Guerras e reformas globais vão pautar reunião do G20 no Rio - Caio Sartori (Valor-Globo)

Guerras e reformas globais vão pautar reunião do G20 no Rio

Caio Sartori

Valor, 26/01/2024

A primeira grande reunião do G20 sob presidência do Brasil está marcada para os dias 21 e 22 de fevereiro, no Rio de Janeiro, com os ministros de Relações Exteriores do grupo. O encontro dos chanceleres, apurou o Valor, vai debater sobretudo dois temas: as tensões internacionais em curso e a reforma da governança global. Escolheu-se como palco a Marina da Glória, no aterro do Flamengo, na divisa entre a zona sul e o centro da cidade.

Em gesto ao Mercosul e à integração regional, o governo brasileiro distribuiu nesta semana convites para os países do bloco participarem do encontro. Oficialmente, além do Brasil, apenas a Argentina integra o G20, que reúne algumas das maiores economias do mundo. Com o convite, portanto, também devem ir ao Rio os chefes diplomáticos de Uruguai, Paraguai e Bolívia.

Outros blocos abarcados pelo aceno do ministro Mauro Vieira foram a Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP) e a Organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica (OTCA), em recados de valorização da língua portuguesa e da pauta ambiental, respectivamente. No total, além dos 21 integrantes oficiais e desses convidados recentes da presidência brasileira, compõem a lista do evento outros oito países que foram convidados ainda no ano passado e 12 organizações internacionais.

A ideia da gestão brasileira é que o primeiro dia da reunião de chanceleres discuta as guerras e conflitos internacionais vigentes, sobretudo a guerra da Ucrânia e o conflito no Oriente Médio. Afinal, será a primeira vez desde o início da tensão em Gaza entre Israel e Hamas que o grupo se encontra.

No caso da guerra na Europa, o G7 despontou nos últimos dois anos como espaço de debate. No G20, espera-se uma postura firme sobre a guerra em Gaza de países próximos à causa palestina, como Arábia Saudita, Turquia, Indonésia e África do Sul - além do Egito, que é membro convidado.

Depois dos chanceleres no Rio, ministros da área financeira se reúnem em SP

No segundo dia de reunião, o foco será a reforma das instituições internacionais, tema que, inclusive, integra um dos três eixos da presidência brasileira ao lado da pauta climática e do combate à fome e às desigualdades. “Não estamos falando só de reforma do Conselho de Segurança da ONU. No G20, esse tópico envolve reforma do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) e, também, das Nações Unidas de forma mais abrangente”, diz uma fonte envolvida na agenda programática da condução brasileira.

O encontro na Marina da Glória serve de ponto de partida para as reuniões ministeriais que vão ocorrer ao longo do ano no Rio e em outras cidades do país até a cúpula dos chefes de Estado, marcada para 18 e 19 de novembro. “Será um evento preparatório fundamental para a logística e a segurança da Marina”, afirma o presidente do comitê municipal que organiza o G20, Lucas Padilha. A tendência é que a cúpula de novembro seja no Museu de Arte Moderna (MAM), localizado próximo à Marina.

Uma semana depois dos chanceleres, será a vez de os ministros de finanças e presidentes de bancos centrais se encontrarem, mas em São Paulo. Ao longo do ano, no Rio, o calendário do comitê do G20 também prevê uma reunião de ministros da área financeira, assim como das temáticas de clima e de saúde.

O G20 é dividido em duas “trilhas”: a dos sherpas, conduzida pela diplomacia, e a financeira, pelo Ministério da Fazenda. O nome sherpa neste caso se aplica aos diplomatas precursores das missões. No Brasil, o sherpa é o embaixador Mauricio Lyrio, secretário de Assuntos Econômicos do Itamaraty, enquanto a coordenadora da trilha de finanças é a secretária de Assuntos Internacionais da Fazenda, Tatiana Rosito.

Antes mesmo de começarem os encontros de ministros, está programado no Rio, na segunda-feira (29), um evento de um dos grupos de engajamento, como são chamados os núcleos de debate voltados para áreas temáticas. O encontro é o Business 20 (B20), marcado na Federação das Indústrias do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Firjan) com a presença do vice-presidente Geraldo Alckmin. Também participam Mauricio Lyrio, Tatiana Rosito e CEOs de empresas nacionais e estrangeiras.

Desde que o Brasil assumiu a presidência do clube de grandes economias do mundo, em dezembro de 2023, a prefeitura do Rio tem investido na divulgação da cidade como “capital do G20”, como é possível ler em diversas placas publicitárias espalhadas pelas ruas. Apesar de vários municípios do país receberem eventos ligados à presidência brasileira, o Rio será o anfitrião da maioria deles.

https://valor.globo.com/google/amp/brasil/noticia/2024/01/26/guerras-e-reformas-globais-vao-pautar-reuniao-do-g20-no-rio.ghtml 

Distinguindo os problemas do Oriente Médio - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Distinguindo os problemas do Oriente Médio

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Nota sobre os problemas da região e o papel de Israel. 

 

O Oriente Médio tem muitos problemas, alguns enormes, e há muito tempo. 

Nenhum deles se chama Israel, que resultou de uma decisão votada na ONU, que prosperou, que introduziu muitas inovações tecnológicas e descobertas científicas, que domou o deserto e floresceu a agricultura em terras áridas, que se manteve democrático, a despeito dos seus integristas ortodoxos, que protesta contra o autoritarismo populista, e que não provocou deliberadamente nenhuma guerra, mas que foi atacado diversas vezes: 1948, no seu próprio nascimento, 1967, 1974, várias intifadas e ataques a partir do Líbano, da Síria, de milícias organizadas e armadas a partir de fora, como agora no caso do Hamas em Gaza. 

Os grandes problemas do Oriente Médio se chamam, desde sempre, antissemitismo, ditaduras familiares, corrupção, não educação, desigualdades persistentes, opressão das mulheres, e também, desde vários anos, ISIS, Hezbollah, Hamas, Jihad Islâmica, Irã teocrático e anti-Israel, Arábia Saudita fundamentalista, terrorismo desenfreado, etc. 

Os problemas dos palestinos não surgiram a partir de Israel, que era muito pequeno e que praticamente não tinha nenhum Exército em 1947-48, mas dos Estados árabes circundantes, que nunca aceitaram o Estado de Israel e tampouco um Estado palestino, e que também mantiveram um povo (feito de muçulmanos, mas também de cristãos) à margem de suas respectivas sociedades.

É muito difícil reconhecer isso?

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4494, 19 outubro 2023, 1 p.

Putin se compara a Pedro, o Grande, e fala em 'devolver' territórios à Rússia - Estadão

Putin pretende se basear na história para apoiar suas pretensões a territórios vizinhos. Ele acha que pode se igualar a Pedro o Grande. Pode terminar como Nicolau II. Em todo caso, ele se engana redondamente sobre a Ucrânia, predecessora da Rússia em termos históricos.

Vou postar algo a respeito.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Putin se compara a Pedro, o Grande, e fala em 'devolver' territórios à Rússia

Estadão, 10/06/2022 | 10:12

 

O presidente russo, Vladimir Putin, comparou-se ao czar Pedro, o Grande, na quinta-feira, 9, tentando relacionar o passado imperial da Rússia à atual campanha militar na Ucrânia. "Pedro, o Grande, travou a Grande Guerra do Norte por 21 anos. Parece que ele estava em guerra com a Suécia, que ele tirou algo deles. Ele não tirou nada deles, ele recuperou (o que era da Rússia)", declarou Putin após visitar uma exposição dedicada aos 350 anos do czar.

"Aparentemente, também coube a nós devolver (o que é da Rússia) e fortalecer (o país). E se partirmos do fato de que esses valores básicos formam a base de nossa existência, certamente conseguiremos resolver os objetivos que enfrentamos", completou Putin em um comentário televisionado.

Em resposta, um conselheiro sênior do presidente ucraniano Volodmir Zelenski rejeitou o que chamou de tentativa de justificar a invasão e tomada do território.

"O Ocidente deve traçar uma linha vermelha clara para que o Kremlin entenda o preço de cada próximo passo sangrento... vamos libertar brutalmente nossos territórios", disse Mikhailo Podoliak.

Putin é natural de São Petersburgo, cidade que leva o nome do czar. Pedro expandiu os contornos da Rússia, transformando o país em um império e se declarando imperador. Na virada do século 18, ele lançou a Grande Guerra do Norte, um conflito de mais de duas décadas com o Império Sueco que terminou com a tomada da Rússia de uma faixa do Báltico.

O czar, cujo legado é amplamente popular entre o público russo, é o modelo de líder autocrático que Putin há muito aspira ser, disse Kyle Wilson, que serviu como diplomata australiano na União Soviética.

Putin deixou claro que está "revivendo o sonho imperial russo", disse Wilson. "E o homem que fez da Rússia um império foi Pedro, o Grande."

Nos últimos anos, as menções de Putin sobre a história da Rússia aumentou cada vez mais em suas aparições públicas. Em abril de 2020, quando a Rússia entrou em seu primeiro lockdown pela covid-19, ele comparou a pandemia às invasões nômades turcas do século IX da Rússia medieval.

Em julho de 2021, o Kremlin publicou um longo ensaio de Putin em que o presidente argumentou que a Rússia e a Ucrânia eram uma nação, dividida artificialmente. Ele lançou as bases para o envio de tropas para a Ucrânia.

No período que antecedeu o que a Rússia chama de "operação militar especial", Putin culpou Lenin, o fundador da União Soviética, por criar a Ucrânia no que disse ser um território historicamente russo. 

Em contrapartida, ele elogiou Josef Stalin por criar "um estado fortemente centralizado e absolutamente unitário", mesmo reconhecendo o histórico de repressão "totalitária" do ditador soviético.

https://www.dgabc.com.br/Noticia/3869932/putin-se-compara-a-pedro-o-grande-e-fala-em-devolver-territorios-a-russia

 

Fatores materiais e psicológicos das guerras: Troia e Grande Guerra - Khaled Serafy (Road Without End)

Um ensaio interessante sobre os fatores que precipitam uma guerra: estruturais e contingentes, inevitáveis, ou por puro acaso.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Who Triggered World War I and the Fall of Troy?

When Serbian Rebel Gavrilo Princip and Pandaros of the Trojan army shot their powerful victims

Khaled Serafy

Road Without End, Jul 30 · 7 min read

https://roadwithoutend.com/what-world-war-i-had-in-common-with-the-trojan-war-68bdfa44f0a5

Photo by British Library on Unsplash and illustration by Johann Balthasar Probst (1673–1748), Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

It’s hard to say why wars happen. The words dispute and conflict get thrown around a lot. It might be a territorial dispute over a piece of land that starts a war, or a conflict over who has the right to rule it. It’s a simple enough explanation: when two groups of people can’t peacefully resolve a material dispute, they turn to violence.

You’ll also find psychological explanations for war. Here, war is some deeply embedded instinct which brews for a long time in the depths of the human psyche, before it bubbles up to collective consciousness and explodes into the world. It’s not a bad way of thinking about it either, and there’s some scientific evidence that supports the idea that it’s in our nature to go to war. See: the case of the Gombe Chimpanzee War.

A third explanation for war, aside from the political and the psychological, is one that defies rationality. It’s the idea that wars are a product of fate, decreed by “the gods”. It’s just one of those explanations that feels like a cop-out, like it’s not an explanation at all but a way of holding our hands up and saying “we don’t know how it happens.”

But if you take a close look at one particular war, World War I, and the role that one man and one freak accident had in starting it, you may feel that there’s more to the “fate explanation” than meets the eye.

Funnily enough, a similar twist of fate breaks the truce of the Trojan war and leads to the fall of Troy in Homer’s Iliad. The Trojan War and World War I are different in lots of ways. For one thing, one is mostly fictional and the other is very real. But they’re similar in other ways, and one of those is that fate, destiny, or “the gods” seemed to play a big role in making them happen.

When Gavrilo Princip Shot Franz Ferdinand

World War I was one of the deadliest conflicts in human history. It paved the way for World War II, the atomic bomb, the rise of fascism and communism, and the deaths of tens of millions of young men. It’s an event whose significance is hard to overstate, and it may not have even happened if it weren’t for a coincidence.

In the summer of 1914, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated by Serbian rebel Gavrilo Princip.

After the assassination, Austria-Hungary issued a humiliating ultimatum to Serbia, Serbia ignored the ultimatum, Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia, and a network of interlocking alliances was triggered which pulled all the forces of modern Europe into The Great War.

But the assassination of Franz Ferdinand did not originally go to plan. He was visiting Sarajevo to give a speech in the Town Hall, and six assassins were positioned along his motorcade’s route. They planned to kill the Archduke as he drove past and waved to the crowd.

The first assassin choked and didn’t pull the trigger. The second assassin hurled a grenade but missed the Archduke’s car. His grenade hit another car in the motorcade instead, seriously injuring some members of the Archduke’s entourage, but leaving Ferdinand himself unscathed. The car sped off to the Town Hall after that, and the rest of the assassins, including Gavrilo Princip, missed their shot. For a moment it seemed like peace would reign, but the moment didn’t last long.

Later that day, Franz Ferdinand delivered his speech and left the Town Hall. He decided to pay a visit to the people who had been hurt by the assassin’s grenade that morning. His driver was instructed to head to the hospital, and as they were driving, the driver incorrectly turned right at the Latin Bridge into Franz Joseph Street. General Potiorek, who had been riding in the car with them, shouted at the driver to stop and turn back. The driver slammed the breaks, and the engine stalled. The car happened to stop just outside of a cafe called Schiller’s Delicatessen, where none other than Gavrilo Princip had been standing. The heir to the Austro-Hungarian empire was a sitting duck. Gavrilo Princip took out his pistol, walked up to the stalled vehicle, and shot the Archduke and his wife at point-blank range.

Photo of Gavrilo Princip, Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons

If the driver hadn’t taken a wrong turn, if the engine hadn’t stalled, and if it hadn’t stalled right outside Schiller’s Deli where Princip happened to be standing, Europe may not have slid down the slippery slope to WWI.

When Pandaros Shot Menelaus

Now let’s turn our attention to another war, which predates the first World War by thousands of years — and is mostly a work of fiction.

Everybody and their grandpa apparently knows the story of how the Trojan War started. Paris, the prince of Troy, took Helen from her husband Menelaus, the king of Sparta. Menelaus and his brother Agamemnon raised the armies of Greece, and they besieged the city of Troy. They wanted to kill every Trojan in the city and return Helen to Greece.

As Homer’s story goes, the Greeks had been besieging the city of Troy for nine years with no success. Try as they might, they weren’t able to penetrate its walls. After so many years of fighting, in Book IV of the Iliad, a truce was struck between both sides. They agreed to a ceasefire on the following condition: Menelaus and Paris would fight man-to-man, the winner would take Helen, and the Greek army would sail home.

It sounds like a sensible solution. Thousands of unnecessary deaths could be prevented. But the gods would not have it so, they had a different plan in mind.

Aphrodite, who had soft-spot for Paris, protected him from Menelaus’ spear and carried him off to safety. The soldiers were dumbfounded, where had Paris disappeared to in the middle of the duel? The truce had been agreed on the condition that Paris fight Menelaus to the death, and they demanded that he come back and finish the fight.

At this point, Athena descended on the battlefield and appeared to an obscure soldier of the Trojan army by the name of Pandaros. “If you dare send an arrow at Menelaus you will win honour and thanks from all the Trojans, and especially from prince Paris.” she said to him. “He would be the first to reward you very handsomely if he could see Menelaus mount his funeral pyre, slain by an arrow from your hand.”

Pandaros’ heart was persuaded. He took his bow from its case, notched an arrow, drew the string to his chest, prayed to Apollo, and let the arrow fly towards Menelaus. Menelaus was also favoured by the gods, so the arrow only hit his belt buckle. It wasn’t enough to kill him, but it was enough to draw his blood in front of the entire Greek army, and so it was enough to break the truce and resume the war.

This is how Homer tells the story of the gods decreeing a fate of war upon humans by persuading one man to take drastic action.

War and Fate

If it wasn’t for Athena persuading Pandaros to shoot Menelaus, the truce wouldn’t have been broken, and Troy may not have fallen.

If it wasn’t for the Archduke’s car stalling in front of Schiller’s deli where Gavrilo Princip happened to be standing, Austria-Hungary wouldn’t have issued the July Ultimatum to Serbia, and World War I may not have started.

To what extent does fate play a part in the great events that shape human history? The rational mind says: none. Everything boils down to either political conflict or psychological disturbance. If we could only resolve peacefully any dispute over land or governance, if we could only overcome the animalistic war-waging chimpanzee within, then there would be no more war.

But what if there were forces beyond our control, forces barely within reach of our imagination, which guide and manipulate us towards war, when all we want is peace? To the Ancient Greek mind, this is self-evidently true. Man is powerless before the gods, who hold his fate in their hands. To this, the modern mind says that the gods are nothing but a creation of man, and it is he who holds them in his hands.

The way I see it, there is such a thing as fate, but we’re not totally powerless against it. We can to an extent become masters of our own destiny, but only with great effort. If our fate is to wage war after bloody war, and human history demonstrates that it is, then we have to do whatever we can to wrestle our future from its grip. We have to be aware of it and to pay attention to it, otherwise we might unknowingly become its victims simply because we dismissed that such a factor could even exist.

Road Without End

O fracasso no Afeganistão - Henry Kissinger (OESP)

 O homem que levou os EUA ao fracasso em intervenções anteriores pretende tirar lições do mais recente fracasso...

O FRACASSO NO AFEGANISTÃO! Henry Kissinger The Economist/O Estado de S. Paulo, 28/08/2021 Os objetivos militares americanos têm sido absolutos e inatingíveis. E os políticos, abstratos e fugidios. A tomada do Afeganistão pelo Taleban põe o foco da preocupação imediata no resgate de dezenas de milhares de americanos, aliados e afegãos imobilizados em todo o país. Seu socorro precisa ser a mais urgente prioridade dos EUA. A questão mais fundamental, porém, é saber como os EUA se viram levados a se retirar em uma decisão tomada sem muito aviso ou consulta aos aliados ou às pessoas mais diretamente envolvidas em 20 anos de sacrifício. E por que o desafio básico no Afeganistão foi concebido e apresentado ao público como uma escolha entre o controle total do país ou a retirada completa. Uma questão subjacente perseguiu os esforços americanos de contrainsurgência, do Vietnã ao Iraque, por mais de uma geração. Quando os EUA arriscam a vida de seus militares, põem em risco também seu prestígio e envolvem outros países, então devem fazê-lo com base em uma combinação de objetivos estratégicos e políticos. Estratégicos, para deixar claras as circunstâncias pelas quais está lutando; políticos, para definir uma estrutura de governo que dê sustentação ao resultado, tanto dentro do país em causa quanto no cenário internacional. Os EUA se dilaceraram em seus esforços de contrainsurgência por causa de sua incapacidade de definir objetivos alcançáveis e vinculá-los de uma forma que fosse sustentável pelo processo político americano. Os objetivos militares têm sido muito absolutos e inatingíveis. E os políticos, muito abstratos e fugidios. O fracasso em vinculá-los um ao outro enredou a América em conflitos sem pontos finais definíveis e a fez dissolver o propósito unificado em um pântano de controvérsias domésticas. Os EUA entraram no Afeganistão com amplo apoio público para responder ao ataque da Al-qaeda ao território americano, lançado de um Afeganistão controlado pelo Taleban. A campanha militar inicial prevaleceu com grande eficácia. O Taleban sobreviveu essencialmente em santuários paquistaneses, de onde realizou ataques no Afeganistão, com a ajuda de algumas autoridades paquistanesas. Mas, enquanto o Taleban estava fugindo do país, os EUA perderam o foco estratégico. Os americanos se convenceram de que, em última análise, o restabelecimento de bases terroristas só poderia ser evitado transformando o Afeganistão em um Estado moderno, com instituições democráticas e um governo constitucional. Tal empreendimento jamais poderia ter um cronograma compatível com os processos políticos americanos. No ano de 2010, em um artigo em resposta a um aumento de tropas, alertei contra um processo que fosse tão prolongado e intrusivo a ponto de virar até mesmo os afegãos não jihadistas contra todo o esforço. Pois o Afeganistão nunca foi um Estado moderno. A organização estatal pressupõe um senso de obrigação comum e centralização da autoridade. O solo afegão, rico em muitos elementos, carece destes. A construção de um Estado democrático moderno no Afeganistão, onde o mandato do governo funcionasse uniformemente em todo o país, implicaria um período de muitos anos – na verdade, décadas. Mas isso vai contra a essência geográfica e etnorreligiosa do país. Foi precisamente a fragmentação, a inacessibilidade e a ausência de autoridade central que fizeram do Afeganistão uma base atraente para redes terroristas. Embora se possa datar do século 18 uma entidade afegã distinguível, seus povos constituintes sempre resistiram ferozmente à centralização. No Afeganistão, a consolidação política – e, especialmente, a militar – ocorre ao longo de linhas étnicas e de clãs, em uma estrutura basicamente feudal, onde os mediadores de poder mais decisivos são os organizadores das forças de defesa do clã. Quase sempre em conflito latente entre si, esses senhores da guerra se unem em coalizões, sobretudo quando alguma força externa – como o Exército britânico que invadiu, em 1839, e as forças armadas soviéticas, que ocuparam em 1979 – tenta impor centralização e coerência. Tanto a calamitosa retirada britânica de Cabul, em 1842, na qual apenas um único europeu escapou da morte ou do cativeiro, quanto a decisiva retirada soviética do Afeganistão, em 1989, foram provocadas por essa mobilização temporária entre os clãs. O argumento hodierno de que o povo afegão não está disposto a lutar por si mesmo não tem respaldo histórico. Eles são combatentes ferozes por seus clãs e pela autonomia tribal. Com o tempo, a guerra assumiu o caráter ilimitado das campanhas de contrainsurgência anteriores, nas quais o apoio interno aos americanos enfraqueceu progressivamente com o passar dos anos. A destruição das bases do Taleban foi essencialmente conseguida. Mas a construção de uma nação sobre um país dilacerado pela guerra absorveu forças militares substanciais. O Taleban podia ser contido, mas não eliminado. E a introdução de formas governamentais desconhecidas minou o compromisso político e aumentou a corrupção já abundante. Assim, o Afeganistão repetiu os padrões anteriores de controvérsias domésticas americanas. O que o lado da contrainsurgência definia como progresso, o lado político tratava como desastre. Os dois grupos tenderam a paralisar um ao outro durante os sucessivos governos de ambos os partidos. Um exemplo é a decisão de 2009 de juntar um aumento de tropas no Afeganistão ao anúncio simultâneo de que elas começariam a se retirar em 18 meses. O que se negligenciou foi uma alternativa concebível, combinando objetivos alcançáveis. A contrainsurgência poderia ter se reduzido à contenção, e não à destruição, do Taleban. E o curso político-diplomático poderia ter explorado um dos aspectos especiais da realidade afegã: o fato de os vizinhos do país – mesmo quando adversários um dos outros e, ocasionalmente, dos EUA – se sentirem ameaçados pelo potencial terrorista do Afeganistão. Teria sido possível coordenar alguns esforços comuns de contrainsurgência? É verdade que Índia, China, Rússia e Paquistão costumam ter interesses divergentes. Uma diplomacia criativa poderia ter destilado medidas comuns para superar o terrorismo no Afeganistão. Essa estratégia é a forma como o Reino Unido defendeu as abordagens territoriais à Índia em todo o Oriente Médio por um século, sem bases permanentes, mas com prontidão constante para defender seus interesses, junto com apoiadores regionais ad hoc. Mas essa alternativa nunca foi explorada. Depois de fazer campanha contra a guerra, os presidentes Donald Trump e Joe Biden empreenderam negociações de paz com o Taleban, com cuja extirpação os EUA haviam se comprometido, induzindo aliados a ajudá-los, 20 anos atrás. Tudo isso agora culminou no que equivale a uma retirada incondicional dos EUA por parte do governo Biden. Descrever a evolução não elimina a insensibilidade e, sobretudo, a intempestividade da decisão da retirada. Por causa de suas capacidades e valores históricos, a América não pode escapar de ser um componentechave da ordem internacional. Não pode evitá-lo apenas retirando-se. Como combater, conter e superar o terrorismo aprimorado e apoiado por países com uma tecnologia crescente e cada vez mais sofisticada? Essa questão continuará a ser um desafio global, que deverá ser enfrentado pelos interesses estratégicos nacionais, juntamente com qualquer estrutura internacional que os EUA possam criar por meio de uma diplomacia proporcional. Os americanos devem reconhecer que não haverá no futuro imediato nenhum movimento estratégico dramático para compensar esse revés autoinfligido, como assumir novos compromissos formais em outras regiões. A precipitação americana aumentaria o desapontamento entre os aliados, encorajaria os adversários e semearia confusão entre os observadores. O governo Biden ainda está em seus estágios iniciais. Deve ter a oportunidade de desenvolver e sustentar uma estratégia compatível com as necessidades nacionais e internacionais. As democracias evoluem nos conflitos entre as partes. E alcançam grandeza por suas reconciliações.

A tragédia do Irã contemporâneo: guerras intercaladas - Azadeh Moaveni (NYT)

The Day After War Begins in Iran

The outpouring of grief for Qassim Suleimani is the country’s first act of retaliation.

Azadeh Moaveni

The New York Times – 7/01/2010

The last time I wrote seriously about a war with Iran was in 2012. It had been an especially fraught year, with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards running naval exercises in the Persian Gulf, Israel and the United States conducting joint drills, and the safety of oil shipping lanes looking entirely unassured. Oil prices rattled skittishly, everyone suddenly monitored ships, and headlines speculated that Israel might attack Iran’s nuclear sites.

My assignment was to consider “the day after” — to imagine how Iranians would react if their country was bombed by Israel. My piece featured scenes of distraught young people gathering on crowded intersections singing the national anthem — suddenly everyone a terrified Iranian citizen rather than an aspiring guitarist or a day laborer or whatever they were the day before — and a screaming mother buying formula to stockpile from a supermarket. I don’t even remember writing it. How many times can you write, predict and analyze your country’s destruction before your mind begins to dissolve the traces?

That rehearsal feels like it was all in preparation for today. Last week an American drone strike incinerated Iran’s top general and national war hero Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, along with a senior Iraqi militia commander, in what can only be understood as an act of war.

Being here again makes me feel that I — an American citizen of Iranian origin — have been here so often before. The cycles of imminent war and upheaval Iranians seem destined to face every few years, cycles often driven by the whims of the United States and the increasing boldness of Iran, now feel like a civilizational inheritance, a legacy that my mother bore before me, her mother before her, and that I will pass down to my children. Every Iranian family’s history is touched with this past, in its own way.

The American-backed 1953 coup destroyed both my grandfather and great uncle’s careers, until then in service of the government, and sent the latter into exile. America’s support for, and then eventual abandonment of, the Shah helped shape the 1979 revolution, disrupted all of our lives, with the new authorities expropriating our assets, and landing an uncle in prison for belonging to that educated, pro-Western class that built modern Iran and saw the revolution as its demise.

The years that followed only deepened the American-Iranian chasm. There was the 1979-81 hostage crisis at the American Embassy in Tehran, which killed nobody in the end but poisoned relations to this day. The United States scarcely concealed its support for Iraq in the devastating years of the Iran-Iraq War. And in 1988, as the war dragged to a close, continued skirmishing resulted in the U.S. Navy shooting down an Iranian passenger plane flying over Iran’s territorial waters, killing 290 people. Deeply regrettable, lamented President Ronald Reagan, but honors and medals for the naval officers.

For decades now, the United States has often seemed driven to hurt Iran, at times through interventionist policies that were careless and transactional, and then after 1979, with a fierce determination out of proportion to whatever challenge the new system posed.

At a certain point, Iran started retaliating: In the 1980s, it cultivated regional groups and militias hostile to Washington, and encouraged them to take Westerners hostages and staged attacks through these networks. In later years, Iran challenged American roles in wars in the region and interventions in bordering countries — the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 — by backing nonstate allies that rose to become formidable powers in their own right. This lifted Tehran’s game of asymmetrical leverage into a regional influence it had probably never conceived of achieving. General Suleimani was behind much of this strategy.

Many consider him responsible for the deaths of thousands, for his intervention in salvaging Bashar al-Assad’s rule in Syria. But to many Iranians, Iraqis, Kurds and others, he was a pivotal figure in vanquishing the Islamic State, helping repel its rapid march across Iraq in 2014. In Syria, for the many Syrians who endured the industrial-scale brutality of the Assad regime, the general led what could only be understood as an offensive force. But Iran’s leaders always reminded their people that Syria, the lone Arab country that sided with Iran during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, could not be abandoned, that without it, Iran would be vastly more vulnerable in the region.

It is for these maneuvers, in part to provide Iran some deterrence against relentless American hostility, that General Suleimani is remembered. He had become a patriarch for an ambivalent country adrift, forgiven, at least by the hundreds of thousands who turned out for his funeral, for the hard excesses of the force he commanded because he secured the land in a time of the Islamic State’s butchery, seen as a man of honor and merit among political contemporaries who were usually neither. (Of course, he certainly did not impress all Iranians in this way; he had detractors who did not support his regional stratagems.)

Iran’s leaders have rallied around his legacy; Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed “severe revenge” and assured that his killing would “double” resistance against the United States and Israel. Even the reformist cleric Mehdi Karroubi, an octogenarian who is confined under permanent house arrest, issued condolences.

Beyond this official show of unity, newspapers across the political spectrum darkened their front pages, and ran full-cover photos of General Suleimani in all his guises, from brassy military uniform to slick dark suit jacket, with even the most liberal-minded running lachrymose headlines like “the sorrow is inconceivable.”

“What to do with a thorn lodged in the heart? Is this the fate of all the distinguished descendants of this land, regardless of thought and affiliation?” wrote Iran’s most prominent and oft-censored contemporary novelist, Mahmoud Dowlatabadi, of the man he said “built a powerful dam against the bloodthirsty onslaught of ISIS and secured our borders from their calamity.”

Iranians have turned out to mourn him on an extraordinary scale, in scenes unmatched since the funeral of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini himself in 1989. A sea of people fills Isfahan’s 17th Century central square, the seat of Persian history, and pours across the bridges and streets of Ahvaz, men and women from all backgrounds of Iranian society.

The mourning for the general, it could be said, is Iran’s first act of retaliation: what amounts to an extraordinary four-day state funeral in not one but two countries. The cavalcade has twinned two nations in shared public grief and indignation, as the procession moved deliberately across a crescent of Shiite historical memory. First came the cities of the Iraqi south that Saddam Hussein kept cowed and squalid, the holy shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala, through to the Iranian province of Khuzestan, which saw the bloodiest fighting of the Iran-Iraq war, an indigenously Arab region where mourning congregations chant in Arabic, and whose inclusion in this spectacle of transnational identity and power has clear unifying purpose.

Nearly 40 years ago, General Suleimani began his career in the trenches of the Iran-Iraq War, the formative drama of the Islamic Republic, where heroism was applauded by most Iranians who felt their country was the victim of external attack and isolation. Today’s Iranians, who will most suffer whatever fallout there is from his death, remain economically blockaded, in a suspended state of siege in all but name. Their country remains, by the design of American policy, sanctioned and cash-strapped, their horizons and potential extinguished by visa bans, medicine shortages and inflation. Pinned between a system that increasingly feels it has little to lose, and the all-out vengeance of a zero-plan United States, Iran has endured what feels like a war economy for decades.

I remember as a child, during the years of war with Iraq, my mother telling me about relatives in Iran who gave away their jewelry to aid the war effort. This time, in the face of President Trump’s tweets threatening to attack Iran and destroy its sites of cultural heritage, I needn’t conjure the unity that comes the day after. The country has gathered to mourn. It is already here.

Azadeh Moaveni (@AzadehMoaveni) is a senior gender analyst with the International Crisis Group and the author, most recently, of “Guest House for Young Widows: Among the Women of ISIS.”

Harold James: um historiador reflete a memoria das guerras

Artigo

A História e a Europa

Para o historiador Harold James, no centenário da eclosão da Primeira Guerra, outros conflitos, como o da Síria, poderiam ser estopim para um novo conflito

Harold James

Project Syndicate, February 4, 2014

Soldados alemães usam máscaras de gás enquanto operam uma arma especializada em abater aviões na I Guerra Mundial (General Photographic/Getty Images)

A História influi, mas de diferentes maneiras. Em alguns lugares e para algumas pessoas, a História significa eternos confrontos que são moldados por forças geopolíticas profundas: o que ocorreu há quatro séculos pode representar o mesmo que ontem. Em outros lugares e para outras pessoas, a História sugere uma necessidade de encontrar maneiras de escapar de situações antigas e complexas e preconceitos ultrapassados. É essa diferença que define a batalha intelectual que ocorre atualmente ao redor da Europa.

Com o centenário da eclosão da Primeira Guerra Mundial, este ano, dezenas de novas análises da "guerra para terminar todas as guerras" surgiram na imprensa. E é tentador ver paralelos contemporâneos na complacência imperial da Europa, particularmente na firme convicção de que o mundo seria tão interligado e próspero que qualquer inversão fosse impensável. Hoje, apesar dos supostos efeitos civilizadores de cadeias globais de abastecimento, as tensões na Síria ou no mar da China Meridional poderiam explodir o mundo – assim como ocorreu no conflito na Bósnia, em 1914.

Refletir sobre o legado da Grande Guerra é também uma ocasião de reviver a mentalidade da época. No Reino Unido, o secretário da Educação, Michael Gove, recentemente levantou um forte debate político, posicionando-se contra os historiadores que enfatizam a futilidade da guerra, chamando-a de uma "guerra justa" contra o "implacável darwinismo social das elites alemãs." Isto parece ser uma alusão velada às lutas de poder da Europa contemporânea.

Mas o ano de 1914 não é o único, nem o mais atraente ponto de comparação para interpretar o passado da Grã-Bretanha. O ano de 2015 será o bicentenário da Batalha de Waterloo e da derrota final de Napoleão. O político de direita britânico Enoch Powell costumava afirmar que o mercado comum europeu é a vingança que os alemães e os franceses impuseram à Grã-Bretanha pelas derrotas que o bloco de países lhes infligiu.

As celebrações e comemorações estarão cheias de simbolismo relacionado aos conflitos contemporâneos. O primeiro-ministro britânico, David Cameron, já teve de deslocar uma reunião de cúpula com o presidente francês François Hollande do Palácio de Blenheim, local proposto inicialmente, porque diplomatas franceses perceberam que o edifício havia sido construído para homenagear John Churchill, o Duque de Marlborough, que esmagou as forças de Luís XIV em 1704, perto da pequena cidade da Baviera que deu o nome ao palácio.

O ano de 1704 é repleto de significado. A vitória sobre a França estabeleceu as bases para o Tratado de União de 1707 entre Inglaterra e Escócia. Essa união é objeto de um referendo importante que será realizado este ano em território escocês.

Leia também: Martin Feldstein: O futuro do crescimento americano

Datas históricas alusivas estão sendo usadas ostensivamente, de forma semelhante, em outro extremo do continente europeu, para invocar imagens de inimigos que repercutem em debates políticos contemporâneos.

Há alguns anos, um filme russo, simplesmente intitulado “1612”, evocou a era das trevas na Rússia, quando a enfraquecida liderança levou o país a ser invadido e subvertido por astuciosos empresários e aristocratas poloneses.

O diretor do filme, Vladimir Khotinenko, disse que foi importante que seu público "não tenha considerado o filme como algo que aconteceu na História Antiga, mas como um evento recente, que tenha sentido a ligação entre o ocorrido há 400 anos e hoje."

Enquanto a Rússia luta para trazer a Ucrânia de volta à sua órbita, outra data antiga se agiganta: 1709, quando o Tsar Pedro I, o Grande, esmagou os exércitos sueco e cossaco na Batalha de Poltava. As margens da Europa ocidental e oriental são obcecadas por datas que lembram suas lutas: 1914, 1815, 1709, 1707, 1704 e 1612, entre outras. Por outro lado, o núcleo do continente europeu é obcecado por transcender a História, operando os mecanismos institucionais para superar os conflitos que marcaram a Europa na primeira metade do século XX. O projeto de integração europeu é uma espécie de libertação das pressões e restrições do passado.

Após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, Charles de Gaulle desenvolveu uma metafísica complicada para explicar o relacionamento do seu país com seu passado problemático. Todos os países europeus foram traídos. "A França sofreu mais que os outros porque foi traída mais que os outros. É por isso que a França que deve perdoar... Somente eu posso conciliar a França e a Alemanha, porque somente eu posso tirar a Alemanha da sua decadência”.

Winston Churchill (um descendente direto do Duque de Marlborough), no pós-guerra, tinha uma visão similar para superar as divisões e contendas nacionalistas. "Este continente nobre (...) é a fonte da fé cristã e a ética cristã", afirmou. "Se a Europa se unisse na partilha do seu patrimônio comum, não haveria limite à felicidade, à prosperidade e à glória dos seus trezentos ou quatrocentos milhões de habitantes.”

Hoje, o Centro Europeu é muito ingênuo ou muito idealista? É mesmo possível escapar da História? Ou, ao contrário, há algo estranho na maneira como as margens europeias obsessivamente recorrem aos marcos históricos? Na Grã-Bretanha e na Rússia essa obsessão parece não ser apenas uma maneira de defender os interesses nacionais, mas também um mecanismo para apelar a uma população desencantada com a realidade contemporânea do declínio do passado imperial.

De Gaulle e Churchill sabiam muito sobre a guerra, e queriam transcender o legado sangrento de Poltava, Blenheim e Waterloo. Viam a História como garantia de lições concretas sobre a necessidade de escapar do passado. Hoje, as margens da Europa, por outro lado, parecem determinadas a escapar para o passado. (Tradução: Roseli Honório)

Harold James é professor de História na Universidade de Princeton e pesquisador sênior do Centro para Inovação em Governança Internacional

@Project Syndicate, 2014

A happy new year? Ten pretty beautiful wars, by Louise Arbour (Foreign Policy)

Next Year’s Wars

From Sochi to Sudan, 10 conflicts that will threaten global stability in 2014.

Foreign Policy

• BY LOUISE ARBOUR
• DECEMBER 30, 2013
•   

Before we dive into next year's list of conflicts to watch, some thoughts on the year we are about to conclude are in order. In short, 2013 was not a good year for our collective ability to prevent or end conflict. For sure, there were bright moments. Colombia appears closer than ever to ending a civil war which next year will mark its 60th birthday. Myanmar, too, could bring down the curtain on its decades-long internal ethnic conflicts, though many hurdles remain. The deal struck over Iran's nuclear program was a welcome fillip for diplomacy, even dynamism. The U.N. Security Council finally broke its deadlock over Syria, at least with regards to the regime's chemical weapons, and committed to more robust interventions in Eastern Congo and the Central African Republic. Turkey's talks with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) continue in fits and starts, but the ceasefire looks reasonably durable. Pakistan enjoyed its first-ever democratic handover of power. 
As important as these achievements are, still more important is to keep them in perspective. Colombia's peace process remains vulnerable to messy domestic politics in the election year ahead. Myanmar's positive trajectory could derail if the bigotry unleashed on Muslim communities continues unchecked. Moving towards a final settlement with Iran amidst a sea of red lines and potential spoilers -- in Washington, Tehran, and the region -- is undoubtedly a more perilous challenge than reaching the interim deal in Geneva, welcome step though it was. And that Turkey and Pakistan, both entries on last year's "top 10" list, don't make it onto this year's list is hardly a clean bill of health, given the spillover of Syria's conflict into Turkey, and the ongoing dangers of extremism and urban violence in Pakistan.
But it is Syria and the recent muscular interventions in Central Africa that best illustrate alarming deficiencies in our collective ability to manage conflict.   
In Syria, the speed and decisiveness with which the international community acted to eliminate Bashar al-Assad's chemical weapons can't help but underscore its failure to act with equal determination to end the fighting; even concerted humanitarian action remains elusive. As the conflict in Syria enters its third winter, there is little indication it will stop any time soon, whatever hopes are centered around the Geneva talks scheduled for January. If the Security Council's role is to maintain international peace and security, then as Syria's conflict claims ever more lives and threatens to suck in Lebanon and Iraq, how else can one judge its impact than as an abject failure?
In the Central African Republic, meanwhile, the international community was apparently taken by surprise by the collapse into violence. There is no excuse for this: Decades of misrule, under-development, and economic mismanagement had left behind a phantom state long before this year's coup unleashed turmoil and now escalating confessional violence. France's robust support for the African Union (AU) in a full-fledged humanitarian intervention was commendable. But without concerted, sustained commitment to rebuilding the Central African Republic (CAR), it is unlikely to make much difference in the long run.
So how does this list compared with that of last year? Five entries are new: Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Honduras, Libya, and North Caucasus. Five remain: Central Asia, Iraq, the Sahel, Sudan, and Syria/Lebanon. Of course, by their nature, lists beget lists. It would not have been too difficult to draw up a completely different one. In addition to Pakistan and Turkey, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been omitted, though all could have easily merited a place. Nor did South Sudan, apparently on the cusp of civil war, make it onto this year's list.
In Afghanistan, next year's elections, coupled with the Taliban's continued insurgency in the face of unsettled international support for a still nascent national army, make 2014 a crucial year for the country -- and a potentially ominous one for Afghan women. In Somalia, despite some gains by an AU mission and a new "provisional" government, al-Shabab militants have shown their continued ability to strike -- both at home and abroad -- and many of Somalia's clans remain in conflict with each other. Finally, the sheer absence of the state and the rule of law in the DRC could have justified an entry on this year's list, despite the recent welcome defeat of the M23 rebel movement and signs that, finally, the international community can no longer ignore the conflict's regional dimensions.
But ultimately, this list seeks to focus not just on crises in the international spotlight -- CAR, Syria, the Sahel, and Sudan -- but also on some that are less visible or slower-burning. Thus Honduras -- estimated to be the world's most violent country outside those facing conventional conflict -- is included, as is Central Asia, which totters ever closer to a political and security implosion.  
The list illustrates the remarkable range of factors that can cause instability: organized crime in Central America; the stresses of the political competition around elections, as in Bangladesh; the threat of insurgency -- in the North Caucasus, for example -- or the dangers of regional spillover, as in Lebanon or the Sahel. Then there are the perils of authoritarian rule and an overly securitized response to opposition: in Syria, of course, but also in Iraq and Russia's North Caucasus. An alarming rise in communal or identity-based violence is likewise contributing to instability in Iraq, Syria, and CAR (and Myanmar and Sri Lanka, for that matter). Finally, center/periphery tensions cut across a range of countries on the list. Mali, Libya, Sudan, and Iraq -- plus Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and others -- all wrestle with notions of strong, centralized governance that appear unworkable, yet struggle to find alternatives that don't atomize the state or feed secessionism.
Above all, however, the list highlights that deadly conflict rarely springs up out of nowhere or is entirely unanticipated. It usually has long roots: in underdevelopment; states' inability to provide all their citizens with basic public goods; inequality; and divisive or predatory rule. It shows, too, that reducing the fragility of the most vulnerable countries -- arguably among the greatest moral and political challenge of our era -- takes time, commitment, and resources. Three things that, sadly, too often are lacking.  

Syria and Lebanon
The diplomatic breakthrough in September on Syria's chemical weapons -- and subsequent progress in dismantling them -- has had little noticeable impact on the battlefield. Violence continues, with ever-worsening humanitarian consequences. Having avoided a U.S. military intervention, the Bashar al-Assad regime has displayed increasing confidence, re-escalating its campaign to drive rebels from strongholds around the capital, Aleppo, and the Lebanese border. The regime, with some success, has also sought to market itself to Western governments as a counterterrorism partner -- ironically so, given that its brutal tactics and reliance on sectarian militias helped fuel the rise of its extremist adversaries in the first place.

In part, the regime's momentum -- however limited -- can be attributed to disarray among rebel forces. The opposition's primary political umbrella, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, has no real control of military operations on the ground. The opposition's regional backers -- principally Saudi Arabia and Qatar -- support competing blocs within the coalition, as well as separate armed groups outside it, contributing to rifts that jihadi groups have exploited. The al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is now the strongest rebel faction in much of the north, but its aggressive tactics have alienated fellow militants and the opposition's base. In response, other leading rebel groups formed the "Islamic Front," potentially the largest and most coherent opposition alliance to date. Its Islamist platform, however, has raised concerns among some of the opposition's external backers, and coordination issues remain a persistent problem.

Meanwhile, Syria is slowly but surely dragging Lebanon down with it. Lebanon's population has swelled by at least 25 percent as a result of Syrian spillover. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's growing involvement on the regime's behalf, allegedly in a "pre-emptive war" to keep its jihadist enemies at bay, is in fact luring them to take the fight to the Shiite militant group at home. Other attacks have targeted Sunni mosques in Tripoli, where sectarian strife has pushed the army to take control.

International attention is currently focused on the renewed push to hold talks between the regime and opposition, scheduled for Jan. 22 in Geneva. But both sides see it as little more than a venue for the other to formalize its capitulation. The opposition coalition accepts the premise of the talks -- the June 2012 Geneva communiqué calling for establishment of a mutually agreed transitional body with full executive authority -- but has struggled to make a final decision about whether to participate under current conditions. The regime, by contrast, has readily agreed to join talks, but rejects the ostensible goal of the process: the formation of a transitional government. The positions of each side's external backers will be critical in bringing the parties toward agreement in any political process, but here, too, signs of willingness to compromise are few, if any.

Iraq
Since April 2013, when Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-led government intensified its violent crackdown on a peaceful Sunni protest movement, the tide of attacks, arrests, and executions has gradually swelled. Sunni distrust of the central government is greater than ever, providing an opening for al Qaeda in Iraq after years of decline. Over 7,000 civilians have fallen victim to this destructive cycle already this year, but still the government has shown no appetite for compromise. Iraq's Sunnis, therefore, have turned to Syria, hoping a victory by the opposition there will enable a political comeback at home.

The coming year is likely to see further intertwining of the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts. As the Iraqi state weakens, its frontier with Syria erodes. Baghdad, more overtly than ever, is aiding Damascus in order to stave off the Sunni wave it fears at home -- though its support for the Syrian regime is encouraging precisely that, as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al Qaeda offshoot, has become the biggest player in northern Syria. To halt the violence, the Iraqi government should change its approach radically: It must win Iraqi Sunnis back to its side, re-engage them in the political process and in the fight against al Qaeda, and use its improved domestic support base to secure its own borders. Only an inclusive state can save Iraq from fragmenting.

The coming year's parliamentary elections are unlikely to produce solutions. On the contrary, they risk exacerbating violence and attracting foreign interference. Maliki's ambition to run for a third term pits his coalition against other Shiite groups, encouraging Iran to weigh in. At the same time, the political scene is fragmenting into a variety of political entities, the culmination of eight years of Maliki's divide-and-rule strategy. The prime minister's base has dwindled as well, so absent an unexpectedly dominant candidate or coalition, one can expect the elections to yield an excruciating period of bargaining and political paralysis.

Libya
Beset with myriad security concerns and mired in political deadlock, Libya's post-Qaddafi transition is threatening to go off the rails. The General National Congress' mandate is set to expire on Feb. 7,  2014, and the formation of a constitution-writing body is already over a year late. Ali Zeidan, the current prime minister, has been the target of several attacks -- and a brief kidnapping -- and calls for his dismissal are rising. Meanwhile, public confidence in state institutions is fast waning, and with it confidence in a transition process that was supposed to create the framework for a new democracy.

Like other Arab countries in transition, Libya has become increasingly divided along several different axes -- Islamist vs. liberal, conservative vs. revolutionary, and center vs. periphery -- all of which are contributing to instability on the ground. Following the collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, militias largely took over from the official military and police force, and the country is awash in weapons. The coalition that brought Qaddafi's former allies together with liberal exiles and long-imprisoned Islamists has collapsed, leaving in its wake a fragmented polity. In Libya's east, almost daily targeted assassinations of security officials -- for which residents blame radical Islamists -- is fuelling belligerent anti-Islamist attitudes.
Overwhelmed, the government has been obliged, paradoxically, to bribe and cajole militias in an attempt to rebuild the state's monopoly on force. So far, it has had little success: Armed groups have blocked gas pipelines and besieged crude oil facilities, reducing exports to around 20 percent of the pre-uprising level. The loss of revenues is crippling the national budget.

There are no easy answers to these problems. At a minimum, local militias and the proliferation of small arms will plague Libya (and its neighbors) for years to come, frustrating the government's efforts to rebuild the country's security forces and secure its borders. But it remains an open question whether Libya's leaders can build sufficient consensus to keep the process moving in the right direction.

Honduras
Honduras is the world's murder capital, with more than 80 homicides reported for every 100,000 citizens in 2013. A weak, often compromised justice and law enforcement system means that most serious crimes are never prosecuted. One of the two poorest countries in the region -- half the population lives in extreme poverty -- Honduras is also among the 10 most unequal countries in the world. Much of the country is plagued by criminal violence, and most Hondurans cannot access state services or enjoy the protection of law enforcement. Democracy and rule of law -- never strong -- were further undermined by a coup in 2009.
The United Nations and human rights groups have reported that members of the Honduran National Police have engaged in criminal activity, including murder. Weak, corrupt security forces have turned Honduras into an ideal way-station for drugs heading from the Andes to U.S. markets. An estimated 87 percent of all airborne cocaine headed north stops first in Honduras.
Organized criminal activity ranges from drug and human trafficking to kidnapping and extortion. Criminal groups have become strong enough that the state has effectively lost control over parts of the country. Compounding these security threats are street gangs, led by the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (M18), which together boast an estimated 12,000 members. For the most part, these gangs terrorize the poor, urban neighborhoods in the capital city, Tegucigalpa, and the port of San Pedro Sula.
Violence in Honduras spiked upward in 2009, when President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup. The International Criminal Court is currently investigating crimes committed in the aftermath of that coup, while an official truth commission revealed that the military killed at least 20 people. Since 2009, 10 human rights activists, 29 journalists, 63 lawyers, and some 20 political candidates have been killed. In almost all of these instances, no one has been held accountable.
Newly elected President Juan Orlando Hernandez campaigned on an "iron fist" response to crime, proposing to create a militarized police force. Given ongoing complaints of human rights abuses by security forces -- including allegations of involvement in disappearances and kidnappings for ransom -- it is little surprise that his proposal has been met with vocal opposition by civil society organizations and the diplomatic community. Such an overly securitized response, built on corrupt or predatory institutions, is unlikely to resolve the problem. Absent concerted efforts to strengthen the rule of law, Honduras' plight looks set to continue -- even intensify -- in the coming year.

Central African Republic
Months of deadly clashes in the Central African Republic (CAR) have brought an already perilously weak state to the brink of collapse, with 400,000 people displaced and untold thousands terrorized into hiding. Nearly half of the population is in need of some form of assistance, and state services, including the police and the army, no longer exist.

It was just a year ago that a transition of power from then-President François Bozizé appeared to be in on track. But that agreement fell apart and in March, Seleka rebels -- a loose alliance of Muslim fighters from the CAR, Chad, and Sudan -- staged a coup to oust Bozizé and replace him with their leader, Michel Djotodia. In September, Djotodia disbanded Seleka, triggering a wave of widespread violence with no effective national army in place to stop it.

The United Nations and Western powers were slow to respond, in part because they thought Djotodia could control Seleka fighters and that the African Union-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) could secure the capital, Bangui. They were wrong on both counts. The transitional government and the regional security force have failed to prevent a free fall into chaos. The "wait and see" approach of the United Nations and Western powers now has them breathlessly trying to catch up.

The Seleka have since splintered into leaderless factions that clash regularly with armed groups made up of villagers and national security services alike. Eyewitnesses report daily attacks on civilians and massacres carried out with machetes and semi-automatic weapons. More worryingly still, the conflict has taken on a religious undercurrent, with the Seleka pitted against newly formed Christian self-defense groups. The process of radicalization is well underway. If the violence continues and religious tensions escalate, large-scale confessionally-driven violence is frighteningly possible.

The conflict could also easily spread to other neighboring countries -- insecurity is already rife on the border with Cameroon -- although help appears to be belatedly at hand. Following French warnings of potential regional destabilization, the United Nations authorized France to send 1,600 troops to bolster MISCA's operations and restore law and order. For now, the future of the CAR is in their hands. Challenges ahead include disarming militiamen in Bangui and preventing fighting between Christian and Muslim communities. Only then can the process of state-building begin.


Sudan
A hotbed of instability and violence for years, conditions remain dire across much of Sudan. Political restlessness in Khartoum, economic fragility, and multiple center-periphery tensions all pose major conflict risks for 2014.

In November, Sudan's defense minister announced a new offensive against Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebels in South Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, aimed at "ending the rebellion." The rebel alliance, which is fighting for a more representative government, responded in kind, leveling attacks against strategic roads and army facilities in North and South Kordofan. Khartoum has since backpedaled, downplaying the significance of the campaign and saying the government is ready to resume talks. But African Union mediators still need Khartoum's consent to start a comprehensive, national dialogue that includes the SRF.

In Darfur, the violence that began a decade ago has now mostly given way to fighting between Arab tribes, once the government's main proxies against non-Arab rebels and communities. Since the beginning of 2013, inter-tribal violence has displaced an additional 450,000 people. One of the most violent conflicts in the region -- involving the Salamat, Missiriya, and Ta'aisha tribes at the Sudan-Chad-CAR tri-border -- has forced 50,000 more refugees into Chad. In the east of Sudan, lack of implementation of a 2006 peace deal backed by Eritrea is also threatening to reignite conflict.
Poor governance is also inching the country closer to disaster. Nationwide protests in late September against ending fuel subsidies sparked much deeper levels of discontent among urban populations, once reliable government supporters. The growth of militant Islamist groups -- independent of the governing National Congress Party or the Islamist Movement -- also points to a government losing control on all fronts.

The solution to all of these challenges remains the same as ever: The relationship between Khartoum and the rest of the country must be fundamentally redefined. Otherwise, regional grievances will continue to fester, Khartoum will continue to be consumed with crisis management, and the international community will continue to spend billions each year to manage the consequences.

One of several obstacles that could stand in the way of reforming Sudan's centre-periphery troubles is President Omar al-Bashir's indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Without some incentive, Bashir could well block all but cosmetic change for fear of losing power and ending up at the court. But if the international community confirms that credible reform is underway -- and that the only thing standing in the way of further, comprehensive progress is the indictment -- the Security Council could request that the ICC defer prosecution of Bashir for a year with no obligation to extend.  

The Sahel and Northern Nigeria
The Sahel region and Northern Nigeria have emerged as major sources of instability for parts of West and Central Africa, as last year's watchlist foretold. In 2014, expect separatist movements, Islamist terrorism, and north-south tensions to continue to spark violence, which the region's weak or stressed governments are ill-equipped to address.

In Mali, a French military intervention in early 2013 successfully wrested control of northern cities from a coalition of Islamist militant groups. Subsequently, presidential and parliamentary elections were held without major incident. Still, the country is far from stable today. Terror attacks, inter-communal clashes and bouts of fighting between armed Tuareg groups and the Malian army have continued, while representatives of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the primary Tuareg separatist group, have repeatedly threatened to withdraw from peace talks. A U.N. mission has deployed to the country, but still lacks adequate resources and personnel.

To escape further conflict, Mali must look beyond immediate security concerns and provide its diverse population with essential services, impartial justice, and inclusive politics. The government in Bamako cannot be seen as imposing its own vision for stability on the north -- or the roots of the conflict will remain untouched.

Next door, Niger may seem comparatively tranquil, but it is subject to many of the same pressures that tipped Mali into chaos. President Mahamadou Issoufou has pursued a security agenda focused on external threats, while his government is failing to deliver long promised and vital social goods at home. Tensions surrounding a government shuffle last summer revealed how fragile Niger's democracy remains. Add to the equation suspected criminal infiltration of the state and security services, the acute misery of most of the population, and you have a decidedly combustible mix.

Finally, Nigeria's Boko Haram continues to wage a bloody insurgency in the north of Africa's most populous country. Despite a year-long and often harsh government campaign, the group still mounts regular attacks on military and police installations, and civilians -- often from safe havens in the mountains, as well as from neighboring Niger and Cameroon. Fighting will claim further thousands of lives in 2014 unless the government adopts significant reforms, including addressing impunity, tackling systemic corruption, and promoting development. This will be made even more difficult as the country prepares for what could be fiercely contested general elections in 2015.

Bangladesh
Bangladesh enters 2014 amid escalating political violence. Scores of people died and hundreds were injured in clashes between the opposition and security forces ahead of general elections scheduled for January, the former embracing a growing campaign of violent nationwide shutdowns, or hartals. The opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) has said it will boycott the elections, accusing the ruling Awami League (AL) of authoritarian rule and plans to rig the polls.
A boycott would deepen the crisis and lead to more deadly violence. Merely postponing polls  -- as some have suggested -- without a roadmap for how to hold credible elections in the future is also not the solution. There is deep animosity between the heads of the AL and BNP, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, who have been swapping power since 1991. A phone call between them in October 2013 -- reportedly their first conversation in over a decade -- quickly deteriorated into barbs about each other's mental health.

The roots of Bangladeshi political polarization run deep. Over the past two years, a government-appointed tribunal has carried out profoundly flawed trials for war crimes committed during the country's 1971 war of liberation from Pakistan. To date, everyone on trial is a Bangladeshi citizen. No one from the Pakistani military, the main force resisting the liberation of what was then East Pakistan, has been indicted. Making matters worse, the sentencing to death of six members of the BNP and Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami parties -- for allegedly trying to sabotage the country's formation -- has inflated religious-versus-secular social divisions and spawned the radicalization of newer groups like Hefajat-e-Islam.

The only way out is via credible elections and a stable, responsive government. For that, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia must overcome their mutual loathing and negotiate an inclusive roadmap. The risks are manifold. Since 1971, the military has attempted some 30 coups, about a fifth of them successful. In two, prime ministers were assassinated, including Sheikh Hasina's father, Mujibur Rahman. Today, the military remains a risk. Finally, the potential radicalization of Rohingya refugees, human rights concerns, and Bangladesh's complicated economic trajectory all make for an explosive mix.

Central Asia
The 2014 Afghanistan drawdown is not the only thing to worry about in Central Asia. Most countries in this region are governed by aging leaders and have no succession mechanisms -- in itself potentially a recipe for chaos. All have young, alienated populations and decaying infrastructure. 
Uzbekistan, a perpetually difficult neighbor, squabbles with Kyrgyzstan over borders and with Tajikistan over water. Moscow is warning of a buildup of Central Asian guerrillas on the Afghan side of the border, and is ramping up military assistance. Tajikistan, the main frontline state, is also deeply vulnerable -- with low governance capacity, high corruption, barely functional security forces, and limited control over some strategically sensitive regions. It is also a key transit route for opiates destined for Russia and beyond.
In Kyrgyzstan, extreme nationalist politics threaten not just the country's social fabric, but its economy too, as some politicians seek political and possibly financial gain by hounding foreign investors in the crucial mining sector. Crime and corruption are endemic. The harshly authoritarian state of Uzbekistan is Moscow's biggest irritant and the United States' closest ally in the region. And yet its president, Islam Karimov, may have lost control over his own family: His eldest daughter, Gulnara, is suspected of having her own presidential ambitions and has lashed out against her mother as well as Uzbekistan's security chief, probably the country's second most powerful figure. Neighbors fear post-Karimov instability could trigger waves of refugees, a further pressure on their poorly defined borders.

Resource-rich Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has ambitions of regional leadership, but it could just as easily be undone by a host of internal problems. Investors like China worry that the Kazakhs have made heavy weather of handling even very modest insurgency problems. The country also suffers from a serious lack of transparency for foreign investment, enormous income disparities, a poor human rights record, and increasing pressure from Moscow. It also needs to design a smooth transition mechanism for its long-time leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Finally, Turkmenistan, generously endowed with hydrocarbons but weak in governance, hopes to withstand any post Afghanistan spillover by doing a deal with its new leaders. This has worked in the past, but there is no guarantee it will in the future.
While Afghanistan will undoubtedly be the focus of the international community again in 2014, Central Asia's states will continue to grapple with their own individual and unique circumstances in a corner of the world too long cast as a pawn in someone else's game.

North Caucasus (Sochi)
This February, Russia will host the Winter Olympics -- at $47 billion, the most expensive ever -- in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. But security is even more of a problem than cost: Europe's most active ongoing conflict is taking place nearby in the North Caucasus. If the Olympics motto is "faster, higher, stronger," Putin's motto in approaching the North Caucasus insurgency appears to be "meaner, tougher, stronger."

The leader of the North Caucasus Islamist insurgency, Doku Umarov, has threatened to disrupt the Olympics and urged militants to use all available means to commit terrorist attacks across Russia. His efforts appear to have paid off: In 2013, there were at least 30 terrorist attacks in southern Russia, according to independent media sources. Twin bombings on Monday, Dec. 30, that killed dozens in Volgograd -- responsibility for which is as yet unclaimed -- speak to the nature of the terrorist threat. In response, the Russian government has rolled out unprecedented security measures in Sochi, and strengthened border controls to prevent infiltration of fighters from abroad and minimize the risk emanating from the North Caucasus, especially its most restive republic, Dagestan.

Unfortunately, some of these measures could worsen the situation. In Jan. 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Dagestan's president and overhauled the republic's nuanced security strategy, which had been showing signs of success. Along with vigorous anti-corruption measures, the new president, Ramazan Abdulatipov, backed a wave of repression against the Dagestan's vibrant Salafi community. Security forces conducted mop-up operations in villages, arrested large groups of believers from cafes, madrassas, and homes, and intimidated moderate Salafi leaders, civic organizations, and businesses. Modest initiatives at inter-sectarian dialogue have ceased. Abdulatipov also closed the commission for rehabilitation of fighters and encouraged the creation of people's militias, supposedly to combat extremism. These, however, have already been involved in intra-confessional violence.

Equally troubling was the announcement in September by Yunus-bek Yevkurov, president of another North Caucasus republic, Ingushetia, that the homes of insurgents' families will be demolished and their land seized. In nearby Kabardino-Balkariya, the civilian president, Arsen Kanokov, was replaced by the former chief of the Interior Ministry's Department for Combating Extremism -- not exactly known for its subtle approach to security.