Alan S. Blinder is one
of America's leading economists. One of the few economists who write
really well, he is also a master storyteller. In "After the Music
Stopped," Mr. Blinder, previously a vice chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board and, before that, a member of President Clinton's Council of
Economic Advisers, gives his interpretation of the events leading to the
U.S. financial crisis, the financial crisis itself, and the Bush and
Obama administrations' response. It is one of the best books yet about
the financial crisis.
After the Music Stopped
By Alan S. Blinder
The Penguin Press, 476 pages, $29.95
EPA
pendant le delugeA display of
stock market indexes, including the Dow Jones at top left, in Tokyo on
Oct. 10, 2008—the end of a week in which the Dow fell 18%.
Mr.
Blinder, a professor at Princeton and a regular contributor to the
Journal's editorial page, tells the story in basically chronological
order, gives citations for almost all the important facts he marshals
and, refreshingly, tells the reader when he sees himself as making
judgment calls in controversial cases. Unfortunately, he also makes
judgments on controversial issues that he does not see as (or concede to
be) controversial. He also minimizes the role of the government in
creating the crisis, omitting important facts that contradict his
argument. He describes the financial industry as an example of
laissez-faire, though in reality it is highly regulated. The latter
claim allows him to blame on the private sector what was really the
joint responsibility of a regulated industry and its regulators.
Finally, and most strikingly, Mr. Blinder has faith in government's
power to make things better despite his own exposition of a series of
government actions that he himself admits were mistakes.
Let's begin with the most important of
the relatively uncontroversial points that Mr. Blinder makes about the
financial crisis. It began with the housing price bubble between 1997
and 2006 and the subsequent collapse of housing prices over the next few
years. A major cause of the bubble was that many mortgage lenders lent
to people whom anyone with common sense would have seen to be really bad
risks. In addition, mortgages had been sliced, diced and repackaged
into securities, so that a given person's mortgage was not held by one
individual or one firm, making it hard for borrower and lender to come
to terms after the house's value fell. Finally, the credit-rating
agencies failed spectacularly to do their job. Had the three major firms
that rate bonds—Standard & Poor's,
Moody's
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and Fitch—assessed various mortgage-backed securities accurately, many
bond buyers would have been prepared for the risks they were taking and
some would not have bought the bonds at all. These facts are all pretty
much agreed on, and Mr. Blinder does an excellent job of laying them out
in the first third of his book.
A
somewhat more controversial claim Mr. Blinder makes (but one I agree
with) is that the turning point in the financial crisis was the federal
government's refusal, in September 2008, to bail out Lehman Brothers.
"The Lehman decision," writes Mr. Blinder, "abruptly and surprisingly
tore the perceived rulebook into pieces and tossed it out the window."
Now market participants began to think that the federal government would
let large financial firms fail. Mr. Blinder sees this as so important a
turning point that he refers frequently to Sept. 15, the day Lehman
filed for bankruptcy, as "Lehman Day." Had the feds bailed out Lehman,
he argues, the panic that hit Wall Street would have been less extreme.
But Mr. Blinder omits a crucial fact
about Lehman, one that, by itself, explains why the huge drop in value
of Lehman's mortgage-backed securities led to its collapse: the effect
of changes in federal bankruptcy law. Thanks to the 2005 Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, when Lehman went bankrupt
it could not simply, as in earlier days, pay holders of derivatives as
much as possible with its assets. Instead, it had to give each
derivative holder a new contract identical to the one it had signed with
Lehman, but with a different counterparty. Lehman would also have to
pay the transaction cost of the new contract. Such costs are typically
about 0.15% of the contract's total value. That's small, right? No. When
Lehman went bankrupt, the face value of Lehman's derivative contracts
was $35 trillion—with a "t." The transaction costs alone were $52.5
billion. That is what sank Lehman.
Mr. Blinder also points out that
Reserve Primary Fund, the "world's oldest money market mutual fund," had
1.2% of its assets invested in commercial paper—that is, short-term
bonds—issued by Lehman. With the value of Lehman's bonds falling after
it went bankrupt, Reserve Primary Fund had to "break the buck." Until
then, most people thought that the value of each share in a money-market
fund (MMF) would always be $1. Depositors thought that if they had,
say, 1,000 shares in the fund, they could redeem them for $1,000. Yet
the value could actually fall if the underlying assets lost enough
value.
When depositors tried to withdraw their
funds, Reserve started paying them 97 cents for shares that depositors
expected to be worth $1—thus "breaking the buck." Investors in other
money-market funds, fearing something similar, started redeeming their
shares. In just one week in late September, depositors withdrew $350
billion from MMFs. As other MMFs sold commercial paper to generate the
funds to redeem their customers' shares, the value of commercial paper
fell further. One Federal Reserve economist quoted by Mr. Blinder
recalled that "we were staring into the abyss" and "there wasn't a
bottom to this." That led Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to get
President Bush's permission to set up insurance for MMF depositors. It
worked, and the outflow from MMFs stopped.
This bailout, according to Mr. Blinder,
was "sorely needed" to stem the fire sale of commercial paper. But
that's highly debatable. Had the Treasury made clear that it would not
bail out MMFs, then many of them would have also had to "break the
buck." Once depositors knew there was no gain from getting their funds
out early, the run on MMFs would have ended, thus stopping, or
dramatically slowing, the plunge in value of commercial paper.
Mr. Blinder is a strong believer in the
ability of government regulation to solve problems and even prevent
them in the first place. He sees the private sector as mainly to blame
for the housing and financial crises and criticizes "laissez-faire"
economic policies adopted by the Clinton and Bush administrations that
supposedly contributed. But I do not think that term means what he
thinks it means. Laissez-faire has traditionally meant that the
government keeps its hands off the economy and allows for economic
freedom. But at times, Mr. Blinder applies the term to cases in which
the government, once its hands were already all over the economy, didn't
take the additional steps he favored.
At other times he does use the term in
its traditional sense but fails to establish that it applies. Consider,
for example, three major forms of government intervention that helped
cause the housing bubble: (1) the
Federal National Mortgage Association
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(Fannie Mae) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
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(Freddie Mac); (2) the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act, which requires
banks to lend mortgage money to people who are bad risks; and (3)
federal deposit insurance. During the years when the housing bubble
developed, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac contributed by relaxing their
mortgage lending standards so that they were buying subprime
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Mr. Blinder himself notes that, by
2004, Fannie and Freddie owned a third of all subprime MBS. This figure
was down to 17% by the summer of 2007, but, as Mr. Blinder admits, 17%
is still a large number.
Part of the
reason for the size of these holdings, Mr. Blinder notes, is that
Fannie and Freddie were pressured by the "affordable housing goals" of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Interestingly, although
the Community Reinvestment Act, whose enforcement Mr. Blinder's
previous boss, President Clinton, beefed up in 1995, was part of the
"affordable housing goals," Mr. Blinder never names that legislation. In
any case, this does not sound like laissez-faire.
Finally, consider the role of deposit
insurance. By insuring 100% of bank deposits up to $100,000 (and, later,
$250,000), the federal government substantially weakened depositors'
incentives to monitor their banks' lending practices. Even Franklin D.
Roosevelt, whose administration introduced deposit insurance in 1933,
spoke eloquently of this downside. And the $250,000 limit, moreover, is
not really a firm cap. Wealthy people can legally avoid it with the help
of firms such as Promontory Interfinancial Network, which divide
deposits held in one bank into smaller deposits in many banks. Mr.
Blinder well knows this; as he reveals in a footnote, he is a part owner
of Promontory. Again, this is not laissez-faire. Banking is one of the
most heavily regulated industries in the United States.
None of this is to say that the
financial crisis would not have happened without these three
interventions. The private sector had a large role, and unjustified
optimism is not limited to the government sector. It is to say, though,
that the financial crisis would not have been as bad had the government
been truly laissez-faire.
So once the financial crisis happened,
what was to be done? Mr. Blinder devotes the bulk of his book to the
immediate response to the crisis as well as to ways for avoiding a
repeat. He praises the Troubled Asset Relief Program and points out that
the net cost of TARP to taxpayers is not the $700 billion that was
budgeted for but, rather, a much more modest $32 billion. But there was
another way to go, the way Alan Greenspan handled the 1987 stock market
crash, the Y2K episode in 1999 and 2000, and the post-9/11 economy. That
way was to have the Fed purchase Treasury bills through open-market
operations to make sure the economy had ample liquidity. In all three
cases, it worked.
Many people think that that's exactly
what Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke did when the crisis hit, but
he did not. Mr. Blinder, to his credit, recognizes this, pointing out
that, although the Fed changed its composition of assets, it had little
effect on the money supply. He makes this point briefly, but in a 2011
article San Jose State University economist Jeffrey R. Hummel provides
chapter and verse, noting that Mr. Bernanke took on extensive
discretionary power to favor some financial assets over others. As Mr.
Hummel puts it, under Mr. Bernanke "central banking has become the new
central planning." Mr. Blinder seems to sense this but, unfortunately,
does not pursue the point.
Mr. Blinder is a Keynesian, that is,
someone who believes that the federal government should use fiscal
policy—changing taxes and government spending—to stabilize the aggregate
demand for goods and services. He therefore favored the stimulus policy
that President Obama adopted his second month in office. Mr. Obama had
the government increase spending in order to create more demand for
goods. But Mr. Blinder is relatively unconcerned about whether the money
was spent on valuable items. He has what I call the "GDP fetish"—the
belief that increases in GDP are good whether or not they represent
increased production of things that people actually value. If the
government spends $100 billion digging holes and then filling them back
up, then GDP can rise by $100 billion or more even if the $100 billion
is totally wasted. Some stimulus projects, in fact, are little better
than hole-digging. One example I noted on a recent visit to Detroit is
the tearing up of sidewalk corners to make them wheelchair-friendly,
even though the sidewalks themselves have so many craters that people in
wheelchairs use the roads instead. With his faith in government
intervention, Mr. Blinder sees the corners but not the craters.
—Mr. Henderson is a research fellow with the Hoover Institution and
an economics professor at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.
A version of this article appeared January 19,
2013, on page C5 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with
the headline: When the Rain Came Down.