O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Japao. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Japao. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 6 de janeiro de 2013

Japao: demografia declinante - Alexandre Vidal Porto

Onde as crianças nascem menos
Alexandre Vidal Porto
Folha de S. Paulo, 5 de janeiro de 2013

População do Japão não para de cair; vendem-se mais fraldas para adultos que para crianças no país

NO JAPÃO, a cada 31 segundos, nasce uma pessoa. A cada 26, morre outra. Ou seja, tem mais gente morrendo que nascendo.

Desde 2007, a população japonesa não para de diminuir. Segundo o governo, de 2011 a 2012, o país perdeu o número recorde de 212 mil pessoas. Nesse ritmo, até 2060, os japoneses, hoje 128 milhões, estariam reduzidos a 86 milhões apenas.

Em 2012, nasceram 18 mil crianças a menos que em 2011. Essa tendência está diretamente vinculada à baixa taxa de fertilidade das japonesas. Hoje, a média de filhos por mulher é de 1,39. Para que a população se mantivesse estável, seria necessário que ela alcançasse 2,1.

A redução do número de filhos é explicada, ao menos parcialmente, por razões econômicas. A conjuntura de recessão desencoraja a constituição de novas famílias. As pessoas se casam menos e mais tarde. A manutenção de um filho é cara: em 2009, os cinco primeiros anos de educação infantil custavam cerca de US$ 73 mil, 2,5 vezes mais que nos Estados Unidos, por exemplo.

Além disso, ter filhos dificulta o avanço profissional das mulheres. Como trabalhar 15 horas por dia - coisa comum no Japão- quando se tem criança pequena em casa? Diante desse dilema, número cada vez maior de mulheres tem priorizado a carreira profissional e decidido não ter filhos.

Com a redução no número de nascimentos e uma das expectativas de vida mais elevadas do planeta, o Japão se transformou no país desenvolvido com a mais alta proporção de idosos. No mercado japonês, vendem-se mais fraldas descartáveis para adultos que para crianças. Hoje, 24% da população total é de idosos. Em 2060, os idosos serão 40%.

Essa tendência é uma bomba-relógio populacional. A cada cem segundos, o Japão tem uma criança a menos. Segundo Hiroshi Yoshida, professor de economia da Universidade de Tohoku, a prevalecer esse quadro, em maio de 3011, não haverá mais crianças no país.

O envelhecimento da população imporá sobrecarga crescente ao sistema previdenciário. Também terá impacto sobre o nível da produtividade e o ritmo do crescimento. Agora, mesmo que a taxa de fertilidade subisse, tomaria mais de uma geração para que a diferença pudesse ser economicamente verificada.

A incorporação de imigrantes poderia ajudar a compensar o deficit demográfico, mas essa hipótese parece não ser considerada pelas autoridades japonesas. O governo está ciente da questão e estabeleceu um ministério específico para o tema. Algumas políticas têm sido implementadas, mas os resultados têm ficado aquém das expectativas.

Contudo, a despeito do que faça o governo, é fundamental que a comunidade empresarial reconheça e assuma seu quinhão de responsabilidade. É importante para toda a nação que a cultura corporativa e o ambiente laboral incorporem regras de proteção ao convívio familiar e protejam o avanço profissional das trabalhadoras com filhos. A contribuição que as mulheres japonesas podem dar ao sistema produtivo de seu país, mais do que valiosa, é necessária. Não deve ser desprezada.

ALEXANDRE VIDAL PORTO é escritor e diplomata. Este artigo reflete apenas as opiniões do autor.

terça-feira, 13 de novembro de 2012

Parceria Trans-Pacifica progride; enquanto isso, na América Latina...

Enquanto os países da bacia do Pacífico discutem a formação de uma grande rede de integração produtiva e acordos de liberalização comercial, os países da América Latina se reunem entre si e concluem que o melhor mesmo é continuar entre si, numa grande rede de integração introvertida, mercantilista e protecionista, mas o mais importante é que o fazem sem tutela de qualquer império, de qualquer potência capitalista malévola, sem precisar liberalizar nada, apenas acertando as trocas entre os governos que é assim que se faz, já que mercados deixados livres, leves e soltos, desregulados, só levam a crises, recessões, desigualdade, essas coisas horríveis que soem acontecer quando não se defende a soberania e a altivez dos países da região.
Enfim, sempre tem aqueles, neoliberais, que pretendem ingressar na Parceria Trans-Pacífica, mas felizmente também tem os que querem, e conseguem, proteger a soberania, construindo, por exemplo, o socialismo do século 21 e outras bobagens do século 19. 
Assim vai o mundo, ou pelo menos a região....
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Japan Likely to Embrace Free Trade Pact
The New York Times, November 9, 2012

TOKYO — In a possible gambit to reverse his governing party’s flagging fortunes, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda appears likely to declare Japan’s intent to join an ambitious pan-Pacific free trade agreement, then call a snap election in which the party would campaign on that move.
Related
·       Japan Aims to Revise Security Pact With U.S. (November 10, 2012)
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Major newspapers said on Saturday that support was building in the Noda administration to announce Japan’s entry into the proposed American-led regional agreement sometime in the next two months. The reports said that move would be immediately followed by a decision to dissolve Parliament for national elections that would take place a month later.
Japan has long wavered on entry into the pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is opposed by the nation’s heavily protected farmers but supported by consumers and industry groups. Because the reports about the government’s intentions appeared in most major newspapers, it suggested Mr. Noda’s Democratic Party had made a concerted effort to begin signaling a change in strategy.
The state minister for national policy, Seiji Maehara, has also said joining the agreement would become “a public promise by the Democratic Party that should be a main issue in elections.”
Signing onto the pact is likely to please the United States, which has urged Japan for the last two years to join the group as a way to push the global economy out of its prolonged slump. News reports suggested that the move would also be a way for the government to lash itself even closer to the United States at a time when Japan is increasingly jittery about China’s ambitions in the region. The reports described the likely decision to join the pact as a domestic political gamble by the prime minister to prevent his party from a humiliating loss in elections, which must be held before September.
The Democrats have been searching for a way to regain public support after widespread criticism that they mishandled Japan’s response to the Fukushima nuclear accident. Mr. Noda’s approval ratings have dropped into the teens in recent polls.
When pressed by the opposition on his earlier promises to hold elections “soon,” Mr. Noda has said only that he and other party leaders would decide the timing when they were ready.
If he takes a clear stand on the trade pact, Mr. Noda may be aiming to regain support among the Democrats’ base of urban white-collar voters and union members. They are expected to welcome the lower prices and increased exports that more open markets are likely to bring.
But such a move would also alienate farmers, one of Japan’s most powerful bloc of voters. On Friday, about a half-dozen Democrats said they might defect from the party if Mr. Noda were to back the trade deal.
Joining the pact would also put the largest opposition party, the Liberal Democrats, who currently lead in polls, in an uncomfortable political position. The Liberal Democrats have avoided taking a clear stand on the agreement because they have tried to keep the support of farmers and big business, traditionally the party’s two biggest supporters. Mr. Noda may be hoping to hurt the opposition by forcing it to pick one side, news reports said.
A version of this article appeared in print on November 12, 2012, on page B5 of the New York edition with the headline: Japan Likely To Approve Trade Pact.

domingo, 16 de setembro de 2012

Japao e Alemanha abandonam energia nuclear

Muito bem: só que todas as outras fontes custarão mais caro ou serão mais poluentes...


Japão anuncia plano de abandonar energia nuclear até 2040



Alvo de pressões da sociedade desde o desastre de Fukushima, governo japonês informa que desligará seus reatores nucleares nas próximas décadas. País não especificou quando exatamente meta será alcançada.
Um ano e meio após a catástrofe de Fukushima, o Japão anunciou que irá abrir mão da energia nuclear ao longo das próximas três décadas. Em encontro ministerial nesta sexta-feira (14/09), chegou-se à decisão de abandonar tal fonte energética na "década de 2030", informou a mídia japonesa.
O objetivo ambicioso do governo em Tóquio significaria um corte total do uso de energia nuclear até 2040. Então, os reatores que, até o desastre em 2011 produziam cerca de um terço da energia consumida no país, seriam permanentemente desativados.
O acidente nuclear de Fukushima abalou a confiança da população na segurança da energia nuclear. Em pesquisas recentes, a maioria dos japoneses se declarou a favor do fim do uso desse tipo de energia no país. Diante das eleições gerais previstas para os próximos meses, o tema tem sido motivo de protestos, reunindo até dezenas de milhares de pessoas.
"Muitos japoneses esperam construir uma sociedade que não dependa da energia nuclear. Por outro lado, também está claro que estão divididas as opiniões sobre quando e como exatamente uma sociedade do tipo pode ser alcançada", informou um comunicado do governo nesta sexta-feira.
O plano anunciado pelo Japão se alinha ao da Alemanha, que prometeu desligar todos os seus 17 reatores nucleares até 2022. O país europeu se disse disposto a apoiar o Japão em sua empreitada. "Trata-se de uma tarefa complexa, sobre a qual poderíamos relatar nossa própria experiência, se assim for requisitado", declarou o porta-voz do governo alemão, Steffen Seibert, nesta sexta-feira.
Alvo de críticas
Além de não ter sido especificado quando exatamente a meta será alcançada pelo Japão, o anúncio feito nesta sexta-feira não é obrigatório para governos futuros, o que significa que uma nova administração poderia reverter os planos.
Além disso, muitos críticos veem um Japão sem energia nuclear como algo irreal e alertam que o abandono de tal fonte energética poderia ter graves consequências para a terceira maior economia do mundo.
O Greenpeace deu as boas-vindas à nova política, porém, com cautela. Segundo a organização ambiental, o abandono da energia nuclear deveria ocorrer num prazo menor, juntamente com o desenvolvimento de soluções renováveis.
O cronograma de décadas apresentado pelo Japão é desnecessário, já que 48 dos 50 reatores japoneses foram desligados na sequência da crise de Fukushima, considera o Greenpeace. O poderoso lobby empresarial japonês pressionou para a reativação dos reatores, temendo cortes e aumento do preço da energia.
Na última semana, o Partido Democrático do Japão – do premiê Yoshihiko Noda – recomendou que o país expanda o uso de energia renovável e adote mais medidas de economia energética. O país depende hoje fortemente do petróleo do Oriente Médio e foi obrigado a elevar as importações para compensar o deficit energético desde o acidente de Fukushima.
LPF/dpa/afp

quinta-feira, 2 de agosto de 2012

Capitalism, not culture, drives progress - Fareed Zakaria

Capitalism, not culture, drives economies

Fareed Zakaria
Mitt Romney has explained that his comments abroad were simply truth-telling. “I tend to tell people what I actually believe,” he said. With regard to one much-debated comment — on the cultural differences between Israelis and Palestinians — many agree with him. The Wall Street Journal editorial page and columnists including Marc A. Thiessen and John Podhoretz all applauded. Podhoretz wrote: “Anyone who publicizes his remark is helping Romney win the election.”
“Culture makes all the difference,” Romney said at a fundraiser in Israel, comparing the country’s economic vitality to Palestinian poverty. Certainly there is a pedigree for this idea. Romney cited David Landes, an economics historian. He could have cited Max Weber, the great German scholar who first made this claim 100 years ago in his book “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” which argued that Protestant values were the most important fuel for economic progress.
The problem is that Weber singled out two cultures as being particularly prone to poverty and stagnation, those of China and Japan. But these have been the world’s fastest-growing large economies over the past five decades. Over the past two decades, the other powerhouse has been India, which was also described for years as having a culture incompatible with economic success — hence the phrase “the Hindu rate of growth,” to describe the country’s once-moribund state.
China was stagnant for centuries and then suddenly and seemingly miraculously, in the 1980s, began to industrialize three times faster than the West. What changed was not China’s culture, which presumably was the same in the 1970s as it was in the 1980s. What changed, starting in 1979, were China’s economic policies.
The same is true for Japan and India. Had Romney spent more time reading Milton Friedman, he would have realized that historically the key driver for economic growth has been the adoption of capitalism and its related institutions and policies across diverse cultures.
The link between economic policies and performance can be seen even in the country on which Romney was lavishing praise. Israel had many admirable traits in its early decades, but no one would have called it an economic miracle. Its economy was highly statist. Things changed in the 1990s with market-oriented reforms — initiated by Benyamin Netanyahu — and sound monetary policies. As a result, Israel’s economy grew much faster than it had in the 1980s. The miracle Romney was praising had to do with new policies rather than deep culture.
Ironically, the argument that culture is central to a country’s success has been used most frequently by Asian strongmen to argue that their countries need not adopt Western-style democracy. Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew has made this case passionately for decades. It is an odd claim, because Singapore’s own success would seem to contradict it. It is not so different from neighboring Malaysia. The crucial difference is that Singapore had extremely good leadership that pursued good economic policies with relentless discipline.
Despite all this evidence, most people still believe that two cultures in particular, African and Islamic, inhibit economic development. But the two countries that will next achieve a gross domestic product of $1 trillion are both Muslim democracies — Turkey and Indonesia. Of the 10 fastest-growing economies in the world today, seven are African. The world is changing, and holding on to fixed views of culture means you will miss its changing dynamics.
When societies or people succeed, we search in their cultures for seeds of success. Culture being a large grab bag, you can usually find what you want. We observe the success of Jewish, Lebanese, Chinese and Indian people in various societies and attribute it to culture. But it may really stem from the traits of diaspora populations — small groups of entrepreneurial immigrants forced to live by their wits in alien cultures. Interestingly, Palestinians have a reputation around the Middle East for being savvy merchants and traders and have been successful in the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
Culture is important. It is the shared historical experience of people that is reflected in institutions and practices. But culture changes. German culture in 1935 was different from 1955. Europe was once a hotbed of violent nationalism; today it is postmodern and almost pacifist. The United States was once an isolationist, agrarian republic with a deep suspicion of a standing army. Today it has half of the world’s military power.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan once observed: “The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change culture and save it from itself.” That remains the wisest statement made about this complicated problem, probably too wise to ever be uttered in an American political campaign.
comments@fareedzakaria.com

 

sábado, 26 de maio de 2012

China e Japao: guerra por algumas ilhotas?

Situação deveras preocupante no (?) Mar da China, ou Mar do Japão? Seria ridículo que os dois países se enfrentassem militarmente a esse propósito.
Duas soluções, que nenhum dos dois Estados tomará: levar o caso a arbitragem internacional, como sempre se fez em casos semelhantes; levar o caso à CIJ, da Haia, que poderia dar seu aviso sobre o caso.
Infelizmente, essas soluções não aparecem factíveis, por uma série de motivos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

MALOUINES BIS – Pour une île, Chine et Japon pourraient se déclarer la guerre

Photo aérienne des îles Kitakojima et Minamikojima, de l'archipel Senkaku.
Les deux géants économiques du continent asiatique se sont lancés dans un bras de fer diplomatique. Motif de cette querelle de voisinage : la question de l'appartenance des îles Senkaku, appelées îles Diàoyútái par la Chine, qui les revendiquent depuis les années 60. Ces huit îles et rochers japonais, situés dans la mer de Chine orientale, sont l'objet de toutes les convoitises, du fait des gisements potentiels d'hydrocarbures situés à proximité. En outre, l'emplacement est stratégique pour la marine chinoise, qui considère la mer de Chine du Sud comme une "zone d'intérêt vital".
La situation s'est envenimée ces dernières semaines entre Pékin et Tokyo, comme le relate Slate. La Chine a en effet annulé la semaine dernière une visite officielle au Japon, pour raisons d'"agenda". Mais d’après l’agence d’information japonaise Kyodo, reprise par le Tokyo Times,  "l’annulation constitue un signe de protestation contre l’occupation par le Japon" de ces îles.
"Ça devient vraiment un casus belli"
Cité par Slate, Kazuhiko Togo, le directeur de l’Institut des affaires mondiales à l’université de Kyoto, estime la situation inquiétante : "Nous avons besoin de nous préparer militairement et, en même temps, nous devons faire tous les efforts diplomatiques possibles pour combler la distance entre Tokyo et Pékin. Ça devient vraiment un casus belli."
La lutte pour ce petit territoire avait déjà menacé la relation bilatérale entre les deux pays en 2010, quand la marine japonaise avait arrêté le capitaine d'un bateau chinois près de ces îles. Des marches antijaponaises avaient notamment été organisées dans des villes chinoises de province, et Pékin avait réagi avec brutalité en prenant d'importantes mesures de rétorsion économique.
En 2011, les autorités chinoises avaient de nouveau revendiqué le territoire, affirmant que "depuis les temps anciens, les îles Diaoyu et les eaux adjacentes ont fait partie du territoire chinois et [que] la Chine maintient une souveraineté indiscutable sur elles". La situation semble inextricable, et pourrait bien mener à un conflit semblable à la guerre des Malouines, qui avait opposé l'Argentine et la Grande-Bretagne.

sexta-feira, 30 de dezembro de 2011

Internacionalizacao do yuan: gradual, mas segura (Le Monde)


Du Japon au Soudan, la Chine développe l'utilisation du yuan dans le commerce

LEMONDE | 29.12.11 | 14h47   •  Mis à jour le 29.12.11 | 17h44


SHANGHAÏ (CHINE) CORRESPONDANCE - La Chine accélère l'internationalisation du yuan. Pékin a reçu, mercredi 28 décembre, une demande du Soudan, dont elle est le premier partenaire commercial, afin d'utiliser leurs monnaies respectives dans leurs échanges. Si les Chinois l'acceptent, "nous pourrions abandonner le dollar", a déclaré le gouverneur de la banque centrale soudanaise, selon l'AFP.

Depuis 2009, la Chine a déjà signé des accords de "swap", c'est-à-dire de compensation directe sur des montants plafonnés, avec de multiples banques centrales, surtout en Asie mais aussi avec l'Argentine ou la Nouvelle-Zélande. En décembre, de tels accords ont été conclus avec le Pakistan et la Thaïlande, permettant à leurs commerçants d'obtenir des yuans pour leurs transactions avec le premier exportateur mondial.
Une nouvelle étape a été franchie le 25 décembre, lorsque la Chine a signé avec le Japon un pacte prévoyant l'utilisation directe du yuan et du yen entre les deuxième et troisième économies mondiales, afin de "réduire le risque de change et les coûts de transaction", selon Pékin. Aucun calendrier n'est établi et les détails restent àdéfinir, mais cette étape est la dernière d'une "série progressive de signes montrant que Pékin est déterminé à développer un jour le yuan en tant que monnaie de réserve alternative viable", note Donna Kwok, économiste de la HSBC.
Le Japon s'est engagé au même moment à investir jusqu'à 10 milliards de dollars (7,7 milliards d'euros) de ses réserves dans le yuan. Malgré le montant limité au regard des colossales réserves de change des deux économies, c'est un coup de pouce au statut du yuan comme monnaie de réserve, le Japon étant le premier Etat du G8 à effectuer un placement dans des bons en yuans. "La Chine va poursuivrele processus d'internationalisation du yuan en 2012 malgré les incertitudes à l'international", prédit Mme Kwok.
MONNAIE DE RÉSERVE ALTERNATIVE
Pour Pékin, il est important de contribuer à l'émergence d'une monnaie de réserve alternative pour briser l'exposition aux politiques monétaires américaines. Mais une telle devise de stature internationale doit par nature être librement convertible, ce qui n'est pas le cas du yuan. Soucieuse de conserver un contrôle déterminant pour ses exportations, la Chine n'a pas suivi la méthode orthodoxe consistant àlibéraliser d'abord les taux de change : la Banque populaire de Chine ne tolère qu'un flottement de 0,5 % par rapport au taux-pivot qu'elle établit chaque jour pour le yuan. Elle n'a pas non plus levé les barrières aux flux de capitaux. "La Chine pourrait être le seul exemple d'un pays poussant sciemment l'internationalisation de sa monnaie tout en maintenant les contrôles de capitaux", relevait en novembreStephen Green, chef économiste de Standard Chartered en Chine.
D'où la vive curiosité sur cette internationalisation hybride. Au coeur de ces évolutions : Hongkong, où Pékin a laissé pousser au cours des dix-sept derniers mois un marché en yuan hors de ses frontières monétaires. La contrepartie est que les yuans positionnés à l'extérieur de la forteresse n'échappent pas au vent de marchés changeants. Ainsi, à la fin septembre, les yuans offshore furent-ils vendus massivement, aux côtés des autres devises asiatiques. Si les deux taux ne se séparèrent jamais de plus de 3 %, s'envola la présomption selon laquelle le yuan de Hongkong suit naturellement celui de Chine continentale.
Or le contexte actuel tendu pousse plutôt Pékin à se méfier d'un afflux de capitaux étrangers en quête de sécurité ou de spéculation en cas d'ouverture. "La Chine entend profiter des bénéfices attenants à une devise internationale mais la dernière chose qu'elle souhaite est une fusion du réacteur causée par une libéralisation mal évaluée des marchés financiers, dit Ren Xianfang, analyste d'IHS Global Insight.L'internationalisation restera donc largement limitée au compte commercial avec uniquement des tests limités sur le compte financier."
La prochaine étape dans l'ouverture sera de savoir comment recycler les yuans de Hongkong en Chine. "Tout dépend de la vitesse à laquelle s'ouvrira le compte de capital, résume Kelvin Lau, économiste de Standard Chartered. Mais avec le temps, et la levée des barrières, il va y avoir une convergence graduelle. Nous parlons là de nombreuses années."
Harold Thibault

domingo, 25 de dezembro de 2011

China e Japao fazem acordo de livre comercio: América Latina promete retaliar...

Uau: os dois gigantes do mundo asiático vão fazer o que possivelmente será a maior zona de livre comércio do mundo, ameaçando o status atual da UE e do Nafta.
A América Latina promete retaliar, fazendo um acordo de livre comércio com o Nafta.
Ou estarei sonhando?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 



China and Japan agree to start talks on free trade pact


Shanghai Daily, Dece,ber 26. 2011
CHINA and Japan have agreed to start formal talks early next year on a free trade pact that would also include South Korea, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said yesterday after talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that showed the deepening bonds between Asia's two biggest economies.

Japan also said it was looking to buy Chinese treasury debt, and the two governments agreed to enhance financial cooperation.

"On a free trade agreement among Japan, China and South Korea, we've made a substantial progress for an early start of negotiations," Noda said after his meeting with Wen.

China's central bank, the People's Bank of China, said on its website that the two leaders agreed to strengthen bilateral financial market cooperation and "encourage the use of the yuan and Japanese yen in international trade transactions between the two countries."

The trade talks announcement builds on an agreement between the three countries last month to also seek a trilateral investment treaty and finish studies on the proposed free trade agreement by the end of December so they could start formal negotiations on the trade pact.

"China is willing to closely coordinate with Japan to promote our two countries' monetary and financial development, and to accelerate progress of the China-Japan-Republic of Korea free-trade zone and East Asian financial cooperation," Wen told Noda, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry's official website.

But the regional trade negotiations could compete for attention with Washington's push for a trans-Pacific partnership, after Japan said last month it wants to join in the talks over the United States proposal.

Despite sometimes rancorous political ties between the two neighbors, Japan's economic fortunes are increasingly tied to China's economic growth and consumer demand.

China and Japan are also the world's first and second-biggest holders of foreign reserves. Wen told Noda that closer economic ties were in both countries' interests.

"The deep-seated consequences of the current international financial crisis continue to spread, and the complexity and severity of global and world developments have exceeded our expectations," Wen said.

"China and Japan both have the need and conditions to join hands more closely to respond to challenges and deepen mutually beneficial strategic relations," he said.

In 2010, trade between the two nations grew by 22.3 percent compared to the levels the previous year, reaching 26.5 trillion yen (US$339.3 billion), according to the Japan External Trade Organization.

In a statement issued after the two leaders' meeting, the Japanese government said it would seek to buy Chinese government bonds - a tentative step toward diversification of Tokyo's large foreign exchange reserves that are believed to be mostly held in dollars.

China's central bank said the two governments agreed to support Japanese businesses issuing yuan bonds in Tokyo and other markets outside of China, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation would begin a pilot scheme for issuing yuan-denominated bonds in China's mainland.

The People's Bank of China also said it would support Japan in using the yuan for direct investment in China.

But Japanese officials have stressed that Japan's trust in dollar assets remains unshaken, and the scale of the planned purchase of Chinese government bonds will be small.

Wen and Noda also agreed to set up a framework to discuss maritime issues after diplomatic ties deteriorated last year following Japan's arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain in the East China Sea.

Bilateral meetings attended by vice ministers and senior officials from relevant ministries will be held periodically to exchange views, in an effort to prevent a similar row.

"On maritime matters, we have successfully set up a channel to solve problems through multi-layered dialogue," Noda told reporters

sexta-feira, 9 de setembro de 2011

Economic Dominance in historical perspective - Economist


Charts, maps and infographics

Daily chart

Global economic dominance

Spheres of influence

Sep 9th 2011, 15:14 by The Economist online
By 2030 China's economy could loom as large as America's in the 1970s
A NEW book, discussed in this week's Economics focus, by Arvind Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics argues that China’s economic might will overshadow America’s sooner than people think. Mr Subramanian combines each country’s share of world GDP, trade and foreign investment into an index of economic “dominance”. By 2030 China’s share of global economic power will match America’s in the 1970s and Britain’s a century before. Three forces will dictate China’s rise, Mr Subramanian argues: demography, convergence and “gravity”. Since China has over four times America’s population, it only has to produce a quarter of America’s output per head to exceed America’s total output. Indeed, Mr Subramanian thinks China is already the world’s biggest economy, when due account is taken of the low prices charged for many local Chinese goods and services outside its cities. China will be equally dominant in trade, accounting for twice America’s share of imports and exports. That projection relies on the “gravity” model of trade, which assumes that commerce between countries depends on their economic weight and the distance between them.

Economics focus

The celestial economy

By 2030 China’s economy could loom as large as Britain’s in the 1870s or America’s in the 1970s

IT IS perhaps a measure of America’s resilience as an economic power that its demise is so often foretold. In 1956 the Russians politely informed Westerners that “history is on our side. We will bury you.” In the 1980s history seemed to side instead with Japan. Now it appears to be taking China’s part.
These prophesies are “self-denying”, according to Larry Summers, a former economic adviser to President Barack Obama. They fail to come to pass partly because America buys into them, then rouses itself to defy them. “As long as we’re worried about the future, the future will be better,” he said, shortly before leaving the White House. His speech is quoted in “Eclipse”, a new book by Arvind Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Mr Subramanian argues that China’s economic might will overshadow America’s sooner than people think. He denies that his prophecy is self-denying. Even if America heeds its warning, there is precious little it can do about it.
Three forces will dictate China’s rise, Mr Subramanian argues: demography, convergence and “gravity”. Since China has over four times America’s population, it only has to produce a quarter of America’s output per head to exceed America’s total output. Indeed, Mr Subramanian thinks China is already the world’s biggest economy, when due account is taken of the low prices charged for many local Chinese goods and services outside its cities. Big though it is, China’s economy is also somewhat “backward”. That gives it plenty of scope to enjoy catch-up growth, unlike Japan’s economy, which was still far smaller than America’s when it reached the technological frontier.
Buoyed by these two forces, China will account for over 23% of world GDP by 2030, measured at PPP, Mr Subramanian calculates. America will account for less than 12%. China will be equally dominant in trade, accounting for twice America’s share of imports and exports. That projection relies on the “gravity” model of trade, which assumes that commerce between countries depends on their economic weight and the distance between them. China’s trade will outpace America’s both because its own economy will expand faster and also because its neighbours will grow faster than those in America’s backyard.
Mr Subramanian combines each country’s share of world GDP, trade and foreign investment into an index of economic “dominance”. By 2030 China’s share of global economic power will match America’s in the 1970s and Britain’s a century before (see chart). Those prudent American strategists preparing their countrymen for a “multipolar” world are wrong. The global economy will remain unipolar, dominated by a “G1”, Mr Subramanian argues. It’s just that the one will be China not America.
Mr Subramanian’s conclusion is controversial. The assumptions, however, are conservative. He does not rule out a “major financial crisis”. He projects that China’s per-person income will grow by 5.5% a year over the next two decades, 3.3 percentage points slower than it grew over the past two decades or so. You might almost say that Mr Subramanian is a “China bear”. He lists several countries (Japan, Hong Kong, Germany, Spain, Taiwan, Greece, South Korea) that reached a comparable stage of development—a living standard equivalent to 25% of America’s at the time—and then grew faster than 5.5% per head over the subsequent 20 years. He could find only one, Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania, which reached that threshold and then suffered a worse slowdown than the one he envisages for China.
He is overly sanguine only on the problems posed by China’s ageing population. In the next few years, the ratio of Chinese workers to dependants will stop rising and start falling. He dismisses this demographic turnaround in a footnote, arguing that it will not weigh heavily on China’s growth until after 2030.
Both China and America could surprise people, of course. If China’s political regime implodes, “all bets will be off”, Mr Subramanian admits. Indonesia’s economy, by way of comparison, took over four years to right itself after the financial crisis that ended President Suharto’s 32-year reign. But even that upheaval only interrupted Indonesia’s progress without halting it. America might also rediscover the vim of the 1990s boom, growing by 2.7% per head, rather than the 1.7% Mr Subramanian otherwise assumes. But even that stirring comeback would not stop it falling behind a Chinese economy growing at twice that pace. So Americans are wrong to think their “pre-eminence is America’s to lose”.
Bratty or benign?
If China does usurp America, what kind of hegemon will it be? Some argue that it will be a “premature” superpower. Because it will be big before it is rich, it will dwell on its domestic needs to the neglect of its global duties. If so, the world may resemble the headless global economy of the inter-war years, when Britain was unable, and America unwilling, to lead. But Mr Subramanian prefers to describe China as a precocious superpower. It will not be among the richest economies, but it will not be poor either. Its standard of living will be about half America’s in 2030, and a little higher than the European Union’s today.
With luck China will combine its precocity in economic development with a plodding conservatism in economic diplomacy. It should remain committed to preserving an open world economy. Indeed, its commitment may run deeper than America’s, because its ratio of trade to GDP is far higher.
China’s dominance will also have limits, as Mr Subramanian points out. Unlike America in the 1940s, it will not inherit a blank institutional slate, wiped clean by war. The economic order will not yield easily to bold new designs, and China is unlikely to offer any. Why use its dominant position to undermine the very system that helped secure that position in the first place? In a white paper published this week, China’s State Council insisted that “China does not seek regional hegemony or a sphere of influence.” Whether it is precocious or premature, China is still a tentative superpower. As long as it remains worried about the future, its rivals need not worry too much.