O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

quinta-feira, 13 de janeiro de 2022

Jamil Chade como observador da História in the Making: conversações EUA-Rússia sobre a Ucrânia; Putin em Munique, 2007 (Geneva Observer)

Como diz Jamil Chade, é preciso recuar muito na história para encontrar novamente esse tipo de situação: uma negociação tensa entre duas superpotências por causa de desentendimentos geopolíticos. Antigamente, eram os encontros para tratados de redução (sempre parcial e hipócrita) de armamentos nucleares. 

Agora, depois que o Putin acredita que o desaparecimento da União Soviética foi a "maior tragédia geopolítica do século XX", o neoczar se empenha em restabelecer o antigo status do maior país do planeta, segundo em armas nucleares, mas em posturas bem distantes em matéria de PIB per capita, esperança de vida e outras amenidades prosaicas. Ele não vai conseguir, mas vai incomodar um bocado.

De toda forma, olhando este mapa da expansão da OTAN (desnecessária, e totalmente paranóica) se compreende porque os russos (muito mais paranóicos) estão preocupados com o "cerco".


Dá para entender as agruras de um dirigente que já teve o seu país, em épocas passadas, invadido por mongóis, suecos, franceses e alemães, mais recentemente por George Soros e seus liberais... Transcrevo abaixo o discurso de Putin na conferência sobre segurança de Munique, em 2007, referida por Jamil Chade em sua breve nota. Mas vamos ler Jamil Chade...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

UKRAINE: A CLASH LONG IN THE MAKING

By Jamil Chade

Geneva Observer, January 13, 2022


You need to go back in history to understand what happened in Geneva last Monday (January 10) when Russians and Americans met for eight hours. The tension between the two sides was predictable. Read Vladimir Putin’s major address (http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034)  at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 and you have a list of all the current sticking points underlying the difficult discussion between Washington and Moscow. The speech helps to understand the fundamental lack of trust among the parties involved.

When asked by a journalist whether she trusted the Russians, the head American negotiator Wendy Sherman answered that she “generally doesn’t approach this kind of situation on the basis of trust.” This “situation” includes the presence of an estimated 100,000 Russian troops near the Ukrainian border.

In a world marked by deep mutual distrust between the great powers, that such meetings even take place has to be seen as an accomplishment. Both sides recognized as much even if it didn’t mark the beginning of a formal negotiating process. “This was not a negotiation, so we were putting ideas on the table today.  And we have a long way to go,” Sherman insisted.

Seasoned observers of the international scene in Geneva tell The G|O that this cautious front shows that it is not clear to the Americans or the Europeans if Vladimir Putin intends to negotiate. One senior diplomat from a NATO country conceded that it is Putin who is forcing NATO into introspection and giving new life to an idea openly expressed by Emmanuel Macron when he declared the alliance “brain dead.”

Also speaking to The G|O under the rules of non-direct attribution, a Western diplomat saw in the Russian approach a tactic that has become customary here: propositions known to be unacceptable are tabled with the intention of either slowing down discussions or driving wedges within the Western block . “It’s a kind of crisis diplomacy that we see at work in numerous fora here, from the Human Rights Council to the Conference on Disarmament,” the diplomat said.

-JC

================

Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy

01:38
Munich

Vladimir Putin: Thank you very much dear Madam Federal Chancellor, Mr Teltschik, ladies and gentlemen!

I am truly grateful to be invited to such a representative conference that has assembled politicians, military officials, entrepreneurs and experts from more than 40 nations.

This conference’s structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference’s format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.

Therefore. It is well known that international security comprises much more than issues relating to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations.

This universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that “security for one is security for all”. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the Second World War was breaking out: “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.”

These words remain topical today. Incidentally, the theme of our conference – global crises, global responsibility – exemplifies this.

Only two decades ago the world was ideologically and economically divided and it was the huge strategic potential of two superpowers that ensured global security.

This global stand-off pushed the sharpest economic and social problems to the margins of the international community’s and the world’s agenda. And, just like any war, the Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking. I am referring to ideological stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War bloc thinking.

The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either.

The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history?

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.

It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.

Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.

Along with this, what is happening in today’s world – and we just started to discuss this – is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.

And with which results?

Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished. Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no less people perish in these conflicts – even more are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate.

And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this – no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.

The force’s dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, significantly new threats – though they were also well-known before – have appeared, and today threats such as terrorism have taken on a global character.

I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.

And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly – changes in light of the dynamic development in a whole number of countries and regions.

Madam Federal Chancellor already mentioned this. The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future.

There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.

In connection with this the role of multilateral diplomacy is significantly increasing. The need for principles such as openness, transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force should be a really exceptional measure, comparable to using the death penalty in the judicial systems of certain states.

However, today we are witnessing the opposite tendency, namely a situation in which countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous criminals are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these conflicts are killing people – hundreds and thousands of civilians!

But at the same time the question arises of whether we should be indifferent and aloof to various internal conflicts inside countries, to authoritarian regimes, to tyrants, and to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? As a matter of fact, this was also at the centre of the question that our dear colleague Mr Lieberman asked the Federal Chancellor. If I correctly understood your question (addressing Mr Lieberman), then of course it is a serious one! Can we be indifferent observers in view of what is happening? I will try to answer your question as well: of course not.

But do we have the means to counter these threats? Certainly we do. It is sufficient to look at recent history. Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime – a peaceful transformation! And what a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat of mutual destruction we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values and for the law?

I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. And in connection with this, either I did not understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or what he said was inexact. In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn’t hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law have a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.

And one must not forget that democratic political actions necessarily go along with discussion and a laborious decision-making process.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

The potential danger of the destabilisation of international relations is connected with obvious stagnation in the disarmament issue.

Russia supports the renewal of dialogue on this important question.

It is important to conserve the international legal framework relating to weapons destruction and therefore ensure continuity in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Together with the United States of America we agreed to reduce our nuclear strategic missile capabilities to up to 1700–2000 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. Russia intends to strictly fulfil the obligations it has taken on. We hope that our partners will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration.

Russia strictly adheres to and intends to further adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the multilateral supervision regime for missile technologies. The principles incorporated in these documents are universal ones.

In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character.

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.

It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.

At the same time, it is impossible to sanction the appearance of new, destabilising high-tech weapons. Needless to say it refers to measures to prevent a new area of confrontation, especially in outer space. Star wars is no longer a fantasy – it is a reality. In the middle of the 1980s our American partners were already able to intercept their own satellite.

In Russia’s opinion, the militarisation of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era. And we have come forward more than once with initiatives designed to prevent the use of weapons in outer space.

Today I would like to tell you that we have prepared a project for an agreement on the prevention of deploying weapons in outer space. And in the near future it will be sent to our partners as an official proposal. Let’s work on this together.

Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.

Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, a North Korean rocket to American territory through western Europe obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the left ear.

And here in Germany I cannot help but mention the pitiable condition of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1999. It took into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the elimination of the Warsaw bloc. Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this document, including the Russian Federation.

NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times. We constantly discuss this issue with Mr Solana and he knows our position. We are ready to further work in this direction.

But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all.

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees?

The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice – one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia – a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family.

And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us – these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent. And is it possible that we will once again require many years and decades, as well as several generations of politicians, to dissemble and dismantle these new walls?

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

We are unequivocally in favour of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation. The present international legal principles allow us to develop technologies to manufacture nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. And many countries with all good reasons want to create their own nuclear energy as a basis for their energy independence. But we also understand that these technologies can be quickly transformed into nuclear weapons.

This creates serious international tensions. The situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme acts as a clear example. And if the international community does not find a reasonable solution for resolving this conflict of interests, the world will continue to suffer similar, destabilising crises because there are more threshold countries than simply Iran. We both know this. We are going to constantly fight against the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Last year Russia put forward the initiative to establish international centres for the enrichment of uranium. We are open to the possibility that such centres not only be created in Russia, but also in other countries where there is a legitimate basis for using civil nuclear energy. Countries that want to develop their nuclear energy could guarantee that they will receive fuel through direct participation in these centres. And the centres would, of course, operate under strict IAEA supervision.

The latest initiatives put forward by American President George W. Bush are in conformity with the Russian proposals. I consider that Russia and the USA are objectively and equally interested in strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment. It is precisely our countries, with leading nuclear and missile capabilities, that must act as leaders in developing new, stricter non-proliferation measures. Russia is ready for such work. We are engaged in consultations with our American friends.

In general, we should talk about establishing a whole system of political incentives and economic stimuli whereby it would not be in states’ interests to establish their own capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle but they would still have the opportunity to develop nuclear energy and strengthen their energy capabilities.

In connection with this I shall talk about international energy cooperation in more detail. Madam Federal Chancellor also spoke about this briefly – she mentioned, touched on this theme. In the energy sector Russia intends to create uniform market principles and transparent conditions for all. It is obvious that energy prices must be determined by the market instead of being the subject of political speculation, economic pressure or blackmail.

We are open to cooperation. Foreign companies participate in all our major energy projects. According to different estimates, up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia – and please think about this figure – up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia is done by foreign capital. Try, try to find me a similar example where Russian business participates extensively in key economic sectors in western countries. Such examples do not exist! There are no such examples.

I would also recall the parity of foreign investments in Russia and those Russia makes abroad. The parity is about fifteen to one. And here you have an obvious example of the openness and stability of the Russian economy.

Economic security is the sector in which all must adhere to uniform principles. We are ready to compete fairly.

For that reason more and more opportunities are appearing in the Russian economy. Experts and our western partners are objectively evaluating these changes. As such, Russia’s OECD sovereign credit rating improved and Russia passed from the fourth to the third group. And today in Munich I would like to use this occasion to thank our German colleagues for their help in the above decision.

Furthermore. As you know, the process of Russia joining the WTO has reached its final stages. I would point out that during long, difficult talks we heard words about freedom of speech, free trade, and equal possibilities more than once but, for some reason, exclusively in reference to the Russian market.

And there is still one more important theme that directly affects global security. Today many talk about the struggle against poverty. What is actually happening in this sphere? On the one hand, financial resources are allocated for programmes to help the world’s poorest countries – and at times substantial financial resources. But to be honest — and many here also know this – linked with the development of that same donor country’s companies. And on the other hand, developed countries simultaneously keep their agricultural subsidies and limit some countries’ access to high-tech products.

And let’s say things as they are – one hand distributes charitable help and the other hand not only preserves economic backwardness but also reaps the profits thereof. The increasing social tension in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of radicalism, extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts. And if all this happens in, shall we say, a region such as the Middle East where there is increasingly the sense that the world at large is unfair, then there is the risk of global destabilisation.

It is obvious that the world’s leading countries should see this threat. And that they should therefore build a more democratic, fairer system of global economic relations, a system that would give everyone the chance and the possibility to develop.

Dear ladies and gentlemen, speaking at the Conference on Security Policy, it is impossible not to mention the activities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As is well-known, this organisation was created to examine all – I shall emphasise this – all aspects of security: military, political, economic, humanitarian and, especially, the relations between these spheres.

What do we see happening today? We see that this balance is clearly destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this task is also being accomplished by the OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus which is absolutely not connected with the state founders in any way. Decision-making procedures and the involvement of so-called non-governmental organisations are tailored for this task. These organisations are formally independent but they are purposefully financed and therefore under control.

According to the founding documents, in the humanitarian sphere the OSCE is designed to assist country members in observing international human rights norms at their request. This is an important task. We support this. But this does not mean interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these states should live and develop.

It is obvious that such interference does not promote the development of democratic states at all. On the contrary, it makes them dependent and, as a consequence, politically and economically unstable.

We expect that the OSCE be guided by its primary tasks and build relations with sovereign states based on respect, trust and transparency.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often – and personally, I very often – hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs.

In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.

We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential. And of course we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.

Thank you for your attention.

Horst Teltschik: Thank you very much for your important speech. We heard new themes, including the issue of global security architecture – one was not in the foreground over the last few years – disarmament, arms control, the issue of the NATO-Russian relations, and cooperation in the field of technology.

There are still a whole number of questions and Mr President is ready to answer.

Question: Dear Mr President, thank you for your speech. I would like to emphasise that the German Bundestag is convinced of Russia’s importance as Europe’s partner and of the importance of the role you play. The Federal Chancellor said this in her speech.

Proceeding from experience, I would like to mention two issues in your speech. First of all, on your opinion of NATO and NATO expansion, a phenomenon that you consider dangerous for Russia. Would you acknowledge that this phenomenon is, in practice, not expansion but rather the self-determination of democratic states who want this? And that NATO finds it difficult to accept states that do not declare this readiness? You could admit that thanks to NATO expansion eastern borders have become more reliable, more secure. Why are you afraid of democracy? I am convinced that only democratic states can become members of NATO. This stabilises neighbours.

About what is happening inside your country. The murder of Anna Politkovskaya was a symbol. One can say that this affects many journalists, makes everybody afraid, and the law on non-governmental organisations also causes alarm.

Question: I well understand your comments about non-proliferation. Especially at the end of the Cold War we saw a reduction of the deployment of nuclear weapons, but we also saw increased terrorism. Nuclear materials must be kept away from terrorists.

Question: Coming back to the question that was also asked to the Federal Chancellor. What does the future hold for Kosovo and Serbia? What is your opinion of Mr Ahtisaari? How will Russia influence resolving this problem?

Question: Can you comment on the experiences of Russian servicemen in Chechnya? And about your comments on energy: you briefly mentioned the market role energy plays in politics. The EU is interested in reaching a partnership agreement that contains fixed policy principles. Are you ready to guarantee reliable energy deliveries, including in the agreement?

Question: Mr President, your speech was both sincere and frank. I hope that you understand my frank and direct question. In the 1990s Russian experts actively helped Iran develop missile technologies. Iran now has advanced medium- and long-range missiles that would enable it to strike Russia and part of Europe. They are also working towards placing nuclear warheads on these missiles. Your country has made efforts to negotiate with Iran on this issue and supported the UN Security Council resolution to prevent Iran from carrying out such a policy.

My question is as follows: what efforts will Russia make – through the UN or otherwise – to stop these very serious events in Iran?

Question: I am confident that the historians of the future will not describe our conference as one in which the Second Cold War was declared. But they could. You said that it is necessary to put pressure on Iran and to provide positive incentives. But is it not true that Russia is interfering with the process of applying strong pressure through sanctions? Secondly, with regards to deliveries of weapons, Russia is encouraging Iran, especially since these weapons appeared in Lebanon and in Gaza. What are your comments on this?

Question: I understand your sincerity and I hope that you will accept our sincerity. First of all, about arms control. Who needs a new arms race? I want to point out that the USA has not developed a new strategic weapon in more than two decades and that you recently tested the Topol-M missile, and that it is already deployed in silos and on mobile installations. You criticised the USA for unilateral actions and said twice that military actions can only be legitimate if they receive UN approval. The USA is carrying out military actions in Iraq and in Afghanistan according to UN decisions and today in Kosovo the majority of troops are supporting peace-making operations in this country.

My question is the following: are you saying that independently of how Russia perceives a threat to its international interests, it will not undertake military operations without UN approval?

Question: You talked about the danger of a unipolar world in which one sovereign makes a decision without consulting anyone else. In many people’s opinion, in Russia we are seeing an increasingly unipolar government where competing centres of influence are forced to tow the party line, whether it be in the State Duma, the regional leadership, the media, business communities or non-governmental organisations. Would a unipolar government be such a reliable partner when the issue of energy security is at stake?

President Vladimir Putin: First of all I would like to thank you for your questions. Very interesting. It is a shame that we have little time left because I would be pleased to have a separate discussion with all of you. I very much enjoy this, I like it.

I will begin with the last question about the unipolar nature of the Russian government. Today the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the United Russia Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and other political forces as well sit in the Russian parliament. And their basic positions differ significantly. If you aren’t aware of this then just have a talk with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and then with the leader of our liberal democrats, Mr Zhirinovsky. You will see the difference at once. If you cannot see it now, then have a talk with them. There is no problem here, simply go to Moscow and talk to them.

About our future plans. We would like to have a mature political system, a multi-party system with responsible politicians who can anticipate the country’s development and not only work responsibly before elections and immediately after, but in a long-term future as well. That is what we aspire to. And this system will certainly be a multi-party one. All our actions within Russia, including changing the State Duma election regime, the election regime in the Russian parliament, are designed to strengthen a multi-party system in Russia.

And now about whether our government cabinet is able to operate responsibly in resolving issues linked to energy deliveries and ensuring energy security. Of course it can! Moreover, all that we have done and are doing is designed to achieve only one goal, namely to transfer our relations with consumers and countries that transport our energy to market-based, transparent principles and long-term contracts.

I will remind you and my colleague, the President of Ukraine, who is sitting opposite from me, also knows this. For fifteen years prior to 2006, as long as we did not make the corresponding decisions during our difficult talks, deliveries of Russian energy and, first and foremost, of gas to Europe depended on the conditions and prices for the deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine itself. And this was something that Ukraine and Russia agreed among themselves. And if we reached no agreement, then all European consumers would sit there with no gas. Would you like to see this happen? I don’t think so. And despite all the scandals, the protection of interests, and differences of opinion we were able to agree with President Yushchenko. I consider that he made a responsible, absolutely correct and market-oriented decision. We signed separate contracts for the delivery of our gas to Ukraine and for delivering Russian gas to Europe for the next five years. You should thank us, both Russia and Ukraine, for this decision. And thank you also for your question.

It would have been better if I answered your questions at once.

Regarding our perception of NATO’s eastern expansion, I already mentioned the guarantees that were made and that are not being observed today. Do you happen to think that this is normal practice in international affairs? But all right, forget it. Forget these guarantees. With respect to democracy and NATO expansion. NATO is not a universal organisation, as opposed to the UN. It is first and foremost a military and political alliance, military and political! Well, ensuring one’s own security is the right of any sovereign state. We are not arguing against this. Of course we are not objecting to this. But why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders during this expansion? Can someone answer this question? Unless the expansion of military infrastructure is connected with fighting against today’s global threats? Let’s put it this way, what is the most important of these threats for us today – the most important for Russia, for the USA and for Europe – it is terrorism and the fight against it.

Does one need Russia to fight against terrorism? Of course! Does one need India to fight against terrorism! Of course! But we are not members of NATO and other countries aren’t either. But we can only work on this issue effectively by joining our forces. As such, expanding infrastructure, especially military infrastructure, to our borders is not connected in any way with the democratic choices of individual states. And I would ask that we not mix these two concepts.

You know, I wrote so illegibly here that even I cannot read my own writing. I will therefore answer what I can read and if I do not answer something, please remind me of the question.

What will happen with Kosovo and with Serbia? Only Kosovars and Serbs can know. And let’s not tell them how they should live their lives. There is no need to play God and resolve all of these peoples’ problems. Together we can only create certain necessary conditions and help people resolve their own problems. Create the necessary conditions and act as the guarantors of certain agreements. But we should not impose these agreements. Otherwise, we shall simply put the situation into a dead end. And if one of the participants in this difficult process feels offended or humiliated, then the problem will last for centuries. We will only create a dead end.

What does our position consist in? Our position consists in adhering precisely to this principle. And if we see that one party is clearly dissatisfied with the proposals to resolve the situation then we are not going to support this option.

I did not exactly understand what you meant when you asked about our servicemen’s experience in Chechnya. Their experience is not pleasant, but it is extensive. And if you are interested in the general situation in Chechnya, then I can tell you that a parliament and a president have been elected, and that the government is functioning. All the bodies of authority and administration have been formed. Practically all the political forces in Chechnya have been involved in work in the Republic. As an example, the former Defence Minister of Aslan Maskhadov’s government is now a member of parliament in Chechnya. And we made a whole series of decisions that would allow former insurgents to return not only to normal life, but also to the Republic’s political activities. As such, today we prefer to act by using economic and political means and, in practice, we have transferred the responsibility for ensuring security almost 100 percent to the Chechen people. Because the agencies of law and order that were formed in Chechnya are almost 100 percent composed of local citizens, from those living in Chechnya on a permanent basis – from Chechens.

As to Lebanon, I also did not quite understand what you meant. But, yes, the fact that we sent military construction workers to Lebanon to restore bridges and infrastructure that was destroyed in the conflict with Israel is a confirmation of a well-known situation, the one I described just now. And military units protecting these builders were made up of servicemen from Chechnya and with Chechen origins. We recognised that if our servicemen must operate in regions inhabited by Muslims, sending a contingent of Muslim servicemen would be no bad thing. And we were not mistaken. The local population really gave a warm welcome to our military builders.

Now about the energy agreement with the European Union, since this is how I understood the question. We have said many times that we are not against agreeing on the principles underlying our energy relations with the EU. Moreover, the principles contained in the Charter are generally comprehensible. But the Charter itself is not so acceptable to us. Because not only Russia but also our European partners do not adhere to its principles. It is enough to remember that the market for nuclear materials remains closed for us. Nobody has opened this market to us.

There are also other moments which I simply do not want to draw attention to now. But as to the principles themselves, we are already using these principles in our work with German companies. I shall remind you of the transaction that took place between Gazprom and BASF. As a matter of fact, this was an asset swap. We are ready to continue to work this way. We are ready. But in each concrete instance we must understand what we give, what our partners give, calculate, have an independent international expert evaluation, and then make a decision. We are ready to engage in this work. We have actually just recently done something similar with our Italian partners, with the company ENI. And we did more than simply sign an agreement about deliveries until 2035 – I think – we also talked about swapping assets. And we are studying this same type of cooperation with our Ukrainian friends. This is going ahead.

And is it necessary to fix these principles in a possible future fundamental text between Russia and the EU? It is possible to have different opinions on this issue. I consider that it is not necessary because, in addition to energy, we have other spheres in which we cooperate with the EU, including agriculture, high-tech and transportation. And all of this is very important and very interesting. And we cannot put all of this in one fundamental act that should act as a framework document. Or would you want us to put only what you need in the document and leave what we need outside of the framework? Let’s discuss things honestly with one another and take mutually acceptable decisions.

“In the 1990s Russia helped Iran develop missile technologies”. I think that you asked me this question. “Today Iran wants to put nuclear warheads on these missiles that could reach Europe. What is Russia going to do about the Iranian nuclear programme?” Is that so?

Well first of all, I do not have data that in the 1990s Russia helped Iran create its own missile technologies. It was other countries that worked very actively towards this. And technology was transferred through different channels. And we have proof of this. At the time I gave these proofs directly to the President of the United States. And technology also came from Europe and from Asian countries.

So Russia is hardly at fault here. I assure you. Russia is the country least involved here. Least of all. If it is involved at all. At the time I was still working in St Petersburg, but we were not involved with this. I can assure you of this. But you know that at the business level something could have happened. We trained experts in institutes and so on. And at the request and according to the information of our American partners we reacted harshly to this. Immediately and harshly. We did not observe such a reaction from our other partners, including European partners. Moreover, I do not know whether you are aware of this or not but you should know that military technology and special equipment is still coming from the United States. Until now. Until now spare parts for F-14 planes come from the armed forces and the Pentagon. As far as I know, there is even an investigation taking place in the United States on this account. And despite the fact that this investigation is proceeding and that these spare parts were seized at the border and then sent back, after a certain amount of time, according to the data I have – and if they are not correct then check them – those same cargos were again seized at the border. Even bearing a tag ‘material evidence’.

You know, this stream is really hard to stop. We need to work together to do so.

About whether or not Iran has missiles that threaten Europe. You are mistaken. Today Iran has – Mr Gates is here today and certainly knows this data better than I do, and the Russian Defence Minister is also here – missiles with a range of 2000 kilometres.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov: 1600–1700 kilometres.

Vladimir Putin: 1600–1700 kilometres. Only. Well, count how many kilometres there are between Munich and the Iranian border. Iran has no such missiles. They plan to develop some with a range of 2400 kilometres. It is not known whether they have the technology to do so. And with respect to 4000, 5000 or 6000 kilometres, then I think that this would simply require a different economy. So, it is improbable in general. And Iran is not threatening Europe. With regard to the idea that they are preparing to use nuclear warheads then we do not have such data. We do not have this data about nuclear warheads.

North Korea has tested a nuclear device. Iranians are constantly saying that their nuclear programme has a peaceful character. But I agree with you that the international community has concerns about the character and quality of Iran’s nuclear programmes. And Mr ElBaradai recently stated these concerns in what I think were six or seven points. I agree with you about this. And I do not understand why the Iranian party has still not reacted in a positive and constructive way to the concerns that Mr ElBaradai stated and therefore assuaged these concerns. I do not understand this just as you do not understand it.

What are we going to do? I think that together we need to work patiently and carefully. And, that’s right, to create incentives and show the Iranian leadership that cooperation with the international community is much better than confrontation.

Yes, and again about the deliveries of weapons to Iran. You know that there has been more talk than deliveries. Our military and technical cooperation with Iran is minimal. Simply minimal. I am not sure what minimal figures it is estimated at. In general we deliver much less arms to the Middle East than other countries, including the United States. No comparison is possible there. We recently delivered an anti-aircraft weapon system to Iran – that is true – with a medium range, approximately 30 to 50 kilometres. That is true. Why did we do this? I can explain why. We did this so that Iran did not feel it had been driven into a corner. So that it didn’t feel that it was in some kind of hostile environment. Rather that Iran could understand that it had channels of communication and friends that it could trust. We very much expect that the Iranian party will understand and hear our signals.

As to our weapons in Lebanon and in the Gaza strip. I am not aware of our weapons in the Gaza strip. I have not heard of such examples. Well, Kalashnikovs are in general the most widely used small arms in the world. They are probably everywhere. And probably there are still automatic Kalashnikovs in Germany or, in any case, some that have still not been destroyed. That is one hundred percent certain.

In Lebanon it is true. Elements of our anti-tank systems really have been seen there. That is true. Our Israeli partners told me about this at once. We carried out a thorough investigation into what happened. And we determined that these systems had remained in Lebanese territory after the Syrian army left. We carried out the corresponding work with our Syrian partners. We determined that our future military and technical cooperation with Syria would exclude the possibility that weapons could fall into any hands other than the ones they were destined for. We developed such a system. Among other things, we agreed on a system of possible warehouse inspections, at any time that is convenient for Russian experts. Inspections in warehouses after deliveries of Russian weapons systems to Syria.

“The USA are not developing strategic weapons but Russia is. Will Russia use force in the future if it is not sanctioned by the UN? Russia is developing a system of strategic weapons”.

Fine question, excellent! I am very grateful to you for this question. It will give me the opportunity to talk about the essence of what is happening. What are we indebted to in the past decades if there was a stand-off between two superpowers and two systems but nevertheless a big war did not take place? We are indebted to the balance of powers between these two superpowers. There was an equilibrium and a fear of mutual destruction. And in those days one party was afraid to make an extra step without consulting the other. And this was certainly a fragile peace and a frightening one. But as we see today, it was reliable enough. Today, it seems that the peace is not so reliable.

Yes, the United States is ostensibly not developing an offensive weapon. In any case, the public does not know about this. Even though they are certainly developing them. But we aren’t even going to ask about this now. We know that these developments are proceeding. But we pretend that we don’t know, so we say that they aren’t developing new weapons. But what do we know? That the United States is actively developing and already strengthening an anti-missile defence system. Today this system is ineffective but we do not know exactly whether it will one day be effective. But in theory it is being created for that purpose. So hypothetically we recognise that when this moment arrives, the possible threat from our nuclear forces will be completely neutralised. Russia’s present nuclear capabilities, that is. The balance of powers will be absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from the feeling of complete security. This means that its hands will be free not only in local but eventually also in global conflicts.

We are discussing this with you now. I would not want anyone to suspect any aggressive intentions on our part. But the system of international relations is just like mathematics. There are no personal dimensions. And of course we should react to this. How? Either the same as you and therefore by building a multi-billion dollar anti-missile system or, in view of our present economic and financial possibilities, by developing an asymmetrical answer. So that everybody can understand that the anti-missile defence system is useless against Russia because we have certain weapons that easily overcome it. And we are proceeding in this direction. It is cheaper for us. And this is in no way directed against the United States themselves.

I completely agree if you say that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is not directed against us, just as our new weapons are not directed against you. And I fully agree with my colleague and my friend about another thing. Do you know – and I will not be afraid of the word – that in spite of all our disagreements I consider the President of the United States my friend. He is a decent person and I know that today the wolves can blame the United States for everything that is being done on the international arena and internally. But I know that he is a decent person and it is possible to talk and reach agreements with him. And when I talked to him he said: “I proceed from the fact that Russia and the USA will never be opponents and enemies again”. I agree with him. But I repeat once again that there are symmetries and asymmetries here, there is nothing personal. It is simply a calculation.

And now about whether Russia will use military force without the sanction of the UN. We will always operate strictly within the international legal framework. My basic education is in law and I will allow myself to remind both myself and my colleagues that according to the UN Charter peace-keeping operations require the sanction of both the UN and the UN Security Council. This is in the case of peace-keeping operations. But in the UN Charter there is also an article about self-defence. And no sanctions are required in this case.

So, what have I forgotten?

Question: My question was about multipolarity in Russia itself and about the attitude of the international community towards Russia if Russia does not observe these principles, in reference to the murder of journalists, fears, anxieties, the absence of freedom and non-governmental organisations.

Vladimir Putin: I will say a couple of words. I already answered part of the question when I talked about the structure of the Russian parliament. Look at who is represented there, the political views of the people who have leadership positions in parliament, the legitimate parties. Now, as to non-governmental organisations, they are working actively in Russia. Yes, we introduced a new system for registering these organisations. But it is not that different from registration systems in other countries. And we have not yet seen any complaints from non-governmental organisations themselves. We have not refused registration to almost any organisations. There were two or three cases that were refused on simply formal grounds and these organisations are working on correcting certain provisions in their charters and so on. Nobody has been refused registration based on substantial, fundamental issues. All are continuing to work in the most active possible way and will continue to do so in the future.

What bothers us? I can say and I think that it is clear for all, that when these non-governmental organisations are financed by foreign governments, we see them as an instrument that foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies. That is the first thing. The second. In every country there are certain rules for financing, shall we say, election campaigns. Financing from foreign governments, including within governmental campaigns, proceeds through non-governmental organisations. And who is happy about this? Is this normal democracy? It is secret financing. Hidden from society. Where is the democracy here? Can you tell me? No! You can’t tell me and you never will be able to. Because there is no democracy here, there is simply one state exerting influence on another.

But we are interested in developing civil society in Russia, so that it scolds and criticises the authorities, helps them determine their own mistakes, and correct their policies in Russian citizens’ interests. We are certainly interested in this and we will support civil society and non-governmental organisations.

As to fears and so on, are you aware that today Russians have fewer fears than citizens in many other countries? Because in the last few years we made cardinal changes to improve the economic well-being of our citizens. We still have a great many problems. And we still have a great many unresolved problems. Including problems linked with poverty. And I can tell you that fears basically come from this source.

As to journalists then yes, this represents an important and difficult problem. And, incidentally, journalists are not only killed in Russia, but in other countries as well. Where are most journalists killed? You are an expert and probably know in which country the most journalists died in, say, the last year and a half? The largest number of journalists were killed in Iraq.

As to tragedies within Russia, we will certainly struggle with these phenomena in the most thorough way possible and sternly punish all criminals who try to undermine trust in Russia and damage our political system.

Thank you for your attention.

Mini reflexão sobre o hábito da transferência de culpas - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Mini reflexão sobre o hábito da transferência de culpas

 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

 

 

Um comportamento típico dos escapistas: quando se reclama de um ou outro aspecto das políticas e dos comportamentos atuais, não é difícil ouvir-se a arenga habitual:

 

“Ah, mas os tucanos também roubaram… Ah, mas os petistas também aparelharam o Estado… Ah, mas o STF proibiu doações empresariais… Ah, mas as emendas parlamentares são legítimas… Ah, mas isso e mais aquilo…”

 

Já repararam que, de “mas” em “mas”, o Brasil vem se degradando continuamente?

Persistirá esse tipo de escapismo até algum desenlace fatal?

 

Não cabe, nunca coube, desculpar o desgoverno atual por erros e traquinagens que possam ter sido perpetrados lá atrás, aliás até intermediados e parcialmente corrigidos por um governo de dois anos e meio que tentou, nas condições que se sabe, corrigir a herança maldita do PT.

Não, não se pode desculpar a horripilante degradação atual da politica, da cultura e da economia de um Brasil desgovernado por um genocida, mentecapto e psicopata perverso, por tudo o que se fez antes, inclusive porque não havia nenhum “comunismo” sendo construído.

 

Deve-se, sim, falar do que permitiu que essa deformação surgisse: a maior CRISE de toda nossa história, em 2015-16, por incompetência econômica, e a maior CORRUPÇÃO já conhecida, de caráter sistêmico, institucional, que se instalou nos governos petistas desde o início.

Hoje, na verdade, a corrupção se tornou legal: esquerda e direita se uniram para bloquear a luta contra a corrupção e para assaltar o Estado e todos nós. O Brasil e os brasileiros estão REFÉNS de um estamento político predatório, que não tem ideologia de direita ou de esquerda: a única intenção é rapinar o Estado, ou seja, todos nós.

Há exceções, eu sei, entre os políticos, mas são exceções, e vivem num ambiente contaminado irremediavelmente pelo patrimonialismo, pelo nepotismo, pelo fisiologismo, pelo prebendalismo e por vários outros ismos corruptores. 

 

Não existem desculpas escapistas a todos os horrores que foram sendo construídos ao longo do tempo: o escravismo no Império, o militarismo no surgimento da República, as oligarquias sempre presentes, o autoritarismo inerente às elites sempre medíocres, e mesmo às esquerdas supostamente redistributivas, a indiferença à miséria de grande parte da população por parte de todos os dirigentes, mesmo dos que viviam dessa miséria por objetivos populistas, e, sobretudo, sobretudo, o absoluto DESCASO de todos para com uma educação de massas de qualidade para qualificar produtivamente a população.

 

O Brasil é uma construção falha, estamos vendo agora, no momento de fazermos um balanço das realizações e frustrações em 200 anos de vida independente. Conseguimos construir um Estado até grandioso, para os padrões das antigas formações colonizadas pelos ibéricos, com palácios e até instituições respeitáveis, mas tudo isso sobre pés de barro, sobre o suor dos escravos, sobre o trabalho ingente dos imigrantes analfabetos, que muito fizeram para transformar este país, sobre a preservação da pobreza e da desigualdade que atinge a população mais humilde, que um contingente não desprezível da população total.

 

O Brasil, já se disse, não é um país pobre, mas é um país com muitos pobres. Correto: todos nós nascemos pobres, em conhecimento e capacitação para a vida, uma parte, com sorte, em lares mais ou menos bem dotados, outros, a grande maioria em lares pobres, muito até miseráveis. Esses precisam se alçar à custa de muito trabalho, como fizeram os meus avós imigrantes analfabetos e como fizeram meus pais sem educação primária completa. Esse é o Brasil real, o Brasil que foi construído depois de muita labuta, no Império e na República, infelizmente sem elites preparadas para enfrentar os reais desafios, que não estavam tanto na superestrutura das próprias elites, e sim na infraestrutura mal-acabada dos pobres.

O Brasil cresceu (muito pouco, no máximo 50 anos em 200) indiferente à situação da maioria do povo. Isso fez muito mal a um verdadeiro sentido de nação. 

 

Hoje pagamos o preço não só pela inação das elites — todas elas, não só os ricos e poderosos, mas sindicalistas e atores do “baixo clero” também—, mas sobretudo pelo CARÁTER PREDATÓRIO das elites que foram sendo forjadas ao longo do tempo.

Não cabe mais escapismo e transferência de culpas: todos somos responsáveis pelo país que criamos ou que deixamos “acontecer”. Não, não cabem mais desculpas: ou corrigimos o que está errado, começando pela infraestrutura das massas ou nunca seremos uma nação digna desse nome. 

Termino com uma nota “técnica”, dirigida aos distributivistas habituais (e existem muitos, não só nas esquerdas, mas também nas elites com remorsos) e aos ansiosos por corrigir nossas mazelas: a despeito de o Brasil ser um país horrivelmente desigual, a desigualdade NÃO É o nosso principal problema. Ela é, sobretudo, o resultado da não educação das massas, da baixíssima dotação do país em capital humano, o que responde por ganhos medíocres de produtividade e, portanto, por baixas taxas de crescimento econômico com transformação produtiva.

O Brasil é um país tremendamente assolado por muitos pobres ignorantes, e é isso que permite às elites predatórias (inclusive aquelas que vieram de baixo) manter um sistema expropriatório das riquezas, mesmo poucas, criadas poe essa massa de trabalhadores desqualificados (mas eleitores).

O Brasil é uma verdadeira democracia de massas, mas deformada e de baixíssima qualidade, devido à ação predatória de todas as nossas elites. Isso só vai mudar com a educação de massas de qualidade, com a qualificação do capita humano.

Por isso, sou contrário a essas políticas equivocadas de distributivismo demagógico, feito de quatro anos de supertaxação dos ricos para distribuição de esmolas populistas aos mais pobres.

O trabalho é mais duro e mais lento: o Brasil é um país desigual, mas a desigualdade só vai ser realmente resolvida pela redução da pobreza e eliminação da miséria. Soluções “pikettyanas” são falsa soluções, ainda que elas possam dar a ilusão momentânea de “correção” do problema, que seria a desigualdade. Não, não é; é a pobreza e a não educação. Constrange-me constatar a desinteligência das elites para esses fatos tão simples.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4059: 13 janeiro 2022, 3 p.

 

quarta-feira, 12 de janeiro de 2022

Economia tem pouco a comemorar no Bicentenário - Alexander Busch (Deutsche Welle)

Economia tem pouco a comemorar no Bicentenário

Alexander Busch

O Brasil teve forte crescimento em apenas 50 dos 200 anos que passaram desde que se declarou independente de Portugal. No resto do tempo, a economia ou estagnou, ou encolheu. Qual é o motivo para esse desempenho fraco? 


Este ano, em 7 de setembro, o Brasil comemora os 200 anos de sua independência. Do ponto de vista econômico, o balanço desses dois séculos é modesto. Mário Mesquita, economista-chefe do Itaú Unibanco, demonstrou recentemente esse fato com uma análise estatística, segundo a qual o Produto Interno Bruto da população brasileira, de cerca de 5 milhões de pessoas em 1822, equivalia mais ou menos à metade do PIB dos americanos no mesmo ano. Um terço do povo brasileiro era escravizado.

Cem anos depois, a população cresceu para cerca de 30 milhões de pessoas. Com o café e a borracha, o Brasil viveu um boom de exportações. Mas a produção econômica havia encolhido para parcos 18% do PIB americano.

A partir de 1930, com o início da industrialização, começou a fase de crescimento mais longeva do Brasil até hoje. O país foi industrializado, aberto para a infraestrutura, cidades brotaram, também no interior. O Estado investiu maciçamente em megaprojetos como a Usina de Itaipu ou a fabricante de aeronaves Embraer. Alguns desses projetos tiveram sucesso. Muitos fracassaram.

Essa fase de crescimento durou meio século, até 1980, ano no qual foi registrado o pico do rendimento dos brasileiros em comparação com o dos americanos. Mesquita estima que o PIB per capita dos brasileiros era de 30 a 40% em comparação com o dos americanos. Desde então – principalmente nos últimos dez anos –, voltou a encolher para cerca de 25% do PIB americano.

O economista-chefe do Itaú Unibanco vê a abertura inexistente do país e o consequente protecionismo como motivo decisivo para o fraco desempenho do Brasil no contexto internacional.

No jornal Valor Econômico, Mesquita escreve que "o modelo de crescimento acelerado baseado em substituição de importações e liderado pelo Estado, que selecionava, protegia e financiava os chamados 'campeões nacionais'" é a razão para a estagnação econômica.

Eu vejo as coisas de maneira um pouco diferente.

Certamente, o isolamento de sua economia e a subvenção de empresas individuais é um motivo importante para explicar a falta de dinâmica na economia brasileira. Mas não é o motivo decisivo.

É que modelos similares já funcionaram relativamente bem na Ásia, a exemplo da Coreia do Sul. Com incentivos estatais direcionados a "campeões nacionais" e longos anos de substituição de importações, Seul criou uma indústria com capacidade para alto desempenho. O PIB per capita no país deixou o brasileiro para trás.

Mais decisivo, na minha visão, é que o Brasil sempre só incluiu uma pequena parte da população em sua economia. Isso começou nos tempos coloniais, com a escravidão. Até hoje, porém, a maioria da população é excluída ou participa da economia apenas marginalmente.

Há poucas possibilidades de ascensão para a maior parte dos brasileiros: a má qualidade do ensino público e do sistema de saúde, a segurança pública ausente e a infraestrutura fraca impedem que a maioria da população tenha chance de se integrar na produção econômica.

Isso vale principalmente para a grande fatia afrodescendente da população (56%) e também para os 30 milhões de brasileiros que têm apenas até um salário-mínimo à sua disposição. Quem não consegue obter uma educação também ganhará pouco dinheiro e nunca conseguirá consumir de forma a catalisar um salto de desenvolvimento na economia.

Enquanto a elite brasileira – ou seja, as classes média e alta – dividir entre si os cargos públicos administrativos e nas empresas estatais, além dos postos nos conselhos administrativos e cargos de diretoria nas empresas privadas, o Brasil continuará crescendo abaixo de seu potencial.

Apesar de todos os avanços e tentativas das últimas duas décadas, o Brasil está cada vez menos preparado para a transformação digital da sociedade e da economia que acontece atualmente no mundo todo.

Há pouco a comemorar nas celebrações do bicentenário da Independência.

--

Há mais de 25 anos, o jornalista Alexander Busch é correspondente de América do Sul do grupo editorial Handelsblatt (que publica o semanário Wirtschaftswoche e o diário Handelsblatt) e do jornal Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Nascido em 1963, cresceu na Venezuela e estudou economia e política em Colônia e em Buenos Aires. Busch vive e trabalha em São Paulo e Salvador. É autor de vários livros sobre o Brasil.

O texto reflete a opinião do autor, não necessariamente a da DW.



How the Chinese Language Got Modernized; Jing Tsu: Kingdom of Characters: The Language Revolution That Made China Modern - Book review by Yan Buruma (New Yorker)

How the Chinese Language Got Modernized

Faced with technological and political upheaval, reformers decided that Chinese would need to change in order to survive.

 

Book review

Jing Tsu: 

Kingdom of Characters: The Language Revolution That Made China Modern

(Riverhead)

Reviewed by Ian Buruma

The New Yorker, January, 17, 2022



 The late, great sinologist Simon Leys once pointed out a peculiar paradox. China is the world’s oldest surviving civilization, and yet very little material of its past remains—far less than in Europe or India. Through the centuries, waves of revolutionary iconoclasts have tried to smash everything old; the Red Guards, in the nineteen-sixties, were following an ancient tradition. The Chinese seldom built anything for eternity, anyway, nothing like the cathedrals of Europe. And what survived from the past was often treated with neglect.

So what accounts for the longevity of Chinese civilization? Leys believed it was the written word, the richness of a language employing characters, partly ideographic, that have hardly changed over two thousand years. As Jing Tsu, a scholar of Chinese at Yale, observes in “Kingdom of Characters: The Language Revolution That Made China Modern” (Riverhead), China had long equated writing “with authority, a symbol of reverence for the past and a talisman of legitimacy.” This is why mastery of classical Chinese used to be so important. To become an official in imperial China, one had to compose precise scholarly essays on Confucian philosophy, an arduous task that very few could complete. Even Chairman Mao, who incited his followers to destroy every vestige of tradition, proudly displayed his prowess as a calligrapher, establishing himself as the bearer of Chinese civilization.

Leys was right about the continuity of the Chinese written word. But zealots, intent on erasing old incarnations of Chinese civilization in order to make way for new ones, have often targeted the written language, too. One of Mao’s models was the first Qin emperor (259-210 B.C.), a much reviled despot who ordered the construction of the Great Wall and was perhaps the first major book burner in history. He wanted to destroy all the Confucian classics, and supposedly buried Confucian scholars alive. Mao’s only criticism of his hated predecessor was that he had not been radical enough. It was under the Qin emperor that the Chinese script was standardized.

But, if the endurance of written Chinese is a civilizational achievement, it has not always been seen as an asset. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many Chinese worried that the complexity of the language’s written characters would put China at a hopeless disadvantage in a world dominated by the Roman alphabet. How the Chinese language and its writing system have weathered the modern waves of iconoclasm and been renewed since the turn of the past century is the subject of Tsu’s book.

Chinese certainly presents unique difficulties. To be literate in the language, a person must be able to read and write at least three thousand characters. To enjoy a serious book, a reader must know several thousand more. Learning to write is a feat of memory and graphic skill: a Chinese character is composed of strokes, to be made in a particular sequence, following the movements of a brush, and quite a few characters involve eighteen or more strokes.

Tsu begins her story in the late nineteenth century, when China was deep in crisis. After bloody uprisings, humiliating defeats in the Opium Wars, and forced concessions—predatory foreign powers were grabbing what spoils they could from a poor, exhausted, divided continent—the last imperial dynasty was falling apart. Chinese intellectuals, influenced by then fashionable social-Darwinist ideas, saw China’s crisis in existential terms. Could the Chinese language, with its difficult writing system, survive? Would Chinese civilization itself survive? The two questions were, of course, inextricably linked.

In this cultural panic, many intellectuals were ashamed of the poverty and the illiteracy of the rural population, and of the weakness of a decadent and hidebound imperial élite. They hoped for a complete overhaul of Chinese tradition. Qing-dynasty rule was brought to an end in 1911, but reformers sought to cleanse imperial culture itself. The authority of a tradition based on various schools of Confucian philosophy had to be smashed before China could rise in the modern world. The classical style of the language, elliptical and complex, was practiced by only a small number of highly educated people, for whom it functioned rather like Latin in the Catholic Church, as a pathway to high office. Reformers saw it as an impediment both to mass literacy and to political progress. Before long, classical Chinese was supplanted by a more vernacular prose in official discourse, books, and newspapers. In fact, a more vernacular form of written Chinese, called baihua, had already been introduced, during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). So there was a precedent for making written Chinese more accessible.

More radical modernizers hoped to do away with characters altogether and replace them with a phonetic script, either in Roman letters or in a character-derived adaptation, as had been the practice for many centuries in Japanese and Korean. A linguist, Qian Xuantong, famously argued that Confucian thought could be abolished only if Chinese characters were eradicated. “And if we wish to get rid of the average person’s childish, naive, and barbaric ways of thinking,” he went on, “the need to abolish characters becomes even greater.” Lu Xun, the most admired Chinese essayist and short-story writer of the twentieth century, offered a blunter prognosis in 1936: “If the Chinese script is not abolished, China will certainly perish!”

Many attempts have been made to transliterate Chinese in the Latin alphabet. These range from a system invented by two nineteenth-century British diplomats, Thomas Wade and Herbert Giles, to the “Pinyin” system, developed by linguists in the People’s Republic of China, which is different again from various forms of Romanization used in Taiwan.

Difficulties confront all such systems. The time-honored character-based writing system can readily accommodate different modes of pronunciation, even mutually unintelligible dialects. Chinese has a great many homonyms, which transliterations are bound to conflate. And Chinese, unlike Korean or Japanese, is a tonal language; some way of conveying tones is necessary. (Wade-Giles uses superscript numerals; a system developed by the linguist and inventor Lin Yutang uses spelling conventions; Pinyin uses diacritical marks.) The different efforts at Romanization, accordingly, yield very different results. The word for strength, say, is ch’iang2 in Wade-Giles, chyang in Lin’s script, and qiáng in Pinyin.

Characters never were abolished in the Chinese-speaking world, but serious problems remained. How to make a typewriter that could accommodate all these characters? How to create a telegraph system? Tsu details how solutions were found to such technical difficulties—encoding Chinese characters in a telegraph system geared to the alphabet, for example—and to political ones as well. Which characters or Romanized transliterations should prevail? The ones adopted by the People’s Republic of China or by Hong Kong or Taiwan?

Amid the ferment of the early twentieth century, reformers faced a broader question, too: once Chinese traditions were overthrown, what cultural norms should succeed them? Most of the people whom Tsu writes about looked to the United States. Many of them studied at American universities in the nineteen-tens, subsidized by money that the United States received from China as an indemnity after the anti-Western Boxer Rebellion was defeated. Zhou Houkun, who invented a Chinese typewriting machine, studied at M.I.T. Hu Shi, a scholar and a diplomat who helped elevate the vernacular into the national language, went to Cornell. Lin Yutang, who devised a Chinese typewriter, studied at Harvard. Wang Jingchun, who smoothed the way for Chinese telegraphy, said, with more ardor than accuracy, “Our government is American; our constitution is American; many of us feel like Americans.”

This focus on the U.S. might please American readers. But, in the last years of the Qing dynasty and during the early Republican period, Japan was a far more influential model of modern reform. Oddly, Tsu barely mentions this in her book. Japan—whose military victory against Russia in 1905 had been hailed all over Asia as a sign that a modern Asian nation could stand up to the West—was the main conduit for concepts that changed the social, political, cultural, and linguistic landscape in China. More than a thousand Chinese students joined Zhou and Hu as Boxer Indemnity Scholars in the U.S. between 1911 and 1929, but more than eight thousand Chinese were already studying in Japan by 1905. And many schools in China employed Japanese technical and scientific teachers.

It’s true that Japan’s industrial, military, and educational reforms since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 were themselves based on Western models, including artistic movements, such as Impressionism and Surrealism. But these ideas were transmitted to China by Chinese students, revolutionaries, and intellectuals in Japan, and had a direct and lasting impact on written and spoken Chinese. Many scientific and political terms in Chinese—such as “philosophy,” “democracy,” “electricity,” “telephone,” “socialism,” “capitalism,” and “communism”—were coined in Japanese by combining Chinese characters.

Demands for radical reform came to a head in 1919, with a student protest in Beijing, first against provisions in the Treaty of Versailles which allowed Japan to take possession of German territories in China, and then against the classical Confucian traditions that were believed to stand in the way of progress. A gamut of political orientations combined in the so-called New Culture movement, ranging from the John Dewey-inspired pragmatism of Hu Shi to early converts to socialism. Where New Culture protesters could agree, as Tsu notes, was on the critical importance of mass literacy.

Downgrading classical Chinese and promoting colloquial writing was a step in that direction, even if abolishing characters in Chinese remained too radical for many to contemplate. Still, as Tsu says, some Nationalists, who ruled China until 1949, were in favor of at least simplifying the characters, as were the Communists. Nationalist attempts at simplification ran into opposition from conservatives, who wanted to protect traditional Chinese written culture; the Communists were far more radical, and never gave up on the idea of switching to the Roman alphabet. In the Soviet Union, the Roman alphabet had been used in order to impose political uniformity on many different peoples, including Muslims who were used to Arabic script. The Soviets supported and subsidized Chinese efforts to follow their example. For the Communists, as Tsu notes, the goal was simple: “If the Chinese could read easily, they could be radicalized and converted to communism with the new script.”

The long conflict with Japan, from 1931 to 1945, put a temporary stop to language reform. The Nationalists, who did most of the fighting, were struggling simply to survive. The Communists spent more time thinking about ideological matters. Radical language reform began in earnest only after the Nationalists were defeated, in 1949, and forced to retreat to Taiwan. Mao, in the decade that followed, ushered in two linguistic revolutions: Pinyin, the Romanized transcription that became the standard all over China (and now pretty much everywhere else), and so-called simplified Chinese.

The Committee on Script Reform, created in 1952, started by releasing some eight hundred recast characters. More were released, and some were revised, in the ensuing decades. The new characters, made with many fewer strokes, were “true to the egalitarian principles of socialism,” Tsu says. The Communist cadres rejoiced in the fact that “the people’s voices were finally being heard.” Among the beneficiaries were “China’s workers and peasants.” After all, “Mao said that the masses were the true heroes and their opinions must be trusted.”

Tsu rightly credits the Communist government with raising the literacy level in China, which, she tells us, reached ninety-seven per cent in 2018. But we should take with a grain of salt the claim that these gains came from bottom-up agitation. “Nothing like it had ever been attempted in the history of the world,” she writes. The Japanese might beg to differ; ninety per cent of the Japanese population had attended elementary school in 1900. We can also wonder whether the simplified characters played as large a role in China’s high literacy rate as Tsu is inclined to think. In Taiwan and Hong Kong, traditional characters have been left largely intact; if there is proof that children there have much more difficulty in learning to read and write, it would be good to know. Simply being told that “the people’s voices were finally being heard” is not quite sufficient to make that case. And, even if there are benefits to learning a drastically revised script, there are losses, too. Not only are the new characters less elegant but books written in the old style become hard to understand.

That was part of the point. In 1956, Tao-Tai Hsia, then a professor at Yale, wrote that strengthening Communist propaganda was “the chief motivation” of language reform: “The thought of getting rid of parts of China’s cultural past which the Communists deem undesirable through the language process is ever present in the minds of the Communist cultural workers.” This was written during the Cold War, but Hsia was surely right. After all, as Tsu points out, “those who voiced their dissatisfaction with the pinyin reform would be swallowed up in the years of persecution that followed,” and those who grumbled about the simplified characters fared little better.

Tsu assiduously links the story of language reform to technology—we learn much about the heroic efforts to accommodate modern typesetting to the character-based system—and that story continues through the digital era. The speed with which these advances were accomplished is indeed impressive. In the seventies, more than seventy per cent of all circulated print information in China was set in hot-lead type. Today, as Tsu writes excitedly—at times, her style is redolent of Mao-period journals like China Reconstructs—information processing is “the tool that opened the door to the cutting-edge technology-driven future that China’s decades of linguistic reform and state planning at last pried open.”

Tsu celebrates these technical innovations by highlighting the personal stories of key individuals, which often read like traditional Confucian morality tales about terrible hardships overcome by sheer tenacity and hard work. Zhi Bingyi worked on his ideas about a Chinese computer language in a squalid prison cell during the Cultural Revolution, writing his calculations on a teacup after his guards took away even his toilet paper. Wang Xuan, a pioneer of laser typesetting systems, was so hungry during Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign, in 1960, that “his body swelled under the fatigue, but he continued to work relentlessly.” Such anecdotes add welcome color to the technical explanations of phonetic scripts, typewriters, telegraphy, card-catalogue systems, and computers. Sentences like “Finally, through a reverse process of decompression, Wang converted the vector images to bitmaps of dots for digital output” can become wearying.

Today, in the era of standardized word processors and Chinese social-media apps like WeChat, Pinyin and characters are seamlessly connected. Users typically type Pinyin on their keyboards while the screen displays the simplified characters, offering an array of options to resolve homonyms. (Older users may draw the characters on their smartphones.) China will, as Tsu says, “at last have a shot at communicating with the world digitally.” The old struggles over written forms might seem redundant. But the politics of language persists, particularly in the way the government communicates with its citizens.

“Kingdom of Characters” mentions all the major political events, from the Boxer Rebellion to the rise of Xi Jinping. And yet one might get the impression that language development was largely a story of ingenious inventions devised by doughty individuals overcoming enormous technical obstacles. Her account ends on a triumphant note; she remarks that written Chinese is now “being ever more widely used, learned, propagated, studied, and accurately transformed into electronic data. It is about as immortal as a living script can hope to get.” Continuing in the same vein, she writes, “The Chinese script revolution has always been the true people’s revolution—not ‘the people’ as determined by Communist ideology but the wider multitude that powered it with innovators and foot soldiers.”

However much the modernization of language has been influenced by technology, though, it is also part of a much broader political story. Dictatorships shape the way we write and talk and, in many cases, think. (Victor Klemperer’s brilliant analysis of Nazi-speak in his book “LTI”—Lingua Tertii Imperii—remains an invaluable study of the phenomenon.) This, too, is part of the story of how Chinese changed in the modern age. I still shudder at the memory of reading, as a student in the early nineteen-seventies, Maoist publications in Chinese, with their deadwood language, heavy Soviet sarcasm, and endless sentences that sounded like literal translations from Marxist German—the exact opposite of the compressed poeticism of the classical style. But in Mao’s China mastery of this style was as important as writing Confucian essays had been in imperial times. When, back in the seventies, the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, urged the government to speed up computer technology, its stated aim was to spread the Communist Party’s doctrines more efficiently.

These days, China’s geopolitical and technological status means that its political “narratives” have become global. China is advancing an alternative model to Western-style democracy. Soft power is being used to change the way China is perceived abroad, and the way business with China is to be conducted. Tsu says that China wants to have the ability to promote its “narrative as the master or universal narrative for the world to abide by.” This sounds ominous. Still, it isn’t always clear from her book whether she is talking about China as a civilization, as the Chinese-speaking peoples, or as the Chinese Communist Party. She writes that “the China story no doubt aims for a triumphant narrative.” But which China story? Does it include Taiwan, where citizens enjoy even more advanced information technology than their counterparts in the People’s Republic? Or is it vaguer than that, an entity that binds all Chinese cultures?

To Xi Jinping, of course, there is no distinction. At a Party meeting in November, something called Xi Jinping Thought was defined as “the essence of Chinese culture and China’s spirit.” The question is whether the Chinese Communist government will succeed in using its soft power to make its “narrative” universally triumphant. It already has its hands full imposing official dogma on its own people. China has enough gifted scientists, artists, writers, and thinkers to have a great influence on the world, but that influence will be limited if they cannot express themselves freely. These days, many written Chinese words cannot appear at all, in printed or digital form. In the aftermath of the Peng Shuai affair, even the word “tennis” has now become suspect in Chinese cyberspace.

In the last sentence of her book, Tsu writes, “Still unfolding, history will overtake China’s story.” I’m not sure what that means. But the story of the Chinese language under Communism is mostly one of repression and distortion, which only heroes and fools have defied. In an account of language, narratives, characters, and codes, the meaning of words still matters the most. Overemphasize the medium, and that message may get lost. 

Published in the print edition of the January 17, 2022, issue, with the headline “Character Arc.”

 

 

Um precedente relevante no Direito Internacional Comercial: a aplicação unilateral de retaliações - Assis Moreira (Valor)

 Brasil adotará retaliação unilateral tendo Índia e Indonésia como primeiros alvos


Por Assis Moreira, Valor — Genebra
Valor Econômico, 12/01/2022 13h37  Atualizado há 45 minutos

O governo brasileiro vai se dotar de arsenal para aplicar retaliação unilateral contra países que foram condenados por medidas ilegais sobre exportações brasileiras, mas usam artimanhas para manter as restrições, conforme o Valor apurou.

Uma medida provisória (MP), já aprovada em reuniões ministeriais, e atualmente na Casa Civil, autoriza o Poder Executivo a retaliar proporcionalmente e de forma unilateral, em casos de ganhos de contenciosos na OMC, quando o país perdedor fizer a chamada “apelação no vazio”.

Foi o que aconteceu nesta semana com a Índia, na disputa do açúcar, e com a Indonésia, no fim de 2020, num contencioso envolvendo barreiras à entrada de carne de frango. Os dois países recorreram ao Órgão de Apelação sabendo que o mecanismo está inoperante e não pode decidir; daí o termo “apelação no vazio”. Com isso, na prática, travam a vitória brasileira e mantêm as medidas julgadas ilegais pelo painel (comitê de investigação) que custam milhões de dólares de prejuízos a produtores brasileiros.

Índia e Indonésia são assim potencialmente os primeiros ameaçados quando a MP entrar em vigor. Uma retaliação ocorre na forma de sobretaxa sobre bens e serviços provenientes dos países alvejados ou também suspensão de direitos de propriedade intelectual.

O secretário de Comércio Exterior e de Assuntos Econômicos do Itamaraty, Sarquis J. B. Sarquis, enfatizou que “a atual paralisia do Órgão de Apelação da OMC está na origem da iniciativa concebida pelo Itamaraty, que visa tanto proteger os interesses comerciais legítimos do País no marco do sistema multilateral do comércio, como promover o próprio funcionamento pleno do sistema baseado em regras e nos princípios fundamentais da OMC”.

Uma vez que o Órgão de Apelação da OMC volte a funcionar a contento, a iniciativa terá cumprido seu propósito”, completou.

Na mesma linha, o secretário de Comércio Exterior do Ministério da Economia, Lucas Ferraz, afirmou: “Entendemos que é um mecanismo muito importante para enfrentarmos a situação atual de apelações no vazio. O governo brasileiro está empenhado no processo de reformas da OMC, assim como no restabelecimento tempestivo do seu Órgão de Apelação. Não podemos compactuar com o uso oportunístico da situação atual, em claro prejuízo ao nosso setor produtivo.”

As regras atuais da OMC permitem que um país aplique retaliação comercial se o condenado não implementar as recomendações do Órgão de Apelação, espécie de corte suprema do comércio internacional.

Ocorre que o Órgão de Apelação está paralisado, sem nenhum dos sete juízes permanentes, porque Washington bloqueia a nomeação de novos árbitros. Enquanto perdurar esse fato jurídico, que ninguém tinha previsto, os membros da OMC têm a possibilidade de contornar as condenações estabelecidas por painel e evitar alterar as medidas consideradas ilegais.

O Brasil seguirá agora o exemplo da União Europeia, com o mecanismo de retaliação unilateral. Enquanto o Órgão de Apelação não funcionar, e o país condenado não participar de um mecanismo paralelo de arbitragem, Brasília vai impor o que negociadores chamam de princípio de precaução para proteger interesses dos produtores nacionais.

Um grupo de 25 membros da OMC, incluindo a União Europeia (27 países), tentou atenuar o problema do bloqueio do Órgão de Apelação criando um sistema de arbitragem paralelo plurilateral. Os contenciosos entre seus participantes têm assim decisão final. Por exemplo, a mais recente disputa aberta pelo Brasil, que é contra a UE envolvendo barreiras a carne de frango no mercado europeu, está assegurado que terá decisão implementada, porque ambos participam desse mecanismo plurilateral

Já a Índia e a Indonésia não participam desse mecanismo plurilateral. Em 2019, quando o Brasil denunciou a Índia por políticas ilegais de apoio ao setor açucareiro, que afetam os preços internacionais, o Itamaraty mencionou que estimativas de especialistas apontavam prejuízos de até US$ 1,3 bilhão para os exportadores brasileiros por ano.

No caso da Indonésia, os cálculos são de que o Brasil poderia vender até 3 mil toneladas de carne de frango por ano na fase inicial, se restrições condenadas fossem levantadas. Mas o governo indonésio resiste há anos.

O Brasil ganhou, sem realmente levar, uma disputa contra o país asiático em 2017. Um painel (comitê de investigação da OMC) deu razão ao Brasil naquele ano. A Indonésia teve prazo até julho de 2018 para implementar as recomendações dos juízes. Fez algumas modificações que o Brasil considerou insuficiente.

Um outro painel foi então aberto para examinar a implementação das recomendações dos juízes, e o Brasil ganhou de novo, ao comprovar que os indonésios mantiveram restrições às exportações brasileiras. A Indonésia então apelou ao vazio em dezembro de 2020, sabendo que o Órgão de Apelação da OMC não funciona.

Índia e Indonésia estão hoje entre os países que mais subsidiam a agricultura no mundo. E a paralisia do órgão de apelação da OMC acaba na prática por beneficiá-los. “O Brasil continua trabalhando ativamente para o restabelecimento do Órgão de Apelação e para o pleno desenvolvimento das regras e da reforma da OMC, inclusive em agricultura e disciplinas para subsídios, conforme termos e mandatos estabelecidos desde a Rodada Uruguai”, disse Sarquis.

A paralisia do Órgão de Apelação provocada pelos norte-americanos “é muito grave, dá a impressão de que os EUA não querem mais a OMC, no sentido de um sistema de regras e de disciplinas multilaterais, consentidas, aplicadas, com um processo de contencioso que obriga a parte perdedora a obedecer” a decisão, nota Pascal Lamy, ex-diretor-geral da OMC

Ele lembra que essa obrigação de respeitar as decisões, sob pena de retaliação, é que distinguia a OMC de outras organizações cujas regras são mais ou menos aplicadas e onde os Estados, quando eles perdem um caso diante da Corte de Justiça de Haia, por exemplo, guardam a soberania de aplicar ou não o resultado.

Lamy avalia que os EUA são obcecados pela China, querem poder bater unilateralmente sem estar ligados ao respeito de regras da OMC e a decisões de seu Órgão de Apelação. Essa ausência americana provoca uma degradação do sistema multilateral, e mais países buscam arsenais unilaterais.

https://valor.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2022/01/12/brasil-adota-retaliacao-unilateral-na-omc-tendo-india-e-indonesia-como-primeiros-alvos.ghtml

Homeric Epithets: Famous Titles From 'The Iliad' & 'The Odyssey' - Word Genius

 

Homeric Epithets: Famous Titles From 'The Iliad' & 'The Odyssey'

Direito Internacional no Brasil: pensamento e tradição - George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, 2 vols (Lumen Juris)


  O atual Consultor Jurídico do Itamaraty, jurista e professor George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, deu a partida, alguns anos atrás, a um ambicioso projeto de "garimpagem", ou escavação jurídico-histórica, no sentido de resgatar os grandes mestres do internacionalismo jurídico no Brasil, desde as origens, ainda na criação das primeiras faculdades de Direito no primeiro Reinado, até os dias atuais.


Depois de muita labuta, e com a colaboração de algumas dezenas de mestres do direito, internacionalistas, alguns diplomatas e outros batalhadores do Direito Internacional no e do Brasil, os dois primeiros volumes dessa magnífica coleção vieram a lume, justamente pela Editora Lumen Juris:

George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo (organizador):

Direito Internacional no Brasil : pensamento e tradição, 2 vols.

(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Lumen Juris, 2021, 460 e 444 p; 

ISBNs: 978-65-5510-741-8 e  978-65-5510-742-5 

Tenho o prazer de apresentar, acima, a capa do primeiro volume, que é similar,


 mas não semelhante, à do segundo volume, assim como, aqui ao lado, a gentil dedicatória que ele me fez ao encaminhar os dois primeiros volumes. 

Não figuro ainda nestes dois primeiros volumes, pois minha colaboração, feita já em 2019, relativa ao diplomata internacionalista Rubens Ferreira de Mello deverá constar de um terceiro volume: “Rubens Ferreira de Mello: o primeiro tratado brasileiro de direito diplomático”, Brasília, 3 março 2019, 20 p.

Transcrevo, por importante, mais abaixo, os sumários dos dois volumes já publicados, e aproveito para também inserir o trecho da Introdução no qual o Consultor Jurídico informa sobre os ausentes, grandes nomes do internacionalismo jurídico no Brasil cujas lacunas poderiam ser preenchidas por eventuais interessados em participar desta valiosa iniciativa. Também coloco, o trecho no qual o professor Galindo informa aos candidatos seus critérios metodológicos, ou seja, questões que poderiam ser respondidas por eventuais colaboradores a respeito do seu personagem, ainda faltante, e a respeito da obra por ele conduzida nesse terreno.

Termino por cumprimentar o professor Galindo por este brilhante empreendimento, ao mesmo tempo em que convido novos voluntários a escolherem alguns dos nomes carentes nesta bela homenagem recapitulativa aos grandes mestres do Direito Internacional no Brasil.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 12 de janeiro de 2022

Sumario do 1. volume:



Sumario do 2. volume:



Eis os grandes mestres ainda faltantes do empreendimento em curso atualmente: 


Finalmente, as questões colocadas, sugestivamente, aos colaboradores.


Introdução de George Galindo, neste arquivo: 

Direito Internacional no Brasil: pensamento e tradicao - George Galindo, 2 vols (2021)