Trans-Pacific Partnership: An Assessment - book by Peterson Institute of International Economics

Policy Analyses in International Economics 104
edited by Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs and Jeffrey J. Schott
July 2016 

 

Book Description

http://bookstore.piie.com/book-store/7137.html

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) between 12 Pacific Rim countries has generated the most intensive political debate about the role of trade in the United States in a generation. The TPP is one of the broadest and most progressive free trade agreements since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The essays in this Policy Analysis provide estimates of the TPP's benefits and costs and analyze more than 20 issues in the agreement, including environmental and labor standards, tariff schedules, investment and competition policy, intellectual property, ecommerce, services and financial services, government procurement, dispute settlement, and agriculture. Through extensive analysis of the TPP text, PIIE scholars present an indispensable and detailed "reader's guide" that also sheds light on the agreement's merits and shortcomings.

Contents

Selected chapters and sections are provided for preview only.
Preface
Acknowledgments
Trade Deals Aren't For What You Think They Are For
Adam S. Posen
Overview: Understanding the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Jeffrey J. Schott
1 The Economic Effects of the TPP: New Estimates
Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer
2 Adjustment and Income Distribution Impacts of the TPP
Robert Z. Lawrence and Tyler Moran
3 Tariff Liberalization
Caroline Freund, Tyler Moran, and Sarah Oliver
4 Agriculture
Cullen Hendrix and Barbara Kotschwar
5 Auto Sector Liberalization
Sarah Oliver
6 Rules of Origin in Textiles and Apparel
Kimberly Ann Elliott
7 Government Procurement
Tyler Moran
8 Liberalization of Services Trade
Gary Clyde Hufbauer
9 Financial Services
Anna Gelpern
10 Provisions on Investment
Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski
11 Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Gary Clyde Hufbauer
12 Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Jennifer Hillman
13 TPP and the Conflict over Drugs: Incentives for Innovation versus Access to Medicines
Lee Branstetter
14 TPP and the Environment
Jeffrey J. Schott
15 Labor Standards in the TPP
Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs
16 Other New Areas: Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation, Anticorruption, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, and More
Caroline Freund
17 TPP and Digital Trade
Lee Branstetter
18 Competition Policy
R. Michael Gadbaw
19 Commitments on State-Owned Enterprises
Sean Miner
20 TPP and Exchange Rates
C. Fred Bergsten and Jeffrey J. Schott
Index

Book Data

July 2016
ISBN paper 978-0-88132-713-7
136 pp.

Other Books of Interest

A Parceria Trans-Pacifica: uma analise do Congressional Research Service (2016)

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications

Brock R. Williams, Coordinator, Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Ben Dolven, Coordinator, Specialist in Asian Affairs

Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance

Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs

Michael F. Martin, Specialist in Asian Affairs

Wayne M. Morrison, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance

Congressional Research Service

February 3, 2016

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R44361

Link: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44361.pdf

Summary

On October 5, 2015, Ministers of the 12 Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries announced conclusion of their free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations.

The agreement is one of the Obama Administration’s signature trade policy initiatives, an effort to reduce and eliminate trade and investment barriers and establish new rules and disciplines to govern trade and investment among the 12 countries.

TPP proponents, including Administration officials, argue that the proposed TPP would have substantial strategic benefits for the United States in addition to its direct economic impact.

They argue that the agreement would enhance overall U.S. influence in the economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region and advance U.S. leadership in setting and modernizing the rules of commerce in the region and potentially in the multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Congress plays a key role in the TPP. Through U.S. trade negotiating objectives established in Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation and informal consultations and oversight, Congress has guided the Administration’s negotiations.

Ultimately, Congress would need to pass implementing legislation if the concluded agreement is to take effect in the United States.

The geo-political arguments surrounding TPP are widely debated, as are the arguments about its potential economic impact. To some, the TPP is an important |litmus test of U.S. credibility in the Asia-Pacific region.

As the leading economic component of the Administration’s “strategic rebalancing” to the region, the TPP, proponents argue, would allow the United States to reaffirm existing alliances, expand U.S. soft power, spur countries to adopt a more U.S.-friendly foreign policy outlook, and enhance broader diplomatic and security relations.

Many Asian policymakers – correctly or not – could interpret a failure of TPP in the United States as a symbol of the United States’ declining interest in the region and inability to assert leadership.

Some critics argue that TPP backers often do not identify specific, concrete ways that a successful deal would invigorate U.S. security partnerships in the region, and that an agreement should be considered solely for its economic impact.

They maintain that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign policy dynamics and that U.S. bilateral relations are based on each country’s broader national interests.

The Administration is also pursuing strategic economic goals in the TPP. Through the agreement, proponents argue, the United States can play a leading role in “writing the rules” for commerce with key trading partners, addressing gaps in current multilateral trade rules, and setting a precedent for future regional and bilateral FTA negotiations or multilateral trade talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The core of this argument is the assertion that the TPP’s potential components – including tariff and non-tariff liberalization, strong intellectual property rights and investment protections, and labor and environmental provisions – would build upon the U.S.- led economic system that has expanded world trade and investment enormously

since the end of World War II.

Although most U.S. observers agree it is in the U.S. interest to lead in establishing global and regional trade rules, less consensus exists on what those rules should be, yielding some criticism on the strength and breadth of various TPP provisions.

In addition, some argue that crafting new rules through “mega-regional” agreements rather than the WTO could undermine the multilateral trading system, create competing trading blocs, lead to trade diversion, and marginalize the countries not participating in regional initiatives. China is not a TPP member, but features prominently in discussion of the agreement’s potential strategic effects.

Some argue that China is attempting to create a regional order that seeks to minimize U.S. presence and power. In this line of reasoning, the TPP serves as a counter to growing Chinese economic and political influence, implying that failure to conclude TPP could, in effect, allow China to shape regional rules of commerce and diplomacy through its own trade and investment initiatives.

Others, however, argue that TPP is complementary to other FTAs and trade agreements throughout the region, including those championed by China, and that new members –possibly including China –will be critical for the TPP to influence regional norms.

Trade agreements occur at the intersection of foreign and domestic policy, which can create tensions in balancing competing policy priorities. Key issues Congress faces as it continues its role regarding TPP include: (1) how strongly to weigh geo-political implications of TPP; (2) the potential impact of the TPP on the multilateral trading system and other trade and economic institutions; and (3) the possible expansion of the agreement to include additional members.

Parceria Trans-Pacifica progride; enquanto isso, na América Latina...

Enquanto os países da bacia do Pacífico discutem a formação de uma grande rede de integração produtiva e acordos de liberalização comercial, os países da América Latina se reunem entre si e concluem que o melhor mesmo é continuar entre si, numa grande rede de integração introvertida, mercantilista e protecionista, mas o mais importante é que o fazem sem tutela de qualquer império, de qualquer potência capitalista malévola, sem precisar liberalizar nada, apenas acertando as trocas entre os governos que é assim que se faz, já que mercados deixados livres, leves e soltos, desregulados, só levam a crises, recessões, desigualdade, essas coisas horríveis que soem acontecer quando não se defende a soberania e a altivez dos países da região.
Enfim, sempre tem aqueles, neoliberais, que pretendem ingressar na Parceria Trans-Pacífica, mas felizmente também tem os que querem, e conseguem, proteger a soberania, construindo, por exemplo, o socialismo do século 21 e outras bobagens do século 19. 
Assim vai o mundo, ou pelo menos a região....
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Japan Likely to Embrace Free Trade Pact

By MARTIN FACKLER

The New York Times, November 9, 2012

TOKYO — In a possible gambit to reverse his governing party’s flagging fortunes, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda appears likely to declare Japan’s intent to join an ambitious pan-Pacific free trade agreement, then call a snap election in which the party would campaign on that move.

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Major newspapers said on Saturday that support was building in the Noda administration to announce Japan’s entry into the proposed American-led regional agreement sometime in the next two months. The reports said that move would be immediately followed by a decision to dissolve Parliament for national elections that would take place a month later.

Japan has long wavered on entry into the pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is opposed by the nation’s heavily protected farmers but supported by consumers and industry groups. Because the reports about the government’s intentions appeared in most major newspapers, it suggested Mr. Noda’s Democratic Party had made a concerted effort to begin signaling a change in strategy.

The state minister for national policy, Seiji Maehara, has also said joining the agreement would become “a public promise by the Democratic Party that should be a main issue in elections.”

Signing onto the pact is likely to please the United States, which has urged Japan for the last two years to join the group as a way to push the global economy out of its prolonged slump. News reports suggested that the move would also be a way for the government to lash itself even closer to the United States at a time when Japan is increasingly jittery about China’s ambitions in the region. The reports described the likely decision to join the pact as a domestic political gamble by the prime minister to prevent his party from a humiliating loss in elections, which must be held before September.

The Democrats have been searching for a way to regain public support after widespread criticism that they mishandled Japan’s response to the Fukushima nuclear accident. Mr. Noda’s approval ratings have dropped into the teens in recent polls.

When pressed by the opposition on his earlier promises to hold elections “soon,” Mr. Noda has said only that he and other party leaders would decide the timing when they were ready.

If he takes a clear stand on the trade pact, Mr. Noda may be aiming to regain support among the Democrats’ base of urban white-collar voters and union members. They are expected to welcome the lower prices and increased exports that more open markets are likely to bring.

But such a move would also alienate farmers, one of Japan’s most powerful bloc of voters. On Friday, about a half-dozen Democrats said they might defect from the party if Mr. Noda were to back the trade deal.

Joining the pact would also put the largest opposition party, the Liberal Democrats, who currently lead in polls, in an uncomfortable political position. The Liberal Democrats have avoided taking a clear stand on the agreement because they have tried to keep the support of farmers and big business, traditionally the party’s two biggest supporters. Mr. Noda may be hoping to hurt the opposition by forcing it to pick one side, news reports said.

A version of this article appeared in print on November 12, 2012, on page B5 of the New York edition with the headline: Japan Likely To Approve Trade Pact.