quarta-feira, 25 de janeiro de 2023

Quanto custa cada grande embaixada dos EUA: o circuito milionário dos doadores - Robbie Gramer (Foreign Policy)

 So You Want to Buy an Ambassadorship

The United States is the only Western government that routinely rewards mega-donors with top diplomatic posts.

Robbie Gramer

Foreign Policy, January 24, 2023, 2:23 PM


So you want to be a U.S. ambassador? Broadly speaking, there are two ways to do that.

The first is to make a career in policy or diplomacy and gain lots and lots of experience related to foreign affairs. The second is to have money. Lots and lots of money.

Running for president is really expensive, and presidential candidates in both parties require massive fundraising machines to bankroll campaigns that are becoming all the more so. A pattern has emerged under modern Republican and Democratic administrations alike where presidents will tap deep-pocket campaign donors or “bundlers” who directly donate or help raise hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars for the winning presidential candidate for plum ambassador posts.

Successive administrations argue that these donor ambassadors have the requisite skills and experience—even if outside the realm of foreign policy—through their work in philanthropy, finance, business, politics, or other career paths.

Critics of the practice, including former senior career diplomats, say it’s a form of “thinly veiled” corruption.

U.S. President Joe Biden has continued the trend of tapping mega-political donors for ambassador posts, albeit to a lesser extent than former U.S. President Donald Trump did—despite a push by at least one Democratic presidential hopeful in the 2020 campaign cycle to ban the practice altogether.

Around 44 percent of Trump’s ambassadors were political appointees, many of whom were deep-pocketed campaign donors, compared to around 31 percent under former U.S. President Barack Obama and 32 percent under former U.S. President George W. Bush. Biden has said he will keep the number of political appointee ambassadors at around 30 percent of the total. The practice is often a source of friction and anger within the U.S. State Department, where career diplomats who spent decades working on foreign policy are passed over for important ambassador assignments to make way for a handbag entrepreneur, a soap opera producer, a car dealership owner, or a consultant who happens to be married to an ultra-wealthy campaign donor.

There’s no clear-cut answer on whether donor ambassadors or career ambassadors are better at their jobs, as even the most disgruntled career diplomat would tell you. Some political donor ambassadors end up being highly effective and are even sought after from foreign governments for their close ties to the White House and political connections that few career State Department ambassadors can offer. Some career diplomats, by comparison, flounder in ambassador posts despite their decades of experience building up to the most sought-after senior assignment.

But granting ambassador posts to mega-campaign donors is a practice that no other Western government has—and one that has come under increased scrutiny as the United States slips in its role as the undisputed global leader with the rise of China on the world stage. Donors typically get high-profile and plum ambassador assignments for countries in Western Europe, South America, and Caribbean nations, whereas career diplomats often get the less-than-plum assignments in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, or Central Asia.

Washington’s closest allies offer a stark foil to this story. London’s ambassador to Washington, one of its most important diplomatic postings, Karen Pierce, has spent over four decades in the United Kingdom’s diplomatic service and previously served as the U.K.’s ambassador to the United Nations and envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States’ ambassador post to the United Kingdom has been filled by investment bankers, oil company executives, former admirals, car dealership owners, presidential confidantes, billionaire heirs, and more. The United States has only ever had one career diplomat serve as a full-fledged ambassador to the United Kingdom: Raymond Seitz, who served in the post from 1991 to 1994.

Foreign Policy scoured public disclosure and campaign donation filings, many through the nonprofit transparency group OpenSecrets.org, to take a look at five countries where major donors to Biden were tapped to be ambassadors and totaled up the known available amount that they donated.

For the sake of simplicity, we focused only on the confirmed amount that each ambassador donated directly to Democrats or Biden’s campaign during the 2017 to 2020 election cycles. Where possible and where information was available, FP included information on funds bundled, sent through political action committees (PACs) or donated to broader Democratic causes and races over the past two decades to add additional context.

A caveat: In some cases, because of the convoluted nature of campaign donations in the U.S. political system, it’s difficult to assess how much an individual has given. Donors give directly to the candidate’s campaign as individuals (with a strict legal limit), to PACs that support the president’s campaign, to so-called super PACs that can engage in unlimited political spending, to the president’s party at local or national levels, or even to the president’s inauguration fund to bankroll swanky events coinciding with the president’s first day in office. Other times, these donations are all made in the ambassador’s spouse’s name or as individuals through an affiliated organization.

And even then, the Biden administration, like all administrations, insists that it does not “sell” ambassador posts but matches the right people for the right job overseas. “I’m going to appoint the best people possible,” Biden promised on the campaign trail. “Nobody, in fact, will be appointed by me based on anything they contributed.”

A White House spokesperson told Foreign Policy that Biden “takes selecting ambassadors who carry out our foreign-policy agenda across the globe very seriously” and characterized all of his ambassador picks—including those below—as “highly experienced individuals he has worked with and trusted for years.”

The spokesperson also cited examples of non-career diplomats who Biden tapped for ambassador posts, such as former U.S. Sen. Jeff Flake to Turkey and Julianne Smith, an expert on trans-Atlantic security, to NATO.

Still, nearly two dozen other people Biden chose to be ambassadors happened to raise or donate a lot of money to the Democratic cause. If you want to start putting a price tag on an ambassador post in the Biden era, here’s what it would look like.


Switzerland: $419,200

Biden’s ambassador to Switzerland, Scott Miller, and his husband gave $365,000 to funds helping elect Biden in 2020, and Miller himself gave a total of $54,200 directly to Democrats and Biden’s campaign between 2017 and 2020, according to news reports and campaign donation data from OpenSecrets.org. In total, however, Miller and his husband have donated around $3.6 million to Democratic candidates and causes for the Democratic Party since 2010. Miller is a former vice president at UBS Wealth Management firm based in Denver. He and his husband, Tim Gill, are also major LGBTQ rights activists and philanthropists. In 2016, they gave around $1.1 million to aid the election of then-Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Miller was confirmed as Biden’s ambassador in December 2021. The White House spokesperson cited Miller’s “career in LGBTQ advocacy and philanthropy” as a factor in his nomination to be ambassador.


United Kingdom: $656,980

Biden tapped a longtime Democratic donor and former U.S. ambassador to France, Jane Hartley, to be the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom. According to campaign donations data from OpenSecrets.org, Hartley donated $645,780 to Democrats during the 2017 to 2020 election cycles and $11,200 specifically to Biden during that same time period. But this number doesn’t fully encapsulate how much money Hartley has sent or bundled to Democrats overall. Between 2007 and 2012, she reportedly raised around $2.2 million for Obama’s campaigns, when Biden served as vice president. Hartley is one of the few political appointee ambassadors in the Biden administration who has previous experience in a senior diplomatic post, which the White House spokesperson cited in defending Biden’s decision to nominate her for the post in London. Hartley—who worked for the Democratic Party, corporate broadcasting companies, and consulting firms over the course of her career—served as Obama’s ambassador to France and Monaco from 2014 to 2017.


Canada: $514,378

David Cohen, a former top Comcast executive and lobbyist, was a longtime fixture of Philadelphia’s political and philanthropic scenes. In the 2017 to 2020 election cycles, he donated $514,378 to Democrats and Biden, according to the data from OpenSecrets.org.


That number is the floor, not the ceiling, however, as Cohen was listed as one of 800 top “bundlers” for Biden’s 2020 campaign, a list of individuals who helped raise at least $100,000 for the presidential campaign, but it’s not clear just how much additional money he bundled for Biden.


Kenya: $917,599

Meg Whitman—a former top business executive who was once named one of Forbes Magazine’s 100 most powerful women in the world—currently serves as Biden’s ambassador to Kenya, considered one of Africa’s most economically powerful and diplomatically important countries. Whitman, the former CEO of eBay and Hewlett-Packard, used to be a Republican donor and ran as the Republican candidate for governor in California in 2010 but switched to backing Democrats after disavowing Trump and his rise to the top of the Republican Party. Whitman in 2020 gave $500,000 to the Biden Victory Fund, a joint fundraising committee, and separately donated $417,599 to Democrats and Biden directly during the 2017-2020 election cycle.

The White House spokesperson said for both Cohen in Canada and Whitman in Kenya, their “distinguished careers in business and their ability to advance U.S. economic interests abroad significantly informed their selection to their current posts.”


Argentina: $148,630

Biden picked Marc Stanley, a prominent Dallas lawyer, to be his ambassador to Buenos Aires. Stanley and his wife, Wendy, have donated at least $1.5 million to Democratic causes in the past two decades, according to the Dallas Morning News, and served as major bundlers for Biden and other Democratic candidates through fundraisers and bundling campaign donations. Stanley also led an arm of Biden’s 2020 campaign called Lawyers for Biden that helped organize lawyers to donate legal services to the president’s campaign run. During the 2017 to 2020 cycle, Stanley directly donated $148,630 to the Democratic Party. The White House spokesperson defended Stanley as Biden’s ambassador pick for Argentina for his “career as a leading lawyer and Jewish advocate [that] has spanned four decades.”


Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy. Twitter: @RobbieGramer

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/24/campaign-donor-ambassadors-biden-diplomacy/

Russia-Ukraine War Briefing - The New York Times, Jan 25, 2023

The New York Times, Jan 25, 2023 

By Carole Landry

Editor/Writer, Briefings Team

Welcome to the Russia-Ukraine War Briefing, your guide to the latest news and analysis about the conflict.

A U.S. Abrams tank during military exercises in Poland in 2016.David Mdzinarishvili/Reuters

Tanks, finally

Germany and the U.S. announced today that they would send battle tanks to Ukraine, a move meant to unlock a wave of heavier aid to help Ukrainian forces beat back Russian forces.

President Biden spoke just hours after Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Germany would send an initial shipment of 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine and lift export restrictions to allow other nations to send their own.

Speaking at the White House, Biden said the U.S. would provide 31 Abrams tanks, addressing Germany’s insistence that it would not supply the weaponry unless the U.S. did the same.

In recent weeks, the dispute with Germany had turned bitter, exposing divisions within NATO. Some German politicians and European leaders argued that Berlin was squandering a chance for leadership in Europe and actively hindering its allies. 

While the pledges fell far short of the 300 tanks that Ukraine had said it needed to gain a decisive upper hand on the battlefield, Germany’s announcement prompted Finland, the Netherlands and Spain to say that they would also send tanks to Ukraine or were open to doing so.

Poland said yesterday that it was seeking Germany’s permission to send Leopard tanks from its own stocks. Britain has pledged to send 14 Challenger 2 tanks.

With Germany finally on board, attention turned to getting the tanks to the front lines quickly. It could take months for the first Leopard to arrive on the battlefield, and a year or longer for the Abrams.

A German Leopard 2 tank in 2011.Michael Sohn/Associated Press

“Sending the armor has the potential to be a game-changer,” said Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland. “But it depends on when they get there. If you add up the tanks, plus the Bradleys, plus the German Marders, plus the French armored vehicles — once they all get there and are integrated into the Ukrainian forces, the Ukrainians are going to have a lot more punch.”

The Pentagon had been reluctant to send Abrams tanks, in part because they are challenging to operate and maintain. The Leopard 2 is a natural choice for Ukraine because it is easier to operate and there are already hundreds potentially available in Europe.

After Ukraine’s Russian-made tanks were destroyed or disabled in combat, there were fewer replacements to be found, my colleague John Ismay, who covers the Pentagon, told me.

Along with the deliveries of Abrams and Leopard tanks, “NATO nations also have stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts that Ukrainian troops can use to keep them engaged in combat against Russian forces,” he said.

Russia’s ambassador to Germany, Sergey Nechayev, warned that Germany’s move was an “extremely dangerous decision” that “takes the conflict to a new level of confrontation.”

The decision by the U.S. and Germany will generate enough tanks for about three new Ukrainian battalions. Western officials say that providing tanks and other heavy weaponry to Ukraine will prevent a long and static war that could favor Russia’s military.

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What the future holds for the monetary system - Credit Suisse

 Todos querem escapar de Bretton Woods?

What the future holds for the monetary system

Since its launch in 1944, the USD-centric monetary system has undergone radical change, typically in response to "systemic" crises such as major shifts in US monetary policy that generated stresses outside the United States. 

In recent years, the changes in the global economy, economic policy responses, and the geopolitical situation have triggered hefty reactions in financial markets, including money, bond, and foreign exchange markets. They have also raised the question as to whether the international monetary system may be subject to more long-term and fundamental changes.

In which direction is the monetary system heading?

It seems as if a gradual evolution to a more multipolar monetary system is the most probable outcome, with a more extreme turn away from the USD-centric system being much less likely.

Two unlikely scenarios: A common global currency or a different currency hegemon

1. Creation of a common global currency remains illusory

Proposals for a world currency have not materialized and, in the current geopolitical setting, are now even less likely. Put simply, handing over the power to print money from your own central bank to a supranational authority requires enormous mutual trust among countries and an intensely cooperative geopolitical environment.

2. Lack of an alternative currency hegemon

How about a currency other than the US dollar to take on a similarly dominant role in the global monetary system?
There are two regions that are similar in economic size to the United States, and which by their scale might in principle qualify: the euro zone and China.

  • Euro zone

The euro now accounts for around 20% of global FX reserves – the second largest share behind the US dollar – and is also freely tradable across borders. And yet, euro zone policy makers are clearly not striving for their currency to take on such a role; indeed the focus of the European Central Bank (ECB) remains very much on the domestic economy.
The euro zone is still not a mature fiscal union and therefore lacks a region-wide safe asset like US Treasuries. This means there is no highly liquid and uniform asset that the rest of the world could hold as a reserve. The lack of an integrated capital market and banking union are further roadblocks, reducing the liquidity of the euro.

Global foreign currency reserves

Global foreign currency reserves

Source: Hasver, IMF, Credit Suisse

  • China

In contrast, China is a single fiscal entity and its few large banks can be regarded as money center banks. However, the renminbi lacks the third key characteristic which would qualify it as a competitor to the US dollar: international capital mobility. For the foreseeable future, it seems improbable that China will fully liberalize and open its financial markets for cross-border transactions. Other features, such as an internationally recognized legal system, also argue against the renminbi as a viable candidate for a dominant currency.

The creation of a truly new global currency, or the rise of an alternative "hegemonic" currency is, in our view, very unlikely in the foreseeable future.
So, what might a future monetary system look like in the absence of either a new world currency or a full replacement of the US dollar as the lead currency?

Gradual evolution of a more multipolar system

Essentially we see a new, more multipolar system evolving as a result of three drivers:

1. the trend increase in bilateral trade among many countries, allowing for returns to scale in the use of their respective currencies rather than the US dollar;

2. deepening of local capital markets in emerging markets; and

3. efforts (especially by leading emerging markets) to develop mutual insurance schemes against shocks resulting from shifts in US monetary policy.

Transactions in emerging market currencies are on the increase

Transactions in emerging market currencies are on the increase

Source: BIS, Credit Suisse

Since the financial crisis of 2008 we have seen efforts to increase the robustness of the monetary system and better protect emerging markets from the stresses that arise from the US dollar-centric system. 

This means the world has gradually been moving toward a more multipolar currency system. The question is whether this process will continue in a fairly smooth manner, or whether we might see abrupt moves in one or the other direction.


China: o novo Império faz exigências ao Brasil - Ricardo Della Coletta (FSP)

 E elas serão cunpridas por Lula…

China envia recado ao Brasil e diz querer prioridade em viagem de chanceler à Ásia

Diplomata chinês afirma a embaixador brasileiro considerar oportuno que Mauro Vieira visite Pequim antes de ir à Índia

FSP, 24.jan.2023 às 23h15
Ricardo Della Coletta

BRASÍLIA - A China enviou um recado ao Itamaraty e disse esperar que o chanceler Mauro Vieira priorize Pequim em uma viagem à Ásia agendada para março.

Em meados de janeiro, o embaixador do Brasil em Pequim, Marcos Galvão, teve uma reunião no Ministério das Relações Exteriores local. Nela, o diplomata encarregado de temas relacionados ao Brasil disse a Galvão ter sido informado que Vieira planeja uma viagem à Índia em março, numa reunião de ministros do G20, e que a primeira passagem do chanceler pela China poderia ocorrer no mesmo contexto.

Em seguida, de acordo com relatos feitos à Folha, o diplomata disse considerar importante que Vieira passe primeiro por Pequim —e só depois vá à Índia.
 
Membros do governo que acompanham o tema disseram, sob condição de anonimato, entender que a mensagem foi uma sinalização de que a China espera um gesto simbólico do Itamaraty no sentido de mostrar que Pequim é o parceiro prioritário do Brasil no continente asiático.

O tema é especialmente sensível, uma vez que China e Índia, ainda que integrem o Brics (bloco com Brasil, Rússia e África do Sul), são rivais regionais e têm um histórico de escaramuças em pontos da fronteira. Déli ainda faz parte de uma aliança para se contrapor à influência de Pequim no Indo-Pacífico, o Quad, ao lado de EUA, Japão e Austrália.

A rivalidade se dá também no campo diplomático. Em 2020, em uma cúpula do Brics, os chineses agiram para que fosse suprimido de um documento oficial trecho sobre o apoio dado por Pequim e Moscou às aspirações dos demais membros para desempenhar "papéis mais relevantes na ONU" —referência ao pleito de Brasil e Índia pela ampliação do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, do qual China e Rússia são membros permanentes.

Na reunião, o gigante asiático se aproveitou da falta de interesse na reforma do colegiado por parte do então presidente Jair Bolsonaro (PL) para reforçar sua posição, num recado principalmente contra a possibilidade de a Índia ganhar um assento permanente.

Procurado, o Itamaraty disse que há uma visita prevista do chanceler Mauro Vieira à Índia nos dias 1º e 2 de março, por ocasião de reunião ministerial do G20. A eventual passagem pela China depende de questões de agenda de ambos os lados e ainda está em avaliação.

Segundo relataram à Folha pessoas com conhecimento do assunto, Galvão também tratou, na reunião na chancelaria chinesa, da ida do presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) a Pequim. Ele ouviu que o regime de Xi Jinping espera receber o petista o quanto antes e que a visita é considerada prioritária pelo país.

No último dia 18, Lula disse que pretende viajar à China em março. O presidente cumpre nesta semana sua primeira agenda internacional, com passagens pela Argentina —onde se encontrou com o homólogo Alberto Fernández e participou da cúpula da Celac (Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos)— e pelo Uruguai. Em 10 de fevereiro o petista embarca para Washington (EUA), a convite do presidente Joe Biden.

A retomada das relações com a China, principal parceiro comercial do Brasil, é um dos pontos prioritários da política externa agora comandada por Vieira. O maior desafio é encontrar um ponto de equilíbrio em meio ao atual conflito geopolítico protagonizado por Pequim e Washington.

À Folha o chanceler brasileiro disse que o país pretende se guiar pelo interesse nacional. "O que for de interesse nacional será feito, de um lado ou de outro. Não são coisas conflitantes, não vamos deixar de ter uma relação estratégica importantíssima com a China por qualquer outro motivo", disse. "Os EUA foram durante um século o principal parceiro comercial do Brasil. Em 2010, passou a ser a China. Não podemos deixar de conversar e ter relações com nosso maior parceiro, com o qual nós temos um enorme superávit. Da mesma forma com os EUA, que estão no centro de poder mundial."

terça-feira, 24 de janeiro de 2023

Estrutura do Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Governo Lula, 2023-2026

Estrutura do Ministério das Relações Exteriores, anunciada no documento da CGU em 23/01/2023, a vigorar a partir de 24/01, com vários nomes já anunciados para as lacunas existentes no documento abaixo, páginas 57-59 do documento disponível aqui.

 

MINISTÉRIO DAS  Relações Exteriores - MRE 

Perspectivas

Como foi anunciado pelo ministro no dia de sua posse, o foco do Ministério será a retomada da política externa do Brasil. Isso deve ser feito com foco no crescimento econômico, no meio ambiente, na agricultura, na educação, na cultura, na ciência e tecnologia, na inovação, nos direitos humanos, no desenvolvimento social e na defesa de interesses. De acordo com o ministro, a política externa do país foi enfraquecida durante o governo anterior. 

Composição

·       ƒ  Ministro: Mauro Vieira 

·       ƒ  Secretria-Geral das Relações Exteriores: Maria Laura 

da Rocha 

·       ƒ  Instituto Rio Branco: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretário de América Latina e Caribe: Michel Arslanian 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Europa e América do Norte: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de África e de Oriente Médio: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Ásia e Pacífico: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Assuntos Econômicos e Financeiros: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Assuntos Multilaterais Políticos: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Promoção Comercial, Ciência, Tecnologia, 

Inovação e Cultura: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Comunidades Brasileiras e Assuntos Consulares e Jurídicos: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Clima, Energia e Meio Ambiente: A definir 

·       ƒ  Secretaria de Gestão Administrativa: A definir 

Destaques da nova estrutura organizacional 

A organização das secretarias se mantém por regiões (América, Europa, Ásia e África), o que será indispensável para a retomada das relações do governo com países que perderam contato diplomático no governo anterior. Além disso, a secretaria de Clima, Energia e Meio Ambiente vem como um diferencial do que estava sendo feito pelo último governo. A pauta ambiental será restaurada e, com isso, o país voltará a participar de acordos e discussões sobre o assunto. A estrutura do ministério foi consideravelmente alterada. O órgão agora conta com uma maior organização em pastas, sendo 6 delas para atuação direta ao lado do Chanceler (assessorias especiais, secretaria de controle interno e consultoria jurídica). O Instituto Rio Branco fica classificado como órgão vinculado à Secretaria-Geral. Mais seis secretarias foram criadas para assuntos específicos, e o ministério deve contar com unidades descentralizadas e no exterior. 


Reviravoltas da História - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Reviravoltas da História

Paulo Roberto de Almeida


A reforma da Lei das Estatais, para abrigar companheiros e seus associados em cargos de direção e nos conselhos de administração dos dinossauros públicos, constitui mais um passo no caminho para Sua Majestade Lula III virar uma espécie de Luís XVIII da República brasileira, um Bourbon tupiniquim, da mesma família daqueles que “não aprenderam nada e não esqueceram nada”.


A Restauração francesa, depois dos ciclos revolucionário e napoleônico, não durou dez anos: depois dos Bourbons, vieram os Orleans, aliás conhecidos por aqui também. Foram igualmente descartados na revolução seguinte, que criou uma efêmera terceira república, que rapidamente sucumbiu a um novo Império, por sua vez aniquilado mais adiante. A França conseguiu ter mais repúblicas do que o Brasil, e muito mais constituições (se não me engano 14, quase o dobro das nossas).


Existe algo próximo à promiscuidade autoprotetora nos círculos dirigentes e entre os membros de certas elites do poder, o que os faz defender a cooptação dos “mais iguais”, como Orwell, no Animal Farm, chamava aqueles que tinham ascendido ao pináculo do poder estatal e passavam a reproduzir as deformações do Antigo Regime. Essa “revolução dos bichos” também é muito conhecida entre nós, e não precisa ser nenhum Orwell para detectar os mesmos movimentos.


Lula III, por gosto ou necessidade, precisa premiar os companheiros não eleitos e mais alguns aliados de ocasião na festa do poder, mesmo que estes não sejam tão “iguais” quanto a companheirada do primeiro escalão.

Não tem problema: se não tiver estatais suficientes, criam-se mais algumas, como já feito sob Lula I e Lula II. 


Gaetano Mosca e Vilfredo Pareto, dois grandes intelectuais italianos, descreveram muito bem os fenômenos da rotação e da circulação das elites. Lula certamente não deve conhecer esses analistas, mas ele nem precisa se guiar pela teoria. Ele atua por instinto, um pouco como comentava outro italiano, Lampedusa, aquele que dizia que “é preciso que algo mude, para que tudo continue como sempre foi”.


Gatopardianamente, o Brasil de Lula III vai ficando mais ou menos parecido com o Brasil de Lula I e de Lula II. 

Espera-se apenas que não termine como Dilma 1,5…


Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 24/01/2023

Postagem em destaque

True Believers para todos os gostos - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

  Antigamente a gente usava "true believers", os verdadeiros crentes, no caso daquelas pessoas verdadeiramente, piedosamente, sinc...