Impossível fazer uma análise coerente, adequada, significativa, de duas coisas inexistentes: um Global South, que é um conceito fantasioso, não uma realidade, e UMA economia desse Sul Global, coisa absolutamente sem sentido. Uma terceira coisa totalmente sem sentido é pretender falar de um "processo de desenvolvimento" – o que é isso, para uma multitude de 150 países? – em "ruptura", ou interrompido NO SÉCULO XXI, que está apenas começando.
Loucuras acadêmicas acontecem. Essa pode ser uma delas.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
H-Diplo: New posted content
Musthaq on Gordon, 'Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century' [Review]
Gordon, Ruth Elizabeth. Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 254 pp. $105.00 (cloth), ISBN 9781108424172.$27.99 (paper), ISBN 9781108439527.
Reviewed by Fathimath Musthaq (Reed College)
Published on H-Diplo (May, 2024)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)
Printable Version: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=59722
September 11, 2023, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the CIA-assisted overthrow of Chile’s democratically elected socialist president, Salvador Allende. In his short time as president, Allende worked tirelessly to secure technology sovereignty for Chile, something that countries of the Global South continue to struggle with to this day. Allende was an ardent advocate of the 1969 Andean Pact, signed between Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, to create a free trade bloc to collectively pursue industrialization. Central to the pact was finding ways to access technology more affordably, by curbing the influence of multinational corporations and fostering the domestic market. Inspired by the Santiago School of Technology’s thesis that countries needed technology sovereignty for realizing growth, Allende nationalized the State Development Corporation (Corfo) that housed the powerful Institute for Technological Research, tasked with assisting private firms and government ministries in acquiring technological capacity.[1] During this time, Allende launched the National Electronics Company whose goal was to build a semiconductor plant. While these plans unfortunately never came to fruition, the necessity of technology sovereignty to development became well established in the development discourse coming out of Latin America during this time.
Ruth Elizabeth Gordon’s Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century echoes the centrality of technology to development but approaches the issue from a less state-oriented and more market-based perspective. Gordon begins with the claim that “development is ripe for disruption,” thanks to rapidly advancing technology. The book seeks to uncover these disruptions, which Gordon argues is “a very good news story, not perfect by any means, but progress nonetheless” (p. 1). People in the Global South are configuring new ways to have basic needs met, thanks to technology: digital wallets provide payments systems for unbanked masses, while online platforms provide the latest market prices for rural farmers, allowing them to obtain better prices, and digital platforms allow teachers and students to acquire knowledge and training from afar. As a self-avowed “techno optimist,” Gordon celebrates the proliferation of technology-aided solutions to long-standing development challenges (p. ix).
Gordon begins the book by providing an account of the history of development, starting in the 1940s with US president Harry Truman’s IV Point Program. In chapter 1, she introduces the reader to various international actors and ideologies that have shaped development over the decades, which she dubs as cycles of “conventional wisdom” (p. 8). In chapter 2, she juxtaposes development models espoused by international financial institutions (IFIs), primarily the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to the East Asian developmental (EAD) state, with the conclusion that the latter was more successful in facilitating development, thanks to active industrial and financial policy and competent bureaucracies, among other things. The account in this first part of the book does not touch on the contentious issue of technology transfer, surprising given that from the perspective of the Global South, technology transfer was a longstanding issue in the period covered here, for example, in the Andean Pact mentioned above and in the 1974 New International Economic Order that explicitly called on rich Global North countries to share technology with the Global South.[2] Similarly, in the discussion of EAD states, the centrality of technology-management to the success of the development state, through the acquisition of foreign licenses and investment in research and development, is overlooked.[3] Locating the failures and shortcomings of existing development models to resolve the sticky issue of technology transfer would have nicely motivated the rest of the chapters.
Part 2 of the book is where Gordon begins to engage with the concept of “disruption.” Interestingly, however, the disruption she alludes to here is not technological but more cultural and ideological. In chapter 3, she introduces the actors that are disrupting development: middle-income Global South countries, of which China is treated as a special case, and philanthropic organizations and donors primarily based in the West. Along with a vast and burgeoning literature, Gordon details how Chinese lending differs from IFI lending, the subject of chapter 4. Whereas IFIs turned to “soft infrastructure such as free market reforms, good governance, human rights, and other matters” in the 1990s, Chinese lending has primarily focused on large infrastructure projects and resource extraction, rendering them appealing partners to many African countries seeking such investment (p. 91). China, along with other Global South lenders, Gordon argues, embraces a lending model built on horizontal ties and partnerships, which is, in turn, informed by “mutual benefit, non-interference, and respect for the sovereignty of their partners/recipients” (p. 83).
Chapter 5 introduces the second disrupter: private Western donors that operate considerably differently from traditional donors. Identifying this new trend as “philanthrocapitalism,” Gordon contends that while there are many criticisms to be made of philanthrocapitalism (for example, lack of accountability, absence of transparency), she is more interested in articulating its “positive impacts” since the traditional development model is in severe need of disruption (pp. 110, 111). For Gordon, what is exciting about the turn to philanthrocapitalism is how it has energized a range of financial flows to yield various blended finance instruments, such as public private partnerships that hold the promise of meeting basic needs in the Global South. She agrees with proponents of such models who assume a double coincidence between “business principles” and “social transformation” (p. 110). The optimism Gordon espouses, however, seems unwarranted in light of the growing literature in political economy that identifies “de-risking” as a poor development strategy, given that it prioritizes profit incentives over social purpose in the execution of development projects. Gordon highlights some of these concerns in the chapter but appears to subordinate these to the benefits provided by an increase in financial flows (in her words, “more resources”) to the Global South (p. 122). This argument would have benefited from a demonstration of more specific instances where philanthropists take on risky projects avoided by governments. In practice, what we tend to see more often, under a “de-risking” logic, is states taking on various risks associated with development projects in order to entice investors, which carries with it fiscal implications and equity concerns.[4]
Gordon’s optimism extends not only to new initiatives inaugurated under the banner of philanthrocapitalism but also to the capitalists themselves. One of the running assumptions in this chapter is that tech billionaires can innovate (or “disrupt”) philanthropy just as well as they innovate for the market. The book includes a very short case study of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which, Gordon claims, has “literally disrupted the [global health] space” (p. 122). She notes generous funding, new technologies, and new methods of service delivery as underpinning this disruption. However, the application of the idea is cursory, and the role of technology in the disruption process is not examined.
Part 3 is the heart of the book, which is why it is unfortunate that it comes so late. Here is the first time Gordon provides a definition of “disruption,” and only in a footnote (p. 149n1). For a concept that appears in the title and in the introduction as a central idea, it would have been helpful to the reader if there was a more complete discussion of this concept much sooner. Some of the key markers of “disruption” are that products or services are offered to “non-consumers” (for example, the unbanked) even if the product is a lesser version of the more established version, but because it is also more adaptable and simpler, it triggers a migration from incumbents to the disruptive innovator. Before describing her case studies, in chapter 6, Gordon provides a sweeping account of how technology shapes development through its exponential rate of progress, digitization, and leapfrogging in a so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution. In chapter 7, she summons evidence for technology-led disruptions in finance, education, agriculture, and health care. Throughout, she centers the power of the mobile phone as a platform for information sharing and enabling basic service delivery.
The book first outlines the case of M-Pesa, which was introduced in Kenya in 2007 to provide banking services to a largely unbanked population. Its rapid success was evident in the fact that within 2.5 years of its inauguration, the platform enrolled 8.5 million users and registered 3.7 billion US dollars in transactions (p. 158). She also identifies mobile learning through Text2Teaching (first inaugurated in the Philippines), MoMaths (in South Africa), and Dr. Maths projects (in South Africa) as effective teaching and learning models. The assessment of these platforms, however, seems prematurely optimistic. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous studies have documented an association between remote learning and decline in student learning and academic behavior.[5] While remote learning may be the only option for some in the Global South, it is important to note the downsides of remote learning so that a vision of collective learning can be defended, nurtured, and foregrounded, and not sidelined because mobile learning is more cost effective and easier to implement.
Chapter 8 is different from the rest of the book. It is a stand-alone chapter on climate change, it is mostly descriptive, and it covers some elementary facts about climate change and international coordination over climate action. A few pages at the end of the chapter touch on the ideas of “environmental leapfrogging” and “energy leapfrogging,” noting the importance of China and India moving from a simple model of technology transfer to strengthening domestic innovative capacities to make technologies more context suitable (pp. 209, 210).
One of the defining aspects of the book is how it (re)conceives development. Gordon espouses a development that is centered on the delivery of basic needs, an approach that in many ways resonates with Amartya Sen’s “capabilities approach” (in Development as Freedom [rep. ed. 2000]) that places emphasis on human well-being. The subject of Gordon’s book, however, is more about how we get there, which involves technology developed in local contexts. In the final chapter of the book, Gordon acknowledges a major issue with pursuing technology-led development: jobless growth. For countries in the Global South, premature deindustrialization, thanks to technology, “removes a rung in the development ladder” (p. 229). But she remains optimistic, positing the possibility that Global South countries could potentially “leapfrog” over industrialization. Local innovators that respond to local problems, she portends, may be one way to do this. She writes, “Rather than depending on the robust R&D that produces the state of the art technology that is found in Global North environs, emerging countries must ... focus on solving practical problems” where the solutions may be “quite basic” (p. 233). In fact, in her own words, “one of the most exciting things about the technological revolution” in the Global South is “that it is bottom-up rather than top-down, thus returning power to local entities, individuals, and entrepreneurs” (p. 235).
While offering a unique view of development, Gordon’s conception of development through technology carries with it problematic assumptions. First is the assumption that a profit-oriented private sector can be a long-term solution to development woes. Meeting basic needs is certainly part of the development agenda, but for many in the Global South, development means more than that. According to 1950s Latin American structuralists, it is about creating the conditions for the delivery of basic and complex needs on a long-term sustainable basis. In other words, development has to be about building the capacities of countries to carve out autonomous development paths by reducing dependence on external sources. As a result, the state often plays an important role, even if that role changes over time. Gordon’s account in the second half of the book is largely silent on the role of the state, which is surprising since she champions EAD states in the first part of the book. Private tech-led solutions also introduce precariousness to basic service delivery. For example, with privately delivered services such as M-Pesa, there is no guarantee that terms of service will evolve over time to deliver a better, more accessible product. One thing we have observed with platforms like Uber is that once they acquire a considerable market share, prices go up.[6] Reliance on the private sector for basic service delivery makes uncertain the continuity of the service and its accessibility.
Second, the assumption that locally produced technologies can address development issues at the needed scale seems premature. Throughout the book, there is little acknowledgment of the contentious geopolitics around technology production and access. In the 1950s, Latin American structuralists identified lack of technological capacity as a major impediment to autonomous industrialization.[7] Technological capacity itself is determined, as Evgeny Morozov argues, by the history of geoeconomic and geopolitical struggles, that is, how much power and sovereignty a country possesses in the global economy.[8] Without technology sovereignty, southern economies face falling terms of trade and endure unequal exchange. The dependency school posited that the South’s technological dependence reinforced the development of the center at the expense of the periphery. The case of Indonesia, recently highlighted in the scholarship as a success story, is instructive. After China and India, Indonesia has the largest share of labor in global value chains (GVCs) and has significantly increased the share of value added manufacturing driven by foreign direct investment (FDI).[9] Yet Indonesia’s industrialization is hemmed in by hierarchical structures of foreign corporate control, the result being that industrialization in Indonesia reflects the interests of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) more than the needs of the Indonesian economy.[10] The recent trade war between the United States and China over semiconductor chips (with the US government banning the sale of chips made in the United States or involving US technology to Chinese company Huawei) demonstrates the importance of geopolitics to the acquisition of technology. A third issue is how our privacy may be compromised by migrating basic service delivery to privately owned online platforms that mine data for sale. While loss of privacy may be increasingly treated like a forgone conclusion in a world so interconnected, it remains a central issue to our capacity to live free lives, as Shoshana Zuboff argues in her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019).
Gordon’s book is heavy on details and sparse on analysis. A stronger analytical framework that centers technology could have helped avoid some of the book’s oversights, such as the contentious issue of technology transfer and the geopolitics of technology production. Notwithstanding these lacunas, the book is a serious invitation to consider the power and possibilities of technology for the Global South.
Notes
[1]. Evgeny Morozov, “The Lessons of Chile’s Struggle against Big Tech,” New Statesman (blog), September 9, 2023, https://www.newstatesman.com/the-weekend-essay/2023/09/salvador-allende-fight-big-tech.
[2]. UN General Assembly, Resolution 3201, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1974, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2775/download.
[3]. Alice H. Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
[4]. Daniela Gabor and Ndongo Samba Sylla, “Derisking Developmentalism: A Tale of Green Hydrogen,” Development and Change 54, no. 5 (2023): 1169-96, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12779.
[5]. Jill V. Klosky, Julie A. Gazmararian, Olivia Casimir, and Sarah C. Blake, “Effects of Remote Education during the COVID-19 Pandemic on Young Children’s Learning and Academic Behavior in Georgia: Perceptions of Parents and School Administrators,” Journal of School Health 92, no. 7 (2022): 656–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/josh.13185.
[6]. Len Sherman, “Uber’s New Math: Increase Prices and Squeeze Driver Pay,” Forbes, January 16, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2023/01/16/ubers-new-math-increase-prices-and-squeeze-driver-pay/.
[7]. Raúl Prebisch, “The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems,” Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones), Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), April 27, 1950, https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ecrcol093/29973.htm.
[8]. Morozov, “Lessons of Chile’s Struggle.”
[9]. Intan Suwandi, “Value Chains: The New Economic Imperialism,” Monthly Review (blog), September 3, 2019, https://monthlyreview.org/product/value-chains/.
[10]. Ingrid Harvold Kvangraven, “Beyond the Stereotype: Restating the Relevance of the Dependency Research Programme,” Development and Change 52, no. 1 (2021): 76–112, https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12593.
Fathimath Musthaq is assistant professor of political science at Reed College, Portland. Her primary interests are in central banking and financialization in the Global South, development and dependency, and international monetary reform.
Citation: Fathimath Musthaq. Review of Gordon, Ruth Elizabeth. Development Disrupted: The Global South in the Twenty-First Century. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. May, 2024.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=59722
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
