Uma euforia completamente sem sentido: PIB global do BRICS e do G7 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Uma euforia completamente sem sentido: PIB global do BRICS e do G7

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ingênuos celebram a ultrapassagem do PIB global do G7 pelo do BRICS. Total ilusão numérica: as pessoas vivem no PIB global ou no PIB per capita?  A resposta é meridianamente clara.

O relevante, de fato, é o bem-estar das pessoas, não o tamanho do país ou o do bloco. Demografia acumulada não é desenvolvimento, é apenas uma constatação, sem descurar o fato de que mais de 60% do valor agregado conjunto do BRICS é feito na China.

Quanto mais países forem incorporados ao BRICS, mais o PIB total desse agrupamento heteróclito de vontades aumentará, mas sem qualquer coordenação das políticas econômicas dos membros, como ocorre no G7, todos membros da OCDE e altamente interdependentes. 

O BRICS não comporta NENHUM acordo econômico relevante, sequer em comércio. O NDB é apenas um banco emprestador: existem dezenas deles  com capital estatal e centenas, milhares de bancos privados que fazem o mesmo.

Por acaso, chineses e indianos vivem melhor do que os europeus e americanos? 

E quanto à produção científica (know-how) e tecnológica (patentes) à frente dos investimentos de empresas globais?

Contem outra!

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 20/10/2023

Brazil’s isolation: a love affair - Bill Hinchberger (Global Finance)

 Brazil loves its isolation, says an ex-president. Is the country ready to play a larger role on the global stage?    

Global Finance magazine, SEPTEMBER 26, 2023

Author: BILL HINCHBERGER

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva seems to log more time on his souped-up Airbus than he does at the Alvarado Palace, the presidential mansion in Brasília.

His jet-setting started in November with the COP27 climate summit in Sharm El-Sheik, where the then president-elect was “welcomed like a rock star,” according to the French newspaper Le Monde. He promised to clean up after his predecessor, climate skeptic Jair Bolsonaro, who oversaw a notable uptick in deforestation in the Amazon.

Since his inauguration in January for a second stint (on top of two terms from 2003-2011), Lula has visited over a dozen countries, outpacing even his American counterpart Joe Biden for his presence on the global arena.

Yet “Brazil remains closed,” states veteran Brazilian businessman Roberto Teixeira da Costa in a new book, “Is Brazil Afraid of the World? Discussing Brazilian Foreign Affairs and Challenges.” Of the world’s 15 largest economies, Brazil has ranked “among the lowest” when it comes to the importance of international trade to its economy, he said in the book. This even before Bolsonaro turned Brazil into a “pariah,” says the author, who founded and served as the first president of the Brazilian Security and Exchage Commission (CVM) and is currently chairman of the Arbitrage Chamber of the São Paulo Stock Market (Bovespa).

Relative to its size, Brazil scores lower than one would expect on international participation in all realms, including trade and historic incoming and outgoing FDI. Teixeira da Costa doesn’t blame foreign bullies for blocking Brazil. Instead, he quotes former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso: “Nothing makes Brazilians happier than isolation.”

Part diagnosis, part prescription, Teixeira da Costa’s book may serve as a primer for those who wonder why a continent-size nation of 215 million is often marked down as absent during important international roll calls. For Brazilians, it poses a series of Socratic questions designed to fuel debate, concluded reviewer Marcelo Consentino in the daily Estado de São Paulo.

“The thesis of the book is that Brazil fails to recognize the role it should play in international relations, and instead accepts a secondary role,” Teixeira da Costa says. “Brazil should become a protagonist.”

Many well-informed, well-meaning, and experienced Brazilians remain unconvinced, at least when it comes to the “just do it” modus operandi. “Brazil’s capacity is modest,” says Paulo Roberto de Almeida, a diplomat and director of international relations at the Institute of History and Geography of the Federal District University in Brasília. “First, because of its level of economic development, the average strength of its military force, and the limited resources devoted to international cooperation.”

National pride matters, as it does everywhere, but practical considerations loom large—including a longing to put to rest an old joke. Granted a permanent visa by President Getúlio Vargas during World War II, exiled Austrian writer Stefan Zweig published a book titled, “Brazil, Land of the Future.” Cynical Brazilians began to quip, “Land of the future, and always will be.”

Teixeira da Costa believes that greater international integration can help Brazil address sticky domestic problems, notably poverty and inequality, and help muffle that ostensibly antiquated joke. Brazil perennially ranks near the bottom on the Gini Coefficient, which measures economic inequality. At 12.4% in December 2022 (CEIC Data), Brazil’s low domestic savings rate means that it cannot go it alone. “We have to attract [foreign] investment,” said Teixeira da Costa.

Based on historical data, one would expect inflows from the United States and Europe. These traditional partners must shore up supply chains, given weaknesses revealed by Covid-19 restrictions and fallout from the Russian war in Ukraine. Brazil shores might seem to offer safe ports.

Reticence could be traced in part to the now infamous Custo Brasil (Brazil Cost), which Teixeira da Costa defined in the book as: excessive bureaucracy; high and complicated taxes; high labor costs; high social security costs; frequent regulatory changes; excessive legislation; and conflicts among federal, state and local governments. One example: As a technologically advanced, post-lockdown world adopts more flexible and creative working relationships, Brazilian labor laws remain mired in a model designed for early-20th century factories. “All of this insecurity messes things up,” says Lika Takahashi, head of equity strategy at Fator Asset Management in São Paulo, while referring to a few recent debates over big issues in Congress.

Abrupt alterations and intergovernmental conflicts create uncertainty. This inconsistency is particularly evident in the foreign policy realm.

Of the post-dictatorship presidents since 1985, Teixeira da Costa points to Cardoso and Lula as “particularly active abroad.” (He could have included Fernando Collor de Mello. Before his impeachment on corruption charges, Collor cut tariffs, facilitated foreign investment, hosted the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, and signed the Mercosur regional pact with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.)

Look at the contrasts between the Cardoso and Lula administrations. Cardoso proved “more balanced,” as Teixeira da Costa said in our interview, whereas Lula focused on South-South relations and what some would call “Third World-ist” policies. Now consider what the book calls the “Bolsonaro administration’s blind march toward Donald Trump’s America.” Add to that the lack of reliable foreign policy interlocutors in Congress or the business community. You can understand why outsiders might get weirded out.

One external actor appears willing to wade through the weirdness: China. As with the United States, Teixeira da Costa devoted an entire chapter to Brazilian-Chinese relations. Even under the watch of Trumpista Bolsonaro, “In the first half of 2020, for every dollar Brazil exported to the United States, US$3.4 went to China,” states the book.

Given his South-South proclivity and enthusiasm for the BRICS+, Lula might be expected to lean more firmly into China for FDI. With 11 members, the new BRICS+ accounts for over one-third of global GDP and nearly half of world population, though it is top-heavy with China on both accounts.

When it comes to prescriptions, Teixeira da Costa can seem exceedingly nitpicky and refreshingly specific. Do problems exist at all levels of government and business? Yes. And they can all be addressed. Poor language skills and understanding of the world? More and better education in those realms. If your company is big enough, the board should be required to examine opportunities abroad. Navel-gazing industrial associations should lift their heads and look around.

The 20th century Brazilian composer and poet (and career diplomat) Vinicius de Moraes, perhaps best known for his collaborations with Tom Jobim and other Bossa Nova personages, wrote the song “Medo de Amar (Afraid to Love).” A quarter of a century after de Moraes was expelled from the foreign service by the military dictatorship, it might be time for Brazil to overcome its fear of the global stage.

Or maybe it is time for Brazil to just get down and dirty. In the book, Teixeira da Costa recalls a comment he made in the 1990s to Bill Clinton’s special envoy to the Americas, Mack McLarty: “He who does not make dust, eats dust!” According to the Brazilian, they still get a laugh out of that one.

Why the Israel-Gaza war represents a broader crisis for the Global Justice - Adam Taylor (The Washington Post)

Why the Israel-Gaza war represents a broader crisis for the Global Justice

Adam Taylor

The Washington Post, October 19, 2023

https://www.washingtonpost.com//world/2023/10/20/israel-hamas-war-crimes-gaza-justice-genocide-international-criminal-court/?utm_campaign=wp_todays_worldview&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_todayworld&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F3b85c45%2F65320227b55654324faa000f%2F596b79f3ade4e24119b43ed3%2F11%2F65%2F65320227b55654324faa000f

The bloody Hamas-led attack on Israel and the subsequent bombardment of Gaza have led to rival accusations of war crimes and calls for the International Criminal Court to do something. But what can The Hague-based court actually do? Few know the answer better than Luis Moreno Ocampo. Close to four decades ago, the then-32-year-old Argentine lawyer was thrust into the global spotlight as the deputy prosecutor of the “Trial of the Juntas,” beating Argentina’s former military dictatorship in the courts — a landmark case that was made into an Oscar-nominated film released last year. He went on to have a long and storied career in global justice, becoming the inaugural chief prosecutor for the nascent ICC in 2003. There, he indicted both Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi and Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, though neither lived to face trial. Now 71, Moreno Ocampo finished serving at the ICC 11 years ago. However, he is still active in the world of international humanitarian law and has been closely watching the war in Israel-Gaza. He spoke to Today’s WorldView this week, not long after the office of current ICC prosecutor Karim Khan confirmed that the court had jurisdiction over the conflict in Israel-Gaza. International Criminal Court prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo listens to testimony at the Organization of American States in Washington on Sept. 14, 2017. (Jim Watson/AFP/Getty Images) The conversation took place the same day as the strike on al-Ahli Hospital, though he said it was too early to talk “with precision about this specific incident because we don’t know the facts.” Moreno Ocampo spoke on the phone from Brazil, where this month he took up a new academic role. “I’m in São Paulo because I spent six years at Harvard,” he said later. “American thinks of America solutions. That was the Second World War. Now the world is different.” The following transcript has been edited for length and clarity. Links have been added where appropriate. Today’s WorldView: First off, given what you’ve been seeing and your own time as chief prosecutor of the ICC, how likely is it that we’ll see the ICC open prosecutions in the Israel-Gaza war? Moreno Ocampo: Well, that is absolutely at the discretion of the prosecutor. And he can also decide where to investigate, what crimes to investigate and when to present charges. What is clear is that after a long process, starting in my time, Palestine became a state party in 2015. In 2021, the court’s judges confirmed to the prosecutor, that Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, are part of the territory of Palestine. Therefore, that means that any genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes committed in that territory could be investigated by the ICC and the investigation is open. Q: And this means the ICC can prosecute Palestinians, too, for crimes committed outside of those territories, right? A: Absolutely. The [Oct. 7] Hamas attack was absolutely committed from Gaza, so it’s absolutely under the jurisdiction of the court. It’s absolutely clear that the ICC could say, okay, we’ll start with the crimes committed by Hamas. The prosecutor could choose for his first case to be the Hamas case. Q: In terms of potential crimes that the ICC would investigate — crimes against humanity and war crimes — what have you seen so far that stands out? A: Well, the Hamas attack is clearly a crime against humanity, meaning a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. Taking hostages is also a war crime. It’s also possibly genocide because Hamas has the intention to destroy Israelis. The problem is that the response from Israel … it’s complicated. Just the blockade of Gaza — just that — could be genocide under Article 2(c) of the Genocide Convention, meaning they are creating conditions to destroy a group. There’s forced displacement, another problem. Here, it’s more complicated. Israel has the right to defend itself, even to attack those who attack Israel from a different territory. I agree with that. But Israel has a right to kill Hamas members. It cannot kill civilians and it cannot forcibly displace civilians from that. And that’s a problem. I think, of course, Hamas is using the Palestinians as shields. Therefore, it’s very difficult to discriminate between civilians and combatants. But that does not give [Israel] permit to kill combatants and civilians at the same time. You have to discriminate. Israel cannot pretend it’s just destroying Hamas because in the meantime it is killing masses of civilians. That is a crime for a crime. These are war crimes, possibly a crime against humanity. And then there’s the starvation in Gaza, also possibly a genocide. Q: How could Israel avoid these accusations? A: Well, the most important part is to stop the crimes. That’s complicated because Western politicians are not talking about stopping the crimes, they are talking about opening a humanitarian corridor. That’s not the problem. This is not a natural disaster. This is because of the decision of Israeli officers. So they should put pressure on Israeli officers to not commit crimes. And look, it’s not just because its illegal or legal. History should teach us but humanity is not learning. When Americans were attacked in the twin towers, if we didn’t attack Afghanistan, they could have had prosecutions. Send the troops to arrest Bin Laden, arrest his people and then prosecute them. That is legal. But instead, President Bush decides war. Because war sounds more powerful — but it’s not. Afghanistan is a great example, because 20 years later the Taliban is back in power. Al-Qaeda has allies around the world now. Stanley McChrystal, the head of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, said that when you kill massively, you create retaliation. It’s “insurgency math” — you have 10 terrorists, you kill two and you end up with 20. You multiply the fighters. And obviously, that will happen here. Q: What role can global institutions like the United Nations or the ICC play? A: The U.N. Security Council is divided because of Ukraine, so they will do nothing here. The case is showing how primitive our global institutional system is. We saw the same in [Nagorno-Karabakh] just two weeks ago. Azerbaijan committed genocide against Armenia and nothing happened. We really need to adjust our institution and invent new things. Right now, the only invention is the ICC. And the only one who can investigate today is the ICC. But even if they do, it will be too late. We have to prevent the crimes. We need to oppose the cycle of violence. That is the missing part. Q: What practical issues do you think that the ICC will face in any investigation into the conflict? Israel isn’t a party to the Rome Statute that founded the court. And Gaza is controlled by Hamas, who don’t seem likely to cooperate either. A: It’s not just about the court itself, it’s about how states support courts. There are Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, for example. If the Arab countries agreed, they could push these leaders to surrender themselves to the court, to argue their cases. If you are willing to die, you should be willing to face justice. Q: But do you think that could happen? And even if that happened, would Israel cooperate? A: No. Look, I’m telling you what should happen. When I was a prosecutor, for three years I was involved in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Eventually, I ruled that when Palestine becomes a state recognized by the U.N., it could come back. During that time, I had a conversation with a high-ranking Israeli official because they were pissed off it took me three years to make their decision. He told me: Look, we believe that you are impartial. We believe in your impartiality. The problem for us is that we don’t like impartiality. We like partiality. I have the life of my kids at risk. I don’t like to put the life of my kids in the hands of an impartial person. I like a partial person. That idea, that its just me against the others, has created this impossible conflict. The Palestinians feel the same. Q: There’s a lot going on it the world now for the ICC. Outside of Israel-Gaza, there’s the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. There’s the prosecution of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine. There’s plenty of other situations where the ICC might get involved, such as the war in Ethiopia. A: Yes, Yes. There’s Sudan, India and Pakistan … Q: There’s so many. How can the ICC possibly do everything it should do? How will it have the bandwidth? A: Well that’s the point. We need more. We need to keep evolving and creating other systems to create solutions to conflicts. We did nothing else [after the ICC]. Because there are no global solutions, the world has become more tribal. Everywhere, tribal leaders are flourishing. They promise to protect their own people and people need protection. The lack of global solutions is moving the world toward tribal solutions. The problem is politicians have a different mandate. So we’ve got a problem. And the Gaza-Israel conflict is just a very bad example of a problem.

1,000 Words Portraits of Israelis killed, missing or abducted in the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks, are placed on auditorium seats at Tel Aviv University. (Ahmad Gharabli/AFP via Getty Images) Tents for Palestinians seeking refuge in Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip on Thursday. (Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images) At least 1,400 people in Israel have been killed and more than 4,500 injured since the unprecedented cross-border Hamas attack on Oct. 7, Israeli authorities said. Hamas is also holding 203 hostages, according to the IDF. Palestinian officials said 3,785 people in Gaza have been killed and more than 12,400 wounded in strikes.

What a difference a week makes: the new and the old Middle East - Ishaan Tharoor, Sammy Westfall (The Washington Post)

The Washington Post, October 18, 2023 

By Ishaan Tharoor with Sammy Westfall   Email

Welcome to the new, ‘new’ Middle East Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holds his map of the “The New Middle East” as he addresses the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 22. (Richard Drew/AP) In late September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took his turn at the dais of the U.N. General Assembly. It’s a familiar spot for the long-ruling politico, whose previous appearances in New York included a memorable stunt in 2012 where he drew a red line through part of a cartoon bomb indicating his fears about Iran’s ongoing nuclear enrichment. This time, Netanyahu had a different image as a prop — a map titled “The New Middle East,” depicting a section of the region shaded in green. That included all of Israel from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, with no delineations showing occupied Palestinian territory, as well as countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. These were Arab states that either had already normalized ties with Israel or, as in the Saudi case, were locked in talks to establish formal relations with the Jewish state. Netanyahu took out his red marker and drew a diagonal line from Dubai along the Persian Gulf, through Israel and toward the ports of southern Europe. He hailed the supposed advent of a “corridor” of prosperity that threaded together these Arab countries and Israel at the heart of a new axis of global trade connecting Asia to Europe. “A few years ago, I stood here with a red marker to show the curse, a great curse, the curse of a nuclear Iran,” Netanyahu said. “But today, I bring this marker to show a great blessing. The blessing of a new Middle East, between Israel, Saudi Arabia and our other neighbors.” Videos from the unfolding Israel-Gaza war. (Video: The Washington Post) While perhaps unique in his capacity for posturing on the world stage, Netanyahu was hardly alone in voicing this vision of a “new” Middle East. Before the explosion of war this past week between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas, based in Gaza, many analysts had noted how the geopolitical tectonic plates of the region were steadily shifting. The Abraham Accords — the U.S.-backed deals forged between Israel and a clutch of mostly Arab monarchies — signaled a political desire to move out of old paradigms that had defined the Middle East’s febrile status quo. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s tentative rapprochement pointed to a welcome lowering of temperatures within the region’s most heated rivalry. The fact that it was brokered, in part, by China highlighted another reality: As the United States explicitly tried to disentangle itself from the quagmires and conflicts of the region, other powers in an increasingly “multipolar” world were shouldering their way in. U.S. retrenchment was only one factor in the realignment underway. Others included the exhaustion of the so-called Arab Spring, with Islamist and pro-democracy political movements petering out after a decade of strife, instability and counterrevolution. The reactionary Arab states that had worked to undermine them — especially, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia — were pivoting away from ideological battles to a more pragmatic agenda. That was spurred by the growing need for the region’s petrostates to diversify their own economies as the world fitfully attempts to decarbonize. Saudi Arabia’s crown prince looked starry-eyed at the dynamism of Israel’s tech sector; Dubai became a magnet for Israeli tourists. In the preceding months, the Biden administration has placed a lot of its regional eggs in the basket of Saudi-Israel normalization. A deal was not close, but the White House was convinced of its strategic immensity: If Israel had the Arab world’s most geopolitically potent state formally on its side, underwritten by significant U.S. security guarantees, it would mark a turning of the page in the Middle East. Close Israeli ties with the Saudis could create a deterrent axis against Iran that would allow Washington to better focus on its competition with China and the historic challenge of the war in Ukraine. People carry children as they flee the aftermath of an Israeli strike in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on Oct. 15. (Mohammed Abed/AFP/Getty Images) But it turns out the “old” Middle East was impossible to bury. Hamas’s brutal, deadly Oct. 7 rampage in southern Israel has been followed by a relentless, ongoing Israeli offensive that has killed at least 2,670 Palestinians in Gaza and displaced more than 600,000 people in a matter of days. It has seen an outpouring of support for the Palestinian cause across the Arab world, as well as in majority-Muslim countries further afield. It has frozen any talk of imminent Saudi-Israeli rapprochement. “The starting point for the new Middle East will be an Israeli reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, not an Israeli Embassy in Riyadh,” wrote Steven Cook in Foreign Policy. Netanyahu’s apparent hope that the Palestinians could be sidelined in a broader regional tableau looks more naive than ever, especially as Israel’s neighbors see in the mounting violence evidence of the root cause — the absence of a process to give Palestinians their own state or equal political rights. “The events of Oct. 7 may temporarily close the door to the New Middle East, and its reopening may depend on the path Israel chooses regarding the Palestinian issue,” concluded Murat Yesiltas in Daily Sabah, a Turkish pro-government publication. “Hamas declared in the most clear, painful, and murderous way possible,” wrote Meron Rappaport in the left-leaning, Hebrew-language publication Local Call, “that the conflict that threatens Israelis’ lives is the conflict with the Palestinians, and the idea that they can be bypassed via Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, or that the 2 million Palestinians imprisoned in Gaza will disappear if Israel builds a sufficiently elaborate fence, is an illusion that is now being shattered at a terrible human cost.” The United States is also now being pulled back into the Middle East. Secretary of State Antony Blinken will return to Israel on Monday after a whirlwind tour through regional capitals. Though it’s unclear what Iran — Hamas’s chief international sponsor — knew of the specifics surrounding the Oct. 7 attack, tensions with Tehran are rising once more. The prospect of Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, fully entering the fray looks more likely by the day. “If the U.S. gets more directly involved in the fighting, it could reverse what had been seen as the desire by the Trump and Biden administrations to retrench from the region in favor of greater focus on China and, with the Ukraine war, Russia,” wrote Mathew Burrows and Robert Manning of the Stimson Center, in a memo that highlighted the arrival of a “new, ‘new’ Middle East.” In their analysis, the post-Oct. 7 region will not just be defined by the state-to-state competition and conciliation that seemed to be reshaping the Middle East in recent months, but a web of non-state rogue actors that won’t go away — even if “our focus shifted.” More pressingly, the current moment also highlights the vast inequities that carve through the Middle East. Whatever the bottomless wealth of the Saudi or Emirati royals, there’s the destitution of Yemen and the enduring misery of Syria’s refugees. Whatever the confidence and prowess of Israeli’s private sector, there’s the dysfunction of neighboring Lebanon and the despair of millions of Palestinians living under more than half-a-century of occupation. “The new Middle East’s winners embody a transactional mindset that may yet make them richer,” explained the Economist last month. “Its losers are a reminder that in a world with fewer rules and principles, no one is coming to the rescue.” And for Netanyahu — herald of the “new” Middle East — the new, “new” Middle East may be an unforgiving place. Polls of the Israeli public show a majority pins blame on his government for failing to protect Israelis from the bloodiest day in their nation’s history. His political career may be hard to revive once this round of hostilities ceases. “It is almost certain that once the ground operation is over, after some months, Prime Minister Netanyahu will stop serving as prime minister,” Solon Solomon, a former Knesset lawyer and an international law professor at Brunel University London, told my colleagues.

Declaração do Brasil na sessão do CSNU que não aprovou o projeto brasileiro de Resolução sobre a guerra Hamas-Israel - Sérgio França Danese (NY)

 Ministério das Relações Exteriores

Assessoria Especial de Comunicação Social

 

Nota nº 473

18 de outubro de 2023

 

 Declaração do Representante Permanente do Brasil na ONU sobre a proposta de resolução S/2023/773, sobre a crise israelo-palestina

 

Statement by His Excellency, Ambassador Sérgio França Danese, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations

 Draft resolution S/2023/773, Security Council

(Versão original em inglês)

 

At last Friday's closed consultations, Council members asked for Brazil's leadership, in our capacity as presidency in October, to facilitate a Council response to the escalating crisis in Israel and Palestine, in particular its humanitarian aspects.

We heeded the call with a sense of urgency and responsibility. In our view, the Council had to take action and do so very quickly. Council paralysis in the face of a humanitarian catastrophe is not in the interest of the international community.

Therefore, throughout last weekend and the following days, we worked very hard, through extensive and collaborative engagement with Council members, to help build a unified position.

While making a good faith effort to accommodate different - sometimes opposing - positions, our focus was and remains on the critical humanitarian situation on the ground. Political realism guided us, but our sight was always set on the humanitarian imperative. Exactly as in other very sensitive files on the Council”s agenda in which Brazil had a special role to play, international humanitarian law and human rights law provided a clear framework for action.

Our proposed text unequivocally condemned all forms of violence against civilians, including the heinous acts of terrorism by Hamas and the taking of hostages. It called for their immediate and unconditional release. It also called on all parties to strictly abide by their international legal obligations, in particular those relating to the protection of civilians, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian personnel. The draft resolution also stressed the urgent need for humanitarian access to civilians.

The text incorporated urgent and multiple calls by the UN and many other actors for humanitarian pauses to allow for the delivery of aid and the voluntary safe passage of civilians. It encouraged the establishment of humanitarian corridors and other mechanisms to facilitate the smooth delivery of aid.

The draft further reflected the ethical necessity to provide civilians in Gaza with electricity, water, fuel, food and medical supplies. The necessity to be protected from forced relocation when the prevailing conditions on the ground do not ensure a safe and secure displacement.

Thus, faced with heinous terrorist acts against Israeli civilians, with the forceful reaction to such acts and an ever growing humanitarian disaster imposed on Gaza, the Council response we proposed was robust and balanced.

We are grateful to all Council members who engaged with us since last Friday and demonstrated a sincere and practical commitment to multilateralism.

Sadly, very sadly, the Council was yet again unable to adopt a resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Again, silence and inaction prevailed.

To no one's true, long-term interest.

While we deeply regret that collective action is made impossible in the Security Council, we do hope that efforts by other actors will yield positive results.

They must be prompt, effective and substantial. Hundreds of thousands of civilians in Gaza cannot wait any longer. Actually, they have waited for far too long. To no avail.

I thank you.

 

* * * * 

 

Declaração do Representante Permanente do Brasil na ONU, Embaixador Sérgio França Danese, sobre a proposta de resolução S/2023/773, sobre a crise israelo-palestina

Versão em português 

 

Nas sessões de consultas fechadas da sexta-feira passada, os membros do Conselho requisitaram a liderança do Brasil, como presidente de turno no mês de outubro, para facilitar uma resposta do Conselho à escalada da crise em Israel e na Palestina, em particular seus aspectos humanitários.

Nós atendemos ao chamado com um senso de urgência e responsabilidade. Em nossa opinião, o Conselho tinha de agir, e tinha de fazê-lo muito rapidamente. A paralisia do Conselho diante de uma catástrofe humanitária não é do interesse da comunidade internacional.

Portanto, durante todo o último fim de semana e nos dias seguintes, nós trabalhamos muito, mediante um engajamento amplo e colaborativo com os membros do Conselho, para ajudar a construir uma posição unificada.

Ao fazer um esforço de boa-fé para acomodar posições diferentes - às vezes opostas -, nosso foco esteve e continua a estar na grave situação humanitária no terreno. O realismo político nos orientou, mas a nossa a visão sempre esteve voltada para o imperativo humanitário. Exatamente como em outros dossiês sensíveis na agenda do Conselho, nos quais o Brasil cumpriu um papel especial, o direito internacional humanitário e o direito internacional dos direitos humanos forneceram parâmetros claros para a ação.

O texto que propusemos condenava inequivocamente todas as formas de violência contra civis, inclusive os atos hediondos de terrorismo por parte do Hamas e a tomada de reféns. O texto conclamava à libertação imediata e incondicional desses reféns. Também conclamava todas as partes a cumprirem rigorosamente as suas obrigações internacionais, em particular as relacionadas com a proteção de civis, infraestrutura civil e pessoal humanitário. O projeto de resolução também salientava a necessidade urgente de acesso humanitário aos civis.

O texto incorporava apelos múltiplos e urgentes da ONU e de muitos outros atores em prol de pausas humanitárias para permitir a entrega de ajuda e a passagem voluntária e segura de civis. Encorajava o estabelecimento de corredores humanitários e outros mecanismos para facilitar a prestação de ajuda humanitária sem obstáculos.

O projeto refletia ainda a necessidade ética de fornecer aos civis em Gaza eletricidade, água, combustível, alimentos e suprimentos médicos. A necessidade de serem protegidos contra deslocamentos forçados quando as condições no terreno não garantem um deslocamento seguro.

Assim, confrontados com atos terroristas hediondos contra civis israelenses, com a forte reação contra tais atos e com um desastre humanitário cada vez maior imposto sobre Gaza, a resposta que propusemos para o Conselho foi robusta e equilibrada.

Somos gratos a todos os membros do Conselho que se engajaram conosco desde sexta-feira passada e demonstraram um compromisso sincero e prático com o multilateralismo.

Infelizmente, muito infelizmente, o Conselho foi mais uma vez incapaz de adotar uma resolução sobre o conflito israelo-palestino. Mais uma vez, o silêncio e a inação prevaleceram.

Algo que não serve ao interesse verdadeiro e de longo prazo de ninguém.

Embora lamentemos profundamente que a ação coletiva tenha se tornado impossível no Conselho de Segurança, esperamos que os esforços de outros atores possam produzir resultados positivos.

Eles devem ser rápidos, eficazes e substanciais. Centenas de milhares de civis em Gaza não podem esperar mais. Na verdade, eles já esperaram demais. E em vão.

Obrigado.

 

[Nota publicada em: https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/declaracao-do-representante-permanente-do-brasil-na-onu-sobre-a-proposta-de-resolucao-s-2023-773-sobre-a-crise-israelo-palestina 

Distinguindo os problemas do Oriente Médio - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Distinguindo os problemas do Oriente Médio

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Nota sobre os problemas da região e o papel de Israel. 

 

O Oriente Médio tem muitos problemas, alguns enormes, e há muito tempo. 

Nenhum deles se chama Israel, que resultou de uma decisão votada na ONU, que prosperou, que introduziu muitas inovações tecnológicas e descobertas científicas, que domou o deserto e floresceu a agricultura em terras áridas, que se manteve democrático, a despeito dos seus integristas ortodoxos, que protesta contra o autoritarismo populista, e que não provocou deliberadamente nenhuma guerra, mas que foi atacado diversas vezes: 1948, no seu próprio nascimento, 1967, 1974, várias intifadas e ataques a partir do Líbano, da Síria, de milícias organizadas e armadas a partir de fora, como agora no caso do Hamas em Gaza. 

Os grandes problemas do Oriente Médio se chamam, desde sempre, antissemitismo, ditaduras familiares, corrupção, não educação, desigualdades persistentes, opressão das mulheres, e também, desde vários anos, ISIS, Hezbollah, Hamas, Jihad Islâmica, Irã teocrático e anti-Israel, Arábia Saudita fundamentalista, terrorismo desenfreado, etc. 

Os problemas dos palestinos não surgiram a partir de Israel, que era muito pequeno e que praticamente não tinha nenhum Exército em 1947-48, mas dos Estados árabes circundantes, que nunca aceitaram o Estado de Israel e tampouco um Estado palestino, e que também mantiveram um povo (feito de muçulmanos, mas também de cristãos) à margem de suas respectivas sociedades.

É muito difícil reconhecer isso?

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4494, 19 outubro 2023, 1 p.