Venezuela: Virando um Narco-Estado? - Roger Noriega

Um ultra-conservador americano, da direita dos republicanos de Bush II, escreve sobre seus temores em relação ao que viria depois de Chávez. Ele tema a ascensão dos narcotraficantes, já presentes, segundo ele, no governo da república bolivariana...
A ver.

After Chávez, the Narcostate

There are powerful men in Venezuela who are far worse than Hugo Chávez. And if Obama keeps "leading from behind" in Latin America, that's who we very well might get.

BY ROGER F. NORIEGA |Foreign Policy, APRIL 11, 2012

Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez has tried for 10 months to conceal the fact that he is losing his bout with cancer, determined to appear in command of his revolutionary regime and the nation's future. This past Holy Week, however, television cameras captured him pleading for his life before a crucifix in his hometown church, his mother looking on without the slightest glint of hope on her face. Chávez's raw emotion startled his inner circle and led some to question his mental health. As a result, according to my sources inside the presidential palace, Minister of Defense Gen. Henry Rangel Silva has developed a plan to impose martial law if Chávez's deteriorating condition causes any hint of instability.

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Pretty dramatic stuff. So why isn't anyone outside Venezuela paying attention? Some cynics in that country still believe Chávez is hyping his illness for political advantage, while his most fervent followers expect him to make a miraculous recovery. The democratic opposition is cautiously preparing for a competitive presidential election set for Oct. 7 -- against Chávez or a substitute. And policymakers in Washington and most regional capitals are slumbering on the sidelines.

In my estimation, the approaching death of the Venezuelan caudillo could put the country on the path toward a political and social meltdown. The military cadre installed by Chávez in January already is behaving like a de facto regime determined to hold onto power at all costs. And Havana, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are moving to protect their interests. If U.S. President Barack Obama were to show some energetic engagement as Chávez fades, he could begin to put the brakes on Venezuela's slide, reverse Chávismo's destructive agenda, and reclaim a role for the United States in its own neighborhood. But if he fails to act, there will be hell to pay.

Sources close to Chávez's medical team tell me that for months, his doctors have been doing little more than treating symptoms, trying to stabilize their workaholic patient long enough to administer last-ditch chemo and radiation therapies. In that moment of Chávez's very public prayer for a miracle, he set aside his obsession with routing his opposition or engineering a succession of power to hardline loyalists. Perhaps he knows that his lieutenants and foreign allies are behaving as if he were already dead -- consolidating power, fashioning a "revolutionary junta," and plotting repressive measures.

One of them is longtime Chávista operator and military man Diosdado Cabello, who was installed by Chávez to lead the ruling party as well as the National Assembly in January. Cabello's appointment was meant to reassure a powerful cadre of narcomilitares -- Gen. Rangel Silva, Army Gen. Cliver Alcalá, retired intelligence chief Gen. Hugo Carvajal, and half a dozen other senior officers who have been branded drug "kingpins" by the U.S. government. These ruthless men will never surrender power and the impunity that goes with it -- and they have no illusions that elections will confer "legitimacy" on a Venezuelan narco-state, relying instead on billions of dollars in ill-gotten gain and tens of thousands of soldiers under their command.

Chavismo's civilian leadership -- including Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro, Vice President Elías Jaua, and the president's brother, Adán Chávez, the governor of the Chávez family's home state of Barinas -- are eager to vindicate their movement's ideological agenda at the polls this fall. Maduro is extraordinarily loyal to the president, and is considered by Venezuelan political observers as the most viable substitute on the ballot. Above all, these men crave political power and will jockey to make themselves indispensable to the military leaders who are calling the shots today.

Cuba's Fidel and Raúl Castro are desperate to preserve the life-blood of Venezuelan oil that sustains their bankrupt regime. According to a source who was briefed on conversations in Cuba, Raúl has counseled Chávez to prepare to pass power to a "revolutionary junta"; Venezuelans who are suspicious of the Castros expect them to pack the junta with men loyal to Havana. Cabello does not trust the Castros, but with thousands of Cuban intelligence officers and triggermen on the ground in Venezuela, the Castro brothers are a force to be reckoned with.

The Chinese have provided more than $20 billion in quickie loans to Chávez in the last 18 months, which are to be repaid by oil at well below the market price. Most of these funds were paid into Chávez's slush funds before the Chinese knew of his terminal condition. Another $4 billion is being negotiated now, but my sources in the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry say the Chinese are demanding new guarantees. Beijing also is angling to ensure that any post-Chávez government will honor its sweetheart deals. However, these predatory contracts are being scrutinized by leading opposition members of the National Assembly.

Iran is more dependent than ever on its banks and other ventures in Venezuela as a means to launder billions in funds to evade tightening international financial sanctions. Companies associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Qods Force, and illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs have invested millions in infrastructure in shadowy facilities throughout Venezuela. Tehran will struggle to keep its beachhead near U.S. soil, which is vital to its survival strategy in the critical months ahead.

Russia is considering making $1-2 billion in payments in the weeks ahead to lock in natural gas and oil deals signed with Chávez. Some in Moscow, however, are weary of the Venezuelan shakedown, particularly because they know that Chávez's days are numbered. Russian firms are deciding now whether to double down on the Chávez regime, which has been a reliable customer of more than $13 billion in Russian arms, or wait to see if a successor government will honor its agreements in the oil and gas sector.

The Soviet-style succession that corrupt Chavistas and their Cuban handlers are trying to impose on the Venezuelan people is anything but a done deal. There is room and time for friends of democracy to play a constructive role.

Cabello and company, my sources tell me, are far more likely to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression if they can count on support from Moscow and Beijing. The Chavistas intend to promise continued cheap oil and sweetheart contracts to leverage this support. Discreet U.S. diplomacy -- working in concert with like-minded allies -- can help scuttle these plans. The Chinese and Russians may not be eager to defend yet another violent pariah regime, and Washington should rally Latin American leaders to draw the line against a Syria scenario in the Western Hemisphere.

At the heart of the Chavista strategy is a narco-state, led by men with well-documented ties to narco-trafficking. The White House should instruct U.S. law enforcement agencies to smash the foundations of this regime. One Venezuelan general or corrupt judge in a witness box in a U.S. federal courthouse will strike the regime at the very top and destroy any illusion of legitimacy or survivability.

U.S. intelligence agencies have been virtually blind to the Iranian presence in Venezuela. If they were instructed to kick over the rocks to see what is crawling underneath, I am convinced that they would discover a grave and growing threat against the security of the United States and its allies in the region. Such evidence will help motivate Venezuela's neighbors to take a stand against an even more unaccountable regime taking shape in Caracas.

Venezuela's military is not a monolith, and Chávez has undermined his own succession strategy by giving the narco-generals such visible and operational roles. The fact that the narco-generals will be more willing to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression to keep power and carry the "narco" label sets them apart from the rank-and-file soldiers and institutionalist generals. The United States military still carries a lot of weight with these men. A simple admonition to respect their constitution and serve their people may split the bulk of the force away from the narcos and deny them the means to impose their will. (Institutionalist generals may react in a similar way to news that Iran is conducting secret operations on Venezuelan territory that are both unconstitutional and a dangerous provocation.)

There is much the United States and the international community can do without interfering in Venezuela's internal politics. Although the leaders of the democratic opposition are determined to keep their distance from Washington, they must at least show the flag in the United States and other key countries to elicit the solidarity they deserve. Moreover, anyone who thinks the opposition can take on Cuba, China, Russia, Iran, drug traffickers, and Hezbollah without international backing is just not thinking straight.

Unfortunately, the career U.S. diplomats in Washington responsible for Venezuela have spent the last two years downplaying the mess there and the three years before that neglecting it altogether. So if there is any hope for U.S. leadership, it will require the attention of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or President Obama. Alas, in our own neighborhood, "leading from behind" is not an option.

Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and managing director of Vision Americas LLC, which represents U.S. and foreign clients, and contributes to www.interamericansecuritywatch.com.

Republica Centro-Americana das Drogas (quase...)

Impressionante a progressão dos barões da droga no México e na América Central.
Mais um pouco, e poderão convocar eleições para eleger o presidente da república das drogas...
Da coluna diária do ex-blog do ex-prefeito Cesar Maia (13/04/2012):

CARTEL MEXICANO SE ARTICULA COM GANGUES CENTRO-AMERICANAS!       (La Nacion, 09) Foi revelado um pacto entre os líderes das “maras” (gangues da América Central), e “Los Zetas”, o brutal cartel paramilitar dos narcotraficantes mexicanos, que também vem tomando o controle de grandes áreas rurais do norte da Guatemala, em sua tentativa de dominar as rotas do tráfico de drogas entre a América do Sul e os Estados Unidos. Nos últimos meses começaram a aparecer os primeiros sinais de que os “Los Zetas” estão fornecendo treinamento e equipamento militar para as “maras”.      2. “Los Zetas” - um cartel formado há mais de uma década por desertores das forças especiais do exército do México - já havia unido suas forças com os barões locais da droga nas áreas rurais da Guatemala, e tem recrutado desertores das forças especiais do exército da Guatemala para realizar operações em ambos os países, segundo revelaram autoridades dos dois governos.       3. Uma parceria formal e duradoura com as “maras” proporcionaria aos “Los Zetas” uma fonte de milhares de novos soldados, o que estenderia o alcance do cartel a cidades como a capital da Guatemala e, potencialmente, a outros países da América Central, onde as “maras” controlam as favelas urbanas. Integrantes de “Los Zetas” falaram sobre o recrutamento de 5.000 homens.  Segundo as autoridades, há campos de treinamento do “Los Zetas” nos estados mexicanos de Vera cruz, Sonora, Chiapas e San Luis Potosi.       4. Por isso os membros das “maras” começaram a utilizar fuzis AR-15, M-16 e AK-47, bem como granadas militares de fragmentação. As “maras” também começaram a cortar um dedo de suas vítimas de sequestro para pressionar seus familiares a pagar o resgate, uma técnica já observada no México. Como resultado desta aliança com o “Los Zetas”, a Mara Salvatrucha tem mais capacidade de organização, estratégia e de manobra. 5. Agora, o objetivo final de “Los Zetas”, de acordo com analistas, autoridades guatemaltecas e funcionários internacionais, é integrar as chamadas “maras” a sua própria rede e se tornar o grupo mais poderoso da Guatemala, sejam criminosos ou legítimos. "Los Zetas” são uma organização paramilitar que quer controlar todas as atividades da Guatemala: as legítimas, as ilegítimas e as criminais, disse Antonio Mazzitelli, chefe regional do Escritório das Nações Unidas para as Drogas e o Crime Organizado

Petroleo: as fontes dos EUA - NPR

Where Does America Get Oil? You May Be Surprised

by COREY FLINTOFF

National Public Radio, April 12. 2012

Marcel Mochet/AFP/Getty Images

The source of U.S. oil imports has been evolving. Canada, Latin America and Africa have been sending more oil to the U.S., while Middle Eastern crude is playing a smaller role. This photo shows an oil operation in 2007 off the coast of Angola, a leading producer in Africa.

Since the Arab oil embargoes of the 1960s and 70s, it's been conventional wisdom to talk about American dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf. But the global oil market has changed dramatically since then.

Today, the U.S. actually gets most of its imported oil from Canada and Latin America.

And many Americans might be surprised to learn that the U.S. now imports roughly the same amount of oil from Africa as it does from the Persian Gulf. African imports were a bit higher in 2010, while Persian Gulf oil accounted for a bit more last year.

Where The U.S. Gets Its Oil

Source: Energy Information Administration

Credit: Nelson Hsu / NPR

America is one of the world's largest oil producers, and close to 40 percent of U.S. oil needs are met at home. Most of the imports currently come from five countries: Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela and Nigeria.

Desert Kingdoms Versus The Great White North

Canada is far and away the biggest purveyor of crude to its southern neighbor, hitting a record 2.2 million barrels a day last year as its share of the U.S. market grew by 12 percent.

Energy expert Robert Rapier says the take-away for Americans may be "marry a Canadian," because he or she will be a citizen of an increasingly rich country. "Their budget looks good, and they're sitting on top of tremendous reserves," he says.

Saudi Arabia is a distant second, providing the U.S. with barely half as much crude as Canada. Other Persian Gulf countries also contribute to U.S. oil imports, but make up a relatively small share overall.

"People have tended to exaggerate how much oil we imported from the Middle East," says John Duffield, an energy expert and professor of political science at Georgia State University.

"In the long term, it may look like a historical anomaly that the U.S. became so involved in the Persian Gulf," he adds.

Producers Become Users

In terms of U.S. imports, Mexico is close behind Saudi Arabia in third place. Mexican imports did fall by more than 4 percent last year, partly because Mexico's oil production has been declining and partly because Mexican consumers are demanding more oil for their own use in an increasingly middle-class country.

It's a familiar story among oil-producing countries: As they become wealthier, they consume more of their own oil, says Rapier.

Although Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is no fan of the United States, his country is still a big contributor to America's oil imports. That's at least partly because the economics of shipping Venezuelan oil across the Caribbean are so much more attractive than hauling it to other markets, such as Europe.

But Venezuela's exports to the United States fell by 5 percent last year, dropping to the lowest level in two decades.

Rapier says that's because Chavez's government has been neglecting its oil sector, "siphoning off money from its own industry and killing the goose that lays the golden egg."

Nigeria suffered an even bigger drop in its exports to the United States, down 22 percent last year from the year before, as oil production was disrupted by civil unrest.

Nigeria's turmoil has received relatively little attention in the U.S. even though that country now provides more oil to the U.S. than any Middle Eastern country except Saudi Arabia.

Does It Matter Where Oil Comes From?

In terms of global oil prices, analysts say the source of the oil isn't all that important.

"Anybody who follows the oil industry will tell you that it doesn't make any difference where the oil comes from," says Keith Crane, an energy expert at RAND Corp.

People have tended to exaggerate how much oil we imported from the Middle East. In the long term, it may look like a historical anomaly that the U.S. became so involved in the Persian Gulf.

- John Duffield, energy expert at Georgia State University

Global oil markets are so intertwined, Crane says, that changes in any one part of the system can trigger effects elsewhere.

He points out that the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Iran and therefore does not import its oil. But "if Iranian oil goes off the [world] market, it still affects the price in the United States," Crane says.

Meanwhile, Iran has had no real problem selling its oil to Asian countries, though tougher sanctions are set to go into place this summer.

Now that the U.S. involvement in Iraq has wound down, Crane says, oil seems to be less of an American security concern.

"Do you need military might to preserve access to oil? I don't think there's a lot of evidence to say that's really important," he says.

Crane argues that many of the biggest security challenges the United States faces today are not directly related to energy. He points to the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea, and the U.S. war in Afghanistan.

U.S. Is Producing More Oil

Analysts also point out that the U.S. is producing more oil domestically while reducing its dependence on oil in general.

The recent recession and the slow economic recovery have dampened demand for oil products. But "the big story is that the U.S. has really expanded production over the past several years," says Crane, citing the production of oil from shale in North Dakota and other states.

He notes that the country has also become more energy efficient, building cars with better gas mileage and shifting away from oil-based energy.

"Whereas the U.S. has been the biggest consumer of oil products in the world, the role of oil is smaller than it was in the '70s, and even than it was in the '90s," Crane says.

But the U.S. still spends huge sums on oil because the rise in world prices has more than made up for the drop in U.S. imports.

"Five years ago, we were importing 10 million barrels a day, but at $50 a barrel," says Rapier. "Now we're at 8.4 million barrels, but at prices over $100 a barrel."

Related NPR Stories

What's Behind These High Gas Prices? March 7, 2012

O tumulo do Anonimo Enraivecido (ele sabe que escrevi para ele...)

Desculpem a brincadeira indevida com o "túmulo do soldado desconhecido", mais conhecido nos anais da história, e presente um pouco em todas as guerras, para homenagear um soldado de valor, que morreu sem que seu corpo tenha sido identificado devidamente. Uma homenagem a verdadeiro soldado desconhecido, de qualquer forma.
Mas, isso não tem nada a ver com nosso "Anônimo Enraivecido", que não tem nenhum valor, e nem mereceria este post, que só vai postado para deixá-lo com mais raiva ainda.
Eu sei que ele vai ler, e vai ficar um pouco mais enraivecido.


Mas quem é o "Anônimo Enraivecido"? (doravante AE)
Simples, é alguém que não gosta de mim, o que está inteiramente em seu direito. Eu tenho dezenas, talvez centenas de inimigos.
O que me deixa terrivelmente preocupado. 
Imaginem vocês se algum deles me desafiar para um duelo!!??!!
Oh vida, oh azar, oh céus, eu sabia que não ia dar certo! O que vou fazer agora, aqui perdido nesta vastidão do ciberespaço, sem sequer um Chapolim para me defender?


Eu faço posts provocadores, só para despertar o animus bellicandi de certo tipo de idiota desconhecido (como o AE, por exemplo), que pensa que sabe tudo com os seus dois neurônios concentrados em subliteratura do Zeitgeist.


Mas, estou sendo condescendente: não é que o AE não gosta de mim. 
Ele, na verdade, tem ódio de mim. Se ele pudesse, me colocaria frente a um pelotão de fuzilamento, ou me mandaria para algum Gulag perdido no fundo da Amazônia, como talvez fizessem na terra dos seus diletos companheiros de opinião e de ideologia com dissidentes como eu...


Acho também que o AE é masoquista, pois ele lê tudo o que eu escrevo, inclusive os posts mais errados, mais estropiados, feitos na pressa, na correria das leituras, que estão sempre atrasadas.
Diferente do AE, que dispõe de todo o tempo do mundo para vigiar o que escrevo (o que agradeço, sinceramente).
Acho que ele vai ler mesmo este post, destinado a lhe dar 5 minutos de fama (mas acho que dá para ler em menos tempo...).
Ele lê tudo o que escrevo, com raiva preventiva, imaginem vocês, os seus dois neurônios atilados, saltando para fora da caixa ôca daquilo que passa por cérebro, só para descobrir um errinho qualquer de digitação, de concordância, de construção em meus textos. 
E ele fica extasiado com alguma genial descoberta. Pronto, pegou mais mais uma estupidez da minha parte. Orgiástico, não é mesmo AE?


E aí ele escreve, esperando ser publicado (claro!, do contrário por que ele escreveria??), pois seu único prazer é de ser um PRA-bashing man, um detrator exclusivo que eu tenho, para vigiar todos os meus erros (o que agradeço sinceramente, pois se não fosse ele, os posts sairiam com muitos erros a mais do que já saem). 
Eu cometo erros em todas as línguas em que escrevo, claro, mas já reparei que ele só corrige mesmo o meu portugueis estropiado, não os textos em outras línguas (se ele quiser revisar meus textos em francês e em inglês, eu até agradeço e posto aqui; aliás, preciso verter um para o espanhol, mas não pode ser em portunhol como é o de todos esses amigos de Cuba).


O AE não deve ter muito o que fazer, e não deve ter uma existência própria na vida. Seu único objetivo é destratar este blogueiro provocador e anarquista. Deve ser freudiano.
Ele pensa que isso me dá raiva.
Mas eu aprendo com isso. Thanks AE...


Ele até me dá inspiração para fazer mais um dos meus minitratados.
Ele vai ler, estou seguro, pois terá sido feito especialmente para ele.
E vai me ajudar a descobrir erros involuntários nesse minitratado e em todos os demais textos (e vários outros que derivam da minha própria estupidez, claro). Não desista agora, por favor AE!


O AE é um gênio! Ele trabalha de graça para mim...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O que fazer com o Mercosul? - Mauro Laviola

Parece que o autor deste artigo de opinião gostaria de dizer: 
"Jogue no lixo, ora essa!"
Ele não diz, mas é como se...
Enfim, o artigo é um pouco confuso, refletindo mais observações de leigo, ou de observador interessado, já que empresário, ou burocrata trabalhando diretamente em contato com empresários que exportam e importam do Mercosul -- e sabem a bela confusão que é -- do que propriamente uma análise sistemática, objetiva e bem fundamentada sobre os problemas reais do Mercosul, que estão obscurecidos por uma cortina política de grandiloquência retórica que busca justamente esconder seus fracassos naquilo que interessa: a liberalização comercial e a integração econômica.
Como os governos não acreditam nisso, e como alguns governos trabalham ativamente contra a agenda real, ou essencial do Mercosul -- consolidada simplesmente no artigo 1ro. do Tratado de Assunção, os presidentes ficam fazendo reuniões espalhafatosas, com declarações de muitas páginas, nas quais prometem muito e não entregam nada, ou quase nada.
Em todo caso, fica o artigo para uma leitura amena.
Depois vou postar meus trabalhos mais recentes sobre o Mercosul.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


O que fazer com o Mercosul?
Opinião - Mauro Laviola
O Globo - 12/04/2012


Mês passado o bloco atingiu sua maioridade, mas apenas cronologicamente, porque em termos de maturidade sequer terminou o jardim de infância. Se formos analisar os efetivos resultados alcançados pelo bloco nesses 21 anos de existência, afora o inegável aumento do comércio sub-regional, os resultados de fortalecimento socioeconômico entre os sócios e de maior inserção internacional são notoriamente pífios. A partir da tentativa de formação de uma união aduaneira de forma apressada, de sofrer vicissitudes internas por adoção de políticas nacionais erráticas e inteiramente autônomas, além de sofrer fortes respingos da conjuntura internacional, os anos 2000 caracterizaram-se por frustradas tentativas de reparar o irreparável, uma vez que a engrenagem interna do conjunto já estava carcomida.
A primeira crise internacional deste século, em 2002, nos fez pensar que o comércio regional seria suficiente para fortalecer o conjunto que os anos subsequentes mostraram tratar-se de uma bela armadilha. Na incapacidade ou impossibilidade de implementar os dispositivos inerentes ao aperfeiçoamento do aparato institucional e operacional previsto no Tratado, os países-membros passaram a descumprir, sistematicamente, as regras preestabelecidas e criar inúmeros artifícios dilatórios para encobrir suas inadimplências. Chegaram, ultimamente, ao ponto crítico de sequer cumprir o estipulado no art. 1 do Tratado de Assunção que estabelece a livre circulação de bens, serviços e fatores produtivos.
Nesse aspecto, aliás, vale mencionar certa semelhança com o que ocorre hoje no seio da OMC. Em princípio, todos os países fazem de conta que obedecem estritamente aos dispositivos do organismo praticando, porém, um mercantilismo calcado em subsídios e regulamentos nacionais ambíguos em relação às regras ou simplesmente as ignoram, distorcendo inteiramente o princípio da sadia competitividade. Nesse aspecto, parece que o Mercosul só soube colher do ambiente multilateral o que lá se convencionou denominar de trade rugby (comércio pesado). As recentes medidas argentinas de proteção integral à produção doméstica, flagrantemente contrárias à OMC, ao Mercosul e aos acordos por ela firmados na Aladi, invalidam qualquer visão mais otimista para o futuro do bloco. Por outro lado, as medidas protecionistas pontuais que vêm sendo adotadas pelo Brasil configuram a tentativa de "argentinizar" sua política comercial agravando o quadro geral.
Em outro prisma, a derivação do Mercosul para o campo político, como tentativa de encobrir ou amortecer seu insucesso operacional, tampouco mostrou-se eficaz frente à comunidade internacional. Primeiro porque, internamente, criou uma série de penduricalhos custosos e inócuos como o Parlamento do Mercosul que só teria sentido se o regime de decisões do bloco fosse supranacional. Externamente, embaralhou-se com uma série de outras instâncias regionais de duvidosas intenções ideológicas e pouca praticidade, tais como Unasul/Sela/Calc/Celac/Asa et caterva.
Nesse momento, o governo brasileiro mostra certo "cansaço" do Mercosul e não crê em algo importante a fazer. Mas, como sua política externa mostra-se pendular e obediente ao preceito do "regionalismo aberto" tão a gosto do Itamaraty, a bola da vez volta-se para o campo do Brics. Só que, com os demais integrantes desse grupo, o jogo de interesses será igualmente pesado e vai necessitar de muito engenho e arte para dar frutos adicionais à economia do país.


MAURO LAVIOLA é diretor da Associação de Comércio Exterior do Brasil (AEB).