WIKILEAKS:
Diplomacia brasileira não contava com renúncia de Carlos Mesa
Apublica, 10/7/2011 11:58
Marco Aurélio Garcia, assessor da presidência para assuntos internacionais, disse a americanos não ver ligações entre Chávez e Evo Morales
Por Marcus V F Lacerda, especial para a Pública
Dois telegramas confidenciais da embaixada americana em Brasília de janeiro de 2005 tratam sobre as tensões na Bolívia na época da renúncia do ex-presidente Carlos Mesa.
O país vizinho passava por uma efervescência política com a subida do Movimento al Socialismo, grupo político liderado por Evo Morales.
Chávez: Evo é “louco”
“Garcia observou que ele não acredita que haja uma conexão particularmente forte entre Morales e Chávez, dizendo que Chávez já disse a Garcia no passado recente que “Evo é louco” por sua insistência na alta taxação sobre operações de hidrocarbonetos”, relata uma mensagem de 26 de janeiro.
Outro assessor da presidência procurado pelos americanos sobre o assunto foi Marcel Biato.
Biato, que é marcado em outra mensagem como “estritamente protegido”, disse ao conselheiro político da embaixada americana ter conversado com o então representante brasileiro na Bolívia, embaixador Mena Gonçalves, que havia se encontrado com outros embaixadores em La Paz. Biato diz aos americanos que, segundo estas conversas, havia um consenso que Carlos Mesa não iria levar a cabo suas ameaças de renúncia.
No telegrama, Biato ainda confirma que Lula tentava persuadir o líder da oposição boliviana, Evo Morales. Lula estaria pedindo paciência e adesão de Morales ao processo constitucional em vista de adquirir legitimidade política.
Sobre a ligação entre Chávez e Morales, Marcel Biato foi mais arredio que seu superior, Marco Aurélio Garcia. “Biato negou-se a discutir a questão a fundo, dizendo apenas que o governo brasileiro acredita que Chávez é, no fundo, democrata o bastante para não provocar instabilidade na frágil Bolívia”, relata o telegrama.
Mostrando postagens com marcador Wikileaks. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Wikileaks. Mostrar todas as postagens
segunda-feira, 11 de julho de 2011
domingo, 10 de julho de 2011
Wikileaks: a imprensa brasileira na visao da diplomacia americana
SEMANA WIKILEAKS: A embaixada e a mídia – PARTE I
Por Anselmo Massad, especial para a Pública
A pedido da Pública, repórter avaliou como a diplomacia americana usa nossa mídia – e os nossos jornalistas – como fontes para levantar informações que são enviadas a Washington
Boa parte dos 3 mil telegramas da estrutura diplomática dos Estados Unidos no mundo que dizem respeito ao Brasil vazados pelo Wikileaks consiste em resenhas do que foi publicado em jornais e revistas nacionais, chamados no jargão dos diplomatas como “reação da mídia” (“media reaction”).
Há ainda relatos de reuniões com jornalistas, entrevistas concedidas “off the record” (nas quais o repórter compromete-se a não revelar a fonte das informações), conversas casuais que mostram um e bom relacionamento com a mídia. Termos associados à imprensa e menções a grandes veículos noticiosos ocorrem em 1.305 telegramas, 40,8% do total¹.
Entre os jornais, o mais citado como fonte nos telegramas é a Folha de S.Paulo, com 541 menções em 384 mensagens. Comumente qualificado como o “diário de maior tiragem do país”, em algumas ocorrências, o impresso dirigido por Octávio Frias Filho é descrito como o “maior diário esquerdista” ou como “progressista” (“liberal”)no jargão dos telegramas diplomáticos.
O segundo campeão de leitura e atenção por parte dos funcionários da diplomacia é O Estado de S.Paulo, qualificado por diversas vezes como “conservador” e mais frequentemente “de centro-direita”.
Nas buscas pelo nome do jornal, são 480 citações em 317 telegramas.
O Globo (em 89 mensagens), Valor Econômico (em 84), Jornal do Brasil (em 23) e Correio Braziliense (em 11) são citados a respeito de reportagens e artigos pontuais. Outros diários aparecem com bem menos frequência. O Jornal da Tarde, também do Grupo Estado, surge em 2003 como “jornal regional de esquerda”.
Entre as revistas, Veja é a preferida nas leituras dos diplomatas. São 85 referências em 51 telegramas, sem qualquer qualificação além de “semanal”. Em um único episódio, ela é comparada à norte-americana Time. Em outros, como “líder de circulação”. Época é mencionada em nove mensagens (em uma, é classificada como “revista financeira”, em outras como “semanal noticiosa”) e CartaCapital aparece em duas ocasiões, sendo em uma delas, em dezembro de 2004, descrita como “nacionalista de esquerda”.
IstoÉ e IstoÉ Dinheiro são citadas em 16 oportunidades. Em um único episódio, referente à Liga dos Camponeses Pobres de Rondônia, a cobertura da publicação da Editora Três é vista como “geralmente precisa e justa”, embora suas reportagens sejam “mais desequilibradas do que a líder em circulação Veja”.
Colunistas
Poucos colunistas têm prestígio entre os diplomatas como fontes de informação citadas nos telegramas.
O editorialista da Folha Clovis Rossi lidera com 40 menções, restritas a excertos de sua coluna diária. Demétrio Magnoli, “geógrafo” e “sociólogo”, aparece em resenhas de mídia por oito vezes. Miriam Leitão, analista de economia do grupo Globo, é mencionada cinco vezes, como “respeitada”, “altamente influente” e “aclamada”. Dora Kramer aparece por duas vezes, adjetivada como “influente”.
Há também duas menções ao recém-eleito imortal da Academia Brasileira de Letras, Merval Pereira, e uma singela citação a Diogo Mainardi. O primeiro é taxado ora como “proeminente”, ora como “realista” e “menos otimista” do que o restante dos analistas de plantão. O segundo, como “popular colunista”, à época em que escrevia para a Veja.
O âncora Boris Casoy, em 2004 na Rede Record, também recebe o adjetivo de “popular” quando é citado condenando o projeto de Conselho Nacional de Jornalistas, proposto pela Federação Nacional da categoria. Um documento assinado pelo embaixador Danilovich reproduz sua fala na TV quando ele taxou a iniciativa de “abominável” e uma “óbvia tentativa de controlar jornalistas e a imprensa”.
============
SEMANA WIKILEAKS: A EMBAIXADA E A MÍDIA – PARTE II
Por Anselmo Massad, especial para a Pública
Documentos mostram encontros de membros do corpo diplomático com diversos jornalistas de peso e representantes de grandes grupos midiáticos
A estrutura diplomática dos Estados Unidos mantém-se permanentemente alerta para o comportamento da imprensa. Um dos centros das atenções, segundo mostram documentos vazados pelo WikiLeaks, é a repercussão de questões relacionadas à política interna norte-americana, além de questões de relações bilaterais e temas relacionados a Israel.
Em meio a diversas análises do que sai na imprensa brasileira, há divagações curiosas. Em 23 de outubro de 2009, em meio à discussão de como a mídia se comporta, um telegrama (UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BRASILIA 001254) assinado pela conselheira diplomática Lisa Kubiske, tudo começa por elogios: “Os jornalistas brasileiros, falando genericamente, são profissionais, equilibrados e buscam objetividade”.
A seguir, ela sustenta que muitos são “imparciais” no tratamento concedido aos Estados Unidos, ainda que não concordem pessoalmente com as políticas norte-americanas. “Alguns articulistas da mídia dominante demonstram viés contra as políticas dos EUA, embora a tendência tenha começado a mudar com a eleição do presidente (Barack) Obama”, avalia.
A análise se aprofunda: “Um pequeno segmento do público brasileiro aceita a noção de que os Estados Unidos tem uma campanha para subjugar o Brasil economicamente, miná-lo culturalmente e ocupar com tropas pelo menos uma parte de seus territórios. Esse tipo de atitude e de crenças influenciam repórteres e comentaristas em questões como o retabelecimento da Quarta Frota da Marinha dos EUA (caracterizada como uma ameaça para o Brasil), supostamente por nefastas intenções em direção à Amazônia e à ‘Amazônia Azul’ (mares onde novas reservas de petróleo foram encontradas) e mais recentemente o anúncio do acesso dos EUA a bases militares colombianas”.
Há alguns telegramas que relatam encontros de membros da imprensa com embaixadores, cônsules e funcionários da diplomacia.
RBS amiga
Em um telegrama de 2005, o então cônsul de São Paulo, Patrick Dennis Duddy, narra uma visita do então embaixador John Danilovich a Porto Alegre. A capital gaúcha contava com um consulado próprio, até 1997, quando passou a ter apenas uma agência consular.
O embaixador teve três dias agitados, recheados de encontros com empresários e políticos.
Um dos pontos mais curiosos do relato diz respeito a uma entrevista concedida por Danilovich aos veículos da RBS. “O embaixador teve um almoço ‘off the record’ com a direção editorial do grupo RBS, o maior grupo regional de comunicação da América Latina”.
Os números da empresa são apresentados no relato, com detalhamentos sobre operações no Rio Grande do Sul e em Santa Catarina, incluindo a afiliação à Rede Globo, as 120 estações de rádio em dez estados e o jornal Zero Hora.
“O embaixador subsequentemente concedeu uma entrevista ‘on the record’ para o Zero Hora e para a rede de rádios.”
O documento ainda frisa, em sequência, as relações política entremeadas ao grupo de comunicação. “Pedro Parente, que era chefe da Casa Civil do ex-presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB), é vice-presidente executivo da RBS”, aponta Duddy. Imediatamente a seguir, uma “nota” complementa a informação: “Nós temos tradicionamente tido acesso e relações excelentes com o grupo”.
Estadão amigo
Um telegrama de março de 2005, vazado em fevereiro de 2011, relata um encontro entre o embaixador John Danilovich e líderes da comunidade judaica da capital paulista. A audiência — dois meses antes da Cúpula América do Sul-Países Árabes daquele ano, em Brasília — teve a presença de Abraham Goldstein, presidente da B’nai Brith do Brasil, e Henry Sobel, rabino chefe da maior sinagoga paulistana.
O relato da conversa transcorre no sentido de aprofundar laços com comunidade judaica, mas guarda notas sobre a mídia que passaram despercebidas na ocasião do vazamento, em dezembro do ano passado (o documento já foi publicado pelo WikiLeaks).
Goldstein teria dito a Danilovich que possivelmente haveria uma campanha de imprensa para garantir os pontos de vista favoráveis a Israel e à comunidade de judeus no país.
“Goldstein disse que enquanto o editor de O Estado de S.Paulo prometeu cobertura “positiva”, outros jornais de grande circulação são vistos como tendo inclinação pró-Palestina e não parecem ser de grande ajuda”, redige o embaixador. Na “campanha” estudada, havia menção a buscar não judeus que pudessem criticar o governo brasileiro no que eles consideravam uma tendência anti sionista, centrada na figura do secretário-geral do Itamaraty Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães.
Encontros com jornalistas
Nos telegramas, além de muita leitura e fichamento de jornais, há relatos de reuniões esporádicas com profissionais de mídia.
Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, ex-ombudsman da Folha de S.Paulo, participou de quatro encontros com diplomatas descritos nos telegramas. O primeiro, em abril de 2006, foi um encontro com Anthony Wayne, assistente do Departamento de Estado para assuntos econômicos que participava do Fórum Econômico Mundial América Latina. Durante o evento, sediado na capital paulista, Lins da Silva é apresentado como “ex-jornalista” e “consultor político”. No encontro, ele teria afirmado acreditar na viabilidade de Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) como candidato da oposição.
O segundo encontro ocorreu em 2008, quando Lins da Silva havia sido reconduzido ao posto de ombudsman da Folha.
O então senador do Nebraska, o republicano Chuck Hagel, teve um almoço em São Paulo com a participação de Celso Lafer, ministro de Relações Exteriores (1995-2002) da gestão Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Rubens Barbosa, embaixador brasileiro em Washington (1999 a 2004), Rubens Ricupero, ex-ministro da Fazenda e ex-embaixador nos EUA e na OMC, e Sérgio Amaral, ex-ministro da Indústria (2001-2002). Mas o único participante sem elos com ministérios nem com o Itamaraty não tem nenhuma declaração citada.
Em novembro de 2008, ainda em seu segundo mandato como ouvidor da Folha, Lins da Silva é qualificado como “ex-editor sênior” do Valor Econômico. A reunião, no caso, foi com o cônsul-geral Thomas White a respeito dos planos de exploração dos campos de petróleo do Pré-Sal. O jornalista avaliava que a crise financeira atrasaria os prazos de extração dos poços do campo de Tupi.
Quando Arturo Valenzuela, secretário assistente para assuntos do hemisfério ocidental, passou pelo Cone Sul em 2010, Lins da Silva aparece novamente em um telegrama diplomático. No mesmo encontro estavam o sociólogo Bolivar Lamounier, Lafer, Barbosa e José Goldemberg, ex-ministro de Ciência e Tecnologia e da Educação na década de 1990.
O ombudsman “destacou o vigor financeiro sem precedentes do PT para executar uma campanha, após oito anos no governo” que, em caso de derrota, produziria uma oposição “muito problemática”.
Lamounier aparece em episódio anterior, ainda em 2007. Ele teria almoçado em 28 de setembro ao lado de Jose Augusto Guilhon de Albuquerque com funcionários da embaixada em São Paulo. Ambos são apresentados como acadêmicos “associados” ao PSDB. O blogueiro do site da revista Exame, da editora Abril, apostava que Lula não tentaria terceiro mandato e que a candidatura apoiada por ele levaria a melhor. Acertou.
E disse ainda que o presidente seguinte teria de buscar apoio do PMDB, em função de seu tamanho e peso. “O PMDB, avisou Lamounier, é sempre o problema, nunca a solução, porque não tem nenhuma identidade política nem ideológica e existe com o único propósito de avançar em interesses pessoais para seus membros.
Waack
Quem também participou de almoços e encontros com funcionários do governo dos Estados Unidos foi o apresentador do Jornal da Globo, William Waack. O primeiro entre os citados foi em 28 de abril de 2008. Uma visita de jornalistas ao almirante Philip Cullom, que passava pelo Brasil para uma série de exercícios conjuntos entre as marinhas dos Estados Undidos, Brasil e Argentina.
De acordo com o relato do então embaixador Clifford Sobel, a visita de “membros da imprensa brasileira” resultou numa “cobertura positiva”. Entre todos os jornalistas, apenas o apresentador do Jornal da Globo é nomeado, por ter “apresentado em duas reportagens para O Globo sobre a visita que reflete a importância da parceria dos EUA com o Brasil”.
Outro encontro deu-se em setembro de 2009, com a presença Sérgio Fausto, à época diretor do Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso (iFHC). Nele, Waack trouxe a informação, que posteriormente se revelaria falsa, de que os então governadores de São Paulo, José Serra, e Minas Gerais, Aécio Neves, teriam acertado uma chapa-puro-sangue do PSDB para rivalizar com Dilma Rousseff.
O terceiro encontro foi com o atual embaixador, Thomas Shannon, em fevereiro de 2010. Waak teria dito que em um fórum com empresários, Aécio Neves teria se mostado “o mais carismático”, Ciro Gomes “o mais forte”, Serra “claramente competente” e Dilma “a menos coerente”.
Em agosto de 2005, há menção a um encontro com oito jornalistas e comentaristas de jornais, revistas, TV e internet. Nenhum é mencionado, mas muitas teorias são listadas sobre o que se sucederia às denúncias de corrupção consagradas como o escândalo do “Mensalão”.
Fernando Rodrigues, repórter especial de política da Folha e autor do blog UolPolítica, teve pelo menos duas conversas com o assessor político da embaixada dos Estados Unidos, segundo os documentos. Em ambos, foi procurado para dar a contextualização de questões relativas ao país: o funcionamento do Tribunal de Contas da União e o futuro de Aldo Rebelo (PCdoB-SP) caso perdesse a eleição para presidente da Câmara dos Deputados em 2007.
Por Anselmo Massad, especial para a Pública
A pedido da Pública, repórter avaliou como a diplomacia americana usa nossa mídia – e os nossos jornalistas – como fontes para levantar informações que são enviadas a Washington
Boa parte dos 3 mil telegramas da estrutura diplomática dos Estados Unidos no mundo que dizem respeito ao Brasil vazados pelo Wikileaks consiste em resenhas do que foi publicado em jornais e revistas nacionais, chamados no jargão dos diplomatas como “reação da mídia” (“media reaction”).
Há ainda relatos de reuniões com jornalistas, entrevistas concedidas “off the record” (nas quais o repórter compromete-se a não revelar a fonte das informações), conversas casuais que mostram um e bom relacionamento com a mídia. Termos associados à imprensa e menções a grandes veículos noticiosos ocorrem em 1.305 telegramas, 40,8% do total¹.
Entre os jornais, o mais citado como fonte nos telegramas é a Folha de S.Paulo, com 541 menções em 384 mensagens. Comumente qualificado como o “diário de maior tiragem do país”, em algumas ocorrências, o impresso dirigido por Octávio Frias Filho é descrito como o “maior diário esquerdista” ou como “progressista” (“liberal”)no jargão dos telegramas diplomáticos.
O segundo campeão de leitura e atenção por parte dos funcionários da diplomacia é O Estado de S.Paulo, qualificado por diversas vezes como “conservador” e mais frequentemente “de centro-direita”.
Nas buscas pelo nome do jornal, são 480 citações em 317 telegramas.
O Globo (em 89 mensagens), Valor Econômico (em 84), Jornal do Brasil (em 23) e Correio Braziliense (em 11) são citados a respeito de reportagens e artigos pontuais. Outros diários aparecem com bem menos frequência. O Jornal da Tarde, também do Grupo Estado, surge em 2003 como “jornal regional de esquerda”.
Entre as revistas, Veja é a preferida nas leituras dos diplomatas. São 85 referências em 51 telegramas, sem qualquer qualificação além de “semanal”. Em um único episódio, ela é comparada à norte-americana Time. Em outros, como “líder de circulação”. Época é mencionada em nove mensagens (em uma, é classificada como “revista financeira”, em outras como “semanal noticiosa”) e CartaCapital aparece em duas ocasiões, sendo em uma delas, em dezembro de 2004, descrita como “nacionalista de esquerda”.
IstoÉ e IstoÉ Dinheiro são citadas em 16 oportunidades. Em um único episódio, referente à Liga dos Camponeses Pobres de Rondônia, a cobertura da publicação da Editora Três é vista como “geralmente precisa e justa”, embora suas reportagens sejam “mais desequilibradas do que a líder em circulação Veja”.
Colunistas
Poucos colunistas têm prestígio entre os diplomatas como fontes de informação citadas nos telegramas.
O editorialista da Folha Clovis Rossi lidera com 40 menções, restritas a excertos de sua coluna diária. Demétrio Magnoli, “geógrafo” e “sociólogo”, aparece em resenhas de mídia por oito vezes. Miriam Leitão, analista de economia do grupo Globo, é mencionada cinco vezes, como “respeitada”, “altamente influente” e “aclamada”. Dora Kramer aparece por duas vezes, adjetivada como “influente”.
Há também duas menções ao recém-eleito imortal da Academia Brasileira de Letras, Merval Pereira, e uma singela citação a Diogo Mainardi. O primeiro é taxado ora como “proeminente”, ora como “realista” e “menos otimista” do que o restante dos analistas de plantão. O segundo, como “popular colunista”, à época em que escrevia para a Veja.
O âncora Boris Casoy, em 2004 na Rede Record, também recebe o adjetivo de “popular” quando é citado condenando o projeto de Conselho Nacional de Jornalistas, proposto pela Federação Nacional da categoria. Um documento assinado pelo embaixador Danilovich reproduz sua fala na TV quando ele taxou a iniciativa de “abominável” e uma “óbvia tentativa de controlar jornalistas e a imprensa”.
============
SEMANA WIKILEAKS: A EMBAIXADA E A MÍDIA – PARTE II
Por Anselmo Massad, especial para a Pública
Documentos mostram encontros de membros do corpo diplomático com diversos jornalistas de peso e representantes de grandes grupos midiáticos
A estrutura diplomática dos Estados Unidos mantém-se permanentemente alerta para o comportamento da imprensa. Um dos centros das atenções, segundo mostram documentos vazados pelo WikiLeaks, é a repercussão de questões relacionadas à política interna norte-americana, além de questões de relações bilaterais e temas relacionados a Israel.
Em meio a diversas análises do que sai na imprensa brasileira, há divagações curiosas. Em 23 de outubro de 2009, em meio à discussão de como a mídia se comporta, um telegrama (UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 BRASILIA 001254) assinado pela conselheira diplomática Lisa Kubiske, tudo começa por elogios: “Os jornalistas brasileiros, falando genericamente, são profissionais, equilibrados e buscam objetividade”.
A seguir, ela sustenta que muitos são “imparciais” no tratamento concedido aos Estados Unidos, ainda que não concordem pessoalmente com as políticas norte-americanas. “Alguns articulistas da mídia dominante demonstram viés contra as políticas dos EUA, embora a tendência tenha começado a mudar com a eleição do presidente (Barack) Obama”, avalia.
A análise se aprofunda: “Um pequeno segmento do público brasileiro aceita a noção de que os Estados Unidos tem uma campanha para subjugar o Brasil economicamente, miná-lo culturalmente e ocupar com tropas pelo menos uma parte de seus territórios. Esse tipo de atitude e de crenças influenciam repórteres e comentaristas em questões como o retabelecimento da Quarta Frota da Marinha dos EUA (caracterizada como uma ameaça para o Brasil), supostamente por nefastas intenções em direção à Amazônia e à ‘Amazônia Azul’ (mares onde novas reservas de petróleo foram encontradas) e mais recentemente o anúncio do acesso dos EUA a bases militares colombianas”.
Há alguns telegramas que relatam encontros de membros da imprensa com embaixadores, cônsules e funcionários da diplomacia.
RBS amiga
Em um telegrama de 2005, o então cônsul de São Paulo, Patrick Dennis Duddy, narra uma visita do então embaixador John Danilovich a Porto Alegre. A capital gaúcha contava com um consulado próprio, até 1997, quando passou a ter apenas uma agência consular.
O embaixador teve três dias agitados, recheados de encontros com empresários e políticos.
Um dos pontos mais curiosos do relato diz respeito a uma entrevista concedida por Danilovich aos veículos da RBS. “O embaixador teve um almoço ‘off the record’ com a direção editorial do grupo RBS, o maior grupo regional de comunicação da América Latina”.
Os números da empresa são apresentados no relato, com detalhamentos sobre operações no Rio Grande do Sul e em Santa Catarina, incluindo a afiliação à Rede Globo, as 120 estações de rádio em dez estados e o jornal Zero Hora.
“O embaixador subsequentemente concedeu uma entrevista ‘on the record’ para o Zero Hora e para a rede de rádios.”
O documento ainda frisa, em sequência, as relações política entremeadas ao grupo de comunicação. “Pedro Parente, que era chefe da Casa Civil do ex-presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB), é vice-presidente executivo da RBS”, aponta Duddy. Imediatamente a seguir, uma “nota” complementa a informação: “Nós temos tradicionamente tido acesso e relações excelentes com o grupo”.
Estadão amigo
Um telegrama de março de 2005, vazado em fevereiro de 2011, relata um encontro entre o embaixador John Danilovich e líderes da comunidade judaica da capital paulista. A audiência — dois meses antes da Cúpula América do Sul-Países Árabes daquele ano, em Brasília — teve a presença de Abraham Goldstein, presidente da B’nai Brith do Brasil, e Henry Sobel, rabino chefe da maior sinagoga paulistana.
O relato da conversa transcorre no sentido de aprofundar laços com comunidade judaica, mas guarda notas sobre a mídia que passaram despercebidas na ocasião do vazamento, em dezembro do ano passado (o documento já foi publicado pelo WikiLeaks).
Goldstein teria dito a Danilovich que possivelmente haveria uma campanha de imprensa para garantir os pontos de vista favoráveis a Israel e à comunidade de judeus no país.
“Goldstein disse que enquanto o editor de O Estado de S.Paulo prometeu cobertura “positiva”, outros jornais de grande circulação são vistos como tendo inclinação pró-Palestina e não parecem ser de grande ajuda”, redige o embaixador. Na “campanha” estudada, havia menção a buscar não judeus que pudessem criticar o governo brasileiro no que eles consideravam uma tendência anti sionista, centrada na figura do secretário-geral do Itamaraty Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães.
Encontros com jornalistas
Nos telegramas, além de muita leitura e fichamento de jornais, há relatos de reuniões esporádicas com profissionais de mídia.
Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, ex-ombudsman da Folha de S.Paulo, participou de quatro encontros com diplomatas descritos nos telegramas. O primeiro, em abril de 2006, foi um encontro com Anthony Wayne, assistente do Departamento de Estado para assuntos econômicos que participava do Fórum Econômico Mundial América Latina. Durante o evento, sediado na capital paulista, Lins da Silva é apresentado como “ex-jornalista” e “consultor político”. No encontro, ele teria afirmado acreditar na viabilidade de Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) como candidato da oposição.
O segundo encontro ocorreu em 2008, quando Lins da Silva havia sido reconduzido ao posto de ombudsman da Folha.
O então senador do Nebraska, o republicano Chuck Hagel, teve um almoço em São Paulo com a participação de Celso Lafer, ministro de Relações Exteriores (1995-2002) da gestão Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Rubens Barbosa, embaixador brasileiro em Washington (1999 a 2004), Rubens Ricupero, ex-ministro da Fazenda e ex-embaixador nos EUA e na OMC, e Sérgio Amaral, ex-ministro da Indústria (2001-2002). Mas o único participante sem elos com ministérios nem com o Itamaraty não tem nenhuma declaração citada.
Em novembro de 2008, ainda em seu segundo mandato como ouvidor da Folha, Lins da Silva é qualificado como “ex-editor sênior” do Valor Econômico. A reunião, no caso, foi com o cônsul-geral Thomas White a respeito dos planos de exploração dos campos de petróleo do Pré-Sal. O jornalista avaliava que a crise financeira atrasaria os prazos de extração dos poços do campo de Tupi.
Quando Arturo Valenzuela, secretário assistente para assuntos do hemisfério ocidental, passou pelo Cone Sul em 2010, Lins da Silva aparece novamente em um telegrama diplomático. No mesmo encontro estavam o sociólogo Bolivar Lamounier, Lafer, Barbosa e José Goldemberg, ex-ministro de Ciência e Tecnologia e da Educação na década de 1990.
O ombudsman “destacou o vigor financeiro sem precedentes do PT para executar uma campanha, após oito anos no governo” que, em caso de derrota, produziria uma oposição “muito problemática”.
Lamounier aparece em episódio anterior, ainda em 2007. Ele teria almoçado em 28 de setembro ao lado de Jose Augusto Guilhon de Albuquerque com funcionários da embaixada em São Paulo. Ambos são apresentados como acadêmicos “associados” ao PSDB. O blogueiro do site da revista Exame, da editora Abril, apostava que Lula não tentaria terceiro mandato e que a candidatura apoiada por ele levaria a melhor. Acertou.
E disse ainda que o presidente seguinte teria de buscar apoio do PMDB, em função de seu tamanho e peso. “O PMDB, avisou Lamounier, é sempre o problema, nunca a solução, porque não tem nenhuma identidade política nem ideológica e existe com o único propósito de avançar em interesses pessoais para seus membros.
Waack
Quem também participou de almoços e encontros com funcionários do governo dos Estados Unidos foi o apresentador do Jornal da Globo, William Waack. O primeiro entre os citados foi em 28 de abril de 2008. Uma visita de jornalistas ao almirante Philip Cullom, que passava pelo Brasil para uma série de exercícios conjuntos entre as marinhas dos Estados Undidos, Brasil e Argentina.
De acordo com o relato do então embaixador Clifford Sobel, a visita de “membros da imprensa brasileira” resultou numa “cobertura positiva”. Entre todos os jornalistas, apenas o apresentador do Jornal da Globo é nomeado, por ter “apresentado em duas reportagens para O Globo sobre a visita que reflete a importância da parceria dos EUA com o Brasil”.
Outro encontro deu-se em setembro de 2009, com a presença Sérgio Fausto, à época diretor do Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso (iFHC). Nele, Waack trouxe a informação, que posteriormente se revelaria falsa, de que os então governadores de São Paulo, José Serra, e Minas Gerais, Aécio Neves, teriam acertado uma chapa-puro-sangue do PSDB para rivalizar com Dilma Rousseff.
O terceiro encontro foi com o atual embaixador, Thomas Shannon, em fevereiro de 2010. Waak teria dito que em um fórum com empresários, Aécio Neves teria se mostado “o mais carismático”, Ciro Gomes “o mais forte”, Serra “claramente competente” e Dilma “a menos coerente”.
Em agosto de 2005, há menção a um encontro com oito jornalistas e comentaristas de jornais, revistas, TV e internet. Nenhum é mencionado, mas muitas teorias são listadas sobre o que se sucederia às denúncias de corrupção consagradas como o escândalo do “Mensalão”.
Fernando Rodrigues, repórter especial de política da Folha e autor do blog UolPolítica, teve pelo menos duas conversas com o assessor político da embaixada dos Estados Unidos, segundo os documentos. Em ambos, foi procurado para dar a contextualização de questões relativas ao país: o funcionamento do Tribunal de Contas da União e o futuro de Aldo Rebelo (PCdoB-SP) caso perdesse a eleição para presidente da Câmara dos Deputados em 2007.
sábado, 9 de julho de 2011
Wikileaks Brasil-Bolivia: cultivando amizades (e outras coisas tambem)
There is no need to add any comment...
09LAPAZ1233
admin
222441 8/26/2009 21:06 09LAPAZ1233 Embassy La Paz CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001233
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, ETRD, ENRG, PINR, BR, BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: BRAZIL’S LULA BACKS MORALES FOR RE-ELECTION
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires John Creamer, reasons 1.4 b,d
1. (C) Summary: At an open-air event August 22 in one of Bolivia’s principal coca-growing regions, Brazilian President Lula da Silva delivered a public endorsement of Bolivian President Evo Morales, reflecting Brazil’s conclusion that Morales’ re-election is all but inevitable. Lula and Morales signed several bilateral agreements, including over 300 million dollars in Brazilian financing for Bolivian road construction, and began discussions to revise their gas contract to reflect lower Brazilian demand. Lula offered to eliminate tariffs on up to 21 million dollars of Bolivian textile exports, a move hailed by both sides as compensation for export losses stemming from removal of U.S. ATPDEA trade preferences. Lula and Morales discussed counter-narcotics cooperation, including the pending transfer of Bell-UH helicopters to Bolivia, and the upcoming Unasur summit review of the U.S.-Colombian defense agreement (with Morales more worked up about the issue than ever, despite Lula’s emphasis on dialogue). The Brazilian president queried Morales privately about his relations with the U.S., which prompted a lengthy anti-American diatribe. End summary.
2. (C) Presidents Lula and Morales met August 22 amid a festive atmosphere in Bolivia’s Chapare region, a major coca-growing center and Morales’ home base. With at least 10,000 cocaleros and other Morales supporters in attendance, the two presidents took turns lavishing praise on each other; Morales hailed Lula as a fellow man of the people, while Lula compared Morales to Nelson Mandela. At the stadium event, which resembled a campaign rally as much as a summit meeting, the Brazilian president declared that Morales had begun a new era, confronting the anger of the “powerful,” but also counseled his counterpart to govern on behalf of all Bolivians and to favor dialogue.
3. (C) Those gathered at the event witnessed the signing of four bilateral agreements, among them one establishing over 300 million dollars in Brazilian financing for a 300 km highway extending north from the meeting site (which will be constructed by the Brazilian firm OAS). The other agreements concerned enhanced cooperation in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, professional education, and scientific research aimed at developing lithium reserves in Bolivia’s Uyuni salt plain (with an explicit provision that industrial development will be “100 percent Bolivian”).
4. (C) The Bolivians highlighted their interest in amending their current gas contract with Brazil, hoping to revise the minimum purchase quantities (currently at 24 million cubic meters per day) given reduced Brazilian demand. According to the Bolivian state gas entity YPFB and the Brazilian embassy here. Bolivia prefers an arrangement that better reflects Brazil’s actual requirements, which would free up gas for domestic needs and possible additional sales to Argentina. Presidents Lula and Morales reached no conclusions on gas (the Brazilians did not include their energy representatives in the August 22 meetings), but agreed to hold another bilateral summit in the next two-to-three weeks in Brazil, dedicated entirely to the energy issue.
5. (C) President Lula announced that Brazil will eliminate tariffs on up to 21 million dollars of Bolivian textile exports, which both he and Morales characterized as making up for the losses suffered by withdrawal of ATPDEA (Morales welcomed the offer as an “ATPDEA without conditions”). Although Lula claimed that the amount was exactly what was lost in U.S. trade, textile trade associations here quickly noted that their exports under ATPDEA were several times greater than that (65 million dollars was the most commonly-cited estimate, which tracks roughly with our figures), and that there’s no Brazilian market for heavy wool alpaca textiles. Nevertheless, the offer made big headlines here, allowing both presidents to draw a contrast between the treatment Bolivia receives from us and the “unconditional” friendship Bolivia enjoys with fellow South American states such as Brazil. 6. (C) We spoke with Brazilian embassy officials here in advance of the visit to encourage some helpful signal of caution from President Lula to Morales regarding the Bolivian’s approach to the United States. These officials said that Brazil sees an improved relationship between Bolivia and the U.S. as in its own interest, and pledged to do what they could to encourage more constructive Bolivian behavior. Still, they noted that Brazil wants to maintain stability on its borders, and has concluded that Morales is here to stay. They said Brazil wants to provide Morales with alternatives to the radical advice he is receiving from Venezuela and Cuba, but clarified that Brazil does not see itself in “direct competition” with Venezuela. The Brazilians added that while they engage the Bolivians on democracy issues, they do not consider Bolivia’s human rights or democracy record to be outside hemispheric norms.
7. (C) Brazilian embassy Minister Counselor Julio Bitelli confirmed for us that President Lula did raise with Morales the issue of Bolivian-U.S. relations (in the 40-minute car ride on the way to the public event), but that this prompted the “usual” extended rant against alleged U.S. crimes. Morales recalled his own personal victimization at the hands of DEA agents, railed against American hegemony in Latin America and appeared unreceptive to hearing any counsel, according to Bitelli. Morales expanded on these now-familiar themes in his public remarks. The Colombian defense agreement was another subject on which Lula appeared to make little headway; the Brazilian president emphasized the need for dialogue and a “frank exchange” on the issue at the upcoming Unasur summit, while Morales publicly declared that any government that allows military forces into their country are “traitors to the liberation of the people of Latin America.”
8. (C) Bitelli reported that the presidents did discuss counter-narcotics cooperation, another area in which we had encouraged greater Brazilian engagement with the Bolivians, but that the talks were limited to equipment issues. Lula explained to Morales that the Bell-UH helicopter transfer was proceeding apace, but that delivery is pending Brazilian parliamentary approval. Bitelli said that Morales asked for Brazilian Tucano aircraft as well, surprising the Brazilians by suggesting that “the international community” should pay for the planes, as counter-narcotics is “a global problem.” Bitelli allowed that the Brazilians did not think much of that suggestion.
9. (C) Comment: Brazilian President Lula’s visit was widely seen here as an endorsement of Evo Morales for reelection December 6, reflecting Brazil’s conclusion that Morales is all but certain to win in any case. We believe, however, that this embrace of Morales is tempered by a clear-eyed recognition of the Morales government’s many shortcomings (the Brazilians indicated that they share a great deal of our frustration with the Bolivians, from counter-narcotics to economic policy). We will continue to encourage Brazil to follow through on its expressed interest in helping to moderate Morales, despite the evident limits of such approaches.
CREAMER
09LAPAZ1233
admin
222441 8/26/2009 21:06 09LAPAZ1233 Embassy La Paz CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001233
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, ETRD, ENRG, PINR, BR, BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA: BRAZIL’S LULA BACKS MORALES FOR RE-ELECTION
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires John Creamer, reasons 1.4 b,d
1. (C) Summary: At an open-air event August 22 in one of Bolivia’s principal coca-growing regions, Brazilian President Lula da Silva delivered a public endorsement of Bolivian President Evo Morales, reflecting Brazil’s conclusion that Morales’ re-election is all but inevitable. Lula and Morales signed several bilateral agreements, including over 300 million dollars in Brazilian financing for Bolivian road construction, and began discussions to revise their gas contract to reflect lower Brazilian demand. Lula offered to eliminate tariffs on up to 21 million dollars of Bolivian textile exports, a move hailed by both sides as compensation for export losses stemming from removal of U.S. ATPDEA trade preferences. Lula and Morales discussed counter-narcotics cooperation, including the pending transfer of Bell-UH helicopters to Bolivia, and the upcoming Unasur summit review of the U.S.-Colombian defense agreement (with Morales more worked up about the issue than ever, despite Lula’s emphasis on dialogue). The Brazilian president queried Morales privately about his relations with the U.S., which prompted a lengthy anti-American diatribe. End summary.
2. (C) Presidents Lula and Morales met August 22 amid a festive atmosphere in Bolivia’s Chapare region, a major coca-growing center and Morales’ home base. With at least 10,000 cocaleros and other Morales supporters in attendance, the two presidents took turns lavishing praise on each other; Morales hailed Lula as a fellow man of the people, while Lula compared Morales to Nelson Mandela. At the stadium event, which resembled a campaign rally as much as a summit meeting, the Brazilian president declared that Morales had begun a new era, confronting the anger of the “powerful,” but also counseled his counterpart to govern on behalf of all Bolivians and to favor dialogue.
3. (C) Those gathered at the event witnessed the signing of four bilateral agreements, among them one establishing over 300 million dollars in Brazilian financing for a 300 km highway extending north from the meeting site (which will be constructed by the Brazilian firm OAS). The other agreements concerned enhanced cooperation in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, professional education, and scientific research aimed at developing lithium reserves in Bolivia’s Uyuni salt plain (with an explicit provision that industrial development will be “100 percent Bolivian”).
4. (C) The Bolivians highlighted their interest in amending their current gas contract with Brazil, hoping to revise the minimum purchase quantities (currently at 24 million cubic meters per day) given reduced Brazilian demand. According to the Bolivian state gas entity YPFB and the Brazilian embassy here. Bolivia prefers an arrangement that better reflects Brazil’s actual requirements, which would free up gas for domestic needs and possible additional sales to Argentina. Presidents Lula and Morales reached no conclusions on gas (the Brazilians did not include their energy representatives in the August 22 meetings), but agreed to hold another bilateral summit in the next two-to-three weeks in Brazil, dedicated entirely to the energy issue.
5. (C) President Lula announced that Brazil will eliminate tariffs on up to 21 million dollars of Bolivian textile exports, which both he and Morales characterized as making up for the losses suffered by withdrawal of ATPDEA (Morales welcomed the offer as an “ATPDEA without conditions”). Although Lula claimed that the amount was exactly what was lost in U.S. trade, textile trade associations here quickly noted that their exports under ATPDEA were several times greater than that (65 million dollars was the most commonly-cited estimate, which tracks roughly with our figures), and that there’s no Brazilian market for heavy wool alpaca textiles. Nevertheless, the offer made big headlines here, allowing both presidents to draw a contrast between the treatment Bolivia receives from us and the “unconditional” friendship Bolivia enjoys with fellow South American states such as Brazil. 6. (C) We spoke with Brazilian embassy officials here in advance of the visit to encourage some helpful signal of caution from President Lula to Morales regarding the Bolivian’s approach to the United States. These officials said that Brazil sees an improved relationship between Bolivia and the U.S. as in its own interest, and pledged to do what they could to encourage more constructive Bolivian behavior. Still, they noted that Brazil wants to maintain stability on its borders, and has concluded that Morales is here to stay. They said Brazil wants to provide Morales with alternatives to the radical advice he is receiving from Venezuela and Cuba, but clarified that Brazil does not see itself in “direct competition” with Venezuela. The Brazilians added that while they engage the Bolivians on democracy issues, they do not consider Bolivia’s human rights or democracy record to be outside hemispheric norms.
7. (C) Brazilian embassy Minister Counselor Julio Bitelli confirmed for us that President Lula did raise with Morales the issue of Bolivian-U.S. relations (in the 40-minute car ride on the way to the public event), but that this prompted the “usual” extended rant against alleged U.S. crimes. Morales recalled his own personal victimization at the hands of DEA agents, railed against American hegemony in Latin America and appeared unreceptive to hearing any counsel, according to Bitelli. Morales expanded on these now-familiar themes in his public remarks. The Colombian defense agreement was another subject on which Lula appeared to make little headway; the Brazilian president emphasized the need for dialogue and a “frank exchange” on the issue at the upcoming Unasur summit, while Morales publicly declared that any government that allows military forces into their country are “traitors to the liberation of the people of Latin America.”
8. (C) Bitelli reported that the presidents did discuss counter-narcotics cooperation, another area in which we had encouraged greater Brazilian engagement with the Bolivians, but that the talks were limited to equipment issues. Lula explained to Morales that the Bell-UH helicopter transfer was proceeding apace, but that delivery is pending Brazilian parliamentary approval. Bitelli said that Morales asked for Brazilian Tucano aircraft as well, surprising the Brazilians by suggesting that “the international community” should pay for the planes, as counter-narcotics is “a global problem.” Bitelli allowed that the Brazilians did not think much of that suggestion.
9. (C) Comment: Brazilian President Lula’s visit was widely seen here as an endorsement of Evo Morales for reelection December 6, reflecting Brazil’s conclusion that Morales is all but certain to win in any case. We believe, however, that this embrace of Morales is tempered by a clear-eyed recognition of the Morales government’s many shortcomings (the Brazilians indicated that they share a great deal of our frustration with the Bolivians, from counter-narcotics to economic policy). We will continue to encourage Brazil to follow through on its expressed interest in helping to moderate Morales, despite the evident limits of such approaches.
CREAMER
sábado, 2 de julho de 2011
Wikileaks-Brasil: China pensa que Brasil nao tem peso internacional
Estou terminando a revisão de um trabalho meu que escrevi há mais de um ano (e que ainda não foi publicado): "Brasil, China e a arquitetura da governança global"
A matéria abaixo (e o telegrama transcrito) sobre opiniões de um ex-embaixador da China no Brasil sobre nosso pequeno peso internacional apenas confirma, de modo mais explícito, o que já se sabia: a China não pretende apoiar o Brasil em sua pretensão de ocupar uma cadeira permanente no CSNU. Este nem é o problema principal, pois a China não pretende ampliar o CSNU para ninguém, pois isso diminuiria relativamente seu próprio peso internacional. Se trata, obviamente, de uma posição conservadora, como é, geralmente a das grandes potências (apenas quando elas não conseguem mais pagar a conta, como parece ser o caso dos EUA, atualmente, elas pretendem que outros o façam), e no caso da China, ela pouco se preocupa com a estabilidade do sistema internacional, e não pretende assumir um papel que a engaje mais de perto com certas responsabilidades "imperiais", digamos assim.
No caso do Brasil, porém, ela apenas explicita o que pensam de nós muitos imperiais e outros menos imperiais: não temos peso, ainda.
Pois é, parece que a solução mesmo é: cresça e apareça, mas isso não depende do mundo. Depende de nós mesmos, ou seja de reformas internas e de crescimento econômico e militar. A China só é o que é, hoje, por se tratar, de fato, de uma grande potência (já era antes, mas decaiu durante dois séculos), que cresceu enormemente nas últimas três décadas e vem se afirmando cada vez mais nos planos econômico e financeiro. Falta se afirmar no plano militar, mas isso assusta muita gente...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
A) Matéria da Agência A Pública, sobre telegrama Wikileaks, sobre relações China-Brazil (neste link):
WIKILEAKS: China pensa que Brasil não tem “capacidade” para ser líder
Por João Peres, especial para a Pública, June 29th, 2011
Telegramas revelam conversa entre embaixadores da China e dos Estados Unidos na qual se pondera que o Brasil tampouco está qualificado para um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança da ONU
Segundo o ex-embaixador chinês no Brasil, a China acredita que o Brasil não tem “capacidade e influência” para ser líder e que as ambições do país excedem seu verdadeiro peso no cenário internacional. Telegramas de agosto de 2008 obtidos pelo Wikileaks mostram a conversa de Chen Duqing, que ficou no cargo até 2009, com o ex-embaixador dos Estados Unidos, Clifford Sobel.
Àquela ocasião, Duqing manifestou a Sobel que o Brasil não estaria qualificado para suas aspirações de ocupar um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) e estava “interessado apenas em algumas áreas, e não em paz ou em segurança”.
Para Paulo Vizentini, professor de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), é preciso fazer a ressalva que a afirmação foi feita em 2008, começo da grande crise financeira que catalisaria as mudanças no quadro geopolítico internacional – e o Brasil ganhou força. Porém, admite ele, “o Brasil demonstra uma série de fragilidades quanto a seu projeto. Não temos um pacto de poder mínimo que assegure uma agenda comum que sobreviva a mudanças de governos”.
Conselho de Segurança
Em outro telegrama, os Estados Unidos ponderavam que a principal relutância chinesa quanto à reforma no Conselho de Segurança dizia respeito à possível entrada do Japão no conselho. Para os diplomatas, se a China apoiasse o Brasil em seu antigo anseio por uma inserção mais profunda no principal organismo multilateral, estaria por tabela beneficiando os rivais asiáticos. “Pode haver uma manobra chinesa no sentido de não deixar ninguém entrar. É fato que a China tem ficado incomodada com a reaproximação entre Japão e Estados Unidos”, pondera o professor.
A questão foi parcialmente alterada este ano, quando, em viagem a Pequim, a presidenta Dilma Rousseff conseguiu a inclusão, no comunicado bilateral, do apoio chinês a uma reforma no Conselho de Segurança para incluir nações emergentes. Falta obter, por parte da China, dos Estados Unidos e da própria ONU, uma defesa enfática do direito do Brasil de ingressar no órgão multilateral mais importante do mundo.
No campo interno, o embaixador chinês criticava os problemas de infraestrutura, classificando o porto de Santos como “o pior do mundo”. Ele apontou na conversa com Sobel que a burocracia nacional é muito confusa e que há uma sobreposição de funções. Para Duqing, merece especial atenção o fato de o Brasil não ter consolidado suas bases para dar conta de um desenvolvimento prolongado, indicando que, sem mais crescimento econômico, não se consolidará a meta de reduzir a desigualdade social.
Parceiro importante, parceiro ocasional
Em diversos telegramas, os diplomatas estadunidenses avaliam que o Brasil vê a China como um aliado fundamental, mas advertem que a relação não é marcada por reciprocidade. “O governo Lula considera a China um parceiro para contrabalancear a influência de nações mais ricas em instituições multilaterais”, anota a então embaixadora, Donna Hrinak, em despacho de 14 de maio de 2004 no qual resume, em poucas palavras, a tônica desta relação bilateral: “Para o Brasil, mesmo um casamento de conveniência é preferível a um eterno encontro”.
Naquele momento, chamava atenção a viagem que o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva havia realizado à nação asiática acompanhado por uma enorme delegação de 400 empresários. Os telegramas indicavam que a relação era desigual em termos de trocas comerciais, com envio de commodities brasileiras em troca de produtos industriais chineses.
Dados divulgados em abril pelo Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea) constatam que a desigualdade se aprofundou, e atualmente 86% da exportação brasileira ao parceiro é baseada em produtos primários.
Desconfianças de parte a parte
“Este é um grupo muito heterogêneo de países com diferentes metas”, anotava em 19 de fevereiro de 2010 o subsecretário-geral de política do Itamaraty, Roberto Jaguaribe, em conversa com o embaixador Thomas Shannon, na qual confirmava que a China não queria que o BRIC se transformasse em porta-voz das nações em desenvolvimento.
Na mesma conversa, o diplomata estadunidense demonstrava surpresa com a rapidez com que a China se engajou em negócios na América do Sul, passando de um envolvimento meramente econômico a uma relação política que se aprofundava constantemente. “China será uma forte concorrente, para os Estados Unidos e para o Brasil”, advertia Shannon, segundo telegrama de 22 de abril de 2008.
Os documentos são parte de 2.500 relatórios diplomáticos referentes ao Brasil ainda inéditos, que foram analisados por 15 jornalistas independentes e estão sendo publicados nesta semana pela agência Pública.
Esse posts foi publicado em Wednesday, June 29th, 2011 at 3:13 pm. Está arquivado como +. Você pode acompanhar quaisquer respostas a esse post através do RSS feed.
===========
B) Telegrama da Embaixada dos EUA em Brasilia (1/08/2008), sobre conversa do Embaixador Sobel com Embaixador da China, Chen Duqing (neste link):
08BRASILIA48
136585 1/8/2008 13:01 08BRASILIA48 Embassy Brasilia CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03
BRASILIA 000048
SIPDIS
SIPDIS E FOR TOM PIERCE; EPSC FOR LISA KUBISKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018
TAGS: ETRD, EINV, PREL, BR, CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HIS PRIORITIES, BRAZILIAN ASPIRATIONS
REF: A. STATE 164790
B. SAO PAULO 718
C. BRASILIA 918
D. RIO DE JANEIRO 598
E. BRASILIA 990
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Summary. Chen Duqing, Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, told Ambassador Sobel on October 19 that his top priorities are to create a more favorable environment for economic relations and to promote Chinese interests in the Brazilian Congress. Ambassador Chen described an economic relationship of growing bilateral trade and investment characterized by an unbalanced exchange of finished industrial goods from China for Brazilian raw materials, and said Brazilian political international ambitions exceed Brazil’s political weight. End summary.
2. (C) Chen told Ambassador Sobel that he travels extensively throughout Brazil in pursuit of his top priority of creating favorable conditions to increase the trade relationship, mainly to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, but also to northern states such as Para. He is increasing his ability to pursue his other top priority by adding a counselor to his staff to work full-time on congressional engagement.
“Brazil Must Open Its Mind More” – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -
3. (C) Sino-Brazilian relations are getting to be quite good, he explained, even if the only important Chinese visitor this year was the then-Deputy Foreign Minister (now Foreign Minister). But an outdated view of the Chinese political system blurs Brazil’s perception of China and “Brazil must open its mind more,” he said. The Chinese Communist Party was now taking historic steps at its National Congress, as President Hu noted when he said that China must be more open, and Brazil needed to understand this change, Chen stated. (Note: The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China took place October 15-21, 2007. End note.)
Trade and Investment – - – - – - – - – - -
4. (C) China would soon pass Argentina and Germany to become Brazil’s number two trading partner, after the U.S., Chen noted, offering a figure of two-way Chinese trade with Brazil at USD 20 billion in 2006. (Note: Chinese Foreign Ministry officials cited the same bilateral trade figure at the U.S.-China Sub-Dialogue on Latin America in late November, as reported ref A. According to the Sao Paulo State Federation of Industries, total bilateral trade in 2006 was USD 16.4 billion, as reported ref B. End note.) China’s exports to Brazil are mainly finished goods, especially electronics; Ambassador Chen said Brazil complains of dumping, but Chen added that “this is part of our process of increasing our relationship,” implying Brazilian dumping accusations are a natural part of a growing trade relationship.
5. (C) Brazil’s top exports to China are soy and iron ore. Seventy million tons of iron ore and 11 million tons of soy a year go to China, according to Chen, and China always runs a trade deficit with Brazil, now at about USD 4 billion a year. (Note: China buys about a third of Brazil’s iron ore exports, introducing “an obvious vulnerability” for Brazil, according to the November 2007 issue of Brazil Focus, published by Menas Associates, www.menas.co.uk. Ref C reported Brazilian mining executives’ concerns about China’s influence over Latin American natural resources. End note.)
BRASILIA 00000048 002 OF 003
Chen said that if you calculate undercounting on the Brazilian side the deficit is even greater. His principal concern about the economic relationship is that “Brazil has not consolidated its basis for more development” because “without more economic growth, it will not achieve greater income distribution.” He noted Brazil’s poor infrastructure, calling Santos the “world’s worst port,” and said China is interested in railroad projects in Brazil. Chen said Brazilian bureaucracy is “confused” and has no model, in comparison with China’s, where top bureaucrats must go through the Central Committee Party School.
Major Steel Investment – - – - – - – - – - – -
6. (C) Chen told Ambassador Sobel that China had signed a major joint venture agreement on October 3 with the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD, now “Vale”) to construct a steel plant in Vitoria, Espirito Santo, making China a majority partner in the Companhia Siderurgica de Vitoria (CSV) with an investment of USD 5.5 billion (ref D). Chen said China would like to make more such investments, but there is political resistance in some circles in Brazil. (Note: Ref E reported Brazilian fears of China. Nonetheless, Brazilian leaders continue to court Chinese investment. Bahia governor Jaques Wagner led a trade mission November 15-25 to China in search of investment in tourism, ports, railroads, mining, ethanol, and semiconductors. Also in November, Amazonas Governor Eduardo Braga and a large entourage embarked on a 20-day Asian trade and investment mission to Japan, China (including Macau), Malaysia, and Indonesia. A Chinese trade and investment mission to Amazonas in 2008 was announced during Braga’s visit to China. End note.) In the northeast of Brazil, for example, Chen continued, there are many opportunities, but China will limit itself to equipment sales. Moreover, in spite of the large size of many Brazilian firms, there is little money for equipment purchases and Brazilian importation of Chinese goods became somewhat more difficult after China increased the exchange rate value of its currency 8.27 percent, he noted. China cannot revalue its currency as fast as the U.S. would like because it will produce a negative impact on the Chinese economy, Chen added.
7. (SBU) China’s domestic steel production accounts for the majority of China’s needs, but China must import certain specialized steels. The trade with Brazil has not grown in the last 20 years and remains at about 30 million dollars a year, according to Chen. (Note: According to the Brazilian Institute of Steel, 2006 Brazilian exports of steel and steel products to China were USD 52.7 million (66,628 metric tons) and have dropped significantly since 2005. Conversely, Brazilian imports of Chinese steel have increased from USD 27.5 million in 2005 to USD 92.7 million in 2006. End note.)
Biofuels – - – - -
8. (SBU) Asked about Chinese interest in Brazilian biofuels, Chen replied that China produces its own biofuel and does not buy any fuels from Brazil, only some heavy oil.
Brazilian Leadership Aspirations – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -
9. (C) Ambassador Chen said he has observed the growth in the U.S.-Brazilian bilateral relationship over the last year, and understands that Brazil wants to be a leader, but it has “no capacity or influence.” Chen dismissed Brazil’s UN Security Council aspirations, saying it is not qualified, and is “interested in only some areas, and not in peace and security.”
BRASILIA 00000048 003 OF 003
Biographical notes – - – - – - – - – -
10. (SBU) Ambassador Chen said he has never been on an official visit to the U.S. and has spent most of his career in lusophone assignments. He began his career in Brazil in 1974, and returned in the period 1981-84. He was Ambassador in Mozambique, and came to Brazil after a year and a half assignment in East Timor. He said he is 60 years old, can retire at any time, and will finish his career in Brazil. He speaks English. Sobel
A matéria abaixo (e o telegrama transcrito) sobre opiniões de um ex-embaixador da China no Brasil sobre nosso pequeno peso internacional apenas confirma, de modo mais explícito, o que já se sabia: a China não pretende apoiar o Brasil em sua pretensão de ocupar uma cadeira permanente no CSNU. Este nem é o problema principal, pois a China não pretende ampliar o CSNU para ninguém, pois isso diminuiria relativamente seu próprio peso internacional. Se trata, obviamente, de uma posição conservadora, como é, geralmente a das grandes potências (apenas quando elas não conseguem mais pagar a conta, como parece ser o caso dos EUA, atualmente, elas pretendem que outros o façam), e no caso da China, ela pouco se preocupa com a estabilidade do sistema internacional, e não pretende assumir um papel que a engaje mais de perto com certas responsabilidades "imperiais", digamos assim.
No caso do Brasil, porém, ela apenas explicita o que pensam de nós muitos imperiais e outros menos imperiais: não temos peso, ainda.
Pois é, parece que a solução mesmo é: cresça e apareça, mas isso não depende do mundo. Depende de nós mesmos, ou seja de reformas internas e de crescimento econômico e militar. A China só é o que é, hoje, por se tratar, de fato, de uma grande potência (já era antes, mas decaiu durante dois séculos), que cresceu enormemente nas últimas três décadas e vem se afirmando cada vez mais nos planos econômico e financeiro. Falta se afirmar no plano militar, mas isso assusta muita gente...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
A) Matéria da Agência A Pública, sobre telegrama Wikileaks, sobre relações China-Brazil (neste link):
WIKILEAKS: China pensa que Brasil não tem “capacidade” para ser líder
Por João Peres, especial para a Pública, June 29th, 2011
Telegramas revelam conversa entre embaixadores da China e dos Estados Unidos na qual se pondera que o Brasil tampouco está qualificado para um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança da ONU
Segundo o ex-embaixador chinês no Brasil, a China acredita que o Brasil não tem “capacidade e influência” para ser líder e que as ambições do país excedem seu verdadeiro peso no cenário internacional. Telegramas de agosto de 2008 obtidos pelo Wikileaks mostram a conversa de Chen Duqing, que ficou no cargo até 2009, com o ex-embaixador dos Estados Unidos, Clifford Sobel.
Àquela ocasião, Duqing manifestou a Sobel que o Brasil não estaria qualificado para suas aspirações de ocupar um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) e estava “interessado apenas em algumas áreas, e não em paz ou em segurança”.
Para Paulo Vizentini, professor de Relações Internacionais da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), é preciso fazer a ressalva que a afirmação foi feita em 2008, começo da grande crise financeira que catalisaria as mudanças no quadro geopolítico internacional – e o Brasil ganhou força. Porém, admite ele, “o Brasil demonstra uma série de fragilidades quanto a seu projeto. Não temos um pacto de poder mínimo que assegure uma agenda comum que sobreviva a mudanças de governos”.
Conselho de Segurança
Em outro telegrama, os Estados Unidos ponderavam que a principal relutância chinesa quanto à reforma no Conselho de Segurança dizia respeito à possível entrada do Japão no conselho. Para os diplomatas, se a China apoiasse o Brasil em seu antigo anseio por uma inserção mais profunda no principal organismo multilateral, estaria por tabela beneficiando os rivais asiáticos. “Pode haver uma manobra chinesa no sentido de não deixar ninguém entrar. É fato que a China tem ficado incomodada com a reaproximação entre Japão e Estados Unidos”, pondera o professor.
A questão foi parcialmente alterada este ano, quando, em viagem a Pequim, a presidenta Dilma Rousseff conseguiu a inclusão, no comunicado bilateral, do apoio chinês a uma reforma no Conselho de Segurança para incluir nações emergentes. Falta obter, por parte da China, dos Estados Unidos e da própria ONU, uma defesa enfática do direito do Brasil de ingressar no órgão multilateral mais importante do mundo.
No campo interno, o embaixador chinês criticava os problemas de infraestrutura, classificando o porto de Santos como “o pior do mundo”. Ele apontou na conversa com Sobel que a burocracia nacional é muito confusa e que há uma sobreposição de funções. Para Duqing, merece especial atenção o fato de o Brasil não ter consolidado suas bases para dar conta de um desenvolvimento prolongado, indicando que, sem mais crescimento econômico, não se consolidará a meta de reduzir a desigualdade social.
Parceiro importante, parceiro ocasional
Em diversos telegramas, os diplomatas estadunidenses avaliam que o Brasil vê a China como um aliado fundamental, mas advertem que a relação não é marcada por reciprocidade. “O governo Lula considera a China um parceiro para contrabalancear a influência de nações mais ricas em instituições multilaterais”, anota a então embaixadora, Donna Hrinak, em despacho de 14 de maio de 2004 no qual resume, em poucas palavras, a tônica desta relação bilateral: “Para o Brasil, mesmo um casamento de conveniência é preferível a um eterno encontro”.
Naquele momento, chamava atenção a viagem que o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva havia realizado à nação asiática acompanhado por uma enorme delegação de 400 empresários. Os telegramas indicavam que a relação era desigual em termos de trocas comerciais, com envio de commodities brasileiras em troca de produtos industriais chineses.
Dados divulgados em abril pelo Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea) constatam que a desigualdade se aprofundou, e atualmente 86% da exportação brasileira ao parceiro é baseada em produtos primários.
Desconfianças de parte a parte
“Este é um grupo muito heterogêneo de países com diferentes metas”, anotava em 19 de fevereiro de 2010 o subsecretário-geral de política do Itamaraty, Roberto Jaguaribe, em conversa com o embaixador Thomas Shannon, na qual confirmava que a China não queria que o BRIC se transformasse em porta-voz das nações em desenvolvimento.
Na mesma conversa, o diplomata estadunidense demonstrava surpresa com a rapidez com que a China se engajou em negócios na América do Sul, passando de um envolvimento meramente econômico a uma relação política que se aprofundava constantemente. “China será uma forte concorrente, para os Estados Unidos e para o Brasil”, advertia Shannon, segundo telegrama de 22 de abril de 2008.
Os documentos são parte de 2.500 relatórios diplomáticos referentes ao Brasil ainda inéditos, que foram analisados por 15 jornalistas independentes e estão sendo publicados nesta semana pela agência Pública.
Esse posts foi publicado em Wednesday, June 29th, 2011 at 3:13 pm. Está arquivado como +. Você pode acompanhar quaisquer respostas a esse post através do RSS feed.
===========
B) Telegrama da Embaixada dos EUA em Brasilia (1/08/2008), sobre conversa do Embaixador Sobel com Embaixador da China, Chen Duqing (neste link):
08BRASILIA48
136585 1/8/2008 13:01 08BRASILIA48 Embassy Brasilia CONFIDENTIAL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03
BRASILIA 000048
SIPDIS
SIPDIS E FOR TOM PIERCE; EPSC FOR LISA KUBISKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2018
TAGS: ETRD, EINV, PREL, BR, CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HIS PRIORITIES, BRAZILIAN ASPIRATIONS
REF: A. STATE 164790
B. SAO PAULO 718
C. BRASILIA 918
D. RIO DE JANEIRO 598
E. BRASILIA 990
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Summary. Chen Duqing, Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, told Ambassador Sobel on October 19 that his top priorities are to create a more favorable environment for economic relations and to promote Chinese interests in the Brazilian Congress. Ambassador Chen described an economic relationship of growing bilateral trade and investment characterized by an unbalanced exchange of finished industrial goods from China for Brazilian raw materials, and said Brazilian political international ambitions exceed Brazil’s political weight. End summary.
2. (C) Chen told Ambassador Sobel that he travels extensively throughout Brazil in pursuit of his top priority of creating favorable conditions to increase the trade relationship, mainly to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, but also to northern states such as Para. He is increasing his ability to pursue his other top priority by adding a counselor to his staff to work full-time on congressional engagement.
“Brazil Must Open Its Mind More” – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -
3. (C) Sino-Brazilian relations are getting to be quite good, he explained, even if the only important Chinese visitor this year was the then-Deputy Foreign Minister (now Foreign Minister). But an outdated view of the Chinese political system blurs Brazil’s perception of China and “Brazil must open its mind more,” he said. The Chinese Communist Party was now taking historic steps at its National Congress, as President Hu noted when he said that China must be more open, and Brazil needed to understand this change, Chen stated. (Note: The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China took place October 15-21, 2007. End note.)
Trade and Investment – - – - – - – - – - -
4. (C) China would soon pass Argentina and Germany to become Brazil’s number two trading partner, after the U.S., Chen noted, offering a figure of two-way Chinese trade with Brazil at USD 20 billion in 2006. (Note: Chinese Foreign Ministry officials cited the same bilateral trade figure at the U.S.-China Sub-Dialogue on Latin America in late November, as reported ref A. According to the Sao Paulo State Federation of Industries, total bilateral trade in 2006 was USD 16.4 billion, as reported ref B. End note.) China’s exports to Brazil are mainly finished goods, especially electronics; Ambassador Chen said Brazil complains of dumping, but Chen added that “this is part of our process of increasing our relationship,” implying Brazilian dumping accusations are a natural part of a growing trade relationship.
5. (C) Brazil’s top exports to China are soy and iron ore. Seventy million tons of iron ore and 11 million tons of soy a year go to China, according to Chen, and China always runs a trade deficit with Brazil, now at about USD 4 billion a year. (Note: China buys about a third of Brazil’s iron ore exports, introducing “an obvious vulnerability” for Brazil, according to the November 2007 issue of Brazil Focus, published by Menas Associates, www.menas.co.uk. Ref C reported Brazilian mining executives’ concerns about China’s influence over Latin American natural resources. End note.)
BRASILIA 00000048 002 OF 003
Chen said that if you calculate undercounting on the Brazilian side the deficit is even greater. His principal concern about the economic relationship is that “Brazil has not consolidated its basis for more development” because “without more economic growth, it will not achieve greater income distribution.” He noted Brazil’s poor infrastructure, calling Santos the “world’s worst port,” and said China is interested in railroad projects in Brazil. Chen said Brazilian bureaucracy is “confused” and has no model, in comparison with China’s, where top bureaucrats must go through the Central Committee Party School.
Major Steel Investment – - – - – - – - – - – -
6. (C) Chen told Ambassador Sobel that China had signed a major joint venture agreement on October 3 with the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD, now “Vale”) to construct a steel plant in Vitoria, Espirito Santo, making China a majority partner in the Companhia Siderurgica de Vitoria (CSV) with an investment of USD 5.5 billion (ref D). Chen said China would like to make more such investments, but there is political resistance in some circles in Brazil. (Note: Ref E reported Brazilian fears of China. Nonetheless, Brazilian leaders continue to court Chinese investment. Bahia governor Jaques Wagner led a trade mission November 15-25 to China in search of investment in tourism, ports, railroads, mining, ethanol, and semiconductors. Also in November, Amazonas Governor Eduardo Braga and a large entourage embarked on a 20-day Asian trade and investment mission to Japan, China (including Macau), Malaysia, and Indonesia. A Chinese trade and investment mission to Amazonas in 2008 was announced during Braga’s visit to China. End note.) In the northeast of Brazil, for example, Chen continued, there are many opportunities, but China will limit itself to equipment sales. Moreover, in spite of the large size of many Brazilian firms, there is little money for equipment purchases and Brazilian importation of Chinese goods became somewhat more difficult after China increased the exchange rate value of its currency 8.27 percent, he noted. China cannot revalue its currency as fast as the U.S. would like because it will produce a negative impact on the Chinese economy, Chen added.
7. (SBU) China’s domestic steel production accounts for the majority of China’s needs, but China must import certain specialized steels. The trade with Brazil has not grown in the last 20 years and remains at about 30 million dollars a year, according to Chen. (Note: According to the Brazilian Institute of Steel, 2006 Brazilian exports of steel and steel products to China were USD 52.7 million (66,628 metric tons) and have dropped significantly since 2005. Conversely, Brazilian imports of Chinese steel have increased from USD 27.5 million in 2005 to USD 92.7 million in 2006. End note.)
Biofuels – - – - -
8. (SBU) Asked about Chinese interest in Brazilian biofuels, Chen replied that China produces its own biofuel and does not buy any fuels from Brazil, only some heavy oil.
Brazilian Leadership Aspirations – - – - – - – - – - – - – - – - -
9. (C) Ambassador Chen said he has observed the growth in the U.S.-Brazilian bilateral relationship over the last year, and understands that Brazil wants to be a leader, but it has “no capacity or influence.” Chen dismissed Brazil’s UN Security Council aspirations, saying it is not qualified, and is “interested in only some areas, and not in peace and security.”
BRASILIA 00000048 003 OF 003
Biographical notes – - – - – - – - – -
10. (SBU) Ambassador Chen said he has never been on an official visit to the U.S. and has spent most of his career in lusophone assignments. He began his career in Brazil in 1974, and returned in the period 1981-84. He was Ambassador in Mozambique, and came to Brazil after a year and a half assignment in East Timor. He said he is 60 years old, can retire at any time, and will finish his career in Brazil. He speaks English. Sobel
quarta-feira, 9 de março de 2011
Wikileaks Brasil-EUA: panorama eleitoral brasileiro um ano antes das eleicoes de 2010
Um telegrama que revela o estado da compreensão, se o termo se aplica, da oposição brasileira ao governo do PT em conversa com enviado americano. Até aquele momento, Serra, que ainda não se tinha declarado candidato (ele só o fez em março de 2010) tinha a preferência dos eleitores. De todo modo, a conversa reincidiu em obviedades políticas que não trazem, naquele momento ou agora, nada de novo sobre o que já se sabia na época ou agora sobre o processo político eleitoral, fortemente dominado pela personalidade do presidente carismático.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
WikiLeaks
Cenário eleitoral no Brasil em dezembro de 2009
241953/ 12/29/2009/ 16:5309 SAOPAULO667/ Consulate Sao Paulo/ CONFIDENTIAL
Excertos dos itens “confidenciais” do telegrama 09SAOPAULO667.
ASSUNTO: Em São Paulo, líderes políticos expõem preocupações sobre o governo do Brasil ao Secretário Assistente para o Hemisfério Ocidental do Governo dos EUA Arturo Valenzuela
1. (C) RESUMO: No trecho final de sua visita de uma semana ao Cone Sul, o Secretário Assistente para o Hemisfério Ocidental do Governo dos EUA Arturo Valenzuela encontrou-se com figuras expressivas da política local e observadores econômicos em São Paulo, os quais manifestaram preocupações com a política externa do Brasil, gastos públicos e manobras políticas com vistas às eleições de outubro de 2010. Em encontro posterior, privado, com AV [Arturo Valenzuela], o governador de São Paulo, que está na dianteira das pesquisas de intenção de voto Jose Serra alertou para o fato de que a radicalização e a corrupção crescem no Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), no governo e sugeriu que, como presidente, conduzirá política exterior mais afinada com os EUA. FIM DO RESUMO.
Em Sao Paulo, observadores políticos e econômicos
2. (C) Concluindo sua visita à região com rápida passagem por SP no sábado, dia 18/12, Arturo Valenzuela participou de almoço oferecido pelo Cônsulo Geral e nove especialistas e observadores políticos e econômicos, entre os quais o ex-ministro de Relações Exteriores Celso Lafer, o ex-embaixador do Brasil nos EUA Rubens Barbosa, e o ex-ministro de Ciência e Tecnologia Jose Goldemberg. Valenzuela apresentou panorama genérico de sua viagem e destacou a alta prioridade que o governo dos EUA dá ao relacionamento bilateral. Identificou a cooperação com o Brasil em questões regionais, inclusive Honduras, como tendo “importância crítica”.
3. (C) Todos os convidados brasileiros criticaram a política exterior do governo Lula, manifestaram preocupações sobre a crescente radicalização do Partido dos Trabalhadores e destacaram a deterioração das contas públicas. O ex-ministro RE descreveu a posição do Brasil em relação ao Irã como “o pior erro” da política exterior de Lula. O embaixador Barbosa citou o papel do Brasil em Honduras como grande fracasso. Todos criticaram a atenção que o Brasil está dando em questões internacionais com as quais o Brasil pouco tem a ver e nada a fazer (Irã, conflito Israel-palestinos, Honduras etc.), ao mesmo tempo em que se ignoram questões mais próximas, inclusive as relações com o Mercosul.
4. (C) Roberto Teixeira da Costa, vice-presidente da empresa Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) e o professor Goldemberg questionaram especialmente o interesse no Irã, dado o pequeno volume de negócios e pobres perspectivas comerciais e a improbabilidade de qualquer cooperação nuclear. [NOTA: Em conversa particular com o encarregado, Goldemberg, que também é renomado físico nuclear, disse que o Brasil nada tem a oferecer ao Irã, no campo dos combustíveis nucleares, dado que o Irã está muito a frente do Brasil na campacidade para centrifugar. Além disso, registrou que muito apreciou recente advertência da secretária Clinton, sobre países que estejam trabalhando muito próximos do Irã. E que o Brasil deveria levar mais a sério aquela advertência. FIM DA NOTA.]
O assessor-secretário Valenzuela destacou que um Irã, cada dia mais isolado, está à caça de qualquer oportunidade, como a que o governo Lula lhe deu, para esconder a ausência de cooperação e a impopularidade na comunidade internacional.
5. (C) No plano doméstico, os participantes brasileiros explicaram a estratégia do PT de tornar as próximas eleições nacionais um referendum para o governo Lula, que será apresentado como avanço em relação do governo de Cardoso. E todos alertaram para a intenção do PT, de conduzir campanha agressiva. Essa via, disseram todos, pode conseguir apresentar Jose Serra como candidato de Cardoso e ajudará a transferir uma parte da popularidade de Lula para Dilma Rousseff – que jamais concorreu a cargo público e até agora tem mostrado pouco carisma como candidata.
O Ombudsman da Folha de Sao Paulo (sic) Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, também presente, destacou que o PT terá força econômica que jamais teve antes, para a campanha eleitoral, depois de oito anos de governo. E o cientista político Bolivar Lamounier disse que um PT cada dia mais radical provavelmente fará campanha negativa contra a oposição. O ombudsman da Folha de Sao Paulo, Lins da Silva, acrescentou que, no caso de o PT não vencer as eleições presidenciais de 2010, com certeza usará a riqueza recém adquirida para trabalha como oposição agressiva.
6. (C) Economicamente, Teixeira da Costa disse que a percepção pública sobre o Brasil estava sendo super otimista e que os mercados despencarão rapidamente, caso a situação internacional se deteriore. Ricardo Sennes, Diretor de negócios internacionais da empresa de consultoria Prospectiva, concordou com a avaliação e disse que as contas públicas estão sob forte e crescente stress. Que a economia brasileira continuava a ser não competitiva no longo prazo, por causa da fraca infraestrutura, alta carga tributária e políticas trabalhistas rígidas. Mas todos concordaram que a forte performance da economia brasileira nos últimos oito anos e a recuperação pós-crise econômica global ajudarão na campanha eleitoral de Dilma Rousseff. Sobre o papel de destaque que o Brasil teve na recente Conferência sobre o Clima, em Conference (COP-15), o professor Goldemberg disse que a performance do presidente Lula foi medíocre. E fez piada, dizendo que o Brasil deixou em Copenhague a impressão de que o Brasil desenvolveu-se muito nas duas últimas semanas. Mas elogiou muito a apresentação da secretária Clinton e disse que os países de ponta deveriam reunir-se em pequenos grupos (não como no G-77) para conseguir fazer avançar questões de financiamento e fiscalização.
O governador de São Paulo, primeiro colocado nas pesquisas eleitorais
7. (C) Em encontro de 90 minutos, privado, no Palácio do Governo, Jose Serra disse praticamente a mesma coisa sobre tendências da política nacional, corrupção crescente, gastos públicos e política externa.
Serra contou ao secretário-assessor Valenzuela que o Partido dos Trabalhadores está fazendo todos os esforços para construir uma base de poder de longo prazo, agora que conseguiu chegar ao governo. Serra alertou que o Brasil está alcançando níveis nunca vistos de corrupção e que o PT e a coalizão que o apóia usam os crescentes gastos públicos para construir uma máquina eleitoral para as próximas eleições. Por isso, e porque seu partido (PSDB), segundo o governador, é partido relativamente mais pobre, Serra não pareceu muito firmemente convencido de que chegará à presidência em outubro de 2010.
8. (C) Além de toda a política doméstica, Serra criticou a política externa do governo Lula e sugeriu que, se eleito, dará ao Brasil direção mais internacionalista. Serra citou Honduras como exemplo específico de fracasso do governo Lula, culpando o governo brasileiro e o presidente Zelaya por não deixarem que se construa solução viável. E falou muito positivamente de seu próprio engajamento, em questões de clima, com o estado da California, como exemplo de oportunidade para trabalho conjunto em questões complexas. Mas, reiterando a posição que tem assumido publicamente, Serra criticou a tarifa que os EUA impuseram ao etanol importado do Brasil, a qual, para ele, seria economicamente ilógica.
9. (C) Sobre o crescente populismo na região, Serra disse que a presidente da Argentina Cristina Kirchner pareceu-lhe “cordial e esperta” e sugeriu que, se o governo dos EUA está preocupado com as políticas populistas de Kirchner, muito mais preocupado ficará com a candidata Dilma Rousseff do PT. Alertou também que as referências que o governo dos EUA tem feito sobre uma “relação especial” com o presidente Lula não soa bem em todos os segmentos no Brasil e pode ser manipulada pelo PT. [COMENTÁRIO: À parte a Argentina, Serra pareceu em geral mal informado ou desinformado sobre recentes desdobramentos no cone sul, inclusive sobre a situação política do presidente Lugo do Paraguai, parecendo imerso, principalmente na política brasileira provinciana. FIM DO COMENTÁRIO.]
No final, Serra disse que está trabalhando em vários artigos para jornal, nos quais articulará suas críticas à política externa do governo Lula, a serem publicados nos próximos meses.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
WikiLeaks
Cenário eleitoral no Brasil em dezembro de 2009
241953/ 12/29/2009/ 16:5309 SAOPAULO667/ Consulate Sao Paulo/ CONFIDENTIAL
Excertos dos itens “confidenciais” do telegrama 09SAOPAULO667.
ASSUNTO: Em São Paulo, líderes políticos expõem preocupações sobre o governo do Brasil ao Secretário Assistente para o Hemisfério Ocidental do Governo dos EUA Arturo Valenzuela
1. (C) RESUMO: No trecho final de sua visita de uma semana ao Cone Sul, o Secretário Assistente para o Hemisfério Ocidental do Governo dos EUA Arturo Valenzuela encontrou-se com figuras expressivas da política local e observadores econômicos em São Paulo, os quais manifestaram preocupações com a política externa do Brasil, gastos públicos e manobras políticas com vistas às eleições de outubro de 2010. Em encontro posterior, privado, com AV [Arturo Valenzuela], o governador de São Paulo, que está na dianteira das pesquisas de intenção de voto Jose Serra alertou para o fato de que a radicalização e a corrupção crescem no Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), no governo e sugeriu que, como presidente, conduzirá política exterior mais afinada com os EUA. FIM DO RESUMO.
Em Sao Paulo, observadores políticos e econômicos
2. (C) Concluindo sua visita à região com rápida passagem por SP no sábado, dia 18/12, Arturo Valenzuela participou de almoço oferecido pelo Cônsulo Geral e nove especialistas e observadores políticos e econômicos, entre os quais o ex-ministro de Relações Exteriores Celso Lafer, o ex-embaixador do Brasil nos EUA Rubens Barbosa, e o ex-ministro de Ciência e Tecnologia Jose Goldemberg. Valenzuela apresentou panorama genérico de sua viagem e destacou a alta prioridade que o governo dos EUA dá ao relacionamento bilateral. Identificou a cooperação com o Brasil em questões regionais, inclusive Honduras, como tendo “importância crítica”.
3. (C) Todos os convidados brasileiros criticaram a política exterior do governo Lula, manifestaram preocupações sobre a crescente radicalização do Partido dos Trabalhadores e destacaram a deterioração das contas públicas. O ex-ministro RE descreveu a posição do Brasil em relação ao Irã como “o pior erro” da política exterior de Lula. O embaixador Barbosa citou o papel do Brasil em Honduras como grande fracasso. Todos criticaram a atenção que o Brasil está dando em questões internacionais com as quais o Brasil pouco tem a ver e nada a fazer (Irã, conflito Israel-palestinos, Honduras etc.), ao mesmo tempo em que se ignoram questões mais próximas, inclusive as relações com o Mercosul.
4. (C) Roberto Teixeira da Costa, vice-presidente da empresa Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) e o professor Goldemberg questionaram especialmente o interesse no Irã, dado o pequeno volume de negócios e pobres perspectivas comerciais e a improbabilidade de qualquer cooperação nuclear. [NOTA: Em conversa particular com o encarregado, Goldemberg, que também é renomado físico nuclear, disse que o Brasil nada tem a oferecer ao Irã, no campo dos combustíveis nucleares, dado que o Irã está muito a frente do Brasil na campacidade para centrifugar. Além disso, registrou que muito apreciou recente advertência da secretária Clinton, sobre países que estejam trabalhando muito próximos do Irã. E que o Brasil deveria levar mais a sério aquela advertência. FIM DA NOTA.]
O assessor-secretário Valenzuela destacou que um Irã, cada dia mais isolado, está à caça de qualquer oportunidade, como a que o governo Lula lhe deu, para esconder a ausência de cooperação e a impopularidade na comunidade internacional.
5. (C) No plano doméstico, os participantes brasileiros explicaram a estratégia do PT de tornar as próximas eleições nacionais um referendum para o governo Lula, que será apresentado como avanço em relação do governo de Cardoso. E todos alertaram para a intenção do PT, de conduzir campanha agressiva. Essa via, disseram todos, pode conseguir apresentar Jose Serra como candidato de Cardoso e ajudará a transferir uma parte da popularidade de Lula para Dilma Rousseff – que jamais concorreu a cargo público e até agora tem mostrado pouco carisma como candidata.
O Ombudsman da Folha de Sao Paulo (sic) Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva, também presente, destacou que o PT terá força econômica que jamais teve antes, para a campanha eleitoral, depois de oito anos de governo. E o cientista político Bolivar Lamounier disse que um PT cada dia mais radical provavelmente fará campanha negativa contra a oposição. O ombudsman da Folha de Sao Paulo, Lins da Silva, acrescentou que, no caso de o PT não vencer as eleições presidenciais de 2010, com certeza usará a riqueza recém adquirida para trabalha como oposição agressiva.
6. (C) Economicamente, Teixeira da Costa disse que a percepção pública sobre o Brasil estava sendo super otimista e que os mercados despencarão rapidamente, caso a situação internacional se deteriore. Ricardo Sennes, Diretor de negócios internacionais da empresa de consultoria Prospectiva, concordou com a avaliação e disse que as contas públicas estão sob forte e crescente stress. Que a economia brasileira continuava a ser não competitiva no longo prazo, por causa da fraca infraestrutura, alta carga tributária e políticas trabalhistas rígidas. Mas todos concordaram que a forte performance da economia brasileira nos últimos oito anos e a recuperação pós-crise econômica global ajudarão na campanha eleitoral de Dilma Rousseff. Sobre o papel de destaque que o Brasil teve na recente Conferência sobre o Clima, em Conference (COP-15), o professor Goldemberg disse que a performance do presidente Lula foi medíocre. E fez piada, dizendo que o Brasil deixou em Copenhague a impressão de que o Brasil desenvolveu-se muito nas duas últimas semanas. Mas elogiou muito a apresentação da secretária Clinton e disse que os países de ponta deveriam reunir-se em pequenos grupos (não como no G-77) para conseguir fazer avançar questões de financiamento e fiscalização.
O governador de São Paulo, primeiro colocado nas pesquisas eleitorais
7. (C) Em encontro de 90 minutos, privado, no Palácio do Governo, Jose Serra disse praticamente a mesma coisa sobre tendências da política nacional, corrupção crescente, gastos públicos e política externa.
Serra contou ao secretário-assessor Valenzuela que o Partido dos Trabalhadores está fazendo todos os esforços para construir uma base de poder de longo prazo, agora que conseguiu chegar ao governo. Serra alertou que o Brasil está alcançando níveis nunca vistos de corrupção e que o PT e a coalizão que o apóia usam os crescentes gastos públicos para construir uma máquina eleitoral para as próximas eleições. Por isso, e porque seu partido (PSDB), segundo o governador, é partido relativamente mais pobre, Serra não pareceu muito firmemente convencido de que chegará à presidência em outubro de 2010.
8. (C) Além de toda a política doméstica, Serra criticou a política externa do governo Lula e sugeriu que, se eleito, dará ao Brasil direção mais internacionalista. Serra citou Honduras como exemplo específico de fracasso do governo Lula, culpando o governo brasileiro e o presidente Zelaya por não deixarem que se construa solução viável. E falou muito positivamente de seu próprio engajamento, em questões de clima, com o estado da California, como exemplo de oportunidade para trabalho conjunto em questões complexas. Mas, reiterando a posição que tem assumido publicamente, Serra criticou a tarifa que os EUA impuseram ao etanol importado do Brasil, a qual, para ele, seria economicamente ilógica.
9. (C) Sobre o crescente populismo na região, Serra disse que a presidente da Argentina Cristina Kirchner pareceu-lhe “cordial e esperta” e sugeriu que, se o governo dos EUA está preocupado com as políticas populistas de Kirchner, muito mais preocupado ficará com a candidata Dilma Rousseff do PT. Alertou também que as referências que o governo dos EUA tem feito sobre uma “relação especial” com o presidente Lula não soa bem em todos os segmentos no Brasil e pode ser manipulada pelo PT. [COMENTÁRIO: À parte a Argentina, Serra pareceu em geral mal informado ou desinformado sobre recentes desdobramentos no cone sul, inclusive sobre a situação política do presidente Lugo do Paraguai, parecendo imerso, principalmente na política brasileira provinciana. FIM DO COMENTÁRIO.]
No final, Serra disse que está trabalhando em vários artigos para jornal, nos quais articulará suas críticas à política externa do governo Lula, a serem publicados nos próximos meses.
terça-feira, 8 de março de 2011
Mercosul anti-americano?: no que depender do Chavez...
Mas não só dele. Muitas outras pessoas, que negavam de público (e vão continuar negando), alimentavam esse anti-americanismo infantil e basicamente estúpido, de querer sair da "dependência comercial americana", como se comércio fosse algo espúrio...
Wikileaks traz críticas dos EUA ao Mercosul
Estado de S.Pauoo, 7/03/2011
O jornal portenho “Página 12″ divulgou hoje o conteúdo de telegramas do Departamento de Estado dos EUA que indicavam que em 2007 o governo do então presidente George W. Bush considerava que “a entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul altera claramente o balanço e a dinâmica da organização”. Segundo os telegramas, filtrados pela Wikileaks, Washington considerava o bloco comercial do Cone Sul uma organização de oposição pertinaz aos Estados Unidos: “o Mercosul gradualmente foi transformando-se de uma união alfandegária imperfeita em uma organização mais restritiva e antiamericana”.
Na época, a Venezuela – governada pelo presidente Hugo Chávez – estava tentando ser aceita como sócia plena do Mercosul. Apesar da aprovação dos parlamentos do Uruguai e da Argentina, encontrava resistências nos Senados brasileiro e paraguaio (o senado brasileiro aprovou a entrada da Venezuela em 2009, enquanto que o Paraguai ainda não debateu o pedido de inclusão do país caribenho, devido à resistência da oposição e de parte do bloco governista).
As definições dos EUA sobre o Mercosul foram emitidas durante uma série de reuniões que foram realizadas nos dias 8 e 9 de maio de 2007 no Rio de Janeiro pelos embaixadores americanos no Brasil, Uruguai, Argentina, Paraguai e Chile. O telegrama, classificado como “secreto” no dia 17 de maio de 2007 por Michael J. Fitzpatrick, da embaixada dos EUA na capital paraguaia, Assunção, leva o título de “Conferência: uma perspectiva do Cone Sul sob a influência de Chávez”.
Segundo os telegramas filtrados pela Wikileaks e publicados pelo “Página 12″, os embaixadores americanos concluíram no final da reunião que “a campanha de Chávez para expandir sua influência no Cone Sul é multifacética e está apoiada em grande parte – mas não totalmente – em uma generosa assistência energética e acordos de investimento”. Os diplomatas consideraram que “poucos países provaram que foram capazes de resistir ao atrativo da ajuda venezuelana e seus pacotes de investimento”.
Os telegramas indicam que os embaixadores consideraram necessário pedir “mais ferramentas e recursos” para enfrentar o que denominaram de “esforços políticos para fissurar a democracia, planejar estratégias econômicas para estrangular o livre comércio, a politização do Mercosul e a expansão dos laços da área de defesa”.
O então presidente Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), falecido em outubro do ano passado, passou pelo crivo analítico dos diplomatas. “Embora Kirchner compartilhe algumas posturas esquerdistas de Chávez, ele é um pragmático”, sustentaram. O governo da presidente Cristina Kirchner, que estava em pleno feriado de carnaval, não fez declarações oficiais sobre o conteúdo dos telegramas filtrados pela Wikileaks.
Wikileaks traz críticas dos EUA ao Mercosul
Estado de S.Pauoo, 7/03/2011
O jornal portenho “Página 12″ divulgou hoje o conteúdo de telegramas do Departamento de Estado dos EUA que indicavam que em 2007 o governo do então presidente George W. Bush considerava que “a entrada da Venezuela no Mercosul altera claramente o balanço e a dinâmica da organização”. Segundo os telegramas, filtrados pela Wikileaks, Washington considerava o bloco comercial do Cone Sul uma organização de oposição pertinaz aos Estados Unidos: “o Mercosul gradualmente foi transformando-se de uma união alfandegária imperfeita em uma organização mais restritiva e antiamericana”.
Na época, a Venezuela – governada pelo presidente Hugo Chávez – estava tentando ser aceita como sócia plena do Mercosul. Apesar da aprovação dos parlamentos do Uruguai e da Argentina, encontrava resistências nos Senados brasileiro e paraguaio (o senado brasileiro aprovou a entrada da Venezuela em 2009, enquanto que o Paraguai ainda não debateu o pedido de inclusão do país caribenho, devido à resistência da oposição e de parte do bloco governista).
As definições dos EUA sobre o Mercosul foram emitidas durante uma série de reuniões que foram realizadas nos dias 8 e 9 de maio de 2007 no Rio de Janeiro pelos embaixadores americanos no Brasil, Uruguai, Argentina, Paraguai e Chile. O telegrama, classificado como “secreto” no dia 17 de maio de 2007 por Michael J. Fitzpatrick, da embaixada dos EUA na capital paraguaia, Assunção, leva o título de “Conferência: uma perspectiva do Cone Sul sob a influência de Chávez”.
Segundo os telegramas filtrados pela Wikileaks e publicados pelo “Página 12″, os embaixadores americanos concluíram no final da reunião que “a campanha de Chávez para expandir sua influência no Cone Sul é multifacética e está apoiada em grande parte – mas não totalmente – em uma generosa assistência energética e acordos de investimento”. Os diplomatas consideraram que “poucos países provaram que foram capazes de resistir ao atrativo da ajuda venezuelana e seus pacotes de investimento”.
Os telegramas indicam que os embaixadores consideraram necessário pedir “mais ferramentas e recursos” para enfrentar o que denominaram de “esforços políticos para fissurar a democracia, planejar estratégias econômicas para estrangular o livre comércio, a politização do Mercosul e a expansão dos laços da área de defesa”.
O então presidente Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), falecido em outubro do ano passado, passou pelo crivo analítico dos diplomatas. “Embora Kirchner compartilhe algumas posturas esquerdistas de Chávez, ele é um pragmático”, sustentaram. O governo da presidente Cristina Kirchner, que estava em pleno feriado de carnaval, não fez declarações oficiais sobre o conteúdo dos telegramas filtrados pela Wikileaks.
quarta-feira, 23 de fevereiro de 2011
Direitos Humanos: varios pesos e muitas medidas (as vezes, nenhuma...)
Pois é, sempre é assim: o Império, que tem seus próprios "SOBs", que eles protegem quando lhes servem, ou quando servem a seus interesses de segurança -- aqui incluídas algumas ditaduras detestáveis -- e que só introduzem moções políticas no Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, se permite criticar este país que andava lendo tendo seus rompantes de hipocrisia -- maiores do que de costume -- nessa questão de direitos humanos.
O Brasil poderia dizer que os EUA não olham o seu próprio rabo, mas sempre se pode dizer, também, que fazemos ou deixamos de fazer coisas, no plano das relações internacionais, não para contentar ou desagradar alguém, ou outro país, mas em função de nossos próprios valores e princípios.
Parece que os valores e princípios, até pouco tempo atrás, eram, infelizmente, os de ser amigo e até aliado desses ditadorezinhos de opereta, apenas porque eles são -- alguns já eram -- supostamente não-hegemônicos e anti-imperialistas. Não há maneira mais cínica de fazer política externa...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
WikiLeaks: EUA criticam hipocrisia do Brasil sobre direitos humanos
Yahoo notícias, 23/02/2011
BRASÍLIA - As relações comerciais e a perspectiva de conquistar um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas levam o Brasil a adotar uma postura ambígua, que chega a ser hipócrita, nas discussões multilaterais sobre a promoção dos direitos humanos. Essa avaliação pontua os relatos a Washington da diplomacia americana em Brasília, segundo telegramas divulgados pelo site WikiLeaks. Para os EUA, o Brasil tem um retrospecto de violações, especialmente no que diz respeito ao trabalho escravo e às condições precárias dos presídios.
Em mensagem confidencial, enviada em 11 de julho de 2008, a conselheira Lisa Kubiske resume a visão americana sobre os votos do Brasil nos fóruns internacionais de direitos humanos:
”Moralidade é uma faca de dois gumes para a política brasileira em razão da clara hipocrisia quando esta firmemente rejeita a condenação de estados que violam os direitos humanos, se estes países podem prover um apoio tangível aos interesses do Brasil”.
Os americanos destacam que o Brasil não encontrou problemas em condenar violações no Turcomenistão, mas é reticente a condenar no Irã ou na China, parceiros durante o governo Lula.
O Brasil poderia dizer que os EUA não olham o seu próprio rabo, mas sempre se pode dizer, também, que fazemos ou deixamos de fazer coisas, no plano das relações internacionais, não para contentar ou desagradar alguém, ou outro país, mas em função de nossos próprios valores e princípios.
Parece que os valores e princípios, até pouco tempo atrás, eram, infelizmente, os de ser amigo e até aliado desses ditadorezinhos de opereta, apenas porque eles são -- alguns já eram -- supostamente não-hegemônicos e anti-imperialistas. Não há maneira mais cínica de fazer política externa...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
WikiLeaks: EUA criticam hipocrisia do Brasil sobre direitos humanos
Yahoo notícias, 23/02/2011
BRASÍLIA - As relações comerciais e a perspectiva de conquistar um assento permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas levam o Brasil a adotar uma postura ambígua, que chega a ser hipócrita, nas discussões multilaterais sobre a promoção dos direitos humanos. Essa avaliação pontua os relatos a Washington da diplomacia americana em Brasília, segundo telegramas divulgados pelo site WikiLeaks. Para os EUA, o Brasil tem um retrospecto de violações, especialmente no que diz respeito ao trabalho escravo e às condições precárias dos presídios.
Em mensagem confidencial, enviada em 11 de julho de 2008, a conselheira Lisa Kubiske resume a visão americana sobre os votos do Brasil nos fóruns internacionais de direitos humanos:
”Moralidade é uma faca de dois gumes para a política brasileira em razão da clara hipocrisia quando esta firmemente rejeita a condenação de estados que violam os direitos humanos, se estes países podem prover um apoio tangível aos interesses do Brasil”.
Os americanos destacam que o Brasil não encontrou problemas em condenar violações no Turcomenistão, mas é reticente a condenar no Irã ou na China, parceiros durante o governo Lula.
sexta-feira, 18 de fevereiro de 2011
Wikileaks: Brasil-EUA e o resto da regiao: ciumes e subterfugios...
A informação relativa à Colômbia já tinha sido postada aqui. Os demais países é novidade, mas não surpresa, nem novidade. Qualquer observador mais atento já teria percebido que o ativismo lulista, ou brasileiro, despertaria preocupações na região.
O que não se sabia era da atuação do ex-chanceler em favor do Sudão...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Diplomacia de Lula irritou sul-americanos
Jamil Chade, correspondente
O Estado de S.Paulo, 8 de fevereiro de 2011
EUA escutaram de Colômbia, Paraguai e Chile pedidos para ‘conter’ o Brasil, revela WikiLeaks
GENEBRA - Telegramas secretos da diplomacia americana revelam que, sob o governo de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, países sul-americanos se incomodaram com a liderança brasileira e chegaram a pedir a Washington que "contivesse" as ambições do Brasil na região. Os despachos foram divulgados pelo grupo WikiLeaks. Entre os que solicitaram à diplomacia americana que atuasse contra o aumento da influência do Brasil estão Colômbia, Chile e Paraguai.
Em 11 de fevereiro de 2004, numa conversa entre o então presidente da Colômbia, Álvaro Uribe, e uma delegação do alto escalão da diplomacia dos EUA, o incômodo com as ambições de Lula ficou claro. "Uribe disse que sua relação com Lula é complicada", relata o telegrama. O ex-líder de Bogotá e forte aliado de Washington alertou na ocasião para a agenda externa de seu colega brasileiro: "Lula se esforça para construir uma aliança antiamericana na América Latina", teria dito Uribe.
"Lula é mais pragmático e mais inteligente do que (Hugo) Chávez, mas é conduzido por seu histórico de esquerda e pelo ‘espírito imperial’ do Brasil para se opor aos EUA", acusou o ex-presidente colombiano. Em outro trecho, Uribe ainda acusa o presidente brasileiro de não ter cumprido sua promessa de lutar contra o narcotráfico.
Quatro anos mais tarde, as desconfianças em relação a Lula continuariam na Colômbia. Em um telegrama de 2008, o governo americano afirma que foi informado por militares de Bogotá sobre o projeto de criação de um Conselho de Defesa da América do Sul pelo Brasil. "A desconfiança é que seja um projeto, no fundo, de Chávez", teriam alertado os militares.
Em telegrama de 19 de maio de 2005, a então chanceler do Paraguai, Leila Rachid, queixou-se ao embaixador americano em Assunção, Dan Johnson, sobre o comportamento de seu colega brasileiro, Celso Amorim, e sua ideia de convocar uma cúpula entre países árabes e sul-americanos. Johnson, por sua vez, disse que o evento promoveria "gratuitamente tensões entre a comunidade árabe e judaica no Brasil". Ele pediu ainda que, na declaração final, elogios ao Sudão fossem evitados.
"Rachid afirmou que o Brasil teve uma ‘grande disputa’ com vários chanceleres (da América do Sul), incluindo a ministra colombiana (Carolina) Barco e o chileno (Ignacio) Walker, quando Amorim pediu que eles reduzissem as objeções que tinham sobre o Sudão e o processo de paz no Oriente Médio", descreve o embaixador americano.
Rachid diz que gostaria de falar com a secretária de Estado dos EUA, Condoleezza Rice, sobre "preocupações em relação à política externa e comercial do Brasil". "Ela (Rachid) estava preocupada com as ambições do Brasil de se tornar uma voz de liderança na região e pediu que os EUA se posicionassem para conter o Brasil."
O que não se sabia era da atuação do ex-chanceler em favor do Sudão...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Diplomacia de Lula irritou sul-americanos
Jamil Chade, correspondente
O Estado de S.Paulo, 8 de fevereiro de 2011
EUA escutaram de Colômbia, Paraguai e Chile pedidos para ‘conter’ o Brasil, revela WikiLeaks
GENEBRA - Telegramas secretos da diplomacia americana revelam que, sob o governo de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, países sul-americanos se incomodaram com a liderança brasileira e chegaram a pedir a Washington que "contivesse" as ambições do Brasil na região. Os despachos foram divulgados pelo grupo WikiLeaks. Entre os que solicitaram à diplomacia americana que atuasse contra o aumento da influência do Brasil estão Colômbia, Chile e Paraguai.
Em 11 de fevereiro de 2004, numa conversa entre o então presidente da Colômbia, Álvaro Uribe, e uma delegação do alto escalão da diplomacia dos EUA, o incômodo com as ambições de Lula ficou claro. "Uribe disse que sua relação com Lula é complicada", relata o telegrama. O ex-líder de Bogotá e forte aliado de Washington alertou na ocasião para a agenda externa de seu colega brasileiro: "Lula se esforça para construir uma aliança antiamericana na América Latina", teria dito Uribe.
"Lula é mais pragmático e mais inteligente do que (Hugo) Chávez, mas é conduzido por seu histórico de esquerda e pelo ‘espírito imperial’ do Brasil para se opor aos EUA", acusou o ex-presidente colombiano. Em outro trecho, Uribe ainda acusa o presidente brasileiro de não ter cumprido sua promessa de lutar contra o narcotráfico.
Quatro anos mais tarde, as desconfianças em relação a Lula continuariam na Colômbia. Em um telegrama de 2008, o governo americano afirma que foi informado por militares de Bogotá sobre o projeto de criação de um Conselho de Defesa da América do Sul pelo Brasil. "A desconfiança é que seja um projeto, no fundo, de Chávez", teriam alertado os militares.
Em telegrama de 19 de maio de 2005, a então chanceler do Paraguai, Leila Rachid, queixou-se ao embaixador americano em Assunção, Dan Johnson, sobre o comportamento de seu colega brasileiro, Celso Amorim, e sua ideia de convocar uma cúpula entre países árabes e sul-americanos. Johnson, por sua vez, disse que o evento promoveria "gratuitamente tensões entre a comunidade árabe e judaica no Brasil". Ele pediu ainda que, na declaração final, elogios ao Sudão fossem evitados.
"Rachid afirmou que o Brasil teve uma ‘grande disputa’ com vários chanceleres (da América do Sul), incluindo a ministra colombiana (Carolina) Barco e o chileno (Ignacio) Walker, quando Amorim pediu que eles reduzissem as objeções que tinham sobre o Sudão e o processo de paz no Oriente Médio", descreve o embaixador americano.
Rachid diz que gostaria de falar com a secretária de Estado dos EUA, Condoleezza Rice, sobre "preocupações em relação à política externa e comercial do Brasil". "Ela (Rachid) estava preocupada com as ambições do Brasil de se tornar uma voz de liderança na região e pediu que os EUA se posicionassem para conter o Brasil."
quinta-feira, 17 de fevereiro de 2011
Wikileaks: Brasil-Colombia-EUA: entre dois imperios...
Wikileaks: Colômbia reclamou com EUA do `espírito imperialista brasileiro`
UOL, Thu, 17 Feb 2011 11:11:33 -0200
Em 15 de dezembro de 2004, entre as 17h30 e 18h (15h30 e 16h em Brasília), o então presidente colombiano Álvaro Uribe participou de uma reunião de alto nível no palácio presidencial com o então subsecretário-adjunto do Departamento de Estado dos Estados Unidos para Assuntos do Hemisfério Ocidental, Charles Shapiro, o subsecretário-adjunto para o combate às drogas Jonathan Farrar e o embaixador norte-americano em Bogotá, William B. Wood, além do diretor de temas andinos, David Henifin.
O fato é relatado em um dos documentos obtidos pelo Wikileaks aos quais esta repórter teve acesso. São despachos da diplomacia norte-americana que tratam das relações entre o Brasil e outros países sul-americanos. Em vários deles, a resistência de algumas nações em relação à influência brasileira é evidente, embora também haja quem a veja com bons olhos e como contraponto aos EUA.
Na época da reunião, Uribe estava há dois anos no cargo e empreendia a política que chamou de “segurança democrática”, para combater os grupos armados que atuam no país. A política, abertamente apoiada pelos EUA, fortaleceu o Exército do país e liberou estradas colombianas antes controladas pelas guerrilhas, empurrando os combatentes das FARC (Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia) e do ELN (Exército de Libertação Nacional) para as montanhas.
O principal tema da reunião foi a ajuda norte-americana na luta contra as FARC. Uribe afirmou, na reunião, que os grupos armados não poderiam resistir mais que cinco anos à pressão militar. O presidente colombiano também se queixou de Hugo Chávez, presidente da Venezuela. A certa altura a conversa chegou ao Brasil.
“Uribe disse que a sua relação com [o então presidente] Lula é complicada pelos esforços de Lula em construir uma aliança anti-EUA na América Latina”, relata o documento. Em seguida, Uribe afirma que o Brasil teria pretensões imperialistas: “Lula é mais prático e inteligente que Chávez, mas é levado pelo seu passado de esquerda e o ‘espírito imperial’ brasileiro a se opor aos EUA”.
O ex-presidente colombiano disse ter pouca influência sobre Lula ou Chávez porque eles o veriam como um amigo dos EUA. Mesmo assim, afirmou que continuaria a pressionar Chávez a tomar ações contra narcotraficantes. Afirmou ainda que Lula não cumpriu suas promessas de lutar contra o narcotráfico.
Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano
Essa não foi a única vez que o alto escalão do governo colombiano reclamou do Brasil com diplomatas norte-americanos. Outro despacho, datado de 9 de maio de 2008, revela a desconfiança do ex-ministro da Defesa colombiano, Juan Manuel Santos (presidente da Colômbia desde junho de 2010) em relação à proposta de criação do Conselho de Defesa Sulamericano (CDS), defendida pelo Brasil.
UOL, Thu, 17 Feb 2011 11:11:33 -0200
Em 15 de dezembro de 2004, entre as 17h30 e 18h (15h30 e 16h em Brasília), o então presidente colombiano Álvaro Uribe participou de uma reunião de alto nível no palácio presidencial com o então subsecretário-adjunto do Departamento de Estado dos Estados Unidos para Assuntos do Hemisfério Ocidental, Charles Shapiro, o subsecretário-adjunto para o combate às drogas Jonathan Farrar e o embaixador norte-americano em Bogotá, William B. Wood, além do diretor de temas andinos, David Henifin.
O fato é relatado em um dos documentos obtidos pelo Wikileaks aos quais esta repórter teve acesso. São despachos da diplomacia norte-americana que tratam das relações entre o Brasil e outros países sul-americanos. Em vários deles, a resistência de algumas nações em relação à influência brasileira é evidente, embora também haja quem a veja com bons olhos e como contraponto aos EUA.
Na época da reunião, Uribe estava há dois anos no cargo e empreendia a política que chamou de “segurança democrática”, para combater os grupos armados que atuam no país. A política, abertamente apoiada pelos EUA, fortaleceu o Exército do país e liberou estradas colombianas antes controladas pelas guerrilhas, empurrando os combatentes das FARC (Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia) e do ELN (Exército de Libertação Nacional) para as montanhas.
O principal tema da reunião foi a ajuda norte-americana na luta contra as FARC. Uribe afirmou, na reunião, que os grupos armados não poderiam resistir mais que cinco anos à pressão militar. O presidente colombiano também se queixou de Hugo Chávez, presidente da Venezuela. A certa altura a conversa chegou ao Brasil.
“Uribe disse que a sua relação com [o então presidente] Lula é complicada pelos esforços de Lula em construir uma aliança anti-EUA na América Latina”, relata o documento. Em seguida, Uribe afirma que o Brasil teria pretensões imperialistas: “Lula é mais prático e inteligente que Chávez, mas é levado pelo seu passado de esquerda e o ‘espírito imperial’ brasileiro a se opor aos EUA”.
O ex-presidente colombiano disse ter pouca influência sobre Lula ou Chávez porque eles o veriam como um amigo dos EUA. Mesmo assim, afirmou que continuaria a pressionar Chávez a tomar ações contra narcotraficantes. Afirmou ainda que Lula não cumpriu suas promessas de lutar contra o narcotráfico.
Conselho de Defesa Sul-Americano
Essa não foi a única vez que o alto escalão do governo colombiano reclamou do Brasil com diplomatas norte-americanos. Outro despacho, datado de 9 de maio de 2008, revela a desconfiança do ex-ministro da Defesa colombiano, Juan Manuel Santos (presidente da Colômbia desde junho de 2010) em relação à proposta de criação do Conselho de Defesa Sulamericano (CDS), defendida pelo Brasil.
sexta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2011
Wikileaks: the history behind
Dealing With Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets
By BILL KELLER
The New York Times Magazine, January 26, 2011
Bill Keller is the executive editor of The New York Times. This essay is adapted from his introduction to “Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War and American Diplomacy: Complete and Expanded Coverage from The New York Times,” an ebook available for purchase at nytimes.com/opensecrets.
E-Book: “Open Secrets”
Purchase an e-book of complete and expanded WikiLeaks coverage from:
nytimes.com/opensecrets
This past June, Alan Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian, phoned me and asked, mysteriously, whether I had any idea how to arrange a secure communication. Not really, I confessed. The Times doesn’t have encrypted phone lines, or a Cone of Silence. Well then, he said, he would try to speak circumspectly. In a roundabout way, he laid out an unusual proposition: an organization called WikiLeaks, a secretive cadre of antisecrecy vigilantes, had come into possession of a substantial amount of classified United States government communications. WikiLeaks’s leader, Julian Assange, an eccentric former computer hacker of Australian birth and no fixed residence, offered The Guardian half a million military dispatches from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. There might be more after that, including an immense bundle of confidential diplomatic cables. The Guardian suggested — to increase the impact as well as to share the labor of handling such a trove — that The New York Times be invited to share this exclusive bounty. The source agreed. Was I interested?
I was interested.
The adventure that ensued over the next six months combined the cloak-and-dagger intrigue of handling a vast secret archive with the more mundane feat of sorting, searching and understanding a mountain of data. As if that were not complicated enough, the project also entailed a source who was elusive, manipulative and volatile (and ultimately openly hostile to The Times and The Guardian); an international cast of journalists; company lawyers committed to keeping us within the bounds of the law; and an array of government officials who sometimes seemed as if they couldn’t decide whether they wanted to engage us or arrest us. By the end of the year, the story of this wholesale security breach had outgrown the story of the actual contents of the secret documents and generated much breathless speculation that something — journalism, diplomacy, life as we know it — had profoundly changed forever.
Soon after Rusbridger’s call, we sent Eric Schmitt, from our Washington bureau, to London. Schmitt has covered military affairs expertly for years, has read his share of classified military dispatches and has excellent judgment and an unflappable demeanor. His main assignment was to get a sense of the material. Was it genuine? Was it of public interest? He would also report back on the proposed mechanics of our collaboration with The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel, which Assange invited as a third guest to his secret smorgasbord. Schmitt would also meet the WikiLeaks leader, who was known to a few Guardian journalists but not to us.
Schmitt’s first call back to The Times was encouraging. There was no question in his mind that the Afghanistan dispatches were genuine. They were fascinating — a diary of a troubled war from the ground up. And there were intimations of more to come, especially classified cables from the entire constellation of American diplomatic outposts. WikiLeaks was holding those back for now, presumably to see how this venture with the establishment media worked out. Over the next few days, Schmitt huddled in a discreet office at The Guardian, sampling the trove of war dispatches and discussing the complexities of this project: how to organize and study such a voluminous cache of information; how to securely transport, store and share it; how journalists from three very different publications would work together without compromising their independence; and how we would all assure an appropriate distance from Julian Assange. We regarded Assange throughout as a source, not as a partner or collaborator, but he was a man who clearly had his own agenda.
By the time of the meetings in London, WikiLeaks had already acquired a measure of international fame or, depending on your point of view, notoriety. Shortly before I got the call from The Guardian, The New Yorker published a rich and colorful profile of Assange, by Raffi Khatchadourian, who had embedded with the group. WikiLeaks’s biggest coup to that point was the release, last April, of video footage taken from one of two U.S. helicopters involved in firing down on a crowd and a building in Baghdad in 2007, killing at least 18 people. While some of the people in the video were armed, others gave no indication of menace; two were in fact journalists for the news agency Reuters. The video, with its soundtrack of callous banter, was horrifying to watch and was an embarrassment to the U.S. military. But in its zeal to make the video a work of antiwar propaganda, WikiLeaks also released a version that didn’t call attention to an Iraqi who was toting a rocket-propelled grenade and packaged the manipulated version under the tendentious rubric “Collateral Murder.” (See the edited and non-edited videos here.)
Throughout our dealings, Assange was coy about where he obtained his secret cache. But the suspected source of the video, as well as the military dispatches and the diplomatic cables to come, was a disillusioned U.S. Army private first class named Bradley Manning, who had been arrested and was being kept in solitary confinement.
On the fourth day of the London meeting, Assange slouched into The Guardian office, a day late. Schmitt took his first measure of the man who would be a large presence in our lives. “He’s tall — probably 6-foot-2 or 6-3 — and lanky, with pale skin, gray eyes and a shock of white hair that seizes your attention,” Schmitt wrote to me later. “He was alert but disheveled, like a bag lady walking in off the street, wearing a dingy, light-colored sport coat and cargo pants, dirty white shirt, beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed around his ankles. He smelled as if he hadn’t bathed in days.”
Assange shrugged a huge backpack off his shoulders and pulled out a stockpile of laptops, cords, cellphones, thumb drives and memory sticks that held the WikiLeaks secrets.
The reporters had begun preliminary work on the Afghanistan field reports, using a large Excel spreadsheet to organize the material, then plugging in search terms and combing the documents for newsworthy content. They had run into a puzzling incongruity: Assange said the data included dispatches from the beginning of 2004 through the end of 2009, but the material on the spreadsheet ended abruptly in April 2009. A considerable amount of material was missing. Assange, slipping naturally into the role of office geek, explained that they had hit the limits of Excel. Open a second spreadsheet, he instructed. They did, and the rest of the data materialized — a total of 92,000 reports from the battlefields of Afghanistan.
The reporters came to think of Assange as smart and well educated, extremely adept technologically but arrogant, thin-skinned, conspiratorial and oddly credulous. At lunch one day in The Guardian’s cafeteria, Assange recounted with an air of great conviction a story about the archive in Germany that contains the files of the former Communist secret police, the Stasi. This office, Assange asserted, was thoroughly infiltrated by former Stasi agents who were quietly destroying the documents they were entrusted with protecting. The Der Spiegel reporter in the group, John Goetz, who has reported extensively on the Stasi, listened in amazement. That’s utter nonsense, he said. Some former Stasi personnel were hired as security guards in the office, but the records were well protected.
Assange was openly contemptuous of the American government and certain that he was a hunted man. He told the reporters that he had prepared a kind of doomsday option. He had, he said, distributed highly encrypted copies of his entire secret archive to a multitude of supporters, and if WikiLeaks was shut down, or if he was arrested, he would disseminate the key to make the information public.
Schmitt told me that for all Assange’s bombast and dark conspiracy theories, he had a bit of Peter Pan in him. One night, when they were all walking down the street after dinner, Assange suddenly started skipping ahead of the group. Schmitt and Goetz stared, speechless. Then, just as suddenly, Assange stopped, got back in step with them and returned to the conversation he had interrupted.
For the rest of the week Schmitt worked with David Leigh, The Guardian’s investigations editor; Nick Davies, an investigative reporter for the paper; and Goetz, of Der Spiegel, to organize and sort the material. With help from two of The Times’s best computer minds — Andrew Lehren and Aron Pilhofer — they figured out how to assemble the material into a conveniently searchable and secure database.
Journalists are characteristically competitive, but the group worked well together. They brainstormed topics to explore and exchanged search results. Der Spiegel offered to check the logs against incident reports submitted by the German Army to its Parliament — partly as story research, partly as an additional check on authenticity.
Assange provided us the data on the condition that we not write about it before specific dates that WikiLeaks planned on posting the documents on a publicly accessible Web site. The Afghanistan documents would go first, after we had a few weeks to search the material and write our articles. The larger cache of Iraq-related documents would go later. Such embargoes — agreements not to publish information before a set date — are commonplace in journalism. Everything from studies in medical journals to the annual United States budget is released with embargoes. They are a constraint with benefits, the principal one being the chance to actually read and reflect on the material before publishing it into public view. As Assange surely knew, embargoes also tend to build suspense and amplify a story, especially when multiple news outlets broadcast it at once. The embargo was the only condition WikiLeaks would try to impose on us; what we wrote about the material was entirely up to us. Much later, some American news outlets reported that they were offered last-minute access to WikiLeaks documents if they signed contracts with financial penalties for early disclosure. The Times was never asked to sign anything or to pay anything. For WikiLeaks, at least in this first big venture, exposure was its own reward.
Back in New York we assembled a team of reporters, data experts and editors and quartered them in an out-of-the-way office. Andrew Lehren, of our computer-assisted-reporting unit, did the first cut, searching terms on his own or those suggested by other reporters, compiling batches of relevant documents and summarizing the contents. We assigned reporters to specific areas in which they had expertise and gave them password access to rummage in the data. This became the routine we would follow with subsequent archives.
An air of intrigue verging on paranoia permeated the project, perhaps understandably, given that we were dealing with a mass of classified material and a source who acted like a fugitive, changing crash pads, e-mail addresses and cellphones frequently. We used encrypted Web sites. Reporters exchanged notes via Skype, believing it to be somewhat less vulnerable to eavesdropping. On conference calls, we spoke in amateurish code. Assange was always “the source.” The latest data drop was “the package.” When I left New York for two weeks to visit bureaus in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where we assume that communications may be monitored, I was not to be copied on message traffic about the project. I never imagined that any of this would defeat a curious snoop from the National Security Agency or Pakistani intelligence. And I was never entirely sure whether that prospect made me more nervous than the cyberwiles of WikiLeaks itself. At a point when relations between the news organizations and WikiLeaks were rocky, at least three people associated with this project had inexplicable activity in their e-mail that suggested someone was hacking into their accounts.
From consultations with our lawyers, we were confident that reporting on the secret documents could be done within the law, but we speculated about what the government — or some other government — might do to impede our work or exact recriminations. And, the law aside, we felt an enormous moral and ethical obligation to use the material responsibly. While we assumed we had little or no ability to influence what WikiLeaks did, let alone what would happen once this material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogosphere, that did not free us from the need to exercise care in our own journalism. From the beginning, we agreed that in our articles and in any documents we published from the secret archive, we would excise material that could put lives at risk.
Guided by reporters with extensive experience in the field, we redacted the names of ordinary citizens, local officials, activists, academics and others who had spoken to American soldiers or diplomats. We edited out any details that might reveal ongoing intelligence-gathering operations, military tactics or locations of material that could be used to fashion terrorist weapons. Three reporters with considerable experience of handling military secrets — Eric Schmitt, Michael Gordon and C. J. Chivers — went over the documents we considered posting. Chivers, an ex-Marine who has reported for us from several battlefields, brought a practiced eye and cautious judgment to the business of redaction. If a dispatch noted that Aircraft A left Location B at a certain time and arrived at Location C at a certain time, Chivers edited it out on the off chance that this could teach enemy forces something useful about the capabilities of that aircraft.
The first articles in the project, which we called the War Logs, were scheduled to go up on the Web sites of The Times, The Guardian and Der Spiegel on Sunday, July 25. We approached the White House days before that to get its reaction to the huge breach of secrecy as well as to specific articles we planned to write — including a major one about Pakistan’s ambiguous role as an American ally. On July 24, the day before the War Logs went live, I attended a farewell party for Roger Cohen, a columnist for The Times and The International Herald Tribune, that was given by Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. A voracious consumer of inside information, Holbrooke had a decent idea of what was coming, and he pulled me away from the crowd to show me the fusillade of cabinet-level e-mail ricocheting through his BlackBerry, thus demonstrating both the frantic anxiety in the administration and, not incidentally, the fact that he was very much in the loop. The Pakistan article, in particular, would complicate his life. But one of Holbrooke’s many gifts was his ability to make pretty good lemonade out of the bitterest lemons; he was already spinning the reports of Pakistani duplicity as leverage he could use to pull the Pakistanis back into closer alignment with American interests. Five months later, when Holbrooke — just 69, and seemingly indestructible — died of a torn aorta, I remembered that evening. And what I remembered best was that he was as excited to be on the cusp of a big story as I was.
We posted the articles on NYTimes.com the next day at 5 p.m. — a time picked to reconcile the different publishing schedules of the three publications. I was proud of what a crew of great journalists had done to fashion coherent and instructive reporting from a jumble of raw field reports, mostly composed in a clunky patois of military jargon and acronyms. The reporters supplied context, nuance and skepticism. There was much in that first round of articles worth reading, but my favorite single piece was one of the simplest. Chivers gathered all of the dispatches related to a single, remote, beleaguered American military outpost and stitched them together into a heartbreaking narrative. The dispatches from this outpost represent in miniature the audacious ambitions, gradual disillusionment and ultimate disappointment that Afghanistan has dealt to occupiers over the centuries.
If anyone doubted that the three publications operated independently, the articles we posted that day made it clear that we followed our separate muses. The Guardian, which is an openly left-leaning newspaper, used the first War Logs to emphasize civilian casualties in Afghanistan, claiming the documents disclosed that coalition forces killed “hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents,” underscoring the cost of what the paper called a “failing war.” Our reporters studied the same material but determined that all the major episodes of civilian deaths we found in the War Logs had been reported in The Times, many of them on the front page. (In fact, two of our journalists, Stephen Farrell and Sultan Munadi, were kidnapped by the Taliban while investigating one major episode near Kunduz. Munadi was killed during an ensuing rescue by British paratroopers.) The civilian deaths that had not been previously reported came in ones and twos and did not add up to anywhere near “hundreds.” Moreover, since several were either duplicated or missing from the reports, we concluded that an overall tally would be little better than a guess.
Another example: The Times gave prominence to the dispatches reflecting American suspicions that Pakistani intelligence was playing a double game in Afghanistan — nodding to American interests while abetting the Taliban. We buttressed the interesting anecdotal material of Pakistani double-dealing with additional reporting. The Guardian was unimpressed by those dispatches and treated them more dismissively.
Three months later, with the French daily Le Monde added to the group, we published Round 2, the Iraq War Logs, including articles on how the United States turned a blind eye to the torture of prisoners by Iraqi forces working with the U.S., how Iraq spawned an extraordinary American military reliance on private contractors and how extensively Iran had meddled in the conflict.
By this time, The Times’s relationship with our source had gone from wary to hostile. I talked to Assange by phone a few times and heard out his complaints. He was angry that we declined to link our online coverage of the War Logs to the WikiLeaks Web site, a decision we made because we feared — rightly, as it turned out — that its trove would contain the names of low-level informants and make them Taliban targets. “Where’s the respect?” he demanded. “Where’s the respect?” Another time he called to tell me how much he disliked our profile of Bradley Manning, the Army private suspected of being the source of WikiLeaks’s most startling revelations. The article traced Manning’s childhood as an outsider and his distress as a gay man in the military. Assange complained that we “psychologicalized” Manning and gave short shrift to his “political awakening.”
The final straw was a front-page profile of Assange by John Burns and Ravi Somaiya, published Oct. 24, that revealed fractures within WikiLeaks, attributed by Assange’s critics to his imperious management style. Assange denounced the article to me, and in various public forums, as “a smear.”
Assange was transformed by his outlaw celebrity. The derelict with the backpack and the sagging socks now wore his hair dyed and styled, and he favored fashionably skinny suits and ties. He became a kind of cult figure for the European young and leftish and was evidently a magnet for women. Two Swedish women filed police complaints claiming that Assange insisted on having sex without a condom; Sweden’s strict laws on nonconsensual sex categorize such behavior as rape, and a prosecutor issued a warrant to question Assange, who initially described it as a plot concocted to silence or discredit WikiLeaks.
I came to think of Julian Assange as a character from a Stieg Larsson thriller — a man who could figure either as hero or villain in one of the megaselling Swedish novels that mix hacker counterculture, high-level conspiracy and sex as both recreation and violation.
In October, WikiLeaks gave The Guardian its third archive, a quarter of a million communications between the U.S. State Department and its outposts around the globe. This time, Assange imposed a new condition: The Guardian was not to share the material with The New York Times. Indeed, he told Guardian journalists that he opened discussions with two other American news organizations — The Washington Post and the McClatchy chain — and intended to invite them in as replacements for The Times. He also enlarged his recipient list to include El País, the leading Spanish-language newspaper.
The Guardian was uncomfortable with Assange’s condition. By now the journalists from The Times and The Guardian had a good working relationship. The Times provided a large American audience for the revelations, as well as access to the U.S. government for comment and context. And given the potential legal issues and public reaction, it was good to have company in the trenches. Besides, we had come to believe that Assange was losing control of his stockpile of secrets. An independent journalist, Heather Brooke, had obtained material from a WikiLeaks dissident and joined in a loose alliance with The Guardian. Over the coming weeks, batches of cables would pop up in newspapers in Lebanon, Australia and Norway. David Leigh, The Guardian’s investigations editor, concluded that these rogue leaks released The Guardian from any pledge, and he gave us the cables.
On Nov. 1, Assange and two of his lawyers burst into Alan Rusbridger’s office, furious that The Guardian was asserting greater independence and suspicious that The Times might be in possession of the embassy cables. Over the course of an eight-hour meeting, Assange intermittently raged against The Times — especially over our front-page profile — while The Guardian journalists tried to calm him. In midstorm, Rusbridger called me to report on Assange’s grievances and relay his demand for a front-page apology in The Times. Rusbridger knew that this was a nonstarter, but he was buying time for the tantrum to subside. In the end, both he and Georg Mascolo, editor in chief of Der Spiegel, made clear that they intended to continue their collaboration with The Times; Assange could take it or leave it. Given that we already had all of the documents, Assange had little choice. Over the next two days, the news organizations agreed on a timetable for publication.
The following week, we sent Ian Fisher, a deputy foreign editor who was a principal coordinator on our processing of the embassy cables, to London to work out final details. The meeting went smoothly, even after Assange arrived. “Freakishly good behavior,” Fisher e-mailed me afterward. “No yelling or crazy mood swings.” But after dinner, as Fisher was leaving, Assange smirked and offered a parting threat: “Tell me, are you in contact with your legal counsel?” Fisher replied that he was. “You had better be,” Assange said.
Fisher left London with an understanding that we would continue to have access to the material. But just in case, we took out a competitive insurance policy. We had Scott Shane, a Washington correspondent, pull together a long, just-in-case article summing up highlights of the cables, which we could quickly post on our Web site. If WikiLeaks sprang another leak, we would be ready.
Because of the range of the material and the very nature of diplomacy, the embassy cables were bound to be more explosive than the War Logs. Dean Baquet, our Washington bureau chief, gave the White House an early warning on Nov. 19. The following Tuesday, two days before Thanksgiving, Baquet and two colleagues were invited to a windowless room at the State Department, where they encountered an unsmiling crowd. Representatives from the White House, the State Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the F.B.I. and the Pentagon gathered around a conference table. Others, who never identified themselves, lined the walls. A solitary note-taker tapped away on a computer.
The meeting was off the record, but it is fair to say the mood was tense. Scott Shane, one reporter who participated in the meeting, described “an undertone of suppressed outrage and frustration.”
Subsequent meetings, which soon gave way to daily conference calls, were more businesslike. Before each discussion, our Washington bureau sent over a batch of specific cables that we intended to use in the coming days. They were circulated to regional specialists, who funneled their reactions to a small group at State, who came to our daily conversations with a list of priorities and arguments to back them up. We relayed the government’s concerns, and our own decisions regarding them, to the other news outlets.
The administration’s concerns generally fell into three categories. First was the importance of protecting individuals who had spoken candidly to American diplomats in oppressive countries. We almost always agreed on those and were grateful to the government for pointing out some we overlooked.
“We were all aware of dire stakes for some of the people named in the cables if we failed to obscure their identities,” Shane wrote to me later, recalling the nature of the meetings. Like many of us, Shane has worked in countries where dissent can mean prison or worse. “That sometimes meant not just removing the name but also references to institutions that might give a clue to an identity and sometimes even the dates of conversations, which might be compared with surveillance tapes of an American Embassy to reveal who was visiting the diplomats that day.”
The second category included sensitive American programs, usually related to intelligence. We agreed to withhold some of this information, like a cable describing an intelligence-sharing program that took years to arrange and might be lost if exposed. In other cases, we went away convinced that publication would cause some embarrassment but no real harm.
The third category consisted of cables that disclosed candid comments by and about foreign officials, including heads of state. The State Department feared publication would strain relations with those countries. We were mostly unconvinced.
The embassy cables were a different kind of treasure from the War Logs. For one thing, they covered the entire globe — virtually every embassy, consulate and interest section that the United States maintains. They contained the makings of many dozens of stories: candid American appraisals of foreign leaders, narratives of complicated negotiations, allegations of corruption and duplicity, countless behind-the-scenes insights. Some of the material was of narrow local interest; some of it had global implications. Some provided authoritative versions of events not previously fully understood. Some consisted of rumor and flimsy speculation.
Unlike most of the military dispatches, the embassy cables were written in clear English, sometimes with wit, color and an ear for dialogue. (“Who knew,” one of our English colleagues marveled, “that American diplomats could write?”)
Even more than the military logs, the diplomatic cables called for context and analysis. It was important to know, for example, that cables sent from an embassy are routinely dispatched over the signature of the ambassador and those from the State Department are signed by the secretary of state, regardless of whether the ambassador or secretary had actually seen the material. It was important to know that much of the communication between Washington and its outposts is given even more restrictive classification — top secret or higher — and was thus missing from this trove. We searched in vain, for example, for military or diplomatic reports on the fate of Pat Tillman, the former football star and Army Ranger who was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan. We found no reports on how Osama bin Laden eluded American forces in the mountains of Tora Bora. (In fact, we found nothing but second- and thirdhand rumors about bin Laden.) If such cables exist, they were presumably classified top secret or higher.
And it was important to remember that diplomatic cables are versions of events. They can be speculative. They can be ambiguous. They can be wrong.
One of our first articles drawn from the diplomatic cables, for example, reported on a secret intelligence assessment that Iran had obtained a supply of advanced missiles from North Korea, missiles that could reach European capitals. Outside experts long suspected that Iran obtained missile parts but not the entire weapons, so this glimpse of the official view was revealing. The Washington Post fired back with a different take, casting doubt on whether the missile in question had been transferred to Iran or whether it was even a workable weapon. We went back to the cables — and the experts — and concluded in a subsequent article that the evidence presented “a murkier picture.”
The tension between a newspaper’s obligation to inform and the government’s responsibility to protect is hardly new. At least until this year, nothing The Times did on my watch caused nearly so much agitation as two articles we published about tactics employed by the Bush administration after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The first, which was published in 2005 and won a Pulitzer Prize, revealed that the National Security Agency was eavesdropping on domestic phone conversations and e-mail without the legal courtesy of a warrant. The other, published in 2006, described a vast Treasury Department program to screen international banking records.
I have vivid memories of sitting in the Oval Office as President George W. Bush tried to persuade me and the paper’s publisher to withhold the eavesdropping story, saying that if we published it, we should share the blame for the next terrorist attack. We were unconvinced by his argument and published the story, and the reaction from the government — and conservative commentators in particular — was vociferous.
This time around, the Obama administration’s reaction was different. It was, for the most part, sober and professional. The Obama White House, while strongly condemning WikiLeaks for making the documents public, did not seek an injunction to halt publication. There was no Oval Office lecture. On the contrary, in our discussions before publication of our articles, White House officials, while challenging some of the conclusions we drew from the material, thanked us for handling the documents with care. The secretaries of state and defense and the attorney general resisted the opportunity for a crowd-pleasing orgy of press bashing. There has been no serious official talk — unless you count an ambiguous hint by Senator Joseph Lieberman — of pursuing news organizations in the courts. Though the release of these documents was certainly embarrassing, the relevant government agencies actually engaged with us in an attempt to prevent the release of material genuinely damaging to innocent individuals or to the national interest.
The broader public reaction was mixed — more critical in the first days; more sympathetic as readers absorbed the articles and the sky did not fall; and more hostile to WikiLeaks in the U.S. than in Europe, where there is often a certain pleasure in seeing the last superpower taken down a peg.
In the days after we began our respective series based on the embassy cables, Alan Rusbridger and I went online to answer questions from readers. The Guardian, whose readership is more sympathetic to the guerrilla sensibilities of WikiLeaks, was attacked for being too fastidious about redacting the documents: How dare you censor this material? What are you hiding? Post everything now! The mail sent to The Times, at least in the first day or two, came from the opposite field. Many readers were indignant and alarmed: Who needs this? How dare you? What gives you the right?
Much of the concern reflected a genuine conviction that in perilous times the president needs extraordinary powers, unfettered by Congressional oversight, court meddling or the strictures of international law and certainly safe from nosy reporters. That is compounded by a popular sense that the elite media have become too big for their britches and by the fact that our national conversation has become more polarized and strident.
Although it is our aim to be impartial in our presentation of the news, our attitude toward these issues is far from indifferent. The journalists at The Times have a large and personal stake in the country’s security. We live and work in a city that has been tragically marked as a favorite terrorist target, and in the wake of 9/11 our journalists plunged into the ruins to tell the story of what happened here. Moreover, The Times has nine staff correspondents assigned to the two wars still being waged in the wake of that attack, plus a rotating cast of photographers, visiting writers and scores of local stringers and support staff. They work in this high-risk environment because, while there are many places you can go for opinions about the war, there are few places — and fewer by the day — where you can go to find honest, on-the-scene reporting about what is happening. We take extraordinary precautions to keep them safe, but we have had two of our Iraqi journalists murdered for doing their jobs. We have had four journalists held hostage by the Taliban — two of them for seven months. We had one Afghan journalist killed in a rescue attempt. Last October, while I was in Kabul, we got word that a photographer embedded for us with troops near Kandahar stepped on an improvised mine and lost both his legs.
We are invested in the struggle against murderous extremism in another sense. The virulent hatred espoused by terrorists, judging by their literature, is directed not just against our people and our buildings but also at our values and at our faith in the self-government of an informed electorate. If the freedom of the press makes some Americans uneasy, it is anathema to the ideologists of terror.
So we have no doubts about where our sympathies lie in this clash of values. And yet we cannot let those sympathies transform us into propagandists, even for a system we respect.
I’m the first to admit that news organizations, including this one, sometimes get things wrong. We can be overly credulous (as in some of the prewar reporting about Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction) or overly cynical about official claims and motives. We may err on the side of keeping secrets (President Kennedy reportedly wished, after the fact, that The Times had published what it knew about the planned Bay of Pigs invasion, which possibly would have helped avert a bloody debacle) or on the side of exposing them. We make the best judgments we can. When we get things wrong, we try to correct the record. A free press in a democracy can be messy. But the alternative is to give the government a veto over what its citizens are allowed to know. Anyone who has worked in countries where the news diet is controlled by the government can sympathize with Thomas Jefferson’s oft-quoted remark that he would rather have newspapers without government than government without newspapers.
The intentions of our founders have rarely been as well articulated as they were by Justice Hugo Black 40 years ago, concurring with the Supreme Court ruling that stopped the government from suppressing the secret Vietnam War history called the Pentagon Papers: “The government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.”
There is no neat formula for maintaining this balance. In practice, the tension between our obligation to inform and the government’s obligation to protect plays out in a set of rituals. As one of my predecessors, Max Frankel, then the Washington bureau chief, wrote in a wise affidavit filed during the Pentagon Papers case: “For the vast majority of ‘secrets,’ there has developed between the government and the press (and Congress) a rather simple rule of thumb: The government hides what it can, pleading necessity as long as it can, and the press pries out what it can, pleading a need and a right to know. Each side in this ‘game’ regularly ‘wins’ and ‘loses’ a round or two. Each fights with the weapons at its command. When the government loses a secret or two, it simply adjusts to a new reality.”
In fact, leaks of classified material — sometimes authorized — are part of the way business is conducted in Washington, as one wing of the bureaucracy tries to one-up another or officials try to shift blame or claim credit or advance or confound a particular policy. For further evidence that our government is highly selective in its approach to secrets, look no further than Bob Woodward’s all-but-authorized accounts of the innermost deliberations of our government.
The government surely cheapens secrecy by deploying it so promiscuously. According to the Pentagon, about 500,000 people have clearance to use the database from which the secret cables were pilfered. Weighing in on the WikiLeaks controversy in The Guardian, Max Frankel remarked that secrets shared with such a legion of “cleared” officials, including low-level army clerks, “are not secret.” Governments, he wrote, “must decide that the random rubber-stamping of millions of papers and computer files each year does not a security system make.”
Beyond the basic question of whether the press should publish secrets, criticism of the WikiLeaks documents generally fell into three themes: 1. That the documents were of dubious value, because they told us nothing we didn’t already know. 2. That the disclosures put lives at risk — either directly, by identifying confidential informants, or indirectly, by complicating our ability to build alliances against terror. 3. That by doing business with an organization like WikiLeaks, The Times and other news organizations compromised their impartiality and independence.
I’m a little puzzled by the complaint that most of the embassy traffic we disclosed did not profoundly change our understanding of how the world works. Ninety-nine percent of what we read or hear on the news does not profoundly change our understanding of how the world works. News mostly advances by inches and feet, not in great leaps. The value of these documents — and I believe they have immense value — is not that they expose some deep, unsuspected perfidy in high places or that they upend your whole view of the world. For those who pay close attention to foreign policy, these documents provide texture, nuance and drama. They deepen and correct your understanding of how things unfold; they raise or lower your estimation of world leaders. For those who do not follow these subjects as closely, the stories are an opportunity to learn more. If a project like this makes readers pay attention, think harder, understand more clearly what is being done in their name, then we have performed a public service. And that does not count the impact of these revelations on the people most touched by them. WikiLeaks cables in which American diplomats recount the extravagant corruption of Tunisia’s rulers helped fuel a popular uprising that has overthrown the government.
As for the risks posed by these releases, they are real. WikiLeaks’s first data dump, the publication of the Afghanistan War Logs, included the names of scores of Afghans that The Times and other news organizations had carefully purged from our own coverage. Several news organizations, including ours, reported this dangerous lapse, and months later a Taliban spokesman claimed that Afghan insurgents had been perusing the WikiLeaks site and making a list. I anticipate, with dread, the day we learn that someone identified in those documents has been killed.
WikiLeaks was roundly criticized for its seeming indifference to the safety of those informants, and in its subsequent postings it has largely followed the example of the news organizations and redacted material that could get people jailed or killed. Assange described it as a “harm minimization” policy. In the case of the Iraq war documents, WikiLeaks applied a kind of robo-redaction software that stripped away names (and rendered the documents almost illegible). With the embassy cables, WikiLeaks posted mostly documents that had already been redacted by The Times and its fellow news organizations. And there were instances in which WikiLeaks volunteers suggested measures to enhance the protection of innocents. For example, someone at WikiLeaks noticed that if the redaction of a phrase revealed the exact length of the words, an alert foreign security service might match the number of letters to a name and affiliation and thus identify the source. WikiLeaks advised everyone to substitute a dozen uppercase X’s for each redacted passage, no matter how long or short.
Whether WikiLeaks’s “harm minimization” is adequate, and whether it will continue, is beyond my power to predict or influence. WikiLeaks does not take guidance from The New York Times. In the end, I can answer only for what my own paper has done, and I believe we have behaved responsibly.
The idea that the mere publication of such a wholesale collection of secrets will make other countries less willing to do business with our diplomats seems to me questionable. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates called this concern “overwrought.” Foreign governments cooperate with us, he pointed out, not because they necessarily love us, not because they trust us to keep their secrets, but because they need us. It may be that for a time diplomats will choose their words more carefully or circulate their views more narrowly, but WikiLeaks has not repealed the laws of self-interest. A few weeks after we began publishing articles about the embassy cables, David Sanger, our chief Washington correspondent, told me: “At least so far, the evidence that foreign leaders are no longer talking to American diplomats is scarce. I’ve heard about nervous jokes at the beginning of meetings, along the lines of ‘When will I be reading about this conversation?’ But the conversations are happening. . . . American diplomacy has hardly screeched to a halt.”
As for our relationship with WikiLeaks, Julian Assange has been heard to boast that he served as a kind of puppet master, recruiting several news organizations, forcing them to work in concert and choreographing their work. This is characteristic braggadocio — or, as my Guardian colleagues would say, bollocks. Throughout this experience we have treated Assange as a source. I will not say “a source, pure and simple,” because as any reporter or editor can attest, sources are rarely pure or simple, and Assange was no exception. But the relationship with sources is straightforward: you don’t necessarily endorse their agenda, echo their rhetoric, take anything they say at face value, applaud their methods or, most important, allow them to shape or censor your journalism. Your obligation, as an independent news organization, is to verify the material, to supply context, to exercise responsible judgment about what to publish and what not to publish and to make sense of it. That is what we did.
But while I do not regard Assange as a partner, and I would hesitate to describe what WikiLeaks does as journalism, it is chilling to contemplate the possible government prosecution of WikiLeaks for making secrets public, let alone the passage of new laws to punish the dissemination of classified information, as some have advocated. Taking legal recourse against a government official who violates his trust by divulging secrets he is sworn to protect is one thing. But criminalizing the publication of such secrets by someone who has no official obligation seems to me to run up against the First Amendment and the best traditions of this country. As one of my colleagues asks: If Assange were an understated professorial type rather than a character from a missing Stieg Larsson novel, and if WikiLeaks were not suffused with such glib antipathy toward the United States, would the reaction to the leaks be quite so ferocious? And would more Americans be speaking up against the threat of reprisals?
Whether the arrival of WikiLeaks has fundamentally changed the way journalism is made, I will leave to others and to history. Frankly, I think the impact of WikiLeaks on the culture has probably been overblown. Long before WikiLeaks was born, the Internet transformed the landscape of journalism, creating a wide-open and global market with easier access to audiences and sources, a quicker metabolism, a new infrastructure for sharing and vetting information and a diminished respect for notions of privacy and secrecy. Assange has claimed credit on several occasions for creating something he calls “scientific journalism,” meaning that readers are given the raw material to judge for themselves whether the journalistic write-ups are trustworthy. But newspapers have been publishing texts of documents almost as long as newspapers have existed — and ever since the Internet eliminated space restrictions, we have done so copiously.
Nor is it clear to me that WikiLeaks represents some kind of cosmic triumph of transparency. If the official allegations are to be believed, most of WikiLeaks’s great revelations came from a single anguished Army private — anguished enough to risk many years in prison. It’s possible that the creation of online information brokers like WikiLeaks and OpenLeaks, a breakaway site announced in December by a former Assange colleague named Daniel Domscheit-Berg, will be a lure for whistle-blowers and malcontents who fear being caught consorting directly with a news organization like mine. But I suspect we have not reached a state of information anarchy. At least not yet.
As 2010 wound down, The Times and its news partners held a conference call to discuss where we go from here. The initial surge of articles drawn from the secret cables was over. More would trickle out but without a fixed schedule. We agreed to continue the redaction process, and we agreed we would all urge WikiLeaks to do the same. But this period of intense collaboration, and of regular contact with our source, was coming to a close.
Just before Christmas, Ian Katz, The Guardian’s deputy editor, went to see Assange, who had been arrested in London on the Swedish warrant, briefly jailed and bailed out by wealthy admirers and was living under house arrest in a country manor in East Anglia while he fought Sweden’s attempt to extradite him. The flow of donations to WikiLeaks, which he claimed hit 100,000 euros a day at its peak, was curtailed when Visa, MasterCard and PayPal refused to be conduits for contributors — prompting a concerted assault on the Web sites of those companies by Assange’s hacker sympathizers. He would soon sign a lucrative book deal to finance his legal struggles.
The Guardian seemed to have joined The Times on Assange’s enemies list, first for sharing the diplomatic cables with us, then for obtaining and reporting on the unredacted record of the Swedish police complaints against Assange. (Live by the leak. . . .) In his fury at this perceived betrayal, Assange granted an interview to The Times of London, in which he vented his displeasure with our little media consortium. If he thought this would ingratiate him with The Guardian rival, he was naïve. The paper happily splashed its exclusive interview, then followed it with an editorial calling Assange a fool and a hypocrite.
At the mansion in East Anglia, Assange seated Katz before a roaring fire in the drawing room and ruminated for four hours about the Swedish case, his financial troubles and his plan for a next phase of releases. He talked vaguely about secrets still in his quiver, including what he regards as a damning cache of e-mail from inside an American bank.
He spun out an elaborate version of a U.S. Justice Department effort to exact punishment for his assault on American secrecy. If he was somehow extradited to the United States, he said, “I would still have a high chance of being killed in the U.S. prison system, Jack Ruby style, given the continual calls for my murder by senior and influential U.S. politicians.”
While Assange mused darkly in his exile, one of his lawyers sent out a mock Christmas card that suggested at least someone on the WikiLeaks team was not lacking a sense of the absurd.
The message:
“Dear kids,
Santa is Mum & Dad.
Love,
WikiLeaks.”
A version of this article appeared in print on January 30, 2011, on page MM32 of the Sunday Magazine
Purchase "Open Secrets" a new e-book from The New York Times today.
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By BILL KELLER
The New York Times Magazine, January 26, 2011
Bill Keller is the executive editor of The New York Times. This essay is adapted from his introduction to “Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War and American Diplomacy: Complete and Expanded Coverage from The New York Times,” an ebook available for purchase at nytimes.com/opensecrets.
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This past June, Alan Rusbridger, the editor of The Guardian, phoned me and asked, mysteriously, whether I had any idea how to arrange a secure communication. Not really, I confessed. The Times doesn’t have encrypted phone lines, or a Cone of Silence. Well then, he said, he would try to speak circumspectly. In a roundabout way, he laid out an unusual proposition: an organization called WikiLeaks, a secretive cadre of antisecrecy vigilantes, had come into possession of a substantial amount of classified United States government communications. WikiLeaks’s leader, Julian Assange, an eccentric former computer hacker of Australian birth and no fixed residence, offered The Guardian half a million military dispatches from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. There might be more after that, including an immense bundle of confidential diplomatic cables. The Guardian suggested — to increase the impact as well as to share the labor of handling such a trove — that The New York Times be invited to share this exclusive bounty. The source agreed. Was I interested?
I was interested.
The adventure that ensued over the next six months combined the cloak-and-dagger intrigue of handling a vast secret archive with the more mundane feat of sorting, searching and understanding a mountain of data. As if that were not complicated enough, the project also entailed a source who was elusive, manipulative and volatile (and ultimately openly hostile to The Times and The Guardian); an international cast of journalists; company lawyers committed to keeping us within the bounds of the law; and an array of government officials who sometimes seemed as if they couldn’t decide whether they wanted to engage us or arrest us. By the end of the year, the story of this wholesale security breach had outgrown the story of the actual contents of the secret documents and generated much breathless speculation that something — journalism, diplomacy, life as we know it — had profoundly changed forever.
Soon after Rusbridger’s call, we sent Eric Schmitt, from our Washington bureau, to London. Schmitt has covered military affairs expertly for years, has read his share of classified military dispatches and has excellent judgment and an unflappable demeanor. His main assignment was to get a sense of the material. Was it genuine? Was it of public interest? He would also report back on the proposed mechanics of our collaboration with The Guardian and the German magazine Der Spiegel, which Assange invited as a third guest to his secret smorgasbord. Schmitt would also meet the WikiLeaks leader, who was known to a few Guardian journalists but not to us.
Schmitt’s first call back to The Times was encouraging. There was no question in his mind that the Afghanistan dispatches were genuine. They were fascinating — a diary of a troubled war from the ground up. And there were intimations of more to come, especially classified cables from the entire constellation of American diplomatic outposts. WikiLeaks was holding those back for now, presumably to see how this venture with the establishment media worked out. Over the next few days, Schmitt huddled in a discreet office at The Guardian, sampling the trove of war dispatches and discussing the complexities of this project: how to organize and study such a voluminous cache of information; how to securely transport, store and share it; how journalists from three very different publications would work together without compromising their independence; and how we would all assure an appropriate distance from Julian Assange. We regarded Assange throughout as a source, not as a partner or collaborator, but he was a man who clearly had his own agenda.
By the time of the meetings in London, WikiLeaks had already acquired a measure of international fame or, depending on your point of view, notoriety. Shortly before I got the call from The Guardian, The New Yorker published a rich and colorful profile of Assange, by Raffi Khatchadourian, who had embedded with the group. WikiLeaks’s biggest coup to that point was the release, last April, of video footage taken from one of two U.S. helicopters involved in firing down on a crowd and a building in Baghdad in 2007, killing at least 18 people. While some of the people in the video were armed, others gave no indication of menace; two were in fact journalists for the news agency Reuters. The video, with its soundtrack of callous banter, was horrifying to watch and was an embarrassment to the U.S. military. But in its zeal to make the video a work of antiwar propaganda, WikiLeaks also released a version that didn’t call attention to an Iraqi who was toting a rocket-propelled grenade and packaged the manipulated version under the tendentious rubric “Collateral Murder.” (See the edited and non-edited videos here.)
Throughout our dealings, Assange was coy about where he obtained his secret cache. But the suspected source of the video, as well as the military dispatches and the diplomatic cables to come, was a disillusioned U.S. Army private first class named Bradley Manning, who had been arrested and was being kept in solitary confinement.
On the fourth day of the London meeting, Assange slouched into The Guardian office, a day late. Schmitt took his first measure of the man who would be a large presence in our lives. “He’s tall — probably 6-foot-2 or 6-3 — and lanky, with pale skin, gray eyes and a shock of white hair that seizes your attention,” Schmitt wrote to me later. “He was alert but disheveled, like a bag lady walking in off the street, wearing a dingy, light-colored sport coat and cargo pants, dirty white shirt, beat-up sneakers and filthy white socks that collapsed around his ankles. He smelled as if he hadn’t bathed in days.”
Assange shrugged a huge backpack off his shoulders and pulled out a stockpile of laptops, cords, cellphones, thumb drives and memory sticks that held the WikiLeaks secrets.
The reporters had begun preliminary work on the Afghanistan field reports, using a large Excel spreadsheet to organize the material, then plugging in search terms and combing the documents for newsworthy content. They had run into a puzzling incongruity: Assange said the data included dispatches from the beginning of 2004 through the end of 2009, but the material on the spreadsheet ended abruptly in April 2009. A considerable amount of material was missing. Assange, slipping naturally into the role of office geek, explained that they had hit the limits of Excel. Open a second spreadsheet, he instructed. They did, and the rest of the data materialized — a total of 92,000 reports from the battlefields of Afghanistan.
The reporters came to think of Assange as smart and well educated, extremely adept technologically but arrogant, thin-skinned, conspiratorial and oddly credulous. At lunch one day in The Guardian’s cafeteria, Assange recounted with an air of great conviction a story about the archive in Germany that contains the files of the former Communist secret police, the Stasi. This office, Assange asserted, was thoroughly infiltrated by former Stasi agents who were quietly destroying the documents they were entrusted with protecting. The Der Spiegel reporter in the group, John Goetz, who has reported extensively on the Stasi, listened in amazement. That’s utter nonsense, he said. Some former Stasi personnel were hired as security guards in the office, but the records were well protected.
Assange was openly contemptuous of the American government and certain that he was a hunted man. He told the reporters that he had prepared a kind of doomsday option. He had, he said, distributed highly encrypted copies of his entire secret archive to a multitude of supporters, and if WikiLeaks was shut down, or if he was arrested, he would disseminate the key to make the information public.
Schmitt told me that for all Assange’s bombast and dark conspiracy theories, he had a bit of Peter Pan in him. One night, when they were all walking down the street after dinner, Assange suddenly started skipping ahead of the group. Schmitt and Goetz stared, speechless. Then, just as suddenly, Assange stopped, got back in step with them and returned to the conversation he had interrupted.
For the rest of the week Schmitt worked with David Leigh, The Guardian’s investigations editor; Nick Davies, an investigative reporter for the paper; and Goetz, of Der Spiegel, to organize and sort the material. With help from two of The Times’s best computer minds — Andrew Lehren and Aron Pilhofer — they figured out how to assemble the material into a conveniently searchable and secure database.
Journalists are characteristically competitive, but the group worked well together. They brainstormed topics to explore and exchanged search results. Der Spiegel offered to check the logs against incident reports submitted by the German Army to its Parliament — partly as story research, partly as an additional check on authenticity.
Assange provided us the data on the condition that we not write about it before specific dates that WikiLeaks planned on posting the documents on a publicly accessible Web site. The Afghanistan documents would go first, after we had a few weeks to search the material and write our articles. The larger cache of Iraq-related documents would go later. Such embargoes — agreements not to publish information before a set date — are commonplace in journalism. Everything from studies in medical journals to the annual United States budget is released with embargoes. They are a constraint with benefits, the principal one being the chance to actually read and reflect on the material before publishing it into public view. As Assange surely knew, embargoes also tend to build suspense and amplify a story, especially when multiple news outlets broadcast it at once. The embargo was the only condition WikiLeaks would try to impose on us; what we wrote about the material was entirely up to us. Much later, some American news outlets reported that they were offered last-minute access to WikiLeaks documents if they signed contracts with financial penalties for early disclosure. The Times was never asked to sign anything or to pay anything. For WikiLeaks, at least in this first big venture, exposure was its own reward.
Back in New York we assembled a team of reporters, data experts and editors and quartered them in an out-of-the-way office. Andrew Lehren, of our computer-assisted-reporting unit, did the first cut, searching terms on his own or those suggested by other reporters, compiling batches of relevant documents and summarizing the contents. We assigned reporters to specific areas in which they had expertise and gave them password access to rummage in the data. This became the routine we would follow with subsequent archives.
An air of intrigue verging on paranoia permeated the project, perhaps understandably, given that we were dealing with a mass of classified material and a source who acted like a fugitive, changing crash pads, e-mail addresses and cellphones frequently. We used encrypted Web sites. Reporters exchanged notes via Skype, believing it to be somewhat less vulnerable to eavesdropping. On conference calls, we spoke in amateurish code. Assange was always “the source.” The latest data drop was “the package.” When I left New York for two weeks to visit bureaus in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where we assume that communications may be monitored, I was not to be copied on message traffic about the project. I never imagined that any of this would defeat a curious snoop from the National Security Agency or Pakistani intelligence. And I was never entirely sure whether that prospect made me more nervous than the cyberwiles of WikiLeaks itself. At a point when relations between the news organizations and WikiLeaks were rocky, at least three people associated with this project had inexplicable activity in their e-mail that suggested someone was hacking into their accounts.
From consultations with our lawyers, we were confident that reporting on the secret documents could be done within the law, but we speculated about what the government — or some other government — might do to impede our work or exact recriminations. And, the law aside, we felt an enormous moral and ethical obligation to use the material responsibly. While we assumed we had little or no ability to influence what WikiLeaks did, let alone what would happen once this material was loosed in the echo chamber of the blogosphere, that did not free us from the need to exercise care in our own journalism. From the beginning, we agreed that in our articles and in any documents we published from the secret archive, we would excise material that could put lives at risk.
Guided by reporters with extensive experience in the field, we redacted the names of ordinary citizens, local officials, activists, academics and others who had spoken to American soldiers or diplomats. We edited out any details that might reveal ongoing intelligence-gathering operations, military tactics or locations of material that could be used to fashion terrorist weapons. Three reporters with considerable experience of handling military secrets — Eric Schmitt, Michael Gordon and C. J. Chivers — went over the documents we considered posting. Chivers, an ex-Marine who has reported for us from several battlefields, brought a practiced eye and cautious judgment to the business of redaction. If a dispatch noted that Aircraft A left Location B at a certain time and arrived at Location C at a certain time, Chivers edited it out on the off chance that this could teach enemy forces something useful about the capabilities of that aircraft.
The first articles in the project, which we called the War Logs, were scheduled to go up on the Web sites of The Times, The Guardian and Der Spiegel on Sunday, July 25. We approached the White House days before that to get its reaction to the huge breach of secrecy as well as to specific articles we planned to write — including a major one about Pakistan’s ambiguous role as an American ally. On July 24, the day before the War Logs went live, I attended a farewell party for Roger Cohen, a columnist for The Times and The International Herald Tribune, that was given by Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. A voracious consumer of inside information, Holbrooke had a decent idea of what was coming, and he pulled me away from the crowd to show me the fusillade of cabinet-level e-mail ricocheting through his BlackBerry, thus demonstrating both the frantic anxiety in the administration and, not incidentally, the fact that he was very much in the loop. The Pakistan article, in particular, would complicate his life. But one of Holbrooke’s many gifts was his ability to make pretty good lemonade out of the bitterest lemons; he was already spinning the reports of Pakistani duplicity as leverage he could use to pull the Pakistanis back into closer alignment with American interests. Five months later, when Holbrooke — just 69, and seemingly indestructible — died of a torn aorta, I remembered that evening. And what I remembered best was that he was as excited to be on the cusp of a big story as I was.
We posted the articles on NYTimes.com the next day at 5 p.m. — a time picked to reconcile the different publishing schedules of the three publications. I was proud of what a crew of great journalists had done to fashion coherent and instructive reporting from a jumble of raw field reports, mostly composed in a clunky patois of military jargon and acronyms. The reporters supplied context, nuance and skepticism. There was much in that first round of articles worth reading, but my favorite single piece was one of the simplest. Chivers gathered all of the dispatches related to a single, remote, beleaguered American military outpost and stitched them together into a heartbreaking narrative. The dispatches from this outpost represent in miniature the audacious ambitions, gradual disillusionment and ultimate disappointment that Afghanistan has dealt to occupiers over the centuries.
If anyone doubted that the three publications operated independently, the articles we posted that day made it clear that we followed our separate muses. The Guardian, which is an openly left-leaning newspaper, used the first War Logs to emphasize civilian casualties in Afghanistan, claiming the documents disclosed that coalition forces killed “hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents,” underscoring the cost of what the paper called a “failing war.” Our reporters studied the same material but determined that all the major episodes of civilian deaths we found in the War Logs had been reported in The Times, many of them on the front page. (In fact, two of our journalists, Stephen Farrell and Sultan Munadi, were kidnapped by the Taliban while investigating one major episode near Kunduz. Munadi was killed during an ensuing rescue by British paratroopers.) The civilian deaths that had not been previously reported came in ones and twos and did not add up to anywhere near “hundreds.” Moreover, since several were either duplicated or missing from the reports, we concluded that an overall tally would be little better than a guess.
Another example: The Times gave prominence to the dispatches reflecting American suspicions that Pakistani intelligence was playing a double game in Afghanistan — nodding to American interests while abetting the Taliban. We buttressed the interesting anecdotal material of Pakistani double-dealing with additional reporting. The Guardian was unimpressed by those dispatches and treated them more dismissively.
Three months later, with the French daily Le Monde added to the group, we published Round 2, the Iraq War Logs, including articles on how the United States turned a blind eye to the torture of prisoners by Iraqi forces working with the U.S., how Iraq spawned an extraordinary American military reliance on private contractors and how extensively Iran had meddled in the conflict.
By this time, The Times’s relationship with our source had gone from wary to hostile. I talked to Assange by phone a few times and heard out his complaints. He was angry that we declined to link our online coverage of the War Logs to the WikiLeaks Web site, a decision we made because we feared — rightly, as it turned out — that its trove would contain the names of low-level informants and make them Taliban targets. “Where’s the respect?” he demanded. “Where’s the respect?” Another time he called to tell me how much he disliked our profile of Bradley Manning, the Army private suspected of being the source of WikiLeaks’s most startling revelations. The article traced Manning’s childhood as an outsider and his distress as a gay man in the military. Assange complained that we “psychologicalized” Manning and gave short shrift to his “political awakening.”
The final straw was a front-page profile of Assange by John Burns and Ravi Somaiya, published Oct. 24, that revealed fractures within WikiLeaks, attributed by Assange’s critics to his imperious management style. Assange denounced the article to me, and in various public forums, as “a smear.”
Assange was transformed by his outlaw celebrity. The derelict with the backpack and the sagging socks now wore his hair dyed and styled, and he favored fashionably skinny suits and ties. He became a kind of cult figure for the European young and leftish and was evidently a magnet for women. Two Swedish women filed police complaints claiming that Assange insisted on having sex without a condom; Sweden’s strict laws on nonconsensual sex categorize such behavior as rape, and a prosecutor issued a warrant to question Assange, who initially described it as a plot concocted to silence or discredit WikiLeaks.
I came to think of Julian Assange as a character from a Stieg Larsson thriller — a man who could figure either as hero or villain in one of the megaselling Swedish novels that mix hacker counterculture, high-level conspiracy and sex as both recreation and violation.
In October, WikiLeaks gave The Guardian its third archive, a quarter of a million communications between the U.S. State Department and its outposts around the globe. This time, Assange imposed a new condition: The Guardian was not to share the material with The New York Times. Indeed, he told Guardian journalists that he opened discussions with two other American news organizations — The Washington Post and the McClatchy chain — and intended to invite them in as replacements for The Times. He also enlarged his recipient list to include El País, the leading Spanish-language newspaper.
The Guardian was uncomfortable with Assange’s condition. By now the journalists from The Times and The Guardian had a good working relationship. The Times provided a large American audience for the revelations, as well as access to the U.S. government for comment and context. And given the potential legal issues and public reaction, it was good to have company in the trenches. Besides, we had come to believe that Assange was losing control of his stockpile of secrets. An independent journalist, Heather Brooke, had obtained material from a WikiLeaks dissident and joined in a loose alliance with The Guardian. Over the coming weeks, batches of cables would pop up in newspapers in Lebanon, Australia and Norway. David Leigh, The Guardian’s investigations editor, concluded that these rogue leaks released The Guardian from any pledge, and he gave us the cables.
On Nov. 1, Assange and two of his lawyers burst into Alan Rusbridger’s office, furious that The Guardian was asserting greater independence and suspicious that The Times might be in possession of the embassy cables. Over the course of an eight-hour meeting, Assange intermittently raged against The Times — especially over our front-page profile — while The Guardian journalists tried to calm him. In midstorm, Rusbridger called me to report on Assange’s grievances and relay his demand for a front-page apology in The Times. Rusbridger knew that this was a nonstarter, but he was buying time for the tantrum to subside. In the end, both he and Georg Mascolo, editor in chief of Der Spiegel, made clear that they intended to continue their collaboration with The Times; Assange could take it or leave it. Given that we already had all of the documents, Assange had little choice. Over the next two days, the news organizations agreed on a timetable for publication.
The following week, we sent Ian Fisher, a deputy foreign editor who was a principal coordinator on our processing of the embassy cables, to London to work out final details. The meeting went smoothly, even after Assange arrived. “Freakishly good behavior,” Fisher e-mailed me afterward. “No yelling or crazy mood swings.” But after dinner, as Fisher was leaving, Assange smirked and offered a parting threat: “Tell me, are you in contact with your legal counsel?” Fisher replied that he was. “You had better be,” Assange said.
Fisher left London with an understanding that we would continue to have access to the material. But just in case, we took out a competitive insurance policy. We had Scott Shane, a Washington correspondent, pull together a long, just-in-case article summing up highlights of the cables, which we could quickly post on our Web site. If WikiLeaks sprang another leak, we would be ready.
Because of the range of the material and the very nature of diplomacy, the embassy cables were bound to be more explosive than the War Logs. Dean Baquet, our Washington bureau chief, gave the White House an early warning on Nov. 19. The following Tuesday, two days before Thanksgiving, Baquet and two colleagues were invited to a windowless room at the State Department, where they encountered an unsmiling crowd. Representatives from the White House, the State Department, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the F.B.I. and the Pentagon gathered around a conference table. Others, who never identified themselves, lined the walls. A solitary note-taker tapped away on a computer.
The meeting was off the record, but it is fair to say the mood was tense. Scott Shane, one reporter who participated in the meeting, described “an undertone of suppressed outrage and frustration.”
Subsequent meetings, which soon gave way to daily conference calls, were more businesslike. Before each discussion, our Washington bureau sent over a batch of specific cables that we intended to use in the coming days. They were circulated to regional specialists, who funneled their reactions to a small group at State, who came to our daily conversations with a list of priorities and arguments to back them up. We relayed the government’s concerns, and our own decisions regarding them, to the other news outlets.
The administration’s concerns generally fell into three categories. First was the importance of protecting individuals who had spoken candidly to American diplomats in oppressive countries. We almost always agreed on those and were grateful to the government for pointing out some we overlooked.
“We were all aware of dire stakes for some of the people named in the cables if we failed to obscure their identities,” Shane wrote to me later, recalling the nature of the meetings. Like many of us, Shane has worked in countries where dissent can mean prison or worse. “That sometimes meant not just removing the name but also references to institutions that might give a clue to an identity and sometimes even the dates of conversations, which might be compared with surveillance tapes of an American Embassy to reveal who was visiting the diplomats that day.”
The second category included sensitive American programs, usually related to intelligence. We agreed to withhold some of this information, like a cable describing an intelligence-sharing program that took years to arrange and might be lost if exposed. In other cases, we went away convinced that publication would cause some embarrassment but no real harm.
The third category consisted of cables that disclosed candid comments by and about foreign officials, including heads of state. The State Department feared publication would strain relations with those countries. We were mostly unconvinced.
The embassy cables were a different kind of treasure from the War Logs. For one thing, they covered the entire globe — virtually every embassy, consulate and interest section that the United States maintains. They contained the makings of many dozens of stories: candid American appraisals of foreign leaders, narratives of complicated negotiations, allegations of corruption and duplicity, countless behind-the-scenes insights. Some of the material was of narrow local interest; some of it had global implications. Some provided authoritative versions of events not previously fully understood. Some consisted of rumor and flimsy speculation.
Unlike most of the military dispatches, the embassy cables were written in clear English, sometimes with wit, color and an ear for dialogue. (“Who knew,” one of our English colleagues marveled, “that American diplomats could write?”)
Even more than the military logs, the diplomatic cables called for context and analysis. It was important to know, for example, that cables sent from an embassy are routinely dispatched over the signature of the ambassador and those from the State Department are signed by the secretary of state, regardless of whether the ambassador or secretary had actually seen the material. It was important to know that much of the communication between Washington and its outposts is given even more restrictive classification — top secret or higher — and was thus missing from this trove. We searched in vain, for example, for military or diplomatic reports on the fate of Pat Tillman, the former football star and Army Ranger who was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan. We found no reports on how Osama bin Laden eluded American forces in the mountains of Tora Bora. (In fact, we found nothing but second- and thirdhand rumors about bin Laden.) If such cables exist, they were presumably classified top secret or higher.
And it was important to remember that diplomatic cables are versions of events. They can be speculative. They can be ambiguous. They can be wrong.
One of our first articles drawn from the diplomatic cables, for example, reported on a secret intelligence assessment that Iran had obtained a supply of advanced missiles from North Korea, missiles that could reach European capitals. Outside experts long suspected that Iran obtained missile parts but not the entire weapons, so this glimpse of the official view was revealing. The Washington Post fired back with a different take, casting doubt on whether the missile in question had been transferred to Iran or whether it was even a workable weapon. We went back to the cables — and the experts — and concluded in a subsequent article that the evidence presented “a murkier picture.”
The tension between a newspaper’s obligation to inform and the government’s responsibility to protect is hardly new. At least until this year, nothing The Times did on my watch caused nearly so much agitation as two articles we published about tactics employed by the Bush administration after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. The first, which was published in 2005 and won a Pulitzer Prize, revealed that the National Security Agency was eavesdropping on domestic phone conversations and e-mail without the legal courtesy of a warrant. The other, published in 2006, described a vast Treasury Department program to screen international banking records.
I have vivid memories of sitting in the Oval Office as President George W. Bush tried to persuade me and the paper’s publisher to withhold the eavesdropping story, saying that if we published it, we should share the blame for the next terrorist attack. We were unconvinced by his argument and published the story, and the reaction from the government — and conservative commentators in particular — was vociferous.
This time around, the Obama administration’s reaction was different. It was, for the most part, sober and professional. The Obama White House, while strongly condemning WikiLeaks for making the documents public, did not seek an injunction to halt publication. There was no Oval Office lecture. On the contrary, in our discussions before publication of our articles, White House officials, while challenging some of the conclusions we drew from the material, thanked us for handling the documents with care. The secretaries of state and defense and the attorney general resisted the opportunity for a crowd-pleasing orgy of press bashing. There has been no serious official talk — unless you count an ambiguous hint by Senator Joseph Lieberman — of pursuing news organizations in the courts. Though the release of these documents was certainly embarrassing, the relevant government agencies actually engaged with us in an attempt to prevent the release of material genuinely damaging to innocent individuals or to the national interest.
The broader public reaction was mixed — more critical in the first days; more sympathetic as readers absorbed the articles and the sky did not fall; and more hostile to WikiLeaks in the U.S. than in Europe, where there is often a certain pleasure in seeing the last superpower taken down a peg.
In the days after we began our respective series based on the embassy cables, Alan Rusbridger and I went online to answer questions from readers. The Guardian, whose readership is more sympathetic to the guerrilla sensibilities of WikiLeaks, was attacked for being too fastidious about redacting the documents: How dare you censor this material? What are you hiding? Post everything now! The mail sent to The Times, at least in the first day or two, came from the opposite field. Many readers were indignant and alarmed: Who needs this? How dare you? What gives you the right?
Much of the concern reflected a genuine conviction that in perilous times the president needs extraordinary powers, unfettered by Congressional oversight, court meddling or the strictures of international law and certainly safe from nosy reporters. That is compounded by a popular sense that the elite media have become too big for their britches and by the fact that our national conversation has become more polarized and strident.
Although it is our aim to be impartial in our presentation of the news, our attitude toward these issues is far from indifferent. The journalists at The Times have a large and personal stake in the country’s security. We live and work in a city that has been tragically marked as a favorite terrorist target, and in the wake of 9/11 our journalists plunged into the ruins to tell the story of what happened here. Moreover, The Times has nine staff correspondents assigned to the two wars still being waged in the wake of that attack, plus a rotating cast of photographers, visiting writers and scores of local stringers and support staff. They work in this high-risk environment because, while there are many places you can go for opinions about the war, there are few places — and fewer by the day — where you can go to find honest, on-the-scene reporting about what is happening. We take extraordinary precautions to keep them safe, but we have had two of our Iraqi journalists murdered for doing their jobs. We have had four journalists held hostage by the Taliban — two of them for seven months. We had one Afghan journalist killed in a rescue attempt. Last October, while I was in Kabul, we got word that a photographer embedded for us with troops near Kandahar stepped on an improvised mine and lost both his legs.
We are invested in the struggle against murderous extremism in another sense. The virulent hatred espoused by terrorists, judging by their literature, is directed not just against our people and our buildings but also at our values and at our faith in the self-government of an informed electorate. If the freedom of the press makes some Americans uneasy, it is anathema to the ideologists of terror.
So we have no doubts about where our sympathies lie in this clash of values. And yet we cannot let those sympathies transform us into propagandists, even for a system we respect.
I’m the first to admit that news organizations, including this one, sometimes get things wrong. We can be overly credulous (as in some of the prewar reporting about Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction) or overly cynical about official claims and motives. We may err on the side of keeping secrets (President Kennedy reportedly wished, after the fact, that The Times had published what it knew about the planned Bay of Pigs invasion, which possibly would have helped avert a bloody debacle) or on the side of exposing them. We make the best judgments we can. When we get things wrong, we try to correct the record. A free press in a democracy can be messy. But the alternative is to give the government a veto over what its citizens are allowed to know. Anyone who has worked in countries where the news diet is controlled by the government can sympathize with Thomas Jefferson’s oft-quoted remark that he would rather have newspapers without government than government without newspapers.
The intentions of our founders have rarely been as well articulated as they were by Justice Hugo Black 40 years ago, concurring with the Supreme Court ruling that stopped the government from suppressing the secret Vietnam War history called the Pentagon Papers: “The government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.”
There is no neat formula for maintaining this balance. In practice, the tension between our obligation to inform and the government’s obligation to protect plays out in a set of rituals. As one of my predecessors, Max Frankel, then the Washington bureau chief, wrote in a wise affidavit filed during the Pentagon Papers case: “For the vast majority of ‘secrets,’ there has developed between the government and the press (and Congress) a rather simple rule of thumb: The government hides what it can, pleading necessity as long as it can, and the press pries out what it can, pleading a need and a right to know. Each side in this ‘game’ regularly ‘wins’ and ‘loses’ a round or two. Each fights with the weapons at its command. When the government loses a secret or two, it simply adjusts to a new reality.”
In fact, leaks of classified material — sometimes authorized — are part of the way business is conducted in Washington, as one wing of the bureaucracy tries to one-up another or officials try to shift blame or claim credit or advance or confound a particular policy. For further evidence that our government is highly selective in its approach to secrets, look no further than Bob Woodward’s all-but-authorized accounts of the innermost deliberations of our government.
The government surely cheapens secrecy by deploying it so promiscuously. According to the Pentagon, about 500,000 people have clearance to use the database from which the secret cables were pilfered. Weighing in on the WikiLeaks controversy in The Guardian, Max Frankel remarked that secrets shared with such a legion of “cleared” officials, including low-level army clerks, “are not secret.” Governments, he wrote, “must decide that the random rubber-stamping of millions of papers and computer files each year does not a security system make.”
Beyond the basic question of whether the press should publish secrets, criticism of the WikiLeaks documents generally fell into three themes: 1. That the documents were of dubious value, because they told us nothing we didn’t already know. 2. That the disclosures put lives at risk — either directly, by identifying confidential informants, or indirectly, by complicating our ability to build alliances against terror. 3. That by doing business with an organization like WikiLeaks, The Times and other news organizations compromised their impartiality and independence.
I’m a little puzzled by the complaint that most of the embassy traffic we disclosed did not profoundly change our understanding of how the world works. Ninety-nine percent of what we read or hear on the news does not profoundly change our understanding of how the world works. News mostly advances by inches and feet, not in great leaps. The value of these documents — and I believe they have immense value — is not that they expose some deep, unsuspected perfidy in high places or that they upend your whole view of the world. For those who pay close attention to foreign policy, these documents provide texture, nuance and drama. They deepen and correct your understanding of how things unfold; they raise or lower your estimation of world leaders. For those who do not follow these subjects as closely, the stories are an opportunity to learn more. If a project like this makes readers pay attention, think harder, understand more clearly what is being done in their name, then we have performed a public service. And that does not count the impact of these revelations on the people most touched by them. WikiLeaks cables in which American diplomats recount the extravagant corruption of Tunisia’s rulers helped fuel a popular uprising that has overthrown the government.
As for the risks posed by these releases, they are real. WikiLeaks’s first data dump, the publication of the Afghanistan War Logs, included the names of scores of Afghans that The Times and other news organizations had carefully purged from our own coverage. Several news organizations, including ours, reported this dangerous lapse, and months later a Taliban spokesman claimed that Afghan insurgents had been perusing the WikiLeaks site and making a list. I anticipate, with dread, the day we learn that someone identified in those documents has been killed.
WikiLeaks was roundly criticized for its seeming indifference to the safety of those informants, and in its subsequent postings it has largely followed the example of the news organizations and redacted material that could get people jailed or killed. Assange described it as a “harm minimization” policy. In the case of the Iraq war documents, WikiLeaks applied a kind of robo-redaction software that stripped away names (and rendered the documents almost illegible). With the embassy cables, WikiLeaks posted mostly documents that had already been redacted by The Times and its fellow news organizations. And there were instances in which WikiLeaks volunteers suggested measures to enhance the protection of innocents. For example, someone at WikiLeaks noticed that if the redaction of a phrase revealed the exact length of the words, an alert foreign security service might match the number of letters to a name and affiliation and thus identify the source. WikiLeaks advised everyone to substitute a dozen uppercase X’s for each redacted passage, no matter how long or short.
Whether WikiLeaks’s “harm minimization” is adequate, and whether it will continue, is beyond my power to predict or influence. WikiLeaks does not take guidance from The New York Times. In the end, I can answer only for what my own paper has done, and I believe we have behaved responsibly.
The idea that the mere publication of such a wholesale collection of secrets will make other countries less willing to do business with our diplomats seems to me questionable. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates called this concern “overwrought.” Foreign governments cooperate with us, he pointed out, not because they necessarily love us, not because they trust us to keep their secrets, but because they need us. It may be that for a time diplomats will choose their words more carefully or circulate their views more narrowly, but WikiLeaks has not repealed the laws of self-interest. A few weeks after we began publishing articles about the embassy cables, David Sanger, our chief Washington correspondent, told me: “At least so far, the evidence that foreign leaders are no longer talking to American diplomats is scarce. I’ve heard about nervous jokes at the beginning of meetings, along the lines of ‘When will I be reading about this conversation?’ But the conversations are happening. . . . American diplomacy has hardly screeched to a halt.”
As for our relationship with WikiLeaks, Julian Assange has been heard to boast that he served as a kind of puppet master, recruiting several news organizations, forcing them to work in concert and choreographing their work. This is characteristic braggadocio — or, as my Guardian colleagues would say, bollocks. Throughout this experience we have treated Assange as a source. I will not say “a source, pure and simple,” because as any reporter or editor can attest, sources are rarely pure or simple, and Assange was no exception. But the relationship with sources is straightforward: you don’t necessarily endorse their agenda, echo their rhetoric, take anything they say at face value, applaud their methods or, most important, allow them to shape or censor your journalism. Your obligation, as an independent news organization, is to verify the material, to supply context, to exercise responsible judgment about what to publish and what not to publish and to make sense of it. That is what we did.
But while I do not regard Assange as a partner, and I would hesitate to describe what WikiLeaks does as journalism, it is chilling to contemplate the possible government prosecution of WikiLeaks for making secrets public, let alone the passage of new laws to punish the dissemination of classified information, as some have advocated. Taking legal recourse against a government official who violates his trust by divulging secrets he is sworn to protect is one thing. But criminalizing the publication of such secrets by someone who has no official obligation seems to me to run up against the First Amendment and the best traditions of this country. As one of my colleagues asks: If Assange were an understated professorial type rather than a character from a missing Stieg Larsson novel, and if WikiLeaks were not suffused with such glib antipathy toward the United States, would the reaction to the leaks be quite so ferocious? And would more Americans be speaking up against the threat of reprisals?
Whether the arrival of WikiLeaks has fundamentally changed the way journalism is made, I will leave to others and to history. Frankly, I think the impact of WikiLeaks on the culture has probably been overblown. Long before WikiLeaks was born, the Internet transformed the landscape of journalism, creating a wide-open and global market with easier access to audiences and sources, a quicker metabolism, a new infrastructure for sharing and vetting information and a diminished respect for notions of privacy and secrecy. Assange has claimed credit on several occasions for creating something he calls “scientific journalism,” meaning that readers are given the raw material to judge for themselves whether the journalistic write-ups are trustworthy. But newspapers have been publishing texts of documents almost as long as newspapers have existed — and ever since the Internet eliminated space restrictions, we have done so copiously.
Nor is it clear to me that WikiLeaks represents some kind of cosmic triumph of transparency. If the official allegations are to be believed, most of WikiLeaks’s great revelations came from a single anguished Army private — anguished enough to risk many years in prison. It’s possible that the creation of online information brokers like WikiLeaks and OpenLeaks, a breakaway site announced in December by a former Assange colleague named Daniel Domscheit-Berg, will be a lure for whistle-blowers and malcontents who fear being caught consorting directly with a news organization like mine. But I suspect we have not reached a state of information anarchy. At least not yet.
As 2010 wound down, The Times and its news partners held a conference call to discuss where we go from here. The initial surge of articles drawn from the secret cables was over. More would trickle out but without a fixed schedule. We agreed to continue the redaction process, and we agreed we would all urge WikiLeaks to do the same. But this period of intense collaboration, and of regular contact with our source, was coming to a close.
Just before Christmas, Ian Katz, The Guardian’s deputy editor, went to see Assange, who had been arrested in London on the Swedish warrant, briefly jailed and bailed out by wealthy admirers and was living under house arrest in a country manor in East Anglia while he fought Sweden’s attempt to extradite him. The flow of donations to WikiLeaks, which he claimed hit 100,000 euros a day at its peak, was curtailed when Visa, MasterCard and PayPal refused to be conduits for contributors — prompting a concerted assault on the Web sites of those companies by Assange’s hacker sympathizers. He would soon sign a lucrative book deal to finance his legal struggles.
The Guardian seemed to have joined The Times on Assange’s enemies list, first for sharing the diplomatic cables with us, then for obtaining and reporting on the unredacted record of the Swedish police complaints against Assange. (Live by the leak. . . .) In his fury at this perceived betrayal, Assange granted an interview to The Times of London, in which he vented his displeasure with our little media consortium. If he thought this would ingratiate him with The Guardian rival, he was naïve. The paper happily splashed its exclusive interview, then followed it with an editorial calling Assange a fool and a hypocrite.
At the mansion in East Anglia, Assange seated Katz before a roaring fire in the drawing room and ruminated for four hours about the Swedish case, his financial troubles and his plan for a next phase of releases. He talked vaguely about secrets still in his quiver, including what he regards as a damning cache of e-mail from inside an American bank.
He spun out an elaborate version of a U.S. Justice Department effort to exact punishment for his assault on American secrecy. If he was somehow extradited to the United States, he said, “I would still have a high chance of being killed in the U.S. prison system, Jack Ruby style, given the continual calls for my murder by senior and influential U.S. politicians.”
While Assange mused darkly in his exile, one of his lawyers sent out a mock Christmas card that suggested at least someone on the WikiLeaks team was not lacking a sense of the absurd.
The message:
“Dear kids,
Santa is Mum & Dad.
Love,
WikiLeaks.”
A version of this article appeared in print on January 30, 2011, on page MM32 of the Sunday Magazine
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