Mostrando postagens com marcador Parceria Trans-Pacifica. Mostrar todas as postagens
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sexta-feira, 12 de agosto de 2016
terça-feira, 9 de fevereiro de 2016
A Parceria Trans-Pacifica: uma analise do Congressional Research Service (2016)
The
Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications
Brock
R. Williams, Coordinator, Analyst in International Trade and Finance
Ben
Dolven, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Ian
F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Mark
E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Michael
F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Wayne
M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
Congressional
Research Service
February
3, 2016
7-5700
R44361
Summary
On
October 5, 2015, Ministers of the 12 Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries announced
conclusion of their free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations.
The
agreement is one of the Obama Administration’s signature trade policy
initiatives, an effort to reduce and eliminate trade and investment barriers
and establish new rules and disciplines to govern trade and investment among
the 12 countries.
TPP
proponents, including Administration officials, argue that the proposed TPP would
have substantial strategic benefits for the United States in addition to its
direct economic impact.
They
argue that the agreement would enhance overall U.S. influence in the
economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region and advance U.S. leadership in setting
and modernizing the rules of commerce in the region and potentially in the
multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Congress
plays a key role in the TPP. Through U.S. trade negotiating objectives
established in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation and informal
consultations and oversight, Congress has guided the Administration’s
negotiations.
Ultimately,
Congress would need to pass implementing legislation if the concluded agreement
is to take effect in the United States.
The
geo-political arguments surrounding TPP are widely debated, as are the
arguments about its potential economic impact. To some, the TPP is an important
|litmus test of U.S. credibility in the Asia-Pacific region.
As
the leading economic component of the Administration’s “strategic rebalancing”
to the region, the TPP, proponents argue, would allow the United States to
reaffirm existing alliances, expand U.S. soft power, spur countries to adopt a
more U.S.-friendly foreign policy outlook, and enhance broader diplomatic and
security relations.
Many
Asian policymakers – correctly or not – could interpret a failure of TPP in the
United States as a symbol of the United States’ declining interest in the
region and inability to assert leadership.
Some
critics argue that TPP backers often do not identify specific, concrete ways
that a successful deal would invigorate U.S. security partnerships in the
region, and that an agreement should be considered solely for its economic
impact.
They
maintain that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign
policy dynamics and that U.S. bilateral relations are based on each country’s
broader national interests.
The
Administration is also pursuing strategic economic goals in the TPP. Through
the agreement, proponents argue, the United States can play a leading role in
“writing the rules” for commerce with key trading partners, addressing gaps in
current multilateral trade rules, and setting a precedent for future regional
and bilateral FTA negotiations or multilateral trade talks at the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
The
core of this argument is the assertion that the TPP’s potential components – including
tariff and non-tariff liberalization, strong intellectual property rights and
investment protections, and labor and environmental provisions – would build
upon the U.S.- led economic system that has expanded world trade and investment
enormously
since
the end of World War II.
Although
most U.S. observers agree it is in the U.S. interest to lead in establishing
global and regional trade rules, less consensus exists on what those rules
should be, yielding some criticism on the strength and breadth of various TPP
provisions.
In
addition, some argue that crafting new rules through “mega-regional” agreements
rather than the WTO could undermine the multilateral trading system, create
competing trading blocs, lead to trade diversion, and marginalize the countries
not participating in regional initiatives. China is not a TPP member, but
features prominently in discussion of the agreement’s potential strategic
effects.
Some
argue that China is attempting to create a regional order that seeks to
minimize U.S. presence and power. In this line of reasoning, the TPP serves as
a counter to growing Chinese economic and political influence, implying that failure
to conclude TPP could, in effect, allow China to shape regional rules of
commerce and diplomacy through its own trade and investment initiatives.
Others,
however, argue that TPP is complementary to other FTAs and trade agreements
throughout the region, including those championed by China, and that new
members –possibly including China –will be critical for the TPP to influence
regional norms.
Trade
agreements occur at the intersection of foreign and domestic policy, which can
create tensions in balancing competing policy priorities. Key issues Congress
faces as it continues its role regarding TPP include: (1) how strongly to weigh
geo-political implications of TPP; (2) the potential impact of the TPP on the
multilateral trading system and other trade and economic institutions; and (3) the
possible expansion of the agreement to include additional members.
terça-feira, 13 de novembro de 2012
Parceria Trans-Pacifica progride; enquanto isso, na América Latina...
Enquanto os países da bacia do Pacífico discutem a formação de uma grande rede de integração produtiva e acordos de liberalização comercial, os países da América Latina se reunem entre si e concluem que o melhor mesmo é continuar entre si, numa grande rede de integração introvertida, mercantilista e protecionista, mas o mais importante é que o fazem sem tutela de qualquer império, de qualquer potência capitalista malévola, sem precisar liberalizar nada, apenas acertando as trocas entre os governos que é assim que se faz, já que mercados deixados livres, leves e soltos, desregulados, só levam a crises, recessões, desigualdade, essas coisas horríveis que soem acontecer quando não se defende a soberania e a altivez dos países da região.
Enfim, sempre tem aqueles, neoliberais, que pretendem ingressar na Parceria Trans-Pacífica, mas felizmente também tem os que querem, e conseguem, proteger a soberania, construindo, por exemplo, o socialismo do século 21 e outras bobagens do século 19.
Assim vai o mundo, ou pelo menos a região....
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Enfim, sempre tem aqueles, neoliberais, que pretendem ingressar na Parceria Trans-Pacífica, mas felizmente também tem os que querem, e conseguem, proteger a soberania, construindo, por exemplo, o socialismo do século 21 e outras bobagens do século 19.
Assim vai o mundo, ou pelo menos a região....
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Japan Likely to Embrace Free Trade Pact
The New York Times, November 9,
2012
TOKYO
— In a possible gambit to reverse his governing party’s flagging fortunes,
Prime Minister Yoshihiko
Noda appears likely to declare Japan’s
intent to join an ambitious pan-Pacific free trade agreement, then call a snap
election in which the party would campaign on that move.
Related
·
Japan Aims to Revise Security Pact With U.S. (November
10, 2012)
Follow@nytimesworldfor international breaking news
and headlines.
Major newspapers said on Saturday that support was
building in the Noda administration to announce Japan’s entry into the proposed
American-led regional agreement sometime in the next two months. The reports
said that move would be immediately followed by a decision to dissolve
Parliament for national elections that would take place a month later.
Japan has long wavered on entry into the pact, the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is opposed by the nation’s heavily protected
farmers but supported by consumers and industry groups. Because the reports
about the government’s intentions appeared in most major newspapers, it
suggested Mr. Noda’s Democratic Party had made a concerted effort to begin
signaling a change in strategy.
The state minister for national policy, Seiji Maehara,
has also said joining the agreement would become “a public promise by the
Democratic Party that should be a main issue in elections.”
Signing onto the pact is likely to please the United
States, which has urged Japan for the last two years to join the group as a way
to push the global economy out of its prolonged slump. News reports suggested
that the move would also be a way for the government to lash itself even closer
to the United States at a time when Japan is increasingly jittery about China’s
ambitions in the region. The reports described the likely decision to join the
pact as a domestic political gamble by the prime minister to prevent his party
from a humiliating loss in elections, which must be held before September.
The Democrats have been searching for a way to regain
public support after widespread criticism that they mishandled Japan’s response
to the Fukushima nuclear accident. Mr. Noda’s approval ratings have dropped
into the teens in recent polls.
When pressed by the opposition on his earlier promises
to hold elections “soon,” Mr. Noda has said only that he and other party
leaders would decide the timing when they were ready.
If he takes a clear stand on the trade pact, Mr. Noda
may be aiming to regain support among the Democrats’ base of urban white-collar
voters and union members. They are expected to welcome the lower prices and
increased exports that more open markets are likely to bring.
But such a move would also alienate farmers, one of
Japan’s most powerful bloc of voters. On Friday, about a half-dozen Democrats
said they might defect from the party if Mr. Noda were to back the trade deal.
Joining
the pact would also put the largest opposition party, the Liberal Democrats,
who currently lead in polls, in an uncomfortable political position. The
Liberal Democrats have avoided taking a clear stand on the agreement because
they have tried to keep the support of farmers and big business, traditionally
the party’s two biggest supporters. Mr. Noda may be hoping to hurt the
opposition by forcing it to pick one side, news reports said.
A version of this
article appeared in print on November 12, 2012, on page B5 of the New
York edition with the headline: Japan Likely To Approve Trade Pact.
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