Russia Invades Ukraine: The Dangerous Weakness of a Military Superpower - Sven Biscop (Egmont Institute)

Russia Invades Ukraine: The Dangerous Weakness of a Military Superpower

By  Sven Biscop

Egmont Institute, 25 February 2022

https://www.egmontinstitute.be/russia-invades-ukraine-the-dangerous-weakness-of-a-military-superpower/

What is an extra slice of Ukrainian territory to Russia? A war of aggression no longer fits in our European logic, but it does in that of President Putin. He seeks to permanently position Russia as a great power to be taken into account, and to restore a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union.

Russia Invades Ukraine: The Dangerous Weakness of a Military Superpower 

What is an extra slice of Ukrainian territory to Russia? A war of aggression no longer fits in our European logic, but it does in that of President Putin. He seeks to permanently position Russia as a great power to be taken into account, and to restore a sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. For Putin, the greatest threat is not potential NATO membership of Ukraine, but the country’s gradual westernisation through its close association with the European Union. For if that succeeds in one large former Soviet republic, then who knows where else the public might turn against its authoritarian leaders…

It is precisely because the new regime in Ukraine was about to conclude a far-reaching free trade agreement with the EU, that Putin attacked the first time, in 2014. Perhaps most determining of his actions today, is that in fact that first invasion was a failure. Russia annexed the Crimea, but against its expectations the rest of the country totally turned against it. Only in a small region in the east could Russia instrumentalise limited numbers of armed separatists. Putin, therefore, is trying to undo his own failure.

And we just stand aside and watch? “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”, Thucydides wrote already. Sadly, all too often that still is the hard reality of international politics today. When a great power decides upon war against another country, there is little the other powers can do to prevent it. Unless they are prepared to go to war themselves, but a direct confrontation between nuclear powers is so incredibly dangerous that all refrain from it unless their own territory is directly under threat. Once Putin had decided, therefore, the renewed invasion of Ukraine could no longer be stopped (just like in 2003 nobody could halt the US once it had made up its mind to invade Iraq).

That does not mean it was a mistake to enter into negotiations with Russia – attempting to prevent bloodshed is never wrong. Today, however, we can assume that actually Putin decided early on in the current crisis to revert to military action anyhow (but perhaps not at which scale). Maybe he had even set his eyes on this years ago, and was just waiting for what he considered the right moment. This is not a failure of diplomacy. When two sides want to talk yet part ways without an agreement, that is a failure. But when one side is not willing to concede anything, and uses diplomacy only to mask its true intentions (and thus to lie to its interlocutors), real negotiations have never actually started.

Now that Putin has opted for war, there is little space left for diplomacy. At some point regular combat will come to a halt and a new demarcation line will emerge (if Russia does not occupy all of Ukraine). The EU and the US cannot in any way legitimise the result of this war of aggression. There will be no peace conference drawing new borders. At most we will see a ceasefire between Russia and what remains of Ukraine.

What will the future bring then? Tough sanctions from the EU and the US, and a freezing of relations with Russia for probably many years to come. That will not immediately help Ukraine: sanctions will not make Russia retreat, and will hurt us too. Yet they are absolutely necessary to send a signal to the entire world: one cannot violate the core rules of the world order without paying a price. Otherwise the rules would be hollowed out and no order would eventually remain. Reducing relations with Russia will hit the EU hardest in the energy domain, but it can be done – one more argument to accelerate the green transition. Russia has built up great reserves and can do without the revenue of gas export to Europe for now, but cannot sell that gas to anyone else; those fields are connected to us alone.

Is Putin really winning, therefore, or is he trying not to lose? War with Ukraine will not solve Russia’s domestic problems; instead, it will worsen its economic prospects. The sphere of influence that Putin says he is defending he already has to share with China, a major economic presence in all former Soviet republics. In that sense, conquering Ukraine is a sign of weakness: Russia does not have any positive project that can attract other countries of their own accord. The same applies to Russian interventions in Africa and the Middle East: sufficient to disrupt our plans (as in Mali, where the military regime kicked us out), but not to construct their ow project. Indirectly Russian military adventurism also undermines China’s, mostly economic strategy. That is why today China does not really pronounce itself: it will not openly go against Russia, but will not openly support it either.

Nonetheless, a declining great power that remains a military superpower can be very dangerous. The EU will have to seriously reassess its strategy, therefore. First of all, we must enhance our territorial defence. In previous decades, most European armed forces have focused on expeditionary operations. Those remain necessary, but at the same time we must reinforce our conventional deterrence. Today, the US fully assumes its leadership role within NATO, but what if there were a major crisis in Asia at the same time, or if Trump were in the White House? A dimension of our defence that demands urgent reinforcement, is deterrence of hybrid actions. Russia will undoubtedly intensify those: cyber-attacks, disinformation, sabotage, coercion etc. As the host of NATO and the EU, Belgium is a primary target, as its National Security Strategy adopted last December emphasises. We must dare to retaliate against hybrid actions, including with our own offensive cyber operations. The EU must also elaborate an entirely new strategy for North Africa, in order not to lose all influence.

This is not the end of the European security architecture. Russia cannot bring down the EU or NATO. Only our own antidemocratic extremists can do that, who often act as useful idiots in the service of Russia. But relations with Russia will become very cold again, and we will be forced to invest more in defence. At the same time, we must continue to invest in our own positive project, the EU, and in multilateral cooperation with all states, authoritarian regimes included, whenever interests coincide. Cooperate when you can, push back when you must. Keeping the world together in one order to which all states subscribe: that is the challenge for international politics in the 21^st century. Russia has now put itself outside that order for some time to come, but it does not have the power to overturn it. China could, but so far has opted for an assertive economic rather than military strategy. The US hopefully realises that in addition to its military contribution, for which Europe must be grateful, it ought to propose a positive project for the world as well. No country can safeguard its way of life alone, and with military means alone – not even a great power.

Finally, those with a knowledge of military history recognise all the names. Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa: those were the sites of large-scale murderous battles where Soviet soldiers and citizens fought against the Nazi invaders. Today that is where Vladimir Putin attacks Ukraine.

***

Every year, Sven Biscop lectures at the National Defence University in Kyiv. Today, his thoughts are with the Ukrainian military in the field. 

Conflito Ira-EUA: o contexto em International Security

O Belfer Center, da Harvard University, divulga uma série de artigos sobre o contexto mais amplo da contenda entre o Irã e os EUA, ou mais especificamente entre Trump e a teocracia iraniana.

Crisis Reader: U.S. Killing of Iranian Commander Qassim Suleimani

Jan. 03, 2020

What Happened?

On January 3, 2020, an American drone strike near Baghdad airport killed Major General Qassim Suleimani, the longtime commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The incident followed an increasingly tense exchange of attacks between Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and the U.S. military, which included a violent demonstration by members and supporters of the former against the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The assassination of Suleimani—a senior and prominent figure in the Iranian regime and across the region—represents a large-scale and dangerous escalation in tensions between Washington and Tehran.

Want to Dig Deeper?

The editors of International Security have selected the following articles as excellent starting points to help achieve a greater understanding of the crisis at hand:

On the origins and implications of norms against international assassination:

“Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination”
Ward Thomas (Summer 2000)

On the historical foundations of Iran’s foreign policy and approach to nuclear weapons:

“What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal”
Ariane M. Tabatabai and Annie Tracy Samuel (Summer 2017)

On a hypothetical scenario of an Iranian reprisal in the Persian Gulf: 

“Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz”
Caitlin Talmadge (Summer 2008)

On why individual leaders choose between different intervention strategies:

“Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy”
Elizabeth N. Saunders (Fall 2009)

On why foreign-imposed regime change carries substantial risks:

“You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
Seldom Improves Interstate Relations”
Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O’Rourke (Fall 2016)

Download the Reader as a PDF:

• CRISIS READER: SULEIMANI

Sim, o Brasil deve se interessar pelo Iran - Clovis Rossi (FSP)

O jornalista e editorialista da Folha de S. Paulo, Clovis Rossim chama a atenção para um conflito que ameaça desestabilizar não só o Oriente Médio e o mundo inteiro, como também precipitar uma crise econômica capaz de afundar um pouco mais o Brasil, que já se encontra, segundo o ministro Paulo Guedes, no "fundo do poço".
O que vai fazer o nosso chanceler, ou melhor os chanceleres, o real e o nominal?
Imagino que, por seus instintos, escolheriam ficar do lado de Trump, o que seria um desastre, não necessariamente para o que pode acontecer em seguida. Independentemente disso, seria um desastre para nossa já arranhada credibilidade, para nossa já desgastada imagem internacional.
Um bookmaker inglês recomendaria, talvez, apostar na Lei de Murphy. Segundo esse tipo de especulador, nunca, ninguém, em qualquer época, perdeu dinheiro apostando na estupidez humana.
Segundo Einstein, por outro lado, existem duas coisas infinitas: a expansão do universo e a estupidez humana, e ele não tinha certeza quanto à primeira...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O Irã é, sim, assunto para o Brasil

Mas para entender, e não isolar o país persa

Folha de S. Paulo, 16.mai.2019 às 2h52

Se sobrou alguma vida inteligente no governo Bolsonaro, Israel ofereceu a ele uma bela oportunidade para sair das alucinações e da consequente paralisia. Pedir que o Brasil entre no complicado jogo do contencioso iraniano, como revelado nesta quarta-feira (15) pela Folha, é a chance para a diplomacia brasileira estudar o que fazer a respeito.

Para deixar claro: não se trata de o Brasil se alinhar automaticamente a Estados Unidos e Israel na ofensiva contra o Irã. Trata-se, isto sim, de definir uma política para a região. Não pode haver melhor momento para tanto, se se considerar o potencial explosivo da presente crise.

O Crisis Group, especialista em analisar crises e propor soluções para elas, faz um bom resumo do momento: "Um choque não é inevitável, mas bem pode ocorrer --deliberadamente ou como produto de erro de cálculo".

As consequências desse choque seriam calamitosas para os países da região mas também para a economia internacional, dada a alta dependência do livre fluxo de petróleo pelo golfo Pérsico.

Tudo o que o Brasil não precisa neste momento em que está no fundo do poço(segundo Paulo Guedes) é um conflito que sacuda a economia global.

Logo, entender o Irã é uma questão vital. Em primeiro lugar, cabe separar as perspectivas de EUA e Israel nessa questão. Para Israel, trata-se, sim, de uma ameaça existencial. O Irã dos aiatolás já fez incontáveis declarações de que gostaria de tirar do mapa o Estado judeu. Portanto, Israel tem mesmo que tomar todas as cautelas.

Já para os Estados Unidos, o Irã só é um problema no Iraque, mesmo assim porque a derrubada do governo de maioria sunita (de Saddam Hussein) levou a um país dominado pelos xiitas e, como tal, inevitavelmente sujeito à influência iraniana. É o que analisam, para Foreign Affairs, Steven Simon (Amherst College) e Jonathan Stevenson (Instituto Internacional de Estudos Estratégicos).

Mais: há aparente contradição entre o presidente Donald Trump, em tese pró-negociações desde que levem a um acordo talhado para os interesses de Washington, e seus assessores belicosos, Mike Pompeo e John Bolton.

Sanam Vakil, pesquisador da Chatham House, excelente centro britânico, procurou 75 analistas e formuladores de políticas de dez países (incluídos Irã e Estados Unidos), em busca de entender o quadro do contencioso.

Relatou também para Foreign Affairs que "alguns entrevistados, incluindo americanos, expressaram preocupação com a possibilidade de que Bolton e Pompeo minem o sucesso de qualquer discussão com o Irã".

Sugestão para o Itamaraty, se está interessado em algo mais do que as idiotices de Olavo de Carvalho: recuperar essa consulta da Chatham House. Fornecerá subsídios excelentes para entender o Irã.

Não é nada simples: se há divergências na administração americana, existem também no Irã, entre o moderado presidente Hassan Rouhani e a linha dura, conforme expôs para o israelense Haaretz Ariane Tabatabai, especialista no país persa.

Resumo da ópera: o Brasil deve, sim, atender ao pedido de Israel, mas não para participar do cerco ao Irã e, menos ainda, para estimular um conflito. Estudar o Irã é a melhor maneira —talvez a única— de distender uma situação com tanto potencial desestabilizador.

Turquia vs USA, ou Erdogan vs Trump: um combate assimétrico -

Erdogan fights a losing battle with Trump

Ishaan Tharoor, The Washington Post, August 13, 2018

On Friday, the Turkish lira suffered its biggest one-day devaluation in nearly two decades, dropping more than 14 percent against the dollar. The minister of finance — the son-in-law of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan — couldn’t avert the slide, delivering a halting speech that did little to boost confidence.

But Erdogan, as he so often does, placed the blame on a foreign scapegoat: the United States.

“Shame on you, shame on you,” he declared at a rally. "You are swapping your strategic partner in NATO for a pastor.”

The pastor in question is Andrew Brunson, an American clergyman who has been in Turkish custody since 2016. He is charged with espionage and other crimes — charges that he and U.S. officials reject. Attempts to win his freedom have so far failed.

According to my colleagues, Ankara hoped to swap Brunson for Hakan Atilla, a banker convicted in the United States for his role in a scheme that skirted U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil. But the Trump administration resents Turkey’s use of Brunson as a political hostage. A high-level meeting in Washington last week with a visiting Turkish delegation ended abruptly after the Americans demanded the pastor’s immediate release.

President Trump then announced increased tariffs on Turkish aluminum and steel, which sent the value of the lira plummeting to a historic low. Turkey’s economic woes are of its own making, but the tariffs made things worse — and Trump was only too happy to take credit.

Erdogan continued his complaints in a New York Times op-ed, railing against “unilateral actions against Turkey by the United States, our ally of decades.” He recited the familiar catalog of affronts, including Washington’s unwillingness to hand over Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric accused of fomenting a failed 2016 coup against Erdogan, and continued American support for Syrian Kurdish factions. He then delivered a clear threat, urging Washington to “give up the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives.”

If the United States won’t change its approach, Erdogan warned, Turkey will “start looking for new friends and allies.” Indeed, the Turkish president has beefed up ties with Russia, attempted to mend fences with key Western European governments and, as a significant importer of Iranian oil, could undermine American efforts to isolate Tehran.

But this posturing will win him even more enemies in Washington, where Erdogan is already a deeply unpopular figure. Congress has passed legislation making a critical sale of F-35 jets to Turkeycontingent upon terms that include Brunson’s immediate release. Erdogan critics in U.S. foreign-policy circles loathe his creeping authoritarianism. And Trump, unlike previous presidents, has shown an endless willingness to bully erstwhile allies whenever he disagrees with them.

“Washington has generally tried to calm global markets in such moments, especially when investors are gripped by fear of contagion,” noted the Wall Street Journal. “Trump instead squeezed Ankara further.” This had global ramifications: Turkey’s wobbles stoked wider fears of fragility in other emerging markets and raised alarms among some major European banks that hold Turkish debt.

In an interview with Bloomberg News, Aaron Stein, a Middle East expert at the Atlantic Council, suggested Erdogan had badly miscalculated the situation. “The power balance is asymmetric, totally in the U.S. favor,” Stein said. “There are no guard rails to escalation on the U.S. side, and that’s where the Turks have completely, completely messed up in their understanding of what’s going on in the U.S.”

Erdogan’s appeals to NATO partnership ring especially hollow, given both Erdogan’s testy relations with Europe and Trump’s carping about the alliance. "For an administration or a president that doesn’t give much value to NATO, the value of Turkey as a staunch NATO ally also has declined,” Jacob Funk Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute for International Economics told Bloomberg News. “The Trump administration isn’t going to walk an extra mile to save an organization it doesn’t value.”

Analysts hope cooler heads prevail. “Turkey’s economic and legal problems are obvious, but sanctions by the U. S. are unlikely to help anything,” observed Turkish commentator Mustafa Akyol. “Rather they may be counterproductive, boosting Turkey’s nationalist mood and pushing the country further towards the Russian axis. More diplomacy is needed, not sanctions.”

But productive diplomacy is in short supply. Much of Erdogan’s politics now hinge on stirring nationalist sentiment to justify his tightening grip on the country. He won re-election in June with the backing of ultra-nationalists, arguing that greater control would help him steer Turkey’s flagging economy out of trouble. Instead, things have only gotten worse.

“The current crisis is the culmination of Erdogan’s reckless stewardship. Fixing it will take years — a task that will require new leadership and an entirely different mentality,” wrote Aykan Erdemir, a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington and an Erdogan critic.

Nevertheless, even as Turkey suffers, Erdogan may not take much of a political hit. “Turkey’s toothless opposition ... fails to provide much hope,” Erdemir noted. “Without strong political forces to push him out, Erdogan will almost certainly continue to dig himself and the Turkish economy into a deeper hole.”

Trump also may gain more by refusing to compromise. He may relish the chance to act tough and appeal to his core supporters by squeezing a prominent Muslim leader over the fate of an American pastor.

“Backing Brunson plays to the American president’s base — all the more conspicuously so given that NASA scientist Serkan Golge, a dual Turkish–U.S. citizen, is also being held in Turkey, serving out a seven-and-a-half-year sentence for charges similar to those being brought against Brunson,” wrote Elmira Bayrasli, a professor of international affairs at Bard College.

Of course, she noted, there’s a key difference: “Golge is Muslim, unlike Brunson, whom Trump has called ‘a great Christian’ and ‘innocent man of faith.’ The Trump administration has said nothing about Golge’s detention.”

Paraguai vs Mercosul: vias travadas em Haia

Não creio que o Paraguai consiga algo no caminho de Haia, assim como não conseguiu nada no caminho de Assunção, ou melhor do Tribunal Permanente de Revisão. Basta que os demais países, ou seja, os três outros membros do Mercosul, Argentina, Brasil e Uruguai, deixem de atender qualquer convocação, e nada acontece.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Paraguai contrata especialistas dos EUA para recorrer em Haia contra decisão do Mercosul

O presidente do Paraguai, Federico Franco, anunciou que o governo pode recorrer ao Tribunal Internacional de Haia contra a decisão doMercosul de suspender o país do bloco, até as eleições de abril de 2013. Franco disse que contratou uma equipe de especialistas norte-americanos para defender a ação movida pelo governo paraguaio contra a medida. O Paraguai foi suspenso doMercosul, no final de junho, após a destituição do então presidente Fernando Lugo do poder.

- Por intermédio do chanceler (Félix Fernández Echibarria) decidimos pela contratação de uma equipe jurídica de primeiro nível, dos Estados Unidos (para levar a questão a Haia) – disse o presidente. Anteriormente, Franco tinha anunciado a desistência da ação por considerar que o preço era elevado e a demora demasiada.

Segundo Franco, a equipe de especialistas irá fazer consultorias para verificar a possibilidade de o governo do Paraguai conseguir mover a ação e vencer o embate jurídico com o Mercosul. Para os líderes políticos do bloco, houve o rompimento da ordem democrática no Paraguai pela rapidez e pouco prazo para Lugo se defender no processo de impeachment.

As autoridades do Paraguai negam irregularidades no processo, informando que a Constituição e as leis do país foram seguidas, sem rompimento dos preceitos democráticos. Porém, a medida de suspensão também foi adotada pela União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul) pelo mesmo prazo,  até 21 de abril de 2013.

- A avaliação dos juristas contratados pelo governo paraguaio pode ajudar a diminuir a situação de tensão que estamos passando neste momento – disse o presidente do Paraguai.

Troca de prisioneiros entre Israel e Egito

Israel e Egito trocam prisioneiros sob acordo mediado pelos EUA

Reportagem de Dan Williams e Ori Lewis, em Jerusalém; e de Shaimaa Fayed e Omar Fahmy, no Cairo

Reuters, 28/10/2011

JERUSALÉM/TABA, Egito - O Egito libertou um americano-israelense que estava detido como um suposto espião e Israel liberou 25 egípcios em uma troca de prisioneiros nesta quinta-feira que irá aliviar as tensões entre os novos governantes do Cairo e os Estados Unidos e Israel.

Ilan Grapel, de 27 anos, viajou para Israel acompanhado por dois enviados israelenses nomeados pelo primeiro-ministro israelense, Benjamin Netanyahu, com quem ele se reuniu no final do dia. Sorrindo, ele abraçou sua mãe, que o esperava na pista do aeroporto de Tel Aviv.

Os egípcios libertados cruzaram por terra até o deserto do Sinai, alguns deles de joelhos em uma oração de agradecimento. “Eu não posso descrever meus sentimentos hoje”, afirmou um dos egípcios libertados, Fayez Abdel Hamid, a repórteres.
O Egito prendeu Grapel em junho sob suspeita de que ele estava fora para recrutar agentes e monitorar eventos na revolta que derrubou Hosni Mubarak, um aliado de Israel e dos Estados Unidos.

Israel negou que Grapel, que emigrara de Nova York em 2005 e foi ferido como um paraquedista israelense na guerra do Líbano em 2006, era um espião. Suas ligações com Israel eram aparentes em sua página no Facebook, que continha fotos dele com o uniforme militar israelense.

Estudante de direito nos Estados Unidos, Grapel trabalhava para o Serviço de Refugiados de Saint Andrew, uma agência não-governamental, quando foi detido.

Os Estados Unidos, que concedem bilhões de dólares em ajuda militar ao Exército que agora dirige o Egito, haviam exigido a libertação de Grapel. Ele foi libertado três semanas depois que o secretário de Defesa dos EUA, Leon Panetta, visitou o Egito.

O acordo de troca mediado pelos EUA foi atingido pouco depois de um acordo diplomático mais amplo mediado pelo Egito entre Israel e o grupo islâmico Hamas que possibilitou a libertação do soldado israelense Gilad Shalit em troca de mais de 1.000 prisioneiros palestinos.

Eli Avidar, um ex-diplomata que chefiou a missão de Israel no Catar, afirmou que garantir a libertação de prisioneiros egípcios poderia ajudar os novos líderes do Cairo nacionalmente.

“O governo egípcio precisa disso para o seu prestígio”, disse ele na televisão israelense.

Israel é amplamente impopular no Egito, que assinou um tratado de paz com seu vizinho do norte em 1979.