A OTAN aos 70 anos: tem futuro? - Karen Donfried (German Marshall Fund)

3 Ways Europe Is Looking at a Fraying NATO

Karen Donfried, president German Marshall Fund

DefenseOne, April 2, 2019

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/04/3-ways-europe-looking-fraying-nato/155982/?oref=d-river

When 29 foreign ministers gather this week to mark NATO’s 70th birthday in Washington, D.C., their bonhomie will seek to mask important divisions within the alliance, not only across the Atlantic but also within Europe. 

In Paris, the talk is all about strategic autonomy. Many French feel America has gone bad. President Trump’s antipathy toward NATO has led them to conclude that the U.S. security guarantee, enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledging each ally to collective defense, can no longer be relied on. Even with their nuclear-weapons capacity and permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, the French admit that they are far from strategic autonomy today given their clear dependence on the United States for their security and defense needs. Unsurprisingly, they are the most ardent evangelists about the need for Europeans to double down on building their own independent assets and capabilities. 

In Berlin, the focus is on strategic patience. While some Germans find the French argument compelling, more have reached a different conclusion. Many Germans perceive the change in the United States as cyclical, having to do with a particular U.S. president, rather than structural, signifying a fundamental turning-away from the Alliance as an enduring commitment, not just a series of transactions. To be sure, they do not foresee a return to the status quo antewhen the Trump era ends. But they do believe that the President’s successor will have a clear-eyed view of the benefits NATO brings to the United States and, accordingly, will return to a more traditional view of transatlantic relations. Chancellor Merkel has talked about how the times have changed and Germany can no longer “completely depend on others,” and she has called on Europe to take its fate into its own hands — but still, she describes the relationship with the United States as “crucial.” 

In Warsaw, the buzzwords are strategic embrace. The Poles see a big, bad neighbor to their East: Russia. U.S. troops are currently deployed to Poland on a rotational basis as part of NATO’s effort to buttress defenses on its eastern flank after Russia illegally annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. The Poles are not convinced that their European allies will defend them if push comes to shove and thus the Polish government has offered to pay $2 billion to establish a permanent U.S. military presence in Poland. Polish President Duda even offered to call the base “Fort Trump.” In Polish eyes, there is simply no substitute for the U.S. security guarantee.

To stop further fraying of alliance cohesion, NATO allies need to unify around a policy of strategic responsibility. Having European military forces that are more effective, efficient, and capable is in the interest of every NATO member, whether France, Germany, Poland, or the United States. It is hard to imagine future scenarios in which Europeans will not be called on to take greater responsibility, especially in their neighborhood.

To the Trump administration, the most important expression of taking strategic responsibility is the level of defense spending. Most Americans agree that their NATO partners are largely failing on that front. Only six of Washington’s 28 allies spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense (a NATO guideline that members recommitted themselves to back in 2014 with a vague formulation of “aim[ing] to move toward the 2 percent guideline within a decade”).

Defense spending is an important metric, but it is not the only one. Alliance cohesion has long been NATO’s holy grail. 

Congress has grown increasingly concerned about mixed signals emanating from the administration about NATO’s value and has stepped up its engagement over the past year. Most recently, in a rare expression of bipartisanship, House Speaker Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader McConnell invited NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to address a joint session of Congress. 

Ever since last July’s NATO Summit in Brussels, rumors have been flying that the U.S. president wants to pull the United States out of NATO. Congress has sought to reassure the allies. In the immediate run-up to that summit, the Senate voted 97-2 to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the collective defense of the alliance. This January, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the NATO Support Act, 357 to 22, thus “reject[ing] any efforts to withdraw the United States from NATO” and prohibiting any use of federal funds for that purpose.

Members are also taking their support on the road. Over 50 members of Congress, from Senate Judiciary Chairman Graham to Speaker Pelosi, attended the Munich Security Conference – the largest Congressional delegation in the half-century history of this annual high-level gathering. Their message was clear: The United States will stay engaged in the world and values its allies; and because we are stronger together, the Europeans need to up their contribution. Europeans applauded this bipartisan show of support for NATO and welcomed the message of reform, rather than obsolescence.

Congress’s engagement could prove to be the critical variable for unifying transatlantic partners around a shared goal of strategic responsibility. Anniversaries are not only for celebrating. Remembering past achievements can inspire, but neither nostalgia nor hope is a policy. Foreign ministers need to unify around a common sense of purpose and recommit their countries to investing more in credible capabilities. The reason to do so is not because the United States is asking; it is because the current strategic reality demands it. 

Related: To Strengthen NATO, Congress Must Help End Its Reliance On Russian Equipment

Related: We Need a NATO/EU for Cyber Defense

Related: French MOD Rebukes Trump Administration for Arms-Sales Focus

A Russia ameaca a seguranca e a estabilidade da Europa? Editorial Washington Post

The Post’s View

Obama doesn’t grasp Putin’s Eurasian ambitions

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By Editorial Board, The Washington Post: Wednesday, March 19, 7:52 PM

IT’S EASY to conclude that Vladi­mir Putin’s passionate defense of Russia’s takeover of Crimea “just didn’t jibe with reality,” as Secretary of State John F. Kerry put it. In a speech on Tuesday, the Russian ruler repeated mendacious charges that the Ukrainian government had been hijacked by “nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites”; voiced his paranoid conspiracy theory about supposed Western sponsorship of popular revolutions, including the Arab Spring; and brazenly compared Russia’s abrupt annexation of Ukraine with the reunification of Germany.

It’s necessary, however, to take some of what Mr. Putin said seriously, because of the implicit threat it poses to European and global security. Mr. Putin advanced a radical and dangerous argument: that the collapse of the Soviet Union left “the Russian nation” as “one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders.” That, he suggested, gave Moscow the right to intervene in Crimea, and, by extension, anywhere it considers ethnic Russians or their culture to be threatened.

Mr. Putin’s doctrine would justify Russian meddling not just in other parts of Ukraine — he claimed that “large sections of the historical south of Russia” now “form the southeast of Ukraine” — but also in other former Soviet republics with substantial populations of ethnic Russians.

Western officials seem to be betting that Mr. Putin won’t dare to extend his aggression beyond Crimea. But then, just last week they were saying they did not expect Moscow to move quickly on Crimean annexation. The Obama administration and its European allies have been too slow to grasp that Mr. Putin is bent on upending the post-Cold War order in Europe and reversing Russia’s loss of dominion over Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Worse, some in and outside of Western governments may be feeding Mr. Putin’s imperialism by rushing to concede “Russian interests” in Eurasia. President Obama and Mr. Kerry are among those who have said they recognize such “interests” in Ukraine. But the fact that there are ethnic Russians in a country should not give Mr. Putin’s regime a privileged say in its affairs. The idea that areas populated by Russians must be ruled or protected by Moscow is less the ideology of the 19th century, as Mr. Kerry would have it, than of the 1930s.

Mr. Putin’s claim that Russia should have a say in the political orientation of its neighbors, and whether they join alliances such as the European Union or NATO, is equally unacceptable. (Mr. Kerry recently renounced, gratuitously, any such U.S. claim on Latin American states, several of which have close military ties with Russia.) Perversely, some in the West are echoing Mr. Putin’s argument that his aggression is an understandable response to Western encouragement of the former Soviet Bloc states that embraced democracy and free markets and sought NATO and European Union membership.

The two countries that Mr. Putin has invaded since 2008, Ukraine and Georgia, were rejected for NATO membership action plans that year. Can it be argued seriously that Estonia and Latvia, with their large Russian minorities, now would be less vulnerable to Russian aggression had they had not joined NATO? The crisis in Europe has come about not because Western institutions expanded, but because they did not fulfill their post-Cold War promise of “a Europe whole and free.”

Nossos aliados no Brics: sobre Siria e Assange-Equador

O ministro Lavrov sempre foi, é um dos melhores amigos dos amigos dos amigos, se é que vocês me entendem, todos companheiros unidos numa mesma causa, em prol da soberania, do respeito à lei, da não intervenção nos assuntos internos dos outros Estados e essas outras coisas antigas, mas ainda válidas. Sua fala, abaixo transcrita, é de um realismo impressionante, o que só testemunha em favor de sua coerência lúcida e de sua adequação aos princípios consagrados do direito internacional, sem falar da lógica e do interesse próprio.
Como é que o regime sírio vai deixar de massacrar seus opositores, se estes pretendem massacrar o regime sírio, a começar por Assad e seus asseclas? Seria pedir que eles cometessem suicídio certo?
Por isso que Brasil e Rússia estão certos, desse ponto de vista: enquanto todas as partes não cessarem suas hostilidades, é irrealista pedir que apenas uma das partes renuncie à violência. Lógico, pois não?
Portanto, Assad está plenamente certo em continuar a destruir tranquilamente seu país, bombardeando bairros e cidades inteiras, lançando ataques aéreos contra seus opositores, enfim, massacrando alegremente aqueles que não concordam em que ele seja o único presidente legítimo da Síria. Quem não concorda com isso, não pode dialogar com o governo, certo?
O problema desses ocidentais é que eles não respeitam os direitos legítimos dos Estados soberanos, e ficam perturbando o cenários com demandas ilegítimas e ilegais relativas a democracia, direitos humanos e essas coisas incômodas. O Brasil está certo em defender a soberania dos Estados, e impedir a derrubada de governos legítimos pela força. O governo está certo ao se alinhar com a Rússia e a China no veto a essas medidas propostas no CSNU pelos ocidentais de intervenção nos assuntos internos da Síria. Onde iríamos parar, se isso fosse autorizado?
Quanto ao Equador, acho que o ministro Lavrov está ligeiramente equivocado: o que os bolcheviques fizeram foi justamente invadir o Palácio de Inverno, contra a lei e o direito. O ministro Lavrov está condenando agora os bolcheviques? Que gracinha...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

UN Security Council has no authority to support revolution in Syria – Lavrov

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Published: 01 September, 2012, 10:51
Edited: 01 September, 2012, 17:03

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (RIA Novosti/Eduard Pesov)

The UN Security Council has no right to support a revolution or foreign intervention in Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned. Any plan to withdraw government troops while fighting continues is untenable, and naïve at best, he added.

The demand for President Bashar al-Assad to resign as a precondition to resolving the Syrian crisis is a completely unrealistic approach, Lavrov said during a public appearance at the Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs.

“There are different attitudes towards the Syrian regime. But while fighting in the streets continues, it is absolutely unrealistic to say that the only way out is for one side to unilaterally capitulate. It is not a matter of ideology, we don’t support any political figures in Syria. We just reason from what is realistic,” Lavrov said to the students of the diplomatic university.

Harking back to the summit in Geneva in June, Lavrov noted that despite differing opinions on the conflict, all the participating countries agreed to work for a “free, stable, independent and democratic”Syria. However, “our western partners and some nations in the region are almost openly pushing for outside intervention,” said Lavrov.

“Outside intervention should be positive. Every international player should push for both sides of the Syrian conflict to cease violence,” stressed Lavrov. “Saying that the government should be the first to pull out its troops from towns and then the opposition is not a viable plan.”

The Russian foreign minister added that those foreign players who insist on inciting the opposition forces “are not working in the interests of the Syrian people. They are motivated by their own geopolitical interests.”

Lavrov cited the fact the Security Council dismissed a vote on the Geneva accord as evidence that a number of countries were not working for the Syrian people.

Ecuador, Assange’s rights must be respected

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange’s rights as a political refugee must be respected, Lavrov said, adding that under international law, it would be illegal for UK police to storm the Ecuadorian embassy.

“As long as he is inside Ecuadorian territory, I think no one will try any rash actions, and the rights of the refugee [Assange] must be respected. No one can challenge the judicial process. But when the Ecuadorian embassy is threatened with being stormed, just like the Winter Palace was, I think it’s a little outside the rule of law,” Lavrov said in his talk to the students, alluding to the Bolshevik storming of the Winter Palace during Russia's 1917 revolution.

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been holed up inside the Ecuadorian embassy in London since June. The whistleblower is currently in the center of an international stalemate insofar as Ecuador has granted him asylum but the UK has pledged to arrest him if he sets foot outside the building. 

Assange estimates that he could potentially get out of the Ecuadorian embassy in a year’s time if Sweden drops the extradition order against him. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.

Assange has said that if Sweden drops the extradition order against him he could potentially leave the embassy in a year’s time. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.

Commenting on the WikLeaks whistleblowing scandal that precipitated Assange’s asylum request, Lavrov said that the information in the WikiLeaks cables “brought to light how governments relate to their partners, and what they think of them.” The document dump hadn’t harmed or threatened the safety of any particular government, he said.

“It was curious,” Lavrov said. “But nothing more. Many of our impressions were simply confirmed.”

Agora seriamente: tribulacoes na OTAN na Libia, a coalizao dos "empurrados"...

SPIEGEL Interview with NATO Head Rasmussen
'There Is No Military Solution to the Libya Conflict'
Der Spiegel, 13/04/2011

Even after weeks of NATO air strikes, the conflict in Libya appears no closer to being resolved. SPIEGEL spoke with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen about whether bombs can lead to democracy, the possibility of Libya becoming a failed state and Germany's reluctance to get involved.
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About Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 58, has been NATO Secretary General since 2009. Prior to taking over the top post at the trans-Atlantic alliance, he led a conservative governing coalition as Danish prime minister. In 2003, he threw his support behind US President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq. Turkey initially blocked his nomination to lead NATO because Ankara considered him to be anti-Islam. In office, Rasmussen has proven to be a flexible negotiator and recently steered the alliance toward greater cooperation with Russia.
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SPIEGEL: Mr. Secretary General, the military leadership of the Libyan rebel government has leveled serious charges against NATO, saying the alliance has been active enough in flying air strikes against troops loyal to Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi and is thus partly responsible for the deaths of countless civilians. Is NATO failing?

Rasmussen: I can assure you that we are fully implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan civilian population. The scope and speed of our operation remain high. During the first week of our NATO operation alone, we flew more than 1,000 sorties. We have already destroyed a third of Gadhafi's military machinery.


NATO air strikes in Libya have been ongoing for weeks now. Forces loyal to Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi have been stalled in their attempts to wipe out the pro-democracy rebellion. But the rebels have been unable to make advances and a stalemate would seem to have ensued.



SPIEGEL: The foreign minister of the Libyan transitional council, Ali al-Issawi, says that the problems began after the initial coalition -- led by the US, Great Britain and France -- turned over the command to NATO. According to Issawi, NATO is obstructing and even betraying the resistance.

Rasmussen: That's not fair. To some extent, we have been hampered by bad weather, which may have created the impression that we have scaled down our campaign. But that was unavoidable, and it has long since changed again. We are currently flying at least as many air strikes now as we were before.


The US has ceased flying missions in Libya and the French and British continue to take the lead in the effort. Here, a French Mirage 2000 approaches an airborne refuelling tanker.


SPIEGEL: But not necessarily with more success. And there remains the high risk of civilian casualties. Was it not to be expected that Gadhafi would abuse civilians as human shields?

Rasmussen: Yes, you're right. He has changed his tactics. But that also points to our successes. Now that he has to hide his tanks and other heavy weapons, he can no longer use them as easily against civilians. The fact that the regime is using people as human shields also points to its unbelievable brutality. Gadhafi knows that we have to do everything, and want to do everything, to avoid civilian casualties, and he's taking advantage of that.
SPIEGEL: Some rebel leaders are encouraging you to accept this "collateral damage" and, if necessary, to bombard central neighborhoods of the embattled city of Misurata if you could decisively weaken Gadhafi's forces by doing so. Is it a question of strategy, or of morality?

Rasmussen: Some chastise us because we are supposedly too cautious, while others criticize us for doing what we are doing. It's a difficult line to walk. Our mission is to protect the civilian population. After all, we don't have any troops on Libyan soil.

SPIEGEL: Can this war be won without ground troops?

Rasmussen: The honest answer is that there is no military solution to this conflict. We need a political solution, and it's up to the Libyan people to come up with one. We can only call upon the leadership in Tripoli to put an end to its acts of violence, to grant the people their legitimate rights and to permit a peaceful transition to democracy.

SPIEGEL: What happens if Gadhafi doesn't comply with these demands? Wouldn't NATO at least have to provide for weapons parity and begin supplying tanks and missiles to the rebels?

Rasmussen: All I can say to that is this: We are responsible for the implementation of UN Resolution 1973. This resolution states that we are to participate in the implementation of the arms embargo against Libya. We will strictly adhere to the resolution. That's our mission.

SPIEGEL: On the other hand, though, Resolution 1973 expressly allows for the protection of the civilian population "with all means necessary." British Defense Secretary Liam Fox has said that Gadhafi could indeed be a possible target of operations. Some international law experts agree.

Rasmussen: I will not enter into a legal dispute over questions of interpretation. We are focusing on implementing the resolution.

SPIEGEL: This isn't just a question of legal interpretation. The greatest threat to the civilian population stems from the dictatorial regime, from the despotism of Gadhafi and his clan. How can a solution be possible in Libya without Gadhafi and his clan leaving the country or being arrested?

Rasmussen: Of course the threat against the civilian population comes from the Gadhafi regime. The UN Security Council has clearly stated that the actions of the regime could constitute crimes against humanity. And Gadhafi could be tried for such crimes in the International Criminal Court.

SPIEGEL: What criteria have to be met so that you can call the NATO operation "Unified Protector" a success?

Rasmussen: If we manage to stop the violence, so that there is no longer a threat to the Libyan civilian population.

SPIEGEL: The implementation of a no-fly zone alone is extremely costly. Such zones had to be maintained for years in the Balkans and Iraq.

Rasmussen: I very much hope that we will be able to find a political solution in the near future. The worst outcome would be a military stalemate or a de facto partition of Libyan society, in which Libya would become a failed state and a breeding ground for terrorist groups -- and that so close to Europe's borders.

SPIEGEL: At the moment, it's looking like a military stalemate is a very real possibility. Libya is already de facto divided. Is peace in a divided Libya possible?

Rasmussen: In the end, it will be up to the UN to help Libya achieve a political solution to this crisis. The territorial integrity of Libya must be maintained.

SPIEGEL: Would you welcome a cease-fire? Would it have to be tied to conditions?

Rasmussen: The UN resolution calls for a cease-fire. It should be credible and verifiable. The protection of the civilian population must be guaranteed. Under no circumstances may a cease-fire cement the current situation. On the contrary, it must create the conditions for a constructive political process.

SPIEGEL: From whom do you receive the coordinates for air strikes -- from the rebels, who may not always be trustworthy, or from CIA agents on the ground?

Rasmussen: I cannot comment on operational details.

SPIEGEL: Can you imagine a future for Libya without the entire Gadhafi clan leaving the country?

Rasmussen: The message of UN Resolution 1973 is clear: Any solution must take the legitimate wishes of the Libyan people into account.

SPIEGEL: German Chancellor Angela Merkel has said that if one intervenes in Libya, then intervention in other trouble spots becomes unavoidable. Is she wrong?

Rasmussen: The chancellor has raised a legitimate question that requires a pragmatic response. The international community cannot solve all the world's problems. We have to decide on a case-by-case basis. A massacre threatened to unfold in Libya. That was the reason why we, as the international community, became active.

SPIEGEL: It wasn't NATO but a "coalition of the willing," including France, Great Britain and the United States, that launched the initial air strikes against Gadhafi's positions.

Rasmussen: I was very supportive of this rapid commitment by the coalition. The air strikes began literally at the last minute.

SPIEGEL: NATO was unable to achieve a rapid consensus over military intervention. The French were opposed to NATO leadership of the mission and wanted to play the leading role themselves, the Germans refused to get involved militarily and the Turks long obstructed an intervention.

Rasmussen: Many lengthy meetings were necessary before we reached a joint decision. But compared with the past, we reached agreement relatively quickly this time. In the 1990s, when NATO became active over the Balkans, it took the alliance several months to prepare a campaign. This time it took only a week.

SPIEGEL: Germany's abstention from the UN Security Council vote on Resolution 1973 has been widely criticized. You called it "absurd" that the Germans opted not to make its military capabilities available to the alliance.

Rasmussen: I will not comment on internal discussions within the NATO council.

SPIEGEL: In response to your criticism, the German NATO ambassador walked out of the room in protest.

Rasmussen: We have many long meetings in the NATO council, during which people are constantly coming in and going out. What counts is that we agreed in the end.

SPIEGEL: The Germans are still waiting for an apology.

Rasmussen: I have no problems whatsoever with the Germans.

SPIEGEL: Do you see a tendency toward pacifism in Germany?

Rasmussen: I greatly value Germany's contribution to NATO. When I meet Berlin politicians, no matter what their politician affiliation, I sense a strong commitment to the trans-Atlantic partnership. Germany has been very involved in NATO operations, especially in Afghanistan, but also in Kosovo.

SPIEGEL: Now you're painting a rather rosy picture. The United States, Great Britain and France voted for the Libya resolution in the Security Council, while Germany joined China and Russia in abstaining. How is that consistent with commitment to the trans-Atlantic alliance?

Rasmussen: Even though the Germans abstained in the Security Council, which some found incomprehensible, their role in the ensuing NATO meetings was very constructive. Berlin didn't obstruct the mission. On the contrary, it has now even issued a mandate for German involvement in AWACS reconnaissance flights over Afghanistan.

SPIEGEL: In doing so, Germany essentially bought its way out of the Libyan campaign. Only two months earlier, Berlin was still refusing to take part in an AWACS mission in Afghanistan.

Rasmussen: But this also highlights the flexibility of the Germans. Berlin abstained in the Security Council, but in NATO it supported the Libya campaign and assumed more responsibility in Afghanistan.

SPIEGEL: Germany has now agreed to provide military protection for a European Union humanitarian mission in Libya. Is this more than a gesture of good will?

Rasmussen: I welcome all contributions that improve the situation in Libya. I am very concerned about the humanitarian situation there, but NATO does not assume a leading role on this issue. The United Nations should handle the coordination of humanitarian aid. The EU can play a supporting role.

SPIEGEL: When it comes to Afghanistan, there is growing war fatigue in all NATO countries, and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made it clear that he wants the ISAF mission to end quickly. How much longer do you see NATO in Afghanistan?

Rasmussen: At the NATO summit in Lisbon last fall, we agreed to a timetable together with the Afghans. I have complete confidence in President Karzai. We plan to begin a gradual transition process in July. The control of seven regions will be handed over to the Afghans. Hopefully this process will be complete by the end of 2014. However, we will continue to conduct our mission there after the combat portion is over, supporting the Afghans in the development and training of their troops. We will not leave behind a vacuum.

SPIEGEL: In August you will have been head of the defense alliance for two years. Did you expect so many difficulties? As a result of the WikiLeaks publications, we now know that an American mole secretly forwarded documents and the minutes of meetings from your office to Washington.

Rasmussen: I have been in politics for so long that nothing surprises me anymore.

SPIEGEL: At the beginning of your term, you said that you wanted to be more of a general than a secretary. Some in the alliance are taken aback by your assertive manner. Do you need to be more gentle and compromising, or is banging on the table with one's fist simply a part of the top job at NATO?

Rasmussen: I am not a patient person by nature. But I was the head of a minority government in Denmark and have spent countless hours forging majorities. There are 28 members of NATO, and all decisions must be made unanimously. This means that I often have to be more of a secretary and focus on mediation.

SPIEGEL: Mr. Secretary General, thank you for this interview.

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan
Interview conducted by Erich Follath and Christoph Schult

A OTAN, num encontro "crucial" (segundo dizem)

Análise de um estrategista de Stratfor, possivelmente o melhor think tank de pensamento estratégico do momento:

Senior Eurasia analyst Lauren Goodrich examines the prospects for this weekend’s crucial NATO summit in Lisbon on the alliance’s future.

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Colin Chapman: NATO is at a crossroads. Friday and Saturday see the most important meeting of the organization since the end of the Cold War. The meeting to be held in the Portuguese capital Lisbon will be attended by the president of Russia for the first time. So does NATO face just a facelift or a transformation?

Welcome to Agenda. And joining me to discuss this is STRATFOR Senior Eurasia Analyst Lauren Goodrich. Lauren, the agenda looks very different at this NATO summit. It’s not going to be about Afghanistan, is it?

Lauren Goodrich: Not at all. This is the most critical NATO summit in over a decade because they’re going to be drafting the Strategic Concept Document. This Strategic Concept Document is pretty much the mission statement of NATO. It’s the third one drafted since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Strategic Concept during the Cold War, of course, was to contain the Soviets. But after the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategic concept changed to pretty much deal with the fall of the Soviet Union at first, and then shifted again in 1999 in order to expand NATO’s ability to intervene outside the Eurasian theatre. This allowed NATO to militarily intervene in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, etc… So now it’s time for the third strategic concept document to actually be drafted. This one is going to set what is NATO’s focus for the next decade. What is the threat for the next decade?

Chapman: So what is the threat in the next decade?

Goodrich: Well that’s the problem. You have 28 members now of NATO all with differing interests and different definitions of what a threat is. This is where we go into pretty much how NATO is divided into three camps.

The first camp is what I would call the Atlanticists – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark. The Atlanticists are interested in the non-Eurasian theatre. They want NATO to focus on the threats that we’ve seen recently such as the war in Afghanistan and nontraditional threats such as terrorism.

The second camp is actually the core Europeans led by the French and Germans. They are interested in limiting NATO, a leaner NATO, having the members not be as committed and limiting their ability to commit. And also having NATO work with other organizations such as the United Nations.

The third group within NATO which is the Intermarium states. This is the more interesting group because it’s newer NATO members - mainly the ones from Central Europe. What they see as a threat is what the core and the root level NATO theat was going back to the beginning of NATO - the Soviets. And the Central Europeans want NATO to focus back on the Russians.

Chapman: It’s called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but after this is it going to emerge as something completely different?

Goodrich: Well that depends on the Strategic Concept Document that’s drafted this weekend. But how do you draft a common document when you have so many diverging interests in NATO at this moment? The Strategic Concept Document looks like it’s only going to show how divided the alliance is now.

Chapman: Let me throw that question back to you. Could this all really be resolved in just two days?

Goodrich: Well the negotiations over this concept document have been going on for quite a while now. But we are not seeing any ability for them to come together. Even in the past week we’ve seen statements out of France and the Poles, the United States, United Kingdom, the Germans - everyone’s on a different page.

Chapman: Lauren – why did the Russians accept an invitation to attend – what do they expect to get out of it?

Goodrich: Well the NATO summit is actually in two parts. The first part is the NATO summit in which they will be discussing the Strategic Concept Document. The second part is actually the Russian-NATO summit, which is why Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was invited. Medvedev is going with two goals. The first goal is to see what comes out of the first part of the summit. The more divided NATO is especially over the Strategic Concept Document, the better it is for the Russians. The Russians know that as long as NATO is divided, it can never agree on things like expansion – especially into the former Soviet states. Or declaring Russia as the target of their focus.

The second is for Medvedev to sit down with U.S. President Barack Obama. This is the very first one-on-one since the U.S. elections. The Russians were very wary going into these elections because they know the Republicans tend to have a firmer, more aggressive take on Russia. Since the elections, which did not go in Obama’s favor occurred, Russia has grown wary as to whether Obama would stick to his previous commitments on having warmer relations with Russia.

Chapman: I suppose one of the ironies of all this is just as things look as if they could change, they might not change because of the state of America’s politics.

Goodrich: Very much so. The United States and Russia seemed as if they were on a warming period under Barack Obama – starting in about April – but really fleshing out over the summer. The United States and Russia decided that it was better to have a temporary detente between their two countries in order to focus on more important issues of the moment.

For the United States this meant that they needed Russia to agree to sanctions on Iran and logistical support for Afghanistan. For Russia, this meant that they needed the U.S. to cease support for Georgia and Ukraine, freeze ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe, as well as aiding Russia in its modernization and privatization programs. Both sides actually agreed to all of this until the elections.

The START Treaty ended up being the bellwether of whether this temporary detente was being successful or not. It looked like it was going to slide through both legislatures in both Russia and the United States easily - until the elections. So now we have a stall on START.

Chapman: So summing up, its’t NATO really just playing into Russia’s hands? As these groups in NATO argue about the future, the Russians just get on about their own business.

Goodrich: Very much so. They’re counting on the divisions within NATO. As long as it’s divided Russia will have a much easier time in order to clamp down on its resurgence especially in its former Soviet states and be able to start even pushing on the NATO members themselves.

Chapman: Thanks very much Lauren. Lauren Goodrich there, and that’s Agenda for this week. I’m Colin Chapman. See you next time.