Não se enganem: mesmo prêmios Nobel de economia podem se enganar.
Ou então simplesmente trabalhar por dinheiro, e tentar enganar os outros.
O exemplo está aí abaixo: o banco dos Brics, uma inutilidade totalmente desnecessária, em virtude dos imensos volumes de liquidez existentes no sistema financeiro internacional atualmente, seja nos mercados de créditos comerciais, seja nos fundos nacionais e privados de investimentos, seja ainda nos diversos mecanismos institucionais, multilaterais ou regionais de financiamento produtivo, sem falar dos fluxos de investimentos direto, a cargo de empresas ou consórcios bancários. Ou seja, não falta dinheiro no mundo, mas podem faltar bons projetos, o que depende das burocracias governamentais (nem sempre as mais qualificadas ou competentes, ou economicamente isentas).
Que um prêmio Nobel de economia e um poutro economista de prestígio se tenham dedicado a formular um documento "comprovando" que um banco dos BRICS é necessário e bem-vindo apenas comprova que eles também podem trabalhar por dinheiro, e emprestar seu prestígio a um objetivo claramente político, sem qualquer racionalidade econômica.
Enfim, parece que os governos dos BRICS têm dinheiro para gastar em projetos que serão selecionados politicamente, sem qualquer conexão com custo-oportunidade, cálculo de retorno de benefícios e outros mecanismos normalmente aplicados em empréstimos e financiamentos elaborados com base em critérios objetivos e transparentes.
Não pensem que toda esta conversa dos dois economistas vale dois dólares. Mas eles devem ter ganho alguns milhares de dólares para escrever esse relatório.
Por que não? Se eles podem ganhar dinheiro fácil de governos ambiciosos, por que deixar de fazê-lo?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Instituto Mais Democracia
http://maisdemocracia.org.br/blog/2013/01/17/o-banco-dos-brics-em-marco/
Os países que compõem o bloco BRICS (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul) realizam de 26 a 28 de março, em Durban, África do Sul, sua quinta reúnião de chefes de estado e devem aprovar a criação de seu próprio banco de desenvolvimento – espelhado, em alguma medida, no Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES).
O Instituto Mais democracia, em aliança com a Fundação Heinrich Böell, está monitorando esse importante movimento financeiro e geopolítico e teve acesso a uma das versões do documento elaborado pelos economistas Nicholas Stern (da London School of Economics) e Joseph Stiglitz (da Universidade de Columbia), divulgado em setembro de 2011, que vem servindo como um dos subsídios aos estudos de viabilidade da futura instituição financeira.
Leia abaixo.
An International Development Bank for Fostering South-South Investment:
Promoting the New Industrial Revolution, Managing Risk and Rebalancing Global Saving
Nicholas Stern (LSE) and Joseph Stiglitz (Columbia University), September 2011
0. Introduction and summary
If the international economy functions well this decade could see
substantial improvements in the quality of life across the world, with
the possibility of lifting hundreds of millions of people out of
poverty. This will require infrastructure investment on a great scale in
the developing world to support growth and opportunity, particularly
for poor people. That investment requires finance on a comparable scale
and in ways that are tailored to the risks and challenges. But there are
risks to these possibilities if the world’s macroeconomic prospects
remain fragile, if financial markets perform inadequately in their job
of bringing funds to good investments, and if the world continues on its
current pattern of climate and environmental damage.
This paper provides a proposal – the establishment of an
International Development Bank for fostering South-South investment –
that can respond to the challenges of finance for development, help
reduce these dangers and risks, and help emerging markets and developing
countries show the leadership that their changing economic position
justifies. In summary:
A new institution is required to ensure a better allocation of
hard-earned savings of developing and emerging economies away from risky
portfolios, much of which is in rich countries, and onto sound
investments in the developing and emerging world.
Low-carbon infrastructure and technologies, in particular, are crucial
to lay different and more resilient foundations for growth in the next
decades. Investments are urgently required to both mitigate the risks
and adapt to climate change, generate economic growth, reduce poverty
and promote stability and security. These are the great challenges of
the 21st century. Failure on one is likely to imply failure on the
others.
Developing and emerging countries are in the position to both lead on
the efforts to rebalance savings and investments and to make significant
progress in creating the infrastructure for a different type of
economic growth. Their hard work and strong economic growth is changing
the world and they have created the right and ability to lead. This in
no way absolves developed countries from their existing commitments both
on development and climate change.
Existing institutions are inadequate for financing these crucial
investments. There are major deficiencies in their ability to manage and
transfer sovereign, commercial and climate change policy risk, they
have unsuitable governance structures, and they are unable to deliver
finance on the scale required and with appropriate instruments. Further,
they face political obstacles to expansion and reform. And they are
often unable to involve important stakeholders, such as the private
sectors, sovereign wealth funds and philanthropic organizations on a
sufficient scale and with an ability to share in shaping the agenda.
Decisions on ownership and governance structure for this new institution
should be led by emerging and developing countries, with an
appropriately skilled and equipped Board. It should be able to issue a
wide range of instruments that suit the diverse range of infrastructure
and technologies. Initial capital may be around US$30bn, with say, $8bn
paid in. This could quickly lead to lending volumes of $3-6bn per year
with overall investment size around $10-20bn per year. Success could
lead it to double or triple its capital over the following 10 years or
so, in which case it could be associated with investments of $50bn or
more per year by the end of its first decade.
1. Investment for development
Key large, fast-growing countries around the world have agreed on the
urgent need to direct some of the global savings to developing
countries as part of the response to the current global
macro-imbalances.1 Their huge exposure to developed country bonds now
looks like an unbalanced portfolio. Simultaneously, the weak functioning
of financial systems in developed countries was a central cause of a
serious misallocation of resources towards risky financial
propositions—including bets on inflated housing markets—and,
consequently, of the current economic and financial crisis.
At the same time, there is broad consensus that development should
take a different path; a systemic transformation of the economy based on
reduced emissions and higher resource efficiency. There is an
overwhelming case for action to radically reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and to increase the productivity, sustainability and resource
demand of developed, emerging and developing economies. And unless that
action is strong in the next two decades, there is a major risk that
climate damage will be so radical as to imperil living standards across
the world and cause many to move. There is thus a danger that during
this century development could be halted and reversed and the
achievements of recent decades undermined. The dangers from climate
change affect all countries, although poor people are hit earliest and
hardest. The potential scale of risk is such that we are the first
generation that could destroy, through our neglect, the relationship
between humans and the planet. Laying the foundations for a new energy
and industrial revolution is therefore the right thing to do from the
perspectives of development, fighting poverty, promoting stability and
security, and managing sustainability and climate change. Development
and climate change are the same agenda: a growth pattern based on
high-carbon and intensive resource use will destroy itself. Developing
and emerging markets is where the bulk of infrastructure and other
investment in coming years will be: they are in a special position to
set the pace of this new energy and industrial revolution.
All this points to the opportunity to channel some of the flows of
global savings to emerging markets and developing countries where many
of the sound production investment opportunities exist. Investments on a
major scale are also necessary to adapt to climate change and many of
them can simultaneously advance development and mitigation as well as
adaptation. All sectors are relevant to both mitigation and adaptation:
agriculture, industry, buildings, transport, power. Energy efficiency,
renewables and technological change will be crucial. Urban
infrastructure will be centre stage. There is a great urgency and
potential in fighting deforestation.
A South-to-South facility could facilitate the necessary flows: a
modern bank with a strong sustainable infrastructure perspective,
equipped with a full range of financing instruments and the ability to
manage risk, able to be flexible enough to involve existing national,
regional and multinational development banks as well as the private
sector and others (such as sovereign wealth funds and philanthropic
organizations). In this paper we argue that such a new facility could
play a crucial and constructive role in fostering South-South
investment. For specificity we speak of an International Development
Bank (IDB) but many titles are possible. We outline the arguments for
such an institution and the facilities it should provide and then, for
illustrative purposes, give examples of possible structures. These are
potential options for a number of features, such as the range of
instruments, but the specifics of design would naturally be a matter for
the founders.
2. The break between savings flows and investment needs
In the years before the crisis, there were complaints in some
advanced industrial countries about a global “savings surplus”—so large
that it was referred to in some quarters as a “savings glut”—and several
fast-growing emerging economies are indeed characterised by high saving
rates. Some of these countries are now looking for investment
opportunities to diversify out of the ‘traditional’ investment in US or
Euro bonds. Even before the crisis there was a feeling that something
was amiss: there were better ways of deploying the world’s savings,
given the enormous needs for investments to promote development and to
respond to the challenge of climate change. But today, after the crisis,
the world is operating well below its potential. Something is wrong if,
simultaneously, there are excess funds looking for uses, unutilised
labour and capital and vital needs that need to be satisfied.
The G20, meanwhile, has been calling for those countries with high
savings to reduce their savings and to consume more. But the planet will
not survive as a viable habitat if everyone aspires to the kind of
resource-intensive lifestyles that have marked some of the advanced
industrial countries. Developing countries and emerging markets are
increasingly aware of this,2 and they are increasingly recognizing it in
their development plans. One example is China’s 12th Five-Year Plan.
The focus should thus not be on discouraging savings, but on
recognising that there was (and is) a massive failure in the deployment
of savings. In other words, global financial intermediation has not
functioned well, and there is a great misallocation in how savings have
been “recycled”. Surely, investing them in American houses that were
beyond buyers’ ability to pay was not the best global use of those
funds.
The problem is that markets, for all their virtues, have not been
good at handling certain kinds of risks. The deficiencies in global
capital markets are exemplified in the phenomenon of massive flows of
money going in the wrong directions—from developing and emerging markets
to the advanced industrial countries—rather than taking advantage of
opportunities for sound investment in economic growth and poverty
reduction in the developing world, which is low-carbon and
climate-resilient. Developing countries have been exporting their
hard-earned savings and importing risky portfolios that do little to
advance the well-being of their own people.
A South-to-South multilateral facility, where a number of key
economies in the South would take the lead in ensuring that funds are
used to promote development and respond to climate change, would enhance
the well-being of the citizens of the South today and in the future. At
the same time, such a facility could help the vexing and until now
seeming irresolvable problem of global imbalances. But contrary to the
G-20 proposal of promoting the kind of consumption that would put our
planet at risk, it would do so in a way that actually lays the
foundation for the next decades of sustainable growth and development.
In doing so, it would make an important contribution to resolving a set
of issues that has been a source of global tension for years. And at the
same time, such a facility would provide a sound driver of growth in a
world economy that is likely to be fragile for much of this decade.
3. Unblocking financial flows to invest in sustainable infrastructure and new technologies
Over the last few years we have seen a substantial trend in
developing countries pioneering a new approach to growth, focused on
sustainability: growth that more efficiently uses natural resources, and
limits emissions. This contrasts markedly with past growth strategies
in the more advanced industrial countries, which traditionally have
focused on the more efficient use of labour, treating natural resources
and the environment with abandon. This focus on the environment and
sustainability is driven not only by the recognition of the planet’s
limited resources and by an awareness of the adverse effects of
environmental degradation on quality of life, but also by the desire to
be less dependent on fossil fuels.
The advances within developing countries and emerging markets are
starkly different from the stalling international negotiations for a
global deal on climate: developing countries seem to be taking natural,
bottom-up leadership in reducing their emissions. Still, it should be
understood that the international negotiations, even if they are
currently going slowly, are nevertheless a crucial complement to
national-level action. Further, while the initiative described in this
paper will strengthen the efforts of developing countries and emerging
markets, it is not intended in any way to absolve the developed
countries of their responsibilities and obligations, undertaken at Rio
in 1992, Kyoto in 1997, Bali in 2009 and Cancun in 2010—obligations not
only to reduce their own emissions, but to provide substantial financial
assistance and technology to developing countries and emerging markets
to help them continue with their efforts in responding to climate
change. Indeed, it will set an example for the advanced industrial
countries of what they can and should be doing. It can also create
investment vehicles through which the advanced industrial countries can
more easily make contributions in fulfilment of the commitments that
they have already undertaken. To that end, it is our hope that through
this effort on the part of the developing countries and emerging
markets, the developed countries will be inspired and challenged not
only to live up to previously made, albeit modest, commitments, but also
to go further, making new commitments of the kind that will be
necessary if the world, together, is to respond to the challenge of
climate change and to do so with equitable contributions from all
countries.
These are initiatives of immense value to the world as a whole. They
are based on the recognition that the notion of low-carbon growth and
the new energy-industrial revolution will write the growth story of the
future. As we stand on the verge of a new growth model, it is apparent
that there will be immense needs for investment in the coming years, not
only in the fight against poverty but also in the battle against
climate change. These are the two defining challenges of our
century—failure on one means failure on the other.
The infrastructure needs of the developing world are, themselves,
enormous. The energy sector alone, over the next 25 years, will require
$33tr of investment, 64% of which is expected to be in developing and
emerging countries.3 This infrastructure will, of course, have to be
financed. The development and demonstration of new technologies is
vital. We all gain from the emissions reductions they can bring and it
is vital that the world develops mechanisms for their sharing. Some of
this, too, will involve finance. The proposal described below focuses on
infrastructure, but its potential role in the financing of technology
should not be ignored.4
Much of the investment is likely to be in the private sector, much of
it public, and much of it a combination. The proposed institution could
finance only a small fraction of the whole. But it can be crucial in
poorer economies. And it can provide strong examples for all: the power
of the example is absolutely vital in a process of transition.
A central impediment to the financing of these crucial high-return
investments is the absence of practical instruments for the effective
mitigation of risks. The risks of investments in infrastructure can be
especially large, given the high level of investment required upfront
and the long-term nature of the underlying assets. And the deficiencies
in institutions for managing and transferring risk are especially large
in developing countries and emerging markets. Establishing
risk-mitigation institutions or facilities—which in turn help create and
manage appropriate risk-mitigation instruments—will thus be crucial for
unblocking and fostering the necessary flow of funds. There are three
important sets of risks:
a) Sovereign risk: There are, e.g. political risks associated with
expropriation or adverse policies. These can be handled, at least in
principle, by MIGA and by a number of relevant national institutions,
although accessing such support is often complex and entails substantial
costs of transaction.
b) Commercial risk: Every project involves technical and economic risks.
Markets are supposed to choose the best projects, and manage them and
their associated risks. Risk management may entail, for instance, the
use of financial instruments (e.g., cover for exchange rate risk,
insurance, and the issuance of equity, to spread risk). An example here
might be an economy that could sell hydro-electric power to a neighbour,
but needs to cover the risk of cross-border delivery and payment.5
c) Global climate-change policy risk: The global price of carbon
emissions is for the most part close to zero across the world; almost
surely, sometime in the coming half century, it will increase markedly
either explicitly or implicitly via regulation. There is uncertainty
about when the price adjustments will occur, and the level to which the
price will rise. A firm investing in climate change mitigation might
earn a high return if the price of emissions increases, but might lose
money if the price remains low for the next twenty years.
This discussion makes clear that, while there exist mechanisms for
addressing some of these investment risks, there remain important
lacunae. The proposal below is meant to address these gaps as part of a
process of facilitating the demand for and flow of the necessary funds.
A number of other obstacles may, of course, also hold back investment
flows, including: i) limited management and technical capacity; (ii) a
weak investment climate; and iii) the absence of sound climate policies
both in the host country and more broadly. Improvements in the
investment climate and managerial ability are key parts of the
development and investment processes on which all countries will have to
work, and are crucial complements to the more specific proposal that we
have described. Still, we believe that, even under current
circumstances, the proposal below could help unleash billions of dollars
of additional investment which would simultaneously promote development
and help preserve the planet.
Why we need to go beyond the existing financial architecture
The existing financial architecture is not adequate for the purpose
of mobilising flows originating in emerging markets and directed to the
objectives outlined earlier for a number of reasons:
1. The governance structure of the current international financial
institutions does not correspond to the influence of emerging economies
on global financial flows.
2. The current IFIs are not in a position to deliver the scale of
financial commitments that are necessary given the reluctance of
developed countries both to increase paid-in capital and to allow
dilution of their shares if others take the lead in providing more
capital.
3. The current IFIs cannot deliver the required blend of different types
of finance required by developing countries to support their transition
to a green economy (for public and private investments or a blend,
different types of debt and equity, guarantees and other instruments,
etc.)
4. History matters, and in some countries, the history of the IFIs
raises political obstacles to their effective participation in many
projects within emerging markets and developing countries.
4. A potential role for emerging countries in developing a relevant institution
The reasons for Southern leadership
Developing countries could take the lead in developing a
South-to-South facility tailored to their needs and capable of
generating the momentum necessary to manage the global rebalancing of
savings and investments while, at the same time fostering sound
development and poverty reduction and setting the pace of the new energy
and industrial revolution. There are several reasons why this makes
sense:
Developing countries have the clout to do it. Several developing
countries have the strength and growth potential necessary to generate
credibly a strong financial institution, backed by their sovereign
guarantees, which could finance itself issuing high-quality debt. As a
comparison, at its foundation in 1946, the World Bank had capital
commitments from member countries of $7.67bn (approximately $50bn in
today’s money, an amount that represents approximately 1% of the amount
that emerging markets and developing countries hold in their reserves6)
and the US paid-in capital contribution was $317mn (less than $2bn in
today’s money). This allowed the World Bank to play a significant role
in post WWII reconstruction. In PPP terms, the GDP of the US and Europe
at the end of WWII is 1/3 of the current GDP of Brazil, India, China and
South Africa taken together.7 It would be feasible for a core of
fast-growing emerging countries to start an institution of similar
scale.
Such cooperative institutions can obtain funds in the international
market at very low rates—much lower than those paid even by member
countries, illustrated most dramatically by CAF.8
There is strong demand for low-risk high-grade investment opportunities.
In particular, there is real appetite for new, low-risk bonds in the
market, particularly as saving-rich developing and emerging-market
countries look for ways to diversify their reserve accounts from US
dollars and Euros.
Such an institution in co-operation with other development institutions
could help with promoting the appropriate policy environment, investment
climate and capacity building.
There is great need and potential demand for investment in new,
sustainable infrastructure in the developing world with the prospect of
high returns, on the back of strong growth and the potential of
additional returns through stronger climate policies.
Such an institution can be crucial in generating sufficient confidence
for the private sector to invest: private investors need long-term
commitment from developing countries and risk sharing to help with
issues of sovereign and commercial risk. The presence of such an
institution as an investor, as for example the EBRD has shown, can bring
confidence and credit enhancement to project sponsors and co-investors.
This is a substantial opportunity for developing and emerging markets to
build on the experience they have in investing in infrastructure and
developing carbon-friendly technologies. For example, the BNDES –
Brazilian Development Bank, has invested more than $400bn in the last 10
years.9 The China Development Bank can also point to relevant
experience in developing infrastructure. Many emerging market economies,
such as India, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, have developed strong
industries and specialisations in certain low-carbon technologies, and
would find great scope for expansion and further technological
development.
An institution of this kind could facilitate the transfer of technology
and know-how from industrialised countries and from those emerging
markets that have been at the forefront of developing technologies
appropriate for developing countries and emerging markets. Financial
instruments to facilitate green infrastructure investment could
substantially increase the investment of the current green technology
market leaders into developing countries. Several corporations, whether
from emerging market or developed countries, would likely increase their
presence and investments in developing countries, hence sharing both
technology and know-how. Financial tools could be tailored in order to
prioritise investment flows that carry with them technologies and
know-how that are more important for developing countries—for instance
offering wider financial guarantees for companies that transfer specific
technologies. Such mechanisms could be designed to be additional and
complementary to other mechanisms for the transfer of intellectual
property. There is evidence that such mechanisms can work: for example,
strong private investment in the financial sector fostered by EBRD
guarantees and co-investments was accompanied by the transfer of skills
to that sector which brought benefits to the transition economies at
large.10
There is also strong need for investment in safeguarding economies from
the inevitable consequences of climate change and reducing the
vulnerability of the poorest. A South-South facility would be in a
position to work together with regional development banks, the World
Bank, other IFIs and bilaterals in financing action on adaptation.
The institution could also enhance responsibility and climate and
environmental sensitivity for existing and future South-South
investments more generally.
The G20 has already indicated that it intends to strengthen the
cooperation between its ministries of finance to ensure stronger action
in rebalancing global savings and investments. The potential of such an
institution to play a catalytic role among emerging markets in fostering
such rebalancing and channelling excess savings to sensible investment
across the developing world makes it a very attractive option.
5. Governance and relations with other institutions
Governance should be related to purposes, risks and ownership. Given
the purposes, both governance and ownership should be focused on
emerging and developing countries. Decisions on the ownership and
governance structure should be led by emerging and developing countries.
As we have noted, they may decide to allow some participation by
advanced industrial countries, e.g. as minority “shareholders.”11
Decision on the location of e institution should also reflect the
purpose and ownership. From this perspective the headquarters might be
in a major emerging market economy and there could be branch offices in
developing countries focused on implementation.
It is important that the Board of such an institution be equipped to
form judgements on risk and on growth, on the climate and the
environment more generally. Thus the board should seek to provide for
competencies beyond those of the standard civil service which
predominates as “country representatives” in a number of the boards of
the international financial institutions.12
A modern governance structure and board competencies could help
provide an example for the reform of the governance structures of the
existing IFIs as they struggle to adapt themselves to the profoundly
changing reality of a new international economy. Fifteen or so years ago
the rich countries with a little under 20% of the world’s population
had around 80% of the income. Now rich countries’ share of global income
is around two-thirds and 15 years from now it will be around one-half.
And it is not only aggregate output that is being transformed; the
international division of labour and skills is changing rapidly too. The
proposed new institution reflects this leadership from emerging markets
and developing countries in a changing world and its example could help
others. Mutual support amongst emerging and developing countries would
also contribute to decreasing the dependence on firms and industries
from rich countries.
6. Sketch of possible structures
Key aspects of the new institution
Instruments
It would be important for this institution to be able to offer a wide
range of instruments and methods that suit the diverse range of needs of
climate-related projects (examples include equity participation,
insurance and credit enhancement, loan-guarantees, debt instruments,
first-loss equity, challenge funds, grants and so on).
Cooperation with other institutions
The extensive experience of the regional development banks, the World
Bank Group, the IMF and other international institutions and
organisations will be valuable. Also, the experience of national
development banks, particularly in emerging countries, will be
important. These other institutions would have complementary and
mutually supportive instruments and focus. The new institution with its
flexibility for public and private, capabilities for risk-management,
and environmental mandate would be a strong partner for more traditional
development banks most which have a predominantly public sector focus.
The new institution could draw on the long experience and skills of
these various institutions in promoting development and overcoming
poverty.13
Private sector participation
Such a new institution could and should allow the direct and close
involvement of the private sector. The private sector will provide some,
and in some countries and areas, most of the investment in the
transition to an economy based on more sustainable infrastructure given
the scale and nature of investments involved. This private sector
involvement, in the scale and in the direction necessary to achieve
success in the objectives laid out in the beginning of this paper, can
be achieved only if the needs of the private sector, around sovereign,
commercial and climate risk, are understood and supported by the new
institution performing the functions described. Practically, this would
mean that financial instruments would need to be created to share the
risk of projects at tolerable transaction cost, and taking into account
the nature and capabilities of both local and global private sector
banks and multilateral institutions. The power of the example will be of
immense importance—a new institution cannot possibly provide finance
for all but it can give examples for all.
At the same time, in many countries there will be a need for
private-public sector cooperation, including cooperation with
international organisations and institutions.
Cooperation with developed countries
While we envisage the new institution as primarily a South initiative,
developed countries could cooperate if they wished to do so, in a
variety of ways. They could provide grants for technological sharing or
capability development or adaptation. They could co-invest in projects
carried out by the institution, and the new institution could create SIV
in which developed countries could participate.
As we have already note, it must be very clear, however, that this
institution would not be a substitute for developed countries’
commitments to support developing countries in their transition to more
sustainable infrastructure via the GCF and in other ways. It would
simply provide an additional and potentially more effective way by which
developed countries could channel the funds that they have already
committed—and will need to commit in the future—to fulfil their
responsibilities in meeting the challenges of global climate change.
Cooperation with other institutions
It would be of great importance for this institution to retain
flexibility in terms of its ability to cooperate with non-traditional
funders and non-national institutions. It would be of particular
importance for this institution to be able to engage directly with
sovereign wealth funds and with large philanthropic organizations, as
these are likely to continue playing and increasingly important role in
low-carbon infrastructural investment in developing countries.
Membership of the Bank could be open to national development banks,
sovereign wealth funds and philanthropical organisations – that would be
a choice for the founders.
Developed countries could even participate by making capital
contributions to the new institution. Given its principal purpose of
fostering South-South investment, the majority ownership should,
however, be from emerging market and developing countries—for further
discussion, see chapter on governance.
Building to a decision
The first issue to be decided is the need for and value of such an
institution. As is set out in this paper, given the scale of the
required investment over the next few decades, particularly in light of
the risks of climate change, the nature of the new energy-industrial
revolution, the great potential of South-South flows and the limitations
on other development institutions, this initial step in the argument
seems clear. It must be decided in the first place primarily by emerging
market and developing economics.
Once this decision is taken then details of the new institution and
its establishment could be created and achieved fairly rapidly. We have
the example of the IBRD (World Bank), which was created in 1944, but
then quickly played an important role in the reconstruction of Europe.
The decision to establish the EBRD in 1990 came shortly after the fall
of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989, and it was operational in 1991.
Quickly, in response to the “Arab Spring” of 2011, it expanded its
coverage to large parts of North Africa.
The principal purpose of this paper is to describe the great
potential for such a facility and some of the key issues of design. This
is surely a real opportunity for developing countries to take the lead
in shaping for themselves the growth story of the future. They are
becoming the leaders in savings and investments and, increasingly, in
developing new, sustainable infrastructure and even technology across
the world. Such an institution would mark and enhance their leadership
in a changed and changing world. But sketches of possible models are
useful in thinking about how to move forward.
Paid-in and callable capital
It was Keynes’ genius in the establishment of the IBRD to create the
idea of paid-in capital (around say 25% of the total) and callable
capital which, in extremes, can be called. It is this multiplicative
factor (from paid-in to callable) of around 4 that is so powerful. The
IBRD and EBRD, like other development banks, cannot invest (loans,
equities, guarantees, etc.) beyond the total capital. This very
conservative 1:1 gearing ratio allows them to borrow to finance
investments (as other international development banks) at AAA status.
And this very solid capital structure provides a useful destination for
bondholders seeking a reliable return and looking for some
diversification. It is the soundness and commitment of the governments
and institutions that stand behind the callable capital that provides
this AAA status, but the soundness of the investment portfolio of the
institution itself is also of great importance.14
We have already drawn on some lessons of the EBRD as the most
recently-established modern and flexible of current IFIs. Some numbers
on its establishment and growth may be instructive.
Scale
The EBRD began in 1991 with €10bn of capital. The paid-in component
was spread over a period of five years or so. It has had two capital
increases of a further €10bn each time to reach its €30bn now (the
paid-in capital was lower in the recent increase – 2010 – to reflect its
experience and performance). This EBRD experience should not be
regarded as a model for the new institution but can provide some
pointers.
A new institution might be established with, say, around $30bn
initial capital with, say, $8bn paid-in. These illustrative numbers can
be scaled multiplicatively. Suppose, for illustration, the eight
emerging market/developing countries in the G20 but outside the G8
(China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, South Africa, Argentine, Brazil,
Mexico15) took around 50% of the capital, so that the average share was
6-7%. Some would likely want to take a higher share and some a lower.
This would be translated into paid-in capital for each of this group of,
on average, around $500mn or $100mn for each of five years. This would
surely be a manageable amount in relation to the investment it could
unleash and to the resources available within these countries. It is
likely that other emerging countries would also want to take a
significant share. Smaller economies will want to take small shares. It
would not be unreasonable if membership would be necessary in order to
be a country of operation, and that priority for investment be given to
poorer regions. Again, all of this would be for the founders to decide.
It would also be possible to allow membership of non-sovereign
entities. Examples might be major domestic development institutions such
as the BNDES, sovereign wealth funds from emerging market economies, or
large charitable institutions of a sufficient scale. Whether or not to
allow for that kind of membership, or the “voting rights” allotted to
such “associated membership” should be an early decision for the key
founders.
The total capital would allow total investments of the new
institution of around $30bn and given that co-investment would be a
crucial objective, with, say, a mobilisation ratio of 3, the total
project size would be $90bn. Many investors would want to invest
alongside, not simply because of the risk-mitigation instruments, but
also because the presence of the institution itself in a transaction
gives greater security against policy and commercial risk and enhances
the credit worthiness of sponsors and co-investors for projects. This
type of mobilisation is crucial to the power of the example and to
demonstrating the possibilities in a context where innovation in
technology, financing and policy are vital.
Such an institution could fairly quickly build to a lending volume of
$3-6bn per year associated with overall investment size of $10-20bn per
year. Success could lead it to double or triple its capital, after 10
years or so, when it has proven itself, in which case it could be
associated with investments of $50bn or more per year. This type of
scale could be valuable in its own right but, even more important, these
investments could provide a whole range of powerful examples which
could lead to other similar investments on a much greater scale.16
7. Concluding comments
The institution proposed here is an idea whose time has come. It
reflects the urgency of embarking on the energy and industrial
revolution to manage climate change with growth. It embraces the
attractiveness of the new path in terms of creativity, innovation,
energy-security, biodiversity and so on. It could provide for a
sustainable response to the challenge of overcoming poverty. At the same
time, it provides a way to rebalance savings and investment across the
emerging and developing worlds, and an alternative to the promotion of
profligate consumption in the emerging markets—a course that would
endanger the planet. And it could help foster a powerful source of
growth in a fragile world economy.
Such an institution also represents and builds on the new reality of
the size, growth and increasing sophistication of emerging-market and
developing countries. They have much to contribute to each other and
much to gain both in the shorter term and the longer run from fostering
the investment flows crucial to this low-carbon path to prosperity and
poverty reduction. This is an opportunity to act, to take advantage of
the new economic landscape, and to turn these potential benefits into a
reality.