Falklands-Malvinas: um imbroglio eterno?

Recebo, de um leitor deste blog, as seguintes perguntas:

On Nov 22, 2012, at 02:25 PM, [fulano] <fulano@gmail.com> wrote:

Boa tarde
Dr. Paulo, gostaria de tirar uma dúvida sobre as Malvinas.
Eu acredito que a situação política das Malvinas, está mais para uma posição geográfica estratégica militar em relação a América do Sul do que simplesmente uma situação isolada para benefícios para a Argentina.
No entanto, caso a Argentina obtenha direitos sobre as Malvinas, após análise da ONU, e a Inglaterra não concordar, esgotados todos os direitos legais, poderá a Argentina ter o direito de  expulsar a Inglaterra por uso da força?
Grato
 [Fulano]

Eis o que respondi, muito improvisadamente e de forma rápida:

Ilhas no meio do oceano sempre são interessantes, para países costeiros, ainda que um pouco longe da linha territorial: elas ampliam tanto o conceito e a realidade do mar territorial (12 milhas reconhecidas internacionalmente, 200 milhas requeridas por muitos países), como a da Zona Econômica Exclusiva, também de 200 milhas segnudo a Convenção do Direito do Mar. Estamos falando de recursos econômicos: petróleo e outros nódulos metálicos, além dos recursos pesqueiros.
Quando Grã-Bretanha se apossou do antigo território espanhol das Malvinas, reivindicado pela Argentina então nascente, se tratava apenas de uma etapa de apoio na longa viagem entre o Atlântico norte e o Pacífico, passando pelo canal de Magalhães para alcancar o Oriente, cujo outro acesso seria pelo Indico, antes da abertura dos canais do Panamá e de Suez.
No plano militar tinha pouca importãncia, mas a Royal Navy, como todo grande império, gostava de ter bases em todos os mares. Hoje sua importância é basicamente econômica.

Não sei como a ONU poderia conceder direito sobre as Malvinas à Argentina, pois isso dependeria, basicamente, de um laudo da Corte Internacional de Justiça, caso as duas partes aceitassem tal procedimento e se comprometessem a cumprir um veredito (que imagino não ocorrerá por objeção da GB), ou de uma resolução do CSNU, o que também não ocorrerá, uma vez que a GB também possui direito de veto, mesmo que todos os demais, e os quatro outros permanentes, assim o desejem.
Não haverá, portanto, mas se por acaso houvesse, a Argentina ainda assim não teria como conduzir sozinha uma operação de "desalojo", pois não estaria se defendendo de uma agressão contra si, e não teria nenhuma resolução do CSNU autorizando medidas retorsivas. A única operação desse tipo ocorrida foi a primeira guerra do Golfo, depois que o Iraque invadiu o Kwait.
Ou seja, o tema vai permanecer na agenda, mas não haverá solução política, diplomática ou militar, até que a GB decida, sozinha, unilateralmente, por vontade própria, retirar seus cidadãos das Malvinas e entregar o território à Argentina.
Isso, se ocorrer, deve demorar pelo menos mais 50 anos, até que estejam mortos todos os protagonistas da guerra de 1982.
 Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Licoes nao solicitadas de economia: a falsa versao e a verdadeira - Rolf Kuntz

As lições de Tia Dilma

Rolf Kuntz 

O Estado de S.Paulo, 21 de novembro de 2012

 

A presidente Dilma Rousseff aproveitou a viagem à Espanha para oferecer aos governantes europeus, mais uma vez, lições de política econômica. Nenhuma autoridade local perguntou à visitante por que a economia brasileira deve crescer tão pouco neste ano - talvez nem 2% -, depois do fiasco dos 2,7% em 2011. Enquanto ela completava suas lições e propunha maior autonomia para o Banco Central Europeu, em Brasília a ministra do Planejamento, Miriam Belchior, divulgava mais um constrangedor balanço do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC). Desde o início do governo até setembro, foram aplicados R$ 385,9 bilhões em "obras de infraestrutura logística, social e urbana", segundo os dados oficiais. Mas esse valor inclui R$ 154,9 bilhões de financiamentos habitacionais e de subsídios ao programa Minha Casa Minha Vida. Esses financiamentos correspondem a 40,1% do total contado como investimento. Faltou a presidente explicar aos europeus se essa forma de contabilidade é parte do pragmatismo por ela defendido durante a cúpula ibero-americana. Ou dizer se é pragmático tentar impor sem conversa prévia os contratos de renovação de concessões às companhias do setor elétrico. A depreciação das ações da Eletrobrás, R$ 7,9 bilhões de 11 de setembro a 19 de novembro, parece indicar uma resposta negativa.
Em seus comentários mais sensatos, a presidente defendeu uma combinação de austeridade e crescimento como a fórmula mais eficiente para o ajuste europeu. A arrumação fiscal, ponderou, será muito mais difícil, penosa e pouco frutífera, se depender apenas do corte de gastos e do aumento de impostos. Mas esse comentário foi mera repetição do discurso apresentado muitas vezes por dirigentes do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI), por economistas de várias nacionalidades e por alguns governantes europeus. Sem acrescentar a mínima novidade em relação a esse ponto, a presidente permitiu-se, no entanto, reescrever a história econômica à sua maneira. Para reforçar sua argumentação, citou a experiência latino-americana dos anos 80 e 90, quando os governos do Brasil e de outros países foram, segundo o seu relato, orientados pelo FMI a adotar políticas de ajuste sem espaço para crescimento.
Essa versão é popular, mas a história é um pouco mais complicada e inclui detalhes mais instrutivos. Dezenas de países afundaram na crise da dívida externa, nos anos 80. O drama começou quando o Federal Reserve, o banco central americano, iniciou um drástico aumento de juros em 1979. O desastre generalizou-se em 1982, mas vários países entraram em apuros bem antes disso. A renegociação das dívidas foi vinculada a duros programas de ajuste, jamais cumpridos integralmente por alguns governos, incluído o brasileiro.
O programa inicial de ajuste adotado no Chile foi reformado e substituído, com bons resultados, depois de algum tempo. O governo coreano iniciou a arrumação em 1979. O país entrou em recessão em 1980 e em seguida voltou a crescer velozmente, com déficit fiscal reduzido, grande aumento de exportações e investimentos sempre superiores a 30% do PIB. Chile e Coreia saíram da crise com as contas públicas em ordem, inflação baixa e medidas fundamentais para competir e crescer.
Falta algo, portanto, na versão popular, repetida pela presidente Dilma Rousseff, da história da crise e dos ajustes dos anos 80. Falta explicar por que alguns países - Coreia e Chile são apenas dois dos exemplos mais notáveis - emergiram da fase de provação muito mais fortes do que antes. Outras economias da Ásia atingidas pela crise da dívida também se tornaram mais eficientes a partir da segunda metade dos anos 80. A maior parte dos países latino-americanos ficou para trás porque os governos foram incapazes, por muito tempo, de abandonar velhos vícios e de favorecer a eficiência. Não se deve atribuir esse atraso a algum excesso de austeridade, mas à insistência na prática de contemporizar em vez de enfrentar os problemas.
Quando os governantes se dispuseram, afinal, a adotar reformas e políticas sustentáveis, as contas públicas melhoraram, a inflação caiu, as contas externas se tornaram superavitárias e as reservas cresceram. Por essas mudanças, e nada mais, as ações de socorro do FMI à América Latina foram bem menos frequentes nos primeiros anos deste século do que nas três ou quatro décadas anteriores.
Nenhuma dessas conquistas é irreversível. Em alguns países, o grande risco é a tentação do populismo. No Brasil, a tentação mais perigosa é a dos controles autoritários. A intervenção nos preços dos combustíveis, as pressões para corte de juros, o jogo perigoso de tolerância à inflação e as trapalhadas na política do setor elétrico são elementos desse quadro. O atraso nos projetos da Petrobrás é uma das consequências. A presidente seria provavelmente menos propensa a dar lições se pensasse um pouco mais sobre esses fatos.
* JORNALISTA

Islandia e Irlanda: as verdadeiras causas da crise (nao as atribuidas...)

Corre a versão, em certos setores ingênuos, mal informados, ou simplesmente deliberadamente deformados (ou seja, mistificadores, mentirosos, fraudadores, equivocados e enganadores, e nem preciso dizer quem é), de que as crises financeiras dos países desenvolvidos, a partir de 2008 -- sucedendo ao estouro da bolha imobiliária em 2007 -- foram provodadas por manobras especulativas de loiros de olhos azuis, pela ambição desmedida dos banqueiros de Wall Street, enfim pela cupidez habitual do capitalismo financeiro, sempre tão propenso a privatizar lucros e a socializar prejuizos.
A história, obviamente, é mais complexa do que isso, e se houve especulação, cabe lembrar que nenhum banqueiro ganancioso, nenhum especulador de Wall Street, nenhum manipulador de mercado, seja ele preto, loiro, azul ou vermelho, tem a capacidade de fixar os juros de referência.
Quem faz isso são os bancos centrais, que sinalizam, portanto, para o resto do sistema financeiro, e para a sociedade em geral, quais os níveis que serão praticados nos mercados imobiliários, de créditos para consumo, investimento, etc.
Juros baixos, obviamente, são uma benção para devedores, investidores e outros inadimplentes, enquanto são uma maldição para poupadores e credores. O mundo não é o ideal, e se os mercados fossem livres, realmente, como proclamam aqueles que acreditam equivocadamente que o sistema financeiro não tem regras (quando as tem, e muitas), esses mercados jamais fixariam as taxas de juros em níveis artificialmente baixos durante tanto tempo, como fizeram o Federal Reserve (de 2002 a 2005) e diversos outros bancos centrais.
Em resumo, quem provocou verdadeiramente as crises foram os bancos centrais, não os mercados, como demonstra este articulista sobre os casos mais dramáticos da Islância e da Irlanda...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Ire and Ice: A Tale of Two PIIIGS
by Frank Shostak 
Mises Daily, November 22, 2012

There were a lot of commentaries regarding the Ireland and Iceland 2008–2012 financial crises. Most of the commentaries were confined to the description of the events without addressing the essential causes of the crises. We suggest that providing a detailed description of events cannot be a substitute for economic analysis, which should be based on the essential causes behind a crisis. The essential cause is the primary driving force that gives rise to various events such as reckless bank lending (blamed by most commentators as the key cause behind the crisis) and a so-called overheated economy. Now, in terms of real GDP, both Ireland and Iceland displayed strong performance prior to the onset of the crisis in 2008. During 2000–2007, the average growth in Ireland stood at 5.9 percent versus 4.6 percent in Iceland. So what triggered the sudden collapse of these economies?

Central-Bank Policy the Key Trigger for Economic Boom
What set in motion the economic boom (i.e., a strong real GDP rate of growth) in both Ireland and Iceland was an aggressive lowering of interest rates by the respective central banks of Ireland and Iceland. In Ireland, the policy rate was lowered from 13.75 percent in November 1992 to 2 percent by November 2005. In Iceland, the policy rate was lowered from 10.8 percent in November 2000 to 5.2 percent by April 2004.

In response to this, bank lending showed a visible strengthening with the yearly rate of growth of Irish bank assets rising from 7.4 percent in June 2002 to 31 percent by November 2005. In Iceland, the yearly rate of growth of bank lending to residents climbed from 26.5 percent in September 2004 to 57.8 percent by April 2006.

The growth momentum of the money supply strengthened visibly in both Ireland and Iceland. The yearly rate of growth of our measure of money supply (AMS) for Ireland jumped from minus 6.7 percent in March 2003 to 22 percent by March 2006. In Iceland, the yearly rate of growth of AMS climbed from minus 1.6 percent in January 2003 to 61.6 percent by June 2004 before closing at 47.7 percent by July 2004.

The aggressive lowering of interest rates, coupled with strong increases in the money-supply rate of growth, gave rise to various bubble activities. (The central banks' loose monetary stance set in motion the transfer of wealth from wealth-generating activities to nonproductive bubble activities.)

Central-Bank Policies Trigger Economic Bust
Because of strong increases in the money-supply rate of growth, a visible strengthening in price inflation took place in Ireland and Iceland. In Ireland, the yearly rate of growth of the consumer price index (CPI) rose from 2.9 percent in January 2006 to 5.1 percent by March 2007. In Iceland, the yearly rate of growth of the CPI jumped from 1.4 percent in January 2003 to 18.6 percent by January 2009.

To counter the acceleration in price inflation, the central banks of Ireland and Iceland subsequently tightened their stance. The policy interest rate in Ireland rose from 2.25 percent in January 2006 to 4.25 percent by July 2008. In Iceland, the rate shot up from 10.2 percent in January 2006 to 18 percent by February 2009. Furthermore, the pace of money pumping by the central bank of Ireland fell to minus 8.2 percent by July 2007 from 25 percent in January 2007. The pace of pumping by the Iceland's central bank fell to 43 percent by February 2008 from 123 percent in July 2006.

The yearly rate of growth of AMS in Ireland plunged from 32 percent in August 2009 to minus 30 percent by November 2011. In Iceland, the yearly rate of growth of AMS fell from 96 percent in October 2007 to minus 18 percent by September 2009.

The sharp fall in the growth momentum of the money supply, coupled with a tighter interest-rate stance, put pressure on various bubble activities that emerged on the back of the previous loose-monetary-policy stance.

Consequently, various key economic indicators came under pressure. For instance, the unemployment rate in Ireland rose from 4.4 percent in January 2006 to 14.9 percent by July 2012. In Iceland, the unemployment rate climbed from 2 percent in January 2006 to 9.2 percent by September 2010. Year on year, the rate of growth of Irish real retail sales fell from 3.8 percent in January 2008 to minus 25 percent by September 2009. In Iceland, the yearly rate of growth of real retail sales fell from 11.9 percent in Q1 2008 to minus 31 percent by Q1 2009.

Most commentators blame the crisis on the conduct of banks that allowed the massive expansion of credit. It is held that this was responsible for the massive property boom in Ireland and overheated economic activity in Iceland.

We hold that the key factor in the economic crisis was the boom-bust policies of the central banks of Ireland and Iceland. Loose monetary policy had significantly weakened the economies' abilities in both Ireland and Iceland to generate wealth. This resulted in the weakening of various marginal activities. Consequently, a fall in these activities, followed by a decline in the pace of lending by banks — and this, in turn, coupled with a tighter stance by central banks — set in motion an economic bust. With the emergence of a recession, banks' bad assets started to pile up and this in turn posed a threat to their solvency.

From May 2007, the banks' stock prices on the Irish stock market declined markedly — they had halved by May 2008. This had an inevitable effect on banks' capital-adequacy ratios and therefore their ability to lend the ever-higher amounts that were necessary to support property prices.

As a result, housing loans as percentage of GDP plunged from 70.5 percent in Q2 2009 to 49.2 percent by Q2 this year. At the height of the boom, a fifth of Irish workers were in the construction industry. The average price of a house in Ireland in 1997 was €102,491. In Q1 2007 the price stood at €350,242 — an increase of 242 percent. The average price of a home in Dublin had increased 500 percent from 1994 to 2006.

Now, in Iceland, at the end of Q2 2008, external debt was €50 billion, more than 80 percent of which was held by the banking sector — this value compares with Iceland's 2007 GDP of €8.5 billion. The liabilities of the three main banks were almost 10 times the size of the island's GDP.

With the emergence of the bust, Icelandic authorities allowed its banks to go belly up, while the Irish government decided to support the banks. According to estimates, the cost to the taxpayers of providing support to Irish banks stood at €63 billion. (The private debt of the failed banks was nationalized.) In Iceland, the government, by allowing Icelandic banks to fail, made foreign creditors, not Icelandic taxpayers, largely responsible for covering losses.

The fact that Iceland allowed the banks to go bankrupt was a positive step in healing the economy. Unfortunately Iceland introduced a program of safeguarding the welfare of the unemployed. Also, the collapse of the Icelandic krona was a hard hit to homeowners who borrowed in foreign currency. In response to this, the authorities orchestrated mortgage-relief schemes. Iceland has also imposed draconian capital controls. Obviously, all this curtailed the benefits of allowing the banks to go belly up.

Whether the Icelandic economy will show a healthy revival, as suggested by some experts, hinges on the monetary policy of Iceland's central bank. We suggest the same applies to Ireland. (What is required is to seal off all the loopholes for the growth of the money supply.)

However, it is clear that Iceland's economic situation is less bad than Ireland's, and that is largely due to the Iceland's allowing its banks to go bankrupt.

Bad Policies Are Coming Back
For the time being in Iceland, the yearly rate of growth of AMS jumped from minus 11.3 percent in May 2010 to 34 percent by May 2012. Also, in Ireland, the growth momentum of AMS is showing strengthening with the yearly rate of growth rising from minus 30.3 percent in November last year to 4.7 percent in September 2012.

The rising growth momentum of money supply is a major threat to sound economic recovery in both Ireland and Iceland.

Also note that the policy interest rate in Ireland fell from 1.5 percent in October 2011 to 0.75 percent at present. In Iceland, the policy rate was lowered from 18 percent in February 2009 to 4.25 percent by July 2011. All this again sets in motion a misallocation of resources and new bubble activities — and, in turn, economic impoverishment.

Summary and Conclusion
Many commentators blame reckless bank lending as the key cause behind the 2008–2012 financial crises in Ireland and Iceland. Our analysis, however, suggests that it was not the banks as such that caused the crisis but rather the boom-bust policies of the central banks of Ireland and Iceland. It is these institutions that set in motion the false economic boom and the consequent economic bust. While Iceland allowed its banks to go bankrupt, the Irish government chose to bail out its banks. So, in this sense, the Icelandic authorities did the right thing, and Iceland has consequently outperformed Ireland economically. We hold that despite this positive step, Iceland's authorities have introduced various welfare schemes that have curtailed the benefits of having let banks go belly up. Furthermore, both Ireland and Iceland have resumed aggressive money pumping, thereby setting in motion the menace of boom-bust cycles.

Frank Shostak is an adjunct scholar of the Mises Institute and a frequent contributor to Mises.org. His consulting firm, Applied Austrian School Economics, provides in-depth assessments and reports of financial markets and global economies. Send him mail. See Frank Shostak's article archives.

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Copyright © 2012 by the Ludwig von Mises Institute. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is hereby granted, provided full credit is given.

Bretton Woods: present at the creation (transcripts found)

Transcript of 1944 Bretton Woods Conference Found at Treasury

Associated Press

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, standing at center, and representatives of 28 Allied nations met in Washington in 1945 to sign the pact reached at the Bretton Woods conference.

By ANNIE LOWREY

The New York Times, October 25, 2012

WASHINGTON — A Treasury economist rummaging in the department’s library has stumbled on a historical treasure hiding in plain sight: a transcript of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 that cast the foundations of the modern international monetary system.

The Bretton Woods Transcripts

The Center for Financial Stability has included links to the transcripts on its web site.

Enlarge This Image

International Monetary Fund, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

John Maynard Keynes addressed the Bretton Woods conference, where the International Monetary Fund was created.

Historians had never known that a transcript existed for the event held in the heat of World War II, when delegates from 44 allied nations fighting Hitler gathered in the mountains of New Hampshire to create the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. But there were three copies in archives and libraries around Washington that had never been made public, until now.

“It’s as if someone handed us Madison’s notes on the debate over the Constitution,” said Eric Rauchway, a historian the University of California, Davis.

Economic historians who have viewed the transcript say it adds color and detail to the historical record, an already thick one given the many contemporaneous and subsequent accounts of Bretton Woods. The transcript seems to contain no great surprises, but it sheds light on the intense debates as the war raged abroad.

It depicts John Maynard Keynes, the British economist, hurrying to marshal support for the broad agreements on international finance. It underscores the tremendous power then wielded by Britain and, especially, the United States. It also shows the seeds of contemporary disputes being sown.

For instance, seven decades ago, a number of poorer or smaller countries were protesting their International Monetary Fund quotas, which determine power in the fund. Many of those countries, including China and India, are still pushing for more influence today.

In one section of the transcript, an American representative lays out a proposal for apportioning power in the fund and underscores what was at stake, with the war coming to its bloody climax in Europe.

“We fight together on sodden battlefields. We sail together on the majestic blue. We fly together in the ethereal sky,” said Fred M. Vinson, who later became chief justice of the United States. “The test of this conference is whether we can walk together, solve our economic problems, down the road to peace as we today march to victory.”

But the response was not one of absolute unity.

“In spite of the very eloquent and moving speech of the United States delegate, on behalf of the Iranian delegation I wish to state that the quota proposed for my country is entirely unsatisfactory,” a delegate from Tehran responded.

Then, a delegate from China added: “I hesitate greatly to sound a note of discord at this conference. It has been the effort of the Chinese delegation to promote harmony and the success of this great common enterprise. But every delegation has its difficulties.”

The Netherlands, Greece, Australia, India, Yugoslavia, New Zealand, France, Ethiopia, Norway and Britain then added their comments and objections. “I think that a lot of people have thought of Bretton Woods as being a stitch-up job between United Kingdom and the United States,” Mr. Rauchway said. “But that’s overstated, and it’s definitely visible in this transcript. You can see the poorer countries fighting their own corner.”

Kurt Schuler a Treasury Department economist, was browsing in an “out of the way” section of uncataloged material in the library two years ago when he came across the Bretton Woods document. He flipped through and saw some remarks by Keynes that he was not familiar with, sort of the economists’ equivalent of a Bob Dylan fan finding unknown lyrics.

“I checked them against Keynes’s collected works,” Mr. Schuler said. “And I knew I had something.”

His research revealed that there were three copies of the transcript that scores of economic historians were not aware of: the version at the Treasury Department; one in the National Archives; and the third in the International Monetary Fund archives.

In his spare time, Mr. Schuler set about turning the yellowed transcript into a book, with a co-editor, Andrew Rosenberg. It took a tremendous amount of work, Mr. Schuler said. They read the transcript aloud into transcription software. They added hyperlinks to documents referenced at the conference, and wrote summaries, annotations and historical notes.

This week, the polished transcript was published as an 800-page e-book by the Center for Financial Stability, a nonprofit group based in New York that researches financial markets, where Mr. Schuler is a senior fellow and Mr. Rosenberg a research associate.

“Everyone thinks they know what happened at Bretton Woods, but what they know has been filtered by generations of historical accounts,” Barry Eichengreen, a professor or economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley, said in a statement. “International monetary history will never be the same.”

The transcript provides “insight in how it was that they were able to maintain a pace of work which allowed them to reach two really big agreements, on the I.M.F. and the World Bank, within a space of three weeks,” Mr. Schuler said. “Keynes was something of a task master,” he added.

Benn Steil, a senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, said readers can see the British Empire “disintegrating before your eyes,” in the transcript. “The Indians are so vociferous that the British are ripping them off. The British are both furious and mortified that their colony would do this to them,” he said, describing a dispute over debts with the colonies.

“Bretton Woods was itself 95 percent Kabuki theater,” he said. “But it’s interesting Kabuki theater.”

A version of this article appeared in print on October 26, 2012, on page B1 of the New York edition with the headline: Transcript of ’44 Bretton Woods Conference Found at Treasury.

Louis Pasteur: savant humaniste (190 ans de la naissance)

L'ILLUSTRATION, LA PLUS VIVANTE DES ENCYCLOPÉDIES UNIVERSELLES

190 ans de la naissance de Louis Pasteur Louis Pasteur, né à Dole le 27 décembre 1822 et mort à Marnes la Coquette le 28 septembre 1895, est un scientifique, chimiste et physicien français, considéré comme l’un des pères de la microbiologie. Après des études au collège de Besançon et l’obtention de son baccalauréat en 1840, Louis Pasteur intègre l’Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris, où il occupe le poste d’administrateur. Il quitte sa fonction pour se consacrer à la physique chimie, et notamment en cristallographie, le sujet de sa thèse. Ses résultats lui valurent le prix de la Société de pharmacie ainsi qu’un poste de professeur à Dijon avant d’être nommé doyen et professeur de chimie à l’université des sciences de Lille en 1854.   Pasteur aura eu quatre filles dont trois qui mourront avant l’âge de 15 ans. En 1863, Napoléon III, alors empereur, le charge de recherches sur les vins et leurs maladies. Il élucidera le phénomène et apportera une amélioration de leurs procédés de conservation. Il reçoit en 1867 le Grand Prix de l'exposition universelle pour ses travaux sur la fermentation du vin. Il développe à cette époque le procédé de pasteurisation. Après cette publication il tente une entrée de la politique et se présente aux élections sénatoriales. La tentative se solde par un échec.    Parallèlement, il s'intéresse aux infections humaines : il met en évidence le staphylocoque et commence l'étude de la rage. Après quelques expériences sur la salive et la moelle épinière, il conclut que la maladie se situe dans le système nerveux Le 6 juillet 1885, il inocule pour la première fois le vaccin contre la rage à un être humain. Le procédé est un succès.     Louis Pasteur a reçu la Grande Croix de la Légion d'Honneur et fut plusieurs fois lauréat de l'Académie des sciences. A sa mort, le gouvernement fit voter des funérailles nationales.

Enquanto isso, na América Latina... paises se fecham...

Cúpula asiática vai impulsionar criação de gigantesco bloco comercial

Hans Spross / Marcio Damasceno

Ásia – DW – 19/11/12.

Cúpula da Asean no Camboja leva adiante negociações para criar área de livre comércio com 3,5 bilhões de consumidores, incluindo China, Japão, Índia e Austrália.

As nações do Sudeste Asiático realizam nesta semana, durante a cúpula da Associação de Países do Sudeste Asiático (Asean, em inglês), uma rodada de conversações com países vizinhos para formar uma gigantesca área de livre comércio.

O projeto, chamado Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), quer incluir 16 nações – os 10 membros da Asean, mais China, Japão, Coreia do Sul, Índia, Austrália, Nova Zelândia – responsáveis hoje por um terço do comércio e da produção econômica do planeta e com mais de 3,5 bilhões de consumidores.

Os planos preveem que as negociações para a criação dessa parceria econômica regional estejam concluídas já em 2015. O projeto deve ser facilitado por vários acordos de livre comércio já existentes entre a Asean e os seis países parceiros. Fazem parte da Asean Myanmar, Brunei, Camboja, Filipinas, Indonésia, Laos, Malásia, Cingapura, Tailândia e Vietnã.

O primeiro-ministro do Camboja, Hun Sen, quer lançar as negociações para o RCEP nesta quinta-feira (22/11), último dia da cúpula realizada em Phnom Penh, capital do Camboja. O secretário-geral da Asean, Surin Pitsuwan, afirmou que o RCEP ajudará a fortalecer a tendência de migração do poder econômico global do Ocidente para a Ásia.

“A tendência já existe. Agora, o próximo passo é consolidar. Este vai ser um grande salto para a frente se nós pudermos realizá-lo”, declarou. Analistas creem que o bloco pode ser um contrapeso para o Acordo da Associação Transpacífico (TPP), outro projeto de área de livre comércio em negociação entre EUA e outros dez países.

Membros do governo norte-americano esperam que o TPP avance para a formação de uma região de livre comércio das economias da Ásia-Pacífico que vincule América Latina e Ásia através dos EUA. Mas uma diferença significativa seria que, enquanto o TPP exclui a China, a segunda maior economia do mundo deverá ser um membro importante no RCEP.

A China tem relutado a se unir ao TPP, preferindo se concentrar num acordo de livre comércio centrado na Ásia, onde o país tem mais influência.

Disputas territoriais

Há algumas preocupações de que uma série de disputas territoriais marítimas entre os principais participantes do RCEP possam dificultar as negociações. Relações diplomáticas e comerciais do Japão com a China têm sido severamente abaladas neste ano devido a disputas crescentes em torno de ilhas no Mar da China Oriental.

Japão e Coreia do Sul se envolveram numa disputa similar sobre outras ilhas, enquanto China e alguns membros da Asean também têm disputas envolvendo territórios no Mar da China Meridional.

Mas o secretário-geral da Asean, Surin Pitsuwan, afirmou que tais disputas podem ser gerenciadas separadamente e que a tendência de relações econômicas e laços comerciais mais estreitos não pode ser interrompida. Surin disse, ainda, que o RCEP tem vantagem em relação ao TPP porque a Asean já tem pactos de livre comércio com China, Índia, Japão, Coreia do Sul, Austrália e Nova Zelândia.

A Asean deve se tornar realidade em 2015, quando bens e serviços deverão poder circular livremente pela região, objetivo perseguido pelo projeto desde o final de 1970. Uma dificuldade será unir níveis de desenvolvimento muito diferentes, incluindo tanto a pobre Myanmar quanto a rica Singapura.

Problemas com a China

As disputas do Mar da China Meridional pairam como uma sombra sobre a visão de harmonia do livre comércio do projeto Asean. Nele, existe há tempos a ideia de se chegar a um acordo entre o bloco e a China através de um “código de conduta”, citado numa declaração conjunta em 2002, mas que não chegou a ser colocado em prática.

Não só a China bloqueia uma abordagem cooperativa multilateral para o problema da área do Mar da China Meridional. Na reunião dos ministros do Exterior da Asean em julho, o Camboja, que atualmente ocupa a presidência da Asean, evitou a menção da disputa territorial na declaração final, que acabou sendo deixada completamente de fora.

Mesmo assim, na preparação para a atual cúpula no Camboja, os participantes já falaram em um “primeiro esboço de um código de conduta regional no Mar da China Meridional”, como comunicou a Asean. A presidente das Filipinas, Benigno Aquino, apelou pouco antes do início da cúpula para que a Asean fale com uma só voz com relação à disputas territoriais com a China.

Seja qual for abordagem diplomática do problema, o conflito não deve ser resolvido. Porque mesmo se a China concordar com tal código, que deve conter apenas uma lista de regras de conduta, Pequim não desistirá de reivindicar sua soberania sobre o Mar da China Meridional.

Classificacao de risco: Argentina em nivel de... lixo

Argentina: Moody’s advierte de impacto de fallo en EEUU sobre el pago de deuda

Infolatam/Efe
Nueva York, 19 de noviembre de 2012

Las claves

• Moody's, que otorga al país latinoamericano una nota de B3, en la categoría de bono basura, añade que por ahora esta decisión judicial no repercutirá sobre la calificación de su deuda, puesto que cualquier modificación dependerá "de los detalles de la decisión final, su ejecución y la respuesta de Argentina".

El fallo de un tribunal de Nueva York que obliga a Argentina a pagar a los acreedores que no aceptaron sus reestructuraciones de deuda en 2005 y 2010 tiene el potencial de ocasionar pérdidas a quienes sí accedieron a esos canjes, advirtió la agencia de calificación Moody’s.
“Desde el punto de vista de la calificación, la cuestión clave es si el fallo provocará pérdidas a los tenedores de bonos reestructurados”, aseguró la agencia de medición de riesgo en un informe, titulado “Dictámen legal plantea interrogantes sobre los pagos de deuda de Argentina”.
Moody’s, que otorga al país latinoamericano una nota de B3, en la categoría de bono basura, añade que por ahora esta decisión judicial no repercutirá sobre la calificación de su deuda, puesto que cualquier modificación dependerá “de los detalles de la decisión final, su ejecución y la respuesta de Argentina”.
El pasado 26 de octubre, el Tribunal de Apelaciones del Segundo Circuito de Nueva York ratificó la decisión del juez federal Thomas Griesa, quien decidió en febrero que Argentina debía pagar también a los acreedores que se negaron a participar en las reestructuraciones de deuda y no solamente a aquellos que sí accedieron al trueque.
Además, ese tribunal determinó que Argentina no podía realizar ningún pago a los acreedores que aceptaron los canjes mientras siga negándose a pagar a quienes rechazaron el acuerdo, entre los que se encuentra el fondo NML, involucrado en la retención en Ghana de la fragata “Libertad” de la Armada argentina.
La corte de apelaciones ha devuelto el caso al juez Griesa para que clarifique cuánto y cómo deberá pagar Argentina, así como cuál será el impacto de este fallo sobre las terceras partes implicadas en este proceso, como Bank of New York Mellon, encargado de transferir los pagos del Gobierno a los tenedores de deuda.
Por su parte, el país latinoamericano ha reiterado que no pagará a quienes no aceptaron las reestructuraciones pese a este fallo y argumentó en un escrito la semana pasada que las cortes de EE.UU. no tienen jurisdicción para interferir en los pagos de su deuda realizados fuera del territorio estadounidense.
“El escenario base de Moody’s es que Argentina intentará seguir pagando la deuda reestructurada sin cambios en el tipo de cambio, interés o vencimiento, sin ocasionar así pérdidas a los inversores, pero este acercamiento puede chocar con el objetivo del Gobierno de negar pagos a quienes no aceptaron los canjes”, añadió la calificadora.

Classificacao de risco: a publica e a privada (em nada diferentes)

Os franceses, que costumam se revoltar contra o termômetro, mas bem menos contra a febre, reclamam das agências de notação de riscos soberanos, que eles acreditam estar dominadas por interesses privatistas, capitalistas, neoliberais de especuladores de Wall Street, apenas interessados em ganhar dinheiro com a desgraça alheia.
Que surpresa! Uma agência pública, portanto isenta dos vieses de mercado, acaba de dar à França a mesma nota que lhe deu a Moody's, esta acusada imediatamente de viés negativo contra o país dos queijos e das greves.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

La fondation Bertelsmann présente "sa" notation de la France

Frédéric Lemaître Berlin Correspondant 

Le Monde.fr | 20.11.2012 à 18h53

Hasard du calendrier, douze heures après l'annonce de la dégradation de la France par l'agence Moody's, la fondation Bertelsmann présentait, à Berlin, mardi 20 novembre, "sa" notation de la France. Cette fondation privée, considérée comme la plus influente du pays, avait dévoilé son projet en avril en marge de l'Assemblée générale du Fonds monétaire international à New York.

Pour répondre aux critiques visant les agences de notation – un oligopole dont les membres ne sont pas indépendants et se contentent de données macro-économiques — Bertelsmann souhaite créer une fondation indépendante dont les indicateurs seraient à la fois macroéconomiques mais aussi prospectifs. Pour ce faire, Bertelsmann estime avoir besoin d'un capital de départ d'environ 310 millions d'euros (400 millions de dollars) qu'elle aimerait recueillir auprès des membres du G20 et des grandes institutions internationales.
A quoi ressembleraient ces notations ? La fondation a présenté mardi cinq pays-pilotes : l'Allemagne, le Brésil, la France, l'Italie et le Japon. Chacun a été jugé selon treize critères (eux-mêmes résultant de l'agrégat de sous-critères) : cinq critères macro-économiques et huit prospectifs.
Les fondamentaux économiques, la politique budgétaire, la politique monétaire, le risque financier, la dépendance vis-à-vis de l'étranger constituent les cinq critères classiques. Les critères prospectifs sont le respect de la loi par le gouvernement et l'administration, la transparence et la prévention de la corruption, la cohésion sociale, la qualité du système d'enseignement, la capacité du gouvernement à définir des priorités stratégiques, la mise en place des réformes annoncées, la flexibilité du gouvernement et sa capacité à innover, la capacité des gouvernements à gérer des crises.
Les critères macro-économiques représentent 40 % de la note finale dans les pays développés et 50 % chez les émergents. Les pays sont notés de 1 à 10. Ceux obtenant plus de 8 bénéficient d'un AAA, ceux ayant entre 7,70 et 7,99 d'un AA+, ceux entre 7,30 et 7,69 d'un AA, etc. La France, avec une note de 7,9 (8,2 pour la macro-économie et 7,7 pour les critères qualitatifs) obtient un solide AA+.
"PAS TROP PESSIMISTE" SUR LA FRANCE
L'Allemagne, avec son 8,1 (8,8 pour le quantitatif et 7,6 pour le qualitatif) jouit d'un AAA mais avec "perspective négative". Par ailleurs, l'Italie obtient 7,2 (AA-), le Brésil 6,8 (A+) et le Japon 6,0 (A-). "Ces notes sont des opinions qui peuvent et devraient être discutées. (...) La seule et unique question à laquelle elles répondent est : quelle est la capacité et la volonté de l'Etat à rembourser ses dettes ?" expliquent les dirigeants de la fondation.
L'expert qui a travaillé en août et en septembre sur la France est Henrik Uterwedde, un économiste allemand parfaitement francophone travaillant à l'institut franco-allemand de Ludwigsburg. Celui-ci a travaillé seul – ce qu'il déplore — mais ses appréciations ont été discutées par les permanents de la fondation Bertelsmann qui le jugeaient "un peu sévère" par rapport à ses collègues chargés de noter d'autres pays puis soumis à l'avis d'une demi-douzaine d'experts connaissant bien la France.
"Ma note est totalement dans le ton de la conférence de presse de François Hollande. Je trouve que Moody's arrive trop tard. Le gouvernement français a établi le même constat. Je ne suis pas trop pessimiste car la France a montré, notamment en 1983, qu'elle est capable de changer de cap si le pouvoir exécutif le décide", explique M. Uterwedde qui porte sur la France un avis moins sévère que nombre de ses compatriotes.

Frédéric Lemaître Berlin Correspondant

============

Newcomer to Ratings Game Gives France a Dim View

By JACK EWING and DAVID JOLLY

The New York Times, November 20, 2012

FRANKFURT — Hours after the French government suffered a debt downgrade by the ratings agency Moody’s Investors Service, a new nonprofit agency offered a similar critique Tuesday.

Interactive Feature

Tracking Europe's Debt Crisis

• Moody’s Lowers France’s Sovereign Debt Rating (November 20, 2012)

The criticism came from the International Nonprofit Credit Rating Agency, or Incra, a pilot project intended to show the feasibility of a nonprofit agency that would provide an alternative to the three main ratings agencies: Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings.

Those agencies have come under fire for failing to warn of the financial crisis and overlooking huge risks in the debt market, including loans for subprime real estate as well as the Greek government’s debt pile. The agencies usually get their funding from the creditors whose debt they assess. In the case of sovereign debt, the agencies have been accused of timidity for fear of provoking officials whose governments would probably have to pay higher borrowing costs.

French officials played down the Moody’s decision, issued late Monday, and sought to blame the country’s previous rightist governments for the economic challenges.

“This rating change doesn’t call into question either our economic fundamentals or the reforms engaged in by the government, nor the high standard of our credit,” Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici said at a news conference.

The downgrade, he added, “is punishment for the situation we have inherited, which hasn’t stopped deteriorating for 10 years.”

President François Hollande, a Socialist, took office in May. For the previous decade, France was led by Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, both from the right.

Incra is an attempt by the Bertelsmann Foundation, financed by a German media conglomerate, to show how a ratings agency could be structured without the potential conflicts of interest the commercial agencies face.

The European Commission has stepped up regulation of ratings agencies while also requiring banks and bond funds to take more responsibility for analyzing the creditworthiness of the governments and companies they invest in. There has also been talk of creating a European credit ratings agency.

Annette Heuser, executive director of the Bertelsmann Foundation in Washington, said the organization hoped that the Group of 20 countries, which have also expressed concern about the current debt rating system, would take the lead in creating a nonprofit ratings agency.

“We need an international solution that brings in the emerging economies,” Ms. Heuser said.

It was the first report on France by Incra, so there were no previous ratings to compare to. The agency gave France a score of 7.9 out of 10, or AA+. Incra had given Germany a rating of 8.1, or AAA–; and 7.2 for Italy, or AA–.

On Tuesday, Incra also rated Brazil, which received a score of 6.8, or A+; and Japan, which received a score of 6.0, or A–, because of its high debt and stagnant economy.

Incra cited what it said was France’s slow growth, heavily regulated labor market and a pension system that could become unaffordable over time. France could also be required to help pay for the bailout of other euro zone countries as well as its own banks, Incra said.

Moody’s cited some of the same factors in its decision to downgrade France. But Ms. Heuser said that Incra’s methodology looked not only at economic data but also at indicators of how well society functions, including the efficiency of the court system and the level of corruption.

“Even if we come to a similar conclusion, the underlying analysis is completely different,” Ms. Heuser said.

She said that Incra also believed that the French educational system had been declining, which hurt the country’s score.

In its decision to downgrade French debt, Moody’s cited a worse outlook for government finances as a result of France’s fading competitiveness and “the longstanding rigidities of its labor, goods and service markets.” It also warned that the country’s resilience to shocks from the euro crisis was declining. At the same time, Moody’s said, France faces greater fiscal obligations from developments including the bailouts of other euro zone countries.

Moody’s decision came as no surprise, as Standard & Poor’s had stripped France of its triple-A rating in January. The French economy has stagnated for most of this year, growing just 0.2 percent in the third quarter from the second quarter. The euro zone as a whole has fallen back into recession.

Fitch still rates France as AAA, and Mr. Moscovici pointed out that investors had largely ignored the S.&P. downgrade: the country’s borrowing costs remain near record lows.

The United States, which lost its triple-A rating from S.&P. in August 2011, has also been able to borrow at historically low rates.

David Jolly reported from Paris.

A version of this article appeared in print on November 21, 2012, in The International Herald Tribune

O ceu carrtelizado (nos EUA); no Brasil, oligopolizado...

Competição, mercados livres no céu, é o que não temos. As viagens ficam mais longas e mais caras...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Op-Ed Contributor

A Free Market in the Sky

By CLIFFORD WINSTON

The New York Times, November 20, 2012

Washington

Ron Regé Jr.

AS the holiday season approaches, the major airlines are signaling to some passengers to take a hike. At least that’s what travelers might infer from the smaller number of flights being scheduled at many of the nation’s airports.

Between 2007 and 2012, airlines cut the number of domestic passenger flights by 14 percent, according to the Department of Transportation — with the biggest drops occurring at midsize and smaller regional airports. The five heartland hubs of Cincinnati, Cleveland, Memphis, Pittsburgh and St. Louis have lost a stunning 40 percent of their scheduled flights.

The reason is simple: airlines have decided that the best way to earn a healthy return on their investment is to maintain tight discipline on capacity. That’s a fancy way of saying they want their planes to fly as full as sardine cans. And the way they’ve been accomplishing this is by concentrating service on the big domestic and international markets and by cutting flights in smaller, less traveled ones.

That’s smart business, of course. Why expend the same dollars on jet fuel, pilots and Sun Chips on a flight that’s likely to leave half-empty from Memphis when you can trim the number of scheduled departures from the same airport and really pack them in on each flight?

But this, of course, leaves Aunt Sally in Sarasota, Fla., with fewer options to visit family during the holidays; it leaves millions of us with longer boarding and exiting delays on our planes — and, yes, it helps drive up fare prices, too. It’s that old rule of supply and demand. Travelocity, an online booking site, has found airline ticket prices for this pre-Thanksgiving period to be 10 percent higher on average than last year.

Unfortunately for travelers, this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. With five airlines now serving 85 percent of the domestic market — four, if American Airlines and US Airways merge, as industry analysts expect — the major carriers are worrying less about the one factor that could disrupt their cozy, cram-’em-in strategy: competition.

That is, unless policy makers do what they should have done a long time ago and allow foreign airlines, including discount carriers like Ryanair and global players like Qantas and British Airways, to serve domestic routes in the United States. Why, after all, should an industry that has ingeniously used free-market principles to squeeze the most revenue out of each middle seat be protected from competing in a real free market?

As things stand now, the United States allows foreign airlines to serve its major cities as part of international agreements — conventions that have been around for decades. Foreign airlines have never posed a threat to national security or to the safety of air travelers; there’s no indication that such carriers have resisted American security measures in the past or any reason to think they’d violate any protocols required for domestic routes either.

Competition from foreign airlines would put downward pressure on wages, something that union workers may object to. But by reducing fares and expanding service, it would also increase the demand for air travel and related services — thus, presumably, creating additional jobs during a time of persistently high unemployment.

Airline travelers, in fact, have already benefited significantly from increased competition among international carriers. Beginning with a successful agreement with the Netherlands in 1992, the United States has pressed for liberal free-trade pacts, called “open skies” agreements, with several nations.

In collaboration with Jia Yan of Washington State University, I have estimated that travelers have gained at least $5 billion annually as a result of lower international fares and additional flights generated by open skies agreements.

By allowing foreign airlines to serve American domestic markets, the process of creating a truly free market in airline services here would be complete and, as in the case of international markets, would provide travelers the benefit of more flight choices and lower fares.

Naturally, domestic airlines are likely to oppose such a policy. But they should realize that their current strategy to maximize profits — reducing flights and raising fares — runs the danger of alienating the American flying public and spawning new regulation.

One possible solution is to take a half-step toward opening up domestic markets and allow foreign carriers to serve any midsize and regional airport in the United States that has lost service in the past few years. New entrants would be able to integrate those markets with their international routes, something that could put many smaller American cities on the global business map.

Soon, Aunt Sally might enjoy the service on Singapore Airlines en route to Cincinnati. It’s a short flight from Sarasota — but the hot face towels are a dream.

Clifford Winston is a senior fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution and author of “Last Exit: Privatization and Deregulation of the U.S. Transportation System.”

A version of this op-ed appeared in print on November 21, 2012, on page A27 of the New York edition with the headline: A Free Market in the Sky.

Livro PRIVATIZE JA': Hoje (20/11) e todos os demais dias do ano...

Repostando um convite, no qual sou parte interessada e, portanto, altamente suspeito de conivência com o tema, o livro, o autor, a ideia, os princípios, as motivações e as finalidades das privatizações no Brasil. Para todos os interessados, a ocasião de fazer um bom debate, ou seja:
TUDO O QUE VOCÊ SEMPRE QUIS SABER SOBRE AS PRIVATIZAÇÕES E NUNCA TEVE A QUEM PERGUNTAR...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Tenho o prazer de transmitir o convite abaixo para um lançamento-debate em torno das questões do intervencionismo governamental e das propostas de retomada das privatizações no Brasil, no qual atuarei como um apresentador-comentarista do conhecido economista liberal Rodrigo Constantino, que vem do Rio de Janeiro especialmente para este lançamento em première.

Em meu blog, coloquei a apresentação geral do livro, neste link:

http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2012/11/privatiza-ja-um-livro-de-rodrigo.html

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

LeYa e Livraria Cultura convidam para o lançamento de 

Privatize Já

de Rodrigo Constantino

Dia 20/11, a partir das 19hs

Debate com o autor e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Livraria Cultura – Shopping CasaPark

SGCV – Sul, Lote 22 – Loja 4-A

Zona Industrial – Guará - DF

ASEAN e EUA: uma relacao mutuamente benefica; e o Mercosul?

Enquanto a Asean estimula todos os tipos de interação recíproca, não apenas internamente ao grupo, mas igualmente entre o grupo e seus principais parceiros na região (China, Japão, Taiwan e Coreia do Sul) e, crescentemente, com os EUA, o Mercosul parece que pretende praticar a velha política do insulamento soberano, a recusa de interagir com o "império", visando, como já disse um ministro particularmente infeliz nessa área, preservar sua independência e reunir-se "sem tutela" (o que nada mais representa senão um infantil antiamericanismo primário).
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

U.S. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR ASEAN. 

Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State

November 19. 2012 

 

On November 19 and 20, Secretary Clinton accompanied President Obama to the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting and East Asia Summit (EAS) in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Their attendance at these events for the second consecutive year reaffirms U.S. commitment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and to Southeast Asia as a whole. At EAS and the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting, the United States highlighted our broad engagement with the region across ASEAN’s political-security, economic, and socio-cultural pillars and introduced initiatives to deepen these ties. EAS provided an opportunity to highlight the United States’ enduring commitment to supporting ASEAN as it becomes a driver of peace, security, prosperity, and democracy in the region. The United States has demonstrated our institutional support for ASEAN in a number of ways.

The U.S. Mission to ASEAN: In June 2010, the United States became the first non-ASEAN country to establish a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta. Under the leadership of Ambassador David L. Carden, the United States’ first resident Ambassador to ASEAN, the Mission provides a venue for regular engagement and cooperation with ASEAN as well as the most visible symbol of our commitment to ASEAN’s success.

Support for U.S.-ASEAN Scholarship: Building on more than 60 years of supporting scholar and student exchanges between the United States and countries in the region through the Fulbright Program, recruitment for the pilot U.S.-ASEAN Fulbright initiative started this fall, with the first group of exchange scholars beginning study in early 2013. The United States also supports both U.S. and ASEAN Member States’ scholars working on issues central to the region through symposia held at American University’s ASEAN Studies Center in Washington DC. Our participation in the Brunei-U.S. English Language Enrichment Project for ASEAN reflects a commitment to help unify the diverse members of ASEAN, improve English language capacity, and advance educational and teaching opportunities in the region. This five-year, $25 million initiative is supported by the governments of Brunei and the United States with the East-West Center in Hawaii as an implementing coordinator, and the first cohort of 59 government officials and teacher-trainers traveled to Universiti Brunei Darussalam and East-West Center this fall.

Institutional Support in Disaster Management: Since mid-2011, the United States has supported a full-time, resident Advisor to the ASEAN Secretariat’s ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Unit and to broader Disaster Management efforts through the Secretariat and ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (AHA Centre). The Advisor works closely with ASEAN officials and our fellow ASEAN Dialogue Partners to oversee activities such as:

The installation of a multi-hazard Disaster Monitoring and Response System in the AHA Centre. Along with Japan, the United States is providing the hardware and software AHA Centre operators need to improve response times and use relief resources more efficiently.

Building the search and rescue capacity of ASEAN Member States and creating guidelines for mobilization of assets for disaster relief across the region.

Supporting efforts to share best practices in Peacekeeping Operations.

Promoting Public-Private Dialogue Economic Partnerships: The United States has partnered with ASEAN in private-sector outreach in several areas:

Secretary Clinton opened the first-ever U.S.-ASEAN Business Forum in July in Siem Reap, which brought government and private actors from across the spectrum together to find ways to further economic engagement and integration.

The U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s first connectivity event, which brought representatives together from ASEAN governments, seven U.S. Government agencies, and several private businesses. Participants shared expertise in disaster reduction and disaster recovery, and attendees showcased technology which enables more effective disaster preparation and emergency response.

We have supported the ASEAN Single Window Steering Committee, which incorporates the views of businesses active in the region into the planning for the ASEAN Single Window project, a state-of-the-art regional electronic customs clearance information sharing system, which will help to enable the integration of the broader ASEAN economic community.

Economic Partnerships:

At the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting, the United States and ASEAN announced agreement to develop an Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) initiative. The U.S.-ASEAN E3 will provide capacity building and technical assistance to ASEAN members as they move toward high-standard trade obligations. The E3 will also prioritize the negotiation of a U.S.-ASEAN Trade Facilitation Agreement, a U.S.-ASEAN Bilateral (Regional) Investment Treaty, and a U.S.-ASEAN Agreement on Information and Communication Technology (ICT).

We support triennial conferences to encourage private sector engagement with ASEAN’s food security agenda. The U.S.-funded Maximizing Agricultural Revenue through Knowledge, Enterprise Development, and Trade (MARKET) Program is helping to carry these critical private-public partnerships. We will support the Second Annual Dialogue between ASEAN Agriculture Ministers and food industry business leaders in September.

ASEAN Science & Technology Cooperation:

Recognizing the key role that science, technology, and health expertise play in promoting sustained economic development, at the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting the United States and ASEAN agreed to launch the U.S.-ASEAN Innovation in Science through Partners in Regional Engagement (INSPIRE) initiative. Through INSPIRE, the United States will enhance our scientific engagement and exchange across these fields with ASEAN, complementing the existing, excellent bilateral cooperation between the United States and ASEAN member states.

The United States funded an expert to work closely with the ASEAN Secretariat to improve IT operations and prepare a medium-term IT strategy that was presented to the Committee of Permanent Representatives. In early September, the ASEAN Secretariat and United States will jointly launch a new ASEAN Web Portal with a redesign of the front end of the website, the creation of central repository for past, current and future ASEAN documents, and a user-friendly interface with a searchable function.

U.S.-ASEAN Eminent Persons Group (EPG): President Obama announced the names of the three representatives, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky (a former U.S. Trade Representative), Muhtar Kent (Chairman and CEO of the Coca-Cola Company), and Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy (former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia,) in November 2011 at the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting. This year, the group met with their ASEAN counterparts in Manila and Rangoon. In these meetings and through extensive additional consultations, the group formulated a report containing recommendations on enhanced U.S.-ASEAN engagement for consideration by President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and ASEAN Leaders. The EPG report offers expert insights on topics including engagement and integration among ASEAN Member States across all three Pillars of the ASEAN Community: political/security, economic, and socio-cultural. This important Presidential initiative demonstrates our deepening engagement with multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific, and specifically with ASEAN, as we celebrate the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue this year.

ASEAN Secretariat Committee of Permanent Representatives Visit: This September, the United States sponsored a trip to Washington, DC and San Francisco, CA for the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR), led by U.S. Mission to ASEAN Ambassador David L. Carden. The CPR oversees ASEAN Member States’ interactions with the ASEAN Secretariat and Dialogue Partners such as the United States, and includes one Representative from each of the 10 ASEAN Member States. During their visit, the CPR exchanged best practices across a variety of disciplines with officials drawn from U.S. Government, the private sector, think tanks, and universities, with the goal of improving ASEAN’s capacity to promote sustainable development, improve regional rule of law, and create an environment conducive to economic growth across Southeast Asia.

Dialogue Partner/Donor Coordination: The United States places a high priority on outreach and collaboration with our development partners in the region and in helping ASEAN strengthen its role in partner coordination. For example, the USAID-AusAID-ASEAN collaboration with the MTV End Exploitation and Trafficking (EXIT) campaign is highlighting ASEAN’s commitment to end trafficking in persons in cooperation with its Dialogue Partners. We are also coordinating support to the AHA Centre. The United States, Japan, Australia, the EU, and New Zealand are working directly with the AHA Centre and the ASEAN Secretariat to balance the types of assistance from each partner to cover AHA Centre's priority needs for systems, staffing and training. The United States and Canada also co-chair the working group on human rights cooperation with ASEAN.

Defense Liaison Officer: In 2011 the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) deployed a Liaison Officer to the U.S. Mission to ASEAN with the objectives of encouraging information-sharing between DOD and other U.S. agencies on multi-national security programs in Southeast Asia, and encouraging deepening and sustained engagement by DOD in ASEAN defense-related fora such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) mechanism. Over the past year the Mission's PACOM liaison has assisted with arrangements for the first informal dialogue between the ASEAN Defense Ministers and U.S. Secretary of Defense; coordinated U.S. co-chairmanship with Indonesia of the ADMM+ Expert Working Group on Counterterrorism; and organized a PACOM-sponsored regional workshop on environmental security.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200825.htm