O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

sábado, 1 de novembro de 2014

Energia: governo mete os pes pelas maos e deixa 60 bilhoes de prejuizo - Adriano Pires

Como esperado, ou como inevitável. 
O governo é um rei Midas, mas só que ao contrário: aonde mete as mãos, e os pés, tudo vira m....
Ne energia, em TODOS os setores, os resultados foram propriamente espetaculares.
Reconheçamos: é preciso ser singularmente preparado para causar um desastre dessas proporções.
Vão ter de inventar um novo Prêmio para esse governo, pois as conquistas não cabem nas definições tradicionais de premiações ao contrário.
Tenho certeza que vocês conhecem as principais: o prêmio IgNobil, o Darwin Award, The Worst Of...
Esse governo ainda vai conseguir arrecadar todos ao mesmo tempo.
Um feito para ninguém botar defeito...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Dilma contra Dilma no setor elétrico

*Por Adriano Pires, Rafael Schechtman

Em 2004, a então ministra de Minas e Energia, Dilma Rousseff, estabeleceu um novo modelo para o setor elétrico brasileiro que tinha três objetivos: a modicidade tarifária, a segurança no abastecimento e a universalização dos serviços de energia elétrica. Durante 8 anos, o governo respeitou as regras que ele mesmo criara. Em 2012, porém, ao publicar a Medida Provisória (MP) n.º 579/12 (posteriormente convertida na Lei n.º 12.783/2013), o próprio governo se encarregou de desorganizar o setor.

Com a intenção de baratear em média 20% da tarifa de eletricidade ao consumidor final, a MP reduziu alguns encargos setoriais incidentes sobre as tarifas e estabeleceu regras para antecipar a renovação das concessões que venceriam no período de 2015 a 2017. As empresas que optassem pela renovação seriam indenizadas pelos seus investimentos ainda não amortizados ou não depreciados, de acordo com cálculos da Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (Aneel), e passariam a receber uma tarifa pela prestação de serviços de operação e manutenção das usinas, também estabelecida pela Aneel.

A MP teve adesão compulsória de empresas estatais federais, mas não atraiu a Cesp, a Cemig e a Copel, que consideram a medida lesiva aos seus interesses. Com isso, dos 11,8 GW médios de energia firme, cuja renovação era esperada pelo governo, apenas 7,8 GW médios foram efetivamente renovados. E, ao cancelar o leilão de compra de energia existente do ano de 2012, o governo deixou o suprimento às distribuidoras descoberto em 2,1 GW médios em 2013. O governo realizou novo leilão em junho, sem que houvesse ofertantes. Em maio de 2013 e em abril de 2014, dois outros leilões de energia foram realizados, com resultados aquém do esperado, por culpa da fixação pelo governo de preços-teto abaixo do esperado pelos investidores.

A ação atabalhoada do governo não só falhou no cumprimento da promessa de reduzir as tarifas em 20%, mas também criou uma dívida de R$ 60 bilhões apenas para o biênio 2012-2013, segundo acórdão do Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU)

Assim, desde maio de 2014 as distribuidoras convivem com uma exposição involuntária de 1,52 GW médio, e são obrigadas a adquirir essa energia no mercado de curto prazo, a preços elevadíssimos, em virtude da conjuntura de baixa hidrologia. Para piorar, no fim de 2014 se encerram os contratos firmados nos dois primeiros leilões de energia existente, realizados em 2004 e em 2005, elevando em mais 2,8 GW médios a exposição involuntária das distribuidoras, que atingirá 4,32 GW médios a partir de janeiro de 2015, o que equivale ao consumo residencial do Estado de São Paulo.

Com relação às concessões das geradoras estaduais, corre-se o risco de seu término ser decidido pelo Poder Judiciário, já que as empresas poderão questionar os valores das indenizações estabelecidos pela Aneel.

Desde 2009, a modicidade tarifária tornou-se ideia fixa do governo, que deixou de lado a preocupação com a segurança do abastecimento. Com isso, acabou atraindo para os leilões investidores abutres, que não entregaram a energia contratada e, junto com os atrasos nas obras, comprometeram o crescimento da oferta de energia.

Neste contexto, em 2012 a MP n.º 579 desorganizou inteiramente o setor, derrubando um dos principais pilares do modelo: a contratação de 100% da energia pelas distribuidoras. A ação atabalhoada do governo não só falhou no cumprimento da promessa de reduzir as tarifas em 20%, mas também criou uma dívida de R$ 60 bilhões apenas para o biênio 2012-2013, segundo acórdão do Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU); incentivou o consumo de energia num momento em que seu custo crescia; obrigou as distribuidoras a pegarem empréstimos nos bancos; e comprometeu as receitas das geradoras, ao despachar usinas fora da ordem do mérito econômico. E a continuidade dessa lei vai levar à federalização dos atuais ativos das estatais estaduais, à diminuição de tamanho do mercado livre e a um aumento brutal dos custos das indústrias, que, com a ida da energia para o mercado cativo, terão de ir buscar energia a preços muito elevados no mercado livre.

Ou seja, a MP n.º 579/12 só criou perdedores no setor elétrico e, de tabela, quebrou a Eletrobras. No cenário de mudanças, é preciso rever essa MP.

Fonte: O Estado de S. Paulo, 31/10/2014

SOBRE ADRIANO PIRES

Adriano Pires
Adriano Pires é professor da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) e diretor fundador do Centro Brasileiro de Infra Estrutura (CBIE). Publica artigos sobre energia elétrica, petróleo e gás natural no jornal “Valor Econômico” e nas revistas “Conjuntura Econômica”, da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) e “Brasil Energia”. Escreve também no site do Instituto Liberal e possui blog no portal "oglobo.com". Foi assessor do diretor-geral da Agência Nacional do Petróleo (ANP) e superintendente da ANP nas áreas de importação, exportação e abastecimento. Pires é economista e mestre em planejamento estratégico pela UFRJ e doutor em economia industrial pela Universidade Paris XIII (França).

Corrupcao: toneladas de dinheiro vivo encontradas na casa de servidor publico; companheiros se animam

Calma, pessoal. Vai precisar de tradutor e um pouco de paciência para saber direitinho como é que o cara conseguiu isso, e talvez preparar um Guia do Corrupto de Sucesso, ou um Idiot's Guide For Amassing a Lot of Money in Cash.
Já tem companheiro encomendando a obra preventivamente.
Afinal de contas, não é todo dia que se encontra um Guinness da Corrupção.
Mas atenção: o cara vai ser fuzilado! Só um detalhe, isso é na China.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

China: Millions in Cash Found at an Official’s Home



Investigators in China have found more than 200 million yuan, or $33 million, in cash at the home of an energy official accused of receiving bribes, in the country’s largest cash seizure ever, a senior prosecutor said Friday. If all the money was in 100-yuan notes, China’s largest cash denomination, it would pile 656 feet high and weigh more than 2.2 tons. 
Investigators wore out four of the 16 cash-counting machines used to tally the money, the financial news publication Caixin reported. The prosecutor, Xu Jinhui, said the cash was seized at the home of Wei Pengyuan, deputy chief of the coal bureau under the National Energy Administration. 
The agency is part of the all-powerful National Development and Reform Commission that sets broad policies for the world’s second-largest economy. Endemic corruption prompted the Chinese leadership to begin an extensive anti-graft crackdown in 2012.

sexta-feira, 31 de outubro de 2014

Pobreza: subsidios do governo nao a eliminam, apenas a prolongam, no Brasil ou na Venezuela

Verdades inconvenientes: é muito diferente eliminar a pobreza e subsidiar o consumo dos mais pobres.
Simples assim.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Juan Nagel - Foreign Policy/ O Estado de S.PauloCARACAS -

 Quando o governo venezuelano se defendia dos seus críticos, sempre mencionava a redução da pobreza como prova do seu sucesso. Durante um período, a estratégia funcionou - o número de pobres diminuiu durante parte dos anos em que Hugo Chávez presidiu o país. Mas os dias em que a pobreza era indicativa do triunfo do chavismo terminaram. Hoje, as estatísticas oficiais mostram que a pobreza aumenta rapidamente. 

Há algumas semanas o Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas (INE) trouxe uma prova de que um a cada três venezuelanos é pobre - há 12 meses essa proporção era de um para quatro. Como parte importante do discurso contra a oposição é de que o governo, e apenas ele, é responsável pela redução da pobreza, esta é uma variação importante. 

Para determinar o índice de empobrecimento, o INE calcula o custo de uma cesta de produtos que inclui alimentação, vestuário, habitação, transporte, saúde, comunicação e educação. A cesta é uma amostra do tipo de coisas que uma família de nível médio consome durante um ano. Se a renda per capita cai abaixo do custo desta cesta, a pessoa é considerada pobre. 

Com base neste sistema de medição, o número de venezuelanos pobres aumentou no ano passado em 1,8 milhão de pessoas. Aproximadamente 6% da população venezuelana, de 30 milhões de pessoas, ficaram pobres só no ano passado. 

A situação é ainda pior quando se trata da pobreza extrema, ou seja, o número de pessoas cuja renda não é suficiente nem mesmo para comprar uma cesta de alimentos. No ano passado o número de venezuelanos nesta situação aumentou em 730 mil, totalizando quase três milhões - aproximadamente 10% da população. 

A revolução chavista de fato ajudou os pobres venezuelanos entre 2003 e 2007, mas desde aquele ano o número de pobres na verdade aumentou.

Isso deve-se à política econômica chavista. Quando o preço do petróleo subiu, há cerca de 10 anos, o Estado venezuelano encheu seus cofres com o enorme fluxo de receita e usou os recursos para criar uma enorme rede de subsídios e controles de preços. Ao mesmo tempo, usou os ganhos com o petróleo em programas sociais e subsídios para reforçar o apoio das classes menos favorecidas. 

A pobreza na Venezuela de Chávez em meados dos anos 2000 de fato diminuiu e o governo manteve os preços artificialmente baixos graças à moeda sobrevalorizada e à importação subsidiada. As pessoas que se beneficiavam dos programas sociais do governo encontravam tudo o que precisavam para comprar uma vez que o governo garantia as importações e os preços baixos. Isto não podia durar. 

Durante a campanha de 2012 para reeleger Chávez, os gastos do governo mais do que duplicaram. De repente o boom do petróleo não era mais suficiente para sustentar as necessidades sociais crescentes. Naquele ano o déficit orçamentário disparou para mais de 10% do PIB. O preço do petróleo já não aumentava tanto e o financiamento externo começou a diminuir. Embora o governo continuasse a ter apoio nas urnas, a bolha estava prestes a explodir para os pobres da Venezuela. 

Desde que assumiu no ano passado, o presidente Nicolás Maduro viu a moeda local se desvalorizar de 4,3 para até 70 bolívares por dólar, dependendo da taxa de câmbio utilizada. Assim, os preços da maior parte dos produtos de consumo também aumentaram. A inflação anual está próxima dos 60%. 

A abrupta queda do nível de vida foi o que levou os manifestantes para as ruas do país. Muitas das pessoas que protestam são o que podemos chamar de "pobres emergentes", que foram de classe média durante o boom, mas viram sua situação econômica piorar desde então. 

No final, a vitória do chavismo contra a pobreza é apenas retórica. Os poucos ganhos foram devidos a um governo que converteu a alta do petróleo num crescimento do consumo passageiro. Essa fase terminou e a pobreza retorna para sua tendência de longo prazo. A hora da verdade aproxima-se rapidamente para o modelo chavista populista. A rapidez com que chegará vai depender do preço do petróleo. Mas se o preço do petróleo cair, a pobreza continuará aumentando e os novos pobres continuarão nas ruas.

Eleicoes 2014: o curral eleitoral do Bolsa Familia funcionou, e como... - Reinaldo Azevedo

Eu já havia apresentado aqui alguns desses mesmos dados, mas havia colocado a proporção de habitantes em cada estado, não a de famílias. No Maranhão, por exemplo, os 78% de votos na candidata oficial correspondem a 50% da população no Bolsa Família.
Qual é o país normal que pode se sentir orgulhoso ao exibir números desse tipo?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

 Dilma, a Priscila do Deserto Moral

 Reinaldo Azevedo


 

É preciso ser desonesto para não constatar a óbvia relação entre Bolsa Família e fidelidade ao petismo

Em Kakânia, o país imaginário de Musil em "O Homem Sem Qualidades", podia-se, às vezes, tomar um "gênio por um patife", mas "nunca se tomava um patife por um gênio". Dia desses, um dublê de colunista político e cortesão resolveu me ironizar porque afirmei que o país sai das urnas "dividido, rachado ao meio". As esquerdas, que produziram vasta literatura sobre a indústria eleitoreira da miséria, agora pretendem negar as suas próprias constatações. O Nordeste servia como emblema dessa relação quando o quase extinto PFL dava as cartas na região. Hoje, apontar o óbvio seria sinal de preconceito e demofobia. Em Banânia, não apenas se tomam gênios como patifes, mas também patifes como gênios.

Vejam os 15 Estados em que Dilma venceu no segundo turno, o seu percentual de votos (primeiro número) e o percentual de famílias atendidas pelo Bolsa Família (segundo número). Os dados são do TSE (desprezei os algarismos depois da vírgula) e do Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social (setembro de 2014). Maranhão (78-58), Piauí (78-54), Ceará (76-47), Bahia (70-47), Pernambuco (70-47), Rio Grande do Norte (69-40), Sergipe (67-49), Paraíba (64-50), Amazonas (64-43), Alagoas (63-53), Amapá (61-33), Tocantins (59-38), Pará (57-46), Rio de Janeiro (54-17) e Minas (52-21).

Agora seguem os Estados em que Dilma perdeu, com os mesmos dados: Santa Catarina (35-07), São Paulo (35-11), Acre (36-42), Distrito Federal (38-12), Paraná (39-13), Goiás (42-19), Mato Grosso do Sul (43-21), Rondônia (45-26), Mato Grosso (45-22), Rio Grande do Sul (46-13), Espírito Santo (46-19) e Roraima (42-47).

É preciso ser intelectualmente desonesto para não constatar que existe uma óbvia relação entre o benefício e a fidelidade ao petismo, que é o coronelismo da hora. A petista venceu o tucano por menos de 3,5 milhões de votos. Só no Nordeste, a sua vantagem foi de mais de 12,2 milhões. O percentual de famílias atingidas pelo programa, na região, varia de 40% (RN) a 58% (MA). O Acre e Roraima, de um lado, e Minas e Rio, de outro, parecem negar a evidência. Vistas as particularidades, não tenho espaço, apenas confirmam.

A média de votos de Dilma nos mil municípios com mais beneficiários do Bolsa Família foi de 73,1%; nos mil com menos, de apenas 28,2%. Nas mil cidades que concentram maior número de famílias com renda per capita igual ou inferior a R$ 70, a petista obteve 74,3% dos votos, nas mil com menos, só 28%.

É claro que não é o Nordeste o culpado. É a pobreza! Mas aí o esquerdista cascudo se regozija porque, afinal, a "represidenta" é a Priscila do Deserto Moral do Bolsa Família --que tem de ser mantido, sim, e de se transformar em política de Estado, imune ao proselitismo. Um governo que não se ocupasse de minorar a miséria seria indecoroso, além de cruel. Um governo que se orgulha de manter 50 milhões de pessoas atreladas ao programa é cruel, além de indecoroso.

Tanto pior quando a máquina oficial é mobilizada para fazer terrorismo eleitoral e ameaçar com o fim do benefício quem depende, para viver, de uma pensão que vai de R$ 32 a R$ 140. Eu não gostaria de estar na pele moral dessa gente.

Os imbecis falam em separatismo. Os decentes têm de pensar em como libertar os pobres da chantagem e da vigarice.

Midia: os orwellianos tupiniquins querem controlar a imprensa rapidamente...

O cinismo bolivariano se expressa rapidamente nesta matéria, preparada pelos companheiros censórios da Câmara dos Deputados: eles não só querem amordaçar a "mídia"-- que é como chamam a imprensa -- como também pretendem reviver essa excrescência do fascismo corporativo que é o diploma para jornalista, desta vez subindo um degrau a mais, retirando do patamar das leis ordinárias (já rejeitada pelo STF) para constitucionalizar a matéria.
Eles não desistem que querer implantar um mundo orwelliano.
Não devemos desistir de impedi-los de perpetrar seus sinistros desígnios.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Câmara realiza Fórum de Comunicação: Momento exige debate sobre regulação do setor
Liderança do PT na Câmara, 31/10/2014

A Câmara dos Deputados realiza nos dias 13 e 14 de novembro o Fórum Brasil de Comunicação Pública com o objetivo articular as emissoras públicas de rádio e TV e capacitar as organizações para atuar na regulação do setor e na formulação de políticas públicas. Para o deputado e jornalista Paulo Pimenta (PT-RS), autor da PEC 386/09, que restabelece a exigência do diploma para jornalista, o período pós-eleição exige aprofundamento do debate sobre essa temática.
“Mais do que nunca, após a eleição, fica claro que a mídia precisa de uma regulação democrática e transparente. O monopólio sem controle perpetuado ao longo de décadas foi perverso. Essa iniciativa da Câmara é urgente e esse tema deve ser prioritário para o País”, observou Paulo Pimenta.
Celso Schroder, presidente da Federação Nacional dos Jornalistas (Fenaj), uma das entidades participantes do Fórum, compartilha a mesma opinião. “Terminada a eleição, fica claro uma crise de identidade que as empresas comerciais sofrem no País. Elas assumiram postura partidária, com prática de crime eleitoral”, alertou.
Para Schroder, a mídia brasileira adota “no dia a dia, o comportamento partidário, inclusive após o período eleitoral, o que pode levar o Brasil a um ambiente político de instabilidade, promovendo a cisão no País, o que compromete a democracia brasileira”.
O presidente da Fenaj disse ainda que a crise da imprensa privada revela a necessidade de um marco regulatório para o setor. Ele lembrou que na disputa presidencial, principalmente no segundo turno, “muitos veículos de comunicação – entre eles os principais jornais e revistas de circulação nacional e os principais grupos de rádio e TV – abdicaram do jornalismo como atividade de produção e veiculação de informação isenta, plural e ética”.
Para contrapor a essa prática recorrente do jornalismo brasileiro, Celso Schroder disse que a aposta é “na produção de conteúdo plural, diverso, no acolhimento ao contraditório. É apostar num jornalismo investigativo, com objetividade e neutralidade”. Ele frisou que uma das ferramentas importantes de contraponto “é incrementar e fortalecer a comunicação pública do Brasil”.
Fórum – O evento, organizado pela Secretaria de Comunicação da Câmara dos Deputados e pela Frente Parlamentar pela Liberdade de Expressão e o Direito à Comunicação com Participação Popular (FrenteCom), acontece no auditório Nereu Ramos. O Fórum conta com a parceira de entidades como a Fenaj, FNDC, Fitert, Renajoc, Intervozes, Barão de Itararé, Astral, Frenavatec, Arpub, Amarc, Abccom, ABTU, Abraço, MNRC, Sinttel-DF, Fenaj, Sindicato dos Jornalistas do DF e Conselho Curador da EBC.
Temas – Entre os assuntos a serem debatidos encontram-se: Regulação do Campo Público; Tecnologia e Infraestrutura do Sistema Público e Convergências de Linguagens e Conteúdo. No dia 14 de novembro, os organizadores pretendem entregar a plataforma dos movimentos à Presidenta da República.

Politica Externa e Diplomacia da era lulo-petista: uma entrevista - Paulo Roberto de Almeida (revist InterAcao)

A mais recente "produção" publicada no Brasil, à disposição dos interessados nesses temas secundários e absolutamente sem importância como podem ser, atualmente, os da diplomacia brasileira:


2683. “Política Externa e Diplomacia Partidária no Brasil atual”, Hartford, 2 outubro 2014, 12 p. Respostas a questões colocadas pelo coordenador do curso de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, para a Revista InterAção (v. 6, n. 6, 2014, 
Relação de Publicados n. 1146.

quinta-feira, 30 de outubro de 2014

Espionagem sovietica: muito mais ampla do que jamais voce poderia sonhar - BBC russian service

Você sabia, caro leitor, que dois embaixadores brasileiros trabalharam para a União Soviética, como agentes pagos, chantageados, voluntários, ou seja lá o que for. Não temos os nomes verdadeiros, ainda, apenas os nomes de guerra: Aleks e Izotys, mas isso não importa muito. O fato é que eles não eram muito produtivos, segundo os papéis do Mithrokin Archives, que já foram publicados nos EUA. Parece que eles ganhavam razoavelmente bem, mas trabalhavam mal, com informações pouco substantivas, ou praticamente anódinas.
Também tem a informação de que cubanos e soviéticos penetraram os códigos confidenciais brasileiros, e leram tudo o transitava em nosso telex, depois mensagens eletrônicas. É a vida...
Enfim, ainda falta muito espião para descobrir, no nosso caso agentes cubanos que ainda estão por aí, pulando alegremente, de um lugar para outro, ganhando dinheiro e continuando a fazer trabalho sujo, como vocês devem saber...
Aqui uma outra história que traduzi pelo Google Translator do russo, espero que seja compreensível.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

What was the name of Abel's actually 157 folders MI5

  • October 30, 2014
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Rudolf Abel (photo - second from left) is considered one of the most successful spies during the Cold War
One of the most intriguing discoveries of new batch of documents declassified British intelligence service MI5, began documents related to Rudolf Abel.
According to the available data to date, Abel was the only Soviet intelligence officer cadre, born in Britain, unlike simple agents. Curiously, at the time of his dossier MI5 did not know what the real name Abel - William Fisher, and that he was born in 1903 in Newcastle-on-Tyne.
In total, the British MI5 counterintelligence declassified 157 folders with documents, most of which are documents from the personal files of people who were in sight of the British counterintelligence.
Declassified information relates to the period between World War I and the time of confrontation between the USSR and the West after the Second World War. The documents are divided into several categories: German intelligence agents and suspected of links with it during the Second World War; people for which audited; Soviet spies and people suspected of spying for the Soviet Union; communists and alleged communists, including citizens of the Soviet Union and those who approve of communist views.
Obviously, the materials of the dossier Abel must study together with the files of his personal file in the KGB, who kidnapped and brought back to Britain a former employee of the Archives Department of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB Vasili Mitrokhin.
Declassified documents are stored in the National Archives of Britain
Almost all the documents stolen from the Mitrokhin archive KGB, with July 2014 have become available to historians. For example, it was reported that Abel in 1947 led a large spy network in the US. In 1949, for the excellent work the leadership of the USSR awarded him the Order of the Red Banner.
In documents MI5 describes his arrest in the US in 1956. In the "Mitrokhin Archive" reported that during the arrest, he is named after his friend Rudolf Abel, who by that time was already dead. Fisher knew that the news of the arrest of "Abel" will signal to the KGB about what actually happened.
As is known, Abel subsequently exchanged in Berlin on pilot spy plane U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union, Gary Powers.

Money laundering of the USSR in the US

There among the documents dossier colorful American businessmen Julius Hammer and his son Armand. Of these, it becomes clear how the Soviet Union in 1920 launched its intelligence activities in the United States.
Family Hammer played a role in laundering money coming from the Soviet Union to finance the American Communist movement.
Famous Hollywood actor Armie Hammer, who played in the movie "The Social Network" - the great-grandson of businessman Armand Hammer
From the archives of the KGB became known in 1921, Vladimir Lenin considered the report of the Hummers so important that he sent a copy of Stalin stamped "Top Secret".
In the declassified document says that after America entered World War II, Julius Hammer could not move there. So he decided to go the other way, that is earning a lot of money that would have gone to the needs of the communist movement. In this he succeeded.
Among other alleged agents of the USSR include Indian diplomat and nationalist Arata Kandet Narayan Nambiar. In 1924 he went as a journalist in Berlin, where he collaborated with the communist cell consisting of Indians. In 1929, at the invitation of the Soviet Union, he came to Moscow.
Before the start of the Second World War, he was deported from Germany, but soon he was allowed to return as a representative nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose in Berlin. Then he led the European cell "Free India", which was funded by the Nazis.
In 1959, Soviet defector told intelligence services of Britain that Nambiar was recruited by the GRU in 1920
He was arrested in Austria in 1945 and received a prison sentence for aiding the Nazis. Conviction has not prevented him Ambassador of India to work in Germany.
In 1959, Soviet defector told intelligence services of Britain that Nambiar was recruited by the GRU in the 1920s. In the "Mitrokhin Archive" no information about it, perhaps because it documents the GRU were not included.

British Marxist historians

It is assumed that most interest to researchers are the files associated with the British Marxist historians Eric Hobsbawm and Christopher Hill.
In the case of Hill turns out that the intelligence agencies became interested in him after his long journey to Russia in 1935, when he was a student at Oxford University. In 1936 he returned to Britain and joined the Communist Party. After the Second World War, MI5 believed Hill's one of the main Communist at Oxford University.
In 1951, counterintelligence received permission from the Ministry of Interior to the audition of his telephone conversations and reading his correspondence. In MI5 believed that thus will be able to get more information about the scientist as well as on the activities of the Communists in the University of Oxford.
Thanks intercepted letter becomes clear infighting Hill and his decision to quit the Communist Party in 1957. Thus he protested the invasion of the Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956. In his address to the party leadership, he wrote: "For too long we have lived in a world of illusions. It was a cozy little world ..."
Counterintelligence reread correspondence Eric Hobsbawm
Unlike Hill Eric Hobsbawm has not left the ranks of the Communist Party after the Soviet invasion of Hungary, but his relationship with some of the British Communists soured. One of the supporters of "hard" line Dee Ann Pritt once said in a private conversation that he was dissatisfied with "this heinous Eric Hobsbawm."
Many Communists unpleasantly surprised to learn that the historian, wrote an article for the Daily Mail and the other is not too sympathetic to the Communists publications under the pseudonym Francis Newton. However, he continued to encourage people, especially young people, to join the Communist Party.
In one of the declassified files specifically states that in 1963 he congratulated the Young Communist League of West Middlesex with "encouraging results" to attract new members. The documents contained his membership card belonging to the beginning of the 1960s, as well as intercepted letters and transcripts of telephone conversations.

Secret agent of the Gestapo

The current package of documents disclosed reveals the secret MI5 agent "Jack King" of which the general public has learned of previously declassified documents. This officer counterintelligence, whose real name is - Eric Roberts, during the Second World War in Britain seemed a secret agent of the German Gestapo, making counterintelligence revealed Britons sympathetic to the Nazis. This operation is called "The Case of the fifth column."
Some British, believing that they are dealing with a German spy, he even passed classified information, including the development of the engine for supersonic aircraft.
Thanks released documents became known name of the agent, as well as recordings of his conversations with supporters of the Nazis, who wanted to uncover all sorts of military secrets and thereby harm the military might of Britain.
Eric Roberts was represented in Britain a secret agent of the Gestapo
Supporters Hitler proposes to continue the bombing of British cities to further undermine the morale of the society, and the German troops entered the territory of Britain. In the period from 1942 to 1945, Roberts was able to identify dozens or even hundreds of people who supported the Nazis.
In declassified documents counterintelligence have information about the American physicist Robert Oppenheimer, who helped create the Atomic bomby.Ego suspects in connection with the Soviet Union because of sympathy for the ideas of Marxism and the communist movement. From his dossier can be understood that the American and British intelligence are very worried that Oppenheimer decides to escape to the Soviet Union.
MI5 declassified dossier on the member of the CPSU, comrade Joseph Stalin Georgy Malenkov. In 1956 Malenkov headed the delegation of the Soviet Union, to visit the UK. The visit was widely covered in the British press.

Reforming the World Monetary System: book review of Carol M. Connell - Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Reforming the World Monetary System: book review

Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Book review:
Reforming the World Monetary System: Fritz Machlup and the Bellagio Group (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013. xii + 272 pp.; ISBN 978-1-84893-360-6; Financial History series n. 21, $99.00; hardcover)

This book appears in a Financial History series of the Pickering & Chatto, which has already published as diverse studies in this area as one on Argentina’s parallel currency, another on the federal banking in Brazil, with most of titles being about banking and finance in the North Atlantic world, from the colonial times to the 20th century. Carol Connell is Professor of Finance and Business Management at the School of Business, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, where she is very well rated by her students; and she is now directing a new monograph series on Modern Heterodox Economics, also being published by Pickering & Chatto. Connell prepared this very well researched work benefitting from a fellowship research grant from the Earhart Foundation, a private charitable institution that funds scholarly research; one of its early beneficiaries was Friedrich von Hayek, who wrote The Road to Serfdom (1944).
Some scenarios and arguments presented in this book were first made public in academic publications, such as the Journal of Management History and the Journal of the History of Economic Thought, and Connell’s interest in Fritz Machlup career and work arose when she was researching about one of his students, the growth theorist Edith Penrose. Besides the preeminent presence of Machlup, the book also deals with the contributions for the discussion and reform of the international financial and monetary system by luminaries such as Robert Triffin, William Fellner, and Milton Friedman.
In the introduction the author states very clearly that her objective was the study of the complex reform process that, from the Sixties up to the Seventies, led to the adoption of a flexible exchange rate – instead of the fixed parity established at the Bretton Woods conference (1944) – and the introduction of the special drawing rights as the main “currency” of the International Monetary Fund (p. 1). Based on archival and published sources, the book follows, in thirteen extensively annotated chapters, the itinerary of the Bellagio Group, established under the leadership of Fritz Machlup, and integrated by 32 non-government academic economists, working in intimate contact with policy makers and IMF officials, between 1963 and 1977. Bellagio Group’s primary documents are everywhere referenced, but there are also 299 secondary sources in the bibliography, among them (besides the four big economists), Charles Kindleberger, Edith Penrose, Fred Bergsten, and John Williamson.
Trying perhaps to emphasize the current appeal of her study to contemporary policymakers and researchers, Connell states in her Introduction that there could be in Machlup’s approach something similar to the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20), which is clearly a non performing analogy, essentially because of the independence of views of the former vis-à-vis the narrow interests of today’s governments. Notwithstanding, Bellagio Group worked in close contact and cooperation with the Group of Ten, launched simultaneously within the IMF. The intention of the Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon was to devise a monetary reform in an already stressed arrangement, in a context when the ten most important countries tried to control and minimize the imbalances of the world economy, the growing liquidity crises, and the volatility in the price of gold (partially circumvented by the introduction of swap facilities and the creation of the General Arrangements to Borrow).
After explaining her research questions and original hypothesis, and informing where Machlup’s and Triffin’s papers are located (Hoover and Yale), Connell opens Chapter 1 by describing the crisis of confidence that arouse in early Sixties, leading to the various exercises of academic debates and institutional brain-storming that mobilized the most important economist of that decade. Late in the Fifties, Robert Triffin was already predicting a forthcoming crisis, and calling for a radical reform of the monetary system in his Gold and the Dollar Crisis (1960). Feeling challenged by the convening by Dillon of an IMF Studies Group, within the Group of Ten, and excluding academic economists, Machlup, Triffin and Fellner decided to “embark on their own study, involving economists of widely divergent views and with no problem or proposal considered ‘out of bounds’. Hence the idea for a series of alternative conference was born” (p. 18), and that was the Bellagio Group, which first met at this Italian resort of the Lake of Como. A brief chronology of the monetary system events from 1944 and 1977 and a synthetic table on the various exchange rate policies and regimes (from gold standard to flexible) close this chapter.
Chapter 2 introduces the life and thought of Fritz Machlup, who had been working and publishing in the area of monetary reform for many years before the convening of his “child”, the Bellagio Group. Born (1902) in a pre-1914 Europe (Austria) with “ten currencies, all with fixed gold parities and fixed exchange rates”, Machlup soon afterwards (1920) was presented to a continent with “twenty-seven paper currencies, none with a gold parity, none with fixed exchange rates and several of them in various stages of inflation or hyperinflation” (p. 23). From 1923 to 1962 Machlup studied and published extensively on monetary problems, particularly the gold standard, but also dealt with patents, industrial organization, production of knowledge and theory of the firm. His 1923 dissertation on the gold-exchange standard at the University of Vienna was supervised by Ludwig von Mises; a decade later he was already residing in the U.S. and teaching at the University of Buffalo; at that time, “he was already the first economist to frame the discussion of balance of payments problems in terms of payments adjustment, liquidity and confidence” (p. 27). John Williamson, a former student, “attributed Machlup’s belief in the importance of the confidence to the role it had played in the collapse of the gold-exchange standard during the Great Depression” (p. 29). The same would occur thirty years later, with the U.S. involvement with and expenditures for the Vietnam’s War, and European countries distrust of America’s capacity to honor its commitments under Bretton Woods. Machlup anticipated the scenario with his lengthy essay “Plans for Reform of International Monetary System”, first published in 1962 and reissued in 1964, significantly updated (p. 32).
Chapter 3 is dedicated to Robert Triffin – a Belgian who worked for the Federal Reserve and the IMF, and professor at Yale from 1951 to 1977 – and to the 1959 Triffin Plan, proposing the replacement of gold and foreign-exchange reserves by gold-guaranteed deposit accounts at the IMF, within a more flexible system. But, at that time, as argued by Charles Kindleberger, even if many economists proposed the idea, “few central bankers recommended flexible exchange rates as a means of eliminating … all the problems of adjustment, liquidity and confidence” (p. 42). Even if Triffin’s solution could be first-best economically, it was politically out of question. The head of the Group of Ten at IMF, Otmar Emminger, “found the Triffin Plan unacceptable because nations were not prepared to hand over so much responsibility and financial power to an international body” (p. 42). At that juncture, confidence, not liquidity, was the problem that made Triffin and Machlup to come together intellectually (p. 47).
Chapter 4 deals with Budapest born (1905) William Fellner, a fugitive from the Nazis, like the two others; professor at Berkeley in 1939, he worked mainly at the intersection of macro and microeconomics, researching and writing about inflation, regulation, growth and balance of payments problems, including in cooperation with the other two in monetary and exchange questions, both in theory and policy. In 1963, he was dealing with budgetary deficits and their consequences, which led to adjustments efforts, and also to the confidence question. Differently from the planned equilibrium advocated by Triffin, Fellner “recommended instead letting free-market processes perform more of the equilibrating function”(p. 57). In many papers, he proposed a limited exchange-rate flexibility system. In fact, both Machlup and Fellner were committed to freely floating exchange-rates, but were aware of the responsibility of national governments, which led them to explore a myriad of possible solutions.
The title of Chapter 5, Why Economists Disagree, takes its name from Machlup’s speech before the American Philosophical Society, in November 1964, five months after the fourth Bellagio Group conference. He explained then his decision to invite 32 economists from eleven countries, most of them from divergent schools of thought, to explore solutions for the problems of the international monetary system of the 1960s. They had to consider hybrid or compromise solutions for the identified problems. This chapter presents each one of the participants, their background and works. The sources of disagreement are very well abridged in a table dealing with the four major policy proposals for reform: semi-automatic gold standard, centralized international reserves, multiple currencies and/or flexible exchange rates (p. 76-78). All proposals were carefully examined at a series of scenario-planning exercises through various Bellagio conferences, allowing the economists to evaluate the “relative impact on payments, liquidity and confidence of the four basic exchange regimes, given any one or combination of them might have been adopted” (p. 80).
Chapters 6 and 7 deal, respectively, with the hypothesis of multiple reserve currencies and Milton Friedman’s arguments for fixed versus flexible exchange rates, in a paper he presented in 1953, making the case for a floating regime. This regime, for him, “has the advantage of monetary independence, insulation from real shocks, and a less disruptive adjustment mechanism in the face of nominal rigidities than it is the case with pegged exchange rates” (p. 99). These two chapter are of a more theoretical and historical nature, despite the fact that all questions discussed in them had a very practical impact on each devised solution for the problems plaguing the international monetary system.
Chapter 8, Collaboration With the Group of Ten, makes the bridge between the two groups, the IMF technocrats and government officials, for one side, the independent academic economists, for the other. Machlup pressed hard on his team, achieving a detailed report, International Monetary Arrangements: The Problem of Choice, two months before (in June 1964) the Group of Ten and the IMF staff could prepare theirs. He also frankly explained, at the first joint meeting, later that year, the differences between the two approaches. This led to the assignment of Group of Ten chairman, Otmar Emminger, to the Bellagio Group, inaugurating a thirteen-year collaboration. The tasks for the groups were the same, but working methods, and freedom of opinion, made them very different, as well as purposes: Bellagio emphasized disagreements among the proposals, and the nature of their differing impact on the problems dealt with. Friedman, in 1965, criticized the report for not offering one unified  solution for the crisis, but Machlup pointed out that a consensus was achieved on the consequences of each solution proposed by his group: governments and the IMF had food for thought.
Chapter 9, Adjustment Policies and Special Drawing Rights: Joint Meetings of Officials and Academics, is a continuation of this kind of collaboration, now assuming other forms of joint exercises, as the deputies of the Group of Ten start to met regularly with the Bellagio Group, and did so from 1964 to 1977, resulting in the creation of special reserve assets, later called the Special Drawings Rights (due to the French Finance minister, Valery Giscard D’Estaing, insistence on considering them a credit, not an owned reserve). The three Bellagio main economists were the organizers of those meetings, which assumed a kind of a NGO feature. “From 1970 to 1977, discussions would focus on the increasing liberalization of the international capital market and the wisdom of special drawing rights for developing countries” (p. 128). This period also corresponds to the U.S. going off the gold and to the floating of the Deutsche mark: main questions became managed floating and international liquidity. A Basle meeting in 1977 was the last meeting of a Joint Academic and Officials meeting, and the first allocation of SDRs was held in 1970. A new time, no less challenging, had arrived for and within the international monetary system.
Chapter 10, From the Bellagio Group to the Bürgenstock Conferences, explores the continuation of the semi-academic discussions under a new format, this time dealing with floating exchange regimes in various guises, but always under the influence, and the intellectual guidance, of Fritz Machlup, who intended to prepare a well conceived book out of the exercise: this came at light in 1970, as a Princeton University Press publication, Approaches to Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility: The Bürgenstock papers. The analysis takes ground on the Austrian background of Machlup’s thought, which also gave light to planning methods based on Delphi scenarios. A first meeting, with a large number of officials, academic people but also representatives from banks and corporations, was held in Long Island, in January 1969, followed by a second meeting in June, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, where five more meetings were organized.
Chapter 11, follows the lead, dealing with de facto successor of the Joint Meeting of Officials and Academics, which was an extended Bellagio Group, the Group of Thirty, which included members from all the current G20 financial group. The Group of Thirty meet twice a year at the beginning of the 1980s, and was broader than the Bellagio Group, including industrialists and private bankers, and preferred not to commission papers from academics, establishing instead an agenda for discussion comprising issues of capital movements and less developing countries assets, international banking supervision, and energy (the issue of the moment). But Fritz Machlup was still on the party, with a minor group of academics. A so-called Bellagio Group met again in 1996, under the leadership of the general manager of the Bank for International Settlements, and has been meeting once a year at the Italian resort, under the intellectual guidance of professor Barry Eichengreen, from Berkeley, and always financed by the BIS.
Chapter 12 is dedicated to Reassessing the Bellagio Group’s Impact on International Monetary Reform; Carol Connell affirms that there are “significant parallels between the calls for monetary system reform in the 1960s and those for reform following the financial crisis of 2008-9” (p. 185). This comparison seems off the mark, as the current financial G20 has achieved nothing comparable, besides pressures for the negotiation and implementation of a more stringent set of Basel prudential rules for the banking sector. The outcry about the dollar crisis has been responded by nothing else than the confirmation of its centrality for the current financial and monetary “non-system”. Initial rumors – at its monnaie unique début – about the strength of the euro were replaced by recent fears of its demise.
Notwithstanding this, Connell presents a clear historical synthesis about the importance of the Bellagio Group for the understanding of the most crucial problems of the international monetary system as devised at Bretton Woods: all of the group members came from G-10 countries, the same as the suppliers of the General Arrangements to Borrow (now expanded, and with the New GAB). At least, the academics convinced the central bankers that floating exchange regimes could work, and that flexible currencies could cushion external shocks; that is not a minor intellectual achievement. And, the same problems they tackled, adjustment, liquidity, and confidence, continue to be at the center of the nightmares of the central bankers and finance officials alike (together with new preoccupations, on the fiscal side, as demography imposes its burdens over all). It seems that liquidity is no more an issue today, as governments create real tsunamis of new financial assets, pushing national debts to new higher peaks.
In the bright side, this Chapter 12 finishes with an impressive list of publications of the Princeton Finance Section under Fritz Machlup’s leadership, from 1960 up to 1971, no less than 98 titles authored by many of the most well-known names of the economics trade, and certainly some of Nobel-worth distinction in this profession.
Chapter 13, finally, is a beautiful piece of scholarly work: The Impact of the Bellagio Group on International Trade and Finance Scholarship from the 1960s to the Present, which could also be called something like “the sons and daughters of Machlup, Triffin and Fellner” (and now their grandsons and grand-daughters, like Connell herself). She lists some disciples of the mentors: Edith Penrose, Stephen Hymer, Charles Kindleberger, James Tobin, Andrew Crockett, Edwin Truman, and many others.
Conclusions, at last, summarizes the lessons drawn from each chapter, before returning to the initial hypothesis. Great Depression and World War II influenced how economists thought about policy, inflation, interest rates, deficits and government intervention. Machlup, Triffin and Fellner were the intellectual masters behind much of the conceptual thinking about the great challenges emerging from a world order devised with some improvisation, and no practical guidance, at the end of the II World War. With some Austrian ingenuity and innovative and creative thinking of their own, they are at the core of the adjustments and arrangements that were made, in the Sixties and the Seventies, for the current, certainly limited and incomplete, international monetary system (or non-system, at discretion). One of her hypothesis, that of the centrality of the Bellagio Group for the reform of the international monetary system, is largely confirmed and deserves proper acknowledgment: they have had a real impact on practical policies, and in the reconfiguration of the multilateral financial organizations. And their influence on scholarship and empirical research over a so large community of academic and applied economists is beyond recognition of traditional prizes and honors.

Paulo R. de Almeida
University Center of Brasilia-Uniceub, and Brazilian Ministry of External Relations

Relacoes Brasil-EUA: alguma chance de melhorar? Hummm -- Andres Oppenheimer (MH)

Don’t expect a U.S.-Brazil honeymoon soon
Andres Oppenheimer
Miami Herald, October 30, 2014

The big question among Brazil watchers in this capital is whether newly re-elected President Dilma Rousseff will improve her government's ailing ties with the United States during her second term. Most are skeptical that she will.
Despite Rousseff’s statement after a telephone conversation with President Barack Obama on Tuesday that both leaders will take “all possible measures” to revamp bilateral ties, and that their foreign ministries will start talks to reschedule a previously canceled Rousseff visit to Washington, few diplomats or foreign-policy experts believe there will be a significant improvement in Brazil-U.S. ties during Rouseff’s second term.
The reason is that Rousseff’s foreign policy is run by her left-of-center Workers Party’s leftist wing, which prioritizes Brazil’s ideological alliances with Venezuela, Argentina, and other leftist-ruled neighboring countries over improving relations with Washington. And that’s not likely to change anytime soon.
Rousseff, who won Sunday's elections in Latin America's biggest country with a meager 51.6 percent of the vote, has focused her foreign policy on strengthening South America’s economic and political blocs, including the MERCOSUR trade bloc led by Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela.
Under MERCOSUR’s rules, which were strongly criticized during the campaign by opposition leader Aecio Neves, no member country can unilaterally negotiate a free-trade deal with non-member countries, such as the United States. Rousseff’s critics argue that, to revamp Brazil’s stagnant economy, the South American country badly needs more trade and investment with the United States and Europe.
Ties between Brazil and Washington hit a low last year, after Rousseff suspended a hard-negotiated trip to Washington following disclosures that the U.S. National Security Agency had spied on her.
“We don't think there will be a huge shift in Rousseff’s second term, neither in economic nor in foreign policy,” says Joao Augusto de Castro Neves, a Brazil analyst with the Eurasia Group political-analysis firm. “Given the economic challenges that she is facing, she may be pressed to make some changes to take distance from her so-called Bolivarian nationalist interventionist policies, but they will be very slow and gradual changes.”
Thiago Aragao, of Brazil’s Arko Advice political-consulting firm, says that Brazil’s foreign policy is unlikely to change “because Dilma (Rousseff) will be even more dependent on the Workers Party than before.” He added, “She will have to govern with a more divided congress, and turning her back to the Workers Party would amount to political suicide.”
The only thing that might change in Brazil’s foreign policy might be a trend to make fewer subsidized loans from its BNDES national development bank to Venezuela, Cuba, and other government allies, Aragao said. “We may see a small decrease in the amounts of these loans, but no change in the general foreign-policy mindset.”
Peter Hakim, a leading Brazil analyst with the Inter-American Dialogue think tank, is more optimistic. Rousseff is expected to reshuffle her economic and foreign-policy teams during her second term, which will give both sides an opportunity to revamp their ties, he said.
Other Brazil watchers note that Marco Aurelio Garcia, Rousseff’s powerful point man for relations with Venezuela, Cuba, and other leftist governments, might soon retire.
U.S. officials are known to be skeptical about Rousseff’s political will — or political capacity — to dramatically improve ties with Washington, citing among other examples the fact that Brazil has not replaced its ambassador to the Washington, D.C.-based Organization of American States in several years. Many U.S. officials take that as a sign that Brazil wants to weaken the OAS in order to strengthen UNASUR, CELAC, and other diplomatic groups that exclude the United States.
My opinion: Both Brazil and the United States are to blame for their tense bilateral ties, which are hurting both countries.
Brazil is hurting itself by essentially giving away its foreign policy to the extreme left of the Workers Party. It has resulted in Brazil’s near automatic support for dictatorships around the world, from Cuba to the Middle East, and damaged Brazil’s economy by isolating it from the world’s biggest markets.
And the United States, in addition to the NSA spying fiasco, has not helped mend fences by, among other things, refusing to support Brazil's bid for a United Nations Security Council seat, while at the same time supporting India's bid.
I hope I'm wrong about this, but despite both Brazil and U.S. statements after Rousseff’s re-election signaling a mutual desire to press the re-set button, it’s not likely to happen anytime soon.

A China seria um Estado autocratico?: canadenses de Toronto dizem que sim...

Sinosphere
Toronto School District Cancels Plans for Confucius Institute
By AUSTIN RAMZY
Canada’s largest school district moved to terminate its agreement with the institute, which would have offered after-school Chinese language and culture classes, over concerns about China’s human rights record and restrictions on academic freedom.

Parece que tem gente que não concorda em manter relações as usual...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Toronto School District Cancels Plans for Confucius Institute

Photo
In early 2011, Hu Jintao, left, who was president of China at the time, visited a Confucius Institute at Walter Payton College Preparatory High School in Chicago. The program has entered partnerships with hundreds of schools and universities around the world.Credit Pool photo by Chris Walker
The Toronto District School Board’s vote to cancel plans for a Confucius Institute marks the latest setback for China’s language- and culture-based soft-power initiative.
Canada’s largest school district moved on Wednesday to terminate its agreement with the institute, which would have offered after-school Chinese language and culture classes, over concerns about China’s human rights record and restrictions on academic freedom.
The decision followed months of debate, with groups including Tibetan exiles and members of the Falun Gong, a spiritual movement banned in China, arguing that the program be stopped on grounds that it would give the Chinese government undue influence over local education. Others, including members of the local Chinese community, argued in favor of the language-learning opportunities the program would have provided and said politics would not play a part.
The board’s decision seemed likely after a committee of its members voted earlier this month to recommend that the district end the agreement. Its Chinese partner, the Hunan Provincial Department of Education, moved last week to sever the deal after Toronto board members’ intentions became clear, The Toronto Star reported.
The nonprofit Confucius Institutes have been set up under the direction of the Hanban, which is affiliated with China’s Ministry of Education. The 10-year-old program has opened 465 institutes and more than 700 smaller Confucius Classrooms around the world. In recent years, it has seen increasing resistance from partner schools, particularly in the United States and Canada, over concerns that the institutes restrict discussion of issues considered sensitive by the Chinese government.
The Toronto decision follows an Oct. 1 move by Pennsylvania State University to end its Confucius Institute partnership. Penn State’s decision came less than a week after the University of Chicago said it was suspending negotiations over the renewal of its Confucius Institute, citing an interview with the Hanban’s director general, Xu Lin, in which she touted her tough negotiating style.
Concerns about Confucius Institutes have run particularly strong in Canada. McMaster University, in Hamilton, Ontario, ended its program last year after a former teaching assistant filed a human rights complaint alleging that the Confucius Institute discriminated against her belief in Falun Gong. The University of Sherbrooke in Quebec also ended its Confucius Institute agreement last year.
This summer, the American Association of University Professors issued a letter calling on schools to cut ties with Confucius Institutes or revise their agreements, saying they “function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom.”
In a commentary on Thursday, the state-run China Daily newspaper accused opponents of Confucius Institutes of having “a deep bias against China.”