O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

quinta-feira, 23 de março de 2023

Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the “Lula Doctrine” - Brian Winter (Americas Quarterly)

 Brazil

Q&A: Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira on the “Lula Doctrine”

An exclusive interview with Brazil’s top diplomat, on the relationship with China, the U.S., the need for multilateral reform, and more.
Brazil's Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira gives a statement in Asunción, Paraguay on March 9, 2023.Norberto Duarte/AFP via Getty Images
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Reading Time: 9 minutes

This article is a preview of Americas Quarterly’s upcoming special report, “What Lula Means for Latin America,” to be published in April. (Ler em português)

BRASILIA — “Brazil is back,” declared President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at an international conference shortly after his election. But what does that mean in practice for its relationships with the rest of Latin America, how it navigates the growing competition between China and the United States, and key flashpoints like the Ukraine war, Venezuela and Nicaragua?

Some of the answers will sound familiar to those who remember Lula’s first presidency, from 2003-10. But a lot since then has changed, both in Brazil and the world, which will lead to differences in foreign policy, Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira explained in an interview with AQ.  

“Twenty years ago, China’s growth was visible, but now it is a superpower, without a doubt,” Vieira said. “In less than 20 years, China has become Brazil’s main trading partner—and not just Brazil, but many Latin American countries. So that changed the scenario a lot, and geopolitics have changed.”

This interview took place in Portuguese via Zoom on March 13. It has been translated to English and lightly edited for clarity and content.

Brian Winter: This may be a very American question, but here in the United States, we always talk about presidents’ doctrines – the Biden doctrine, the Bush doctrine. Is there a Lula doctrine?

Minister Mauro Vieira: I’d say the Lula doctrine is one of restoring Brazil’s image and its relationships—not just with our Latin American neighbors, but also restoring Brazil’s presence in the world, on all the different kinds of world stages, be they bilateral or multilateral. In the past four years, Brazil halted its diplomatic tradition of being a country that is open to all interlocutors, regardless of their ideological positions, and of maintaining contact, and negotiating and talking. I think that if there is a doctrine, that is it.

President Lula gave me very specific instructions. He gave a very powerful, very important speech during the Sharm el-Sheikh Climate Change Conference, where he said that “Brazil is back.” After he appointed me and after he took office, he said repeatedly that this is what matters most, that it should be known that Brazil is back to its diplomatic tradition. He told me to rebuild all the bridges and all channels of communication that had been destroyed.

BW: The world has changed a lot in the past 20 years since Lula’s first term. What are the most important differences between his foreign policy then and now?

MV: At the time, his foreign policy was referred to as ativa e altiva (active and assertive). That’s a phrase coined by the former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, for whom I worked as chief of staff, and who represented very well this style of foreign policy in the first eight Lula years.

Of course, the world has changed a lot, in all ways, including media—information travels much more quickly—and geopolitics have also changed. Twenty years ago, China’s growth was visible, but now it is a superpower, without a doubt. In less than 20 years, China has become Brazil’s main trading partner—and not just Brazil, but many Latin American countries. So that changed the scenario a lot, and geopolitics have changed.

Now we have a war going on in Europe. And I think that global governance has also changed, because multilateral organizations, whether political or commercial, are very weakened, and they have lost their ability to act. From a commercial point of view, the World Trade Organization is paralyzed; it has lost relevance. And, at the same time, the situation of the United Nations is also worrying because we are witnessing the paralysis of its main body aimed at maintaining peace and security, which is the Security Council. The Security Council, with its 1945 format, is no longer reflected in today’s reality. And we are facing a major crisis in which its mechanisms, methods and composition do not allow the United Nations to play the fundamental role it should have—as Brazil’s argues it should, and as it did in the past.

Today there is a certain paralysis, to the detriment of world peace, to the detriment of better governance. So I think those are the big changes. And that’s where Brazil and President Lula’s foreign policy want to be active again, in promoting a discussion on global governance as well.

BW: The world has changed a lot. Brazil has also changed, especially in the last four years, as you mentioned. How do you see the efforts to restore Brazilian democracy following the events of recent months, especially the January 8 attacks in Brasilia? And these episodes, which represented an authoritarian risk for the country, similar to what we face here in the United States, do they have any point of intersection with Brazilian foreign policy? Or are they separate themes?

MV: Look, the issue of democracy in Brazil… I think that since 1964, when there was a break in the democratic order, which took 21 years [for democracy to be restored]… I think that with the restoration of democracy in Brazil and with the promulgation of the [1988] Constitution, we launched a young democracy, but a solid one, with solid instruments, dictated by the Constitution.

The events of January 8 were the result of clashes that have taken place in Brazilian society in recent years, since 2016, with the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and then, in 2018, with the election of the last government, which represented a huge shift to the right. That changed Brazil’s position in terms of foreign policy, but it also changed domestic policies, emboldening a group that felt privileged and encouraged to even finance the events of January 8. I was in Brasília, and it was an unexpected and surprising event—to see that number of people, about 4000 people, arriving at the Praça dos Três Poderes [where the judicial, legislative and executive branches are located] and destroying the buildings… It is an unbelievable thing, which received not only ideological and political encouragement, but also important financial support from various sectors.

This comes from a part of Brazilian society that is not democratic and does not appreciate democratic values. There is no doubt that there was an election, that President Lula won.

So, now it’s a matter of investigating and clarifying what happened, who inspired this, who committed these highly illegal acts that could have really compromised Brazilian democracy. But I think society and the established authorities reacted quickly and everything was brought under control. On Sunday [when the attack happened], already at the beginning of the evening, everything was under control and many had been arrested. And that’s that, in short.

BW: And does this have any impact on Brazil’s foreign policy? For example, were the similarities between the risks faced by Brazil and the United States a fundamental part of President Lula’s [February 10] visit with President Biden in Washington?

MV: Undoubtedly, these are national issues, but also with repercussions on foreign policy. That night I received maybe 15 phone calls from foreign ministers from other countries, in which they expressed solidarity and support for Brazil and for Brazilian democratic institutions. Presidents Biden and Lula discussed the subject, referencing events in each country, and they made public comments on the need to strengthen democracies around the world.

I think that big countries like the United States, Brazil and others, can play an important role in the dissemination of democratic values and in reinforcing the importance of maintaining democracy and highlighting the gains of democracy. In the case of Brazil, it was thanks to the restoration of democracy since the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 that we’ve had progressive governments, such as that of President Lula, which created conditions for economic growth and which benefited the population, lifting millions of people out of poverty, creating housing for people in need, healthcare systems and everything else.

This only happens in a democracy. Hence the importance of defending democracy, and any initiative to defend democracy internationally is very valid, because this way countries can develop and grow.

BW: Does the relative silence of the Lula government about dictatorships in Latin America, such as Nicaragua and Venezuela, in any way contradict this appreciation for democracy?

MV: No, because there is no silence.

The first time that there has been some movement on Nicaragua in the international scene inside a multilateral organization was in Geneva, at the Human Rights Council. [Editor’s note: On March 9, 54 countries including the United States, Chile, Peru and Colombia signed a statement urging the Ortega government to “release all political prisoners” and condemning the regime’s recent decision to revoke the citizenship of more than 300 Nicaraguans.] Brazil did not support [the statement], on the contrary. We wanted to make a separate statement, independent of that made by that group of nations. Because we wanted to make clear our position that there need to be changes, there need to be adjustments. Brazil wanted to first appeal to the multilateral mechanisms that are there and then discuss and exhaust all options before any other stronger measure, such as, for example, the adoption of sanctions, an element that was suggested throughout the debates.

That was the element that made us publish a separate declaration, referring to the need for dialogue with the [Ortega] government and relevant actors from Nicaraguan society. Unilateral sanctions, a measure many countries adopt, are illegal for Brazil. We can only apply sanctions that have been approved by the Security Council of the United Nations. So we could not, in principle, support a statement that didn’t make a reference to dialogue as a first step. And as it was the first opportunity [to debate this subject] in a multilateral forum, which is an institution that has the mechanisms to correct these points, and this was the first time that this discussion took place since President Lula took office, two and a half months ago, we wanted to make our position very clear.

BW: Does Brazil and the president have a role in possible peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia?

MV: Look, President Lula has said this countless times… There is a lot of talk about Lula’s proposal… He didn’t make a concrete proposal, with goals to follow to reach peace. What he said is that he keeps hearing about war, about large amounts of resources being allocated for the purchase of arms, about destruction and death, and he doesn’t hear about peace. What he wants and what he has done is to call for us to start discussing, in some way, peace.

This is what is important, in the face of all the victims, all the destruction wreaked in the country. He also condemned the invasion of Ukraine, and commented on the worldwide effects of inflation, a threat to food security, the risk of this war lasting for many years, or even getting out of control, in a world where weapons are increasingly destructive and more lethal. So, it is with all this concern that he has made and will continue to make, calls for a sit-down, because we are absolutely convinced that it is not in the interest of either party to continue with this sad and deplorable war, without at least trying to find a negotiated solution.

Brazil is a pacifist country … that’s our diplomatic DNA. That’s what the president wants to tell the world.

BW: Many countries, especially in the global south, are adopting the idea, or the doctrine, of “active non-alignment” as a strategy for dealing with the growing competition between the United States and China. Ambassador Amorim, whom you mentioned, even wrote a chapter for a recent book on this idea. Does this concept basically summarize the Brazilian position on this issue?

MV: Yes, we don’t have an automatic alignment to either side. We have, on the contrary, excellent relations with the United States — in fact, next year we will celebrate 200 years of diplomatic relations with ambassadors in each country. And we also have important relations with China. What guides us is the national interest within a framework of multilateralism, of international law. Automatic alignments do not bring positive results and results that are beneficial to the national interest. There can be losses when there is an automatic and unjustifiable alignment. In fact, as there was during the last four years.

Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira is focused on regional integration and met with Uruguay's foreign minister in March.
Brazil’s Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira (R) meets with his counterpart from Uruguay Francisco Bustillo at Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia on March 7, 2023. 
Photo by Evaristo Sa/AFP via Getty Images.

BW: There is a lot of talk about Latin American integration right now. There is ideological alignment between many governments in the region, but there is skepticism among some as to whether these ideas will translate into practical decisions, aside from meetings and the existence of blocs like CELAC and Unasur. Is there a concrete, practical agenda when it comes to regional integration? And what are the most important opportunities?

MV: There is no doubt that integration is a serious goal. In fact, Latin American integration is even in the Brazilian Constitution. And there are concrete examples, very concrete ones. The president visited Argentina and Uruguay. I just came back from Paraguay. President Lula will soon have a meeting with the president of Paraguay. These are the original partners of Mercosur. In these three cases, very specific measures and projects were agreed upon, pertaining to physical integration, for example, which is fundamental. We’ll soon announce them.

And these are projects that will benefit the road and rail infrastructure and river navigation in these countries, which will also have an immediate impact on trade: it lowers costs, it provides more security. It’s not just rhetoric. These are not projects that are starting now. We’re finalizing them, we put the final touches on them, and they are going to be implemented soon. And there are many others that could come.

CELAC is a place, it is a stage for discussions that can lead to concrete things. In addition, President Lula wants to review and update Unasur, which was indeed, differently from CELAC, a strong body, with concrete integration initiatives in many areas and which unfortunately was abandoned, but which we want to adapt and update, because it is also not the same world anymore. Mercosur integration translated to exponential growth in trade between our countries. Today we have important and significant trade for our economies, and without Mercosur, without an integration project, that would not happen.

BW: I mentioned this ideological alignment. Most governments, especially in South America, are left-wing, for all their differences. But it is possible that we will see a change of government in Argentina this year, for example. Is this ideological alignment important for Latin American relations, or is its importance overestimated?

MV: Look, the important thing is the national interest—and above all, the decisions of each country regarding integration with its neighbors. We cannot, under any circumstances, stop talking to any country, even more so to those with which we share a border. You know very well, as a Brazilianist, that we share 10 large borders with countries in the region. We cannot stop talking because this or that government has this or that ideological orientation. This is something that will not happen during President Lula’s government and that did not exist in Brazilian diplomatic tradition.

We will always talk to everyone. Regardless of ideological orientation. The national interest is above any difference of political position. So that’s what I can say, that’s what’s relevant, that’s what counts.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and one of Latin America’s most influential political analysts, with more than 20 years following the region’s ups and downs.


Tags: Brazil,  Brazil's foreign policy,  Lula

Sobre a tal "neutralidade" brasileira e a questão das sanções "unilaterais" - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Sobre a tal "neutralidade" brasileira e a questão das sanções "unilaterais"


Muitas pessoas ignoram que, bem antes da África do Sul ser objeto de sanções multilaterais, ela sofreu, durante vários anos, sanções unilaterais por parte de países que condenavam o nefando regime do Apartheid. 
Essas sanções seriam menos legítimas por isso? 
Claro que não! Tanto que foram depois estendidas a todos e o Brasil teve também de aplicar essas sanções ainda que a contragosto. 
A neutralidade, sobretudo no caso de um país que VIOLOU grosseiramente a Carta das Nações Unidas, em diversos artigos, e que perpetra crimes de guerra, contra a paz e contra a humanidade diariamente, pode ser uma indignidade política, não sustentável em qualquer doutrina jurídica que se queira.
Recomendo a leitura do livro de Rui Barbosa, "Conceitos Modernos de Direito Internacional", original de 1916, no qual ele, referindo-se ao caso da Bélgica neutra invadida pelo Império alemão na Grande Guerra, dizia muito claramente que não se pode ser neutro entre a Justiça e o crime (livro de 1983, da Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa).
A mesma postura teve Oswaldo Aranha, na Segunda Guerra, referindo-se explicitamente a Rui Barbosa, quando alinhou o Brasil às demais Nações Unidas em luta contra as potências fascistas que justamente invadiram outros países, contra o Direito Internacional. 
Em 1939, o Brasil não reconheceu a usurpação violenta da Polônia por Hitler, assim como não reconheceu a invasão e incorporação dos três países bálticos à URSS em 1940.
A doutrina jurídica e diplomática brasileira é muito clara com respeito às normas mais elementares do Direito Internacional, e nem o Estado Novo de Vargas ousou contrária-la, por mais que tivesse simpatias fascistas em 1939-40.
Em 2014, o governo Dilma não se pronunciou em face da invasão ilegal da Crimeia pela Rússia, numa clara indiferença pela histórica posição do Brasil no campo do Direito Internacional.
A vergonha começou ali, foi continuada por Bolsonaro, e parece que está sendo retomada por Lula. 
O Brasil não pode ser neutro em face das violações grosseiras da Carta da ONU pela Rússia, e teria de deixar isso muito claro.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 23/03/2023

Chanceler russo vem ao Brasil em teste à posição de neutralidade do país - Murillo Camarotto (O Globo)

Neutralidade não se significa se eximir ante o crime e a injustiça já se ensinava Rui Barbosa. (PRA)

Chanceler russo vem ao Brasil em teste à posição de neutralidade do país

Viagem é última escala de Sergei Lavrov na busca por maior apoio entre Brics

Por Murillo Camarotto — De Brasília

O Globo, 23/03/2023

 

O ministro das Relações Exteriores da Rússia, Sergei Lavrov, chega a Brasília no dia 17 de abril para uma reunião com o chanceler Mauro Vieira. A visita é mais uma escala do experimentado diplomata russo em seu périplo por países emergentes, de onde vem conseguindo extrair alguns gestos para atenuar o isolamento imposto ao país desde a invasão da Ucrânia, há cerca de um ano.

A missão por aqui parece a mais desafiadora, ao menos se considerado o conjunto de países-sócios do Brics. O Brasil foi o único membro do grupo a votar contra a Rússia em uma resolução da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) que condenou a invasão da Ucrânia. China, Índia e África do Sul se abstiveram.

Se o objetivo de Lavrov é movimentar a posição brasileira no tabuleiro, as chances de ele sair daqui apenas com uma fotografia são grandes. No Itamaraty, a versão quase unânime é de que o Brasil vai manter intocado seu posicionamento atual, de neutralidade no conflito, mas crítico à invasão de um país soberano.

A agenda em Brasília prevê apenas uma reunião entre os dois ministros de Relações Exteriores, mas não está totalmente descartado um encontro com o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, caso haja disponibilidade.

A tendência do Brasil, a meu ver acertada, é continuar na posição atual. Uma posição de décadas do Itamaraty. Ao presidente Lula também não interessa se indispor com o Ocidente”, pondera Angelo Segrillo, professor de história pela Universidade de São Paulo e especialista em Rússia.

Ele explica que a movimentação de Vladimir Putin sobre os emergentes é, em síntese, o aprofundamento forçado de uma estratégia que já tem mais de 20 anos, de promoção de um mundo multipolar, com menor protagonismo dos Estados Unidos.

O próprio Brasil, já sob Lula, participou ativamente dessa agenda anos atrás, com a criação do G20 e a formação de blocos de nações emergentes, caso do Brics, no chamado “Sul Global”. Isolado rapidamente por americanos e europeus após invadir o vizinho, Putin se viu forçado a buscar suporte nesses países.

Sua estratégia, na avaliação de Segrillo, tem obtido algum êxito. Além do estreitamento das relações com a China - evidenciado nas últimas declarações de Pequim e na visita de Estado de Xi Jinping a Moscou -, Putin conseguiu manter laços firmes com a Índia e observou a neutralidade de quase metade do continente africano em votações na ONU.

Além de ter reforçado a compra de petróleo e gás da Rússia, o que ajudou Moscou a atenuar os embargos, o governo indiano tem adotado um tom crítico ao Ocidente. Em janeiro, o ministro do Exterior da Índia, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, apontou a “hipocrisia” dos europeus sobre a invasão de um país pelo outro.

Posso dar-lhes muitos exemplos de países que violam a soberania de outro país. Se eu perguntasse onde está a Europa em muitos deles, temo ter um longo silêncio”, disse ele em entrevista a uma rede de TV austríaca, ao ser questionado sobre a posição de Nova Déli sobre a Ucrânia.

Ano passado, ele já havia sugerido que a Europa mudasse a mentalidade. “Em algum momento a Europa tem que sair da mentalidade de que os problemas da Europa são problemas do mundo, mas problemas do mundo não são problemas da Europa”, criticou o ministro durante uma conferência na Eslováquia.

Jaishankar teve uma reunião bilateral com Lavrov no início deste mês, em meio ao encontro dos ministros de Relações Exteriores do G20, na Índia. O chanceler Mauro Vieira compareceu ao evento e manteve reuniões.

Lavrov também colheu bons frutos na viagem à África do Sul, em janeiro. A ministra de Relações Exteriores do país, Naledi Pandor, descreveu a Rússia como um “país amigo”. A calorosa acolhida veio pouco tempo depois de Pretória confirmar exercícios militares conjuntos com as marinhas russa e chinesa - o que foi criticado pelos Estados Unidos.

A ofensiva russa para o continente africano aposta na relação construída durante a Guerra Fria, um período em que vários países da região estavam saindo da colonização europeia. A União Soviética ofereceu ajuda econômica e militar a várias nações.

Em julho do ano passado, Lavrov visitou quatro países africanos em apenas cinco dias na busca por alianças. Levou na bagagem a mensagem de que a Rússia garantiria o acordo para a exportação de grãos pelos portos ucranianos, operação importante para o abastecimento da região.

No início da guerra, somente 28 dos 54 países da África, pouco mais da metade, votaram contra a Rússia na Assembleia Geral da ONU. O percentual de votos africanos favoráveis à resolução, de 51%, ficou bem abaixo dos 81% representados pelas demais nações participantes da reunião.

Há, entre muitos analistas internacionais, a impressão de que se não há apoio para a invasão da Ucrânia entre os países emergentes, também é baixo o interesse por tomar lado no conflito. É nessa posição que o Brasil deve permanecer e que, de certa forma, a China parece disposta a mudar.

Apesar da pompa da visita a Moscou, nesta semana, o regime chinês ainda não seu sinais de que poderá dar subir o patamar da tensão ao anunciar uma aliança militar com Putin. Indiretamente, no entanto, Pequim seguirá financiando os russos, com compra de petróleo e gás e possíveis novos acordos comerciais.

Segundo o professor Segrillo, um possível teste para a posição neutra do Brasil seria a Rússia cruzar a linha do uso das armas nucleares, por exemplo. Isso poderia forçar o Itamaraty a tomar lado, o que, por ora está fora do radar. “Ninguém tem bola de cristal, mas acredito que a posição do Brasil não deve mudar.”

https://valor.globo.com/google/amp/brasil/noticia/2023/03/23/chanceler-russo-vem-ao-brasil-em-teste-a-posicao-de-neutralidade-do-pais.ghtml

 

Can Russia Ever Become a ‘Normal’ European Nation? - Adrian Karatnycky (Foreign Policy)

Can Russia Ever Become a ‘Normal’ European Nation?

Ironically, a defeat by Ukraine could trigger Russians to reexamine their national identity.

By Adrian Karatnycky, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the founder of Myrmidon Group.

Foreign Policy, February 20, 2023


Can Russia become a normal nation-state following the pattern of other European countries and former empires—and abandon half a millennium of imperial conquest and propaganda? Because the imperial mindset has been intertwined with the Russian sense of nationhood for so long, such a change is unlikely to come from within. Ironically, it is the Ukrainians, who, by handing the imperial center a decisive defeat, can trigger a reexamination of Russia’s national identity. Only in defeat will Russians have a chance to refocus their country’s priorities away from empire and toward a domestic agenda of economic, social, and democratic development.


A Russian sense of nationhood focused on reform at home instead of domination over non-Russians had a brief shining moment in the waning days of the Soviet Union. Around 1990, a group of reformist politicians in Moscow, Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), and other major Russian cities organized around a liberal, patriotic agenda in the Democratic Russia movement. The movement’s leaders—such as the human rights activist Lev Ponomaryov, the civic activist Mikhail Astafyev, the Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin, and soon-to-be-Moscow-Mayor Gavriil Popov—articulated an agenda of domestic reform that sought to repair the damage that 70 years of communist dictatorship had inflicted on the Russian people. Leaders of this nascent movement were the first to unfurl the Russian tricolor at the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR), one of the Soviet Union’s 15 constituent republics. Most people have forgotten it, but the modern Russian flag actually started as a symbol of liberalism and resistance—led by Boris Yeltsin, then the president of the newly formed Russian republic—to the August 1991 coup attempt by military hard-liners seeking to quash reforms and restore the Soviet dictatorship.


The Democratic Russia movement’s moderate agenda coincided with Yeltsin’s political ambitions—including his desire to undermine the central Soviet apparatus and transfer power to the Russian republic he was leading at the time. Yeltsin’s inner circle included influential anti-imperial patriots, such as Gennady Burbulis, one of the drafters of the accords that dissolved the Soviet Union, and Galina Starovoitova, a former dissident. Liberal nationalists, led by economic reformer Yegor Gaidar, then went on to found the Democratic Choice of Russia party, which won 18 percent of the seats in the Russian parliamentary elections of 1993 and became a key part of Yeltsin’s coalition.

In the first years of the country’s post-Soviet independence, Yeltsin promoted the idea of Russia as the homeland of the Russian people. Although he hoped to bind all 15 independent post-Soviet states to each other in a confederation, Yeltsin worked constructively with neighboring non-Russian states, ultimately recognizing their sovereignty. With the exception of Russian support for separatist movements in newly independent Georgia and Moldova, Yeltsin generally avoided destabilizing territorial disputes outside Russia’s borders. Soviet symbols and references to the Russian Empire were jettisoned. In their place came a focus on building state and civic institutions, including political parties, trade unions, veterans organizations, environmental groups, and cultural associations. Instead of the Soviet national anthem, Russsia used the “Patriotic Song,” a melody by the classical composer Mikhail Glinka, without any accompanying lyrics.

But powerful revanchist and chauvinist imperial forces never went away. Their most prominent public voice was a powerful conservative opposition in the Russian Duma that nearly toppled Yeltsin in a bid to replace him with his own vice president, Alexander Rutskoy. Imperialist ideas also retained strength in the security services, whose influence grew amid political ferment among Russia’s many ethnic minorities. Amid the economic hardships of a difficult transition from Soviet rule—and as Chechnya’s drive for independence pitted Russians against non-Russians—the influence and popularity of the liberal nationalists eroded. In their place, Yeltsin gradually allowed hard-liners with imperial ideas to return to positions of influence. These hard-liners convinced Yeltsin that Chechnya’s secessionists should be crushed by force.


The imperial hard-liners’ total victory came in 1999 with the appointment of Vladimir Putin as Yeltsin’s prime minister and designated successor as president. Putin moved quickly to redefine Russia and reawaken its sense of imperial grandeur. In 2000, he jettisoned Yeltsin’s national anthem, restored the melody of the Soviet anthem, and added new lyrics with an imperial twist, celebrating Russia as the “age-old union of fraternal peoples.”

Today, there is little impetus for a Russian patriotic movement focused on domestic development. Even among what’s left of the opposition, there are few voices trying to convince Russians to build a future within the country’s recognized borders. Even the imprisoned opposition activist Alexey Navalny, while he has spoken out against the war, argues that Crimea belongs to Russia and is unapologetic for having used ethnic slurs against Russia’s national minorities. He has also spoken with regret about the separation of the Orthodox Ukrainians from Moscow and blames Putin for destroying the prospects for a “Russian world”—Russkiy mir—that reaches far beyond Russia’s borders, an ideological construct promoted by far-right Russian nationalists and used by Putin and his media mouthpieces to justify Russia’s genocidal denial of Ukrainian nationhood. Navalny and most other Russian opposition figures focus their attention on the state’s authoritarian rule and rampant corruption rather than the fundamental values—such as respect for sovereign countries’ borders and choices—that could lay the foundation of a post-imperial national identity.

Only a clear, unambiguous triumph by Ukrainians asserting their distinct national identity could help Russians transition to a post-imperial civic identity. By forcefully demonstrating that Ukrainians are in no way part of the Russian nation, they are already having important effects on many Russians’ understanding of their relationship to the nations beyond their border. Ukrainian resistance and unity has created impossible challenges for Russian propaganda about the so-called Russian world. Their solution has been to frame the war as Russia’s fight against NATO and the imaginary cabal of Nazis that have supposedly taken over Ukraine, but every battlefield defeat at the hands of better-organized and better-motivated Ukrainians pokes another hole in the Kremlin’s false narrative.


By compelling Russians to embrace a national narrative stripped of imperialism, a Ukrainian victory can help ensure a better future for Russia as well.

There are precedents for Russians changing their view of who belongs to the imperial Russian world. In the 19th century, when much of Poland was part of the Russian Empire, the Kremlin viewed Poles as a nation that was to undergo cultural, educational, and religious Russification. Count Sergei Uvarov, the Russian Empire’s education minister from 1833 to 1849, believed Poles could be transformed into Russians within one generation. But a series of Polish rebellions taught Russia that the forced assimilation of Poles would not work. Russians learned, as they are being taught by the Ukrainians today, that Poles were indeed a separate nation unwilling to lose its culture and identity.

Ukrainians, too, have rebelled against the Russians throughout their history—including under a succession of Cossack Ukrainian hetmans in the 17th and 18th centuries. The story of Ukrainians’ resistance to Russian rule—and ultimately independence—has to do with the fact that their nation has had a separate, Western-influenced history and identity from Russia’s for many centuries. But unlike the Poles’ fierce resistance to Russia, Ukrainian resistance was of insufficient duration and intensity to rid Russians of their illusions that Ukrainians—first called “little Russians” in the tsarist era as a way to erase their nationhood—were indeed a separate people with a separate language and culture. Only by winning this war will Ukrainians finally be able to drive home to Russians what is clear to Ukrainians and just about everyone else: Ukraine is not Russia.

Discussions of Russia’s future have focused primarily on two scenarios—the removal of Putin and his replacement with a more pragmatic leadership, and Russia’s collapse into several states as its internal fractures can no longer be papered over by a common enemy and an authoritarian regime. Neither scenario, however, ensures long-lasting security for Ukraine and other countries formerly in the Soviet sphere. There is no security against Russia if the country and its people do not shed their imperial mindset and become a “normal” European nation-state. Ukrainians desperately want to live next to a normal Russia whose elite and citizenry accept their country’s borders and Ukraine’s right to statehood as a distinct nation.

Even if Ukraine prevails with Western help, Russia’s imperial instincts are unlikely to vanish completely. Imperial collapse usually leaves a long trail of resentment—just look at France’s loss of Algeria in 1962, which remains a point of contestation in the national memory and a source of mobilization for the far right. Still, imperial nations usually—even if only gradually—reconcile with the sovereignty of their former colonies. If Russia is stopped in Ukraine, there is ample reason to believe it will eventually follow this well-trodden path. But the abandonment of empire has almost always required defeat.

There is one glaring issue, however, that makes Russian imperialism different: It is really two imperialisms—the former external empire beyond its borders and Moscow’s internal empire consisting of dozens, if not hundreds, of conquered and colonized non-Russian peoples. Russia includes numerous subnational republics and other political units where a non-Russian ethnic group forms a clear—or even overwhelming—majority, including Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Kalmykia, Sakha, and Tatarstan. While a complete dissolution of Russia is unlikely, many of these regions—some with vast natural resources—have the potential for national mobilization, especially in cases where ethnic Russians are only a small minority. This, in turn, can reinforce chauvinist trends inside the Russian Federation for years to come and withdraw support from moderates, liberals, and anti-imperialists.


Putin has long argued that Ukraine is an essential part of Russian history and identity. In ways he did not anticipate, events may soon prove him right: A victory in which Ukraine reclaims control over its territories and successfully defends its national and European identity can become a crucial factor in pushing Russians onto a path of normal development previously trod by other European peoples and post-colonial states. By compelling Russians to embrace a national narrative stripped of imperialism—a narrative that seeks to build a civic state rooted in a clear national identity within its sovereign boundaries—Ukrainians can help ensure not only their own and the region’s security, but a better future for Russia as well.


Adrian Karatnycky is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the founder of Myrmidon Group.

Economist Intelligence Unit Report on the War in Ukraine in 2023 (Excerpts)

Things to watch in 2023: the war in Ukraine

1. The war will enter a transitional phase in 2023, from an active conflict to a protracted, lower-intensity stalemate with a contested frontline. Exhaustion and heavy losses will make carrying out large-scale offensives increasingly costly and difficult for both sides. Both Russia and Ukraine are preparing for a new push in the spring, but both sides will struggle to gain a conclusive advantage on the ground. Russia’s military problems will continue, including heavy damage to troops and equipment.
This will push Russia to double down on its strategy of inflicting major damage on Ukraine’s critical 
infrastructure as a means to choke the economy and demoralise the population—with limited success. 
A second Russian mobilisation drive is also likely, but it will fail to attract large numbers of troops.

At the same time, Ukraine’s war efforts will continue to be constrained by equipment and personnel shortages.

2. Russia’s plans to mobilise anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Europe will fail and Western support for Ukraine will continue. This was indicated by generous military assistance pledges from the US in December 2022 and from some European countries in January 2023, including an agreement to send German Leopard 2 battle tanks. Pro-Ukrainian sentiment in the EU remains strong, with 74% in approval of the bloc’s position on the war, according to a Eurobarometer survey in January. Financial and humanitarian aid will continue uninterrupted and will prevent a total collapse of the Ukrainian economy. The biggest risk to support for Ukraine comes from donors’ declining arms and ammunition stockpiles. Still, Western support will ensure that Ukraine has the means to keep fighting in 2023 and to proceed with planned counter-offensives to challenge Russia’s positions.


3. Peace negotiations are unlikely to take place.
 Both Russia and Ukraine perceive the war to be existential, and we do not expect either side to agree to concessions in 2023. Ukraine has presented a ten-point peace plan, including the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity (to the country’s 1991 borders), which Russia has dismissed. If any talks do occur, they will be limited in scope, along the lines of the talks that led to the grain deal signed in mid-2022. The lack of meaningful talks is in line with our forecast that this will be a protracted conflict without a clear-cut resolution.


4. Western sanctions will remain in place in the long term, with a focus in 2023 on tightening 
implementation and closing loopholes. Additional restrictions on Russia’s energy sector are also possible (for instance through a tightening of the G7 oil price cap, which could be lowered below the current price of US$60/barrel). The EU and the US will pay close attention to Russia’s circumvention efforts and are likely to impose sanctions on countries that they believe are aiding Russia with sanctions evasion, such as Iran. In parallel, this sanctions push will also prompt greater efforts by the targeted countries to sanction-proof their economies, for example by setting up non-Western financing channels.


5. The Russian economy will contract further. This will result from the G7-imposed price cap on Russian crude oil, as well as the EU’s embargo on oil and petroleum products. Russia’s economic downturn will damage the public finances (complicating the financing of the war), and the results of sanctions will become more evident on the ground, with shortages of goods worsening and domestic manufacturing output under stress. In this context, the Russian leadership will be increasingly concerned about social stability. In the long term Western restrictions on the import of high-tech goods (such as semiconductors) will weigh on the Russian economy and gradually erode the country’s status as a global energy superpower.

6. Europe’s decoupling from Russia will deepen. The EU market will remain closed for Russian hydrocarbons, which used to represent about a third of Europe’s total energy consumption. The bloc will continue to invest in a new model of energy security excluding Russia. Energy prices will remain high in the EU, compared with other advanced economies, and Europe will lose global market share for the exports of energy-intensive industrial sectors such as metals and chemicals. However, this will be followed by a new equilibrium in which Russia will be much more economically constrained and will have far less leverage over Europe.


7. Russia’s role as a security guarantor and regional hegemon in the post-Soviet space will continue to wane. This will open the way for other regional and global powers—notably China, Turkey and Western countries—to jostle for influence. The security vacuum left by a distracted Russia and shifting power dynamics could result in an uptick in regional conflicts in 2023. In the breakaway region of Nagorny Karabakh, Azerbaijan will continue to put pressure on Armenia (which relies on Russia as its security guarantor) for a permanent peace resolution. Georgia and Moldova could also be flashpoints this year. In Central Asia, the Fergana Valley—where the borders of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan meet—will continue to record clashes.


8. The war will continue to reshape global geopolitics. Russia will increasingly rely on China for economic and trade ties and will benefit from worsening US-China relations. However, China will be careful not to become overly dependent on Russian commodities or the Russian market. Russia will try to build new trade routes with emerging markets, which have mostly remained neutral in the conflict, and will aim to capitalise on growing resentment against former colonial powers and US hegemony, notably in Africa and Latin America. Russia will also use its existing economic leverage and disinformation narratives to stoke a further rift between the Global South and the developed economies of Europe and North America, with the goal of hurting US and EU interests from afar.

We expect Russia to have at least some success in this area (for instance by spreading disinformation about the alleged impact of Western sanctions on food security).


9. Global commodity prices will moderate (compared with 2022 highs), but still remain significantly above 2019 levels. We expect Russia’s oil production to contract as a result of the EU oil embargo and the G7-imposed price cap on Russian crude oil. This, combined with OPEC+ production cuts and the reopening of China’s economy, will push the oil market into a deficit and keep prices high. In addition, global natural gas prices will remain high owing to gas shortages in Europe and Russia’s inability to fully re-direct gas flows elsewhere. The main pressure on global food markets will be felt through fertiliser shortages, as high global energy prices keep production costs high. Grain shipments from Russia and Ukraine will also remain subject to uncertainty.

10. The reorientation of global supply chains will continue. With no resolution of the war in sight, firms will push to reorient their supply chains as far from the conflict as possible, and to source critical resources from elsewhere (apart from energy, Russia is a major producer of gold, base and precious metals, fertilisers and food staples). In 2023 “friend-shoring”, prioritising trade and investment ties between friendly countries, will continue to gain traction. As US-China strategic competition deepens, this will add to the long-term trend towards the fragmentation of the global economic and security framework. Large neutral economies (such as India, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Brazil) will play an increasingly important role in the global geopolitical scene.