Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
Just
over a century ago, in August 1914, the major European nations plunged
their peoples into one of the most disastrous conflicts in history. The
First World War claimed at least seventeen million lives, destroyed the
social and economic fabric of Western Europe, and played a vital role in
the expansion of state power around the world. It is therefore
difficult to exaggerate its importance.
The causes of the war are
too many and too complex to discuss in a short article (however, for
those interested, the late Ralph Raico provides a fascinating overview here).
I will discuss only one general problem that helped fuel the
catastrophe: the ideological shift that occurred in Europe in the late
19th and early 20th centuries away from the
liberal philosophy of laissez-faire and laissez-passer and toward
autarky, protectionism, nationalism, and imperialism. Mises, himself a
veteran of the First World War, identified these latter ideologies as
joint causes of numerous conflicts. Furthermore, he repeatedly warned
that war is a necessary outcome of abandoning economic freedom, which is
inextricably tied to the spirit of liberalism and its philosophy of
peace:
Aggressive
nationalism is the necessary derivative of the policies of
interventionism and national planning. While laissez faire eliminates
the causes of international conflict, government interference with
business and socialism create conflicts for which no peaceful solution
can be found. While under free trade and freedom of migration no
individual is concerned about the territorial size of his country, under
the protective measures of economic nationalism nearly every citizen
has a substantial interest in these territorial issues. (Mises, 1998 [1949], pp. 819-820)
Economic
nationalism, the necessary complement of domestic interventionism,
hurts the interests of foreign peoples and thus creates international
conflict. It suggests the idea of amending this unsatisfactory state of
affairs by war. Why should a powerful nation tolerate the challenge of a
less powerful nation? Is it not insolence on the part of small
Lapputania to injure the citizens of big Ruritania by customs, migration
barriers, foreign exchange control, quantitative trade restrictions,
and expropriation of Ruritanian investments in Lapputania? Would it not
be easy for the army of Ruritania to crush Lapputania’s contemptible
forces? (Mises, 1998 [1949], p. 827)
By
and large, these are the kinds of international conflicts that
developed in the decades prior to 1914. As relative free trade declined
and imperialism flourished, a culture of militarism swept Western
Europe, triggering a race to accumulate military assets and materiel on a
previously unknown scale. By the outbreak of the conflict, every major
belligerent except Britain had also adopted conscription so as to
ensure an abundant supply of human as well as physical resources. Such
policies could only end in disaster.
It is important, however,
that even though many soldiers were compelled to fight, extraordinary
numbers also volunteered for service, especially in the early days of
the war. This fact is not so astonishing once we acknowledge the role of
ideology. Throughout the 19th century, the nation-state had
come to play an increasingly important role in forming the identities of
many young European men. This development added a personal ideological
dimension to warfare that was largely new, and which also created
divisions along political lines among peoples who could otherwise have
been at peace. It also helps explain the patriotism and nationalism that
lead so many volunteers so unwittingly to the slaughter. Crucially,
these sentiments were nurtured and reinforced by many important
institutions of European society, especially its intellectual classes,
who bear a large portion of the blame for rationalizing and glorifying
war.
To take only one example, in his book A History of Warfare, John Keegan recounts a call to arms issued jointly by the rectors of the Bavarian universities on August 3rd, 1914:
Students!
The muses are silent. The issue is battle, the battle forced upon us
for German culture, which is threatened by the barbarians from the East,
and for German values, which the enemy in the West envies us. And so
the furor teutonicus bursts into flame once again. The enthusiasm of the wars of liberation flares, and the holy war begins. (quoted in Keegan, 2004 [1993], p. 358; emphasis in original)
This
passage hints at the ideological climate in much of Europe after its
retreat from an all-too-brief trend toward liberalism. Yet even
including the melodramatic rhetoric, the ideas invoked above are
indistinguishable from ones made today by both military and culture
warriors. The use of religious language to frame a political conflict,
the idea that war has been forced upon the blameless, and the claim that
barbarians from foreign nations represent an existential threat to
civilization that can only be overcome by abandoning reason and
resorting to violence based on appeals to tribalism and a (different)
barbarian heritage, are still familiar in an age when the European
empires have been replaced by an American one. They also run strongly
counter to the principles of liberalism.
Historically, the
immediate result of the rectors’ appeal was the mass enlistment of
German students; so many volunteered that they formed two new army
corps. These men were flung almost untrained into battle against British
regulars at Ypres in October, 1914, where 36,000 were massacred in only
three weeks (Keegan, 2004 [1993], pp. 358-359).[1]
This senseless death did not, however, serve as a rebuke to the
military class, much less provide an impetus away from international and
domestic conflicts; instead, it was simply mythologized and used for
propaganda by the Nazis in the Second World War.
The lesson then
is that the human costs of war do not in and of themselves teach
anything to those who are not willing to listen. War will not cease
until the ideas that support it are removed, and until they are, their
costs will simply be used as justifications for further conflict. In
Mises’s words, “To defeat the aggressors is not enough to make peace
durable. The main thing is to discard the ideology that generates war” (Mises, 1998 [1949], p. 828).
[1]
I have been unable to verify this estimate, and other sources suggest
the number killed was significantly lower. In any case though,
casualties were horrific.
Vladimir Putin may spend the next three
months working through his geopolitical wish list, trying to set in place a
number of faits accomplis that will be hard for the next U.S. President to
overturn.PHOTOGRAPH BY ALEXEI NIKOLSKY TASS VIA GETTY
A viewer of Russian
television this week could be forgiven for thinking that the end of the world
was imminent, and that it would arrive in the form of grand superpower war with
the United States, culminating in a suicidal exchange of nuclear weapons. On
one day alone, three separate test firings of intercontinental ballistic
missiles were broadcast on state media: two by submarine, one from a launch pad
in the Far East. Last weekend, NTV, a channel under effective state control,
aired a segment on emergency preparedness that included a tour of a Cold
War-era bomb shelter, fortified in case of atomic war, and a mention of the
municipal loudspeakers that will sound upon the arrival of “Hour X.” On
Sunday, Dmitry Kiselev, the most bombastic and colorful of Kremlin
propagandists, warned on
his weekly newsmagazine show that “impudent behavior” toward Russia may have
“nuclear” consequences.
Grievances against the West and
predictions of militaristic doom are not new in Russia—they have run through
all sixteen years of Vladimir Putin’s rule. But they took on a heightened
intensity in early 2014, after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and the U.S.
sanctions that followed. Suddenly the question of war was in the air in Moscow.
If nothing else, the spectre of a conflict with Washington served as
retroactive justification for the Kremlin’s policies, and a ready-made excuse
for why the Russian economy had sunk into recession. At home, Russia’s
ostracization was spun as a sign of its righteousness.
The war in Syria,
however, was supposed to offer Russia a chance to rehabilitate its image and
re-start relations with the United States. Last year, Putin travelled to New
York, where he addressed the United Nations and called for “a genuinely broad
international coalition” to fight the Islamic State. According to a deeply
informed new book on Putin and his court, “All the Kremlin’s Men,” by the
Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar, the idea, as Putin and his speechwriters had
imagined it, was to “brand isis as the new Third Reich.” Putin envisioned a grand coalition, Zygar
writes—just like in the good old days of the Second World War—that would bring
Russia out of its isolation; what’s more, Putin seemed to hope that, by
“defeating Islamic terrorism, the Russians and Americans would finally succeed
in creating a new world order.” It would be Yalta, 1945, all over again—Putin’s
dream scenario of how global diplomacy is meant to work.
For a while, things
appeared to be going largely Putin’s way. At last year’s U.N. general assembly,
Putin also had a one-on-one meeting with Obama for the first time in two years.
In the months that followed, Moscow became a hub of diplomatic activity, with
everyone from Benjamin Netanyahu to the Emir of Qatar flocking to town for
audiences with the Russian leader. Meanwhile, a Russian air campaign in Syria
was helping Bashar al-Assad regain territory and push back rebel forces.
“Russia’s battlefield successes in Syria have given Moscow . . . new leverage
in decisions about the future of the Middle East,” the Timesreported as
recently as this August. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov were meeting every few weeks, and regularly
exchanging gifts and jokes. (In March, when Lavrov turned sixty-six, Kerry told
him, “You look terrific for thirty-nine.”) In September, their talks culminated
in a deal—viewed with great skepticism by
the Pentagon—that laid out terms for a ceasefire in Syria, and which foresaw
joint U.S.-Russian air strikes against extremist groups. Kerry hailed the
agreement as “a turning point, a moment of change.”
All that has
collapsed in the past month. The ceasefire agreement fell apart after U.S.
forces killed dozens of Syrian troops in a bombing raid—a mistaken strike, U.S.
officials said—and a U.N. humanitarian-aid convoy was hit in an air attack
outside Aleppo, leaving twenty people dead. That strike was widely blamed on
Syrian attack helicopters working under the cover of Russian airpower. In the
aftermath of the convoy strike, Kerry declared his interest in seeing Russia
and the Syrian government investigated for war crimes for its alleged bombing
of civilian areas in Aleppo. The notion that Washington and Moscow could work
together to resolve Syria’s horrific war now appears to have been scrapped. At
a press conference on September 28th, John Kirby, a State Department
spokesperson, warned that
Russia’s continued military campaign in Syria could lead to terror attacks in
Russian cities and “troops in body bags.” Writing in the Financial Times, Dmitri Trenin, the head of Carnegie
Moscow Center, a policy think tank, imagined that Syria “could easily turn into
a battlefield” between Moscow and Washington, “with the proxies first taking
aim at the principals, and the principals then shooting back not at the
proxies, but at each other.”
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The collapse of the Kerry-Lavrov deal appears to have convinced Putin
once and for all of the pointlessness of dealing with the United States, and
prompted him to indulge the more maximalist of his anti-American urges. Last
Monday, he cancelled a U.S.-Russian agreement on the disposal of weapons-grade
plutonium. The program had been functionally dormant for some time, but Putin
got rid of it with a flourish, producing a fantasy list of demands—which
included the U.S. reducing its military presence in nato member states, lifting the
sanctions imposed over Ukraine, and paying compensation for lost revenue it
caused—that would need to be met before the program could be renewed. The absurdity
and impossibility was the very point, an unsubtle message to Obama: don’t even
bother trying to mend this relationship—it’s hopeless. There was a message
embedded here for Obama’s successor, too: this is the hole you’ll have to dig
out of if you want anything constructive from me.
Then, last weekend,
Russia delivered nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles to Kaliningrad, a Russian
enclave on the Baltic Sea. It was a purposefully provocative move. The missiles
are potentially capable of reaching Berlin, and, more important, they make the
defense of nato member states in the Baltics more difficult for military planners.
According to the Russian defense ministry, the country’s military timed the
delivery of the missiles to insure that it would be seen by U.S. spy
satellites. Even so, these moves might have garnered relatively little
attention if not for the fact that the Russian state also appeared to be
preparing its citizens for doomsday. On Monday, it was reported that the
governor of St. Petersburg signed an order that guaranteed residents of the
city three hundred grams of bread per day in the case of war. Then a
Russian news site published a report saying that state officials had been
advised to bring their relatives—in particular, children studying abroad or
parents living elsewhere—back to Russia. It was around then that a friend
sent me a link to a Facebook thread in which some friends in Moscow were
discussing how to respond to air-raid sirens and where the closet bomb shelters
were in their neighborhoods.
Why has Moscow gone,
for lack of a better term, war-crazy? Much has been written about Putin’s
paranoia and conspiratorial view of the world. But there also is a certain
logic in “the demonstration of your ability to carry yourself more or less like
a madman,” as Alexander Golts, a columnist on the military for The New Times, a liberal magazine in Moscow, told me
this week. “Russia entered into this new Cold War without the resources the
Soviet Union once did,” Golts said. “But what does Russia have? It has nuclear
weapons. So it must constantly convince the United States, and the West as a
whole, that it is a little crazy.” In other words, a measured dose of faux
insanity is being used to make up for a gaping disparity in conventional
military and economic strength. (“We have no chance,” one Russian defense
expert told a radio interviewer last week, when asked about the prospects
of an actual clash between Russian and U.S. forces in Syria. “Our detachment
would be destroyed in two days in a single air offensive.”) It is a way
for a “regional power,” in Obama’s purposefully insulting formulation from
2014, to act like a global one. And it may work, at least in part.
Projecting a half-lunatic readiness to
blow up the world is, in essence, a cover operation: a way to make a lot of
noise while the Kremlin goes about creating a lot of new facts on the ground,
whether in Syria or the Baltics. Putin likely believes—perhaps correctly—that,
for reasons of both character and political reality, Obama is unlikely to risk
a potentially dangerous escalation with Russia during his final months of
office. For Obama, Putin was always a nuisance and a mystery, better avoided
and marginalized than confronted head-on—a logic that might hold doubly true in
the lame-duck period. That gives Putin three months to work through
his geopolitical wish list, trying to set in place a number of faits
accomplis that will be hard for the next U.S. President to overturn.
Putin must know, for
example, that sooner or later diplomatic talks over the war in Syria will
resume. But, when they do, he would prefer to see Aleppo in regime hands, which
would strengthen Assad’s position in any negotiations. Thus, Russian warplanes
and Syrian ground troops, fighting with Iranian and Hezbollah militias, will
pound the city until it falls, at however ghastly a human cost. Lest the Obama
Administration consider intervening with a limited air campaign, as some U.S.
officials are apparently discussing, Russia
recently moved its advanced S-300 anti-aircraft system to Syria. “We’ll shoot
them down,” Kiselev, the television host, said of U.S. warplanes. And in the
Baltic states, a zone of perennial rivalry and latent conflict with the West,
Putin and his military advisers see an opportunity to undermine nato defenses. Now that the
Iskander missiles are in place in Kaliningrad, they’re unlikely to be
relocated, and will complicate nato defense planning for years to come.
There are also the
Kremlin’s alleged efforts “to interfere with the U.S. election process,” as
U.S. security officials recently put
it, by stealing U.S. political figures and parties’ data and e-mails and then
leaking them to the public. This summer, WikiLeaks’s release of the Democratic
National Committee’s e-mails was widely blamed on
hackers working for the Russian state, and more recently the F.B.I. has said that
it believes Russian intelligence agencies were behind the hacking of e-mails
belonging to John Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair. This week, I
spoke to Dmitri Alperovitch, the co-founder of CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity
firm that investigated the D.N.C. hack and found a trail that led back to the
Russian intelligence services. “It’s just like a regular criminal
investigation,” he said. “If a bank gets robbed, you don’t try and solve the
crime without looking at past bank robberies in the area—is this similar to
things we’ve seen before?” According to Alperovitch, one of the suspects in the
D.N.C. case, a hacker who goes by the name Fancy Bear, was involved in earlier
cyber attacks aimed at defense targets in Georgia and Ukraine—all during times
of increased tensions with Moscow. CrowdStrike believes that Fancy Bear has
links to Russian military intelligence, and that the other hacker involved in
the D.N.C. operation, Cozy Bear, has ties to the F.S.B., Russia’s
domestic-security service. Alperovitch told me that Cozy Bear had previously
targeted servers used by the White House, State Department, and Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
At this point, any
Russian efforts to meddle in the election are likely not about trying to throw
the election to Donald Trump, whose candidacy most serious Russian
officials now believe is doomed. The goal, instead, is to confuse and discredit
the American election process, in an attempt to weaken the country’s
institutions and the likely future Clinton Presidency. (Trump himself has urged
his supporters to read the WikiLeaks disclosures. They show “how unattractive and
dishonest our country has become,” he said.) In their statement accusing the
Kremlin of involvement in political hacking, U.S. security officials also
expressed worry about potential attacks on election systems in U.S. states.
Alperovitch argued, as many have, that any confusion about voting rolls or the
count itself created by cyber incursions will “help create a narrative the day
after election that the vote was manipulated, that it was somehow not
legitimate.”
Although the Russian self-image of a
scorned and offended partner is, in part, a cynical pose, it belies a very real
sense of injury and betrayal. “Everything that Russia has done is a
reaction—and an answer—to the United States’ unwillingness to speak to Russia
as an equal,” Konstantin Kosachev, the chair of the foreign-affairs
committee in the upper house of Russia’s parliament, told me this week.
During an interview in his office, Kosachev told me that Western officials and
journalists “discuss Russia’s actions as if it were taking proactive steps,
when in fact Russia has been provoked into carrying out retaliatory action.”
“Any scenario of Russian-American
relations is possible,” he told me, but it was all up to Washington. “The
United States is the source of the problems that have arisen in our relations,
and it is the United States that is able to eliminate them.”
Earlier this week, to get a whiff of the
new atmosphere, I went to the studios of Channel One, the country’s main state
broadcaster, to appear as a guest on a daytime political talk show. Russian
television stations have long devoted much of their time to dissecting the
minutiae of America’s every political hiccup, a consequence of the Russian
ruling class’s simultaneous fascination and revulsion with the U.S. political
system. I was the only American on set, and it was clear I was meant to play
the role of the pitiable imbecile and birthday-party piñata: everyone would get
a chance to step up and have a whack. The host of the program, Artem Sheinin,
noted that it was the thirtieth anniversary of the Reykjavik summit between
Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, talks that ultimately led to the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which reduced missile stockpiles in
both countries. “Some people think this is when our country began its
surrender; others say it marks the end of the Cold War,” Sheinin said. “But, as
we see from our conversation today, the Cold War wasn’t brought to an end, and,
in my view, can’t be.”
As a digital
animation of a grizzly bear clawing away at a bald eagle played on a large
screen behind him, Sheinin turned to me. “Does it not seem to you,” he asked,
“that all these children dying in Syria, in eastern Aleppo, this fear about
Iskanders—all this is a result of how you have been pushed into being the
word’s gendarme, and want to remain as such?” I fumbled through an answer.
Russia obviously sees itself as fighting against U.S. hegemony, I said, but
what is it fighting for? What is its
strategic vision for itself and the world? Another guest, a Russian parliamentary
deputy, began to shout, “For Yugoslavia! For Libya! For Syria! For everything
you have done these past twenty years!” He was nearly hysterical, but his
answer was truthful: Putin’s foreign policy at this moment is, in large part,
about avenging the wrongs inflicted on Russia over the past decades, the
insults and grievances borne by a generation. It may be a tall order to achieve
by January 20th of next year. But Putin may certainly try.
Joshua Yaffa is a New Yorker contributor based in Moscow. He is also a
New America fellow.
O ministro Lavrov sempre foi, é um dos melhores amigos dos amigos dos amigos, se é que vocês me entendem, todos companheiros unidos numa mesma causa, em prol da soberania, do respeito à lei, da não intervenção nos assuntos internos dos outros Estados e essas outras coisas antigas, mas ainda válidas. Sua fala, abaixo transcrita, é de um realismo impressionante, o que só testemunha em favor de sua coerência lúcida e de sua adequação aos princípios consagrados do direito internacional, sem falar da lógica e do interesse próprio. Como é que o regime sírio vai deixar de massacrar seus opositores, se estes pretendem massacrar o regime sírio, a começar por Assad e seus asseclas? Seria pedir que eles cometessem suicídio certo? Por isso que Brasil e Rússia estão certos, desse ponto de vista: enquanto todas as partes não cessarem suas hostilidades, é irrealista pedir que apenas uma das partes renuncie à violência. Lógico, pois não? Portanto, Assad está plenamente certo em continuar a destruir tranquilamente seu país, bombardeando bairros e cidades inteiras, lançando ataques aéreos contra seus opositores, enfim, massacrando alegremente aqueles que não concordam em que ele seja o único presidente legítimo da Síria. Quem não concorda com isso, não pode dialogar com o governo, certo? O problema desses ocidentais é que eles não respeitam os direitos legítimos dos Estados soberanos, e ficam perturbando o cenários com demandas ilegítimas e ilegais relativas a democracia, direitos humanos e essas coisas incômodas. O Brasil está certo em defender a soberania dos Estados, e impedir a derrubada de governos legítimos pela força. O governo está certo ao se alinhar com a Rússia e a China no veto a essas medidas propostas no CSNU pelos ocidentais de intervenção nos assuntos internos da Síria. Onde iríamos parar, se isso fosse autorizado? Quanto ao Equador, acho que o ministro Lavrov está ligeiramente equivocado: o que os bolcheviques fizeram foi justamente invadir o Palácio de Inverno, contra a lei e o direito. O ministro Lavrov está condenando agora os bolcheviques? Que gracinha... Paulo Roberto de Almeida
UN Security Council has no authority to support revolution in Syria – Lavrov
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (RIA Novosti/Eduard Pesov)
The UN Security Council has no right to support a revolution or foreign intervention in Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned. Any plan to withdraw government troops while fighting continues is untenable, and naïve at best, he added.
The demand for President Bashar al-Assad to resign as a precondition to resolving the Syrian crisis is a completely unrealistic approach, Lavrov said during a public appearance at the Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs.
“There are different attitudes towards the Syrian regime. But while fighting in the streets continues, it is absolutely unrealistic to say that the only way out is for one side to unilaterally capitulate. It is not a matter of ideology, we don’t support any political figures in Syria. We just reason from what is realistic,” Lavrov said to the students of the diplomatic university.
Harking back to the summit in Geneva in June, Lavrov noted that despite differing opinions on the conflict, all the participating countries agreed to work for a “free, stable, independent and democratic”Syria. However, “our western partners and some nations in the region are almost openly pushing for outside intervention,” said Lavrov.
“Outside intervention should be positive. Every international player should push for both sides of the Syrian conflict to cease violence,” stressed Lavrov. “Saying that the government should be the first to pull out its troops from towns and then the opposition is not a viable plan.”
The Russian foreign minister added that those foreign players who insist on inciting the opposition forces “are not working in the interests of the Syrian people. They are motivated by their own geopolitical interests.”
Lavrov cited the fact the Security Council dismissed a vote on the Geneva accord as evidence that a number of countries were not working for the Syrian people.
Ecuador, Assange’s rights must be respected
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange’s rights as a political refugee must be respected, Lavrov said, adding that under international law, it would be illegal for UK police to storm the Ecuadorian embassy.
“As long as he is inside Ecuadorian territory, I think no one will try any rash actions, and the rights of the refugee [Assange] must be respected. No one can challenge the judicial process. But when the Ecuadorian embassy is threatened with being stormed, just like the Winter Palace was, I think it’s a little outside the rule of law,” Lavrov said in his talk to the students, alluding to the Bolshevik storming of the Winter Palace during Russia's 1917 revolution.
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been holed up inside the Ecuadorian embassy in London since June. The whistleblower is currently in the center of an international stalemate insofar as Ecuador has granted him asylum but the UK has pledged to arrest him if he sets foot outside the building.
Assange estimates that he could potentially get out of the Ecuadorian embassy in a year’s time if Sweden drops the extradition order against him. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.
Assange has said that if Sweden drops the extradition order against him he could potentially leave the embassy in a year’s time. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.
Commenting on the WikLeaks whistleblowing scandal that precipitated Assange’s asylum request, Lavrov said that the information in the WikiLeaks cables “brought to light how governments relate to their partners, and what they think of them.” The document dump hadn’t harmed or threatened the safety of any particular government, he said.
“It was curious,” Lavrov said. “But nothing more. Many of our impressions were simply confirmed.”