Volume XIX, No. 14 (2017)
4 December 2017
Roundtable and Web Production Editor: George Fujii
- Introduction by Thomas Schwartz, Vanderbilt University.. 2
- Review by Werner Lippert, Indiana University of Pennsylvania.. 5
- Review by Luke A. Nichter, Texas A&M University–Central Texas. 8
- Review by Kenneth Weisbrode, Bilkent University.. 12
- Author’s Response by Stephan Kieninger, Independent Historian.. 19
© 2017 The Authors.
Nixon: “I have come completely around to the view that Connally so eloquently expressed a year ago and which we rejected for what then appeared to be good reasons. The way the Europeans are talking today, European unity will not be in our interest, certainly not from a political viewpoint or from an economic viewpoint…What matters now is what we do and we must act effectively and soon or we will create in Europe, a Frankenstein monster, which could prove to be highly detrimental to our interests in the years ahead.”
Time and again, the West Europeans resisted Nixon’s and Kissinger’s efforts to tone down the substance of NATO’s CSCE agenda. The intransigence of the West Europeans gave the bridge builders the cover to continue their policy…. Kissinger could not bring his European partners to trim their ambitious objectives to the CSCE. Therefore, the Soviets were not prepared to deliver concessions in MBFR. In the autumn of 1974, Kissinger’s status quo détente was stuck: SALT was stalemated, MBFR was deadlocked, and the prospects for the expansion of U.S. trade with the Soviet Union were gloomy… Eventually, Kissinger came to support the dynamic détente that he had almost been killing during the previous years. The Bureau of European Affairs gained more leverage. Finally, Kissinger followed the advice of the bridge builders in his own department (313).