Hearing Cuban Voices in a Time of Crisis - Brooke Larson, Ted A. Henken, Flor Barceló (Bildner Center, CUNY)

 

Hearing Cuban Voices  in a Time of Crisis

Tuesday, September 17, 6 PM Skylight Room The Graduate Center, CUNY

The late historian Elizabeth Dore spent the last 20 years directing “Cuban Voices,” a Ford Foundation-sponsored oral history project collecting memories of the Cuban Revolution. In 2023, Duke University Press published her posthumous book, How Things Fall Apart: What Happened to the Cuban Revolution, which tells modern Cuba’s story through the lives of seven islanders from the post-Soviet generation. The 15-year project, which involved a large team of Cuban interviewers and over 100 interviewees, faced many challenges, including difficulty finding a publisher for Dore’s controversial findings. “The ghost of Oscar Lewis kept me awake at night,” she notes wryly in the book’s opening pages. Following Dore’s death in 2022, her children donated the project archive to Columbia University, where it is now digitally available to the public. A lifelong socialist and principled scholar, Dore was dedicated to hearing diverse, critical, and often contradictory Cuban voices describing the Revolution’s challenges, rewards, and dilemmas. Her book captures the voices of those who built, supported, opposed, and even fled the Revolution. This initial panel, the first of three inspired by Dore’s work, will focus on Dore’s personal and political history and intellectual legacy (Brooke Larson), an analysis of How Things Fall Apart (Ted A. Henken), and an introduction to Columbia’s “Cuban Voices” oral history collection by the archivist who prepared it for public access (Flor Barceló).

Brooke Larson is a Professor of History (Emerita) at Stony Brook University, SUNY. She co-founded the Latin American Caribbean Center and has taught a wide range of graduate seminars and undergraduate courses, including Colonial Latin America, Race and Nation, European/Indian Encounters, and Comparative Frontiers. Her research spans five centuries of colonial and modern history, focusing on the Andes. Her latest book, The Lettered Indian. Race, Nation, and the Indigenous Education in 20th-century Bolivia (Duke University Press, 2024), is an ethnographic history exploring the epic battle over indigenous education, its implications for Bolivian nation-building projects, and the contested meanings of race and citizenship throughout the 20th century.

Ted A. Henken (Ph.D., Tulane University) is a Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Baruch College, CUNY. He has conducted sociological research in Cuba and interviewed numerous Cubans over the past 25 years. Based on this extensive research, he has published several books, articles, and profiles, including Cuba’s Digital Revolution: Citizen Innovation and State Policy(2021, co-edited with Sara García Santamaría) and Entrepreneurial Cuba: The Changing Policy Landscape(2015, co-authored with Archibald Ritter). He is currently working on an oral history of Cuban independent journalism, tentatively titled Saturn’s Children: The 60-Year Struggle to Reestablish a Free Press in Cuba (under contract with the University of Florida Press).

Flor Barceló is a Ph.D. student in Latin American and Iberian Cultures at Columbia University. They hold a Licenciatura in Letras (BA) from the University of Buenos Aires, where they concentrated on Literary Theory. Since 2015, Flor has worked as a high school teacher and a community college professor. Their research interests include the construction of queer archives, DIY publications (magazines and fanzines) produced by LGBT+ activists from Latin America and Spain, subjectivity and grievable lives under neoliberalism, and literature written during the AIDS epidemics. Flor interned at Columbia’s Rare Book & Manuscript Library during the Summer of 2023, where she processed the interviews that led to Elizabeth Dore’s book How Things Fall Apart.

TO REGISTER, send e-mail bildner@gc.cuny.edu UPDATES: http://www.bildner.org

Pierre Salama, um economista humanista - homenagem de Mauricio David

 Recebido por e-mail: 11/08/2024;

Certa vez escutei o grande arquiteto e humanista Oscar Niemeyer – o
construtor das mais belas obras arquitetônicas de Brasília e da Pampulha, em
Belo Horizonte – dizer : A vida é um sopro... Uma grande verdade, que só
podia ser pensada e dita por um comunista como Oscar Niemeyer !...

Pois hoje este comentário do Niemeyer me veio à cabeça ao receber o
comunicado da Jeanne-Marie, sua amantíssima esposa e da Pascale, a sua
adorada filha, e também de uma legião de seus ex-colegas e ex-alunos da
tristíssima notícia do falecimento na noite de ontem do nosso adorado amigo,
mestre e querido companheiro de lutas Pierre Salama. Triste notícia, que nos
deixa a todos os que o conheceram órfãos daquela figura humana extraordinária que foi Pierre Salama...

Eu próprio conheci o Salama – como o chamávamos todos os seus amigos – em
1991 quando cheguei a Paris para fazer o meu doutorado em economia na
Universidade de Paris XIII – hoje denominada Universidade de Paris XIII –
Sorbonne. Salama me acolheu como acolhia a todos os “exilados” do mundo que
buscavam completar os seus estudos de pós-graduação sob a orientação do
intelectual marxista e pós-trotskista que fizera o seu nome na Paris pós-68.
A todos este intelectual ímpar que sempre lutou pela justiça social e
econômica acolhia com o abraço afetuoso ajudando a desbravar os caminhos
íngremes da burocracia francesa para facilitar o encaminhamento
administrativo dos registros universitários mas, acima de tudo, dando o
exemplo da sua independência de pensamento e da procura constante de novos caminhos para a descoberta científica. 

De longa data os caminhos do Pierre se cruzaram com a América Latina.
Primeiramente, com o México e a Argentina, de onde vieram muitos dos seus
alunos. Pouco depois, com o Brasil também. Lembro que o Pierre, ainda
estudante em Paris, foi assistente do nosso Celso Furtado na Universidade de
Paris I-Pantheón-Sorbonne, onde o Celso ensinava. Depois, tornou-se
professor da Universidade de Amiens, até transferir-se para a Universidade
de Paris XIII (também conhecida como Paris Nord, em Villetaneuse, até ser
rebatizada de Université de Paris XIII-Sorbonne). Também por longos anos foi
um dos professores mais reconhecidos do IEDES (o Instituto ligado à Paris I)
que se especializava nos estudos do desenvolvimento econômico e social dos
países em desenvolvimento – chamados então de “Terceiro Mundo”. Durante
décadas e décadas Salama dedicou-se a ensinar e a orientar academicamente a
legiões de alunos vindos da América Latina, da Ásia e da África, e a
franceses também. Sempre com a dedicação de sempre. E sempre com o costume
francês de ter os cafés parisienses como a extensão das suas cátedras. O do
Pierre era o Café Select, em Montparnasse, em frente ao conhecido La
Coupole, frequentado por Sartre e por Simone de Beauvoir e tantos outros
intelectuais dos anos 50, 60 e 70. E que, pelas mãos de Salama, também
passou a integrar o meu roteiro gastro-intelectual de Paris. De orientado
passei a amigo do Pierre e da família, da belíssima Jeanne-Marie – sua
companheira de vida- e da Pascale – a sua filha adorada. E para que falar
das adoráveis Judith e Élie, suas netinhas... Mon Dieu !, estou cada vez
mais sentimental. É que quando a gente se aproxima dos 80 – eu já faço 78 em
um mês mais – os amigos começam a ir-se para outras paragens e ficamos cada
vez mais cientes que já entramos na contagem regressiva... Quantos amigos
perdemos nos anos mais recentes, do mestre de todos nós Celso Furtado no
anos 80, logo após o meu amigo mais próximo e íntimo João Paulo de Almeida
Magalhães, a Ana Maria Kirchner no ano passado – que conheci por intermédio
do Salama -, a Tanyra Vargas, ao meu amigo do Pedro II Carlos Eduardo
Gouveia, o Antonio Barros de Castro, o Ignacy Sachs, o Hélio Jaguaribe e
tantos outros... Sem contar os que estão pela Bola 7 como eu próprio e
amigos que já entraram na rota da indesejada dos povos, como dizia o poeta
Manuel Bandeira, para que mencioná-los por nome, para deixá-los ainda mais
assustados. A vida é assim mesmo, um sopro...

Cada amigo que se vai nos deixa aquela sensação de que nos faltou a última
visita, o último fim-de-semana juntos, o último Réveillon, a última leitura
compartilhada... 

Pois é, Pierre... Você se nos foi, pelos caminhos insondáveis e misteriosos
dos seres humanos... Eu costumava lhe mandar alguns versos sempre, pois
sabia que você gostava muito de poesia. Pois, à guisa de despedida,
mando-lhe agora os maravilhosos versos do grande John Donne :

“ Nenhum homem é uma ilha isolada; cada homem é uma partícula do
continente, uma parte da terra; se um torrão é arrastado para o mar, a
Europa fica diminuída, como se fosse um promontório, como se fosse a casa
dos teus amigos ou a tua própria; a morte de qualquer homem diminui-me,
porque sou parte do gênero humano. E por isso não perguntes por quem os
sinos dobram; eles dobram por ti”.

Vá então por estes novos caminhos, querido Pierre ! Sabendo que a morte de
qualquer homem nos diminui, porque somos parte do gênero humano. E não
perguntemos por quem os sinos dobram, eles dobram por nós. Aqui, em Gaza, em
Tel-Aviv, nas favelas cariocas, nos sertões do Brasil profundo...

Em breve, nos veremos novamente, Pierre !

À bientôt,

Mauricio (et Beatriz t’embrasse aussi...)

Centro Carter refuta totalmente a ditadura chavista - Jennie Lincoln, Perkins Rocha

Las 5 frases que pronunció Jennie Lincoln, jefa de la Misión del Centro Carter, sobre las elecciones del 28 de julio, que encolerizaron al régimen de Nicolás Maduro:

1. No hay evidencia de hackeo: “La transmisión de la data de votación es por línea telefónica y teléfono satelital y no por computadora. No han perdido data”. El régimen quiere montar la especie de que la oposición penetró “cibernéticamente” el sistema del CNE. Falso!!!

2. Amoroso no cumplió promesa de entregar resultado: todavía el CNE no entrega a cada representante de las tarjetas y a los candidatos el CD que por ley tiene todos kos resultados de la votación. Amoroso volvió a mentir.

3. La gran irregularidad fue la falta de transparencia del CNE: “A pesar de lo desigual, el pueblo venezolano fue a votar; la gran irregularidad de la jornada electoral fue la falta de transparencia del CNE y la flagrante inobservancia de sus reglas de juego”.

4. Centro Carter confirma a González Urrutia como ganador: “las actas que colgó la oposición en una página web, bloqueada por el gobierno, confirman el triunfo de González Urrutia. El CCarter las ha analizado junto a varias Universidades y otras organizaciones y las valida.

5. Lincoln dice que es incrédula: Soy escéptica sobre lo que un equipo de verificación internacional podría hacer que no hayan hecho ya los miles de testigos, que han producido las verdaderas actas de la noche. El gobierno ha tenido un amplísimo tiempo para mostrar la data real.

Via Perkins Rocha, 11/08/2024

Events in Kursk - Garry Gaspariv (Free Russia Forum)

 Statement by the Council of the Free Russia Forum on Events in the Kursk region.

Garry Kasparov
11/08/2024

Observing the events that have unfolded in recent days in the Kursk region, we feel it necessary to emphasize the following:

As we have repeatedly stated, the war unleashed by Putin against Ukraine is criminal. Now this war is returning to Russia, which is quite natural. As the saying goes, “he who sows the wind will reap the storm." All the victims and destruction caused by this war, including on the territory of the Russian Federation, are a direct consequence of Putin's criminal policy. 

For Ukraine, this war is a defensive and just war. Ukrainians are fighting for their freedom and independence, for the right to exist as a state and a nation. They have the right to defend themselves as they see fit, while of course observing the laws and customs of war. The transfer of hostilities to the territory of the aggressor is their legal right.

We welcome the breakthrough by the Ukrainian armed forces in the Kursk region, which demonstrates to us that the course of the war is by no means a foregone conclusion. The local successes of Putin's invaders in Ukraine turned out to be only an isolated episode. Now the initiative has passed to the Ukrainians, which gives us hope that a Ukrainian victory in this war is not only possible, but quite probable. 

Especially impressive is the fact that the current success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has been achieved with very limited supplies of weapons from Western countries and with an acute shortage of manpower. The breakthrough of the AFU into the Kursk region once again convinces us that fighting for a righteous cause is the strongest of motivations, and can have a greater impact on the course of military operations than weapons and supply of soldiers. 

Recent events in the Kursk region offer the best response to skeptics who talk about the need for negotiations and the impossibility of reaching the 1991 borders. The course of the war is unpredictable, and its end result may turn out to be quite different from what was imagined.

Unfortunately, no combat operation is without casualties. We express our condolences to the families and loved ones of the civilians who were killed as a result of the fighting in Kursk region. At the same time, we draw their attention to the fact that the real culprit behind the deaths of these people (as well as all victims of the war) is the Russian dictator who unleashed this war and continues to wage it to this day—Vladimir Putin.

We also recall that we have consistently supported Ukraine in this war since its beginning. We see the AFU as our natural allies in the fight against Putin's tyranny. This is our fundamental difference from other sections of the exiled Russian diaspora, which have so far taken an insufficiently clear position on this war. We call on them to come to their senses and begin to provide effective support to those who are now confronting Putin's aggression on the battlefield: the Ukrainian armed forces and Russian volunteers.

Our slogan—"Victory to Ukraine, freedom to Russia!"– takes on new meaning when we see the AFU marching through Russian territory, effectively liberating it from Putinism. Whatever the final outcome of this operation, one thing has become clear: Putin's regime is not as strong as it seems. It can be crushed by the force of arms both in Ukraine and in Russia itself. 

The Council of the Free Russia Forum 
August 09, 2024
@forumfreerussia

The Battle of Kursk 2024 - Mick Ryan (Kyiv Post)

ANALYSIS: The Battle of Kursk 2024

A quick assessment of what we know about the surprise Ukrainian assault into Russia, and what might be Ukraine’s strategic and operational objectives.

Mick Ryan

The Kyiv Post, August 11, 2024

In a 1973 lecture, Sir Michael Howard described the impact of surprise, and the necessity of military institutions to prepare their people to absorb, and adapt around, surprises on the battlefield and beyond. He described how “this is an aspect of military science which needs to be studied above all others in the Armed Forces: the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown.”

Sir Lawrence Freedman, has written that, “a surprise attack, conceived with cunning, prepared with duplicity and executed with ruthlessness, provides international history with its most melodramatic moments.” Surprise is an important continuity in human competition and warfare. The desire to surprise an adversary is central to the Eastern and Western traditions of war.

The aim is to shock an adversary and overwhelm them when they are their weakest or when they least expect it. That shock, and the breakdown in enemy cohesion and ability to effectively respond, can then be used to seize large amounts of ground and destroy significant enemy formations.

It appears that yet again, in the past few days, the Ukrainians have surprised Russia, and observers in the west, with their latest operation.

Over the past 72 hours, we have watched as Ukraine has launched a significant cross-border assault into Russia’s Kursk region. Initially viewed as another raid into Russia, similar to the previous Ukrainian operations in May 2023 and March 2024, it has become clear that this is something slightly different, particularly in its use of conventional Ukrainian ground forces.

Just how different this new Ukrainian operation is from those previous raids remains to be seen. The following is my quick assessment based on what we have seen so far. I am the first to admit that we are seeing only a small part of this operation at this point.

The 21st Century Battle of Kursk Begins

Despite our ability to only see a small part of what is occurring in Kursk, there are several aspects of this new Ukrainian operation which are apparent.

First, this is a multi-brigade operation. At least two Ukrainian brigades have been identified so far: the 22nd Mechanized Brigade and the 82nd Air Assault Brigade. These are both quality formations. It appears that unlike in the 2023 southern counteroffensive where fresh brigades were employed, the Ukrainians have allocated experienced formations to this attack.

This already appears to be paying dividends with the depth of the Ukrainian penetration so far. But, if we can see two brigades, there may be even more allocated to the operation which are ready to assume the lead on the advance into Russia. However, this will depend on the operation’s objectives and how long Ukraine thinks it can sustain its attack before Russian defenses are able to effectively respond.

Second, the Ukrainians have attacked with a highly mobile, mechanized force. This is different to the Russian dismounted attacks into Kharkiv in recent months. A high level of mobility is essential to creating or exploiting gaps in enemy defenses, and rapidly exploiting such gaps. Speed and shock action are vital. But mechanized operations create a larger logistic liability than dismounted action, and armored vehicles can be harder to hide in open warfare.

And after a few days of constant operations, they also need maintenance. This reinforces the need for second echelon forces to conduct forward passage of lines operations to assume the advance. You can read about this very complex undertaking in a previous article on Passage of Lines here.

Third, the Ukrainians appear to have deployed a significant amount of air defensecapability. At least one Russian fighter aircraft and two helicopters have been claimed to have been shot down by the Ukrainians. There have been, as of this point, limited reports of Russia being able to use glide bombs or even large numbers of drones to counter the Ukrainian assault. This is indicative of a more effective air defense environment for the Ukrainians than was created for their 2023 counteroffensives. It is also probably another outcome of the surprise and shock generated in the Russian command and control network by the Ukrainians.

Fourth, the Ukrainians have penetrated a good distance into Russia. The map above (from Black Bird Group) shows the currently estimated penetration of Ukrainian forces in Russia on at least two axes of advance. Main and supporting efforts are unclear.

However, the situation remains very unclear and Ukrainian forces could be much deeper into Russia than shown on the map. The situation will remain dynamic for a while yet. That said, this probably constitutes the biggest advance by any side in this war since late 2022. By comparison, the Russian advance into Kharkiv this year penetrated about 8 kilometers into Ukraine.

Fifth, Ukraine has achieved surprise. This is an important theme to note given the obsession of some with describing this war as a ‘transparent battlefield.’ This, again, shows that the modern battlefield is far from transparent, and that deception activities, good intelligence, and surprise are crucial elements of modern war. More importantly, the Ukrainian cross-border attack shows that surprise is still possible, and that offensive operations are also possible despite the prevalence of the defense in the past year. I will be writing a separate piece on surprise in the coming days.

Ukraine’s Objectives

As with all major operations in war, we need to consider the strategic context and strategic / political intent of such operations. The 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive had both political and strategic objectives. This latest Ukrainian offensive into Kursk will as well. What might they be? The section below is speculative, given that Ukraine is yet to make any substantive, official comment on the offensive yet.

At the most basic tactical level, this operation will be about seizing ground and destroying Russian ground and aerial forces. That is the central role of ground forces in war.  But these are tactical tasks – it is the operational and strategic purposes of conducting operations to seize ground and destroy the enemy that is interesting.

There are a couple of possible operational objectives for this Ukrainian attack. First, Ukraine may be seeking to draw Russian forces away from its attacks on the Niu-York and its advances on Toretsk and Pokrovsk. This might be possible, but given Russia’s advantage in manpower, one would have to assess that this outcome is probably unlikely.

Another operational objective, which is more likely to be realized, is to force the Russians to reconsider their force dispositions elsewhere on the front line. The Russians will have to respond, and even they do not have a bottomless pit of resources to do so. To respond to the Ukrainian attack in Kursk, they will have to stop defending somewhere else. Ukrainian surveillance systems will be watching for these kinds of Russian moves and potentially standing by to exploit the opportunities they produce.

Finally, Ukraine may have some specific operational objectives in mind which are related to the ground itself. The Kursk nuclear power station may be one objective, but that is speculative and still lies 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the border with Ukraine, well beyond where Ukraine is currently thought to be operating. Key road and railway lines might also be interrupted. Ultimately, threatening the city of Kursk itself could be an objective for the operation, but that would be a ‘stretch goal’.

The strategic objectives of this attack can only be estimated at this early stage. First, the attack might be an attempt to slow or kill Russian momentum in its offensives which have lasted for the duration of 2024. Ukrainian planners will understand that even Russia can’t remain on the offensive forever. They may be seeking to use this cross-border attack to force the Russians to reassess their troop dispositions across Ukraine. This could have the effect of slowing down or stopping Russian offensive operations.

A second strategic objective might be to shift the narrative on the war to one more positive for Ukraine and counter Russian misinformation about their ‘inevitable victory’ in Ukraine. The 2022 offensive in Kharkiv not only stunned the world but shifted the narrative on Ukraine’s ability to prosecute the war and resulted in a significant change in the west’s approach to providing aid. Ukraine might be hoping for something similar here, although as I have written frequently, NATO also needs to change its strategy to one that embraces Ukraine defeating Russia in Ukraine.

A third strategic objective may be to boost morale in the Ukrainian population. Given the past 8 months of defensive operations, constant aerial attacks on infrastructure and ongoing power shortages, the will of the people will be at the forefront of the Ukrainian government’s considerations about the trajectory of the war. Conducting a successful offensive into Russia, which takes the pressure off in other areas, might be seen by the government as worth the risk of using experienced brigades in this operation rather than in defending in eastern Ukraine.

A fourth strategic objective for Ukraine might be to do what the Russians are doing in eastern Ukraine at the moment – grab as much territory as possible in case Ukraine is forced into some kind of negotiated settlement at the end of 2024 or in early 2025. Negotiating with some of your enemy’s territory is much better than negotiating without it. And while there are many issues related to any kind of ceasefire or negotiated settlement (who will enforce it, for example), Ukrainian strategists might believe that possessing Russian territory will provide them with better leverage if they are forced to the negotiating table in the short to medium term.

Russia’s Response

So far, the Russian system appears to still be suffering the ‘shock’ that has been generated from the Ukrainian cross border attack. The mass of Russian forces, and probably their operational level reserves as well as tactical aviation and operational fires, are concentrated further to the south. While Russia will almost certainly have strategic reserves, and forces in the Kursk and Kharkiv regions it can use to try and halt the Ukrainian advance, this will take some time to organize.

Putin appears to have gotten on the front foot with this Ukrainian attack quicker than other surprises during this war. During the Prigozhin uprising, Putin disappeared for a while. This time, Putin has quickly held a meeting of the National Security Council, some of which was shown on Russian TV, where he described the Ukrainian Kursk operation as “another large-scale provocation.” Because, of course, nothing Russia has done in the past 30 months in its brutal invasion of Ukraine is provocative. Putin will be messaging the U.S. administration here to have them reign in Ukraine.

The Russian assaults in eastern Ukraine, particularly on the Toretsk and Pokrovsk axes of advance do not appear to have been affected yet. The Russians appear to still be very focused on seizing more ground in this region. However, any propaganda coup from such gains has probably already been overtaken by Ukraine’s significant seizures of Russian territory in the Battle of Kursk.

We should expect an accelerating Russian response to the Ukrainian cross border attack. Russia probably has the manpower to respond, but speed will be key to the effectiveness of their response. The centralized nature of the Russian command and control system does hinder their speed and adaptability during crises such as this.

It is very likely that Ukraine will have wargamed Russian responses and will have already allocated strike elements to hit Russian units moving towards Kharkiv (if possible). This is likely to be a multi-phase Ukrainian operation, and planning for likely anticipated Russian moves over the coming days and weeks will have been central to Ukraine’s overall planning for this operation.

Russia’s reaction to the invasion, including troop moves, aerial strikes against Ukraine as well as diplomatic moves, will become clearer in the coming days.

A final point on Russia’s reaction. Will this be the final straw for Gerasimov?

I have written previously about his shortcomings before the war and during the war. He has constantly failed at strategy, force generation and in a range of other strategic leadership areas in this war. In the National Security Council meeting held to discuss the Kursk situation, Gerasimov informed Putin by video that in regard to the Ukrainians, their “advance in the Kursk direction was halted.” While he is loyal to Putin, and this counts for a lot, will Putin finally decide to dump him in the wake of this disaster in Kursk?

Challenges Moving Forward

Ukraine faces a daunting array of issues as it moves forward with this operation (if it continues it beyond a couple of days). These include tactical, operational, strategic and political challenges.

Tactical challenges. A first order tactical challenge will be sustaining momentum. Ukraine will want to keep moving forward until it has achieved its objectives. At the same time, it will want to keep the Russians off balance, and ensure that the Russian army is always a couple of steps behind in responding the Ukrainian actions.

At the same time, Ukraine will want to ensure it can keep the breach open for the advance and for any withdrawal. These kinds of penetrations into enemy territory create opportunities, but they also create vulnerabilities. I have written previously about the challenge of creating salients in enemy territory here. One key vulnerability is the flanks of the advancing Ukrainians. As I wrote in this piece, an important tactical task will be the allocation of security forces to hold open the corridor into Russia that Ukraine has now created. The further Ukraine penetrates, the larger the quantity of forces will be needed for this mission.

Salients create opportunities and problems

Keeping the Ukrainians supplied with fuel, food, munitions and everything an advancing army needs will be challenging. Deep in enemy territory, not only must reliable routes be available, but the logistics convoys need to be protected from ground and air attacks.

Operational Challenges

As Ukraine seizes the initiative in this cross-border assault, they may be considering follow-on operations. These could be reinforcing their current axes of advance to expand the amount of territory held, or they could be operations in an entirely different area to exploit and shifts in Russian defensive troops. But this will be reliant on the amount of forces the Ukrainians have kept in reserve for this offensive, which leads me to the next major challenge.

The Ukrainians will also have to carefully balance the apportionment of air support, munitions, sustainment and other operational enablers between the perilous situation in eastern Ukraine and the new offensive in Kursk. These regions are far enough apart that they cannot be mutually supportive, which will make this a more difficult problem.

This in turn will inform another operational challenge: what is the duration of the cross-border attack, and how long can the offensive be sustained? This will be driven by practical concerns such as logistics and troop availability. But it will also be driven by political influences about how long the Ukrainian government wishes to occupy Russian territory.

Strategic Issues. Troop numbers are a strategic concern. It is no secret that Ukraine has had very significant issues in sustaining numbers in its front-line formations since the end of 2023. And while Ukraine has been able to stay on the positive side of the ratio of Ukraine to Russian casualties, it still has a much smaller pool of troops than Russia. Mobilization is yet to fully replenish Ukrainian losses of the past year. And there remains a compelling requirement for Ukrainian forces to at least slow Russian advances in eastern Ukraine.  

Balancing strategic shortfalls for troops, and the need for large numbers of troops on this operation and in eastern Ukraine will require good intelligence and deft decision making over the coming days and weeks. To compound this challenge, if Ukraine intends to stay on the territory it seizes (this is speculation on my part), this will add the major personnel challenges that Ukraine already has.

Another strategic challenge is fitting the current offensive into a larger military strategy for Ukraine. Is this offensive an integral part of the new strategy that President Zelensky tasked General Syrsky to develop when he was appointed? Or is this an opportunity that has arisen and was too tempting to pass up? Time will tell.

Ukraine, while not having made any official statements about the Kursk offensive yet, will be watching its strategic narrative and how this new operation plays out in Europe and the United States. Ukraine will obviously be looking for a bump in positive perceptions about the trajectory of the war, while avoiding any negative connotations associated with ‘invading its neighbor’ which are sure to be raised by some.

Political Challenges. Related to the strategic narrative discussed above will be avoiding perceptions that Ukraine is significantly escalating the war and increasing the change of Russia using nuclear weapons. I expect to hear this narrative in the coming days. It has been a constant refrain in this war, whenever some new piece of equipment, like artillery, tanks and F-16s, is donated to Ukraine. None of these have crossed any real red lines with Russia, although Russia has many western leaders bluffed into thinking so.

This will potentially be a significant political and strategic challenge for the Ukrainian government in the coming days, even though this operation is very minor compared to the major destruction and death caused by Russia in Ukraine over the past 30 months.

Perhaps one of the more difficult political issues will be how Ukraine deals with the US government. Ukraine can’t use some of its American long-range strike systems to support its operations, which is less than desirable. This operation might force the US administration to reconsider the restrictions it has placed on the use of some of its weapons in this war. That might be wishful thinking on my part, however.

The longer the operation continues, the more likely it is that candidates for the Presidency this year may be forced to make statements about their support (or otherwise) for Ukraine.

The New Battle of Kursk Continues… For Now

Time will tell whether using these Ukrainian brigades to attack into Russia rather than defending eastern Ukraine has been the most strategically effective use of their forces. At a time when Ukrainian defenders in the east are being pushed back on several axes, the use of highly capable Ukrainian combat forces in Kursk is either a brilliant countermove to shift the initiative in the war, or a strategic error which compounds the challenges in Ukraine’s eastern Ukraine defensive operations.

There is no way yet to make this assessment, however. As with all war, there is an abundance of uncertainty at the early stage of another Ukrainian offensive. Not only are we unsure about just how far deep the Ukrainians have penetrated, but we are also unsure of the strategic and political objectives of this operation.

While success or failure in this Ukrainian cross-border attack may not win or lose the war, it will have an important bearing on Ukrainian morale and western support. But ultimately, the success or otherwise of the coming offensives will be determined on the ground. Good leadership at all levels, flexible execution, determined close combat, good logistics, surprise and adapting to opportunity will all be crucial to tactical and operational success. And this must be applied with sound strategic reasons.

This all might end up being just a larger scale raid than the previous 2023 and 2024 incursions into Russia. We will know in time.

There is much to be revealed about the nature and objectives of this operation in the coming days.

This analysis was originally posted on Mick Ryan’s Substack and is reprinted here with the author's permission.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

O que queremos dizer com liberalismo? - Jonathan Rauch, Augusto de Franco (Persuasion)

O que queremos dizer com liberalismo?

Jonathan Rauch, em "Por que você deve se sentir bem com o liberalismo", Persuasion (06/08/2024).

[Um trecho e um comentário]

"Não progressismo ou esquerdismo moderado, como o termo passou a significar no discurso dos EUA do pós-guerra. Em vez disso, liberalismo na tradição de Locke, Kant e os Fundadores. Não é uma ideia, mas uma família de ideias com muitas variantes. Sua filosofia central é que todas as pessoas nascem livres e iguais. Seus princípios operacionais incluem o império da lei, pluralismo, tolerância, direitos das minorias, autoridade distribuída, governo limitado e (sujeito aos outros requisitos) tomada de decisão democrática. Seu método distinto de organização social é confiar em regras impessoais e processos abertos e descentralizados para tomar decisões coletivas.

Incorporando essas noções estão três sistemas sociais interligados: democracia liberal para fazer escolhas políticas; capitalismo de mercado para fazer escolhas econômicas; e ciência e outras formas de troca crítica aberta para fazer escolhas epistêmicas (isto é, decisões sobre verdade e conhecimento). Ao transcender a tribo, renunciar ao autoritarismo, substituir governantes por regras e tratar pessoas como intercambiáveis, o liberalismo alcança o que nenhum outro sistema social pode oferecer, pelo menos em larga escala: coordenação sem controle . Em um sistema liberal, todos podem participar, mas ninguém está no comando.

No contexto da história humana, tudo sobre o liberalismo é radical: sua rejeição da autoridade pessoal e tribal, sua insistência em tratar as pessoas como intercambiáveis, sua demanda de que a dissidência seja tolerada e as minorias protegidas, sua aceitação da mudança e da incerteza. Todas as suas premissas vão contra os instintos humanos arraigados. O liberalismo é a ideia social mais estranha e contraintuitiva já concebida, uma desvantagem compensada apenas pelo fato de que também é a ideia social mais bem-sucedida já concebida.

Claro, é imperfeito. Não resolve todos os problemas antigos e novos problemas sempre surgem. Mas todos os grandes problemas sociais, da pobreza e desigualdade à degradação ambiental, guerra e doença, são demonstravelmente melhor tratados por sociedades liberais do que por sociedades não liberais. Não é exagero dizer que essa tecnologia social estranhamente bem-sucedida permitiu que o Homo sapiens formasse redes globais de cooperação de soma positiva que elevaram ordens de magnitude de conquistas humanas acima de nossa capacidade projetada. O liberalismo literalmente transformou nossa espécie".

Meu comentário para ulterior desenvolvimento

Vinte anos antes de Locke (1690), Spinoza (1670) recuperou a raiz do liberalismo antigo, dos primeiros democratas atenienses, ao dizer que o sentido da política não é a ordem e sim a liberdade.

Não é uma filosofia, um sistema explicativo, descritivo ou prescritivo, e sim uma apreensão do mundo que inspira um comportamento político de aceitação do outro-imprevisível sem a obrigação de que ele concorde com uma ordem pré-concebida por nós. Quando se configuram ambientes favoráveis à manifestação desse comportamento político ocorre a auto-organização, ou "coordenação sem controle" (como assinalou Rauch). Os ambientes sociais que permitem isso são redes mais distribuídas do que centralizadas. O liberalismo político surge na experimentação da democracia como modo-de-vida e é indistinguível dela.

O namoro de Lula com o autoritarismo - Lourival Sant’Anna (O Estado de S. Paulo)

 O namoro de Lula com o autoritarismo

Lourival Sant’Anna, O Estado de S. Paulo (11/08/2024)

Lula fecha os olhos para a opressão e continua apegado aos populistas de esquerda

A crise entre Brasil e Nicarágua revelou o tamanho da resistência do presidente Lula em se distanciar dos regimes ditatoriais de esquerda que ele apoia há duas décadas. Só um pedido irrecusável, do papa Francisco, pôde mover a balança do governo em favor da democracia, em detrimento das afinidades ideológicas. Ainda assim, com muita hesitação.

O embaixador do Brasil em Manágua, Breno Costa, não compareceu à comemoração, no dia 19 de julho, do 45.º aniversário da Revolução Sandinista, liderada pelo ditador Daniel Ortega. Foi avisado de que seria expulso. Em vez de vir logo embora, como faria o funcionário de uma diplomacia “ativa e altiva”, esperou duas semanas, até a expulsão ser consumada.

Só então, a contragosto, Lula se viu forçado a expulsar a embaixadora nicaraguense, Fulvia Castro, que logicamente já havia voltado para Manágua. Para deixar claro que o Brasil não se opõe ao regime, o ministro da Casa Civil, Rui Costa, explicou que a expulsão seguiu o princípio da reciprocidade.

Ou seja: ditadores, não se preocupem com o Brasil. O governo se acostumou a ser humilhado por países pequenos, que não reconhecem sua liderança. Uruguai e Chile, por exemplo, governados respectivamente por presidentes de direita e de esquerda, denunciaram a fraude na eleição venezuelana, enquanto Lula busca uma saída honrosa para Nicolás Maduro.

A ausência do embaixador brasileiro decorreu de decisão do governo de esfriar as relações com o regime sandinista. Isso, depois que o papa Francisco pediu a Lula, em junho do ano passado, que convencesse Ortega a libertar o bispo Rolando Álvarez. Preso desde 2022, ele havia se recusado a embarcar para os EUA com outros 222 presos políticos.

DESAFIO. Confinado numa solitária sem ventilação, apelidada de “Inferninho”, na penitenciária de segurança máxima La Modelo, Álvarez foi condenado a 26 anos de prisão por “desprezo às instituições e espalhar notícias falsas”. O Vaticano fez gestões para que o bispo, junto com outros 18 religiosos, fossem desterrados para Roma, o que acabou acontecendo em janeiro.

A Igreja Católica nicaraguense está engajada na luta pelos direitos humanos. Mas a conduta do regime expôs as contradições de Lula. Católico, ele surgiu como líder sindical na luta contra a ditadura militar, na qual a Igreja teve papel fundamental.

Hoje, Lula fecha os olhos para a opressão. Ele continua apegado aos populistas de esquerda, que chegaram ao poder pela via democrática e capturaram o Estado para se perpetuarem no poder, com apoio do presidente brasileiro. Agora, ele é obrigado a escolher entre seus compromissos históricos com o populismo autoritário ou com a democracia.

A diplomacia como pilar da ordem internacional: Reflexões e desafios da nova ordem mundial e sua integração regional e global - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 4686. “A diplomacia como pilar da ordem internacional: Reflexões e desafios da nova ordem mundial e sua integração regional e global”, Brasília, 16 junho 2024, 15 p.; revisão em 19/06, 16 p. Notas para palestra online a convite do Instituto Simula Model United Nations. Divulgado em Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/122758145/4686_A_diplomacia_como_pilar_da_ordem_internacional_Reflexões_e_desafios_da_nova_ordem_mundial_e_sua_integração_regional_e_global_2024_).

A diplomacia como pilar da ordem internacional 

Reflexões e desafios da nova ordem mundial e sua integração regional e global 

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Notas para palestra online a convite do Instituto Simula Model United Nations. 

 

Sumário: 

1. A ordem internacional e suas alavancas primordiais

2. Atores relevantes da ordem internacional

3. A maneira moderna de fazer diplomacia

4. Desafios das relações internacionais na globalização e na desglobalização

5. Mudanças recentes, e preocupantes, na geopolítica e na geoeconomia mundiais

6. Apocalipse now?

 

 

1. A ordem internacional e suas alavancas primordiais

A diplomacia constitui, sem dúvida alguma, um dos pilares da ordem internacional, pelo seu papel apaziguador das tensões entre os Estados nacionais, e como um relevante componente operacional das relações internacionais, ao lado das Forças Armadas nacionais, do substrato econômico de cada país e da influência de natureza política ou propriamente diplomática dos Estados participantes da política internacional. Mas ela não é, nem pode ser, o pilar exclusivo, na medida em que constitui, essencialmente, um método, uma ferramenta, à disposição dos governos nacionais para regular suas relações recíprocas, suas interações econômicas, culturais, humanas, de preferência de modo pacífico, ou então para prevenir conflitos ou remediar situações de controvérsias graves que poderiam redundar, no limite, em enfrentamentos armados entre dois ou mais Estados soberanos.

O outro pilar da ordem internacional, este sim, decisivo, é representado pelo poder puro dos Estados, em primeiro lugar o poder ofensivo das grandes potências econômicas e militares, ao lado do poder dissuasório de coalizões eventuais de potências médias, ou mesmo grandes, em torno de blocos ou alianças político-militares formalmente constituídas. Um outro pilar, também de natureza diplomática, está representado, complementarmente, pelos organismos multilaterais existentes nos planos internacional e regionais, ressalvando-se que essas entidades, na verdade, só possuem os poderes que lhes são expressamente delegados pelos Estados membros (sendo que, muitas vezes são ignoradas pelos mais poderosos). 

(...)

Ler na íntegra neste link: 

https://www.academia.edu/122758145/4686_A_diplomacia_como_pilar_da_ordem_internacional_Reflexões_e_desafios_da_nova_ordem_mundial_e_sua_integração_regional_e_global_2024_)

Um funeral em Caracas: o apoio ao governo Lula à ditadura chavista na Venezuela - Demétrio Magnoli (FSP)

Venezuela

Um funeral em Caracas

Gesto brasileiro por reunião com opositora de Maduro formaria um anel de proteção

Demétrio Magnoli

Sociólogo, autor de “Uma Gota de Sangue: História do Pensamento Racial”. É doutor em geografia humana pela USP. 

Folha de S. Paulo, 9 de agosto de 2024

Inutilmente, Lula exibiu-se como mediador ideal na Ucrânia e no Oriente Médio, esferas fora do alcance da política externa brasileira. A prova de fogo chegou na Venezuela, desenrolando-se como espetáculo humilhante: em Caracas, junto com a esperança de transição democrática, enterra-se a credibilidade da palavra do Brasil.

Celso Amorim fala como enviado diplomático de Maduro ao mundo democrático. "A oposição coloca dúvidas, mas não consegue provar o contrário." Falso: a oposição publicou as atas de votação escondidas pelo ditador —e a autenticidade delas foi confirmada por especialistas independentes. 

Diante disso, EUA, Argentina, Uruguai, Peru, Equador e Costa Rica reconheceram o triunfo de Urrutia. Boric chegou perto da conclusão factual, declarando que "o Chile não reconhece a vitória autoproclamada de Maduro". Na direção contrária, o Brasil articulou com México e Colômbia um bloco negacionista que, simulando cautela, oferece à ditadura o intervalo indispensável para consolidar a fraude por meio da repressão generalizada.

Circula, nas chancelarias, o desenho de uma solução negociada: a formação de um governo provisório de união nacional com a missão de promover novas eleições. A ideia inspira-se no precedente da Polônia, em 1989, cuja transição começou com a derrota eleitoral do regime autoritário. No governo unitário venezuelano, o chavismo controlaria os ministérios da segurança, enquanto a oposição teria as pastas econômicas. Uma anistia ampla e a criação de instituições eleitorais imparciais preparariam o terreno para eleições gerais livres.

A solução não é justa, pois o povo já votou, mas é realista. Sem a força das armas, a oposição teria que aceitá-la. Mas a chance de impor à ditadura uma saída negociada depende da intensidade das pressões diplomáticas —e, em especial, da rejeição regional à autoproclamada vitória de Maduro.

Regimes ditatoriais começam a desabar quando sofrem fraturas internas. A aposta na pressão diplomática, combinada com garantias de impunidade à máfia chavista, oferece oportunidade a potenciais dissidentes. É precisamente para sabotá-la que o governo brasileiro costurou o bloco tripartite da protelação. Maduro precisa mais do amparo sinuoso do Brasil que do apoio efusivo de Cuba ou da Nicarágua.

O fracasso diplomático estende-se às obrigações mínimas. O Brasil foi um dos fiadores do Acordo de Barbados. Calou-se, repetidamente, frente às violações sistemáticas do compromisso de eleições democráticas. Hoje, avança um pouco mais na via da desonra, virando as costas à selvagem repressão desencadeada contra os oposicionistas vitoriosos no voto popular.

Amorim justificou a resistência brasileira a condenar a fraude alertando para a iminência de um "conflito muito grave", quase uma "guerra civil", que seria caso único de guerra entre uma ditadura armada e uma oposição desarmada. Antes, em entrevista a um jornalista beija-mão, enquanto o regime encarcerava opositores em massa, o mesmo Amorim exprimiu sua "preocupação" com "a hipótese de perseguição aos chavistas caso a oposição chegue ao poder". Entre uma entrevista e outra, esclareceu que o Brasil dialoga com todos os lados —exceto, apenas, com María Corina Machado.

A ditadura acusa a oposição do crime de lesa-pátria de divulgação das atas eleitorais autênticas, que pela lei venezuelana são documentos públicos, qualificando-as como "forjadas". Nada pode impedir a prisão de Corina Machado, mas o gesto brasileiro de enviar um representante de alto nível para reunir-se com ela, sob a luz das câmeras, formaria um anel de proteção. O Brasil, porém, prefere deixá-la exposta.
Na avenida central de Caracas, evolui o cortejo fúnebre das expectativas de transição democrática. Maduro segura uma das alças do caixão. Brasil, México e Colômbia sustentam as outras três.