal policy is not far from global practices. But its efforts to address asset price inflation and credit crises are interesting examples of targeted interventions that harness market forces.   Fourth, the government has sought to "legitimize" markets. Globalization, free trade and open markets lead to significant dislocations. Some of the sharpest debates over the role of government focus on the extent to which governments should facilitate adjustments, redistribute incomes or provide social safety nets, so as to maintain public support for market-oriented policies. Singapore has sought to find its own middle ground on this complex challenge. Addressing these four dimensions explicitly and using them as a guidepost to strike the right balance in the tension between markets and governments will be critical, all the more so because the global financial crisis has profoundly shaken our confidence in both markets and governments. But mistakes and failures are bound to occur. They occur not because market participants are greedy or government officials incompetent. They occur because the world we live in is fundamentally complex and uncertain. Both markets and governments have been found wanting. What we need is not more of one and less of the other. We need both to be more effective and to work in closer collaboration, so that public interest and private initiative are better aligned. "The invisible hand of the market has often relied heavily on the visible hand of government." As the Nobel prizewinning economist Amartya Sen has said: "The invisible hand of the market has often relied heavily on the visible hand of government." Overall, Singapore's experience is that market principles are necessary to help government work better, and that good government is necessary to help markets work better. This is not to suggest that Singapore has got the balance right. Far from it. Singapore is still an experiment, a work in progress. If anything, the key take away from Singapore's story is to keep an open mind, measure outcomes, continually review policies and to learn from mistakes. Pragmatism and experimentation must become the watchwords in public policy. Why Supervising the Financial Sector Really Matters   By Ravi Menon | Wednesday, June 06, 2012   When it comes to the role of government in regulating markets in the wake of the recent crisis, it is regulation of the financial sector that is of greatest interest. Stability is fundamental to a well-functioning financial system. But this stability does not occur naturally, argues Ravi Menon of Singapore's Monetary Authority. hile financial markets are generally efficient, they are subject to market failure and occasional bouts of instability. The global financial crisis of the late 2000s is a perfect example of that. As the recent financial crisis has shown, stakeholder governance and market discipline can fail quite spectacularly. Moral hazard occurs when those who make loans are not the ones who bear the risk of default — or at least, theythought they did not bear the risk. Information asymmetry occurs when debt instruments are packaged into complex products whose risks investors do not understand. When risk is neither monitored nor understood, it gets underpriced and builds up in the system. Effective regulation and supervision of the financial sector is therefore critical to promote prudent behavior and sound risk management. The question is how to do it without stifling the market? There are no easy answers. At Singapore's central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), we try to do this in three ways. First, we set healthy prudential standards. Second, we take a risk-focused approach to supervision. Third, we leverage on the market by relying on stakeholders to complement official oversight. Healthy prudential standards. Singapore's central bank has consistently emphasized healthy prudential standards, especially in good times. Many of these are higher than international norms:   Banks keep a minimum 10% capital adequacy ratio, with at least 6% in Tier 1 capital.   Banks set aside general impairment provisions of not less than 1% of net loans and receivables, so that cushions are built up ahead of loan losses.   Housing loans are subject to an 80% loan-to-value limit. In other words, a lender has at least a 20% buffer against a reduction in collateral value. These buffers have served Singapore well, allowing its financial institutions to ride out successive regional and global financial market stresses. Risk-focused supervision. The crisis has highlighted the importance of getting the supervisory approach and intensity right. MAS evaluates the relative risk posed by each financial institution. It subjects the financial institution that potentially has the largest impact on the financial system to the greatest supervisory intensity. In Singapore, the financial institution that potentially has the largest impact on the financial system receives the greatest supervisory intensity. MAS demands substantial information and data from financial institutions in order to review their financial situations and their risk profiles. And where there are gaps, MAS makes sure the institutions provide additional, detailed answers. Also, rather than having a fixed view of what is an acceptable level of business risk, MAS assesses this against the institution's risk management standards. Institutions engaging in complex financial businesses must be able to demonstrate that their risk-management capabilities match their risk profiles. A risk-focused approach allows greater business latitude for well-managed institutions while retaining higher prudential requirements or tighter restrictions for weaker ones. Relying on stakeholders. Primary responsibility for the safety and soundness of a financial institution must lie with its board of directors and senior management. It is their job to maintain adequate risk oversight of the institution's business activities. It is neither feasible nor desirable for the regulator to do this. The government also leverages market discipline to foster prudent behavior among financial institutions. Stakeholders — such as shareholders, creditors and counterparties — have an interest in the continued financial health of the institution. Likewise, one can assume professionals such as rating agencies and external auditors - chastened by their experiences and failings during the past crisis - will provide an independent assessment of the risks inherent in the institution and the adequacy of internal controls. Of course, as the recent financial crisis has shown, stakeholder governance and market discipline can fail quite spectacularly. Herd behavior and irrational exuberance can lead the market to overvalue assets or underestimate risks. This is why regulation remains necessary and important. But it would be a mistake to substitute tighter regulation for stakeholder governance and market discipline. Rather, governments should examine how to better align market forces and private incentives with regulatory objectives. A stable financial system is better assured with a combination of robust regulation, prudent corporate governance and effective market discipline. Stabilizing markets during a credit crisis The other key role of governments in financial markets is stabilization. While it has been convenient to blame governments for not preventing the financial crisis, let us not forget that it was action by governments around the world that prevented a complete meltdown of markets. Consider Singapore's experience in fighting the credit crisis. When credit conditions had recovered sufficiently, the government pulled back. Knowing when and how to exit is an important consideration in any government intervention. When the financial crisis broke out in September 2008 in the United States, the ripple effects were felt throughout the world. A systemic seizure of credit was underway and threatened to have dire spill-over effects on the real economy if the situation was not stabilized. Trade financing dried up significantly, impacting Singapore's exporters and offshore trading companies. Singapore's Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) and Ministry of Finance (MOF) got together to analyze the situation. The market failure was at two levels: the supply of credit and the price of credit. For some sectors and geographies, there was an unwillingness to provide trade financing or working capital at anyinterest rate. For other kinds of loans or borrowers, banks were willing to lend but at much higher interest rates. The way out of the logjam was for the government to underwrite a sufficiently large share of the default risk to induce banks to resume lending. But how to do this without moral hazard? The fear was that government would end up with "lemons" — that banks would push less creditworthy loans to the government while keeping safer ones for themselves. There was real fear that the government could end up losing a lot of money without improving the access to credit for deserving firms. In all the credit schemes drawn up by MTI and MOF, the principle that government must harness the power of the market was strictly applied. That is, the government was seeking not to replace the lending market, but to complement it. First, the government refrained from direct lending. (Assessing credit risk is not a civil servant's area of expertise.) All government-facilitated loans were made through financial intermediaries in order to tap on their expertise in risk assessment. Second, despite strong pressures from both banks and the industry, the government refrained from taking on 100% of the risk on any loan. For every subsidized loan, the bank assessing the loan had to have "skin in the game." Singapore's credit enhancement schemes worked. When credit conditions had recovered sufficiently by early 2010, the government scaled back the credit enhancement schemes, reducing loan volumes and the risk-share. This let the market revert to normalcy, so that risk would not be mispriced over the longer term. Knowing when and how to exit is an important consideration in any government intervention.