O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

quarta-feira, 8 de maio de 2013

E por falar em exportações e importações, um artigo de Gary North

Agradeço ao Eduardo, do Rio de Janeiro, esta remessa sempre bem vinda.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Qual o benefício de exportar mais do que importar?
por , segunda-feira, 4 de fevereiro de 2013

 

1756FP071.jpg
Guido Mantega cumprindo sua função: atender ao lobby dos exportadores, espoliando o poder de compra do resto da população brasileira
Ao longo dos últimos 300 anos, o senso comum reinante entre os economistas convencionais, a mídia e os leigos é o de que um país estará em melhor situação se ele exportar mais bens e serviços do que ele importa.  A crença dominante é a de que, se um país é um exportador líquido, então este país é uma verdadeira usina de prosperidade.
É por isso que, segundo este raciocínio, a China é considerada por esses economistas e seus seguidores na mídia uma potência econômica.  O país é competitivo por causa de sua capacidade de exportar muitos bens para outros países.  Porém, para fazer isso, há uma contrapartida: a China inevitavelmente tem de aceitar notas promissórias dos estrangeiros. 
Quando um país exporta bens, o que ele recebe em troca são meros dígitos eletrônicos contabilizados em moeda estrangeira — atualmente, o dólar.  Como o dólar não é moeda corrente na esmagadora maioria das nações do globo, o que um país exportador recebe, na realidade, é um título da dívida do governo americano.  Os dólares digitais que este país recebe em decorrência de suas exportações são reinvestidos nos EUA, na aquisição de títulos do governo americano.  No balancete do Banco Central, esta aquisição de títulos do governo é contabilizada como "reservas internacionais".
O que realmente ocorre é o seguinte: indivíduos que trabalham no ramo da exportação estão dispostos a aceitar notas promissórias, ou outros tipos de ativos baseados em dígitos eletrônicos, em troca de bens físicos.  O exportador recebe dinheiro eletrônico — no caso, dólares americanos — em sua conta bancária.  Para ele, estes dólares têm valor.  Se não tivesse, ele não teria exportado os bens.  Ele pode trocar estes dólares por sua moeda doméstica (no caso, ele vende dólares ao seu banco, que irá creditar sua conta-corrente com moeda nacional) ou ele pode manter estes dólares no exterior, depositado em um banco estrangeiro.  Talvez ele prefira comprar ações ou outros ativos estrangeiros que são vendidos em dólares.  A questão é que esse exportador está disposto a aceitar notas promissórias — no caso, promessas digitais — em troca de seus bens reais.  Esta é o único princípio por trás da exportação.
Os EUA são o exemplo clássico de um país que importa muito mais bens do que exporta.  No entanto, os EUA também são considerados uma potência econômica.  Por quê?  Porque estrangeiros estão sempre dispostos a investir no país.  O problema é que o investimento favorito é a compra de títulos emitidos pelo Tesouro americano.  Embora alguns investidores estrangeiros comprem estes títulos, quem os compra em sua esmagadora maioria são os bancos centrais estrangeiros.  Os bancos centrais estrangeiros compram títulos do governo americano porque seus respectivos governos querem manter suas moedas nacionais depreciadas em relação ao dólar, de modo a aumentar as exportações para os EUA.  Em outras palavras, o governo chinês é a real fonte do poderio exportador daquela nação, pois é ele quem manipula o mercado de câmbio para favorecer suas indústrias exportadoras.
Utilizar o poder estatal para subsidiar uma pequena porcentagem da população doméstica (os exportadores, cujo lobby é poderoso em qualquer nação do mundo) ao mesmo tempo em que se prejudica a esmagadora maioria da população (os consumidores, que não têm lobby em nenhuma nação do mundo) é a norma atual em todas as grandes economias do globo.  E a retórica utilizada também é a mesma: beneficiar alguns poucos em detrimento de todo o resto é algo que se faz em nome do fortalecimento da nação. 
O argumento, como em todas as promessas governamentais, é totalmente falacioso.
O que fortalece a população de um país é ter uma moeda previsível.  Isso faz com que os prognósticos de investimento sejam mais fáceis.  A preocupação das pessoas com relação às flutuações do valor da moeda é reduzida.  Mas é impossível obter uma moeda previsível em termos internacionais, pois os governos dos outros países estão continuamente manipulando suas moedas, quase sempre por meio da expansão da oferta monetária.  Em outras palavras, todos os bancos centrais estrangeiros inflacionam.  Sendo assim, uma moeda doméstica cuja oferta seja constante irá se apreciar continuamente em relação às moedas estrangeiras.  Isso significa que seu poder de compra irá aumentar continuamente.  Não haverá taxas de câmbio estáveis entre os países.
Se o Banco Central de um determinado país estivesse operando sob um padrão-ouro genuíno, ele não poderia inflacionar desmedidamente a moeda deste país.  O mesmo valeria para seu sistema bancário de reservas fracionárias.  Qualquer banco que expandisse o crédito enfrentaria uma corrida em seu estoque de moedas de ouro.  Suas reservas de ouro iriam se exaurir rapidamente.  Portanto, o temor de uma corrida bancária, na qual os correntistas apresentam seu dinheiro digital e exigem restituição em moedas de ouro, restringiria a expansão da oferta monetária.  Isso significa que a moeda deste país irá se apreciar em relação a todas as moedas estrangeiras que não estão restringidas por tal ameaça.  Isso significa que os cidadãos que residem na nação sob o padrão-ouro poderiam importar bens estrangeiros a preços decrescentes.  A cada ano as importações estariam mais baratas.  Como consumidores, estes cidadãos seriam beneficiadas e seu padrão de vida aumentaria a cada ano.
Supondo que estas pessoas estão produzindo bens de valor, o que significa que elas estão adquirindo uma moeda denominada em ouro, seu patrimônio líquido está aumentando continuamente.  Por quê?  Porque, com a mesma quantidade de dinheiro, elas podem comprar quantidades cada vez maiores de bens importados.  Elas estão vivenciando aquilo que todos nós adoramos vivenciar: preços cada vez menores para os bens e serviços que desejamos comprar.
Dado que há uma quantidade muito maior de pessoas voltadas para o mercado doméstico do que para as exportações, uma política de moeda estável iria beneficiar aquelas pessoas que são mais produtivas, mais economicamente eficientes e que melhor atendem às demandas da população.  Estas conseguiriam obter um fluxo contínuo da moeda doméstica.  Seu custo de vida cairia ano após ano, de forma consistente, porque os bancos centrais estrangeiros estão inflacionando suas respectivas moedas.  O valor daquelas moedas em relação à moeda estável deste país cairia continuamente.
Logo, uma moeda estável traria um grande benefício para aqueles consumidores que vivem sob este padrão-ouro.  E estes consumidores formam a esmagadora maioria dos consumidores de um país.  Apenas uma relativamente pequena porcentagem dos empreendedores e trabalhadores de uma nação está no setor exportador da economia.  É por isso que a desvalorização da moeda nacional é um subsídio apenas para uma minoria de empresários e trabalhadores.  A vasta maioria dos residentes desta nação é prejudicada.  Ela é obrigada a pagar mais caro por bens importados por causa da política de seu Banco Central de inflacionar a oferta monetária a fim de manter a moeda nacional desvalorizada perante as outras moedas. 
Ao depreciarem sua própria moeda, os planejadores monetários estão prejudicando os interesses da grande maioria dos cidadãos desta nação.  O subsídio beneficia apenas uma minoria.  O fato de haver uma enorme quantidade de pessoas na maioria permite que sua riqueza seja espoliada por meio da inflação da oferta monetária, permitindo ao setor exportador ganhar receitas acima das de mercado ao exportar seus bens.  Uma minoria não pode subsidiar uma maioria.  Sempre tem de ser ao contrário.
Portanto, uma economia com uma moeda estável irá beneficiar a grande maioria de seus cidadãos, os quais poderão comprar a preços continuamente mais baixos.  Essa verdade econômica irrita os defensores do mercantilismo.  Eles dizem que tal política é maléfica.  Eles estão convencidos de que ter um Banco Central depreciando continuamente a moeda como forma de subsidiar o setor exportador é algo extremamente benéfico para uma nação, e que a reduzida quantidade de bens e serviços que estarão disponíveis para os consumidores domésticos (tanto em decorrência das menores importações quanto pelo fato de mais produtos domésticos estarem sendo exportados) é algo sem nenhuma importância.
Os defensores do mercantilismo jamais discutem a realidade econômica desta redistribuição de riqueza.  Eles jamais apontam para aquela incontestável realidade: que a esmagadora maioria dos cidadãos é obrigada a arcar com perdas econômicas, principalmente quando se leva em conta os ganhos que obteriam caso pudessem adquirir bens estrangeiros a preços cada vez menores.
A vasta maioria dos cidadãos de qualquer país não faz a mais mínima ideia da relação entre expansão monetária e redução das importações.  Eles não entendem que estão sendo prejudicados pela política de depreciação monetária feita pelo seu governo.  Se eles entendessem de economia, iriam imediatamente exigir um padrão-ouro puro, e iriam prontamente se beneficiar do crescente valor internacional de sua moeda nacional.  Como iriam se beneficiar?  Podendo comprar uma quantia cada vez maior de bens estrangeiros a preços cada vez menores.
Infelizmente, são tão poucas as pessoas que entendem de lógica econômica, que este subsídio coercivamente extraído de uma maioria para uma minoria não é visto como um programa de transferência de riqueza dos mais pobres (consumidores comuns) para os mais ricos (barões do setor exportador).  Sempre que o governo de um país adota o mercantilismo — algo que ocorre a aproximadamente 100% do tempo —, ele o faz sabendo que praticamente ninguém compreende que aquela política prejudica a vasta maioria dos cidadãos e beneficia apenas uma minoria que está no setor exportador da economia.  Mais ainda: ele o faz sabendo inclusive que contará com o resoluto apoio da mídia e dos desinformados de plantão, que acreditam que um "setor exportador subsidiado fortalece a economia do país".
O mundo está hoje adotando políticas de depreciação monetária competitiva.  Se um país deprecia sua moeda, o outro quer depreciar mais. "Tudo pelos exportadores!" Isso irá prejudicar severamente a vasta maioria dos cidadãos de todas as nações.  Eles não poderão usufruir o benefício de ter uma moeda doméstica forte, algo que os permitiria importar mais bens estrangeiros.  Eles seriam capazes de adquirir os bens e serviços que quisessem, a preços continuamente declinantes, caso sua moeda nacional fosse baseada em um padrão-ouro.  Caso desfrutassem de plena conversibilidade em ouro — isto é, caso pudessem ir a um banco para trocar dinheiro digital por moedas de ouro —, eles vivenciariam um padrão de vida crescente.  Mas como eles não entendem de economia, eles aceitam (e até aplaudem) as políticas mercantilistas de seu governo.  Eles aceitam que sua moeda seja depreciada e seu padrão de vida seja reduzido.  Eles aceitam ser roubados em prol da boa vida dos exportadores.  Eles gostam de ver seus bens sendo enviados para estrangeiros a troco de nada (apenas os exportadores ficam com as notas promissórias).
É lamentável que a maioria das pessoas não entenda de economia.  Para os exportadores, no entanto, que se beneficiam deste assalto ao poder de compra da população, essa ignorância econômica de seus compatriotas é uma dádiva.  Dado que é impossível ganhar algo a troco de nada, o que ocorre é que um pequeno grupo de exportadores ganha muito e, em troca, o restante das massas fica com preços crescentes para quase todos os bens e serviços da economia.  E ainda bate palma.


Gary North , ex-membro adjunto do Mises Institute, é o autor de vários livros sobre economia, ética e história. Visite seu website

Assedio no Consulado em Sidney: the end of the beginning, or the beginning of the end?

Bem isso depende da alta comissão de três embaixadores que, depois de idas e vindas, e de muitas voltas, após uma missão precursora de um só embaixador (parece que não era suficiente, e não foi...) e de, teoricamente, uma outra missão composta por um diplomata da Administração e representantes das carreiras de Oficial de Chancelaria e de Assistente de Chancelaria, tem agora a relevante função de apurar o que já foi apurado duas vezes (mas talvez transcrito apenas em diplomatês), e de produzir novo relatório, que no fabuloso prazo de mais algumas semanas, vai informar aquilo que já foi informado, repassado, repisado, confirmado, insistido, e outros idos e ados...
Casinho difícil esse, para o maior constrangimento, humilhação e angústia daqueles que foram atingidos e ainda não moralmente reparados.
Parece que desta vez, à falta de outras tergiversações, vão ter de fazer alguma coisa, ainda que seja pouco, como essas aposentadorias de juízes corruptos, que são premiados com aposentadoria remunerada, ou seja, ficam em casa sem fazer nada, mas continuando a receber.
Mas, pelo menos o indiciado moral foi removido:  http://www.in.gov.br/visualiza/index.jsp?jornal=2&pagina=55&data=08/05/2013
Resta saber o que vai acontecer depois, bem depois.
Não se apressem, pois a Casa precisa de tempo para resolver o que fazer com questões espinhosas desse tipo (e no entanto, tão claras e assertivas).
Esse é o Brasil, minha gente...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

http://globotv.globo.com/rede-globo/jornal-nacional/v/itamaraty-investiga-denuncias-de-assedio-sexual-e-moral-no-consulado-do-brasil-em-sidney/2560553/

Itamaraty ordena remoção de cônsul em Sydney após denúncias de assédio sexual
Renata Giraldi
Da Agência Brasil, em Brasília
08/05/201316h11
Depois das denúncias de desvios de comportamento, o cônsul-geral do Brasil em Sydney (Austrália), Américo Fontenelle, recebeu ordens para deixar o posto. Em portaria, publicada na edição desta quarta-feira (8) do Diário Oficial da União, a ordem é clara. "Remover ex-officio Américo Dyott Fontenelle", que é ministro da carreira diplomática –o último posto antes de ser promovido a embaixador, que o nível mais alto da carreira.
A íntegra da portaria determinando a remoção de Fontenelle está na página da Imprensa Nacional. Não há definição sobre o próximo posto para o diplomata.
Paralelamente, o Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Itamaraty, abriu um processo administrativo disciplinar contra o cônsul-geral do Brasil em Sydney e o adjunto dele, Cesar Cidade.
Os dois diplomatas são denunciados por funcionários de assédio moral e sexual, homofobia e desrespeito. Inicialmente, as investigações devem ocorrer em um prazo de 30 dias. Mas é possível prorrogação por mais duas semanas.
As investigações serão conduzidas por três embaixadores, com experiência consular e questões administrativas, pelo ministro das Relações Exteriores, Antonio Patriota. Ao final das apurações, os dois diplomatas podem ser condenados com uma advertência oral ou até exonerados de suas funções. Ao Itamaraty, Fontenelle e Cidade negam as acusações.
As denúncias surgiram a partir de acusações feitas por funcionários do Consulado de Sydney, que informaram ao Itamaraty situações em que foram humilhados e houve abuso de autoridade por parte do cônsul e do adjunto dele. Desde então, o ministério passou a apurar as informações.
Patriota reiterou aos diplomatas, responsáveis pelas investigações do caso, que rejeita os comportamentos inadequados às funções desempenhadas pelo Ministério das Relações Exteriores. Na cerimônia de posse do novo secretário-geral, Eduardo dos Santos, o chanceler lembrou que "não há espaço no Itamaraty" para comportamentos que "não se adequem" ao ministério.

Entenda o caso

Pausa para... Faroeste Caboclo (adaptado aos tempos do fascismo companheiro)

Precisa ter paciência para ver tudo, mas os versos são precisos, os desenhos são cortantes, e a música é chatinha, mas é assim que esses poetas improvisados criam um ritmo (aborrecido) para uma narrativa altamente interessante, instrutiva, esclarecedora, verdadeira e..., como diria?,  repugnante?
Assim são os tempos companheiros...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cpo2Z29VFPM

Comentário de um "vidente" (a mais de um título):


... e olha que esqueceram a sua imensa riqueza, a morte do Celso Daniel, as empresas do filho dele, a secretária Rose, os ministros afastados por corrupção e outras maracutaias e centenas de picaretas!

Sobre deficits e superavits - Joao Luiz Mauad

Sobre déficits e superávits
JOÃO LUIZ MAUAD*
Comentário do Dia, Instituto Liberal, 6/05/2013
Saiu na semana passada o resultado da balança comercial do mês de abril.  O resultado foi um “déficit” de US$ 994 milhões que, acrescido ao acumulado nos três primeiros meses, forma um “déficit” total de US$ 6,4 bilhões no ano.  Como esperado, os meios de comunicação deram grande destaque à notícia, e todos eles, sem exceção, o fizeram em tom de lamento.   O site do “Bom dia Brasil” (Portal Globo.com), por exemplo, estampou a seguinte manchete: “Rombo da balança comercial em abril é o pior da história para o mês”.
O uso da palavra “rombo” denota algo imoral, como se o fato de a sociedade brasileira haver importado mais do que exportou fosse algo pecaminoso, digno de vergonha.  Será mesmo?
O leitor deve ter reparado que usei aspas na palavra “déficit”, e isso tem um motivo.  Por alguma razão que já vem de longe, na equação algébrica que resume as contas de comércio internacional de qualquer país, convencionou-se aplicar às exportações o sinal positivo, enquanto às importações está reservado o sinal negativo.  Dessa forma, quando as exportações superam as importações, diz-se que a balança comercial é superavitária, e vice-versa. Como esse padrão foi estabelecido de forma arbitrária, nada impediria que ele fosse o contrário, como deveria.
Saindo da lógica mercantilista, que enxerga o dinheiro como o objetivo e as mercadorias e serviços como meios de obtê-lo, veremos facilmente que são as importações que contribuem efetivamente para o bem estar de uma nação, não as exportações.  Um país é rico na proporção da abundância de produtos e serviços postos à disposição dos cidadãos. A saída de produtos é um custo, enquanto a entrada é o verdadeiro benefício, assim como o trabalho é o meio e o consumo é o fim.  Sobre isso, vale lembrar os ensinamentos oportunos de Milton Friedman:
"Outra falácia raras vezes posta em questão é a de que as exportações são boas e as importações são ruins. A verdade se revela muito diferente disto. Não podemos comer, vestir ou gozar dos bens que enviamos ao exterior... Nosso ganho com o comércio exterior está no que importamos. As exportações constituem o preço que pagamos para obter as importações.”
* ADMINISTRADOR E CONSULTOR DE EMPRESAS


Mao-de-obra estrangeira: Brasil ainda paranoico e atrasado (BBC)

Da BBC, via coluna diária de Cesar Maia:

BRASIL PRECISA DE MÃO DE OBRA QUALIFICADA, MAS NÃO ATUALIZA LEI DO REGIME MILITAR! SÓ ENTRA MÃO-DE-OBRA SEM QUALIFICAÇÃO DO HAITI E BOLÍVIA!


(BBC, 07) 1. Grandes levas de imigrantes haitianos têm entrado no Brasil pela fronteira do Acre. É maciça a entrada de estrangeiros no Brasil pela fronteira com a Bolívia. Mas a discussão sobre a necessidade de atrair mão de obra qualificada de estrangeiros para suprir a demanda do mercado, a criação de uma política migratória – que ainda não existe no Brasil – está parada.
        
2. Atualmente, a lei 6.815, de 1980, conhecida como Estatuto do Estrangeiro, estabelece as condições de entrada e permanência de estrangeiros no país. Criada durante o governo militar, a lei é considerada defasada. O estatuto afirma que a "segurança nacional" é considerada prioridade ao analisar a concessão de visto e permanência a um estrangeiro. Por isso, vistos não devem ser concedidos ao cidadão considerado "nocivo à ordem pública ou aos interesses nacionais".
        
3. A lei também proíbe que estrangeiros realizem atividades políticas (punidas com prisão e expulsão do país) e permite que o Ministério da Justiça impeça a realização de conferências, congressos e "atividades culturais e folclóricas" de estrangeiros, "sempre que considerar conveniente aos interesses nacionais". 
        
4. O projeto de lei que deveria reformular e atualizar o Estatuto, elaborado em 2005, tramita na Câmara dos Deputados desde 2009 e ainda não há previsão de quando irá para a votação no plenário. "Quanto mais o tema ganha relevância no cenário nacional, mais premente fica a modificação e aprovação desse projeto, então já estamos com alguns anos de atraso", afirmou o presidente do CNIg à BBC Brasil.
        
5. Um grupo composto por representantes do Ministério da Justiça, do Itamaraty, do Ministério do Trabalho e da Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos (SAE) prepara um novo plano de reformulação do Estatuto do Estrangeiro, que ainda não tem data para ser apresentado. 

David Stockman: The Great Deformation, book review - Detlev Schlichter

Cover of David A. Stockman's The Great DeformationDavid Stockman’s new book “The Great Deformation” is a brilliant, penetrating analysis of the present state of the US economy and the US political system, and a detailed account of how the nation got into this mess. The book will upset Democrats and Republicans alike, and quite a few other constituencies as well, which can, in this case, be safely accepted as proof that Stockman’s narrative is spot on.
Stockman is an angry man and he admits so himself early in his 719-page tome. That anger adds bite and verve to his writing and keeps what is in fact a detailed historical account and economic analysis always highly entertaining. The book is long but never boring. Furthermore, Stockman does not let the anger cloud his judgement, which remains, in my view, relentlessly accurate throughout.
When dissecting Washington politics and Wall Street deal-making Stockman naturally draws on his experience as the director of the Office of Management and Budget under Ronald Reagan and his many years as an investment banker and private equity investor, and in so doing he reflects on much of his own professional life with commendable candor. But the book goes beyond these specific periods, and Stockman applies the analytical skills and insights acquired on these jobs to the critical examination of a wide spectrum of policy areas and historic periods. Stockman’s command of these topics and the masses of statistics and financial reports involved, and his powers of analytical dissection are impressive. But what is probably even more important for the success of his analysis is that it is based on an accurate understanding of essential economic relationships, in particular the importance of sound money. This is why the narrative that he develops captures America’s present challenges so truthfully and comprehensively. I very much shared Stockman’s anger when I started reading, but even more so when I had finished.
Public service
Stockman does a great service to his fellow Americans for he is providing a much-needed dose of realism that stands in stark contrast to the contrived optimism emanating from much of the political ‘debate’, from stock-pushing Wall Street experts on financial TV, and from the various Keynesian snake-oil merchants from both parties, all of whom want the public to believe that America is fundamentally healthy and just another round of ‘quantitative easing’, another deficit-funded tax break, or another ‘stimulus’ spending measure away from a bright future of self-sustained recovery. Instead, Stockman says it like it is. The US economy in 2013 is fundamentally weakened and structurally deformed by decades of artificially cheap money and a pathological debt addiction. Not the occasional artificial booms of the past twenty years, driven by Fed-induced bubbles in stocks, high-yield bonds and housing, give a correct picture of America’s long-term economic potential but the intermittent periods of slack when the fire-works on Wall Street inevitably end (and end in tears), and the persistent Main Street reality of declining employment prospects, stagnant real income and impaired competitiveness can no longer be covered up.
The Fed’s policy of cheap and then ever-cheaper credit has not only destroyed the free market by constantly distorting price signals, encouraging reckless debt accumulation and rewarding financial speculation (and consequently widening income and wealth gaps, as Stockman illustrates aplenty), it has thoroughly corrupted the political process as well. Stockman portrays a political system that, courtesy of the Fed’s cheap credit policies and interest rate repression, is now chronically incapable of living within its means, and is thus easy prey for hordes of crony capitalists – from the healthcare industry and the military-industrial complex to the ‘labor aristocracy’ of the united autoworkers union to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks, private-equity shops and hedge funds that play the system for a quick profit.
Crucially, Stockman puts his unsentimental assessment of America’s present reality into a broader historical context. Stockman identifies correctly the act of original sin that led America astray from the path of broadly free market economics and limited and fiscally responsible government, namely the abandonment of sound money. As America moved away from hard money, epitomized originally by the gold standard and a Federal Reserve with a strictly limited role as a bankers’ bank, and later, in already watered-down form, by the Bretton Woods gold-exchange-standard, and embraced an unconstrained fiat money system and ‘free-floating’ global paper monies it robbed the free market of its essential inner compass and ‘true north’ of market-based interest rates and market-enforced financial prudence.
The Fed, the central-banking branch of the federal government, was unleashed from its golden shackles in two historic steps in 1933 (by a Democrat president) and in 1971 (by a Republican president) but it was only over the past twenty years under the leaderships of Greenspan and Bernanke that the full destructive potential of unconstrained central banking has come to be felt. As Stockman shows with great clarity, both central bankers turned the Fed into a machine for macro-economic fine-tuning and prosperity management. Greenspan promised to watch the speculating classes’ backs by allowing them to blow bubbles and then shield them from the consequences. Bernanke took the mission one step further as he began (and still continues) to use his vast powers of fixing interest rates and printing limitless amounts of new money to steer the markets to the ‘correct’ yields on government bonds, the ‘correct’ spreads on mortgage-backed-securities, and the ‘appropriate’ shape of the yield curve, and by so doing to centrally manage the overall economy. Needless to say, such socialism for speculators, courtesy of the printing press, is happily explained by Wall Street economists as being in the public interest.
 It is this deformation of money that is the root cause of the numerous deformations in the broader economy and the deformations in the political system. I am grateful that Stockman has fulfilled the important task of documenting in detail the many ways in which unsound money undermines the market economy and corrupts society.
Myth buster
Stockman is a myth buster par excellence. He busts myths that are cherished by Democrats and myths that are cherished by Republicans, and some cherished by both. Never pulling any punches and always happy to name names, he exposes as complicit in the deformation of American capitalism politicians, central bankers, and self-important economists of the Keynesian, monetarist and supply-side persuasion. He also identifies the many crony-capitalists, who shamelessly exploit the system’s many deformations for their own gain. But Stockman not only identifies the villains – the advocates and profiteers of unsound money – he also gives us the heroes, the defenders of sound money, people like Dwight Eisenhower, William McChesney Martin, and Paul Volcker, even if their efforts did ultimately not avert the corruption of American capitalism.
Here are the main myths that Stockman exposes:
Myth one: The 2008 financial crisis was the result of unregulated markets. TARP and the Fed saved the country from Great Depression 2.0
Nonsense, says Stockman. The financial crisis was the consequence of the Fed’s serial bubble blowing, and it should have been allowed to burn itself out in the corridors of Wall Street. Instead, Paulson and Bernanke panicked, declared economic martial law, namely that all rules of fiscal prudence and free market capitalism be tossed aside, and demanded that, via the bail-out of ‘insurance’ giant AIG, firms like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and others be saved from choking on their own outsized speculations.
Myth two: There was such a thing as the ‘Reagan Revolution’ and it revitalized American capitalism.
This is obviously a favourite whenever Republicans sit around the campfire. The reality looks different. Despite all the charisma and the eloquent free market rhetoric, the true legacy of the Reagan presidency is a Republican party that is now largely desensitized to fiscal profligacy and reconciled with endless deficits (Cheney’s famous dictum that “deficits don’t matter.”), as the party has happily joined the Democrats in the ‘aggregate demand’ management business. No longer to be outdone by ‘pro-active’ Democrats advocating Keynesian ‘spending’ to ‘stimulate’ growth, the Republicans came to embrace their own version of top-down GDP management: the Art-Laffer-inspired slashing of taxes at all cost. Fiscal prudence – and a true “hands-off” approach to the economy – was finally expunged from Republican DNA.
Myth three: The Great Depression was caused by the gold standard and was ended by Roosevelt’s Keynesian policies.
Ridiculous. The correction of the early 1930s was the combination of delayed effects of the First World War (a US agricultural boom that had led to overinvestment and distorted prices and had already ended in a bust in the 1920s) and the bursting of various bubbles blown during the Jazz-Age-version of bubble finance, such as the foreign bond market that provided funding for the purchase of then-sizable US exports, and the hot-money driven domestic equity boom. These distortions did not come about because of the gold standard but despite of the gold standard, which had been severely weakened as a disciplinary force not least due to the growing role of the Fed since 1914, and in particular since the central bank funded the war effort through money-printing in 1917-1918. By 1929 liquidation and correction were unavoidable. But what should have been a quick and decisive cleansing was turned into a drawn-out economic catastrophe by bad policy. First, there was economic nationalism – tariffs and other forms of protectionism – and then Roosevelt’s disastrous interventionism and relentless tinkering with the economy. As Stockman illustrates, Roosevelt did not enact a Keynesian textbook program at all. In fact, the clueless president had no coherent program whatsoever but instead implemented the type of potpourri of populist anti-market measures so fashionable at the time among Europe’s fascist leaders: odd infrastructure programs, price and wage fixing, state-directed resource use.
“Having triggered the demise of the old international order, the Roosevelt program of necessity was a purely domestic grab bag of experiments, gimmicks, and nonstarters. These ad-hoc Washington interventions – the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), National Recovery Act (NRA), Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) – did little to revive the dormant machinery of market capitalism and economic wealth creation and, instead, mainly shuffled income and resources randomly among regions, industries, and even individual business firms.” (Stockman, page 159)
Intermezzo
The New Deal had meant curtains for the ‘Old Republic’ and any commitment to sound money and sound public finances. However, and luckily for America, the newly expanded tool kit for interventionist politicians and central bankers remained largely unused for two decades after the end of World War II. A happy interregnum of monetary and fiscal discipline commenced, largely due to the good fortune of having people with strong traditional beliefs in positions of power, such as Dwight D. Eisenhower in the White House and William McChesney Martin at the Fed, two of Stockman’s heroes. Eisenhower slashed military spending after the Korean War and established the ‘Eisenhower minimum’ of strictly contained military outlays. Eisenhower was a soldier who hated war. A highly decorated general himself he famously warned his fellow Americans of the growing powers of the military-industrial complex and stared down a few generals himself when letting them resign in protest of his spending cuts. (By comparison, today’s Commander-in-Chief, former community organizer Barack Obama, oversees a military budget that is twice the size of even Bill Clinton’s.)
Over at the Fed, Martin not only coined the phrase “taking the punch bowl away when the party gets started”, he actually meant it and implemented it. Martin was deeply committed to the monetary discipline of the Bretton Woods system.
Needless to say, such discipline did not last long. America’s military adventures in Far East Asia and LBJ’s great society project put new demands on state spending and, by extension, on the printing press. The last link to gold – and the last remaining constraint on paper dollar creation- was severed in August 1971.
Myth four: Free floating paper monies are a sign of free market capitalism
The importance of what happened at Camp David in August 1971 can hardly be overestimated, and Stockman conveys the magnitude of these events vividly:
“Nixon’s estimable free market advisors who gathered at the Camp David weekend were to an astonishing degree clueless as to the consequences of their recommendation to close the gold window and float the dollar. In their wildest imaginations they did not foresee that this would unhinge the monetary and financial nervous system of capitalism. They had no premonition at all that it would pave the way for a forty-year storm of financialization and a debt-besotted symbiosis between central bankers possessed by delusions of grandeur and private gamblers intoxicated with visions of delirious wealth.” (Stockman, page 281)
Stockman is particularly scathing of Milton Friedman’s influence on these events.
“The great irony, then, is that the nation’s most famous modern conservative economist became the father of Big Government, chronic deficits, and national fiscal bankruptcy. It was Friedman who first urged the removal of the Bretton Woods gold standard restraints on central bank money printing, and then added insult to injury by giving conservative sanction to perpetual open market purchases of government debt by the Fed. Friedman’s monetarism thereby institutionalized a regime which allowed politicians to chronically spend without taxing.”(Stockman, page 272)
Famous academic economists who willingly throw themselves into the machinery of policy-making or policy-advice are among the most tragic-comic figures in Stockman’s narrative.
Thus we meet, on the political Left, John Maynard Keynes’s vicar on earth, the pompous Larry Summers pulling really big numbers out of the air, such as $800 billion, and demanding that this be spent instantly by Washington to stimulate the economy. There is, of course, Paul Krugman, who has never met a deficit-spending program that he thought was big enough. On the political Right, there is Art Laffer, who taught the Republicans not to worry about deficits if they result from tax-cutting as tax cuts are always stimulative and thus inherently self-financing. There is Milton Friedman who could explain the evils of rent-control better than anybody else but got free market money horribly wrong and provided intellectual cover for Tricky Dick’s dollar debasement. And then, naturally, there is Ben Bernanke, the veritable Dr. Strangelove of central banking, who believes this is 1930 all over again and who uses the present crisis to re-enact the policy program he believes, based on his own subjective and highly flawed interpretation of the Great Depression, the Fed should have enacted back then. One can only hope that this litany of abject failure serves as a warning to those economists waiting in the wings for their moment in the limelight, such as John Taylor who promotes his eponymous rule as a way to make central banking workable, or those economists who currently embrace the new Keynesian fad of ‘nominal GDP targeting’ (God help us!).
The deserving heroes of Stockman’s account are instead those statesmen and bankers who stuck by the old (and indeed ancient) rules of hard money and ‘balancing the books’.
Myth five: Modern financial markets represent free market capitalism.
Of course, in a proper free market, speculation, trading and the use of leverage would not only be permissible but would have an important role to play in the process of allocating savings and channeling scarce capital to productive uses. These activities would, however, be tightly controlled and strictly limited by the free market’s most effective regulators: profit and loss. Those regulators are now largely weakened or even removed entirely by the present system of costless fiat money, unlimited central bank backstops (Greenspan/Bernanke put) and artificially low interest rates. Without proper capitalist money, hard and apolitical, at the core of the monetary system, a free market in the rest of finance is impossible. Stockman does an excellent job illustrating the extent to which manipulated money and artificially cheap credit are corrupting the entire financial infrastructure by encouraging excessive risk-taking and the misuse of capital with severely adverse long-term consequences.
“…capital markets eventually lose their capacity to honestly price securities under a regime of unsound money; they end up dancing to the tune of the central bank; that is, pricing the trading value of financial assets based on expected central bank interventions, not the intrinsic value of their cash flows, rights, and risks.” (Stockman, page 383)
Stockman analyses a range of leveraged buy-out deals (LBOs) to show how, in our deformed financial system, these can often lead to huge pay-outs for highly leveraged investors while at the same time leaving the firms financially weakened and sometimes even bankrupt. This chapter may appear long and technically challenging for some readers but it is important as it gives the lie to frequent claims by those who operate in this arena that these activities are simply the free market at work, and that they lead to more efficient allocation of corporate control, to investment in productive capital and to jobs. Stockman exposes the full irony of the Republican Party putting forward Mitt Romney as their 2012 presidential candidate and trying to sell him as an experienced business man and ‘job creator’ when, as the former head of private-equity firm Bain Capital, he would be much more suitable as a poster boy for the lucky few who disproportionally benefitted from three decades of bubble finance and all the deformations it created, a system that stands in sharp contrast to the traditional capitalism the Republicans claim to advocate.
Stockman does certainly not make many friends on the political Left with his – brilliant and entirely justified – annihilation of the Roosevelt myth and the childish ‘Keynes 101’–programs of ‘spending ourselves to prosperity’, but his account supports to a considerable degree the allegation that the ‘1 percent’ live high on the hog at the expense of the rest of the population. However, as Stockman demonstrates at length, this is not the result of free market capitalism, and the answer to it is not regulation and confiscatory taxation. The root cause is unsound money and the possibilities that unsound money provides for the flourishing of ‘crony capitalism’.
Stockman’s outlook is not a happy one. As the nation runs out of balance sheets to leverage up and as, inevitably, ‘austerity’ sets in, he foresees ongoing political strife, further financial market manipulations, on-and-off print-operations by the Fed, and new financial crises. He closes the book with a few pages of policy recommendations, all of them sensible, I guess, and naturally following from the preceding extensive analysis. But Stockman is under no illusion that his policy ideas do not stand a snowball’s chance in hell to be implemented. In any case, the book is not really, first and foremost, about a new policy program but about shifting the parameters of the debate by providing a thorough and accurate description of America’s economic and political problems. And here the book succeeds with flying colors.
This is an important book. I wish it a wide readership.

A tragedia da "politica industrial" do governo (politica?; industrial?) - Mansueto Almeida

Keynesianos de botequim ainda acreditam que o governo é mais esperto que o mercado, e que ele pode desenhar e implementar uma política industrial ótima.
Este economista, e Edmar Bacha, são mais realistas.
Mas quem disse que os keynesianos de botequim do governo estão interessados em críticas construtivas?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Segue abaixo um artigo que havia preparado para o VALOR e que foi publicado na edição desta quarta-feira dia 8 de maio. No entanto, por problemas de espaço, a versão publicada é um pouco menor do que o artigo original. Assim, o que reproduzo abaixo é o artigo original que é diferente da versão mais curta publicada no jornal, que não inclui os quatro últimos parágrafos.

Política industrial e equilíbrio fiscal

Por Mansueto Almeida
Valor promoveu um debate interessante entre os professores Edmar Bacha e Luiz Gonzaga Belluzzo sobre o futuro da indústria no Brasil reproduzido no caderno Rumos da Economia, de 2 de maio; e, na edição do dia 6, publicou matéria com o presidente do Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), Luciano Coutinho. Essas entrevistas contribuem para a discussão do futuro da indústria no Brasil.
Um primeiro ponto destacado pelos três economistas é o reconhecimento que a elevada carga tributária, no Brasil, atrapalha a competitividade da indústria. Estudo recente da Bain e Company para Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp) destaca que, em média, 40,3% do preço da indústria no Brasil resulta da elevada carga tributária. Isso não seria problema se a produtividade da indústria e da economia fossem elevadas. Mas não é esse o caso. É recorrente em todas as análises que reduzir a carga tributária é importante para o futuro da indústria no Brasil.
Segundo, os três economistas reconhecem que a taxa de câmbio mais desvalorizada é importante para aumentar a rentabilidade das exportações de manufaturados. No entanto, como conseguir uma taxa de câmbio mais desvalorizada não é consensual. O professor Bacha deixa claro na sua análise, ao falar do controle do crescimento do gasto público, que déficit em conta corrente é resultado do excesso de demanda sobre oferta. O governo, ao tentar fixar “na marra” a taxa de câmbio, apenas ocasionaria mais inflação e não resolveria o problema da indústria. Assim, salvar a indústria passaria, necessariamente, por uma redução do gasto do governo, em relação ao Produto Interno Bruto (PIB), que permitiria o aumento do investimento público, a redução de carga tributária e uma abertura planejada da economia.
Os outros dois economistas, Belluzzo e Coutinho, reconhecem a necessidade de maior responsabilidade fiscal, mas parecem acreditar que é possível o governo fixar a taxa de câmbio. Os dois passam a impressão que haveria um aumento de oferta decorrente de uma taxa de câmbio mais desvalorizada. No entanto, em uma economia com mercado de trabalho aquecido, maior desvalorização cambial se transforma em inflação e não resolve o problema de competitividade da indústria. Portanto, a necessidade de maior ajuste fiscal aparece novamente, e mesmo Belluzzo confessa que já chegou a defender uma proposta de “déficit (fiscal) nominal zero”.
Terceiro, os três especialistas falam da importância de maior integração das empresas industriais brasileiras às cadeias de produção global. Mas novamente, por trás desse aparente consenso, há divergências de como essa maior integração ocorreria. Bacha defende a redução da exigência de conteúdo nacional e de tarifas de importação. O maior processo de integração de empresas brasileiras ao resto do mundo resultaria da maior abertura, com perdedores e vencedores escolhidos pelo mercado.
Belluzzo e Coutinho, no entanto, acreditam em maior integração a partir de escolhas do governo via política industrial direcionadas a setores mais intensivos em tecnologia e com maior poder de disseminação de inovação para outros setores, por meio do uso de conteúdo nacional e compras governamentais. Os dois economistas parecem acreditar que maior integração com as cadeias globais é importante desde que parcela substancial de algumas cadeias (intensivas em tecnologia) estejam no Brasil.
Bacha e Coutinho utilizam o mesmo exemplo, a Embraer, para defender pontos de vistas totalmente diferentes. Bacha mostra que a Embraer é competitiva porque compra o que há de melhor no mundo para incorporar na sua produção, o que é possível pelo fato de a empresa não estar sujeita às amarras do conteúdo nacional. Coutinho cita o mesmo exemplo de sucesso de política industrial, mas quando questionado pelos repórteres do fato de a empresa ter baixo conteúdo nacional, reconhece que esse não seria o modelo ideal.
Apesar das diferenças comentadas acima, o que surpreende é que todos os três economistas com larga experiência na academia e governo reconhecem a necessidade de uma maior economia fiscal para “salvar a indústria”. No entanto, ao contrário do que poderia sugerir o debate, estamos fazendo exatamente o contrário.
Por exemplo, a agenda de desonerações de setores específicos da indústria está sendo implementada sem que tenha ocorrido um controle do crescimento da despesa pública. Assim, a maior desoneração levará a uma menor economia fiscal e, consequentemente, menor capacidade de o governo aumentar o investimento público. O aumento da dívida e repasses para bancos públicos com o aumento dos subsídios também limitam o espaço fiscal para novas desonerações e aumento do investimento público. Novamente, a agenda de curto prazo para salvar a indústria atrapalha a agenda fiscal de longo prazo da qual depende a indústria. Por fim, a agenda de concessões com o aumento dos subsídios do BNDES para que as novas obras de investimento saiam do papel pesa sobre as contas públicas e, assim, não permite novas desonerações ao longo dos próximos anos.
Em resumo, sem precisar entrar no mérito das ações de política industrial, uma agenda que o presidente do BNDES não cansa de repetir que é “muito complexa”, o que fica claro no debate do futuro da indústria no Brasil é a necessidade de o mesmo estar ligado ao debate fiscal. Infelizmente, não é isso que  está acontecendo e, assim, as ações de curto prazo para estimular o crescimento de indústria e da economia estão aumentando a incerteza do cenário fiscal de médio e longo prazo e, logo, do próprio futuro da indústria. 

Albert O. Hirschman, by Jeremy Adelman (Cass R. Sunstein, in NYRBooks)

Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman
by Jeremy Adelman
Princeton University Press, 740 pp., $39.95                                                  
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Albert Hirschman visiting his son-in-law Alain Salomon’s architectural project to develop a small park for children on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, 1971

Albert Hirschman, who died late last year, was one of the most interesting and unusual thinkers of the last century. An anti-utopian reformer with a keen eye for detail, Hirschman insisted on the complexity of social life and human nature. He opposed intransigence in all its forms. He believed that political and economic possibilities could be found in the most surprising places.
Hirschman is principally known for four remarkable books. The most influential, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), explores two ways to respond to unjust, exasperating, or inefficient organizations and relationships. You can leave (“exit”) or you can complain (“voice”). If you are loyal, you will not exit, and you may or may not speak out. The Passions and the Interests (1977) uncovers a long-lost argument for capitalism in general and commercial interactions in particular. The argument is that trade softens social passions and enmities, ensuring that people see one another not as members of competing tribes, but as potential trading partners. Shifting Involvements (1982) investigates the dramatically different attractions of political engagement and private life, and shows how the disappointments of one can lead to heightened interest in the other. For example, the protest movements of the 1960s were inspired, at least in part, by widespread disappointment with the experience of wealth-seeking and consumption, emphasized in the 1950s.
Finally, The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991) is a study of the reactionary’s tool kit, identifying the standard objections to any and all proposals for reform. The objections are “perversity” (the reform will make the problem even worse), “futility” (the reform will do nothing to solve the problem), and “jeopardy” (the reform will endanger some hard-won social gain). Hirschman shows that these objections are stupefying, mechanical, hyperbolic, and often wrong. In 1845, for example, the historian Jacob Burkhardt deplored the rise of democracy and the expansion of the right to vote on the ground that he did not “expect anything from the despotism of the masses but a future tyranny, which will mean the end of history.”
Hirschman’s work changes how you see the world. It illuminates yesterday, today, and tomorrow. His categories become your categories. A lot of moderate Republicans are disenchanted with the Republican Party. Do they “exit” or do they use their “voice” to try to change the party? In much of the world, nations and regions are now riven by religious and ethnic tensions. Should they emphasize how much their citizens can gain through trading with one another? If people are willing to buy your product, you might not care which god they worship. The Arab Spring saw an extraordinary outburst in political engagement. Is disappointment with the early results shifting people’s involvement toward the private sphere?
The current debate over gun control is a case study in “the rhetoric of reaction.” Those who object to legal restrictions urge that far from decreasing the risk of violence, such restrictions will actually increase it. For Hirschman, this objection would be an example of “perversity.” Opponents also contend that if we want to save lives, gun control will have essentially no effect—the argument from futility. We can find precisely the same rhetorical gambits in countless other debates, including those over Obamacare, increases in the minimum wage, affirmative action, and same-sex marriage.
Hirschman, born in 1915 in Berlin, was an economist by training, and he spent a lot of time reading Adam Smith, but his great intellectual loves were Montaigne (with his advice to “observe, observe perpetually”) and Machiavelli. To support his points, Hirschman drew on Dante, Jane Austen, Flaubert, Chekhov, and Yeats. He had a keen interest in social psychology. Crossing Boundaries is the title of one of his books; another is called Essays in Trespassing.
Part of what made Hirschman distinctive, even unique, was his ability to develop large themes from sharp observations of particular practices, and thus to connect apparently unrelated social phenomena. It was an observation of the behavior of motorists in a tunnel in Boston—who honked with outrage when people in an adjacent lane started to move while their lane remained stuck—that helped him to develop a general theory of disappointment and indignation. He was also wry and mischievous. As he wrote in the preface to Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:
Having found my own unifying way of looking at issues as diverse as competition and the two-party system, divorce and the American character, black power and the failure of “unhappy” top officials to resign over Vietnam, I decided to let myself go a little.
As Jeremy Adelman shows in his astonishing and moving biography, Hirschman sought, in his early twenties and long before becoming a writer, to “prove Hamlet wrong.” In Shakespeare’s account, Hamlet is immobilized and defeated by doubt. Hirschman was a great believer in doubt—he never doubted it—and he certainly doubted his own convictions. At a conference designed to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of his first book, who else would take the opportunity to show that one of his own central arguments was wrong? Who else would publish an essay in The American Economic Review exploring the “overproduction of opinionated opinion,” questioning the value of having strong opinions, and emphasizing the importance of doubting one’s opinions and even one’s tastes? Hirschman thought that strong opinions, as such, “might be dangerous to the health of our democracy,” because they are an obstacle to mutual understanding and constructive problem-solving. Writing in 1989, he was not speaking of the current political culture, but he might as well have been.
In seeking to prove Hamlet wrong, Hirschman was suggesting that doubt could be a source not of paralysis and death but of creativity and self-renewal. One of his last books, published when he was about eighty, is called A Propensity to Self-Subversion. In the title essay, Hirschman celebrates skepticism about his own theories and ideas, and he captures not only the insight but also the pleasure, even the joy, that can come from learning that one had it wrong.
He insisted that human history provides “stories, intricate and often nonrepeatable,” which “look more like tricks history has up its sleeve than like social-scientific regularities, not to speak of laws.” He was interested in “the many might-have-beens of history,” including “felicitous and surprising escapes from disaster.” One of his most important essays is called “Against Parsimony,” which argues that people sometimes choose to change their own preferences (consider, for example, efforts to quit smoking), and that some resources, such as love or public spirit, “may well increase rather than decrease through use.”
Hirschman was delighted by paradoxes, unintended consequences (especially good ones), the telling detail, inventories of actual practices (rather than big theories), surprises, and improvisation. In his view, “history is nothing if not farfetched.” He invented the term “possibilism,” meant to draw attention to “the discovery of paths, however narrow, leading to an outcome that appears to be foreclosed on the basis of probabilistic reasoning alone.” In his lifetime, one of many such outcomes was the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, which almost no one anticipated. Speaking of paradoxes: an economist by profession, he wasn’t great at math, and he wrote with remarkable clarity and subtlety.
Hirschman’s work is more than interesting enough to justify a book (or two, or ten), but Adelman’s achievement is to demonstrate, in novelistic detail, that he also lived an astounding life, full of narrow paths and ridiculously improbable twists and turns. Brought up in Berlin, he was raised during the better days of the Weimar Republic, when Berlin was alive with the avant-garde. Both of his parents’ families had converted from Judaism to Protestantism, and the family celebrated Christmas, not as a religious occasion but as a social one, with gifts for the children. Hirschman was baptized but declined to be confirmed: “Somehow I wasn’t impressed by the minister, and I asked my parents to stop.”
At the age of nine, he was sent to the Französisches Gymnasium, an intellectual hothouse from which he graduated in 1932. In the early 1930s, of course, the influence of the Nazi party was swiftly expanding. Hirschman engaged in countless discussions with his Nazi classmates; his physical education teacher wore a swastika. Communism was also an important presence, and so Hirschman had early and close experience with intransigence on both the left and the right. The topic of his final exam was a quotation from Spinoza: “One should neither laugh nor cry at the world, but understand it.”
After graduation, Hirschman began to study economics at the University of Berlin, which was of course in the midst of intense political conflict, and which contained a large number of Hitler supporters. In his own account, the situation did not seem truly grave until “the Reichstag fire, which really marked the beginning of the political horror.” Hirschman faced personal horror as well. His father, a physician, was diagnosed with terminal cancer and quickly died. Confronted by a new law that threw Jews out of universities, Hirschman chose to exit while still in his teens and left for Paris, where he formed relationships with a number of refugees from Russia, Italy, and Germany.
As Adelman tells the tale, Paris left an indelible mark on Hirschman. Surrounded by political dogmas of many different kinds but rejecting every “guiding ism,” he developed an immense enthusiasm for what he called “petites idées”—small ideas and little observations that, for the rest of his life, he would write down in notebooks or on scraps of paper. In Paris he developed the habit of rejecting abstract theories in favor of close observations of actual practices.
In dealing with events during the difficult period between 1935 and 1938, Hirschman showed a great deal of resilience and bravery. He decided to fight in the Spanish civil war against Franco with the very first Italian and German volunteers, some of whom were killed on the battlefield. For the rest of his life, Hirschman remained entirely silent about this experience, even with his wife, though “the scars on his neck and leg made it impossible for her to forget.” Returning from the war, he worked closely with the anti-Fascist Italian underground, carrying secret letters and documents back and forth from Paris.
As war loomed between France and Germany, Hirschman became a soldier for a second time, ready to fight for the French in what many people expected to be a prolonged battle. After the French defense quickly collapsed, Hirschman lived under German occupation and engaged in what was probably the most courageous and hazardous work of his life. Along with Varian Fry, a classicist from Harvard, he labored successfully to get stateless refugees out of France. In 1939 and 1940, they created a network that would enable more than two thousand refugees to exit. As Adelman writes, the “list of the saved reads like a who’s who.” It included Hannah Arendt, André Breton, Marc Chagall, Marcel Duchamp, and Max Ernst. Meticulous logistical planning was required to work out the right routes and to obtain the necessary exit and transit visas. Hirschman’s “colleagues marveled at his skill; for all his youth he was a font of devious ingenuity and seasoned wisdom.”
It was inevitable that Hirschman would find himself at serious personal risk. The Vichy government was helping agents of the Gestapo to find German Jews. It was time to run, taking one of the same routes that he had devised for so many others. Hirschman threw away everything he owned except what he could fit in a little bag (including his precious copy of Montaigne’s Essais and an extra pair of socks). With two other refugees, he started the long, grueling walk through the Pyrenees. Hirschman had to carry one of his exhausted companions for a part of the way.
After seven hours on foot, they crossed into Spain, and Hirschman made it into Portugal, where he waited for five weeks for the SS Excalibur, the ship that would take him to New York. In his mid-twenties, he wrote his mother, still in Germany, from the ship:
I shall enter this country with the will of getting to something, of showing that I have merited the extraordinary chain of lucky incidents which have led me here. Though I still love France, I am of course disappointed in many ways, and this makes my fourth—or is it the fifth?—emigration easier for me.
Hirschman had of course experienced plenty of horrific bad luck as well, but his characteristic hopefulness stood him in good stead. (One of his books is called A Bias for Hope.) Courtesy of the Rockefeller Foundation, he accepted a two-year fellowship at the University of California at Berkeley. Soon after his arrival there, he met Sarah Chapiro in the cafeteria at International House. Instantly captivated by her, he proposed eight weeks later, and she accepted.
At Berkeley, Hirschman focused on the effects of international trade on national economies. As part of his research, he developed statistical indices designed to measure market concentration (the degree to which a market is dominated by a limited number of firms) and market power. In a letter to his sister, Hirschman described his results as “pretty interesting”—a lovely understatement in view of the fact that those results continue to have basic importance for many areas of economics (including antitrust), under the name of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which measures the level of concentration in industries, and thus helps show how competitive they are. (Orris Herfindahl is often given credit for the index, but Hirschman got there first.)
Exploring the consequences of national power for the structure of foreign trade, Hirschman published his first book in 1945. Among other things, it addressed an interesting puzzle: Nazi Germany shifted from commerce with other wealthy nations to dealing with its smaller and less prosperous neighbors (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania). Hirschman explained that it did so in order to achieve economic and thus political dominance over them. The problem is that when some nations are wealthier than others, national sovereignty can produce economic sovereignty over entire regions. Hirschman’s first book, largely ignored in its own time and also ours, helps to explain a number of current predicaments. Consider China’s growing economic power and the political dominance that is resulting from that power.
As the book was being completed, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, and the young German economist, so recently a soldier in Spain and France, promptly enlisted in the US Army. Originally assigned to a combat unit, Hirschman was shifted to the Office of Strategic Services, where he worked as an interpreter. He read voraciously, including Albert Camus and Friedrich Hayek, whose great work, The Road to Serfdom, he found “very useful for someone like me who grew up in a ‘collectivist’ climate—it makes you rethink many things….” Notwithstanding his extensive reading, he abandoned the idea of an academic career, believing that he had no future in it.
After the war ended, Hirschman was assigned to be the interpreter in the first Allied war crimes trial, brought against the German General Anton Dostler, who had ordered the execution of prisoners in plain violation of conventions of war. Hirschman sat next to Dostler through the dramatic five-day trial. What must this have been like for him? The only record of his feelings is a single sentence in The New York Times, which reported that the nameless American “interpreter turned pale as he had to utter the death sentence” to the German general. Home in California, Sarah came across a black-and-white photo of her husband, leaning close to the Nazi general. Reading about how the interpreter went pale, she “breathed a sigh of relief that the war had not destroyed her husband’s sensitivity.”
After returning to Washington, Hirschman was hired by the Federal Reserve Board and then the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), where he emphasized the need for multilateral trading and helped to develop the thinking behind the Marshall Plan. With his ECA office just a few blocks from the White House, Hirschman argued vigorously against postwar austerity and for opening rather than closing markets. (It is reasonable to speculate that in the current economic situation, he would be a strong opponent of both austerity and protectionism.) Notwithstanding the high quality of his work, McCarthyism hit him directly and hard. A security review wrongly concluded, on the basis of unsubstantiated rumors, that he had some sympathy with communism. As a result, he was dismissed from the federal government in 1951. Adelman shows that false rumors about his past had dogged him since he joined the army.
Now with two daughters, Hirschman and his wife made their way to South America and to Colombia. There he went to work for the World Bank, acquired a lifelong interest in Latin America, and shifted the focus of his work to economic development. Advising Colombia’s president, he found a large disconnect between standard economic theory and actual practice. He produced a paper called “Case Studies of Instances of Successful Economic Development in Colombia,” which emphasized surprising success stories, including that of a bank specializing in small loans to individuals, artisans, and small firms, “which has experienced remarkable expansion recently due to novel methods and political support.”
In 1956, possibilism struck home. He received an unexpected letter from the chair of Yale’s economics department, who asked him whether he might be willing to come to New Haven as a visiting research professor. He accepted immediately, and his academic career started in his forties.
In New Haven, he produced his second book, The Strategy of Economic Development, which attacked the prevailing wisdom in favor of “balanced growth” and top-down planning. He argued instead for providing economic support to industries with strong “linkages,” understood as economic relationships with others. If one sector is closely linked to others, its own development, however unbalanced, can spur additional development and promote growth. Hirschman showed that in underdeveloped countries, the iron and steel industry tends to have high linkages; for that reason, it makes sense for such countries to support that industry. He contended that development depends “on calling forth and enlisting for development purposes resources and abilities that are hidden, scattered, or badly utilized.” In Hirschman’s account, history had no single course and could not be planned.
As he completed The Strategy of Economic Development, his exhilaration was palpable. He wrote his sister that an old teacher had explained
that I shouldn’t worry about love—and she stretched out her arms and then slowly brought her two index fingers together from afar—as sure as that, she said, would the girl that I will love get together with me one day. As it may be, along the lines of the example I think that there exists for each of us a personal (and nevertheless general) truth, we only have to trace it and then follow it deliberately and courageously. And I just had these last months the exciting feeling that I am about to succeed in following my truth.
Though the book received favorable reviews (and was destined to become a classic), Hirschman’s visiting professorship had run out at Yale. But in relatively short order, Columbia offered him his first real academic appointment. The only problem was that he hated teaching (and seemed to have a phobia about it throughout his life). In 1963, he moved to Harvard. Influenced by the protest movements of the 1960s, and seeking to challenge the view that market competition was a cure-all, he wrote Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, which became an immediate sensation. As Adelman notes, the immense influence of the book stems in part from the familiarity and wide application of the master concepts. Faced with a difficult nation, employer, credit card company, religion, or personal relationship, does one leave, protest, or keep quiet? All of us have had to answer that question, and Hirschman offered a new set of categories with which to answer it.
Despising teaching as much as he loved writing, Hirschman longed to spend time at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. In 1971, he asked whether he could visit there for the following year. He was indeed invited and the move became permanent. At the institute, Hirschman became keenly interested in the origins of capitalism and embarked on the project that became The Passions and the Interests. In that work, he rejected the nostalgia, current at the time, for a supposedly lost world of republican virtue, free of commercial avarice. He also rejected the suggestion, prominent then and now in the economics profession, that markets simply take human beings as they are, with their inevitable self-interest.
Instead he observed that the early theorists of free markets thought that commerce would transform people, by cooling our passions and making us gentler. In the words of Samuel Ricard in 1704, commercial interactions would encourage citizens “to be honest, to acquire manners, to be prudent and reserved in both talk and action.” At the same time, however, Hirschman worried that efforts to focus people on economic gain could “have the side effect of killing the civic spirit and of thereby opening the door to tyranny.”
Hirschman’s thinking about the alternating ease and difficulty of getting people to participate in public life led him to Shifting Involvements—a small masterpiece that illuminates the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, and protest movements of diverse kinds. Hirschman emphasized that human beings are often choosing between private and public life, and thus between the different forms of happiness that are associated with each of them. He described “pendular motions of collective behavior,” in which people swing from happiness to disappointment in one kind of activity, and then to the other. For example, the disappointments and frustrations of the student rebellions of the late 1960s encouraged a return to private life in the 1970s and 1980s. Rejecting the highly influential idea that the problem of collective action has a kind of invariable, ahistorical “logic,” Hirschman drew attention to the immense importance of history and timing as, in Adelman’s words, “people leave the streets and plazas disenchanted with politics to seek happiness in the shopping malls”—and vice versa.
The Rhetoric of Reaction, written in his mid-seventies, was an outgrowth of the conservative ascendancy of the 1980s, and it speaks directly to our current debates. Hirschman was struck by the routine, stylized, even mechanical character of much conservative thinking—and its close connection, in its rhetoric, to arguments that have been made for hundreds of years. Indeed, conservative rhetoric is the book’s target, perhaps above all in the person of Edmund Burke, who deplored the French Revolution and its emphasis on the rights of men, and who exclaimed, “Massacre, torture, hanging! These are your rights of men!” But in a fascinating flip, the book ends with a demonstration that the left has its own, closely related rhetorical moves. Where conservatives argue that further reforms will jeopardize precious accomplishments, the left throws “caution to the wind, to disregard not only tradition but the whole concept of unintended consequences of human action,” and hence “progressives are forever ready to mold and remold society at will and have no doubt about their ability to control events.”
Commenting on this aspect of his project, Hirschman refers to the
sheer fun in pursuing my argument into this originally unexpected direction. As is well known, criticizing one’s friends is more demanding and therefore more interesting than to expose once again the boring errors of one’s adversaries. So there was some intellectual exhilaration in my exercise at self-subversion.
That exercise was intended to challenge intransigence on the part of both the right and the left—and to get people to listen to one another in a spirit of humility, rather than making their standard, mind-numbing rhetorical moves.
Hirschman was sharp and productive into his eighties, but his faculties started to fail him, and by 1997, he had lost the ability to write or read. Ultimately he withdrew entirely into himself. In Adelman’s words, he was forced “to gaze in silence from a wheelchair” while Sarah “comforted and accompanied an increasingly spectral husband through his decline.” In 2011, Sarah herself fell ill with cancer and notwithstanding “her determination to be there until his end, the cancer would not be stopped.” The morning after her death, their daughter Katia delivered the news. “Albert’s head jerked up and for a moment his body shook before settling back into his remove.”
Of his many books, Hirschman’s personal favorite was The Passions and the Interests. His explanation is illuminating:
It really was the fruit of free creation. I did not write it against anybody…. That book gave me prolonged pleasure: to write, feeling free to discover things without having to prove someone wrong. A very special case.
That special case has proved to be an enduring achievement, not only because of its eye-opening exploration of the softening power of commerce, but also because of its own gentle and capacious spirit. But if The Passions and the Interests was his favorite, and Exit, Voice, and Loyalty his most important, there can be no question about his most characteristic: The Rhetoric of Reaction. The sustained attack on intransigence, the bias in favor of hope, the delight in paradox, the insistence on the creative power of doubt—all these prove a lot of people wrong, not just Hamlet.