How Russia's 35-mile armoured convoy ended in failure
Stepping outside for his first cigarette of the day, 23-year-old Vladyslav from Ukraine's 80th Air Assault Brigade saw a flurry of bright lights in the night sky.
"I remember watching the lights emerge from the whole forest. At first I thought they were car headlights. But then I realised they were Grads [self-propelled multiple missile launchers]. They were firing at us."
Camped deep within the forest of the Chernobyl exclusion zone, Vladyslav's unit was on patrol when the first Russian vehicles crossed into Ukraine.
"The whole earth was shaking. Have you ever been in a tank? There's no other sound like it. It's a powerful thing."
As planned in the event of any attack, Vladyslav and the rest of the 80th brigade blew up the bridge connecting Chernobyl to the next big town, Ivankiv.
The Russians would be forced to waste time building a replacement pontoon bridge, giving Vladyslav and his unit time to pull back to Kyiv.
"At first I was surprised, why didn't we stop them there in Chernobyl? But we needed to learn about our enemy. So that's what we did."
This close to the Belarus border, the Ukrainians could not afford to open fire and risk starting another conflict. Their priority was to first understand Russia's battle plan, before sending their troops into the line of fire.
Putin's master plan
What Vladyslav saw were the first vehicles of what would become the convoy.
Contrary to many media reports at the time, the 35 mile-long (56 km) column was in fact 10 separate Russian tactical battalion units, according to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
The Russian army also attacked Ukraine in the east and south, but the mission for these 10 units was specific - enter Ukraine from Belarus, overthrow Ukraine's capital city and remove the government. In military terms: a decapitation attack.
One Russian document, seen by the BBC, shows a timetable for the plan. After the first battalion crossed into Ukraine at 04:00 am on 24 February, their orders were to advance straight to Kyiv arriving by 14:55.
Several of the battalions were to advance to Hostomel, just north of Kyiv, to back up the troops who'd been airlifted in to secure the airport.
The rest were to head straight into the centre of Kyiv.
The assault heavily relied on two elements - secrecy and speed.
According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (a UK-based security think tank) by keeping plans about an attack on the capital under wraps, Russian soldiers could outnumber the Ukrainian forces by 12 to one in the north of Kyiv.
However, Putin's secrecy came at a cost. So successful was his deception, even most of his commanders did not receive their orders until 24 hours before the invasion.
On a tactical level, this left them vulnerable. They lacked food, fuel and maps. They were without proper communication tools. They had insufficient ammunition. They were even ill-prepared for the winter weather.
Kitted out with the wrong tyres and surrounded by snow, the Russians drove straight into a mud bath. Civilians close to Ivankiv describe Russian soldiers telling Ukrainian farmers to help pull their tanks out of the sludge.
Unable to progress, the Russian vehicles needed to divert to paved roads in order to avoid soft ground, forcing thousands to group into a single column.
But with limited communication between the battalions, they almost immediately converged into one almighty traffic jam.
As one military expert on the ground put it: "You don't ever travel into hostile territory in a long convoy. Ever."
Based on witness testimony and intelligence from the Ukrainian military, we were able to map the ground the convoy covered in the time between the outbreak of war and the end of March. By avoiding travelling across fields, vehicles ended up on most of the main roads north of Kyiv.