Brasil-Argentina: destravando o comercio bilateral (?) Alguem acredita? - Estadao

Vejam os temos da matéria: 
- assinatura de um memorando de entendimento (ou seja, depende...);
- os dois países se comprometeram a "analisar a possibilidade de emitir títulos em moeda nacional (ou seja, a coisa é meio teórica...);
- esse é o "primeiro passo para destravar o comércio entre os países" (quantos passos mais serão necessários para simplesmente cumprir o tratado do Mercosul?);
- se estuda a criação de instrumentos de hedge cambial (xiii, esquece...);
- Não há um valor estipulado previamente... (ou seja, vai ter de começar tudo outra vez...);
- os dois países vão trabalhar para colocá-lo em prática... (mas o que é que fizeram, mesmo, os dois ministros?).
Bem, esquece, OK...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasil e Argentina assinam acordo para destravar comércio bilateral

Governos tentarão mitigar os riscos cambiais, por meio de instrumentos financeiros, e agilizar os trâmites alfandegários

28 de março de 2014 | 21h 29

Fernando Travaglini - Agência Estado

COSTA DO SAUÍPE - O ministro do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior, Mauro Borges, anunciou na noite desta sexta-feira, 28, a assinatura de um memorando de entendimento com a Argentina para facilitar o comércio entre os dois países. Em acordo assinado com o ministro da economia argentino, Axel Kicillof, os dois países se comprometeram a "analisar a possibilidade de emitir títulos em moeda nacional com correção cambial em prazos compatíveis" com os financiamentos à exportação. Reafirmaram ainda que vão "agilizar" os trâmites alfandegários.

NOTÍCIAS RELACIONADAS

• Linha para comércio com Argentina perto de sair
• Mercosul e UE irão estudar propostas para livre comércio a partir de maio
• Brasil e Argentina trabalham por pacto Mercosul/UE
• Brasil dará crédito para importação da Argentina
• Brasil e Argentina definem financiamento a comércio

Segundo o ministro brasileiro, esse é o "primeiro passo para destravar o comércio entre os países", que passa por dificuldades recentes em função tanto de restrições impostas pela Argentina quanto pela escassez de dólares. "Os dois governos se comprometem em atuar como facilitadores de operações financeiras privadas", disse Borges.

Como explicou o ministro, o que se estuda é a criação de instrumentos de hedge cambial, que funcionarão como garantia para viabilizar os financiamentos à exportação já existentes no mercado privado. Esses mecanismos de proteção poderão ser públicos ou privados, completou Borges, sem dar detalhes. "Os governos vão estimular uma estrutura de proteção cambial do lado do importador", disse o ministro.

Pelo acordo, caso não haja disponibilidade de instrumentos financeiros para mitigar os riscos cambiais, após a concretização de um empréstimo ao exportador, com prazo mínimo de 90 dias, os dois países se comprometem a "analisar a possibilidade de emitir títulos em moeda nacional com correção cambial em prazos compatíveis com os previstos" pelos financiamentos.

Ainda segundo o memorando assinado, os países reafirmaram o "compromisso de entrada no país importador dos fluxos comerciais", garantindo "agilidade aos trâmites administrativos e aduaneiros". Esse ponto tenta reverter a demora na liberação de produtos brasileiros por parte da alfândega argentina.

Não há um valor estipulado previamente para esses mecanismos, mas o ministro afirmou acreditar que um montante ao redor de US$ 2 bilhões será suficiente para dar liquidez ao comércio bilateral entre Brasil e Argentina. O memorando vale a partir de hoje, e os dois países vão trabalhar para colocá-lo em prática. 

Rogoff-Reinhart: Sorry, recoveries are not so different...

Sorry, U.S. Recoveries Really Aren’t Different

By Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff 

Bloomberg News, Oct 15, 2012

Five years after the onset of the 2007 subprime financial crisis, U.S. gross domestic product per capita remains below its initial level. Unemployment, though down from its peak, is still about 8 percent. Rather than the V- shaped recovery that is typical of most postwar recessions, this one has exhibited slow and halting growth.

This disappointing performance shouldn’t be surprising. We have presented evidence that recessions associated with systemic banking crises tend to be deep and protracted and that this pattern is evident across both history and countries. Subsequent academic research using different approaches and samples has found similar results.

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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Maddison (2006), GDP per capita from Total Economy Database, Conference Board. Notes: Total GDP per capita in 1990 US dollars (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs).

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Figure 2. Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical Statistics of the United States, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) Average annual unemployment rates. The change from the level at the outset is the simple difference; for example the unemployment rate in 2007 was 4.6 percent so the difference from 2011 (when the unemployment rate is 9 percent) is 4.4 percent.

Recently, however, a few op-ed writers have argued that, in fact, the U.S. is “different” and that international comparisons aren’t relevant because of profound institutional differences from one country to another. Some of these authors, includingKevin Hassett, Glenn Hubbard and John Taylor -- who areadvisers to the Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney-- as well as Michael Bordo, who supports the candidate, have stressed that the U.S. is also “different” in that its recoveries from recessions associated with financial crises have been rapid and strong. Their interpretation is at least partly based on a 2012 study by Bordo and Joseph Haubrich, which examines the issue for the U.S. since 1880.

Gross Misinterpretations

We have not publicly supported or privately advised either campaign. We well appreciate that during elections, academic economists sometimes become advocates. It is entirely reasonable for a scholar, in that role, to try to argue that a candidate has a better economic program that will benefit the country in the future. But when it comes to assessing U.S. financial history, the license for advocacy becomes more limited, and we have to take issue with gross misinterpretations of the facts.

This is far from the first time we have taken up the history of U.S. financial crises. Our 2009 book, “This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly,” presented results of 224 historical banking crises from around the world, including pre-2007 banking crises in the U.S. Why is our interpretation of the data so different than those of these recent commentators? Is the U.S. different?

Part of the confusion may be attributed to a failure to distinguish systemic financial crises from more minor ones and from regular business cycles. A systemic financial crisis affects a large share of a country’s financial system. Such occurrences are quite distinct from events that clearly fall short of a full-blown systemic meltdown, and are referred to in the academic literature as “borderline” crises.

The distinction between a systemic and a borderline event is well established by widely accepted criteria long used by many scholars, and detailed in our 2009 book.

Indeed, in our initial published study on this topic, in 2008, we showed that systemic financial crises across advanced economies had far more serious economic consequences than borderline ones. Our paper, written nine months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September 2008, showed that by 2007, the U.S. already displayed many of the crucial recurring precursors of a systemic financial crisis: a real estate bubble, high levels of debt, chronically large current-account deficits and signs of slowing economic activity.

Today, there can be little doubt that the U.S. has experienced a systemic crisis -- in fact, its first since the Great Depression. Before that, notable systemic post-Civil War financial crises occurred in 1873, 1893 and 1907.

Defining Success

It is also important to define how a recovery is measured, and how success is defined. The recent op-eds focus on GDP growth immediately after the trough (usually four quarters). For a normal recession, the restoration of positive growth is typically a signal event. In a V-shaped recovery, the old peak level of GDP is quickly reached, and the economy returns to trend within a year or two.

Our book examined both levels and rates of change of per capita GDP; recovery is defined by the time it takes for per capita GDP to return to its pre-crisis peak level. For post- World War II systemic crises, it took about four and a half years to regain lost ground; in 14 Great Depression episodes around the world (including the U.S.) it took 10 years on average. A focus on levels, rather than percentages, is a more robust way to capture the trajectory of an economy where the recovery is more U- or L-shaped than V-shaped.

It also is a way to avoid exaggerating the strength of the recovery when a deep recession is followed by a large cumulative decline in the level GDP. An 8 percent decline followed by an 8 percent increase doesn’t bring the economy back to its starting point.

Taylor, for example, appears to show the recovery from the Great Depression as the strongest in U.S. history, even though it took about a decade to reach the same level of per capita income as at its starting point in 1929.

Working with long historical series, we have stressed per- capita measures because U.S.population growth has fallen from 2 percent a year in the late 1800s to less than 1 percent in more recent times. Put differently, in the early 1900s, a year with 2 percent real GDP growth left the average person’s income unchanged; in the modern context, 2 percent annual GDP growth means an increase of slightly more than 1 percent in real income per person. The impact of cumulative population growth even within an individual crisis episode is significant, as the recovery process usually spans four to 10 years.

Even allowing for all the above doesn’t seem to entirely account for the differences between our interpretation and the conclusions of the Hassett-Hubbard, Bordo and Taylor op-eds.

1907 Panic

Take the Panic of 1907, which fits the standard criteria of a systemic crisis (and one with a global dimension at that). We certainly would count that one. The narrative in the Bordo- Haubrich paper emphasizes that “the 1907-1908 recession was followed by vigorous recovery.” Yet, as we show below, the level of real GDP per capita in the U.S. didn’t return to its pre- crisis peak of 1906 until 1912. Is that a vigorous recovery? The unemployment rate (which we routinely include in our comparisons but the Bordo-Haubrich study doesn’t consider) was 1.7 percent in 1906, climbed to 8 percent in 1908, and didn’t return to the pre-crisis low until 1918.

The aftermath of the systemic banking crisis of 1893 is worse than the period after the 1907 episode, and the Depression of the 1930s is worse still. According to our 2009 metrics, the aftermath of the most recent U.S. financial crisis has been quite typical of systemic financial crises around the globe in the postwar era. If one really wants to focus just on U.S. systemic financial crises, then the recent recovery looks positively brisk.

We examine four systemic financial crises the U.S. has experienced since 1870: 1873 (called the Great Depression until the 1930s), 1893, the Panic of 1907 and the Great Depression.

Given that all of these crises predate the creation of deposit insurance in 1933, and that three of the four events predate the establishment of a U.S. central bank, one could legitimately quibble with the claim that the relevant institutions are more comparable across centuries in the U.S. than across advanced countries over the past 30 years. We would argue that our 2009 international postwar benchmarks, along with comparisons for the recent crisis, are more relevant.

Nonetheless, the comparison across systemic U.S. financial crises doesn’t support the view that:

-- the U.S. recoveries from pre-World War II systemic crises were any swifter than the general cross-country pattern;

-- in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis, the U.S. has performed worse than in previous systemic crises, In fact, so far, it has performed better in terms of output per capita and unemployment. This is true even if one excludes the Great Depression.

Of course, standard errors have to be taken with a grain of salt for such small samples. That is an important reason why our earlier research also incorporates international comparisons, as well as multiple indicators of macroeconomic performance. But if one focuses on U.S. data only, let’s at least acknowledge what the evidence shows.

The Evidence

The reader may wish to note that our comparisons relate to the period dating from the onset of the crisis, and don’t delineate between the “recession” period and the “recovery” period.

We have explained elsewhere why this distinction is somewhat meaningless in the aftermath of a financial crisis, as false dawns make it very difficult to detect the start of a lasting recovery in real time. That is why we have consistently argued that the popular term “Great Recession” is something of a misnomer for the current episode, which we have argued would be better thought of as “the Second Great Contraction” (after Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s characterization of the Great Depression as the Great Contraction).

We anchor the crisis episode at the peak of economic activity, which usually occurs either the year immediately before the crisis or the crisis year itself. For real per capita GDP, we use the Total Economy Database, a multicountry database established by Angus Maddison and now updated by the Conference Board. The most recent annual observation is 2011. The U.S. data are available from 1870 onward. For U.S. unemployment, the data is taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States, where the unemployment-rate series is available from 1890 onward (and is consistent with the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the modern era.)

Figure 1 (attached) compares the still unfolding (2007) financial crisis with U.S. systemic financial crises of 1873, 1893, 1907 and 1929. As the figure illustrates, the initial contraction in per-capita GDP is smaller for the recent crisis than in the earlier ones (even when the Great Depression of the 1930s is excluded). Five years later, the current level of per- capita GDP, relative to baseline, is higher than the corresponding five-crisis average that includes the 1930s. The recovery of per-capita GDP after 2007 is also slightly stronger than the average for the systemic crises of 1873, 1893 and 1907. Although not as famous as the Great Depression, the depression of the 1890s was dismal; in 1896, real per-capita GDP was still 6 percent below its pre-crisis level of 1892.

Peak GDP

So how many years did it take for per-capita GDP to return to its peak at the onset of the crisis? For the 1873 and 1893 (peak is 1892) crises, it was five years; for the Panic of 1907 (peak is 1906), it was six years; for the Depression, it took 11 years. In output per capita timelines, at least, it is difficult to argue that “the U.S. is different.” It can hardly be said to have enjoyed vigorous output per capita recoveries from past systemic financial crises.

The notion that the U.S. exhibits rapid recovery from systemic financial crises doesn’t emerge from the unemployment data, either. That data only begin in 1890, eliminating the 1873 crisis from the pool. The aftermaths of the remaining four crises are shown in Figure 2 (attached).

The 2007 crisis is associated with significantly lower unemployment rates than both the Depression of the 1930s and the depression of the 1890s; it is more in line with the unemployment increases observed after the Panic of 1907. As shown in the inset to Figure 2, the unemployment rate was 1.7 percent in 1906 and almost 6 percent five years later. In the 1893 crisis, the unemployment rate started at 3 percent in 1892, shot up to more than 18 percent, and remained above 14 percent in 1896. In effect, the unemployment rate doesn’t dip below 3 percent until 1906 (on the eve of the next crisis).

The pattern during the Great Depression of the 1930s is off the charts (Barry Eichengreenand Kevin H. O’Rourke’s 2010 study is a must-read on this comparison). These historical U.S. episodes are in line with the 2010 findings of Carmen and Vincent Reinhart, who examine severe/systemic financial crises in both advanced economies and emerging markets in the decade after World War II. They document that in 10 of 15 episodes the unemployment rate had not returned to its pre-crisis level in the decade after the crisis. For the 1893 crisis and the 1929 Depression, it was 14 years; for 1907, it took 12 years for the unemployment rate to return to its pre-crisis level.

Recurring Features

Although no two crises are identical, we have found that there are some recurring features that cut across time and national borders. Common patterns in the nature of the long boom-bust cycles in debt and their relationship to economic activity emerge as a common thread across very diverse institutional settings.

The most recent U.S. crisis appears to fit the more general pattern of a recovery from severe financial crisis that is more protracted than with a normal recession or milder forms of financial distress. There is certainly little evidence to suggest that this time was worse. Indeed, if one compares U.S. output per capita and employment performance with those of other countries that suffered systemic financial crises in 2007-08, the U.S. performance is better than average.

This doesn’t mean that policy is irrelevant, of course. On the contrary, at the depth of the recent financial crisis, there was almost certainly a risk of a second Great Depression. However, although it is clear that the challenges in recovering from financial crises are daunting, an early recognition of the likely depth and duration of the problem would certainly have been helpful, particularly in assessing various responses and their attendant risks. Policy choices also matter going forward.

It is not our intention to closely analyze policy responses that may take years of study to sort out. Rather, our aim is to dismiss the misconception that the U.S. is somehow different. The latest financial crisis, yet again, proved it is not.

(Carmen M. Reinhart is Minos A. Zombanakis professor of the international financial system at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Kenneth S. Rogoff is a professor of public policy and economics at Harvard University. They are co-authors of “This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.” The opinions expressed are their own.)

In Praise of Friedrich Hayek - John Taylor

Não apenas uma homenagem ao mestre, mas um exame das políticas econômicas implementadas nos EUA e na Europa e que levaram-nos à crise atual, assim como um modesto receituário hayekiano para sair da crise...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

JOHN B. TAYLOR

The Road to Recovery

As Hayek taught, freedom and the rule of law drive prosperity.

The City Journal, Summer 2012, vol. 22., n. 3 - July 15, 2012

PAUL POPPER/POPPERFOTO/GETTY IMAGES

Friedrich Hayek, second from left, at the London School of Economics in 1948

Burdened by slow growth and high unemployment—especially long-term unemployment—the American economy faces an uncertain future. We have endured a painful financial crisis and recession, the recovery from which has been nearly nonexistent. Federal debt is exploding and threatening our children and grandchildren. In my view, the reason for this predicament is clear: we have deviated from the principles of economic freedom upon which America was founded.

Few thinkers of the past century understood the importance of economic freedom better than the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek did. As we confront our current situation, Hayek’s work has much to tell us, especially about policy rules, the rule of law, and the importance of predictability—topics that he discussed in his classic The Road to Serfdom (1944) and in greater detail in The Constitution of Liberty(1960). But his work in these areas goes beyond economics into fundamental issues of freedom and the role of government. That’s why reading Hayek is more important than ever.

As Hayek would insist, we need to be careful about what we mean by economic freedom. The basic idea is that people are free to decide what to produce, what to buy, where to work, and how to help others. The American vision, as I explain in my book First Principles, held that people would make these choices within a policy framework that was predictable and based on the rule of law, with strong incentives emanating from a reliance on markets and a limited role for government. Historically, America adhered to these principles more than most countries did, a major reason why the nation prospered and so many people came to these shores.

But we haven’t always followed the principles consistently. Leading up to the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve cut money growth sharply, deviating from a predictable policy framework. The federal government then worsened the Depression by raising tax rates and tariffs and by passing the National Industrial Recovery Act, which overrode market principles and went well beyond sensible limits on government. From the mid-1960s through the 1970s, federal policy again deviated from the principles of economic freedom: the era saw unpredictable short-term stimulus packages, discretionary “go-stop” monetary policies, and wage and price controls—the antithesis of an incentive-based market system. The results: double-digit unemployment, a severe slowdown in economic growth, and the Great Inflation. Well before that time, Hayek had rightly lamented such short-term approaches: “I cannot help regarding the increasing concentration on short-run effects . . . not only as a serious and dangerous intellectual error, but as a betrayal of the main duty of the economist and a grave menace to our civilization.”

In the 1980s and 1990s, America moved back toward its first principles, a restoration that lasted until recently. Temporary stimulus programs were out; permanent tax reform was in. Steady-as-you-go monetary policy replaced go-stop monetary policy. We removed the last vestiges of price controls and reduced inappropriate regulations. The major federal welfare program devolved to the states. The results this time: declining unemployment, lower inflation, and eventually a revival of economic growth.

Now we have tragically gone off the path again. Leading up to the latest downturn, the Federal Reserve held interest rates too low for too long, deviating from the rules-based monetary policy that had worked so well in the 1980s and 1990s. Government regulators failed to enforce existing rules on banks and other financial institutions, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The resulting crisis prompted the Wall Street bailouts, which soon extended beyond their original mission. The auto-company bailouts resulted in arbitrary infringements on creditors’ rights and interventions into business operations. Then came the return of the failed stimulus packages of the 1970s, the Fed’s quantitative easing, and the regulatory uncertainty associated with the 2010 health-care legislation and the Dodd-Frank financial-reform law—which gives government the discretionary authority to take over any failing financial firm and rescue its creditors.

One sign of the increase in policy uncertainty is that over the past 12 years, the number of provisions of the tax code expiring annually has increased tenfold. Another is that the number of federal workers engaged in regulatory activities (excluding those in the Transportation Security Administration) has grown by 25 percent from 2007 to 2012. Most emblematic of the deviation from our basic principles is the self-inflicted fiscal cliff that we face at the end of this year, when virtually the entire tax code will change. And the Fed has effectively replaced the money market with itself, setting a zero-percent interest-rate policy through 2014.

Government policy has largely caused these problems. It follows that we can restore prosperity by changing the policy and implementing a plan based on our core economic principles. We should reduce federal spending, as a share of GDP, to what it was in 2007, which would let us balance the budget and stop the debt explosion with revenue-neutral, pro-growth tax reform. We should unwind our monetary excesses and normalize monetary policy, using a rules-based system of the kind that worked well in the 1980s and 1990s. We should halt the rapid expansion of the entitlement state, keeping entitlement spending growth close to GDP growth and doing it in a way that gives decision-making responsibility to people and states, rather than to the federal government. And we should replace most of Dodd-Frank with bankruptcy reform and simpler regulations, with the goal of ending government bailouts.

In implementing this new economic strategy, policymakers should be guided by Hayek, especially by his emphasis on the rule of law and the predictability of policy. As he wrote in The Road to Serfdom, “Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law. Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”

Rules-based policies produce more stable economies and stronger economic growth. When people make decisions, they look to the future. Prices that convey information and provide incentives reflect the future. So good decisions as well as the prices that guide them depend on the predictability of future policy—and thus on clear policy rules.

But Hayek emphasized that rules for government policy do something more. The rule of law protects freedom, as the title of Hayek’s The Constitution of Libertysuggests. Hayek traced this idea through the ages—first to Aristotle, then to Cicero, about whom Hayek wrote: “No other author shows more clearly . . . that freedom is dependent upon certain attributes of the law, its generality and certainty, and the restrictions it places on the discretion of authority.” Hayek also cited John Locke, who wrote that the purpose of the law was “not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. . . . Where there is no law, there is no freedom.” Finally, Hayek pointed to James Madison and other American statesmen who put these ideas into practice in a new nation. These thinkers distrusted government officials as protectors of freedom; the rule of law, they believed, was more reliable.

So rules have a dual purpose: encouraging economic growth and protecting freedom. The best way to understand the two advantages of rules is to examine what happens in their absence, as in the case of wage and price controls. Such controls are arbitrary: they require decisions by people at the top about virtually every price and wage; they distort economic signals and incentives; they create shortages and surpluses. These effects occur whether the price controls are imposed on the whole economy or on a particular sector, such as health care.

Many wonder how a system of rules can work in practice, with politicians and government officials continually pressured to “do something” about economic problems. Rules mean that you do nothing, say the skeptics, and that’s impossible in today’s charged political climate and hour-to-hour, even minute-to-minute, news cycle. My colleague George Shultz calls the problem “the urge to intervene.”

Hayek had an answer to that challenge. In The Road to Serfdom, he pointed out the need to clear up a “confusion about the nature of this system” of formal rules: “the belief that its characteristic attitude is inaction of the state.” Offering one example of a rules-based system, he noted that “the state controlling weights and measures (or preventing fraud or deception in any other way) is certainly acting.” By contrast, a system in which the rule of law was flouted wasn’t necessarily characterized by action: “The state permitting the use of violence, for example, by strike pickets, is inactive.” Similarly, simple rules for monetary policy don’t mean that the central bank, in response to events, takes no action at all with interest rates or the money supply. The bank might provide loans in the case of a bank run, for instance. But these actions can be taken in a predictable manner. For that matter, deviation from the rules sometimes results in inaction. A decision by government regulators not to act when financial institutions take on unreasonable risks, for example, constitutes both inaction and a violation of the rule of law.

Some argue that crises like the present one force policymakers to deviate from rules and the rule of law. But a crisis may be the worst time to do so. In a crisis, what is vital is increased strategic clarity, not increased unpredictability. That fact became clear following the first bailout of the recent crisis, the Bear Stearns intervention: few knew what to expect the next time a financial institution wanted help, since no strategy had been articulated. The crisis worsened. The sooner people can make decisions with knowledge of the rules, the sooner recovery will come about.

To get America back on track, we must choose leaders who believe in the principles of economic freedom and will implement them. But here, Hayek issued a warning. In a chapter in The Road to Serfdom called “Why the Worst Get on Top,” he suggested that people with the ambition to become leaders, either by election or by appointment, are often interventionists, since their tendency is to do whatever it takes to succeed. Further, those who benefit directly from discretionary government interventions naturally support such officials. Industries and firms that benefit from bailouts will favor officials comfortable with bailouts, for example, and even academic research on economic policy will become biased toward interventionism. Perhaps the answer to Hayek’s warning is to elect or appoint people regarded as overly committed to the principles of economic freedom. Then, after experiencing the heavy pressure pushing them toward intervention, they may emerge with a sensible balance. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan took this tack, appointing many Ph.D.s from the University of Chicago’s free-market school of economics to positions of leadership.

John Maynard Keynes took a different view. In a famous letter to Hayek aboutThe Road to Serfdom, Keynes expressed his preference for more interventionist appointees—but he wanted only those whom he viewed as beneficentinterventionists. “What we want is not no planning, or even less planning, indeed I should say we almost certainly want more,” Keynes wrote. “But the planning should take place in a community in which as many people as possible, both leaders and followers, wholly share your own moral position.” Milton Friedman later cited this letter to illustrate Keynesianism’s defining characteristic: its focus on discretionary interventions taken by people in powerful government positions.

Even those who support the principles of economic freedom can sometimes get off track. One might argue that such deviations were needed in the fall of 2008; perhaps the actions taken then prevented a more serious panic. But that’s no reason to embrace the discretionary policies that led to the mess in the first place. Such an argument is like saying that the person who set fire to a house should be exonerated because he then put out the fire and saved a few rooms.

Is today’s departure from economic freedom any less serious than the assault on freedom that Hayek wrote about in The Road to Serfdom? Am I exaggerating when I say that the future of American prosperity—or even global prosperity—is at stake?

While central planning may not be the right term for it, consider the 2010 health-care law, which gave the federal government the power to mandate the terms of everyone’s health-insurance package and which created an Independent Payment Advisory Board to determine the price, quantity, and quality of the medical services—from number of MRIs to the necessary accuracy of CT scans—that a medical professional provides. Is that so different from the way centrally planned economies determine the price, quantity, and quality of livestock, wheat, or steel that can be produced? Or consider monetary policy. A few years ago, I coined the term “mondustrial policy” to describe the Fed’s practice of quantitative easing, which combined industrial policy (discretionary assistance to certain firms and industries) with monetary policy (printing money to finance that assistance). Since then, the Fed has purchased $1.25 trillion of mortgage-backed securities. In fiscal year 2011, it purchased 77 percent of the newly issued federal debt, long after panic conditions had subsided.

Hayek argued that inflationary monetary policy undermines economic freedom, in part because it hits the elderly and the poor particularly hard, rationalizing more discretionary interventions. Though the inflation problem is less severe now than in the 1970s—at least so far—the impact of the Fed’s multiyear, zero-percent interest-rate policy resembles that of the Great Inflation era: it significantly cuts real incomes for those who have saved over a lifetime for retirement.

By moving away from the basic principles of economic freedom, government policy has caused our recent economic malaise. It should be no consolation that some of our friends in Europe are facing worse economic struggles, often because they moved even further away from those principles. The good news is that a change in government policy will alleviate the problems and help restore economic prosperity. Understanding Hayek’s work, written during similar circumstances, will help us greatly as we undertake that difficult task.

John B. Taylor is the Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics at Stanford University and the George P. Shultz Senior Fellow in Economics at the Hoover Institution. His article is adapted from the 2012 Friedrich Hayek Lecture, which he delivered on winning the Manhattan Institute’s Hayek Prize.

Nouriel Roubini, o economista que previu a crise financeira

Apenas a título de informação sobre um dos economistas mais famosos da atualidade

Nouriel Roubini, el economista que predijo el crack financiero
Gillian Tett
El Cronista.com, Mon, 14 June 2010

Nació en Turquía y vive en Estados Unidos. Fue uno de los pocos intelectuales que pronosticó el colapso bancario. Antes fue criticado por alarmista cuando lo llamaban Dr Funesto. Hoy es uno de los gurús más prestigiosos y toda una celebridad hollywoodense.

El hotel Soho Grand de la neoyorquina Tribeca parece un set de filmación. Dominan la espaciosa recepción las columnas de concreto, las esculturas de metal y amplios sofás de cuero, que la gente elegante, de belleza inalcanzable decora con su presencia.

No parece ser el lugar para encontrarse a desayunar con un académico en Economía. Pero Nouriel Roubini no es el intelectual promedio. Hasta que comenzó la crisis financiera hace tres años Roubini se había dedicado a analizar la economía y a escribir obras como “Ciclos políticos yMacroeconomía” (1997) o “La nueva arquitectura financiera internacional” (coedición, 2005). También dio una serie de discursos referidos a la fragilidad del mundo de los bancos que fue tan agria que le valió el mote de Dr Doom (el Dr. Funesto).

Pero en 2007 se produjo un cambio inesperado. La crisis financiera estalló y, casi de la noche a la mañana, el mundo se dio cuenta de que él era uno de los pocos economistas que había anticipado un colapso bancario de tal magnitud. En la actualidad los líderes del mundo se sujetan de sus palabras, los periodistas van en tropel a sus discursos para enterarse de los últimos anticipos y los clientes pagan sumas altísimas a cambio de los análisis de su consultora Roubini Global Economics.

Su influencia fue más allá del mundo de los negocios y llegó hasta Hollywood. Aparece, representándose a sí mismo, en “Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps”, el próximo filme de Oliver Stone, que continúa la parábola de mercados enloquecidos de la década de los años ochenta, y también en “Inside Job”, un documental narrado por Matt Damon que se estrenará próximamente. Es algo así como un intelectual para enmarcar: su página de Facebook tiene muchas fotos de Roubini en fiestas llenas de estrellas, en general, acompañado de un grupo de mujeres de gran hermosura y juventud. Les encanta la belleza de mi mente... Soy feísimo, pero mi cerebro las atrae‘, le dijo a una sección de chismes el año pasado.

Pocos minutos antes de las ocho, el intelectual devenido en ídolo, de cincuenta y un años, llega a la recepción, vestido con un par de jeans de color negro y una camisa amarillo pálido con el cuello sin abotonar. Combina perfectamente con la decoración del hotel. La única nota disonante son sus zapatos de cuero marrón: sorprende cuán maltrechos están. ¿Es demasiado inteligente para preocuparse por la trivialidad de lustrarlos? O sencillamente, ¿confía demasiado en sí mismo como para que le importe? De cualquier modo, le da a este famoso economista un aire artístico un tanto raro.

Empiezo con: “¿Cómo se siente ser una celebridad?”. Él masculla: “La celebridad tan sólo es palabrería. La gente habla como si yo hubiera salido de la nada, como si todos estos años hubiera trabajado por cuenta en alguna oficina perdida antes de, repentinamente, volverme famoso. Pero eso no es cierto para nada. ¡Hace veinte años que trabajo de economista!”

Con indignación, repasa los detalles de su ejercicio profesional. Es inusitado. Nació en Estambul en 1959, de padres iraníes que profesaban la fe judía. Los primeros años de su vida los pasó en Irán; luego se mudaron a Italia, donde fue a la escuela y a la universidad. Más adelante, se mudó a los Estados Unidos y en Harvard se doctoró en Economía. Luego dio clases en Yale y en Nueva York. Roubini habla italiano, hebreo y persa, pero dice que sintió que en verdad había llegado a los Estados Unidos: “hace aproximadamente quince años, cuando comencé a soñar en inglés”. En este período también realizó trabajos para el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), la Reserva Federal, el Banco Mundial, el Consejo de Asesores Económicos de la Casa Blanca y el Departamento del Tesoro, antes de poner en marcha su propia consultora.

Difícilmente ese sea el currículum de un don nadie. Pero en el otoño de 2006, mientras la economía mundial y los mercados de crédito estaban en auge, Roubini aún estaba lejos de ser un nombre reconocido cuando le advirtió al FMI: “es probable que los Estados Unidos enfrenten, por única vez, el estallido de la burbuja inmobiliaria, la conmoción en la industria del petróleo, la abrupta caída en la confianza del consumidor y, finalmente, una profunda recesión”, además, que “los propietarios no cumplan los pagos de las hipotecas, y que billones de dólares en títulos garantizados con hipotecas fallen en todo el mundo y el sistema financiero global se detenga repentinamente”. Era una apuesta muy audaz; tanto, que muchos líderes y economistas creyeron que Roubini estaba un poco loco.

En realidad, cuando Roubini fue el Foro Económico Mundial que se reunió en Davos, en enero de 2007, e hizo estos anuncios, no se le prestó atención a sus advertencias. Lo conocí en este resort montañés de aire enrarecido, y recuerdo muy bien nuestro encuentro. Durante los meses anteriores, yo también había empezado a escribir sobre los peligros de las finanzas complejas (si bien de un modo mucho menos elocuente e impresionante que el de Roubini), y esos artículos desencadenaron las críticas de algunas de los luminares reunidos en Davos, que me tacharon de ser “alarmista”. Pese a que no nos habíamos conocido -y habíamos hablado poco desde que lo hicimos-, Roubini defendió vigorosamente mis artículos en un soleado almuerzo muy concurrido que se ofreció en un hotel suizo. Le expresé mi agradecimiento; los agoreros eran muy pocos en ese entonces.

Riendo, Roubini señala: “Lo recuerdo”. Luego evoca, no sin enojo, el artículo que Michael Lewis, autor del ensayo “Liar’s Poker” (1989) y de “The Big Short” (2009), que escribió en esa reunión de Davos, en la que se llamó debiluchos y sosos a los agoreros como Roubini. “Sorprende el modo como algunas personas cambiaron su forma de pensar”, afirma y añade con mordacidad, “Ahora todos son generales después de la batalla”.

Con el profesor de historia económica Stephen Mihm, Roubini es coautor de un libro que trata el colapso bancario, “Crisis Economics”, que aspira a responder a la pregunta de ¿por qué el mundo perdió el control en 2007? y sugiere qué es lo que puede hacerse para subsanarlo. A primera vista, parece dedicarse a la misma temática que los libros originados en el aprieto económico, que en la actualidad los economistas producen en serie. Sin embargo, lo que distingue a esta obra es que Roubini puede afirmar que entendió lo que sucedía antes de que sobreviniera el desastre, a diferencia de casi cualquier otro economista, con la excepción de William White y Claudio Borio del Banco de Pagos Internacionales (BPI). Le pregunto qué fue lo que le dio certeza de que estaba en lo correcto. Me explica: “Después de diez años de analizar los mercados emergentes, sé que Uds. tienen patrones que se repiten una y otra vez. Una burbuja es como el fuego, que precisa oxígeno para seguir ardiendo... cuando ya no hay oxígeno, las cosas cambian”. Más concretamente, en el verano de 2006, Roubini ya veía que el mercado inmobiliario había alcanzado su pico. Eso lo convenció de que el sistema estaba a punto de colapsar, porque había mucha deuda hipotecaria.

Siguió dando advertencias desde el colapso financiero. A principios de 2009, sostuvo que la crisis bancaria podría no haber llegado a su fin. También insinuó que había una probabilidad del 20% de una W (nueva caída en la recesión), a causa de que el crecimiento estadounidense sería muy débil. De hecho, la economía de los EE.UU. se recuperó más rápidamente que lo esperado y también subió el valor de las acciones de los bancos. Por todo ello, algunos rivales se regodean en decir que lo que Roubini tuvo en su mensaje de 2006 fue, simplemente, suerte. Pese a ello, Roubini replica con rapidez que aún es demasiado pronto para concluir que la economía mundial camina hacia la recuperación. Y al menos un mensaje de los que envió últimamente estuvo en lo cierto: durante el año pasado, advirtió repetidas veces sobre los peligros de acechar la deuda soberana. En especial, cree que las dificultades que hay en Grecia son reflejo del problema mayor que enfrenta el mundo occidental, pues parece que los gobiernos no tienen la voluntad de tratar de resolver la deuda gubernamental creciente.

“En la actualidad, lo que en verdad me preocupa sobre los EE.UU. es que tienen estancamiento político”, afirma Roubini y sostiene que esto evita que el gobierno tome las decisiones arduas que se necesitan. “El Reino Unido tiene el mismo problema. No hay una voluntad real de recortar gastos o aumentar los impuestos”. En consecuencia, “habrá tentación de seguir monetizando el déficit fiscal”, lo que finalmente produce inflación.

Para detener esos riesgos, Roubini quiere que los líderes cooperen con la línea de los partidos y que dejen atrás las antiguas etiquetas ideológicas de la “derecha” y la “izquierda”. “Crecí en la Italia de la década de los años sesenta y setenta, y fue un período de mucha agitación social, en la que hasta los adolescentes más jóvenes estaban en política. En ese momento, era un más de centroizquierda”, afirma. En la actualidad, es de centro por lo que respecta a las cuestiones económicas, pues cree que los gobiernos precisan gastar durante una crisis, de modo de respaldar el sistema, lo que está de acuerdo con el pensamiento económico keynesiano; sin embargo, cree que, cuando la crisis llega a su fin, deben cambiar por los enfoques de libremercado, y así refleja los principios de la denominada Escuela Austríaca de Economía. “Hay una gran discusión entre la escuela keynesiana y la austríaca. Pero soy pragmático y ecléctico. Se trata del momento oportuno”.

Entonces, en su opinión, la gente, ¿donde debería invertir en este momento? ¿Qué es lo que él hace? Evasivo, responde: “Jamás compré siquiera una acción, un bono o divisa. Tengo mi 401k (plan de ahorro y aporte jubilatorio) en un fondo de tipo pasivo, que tiene el 100% de inversiones en acciones, la mitad de Estados Unidos y la otra mitad de otras partes. El resto de los ingresos que percibí en los últimos años está en dinero. En algún momento, volveré a los activos que involucren un riesgo mayor, mas no ahora”. Insinúo que esta cautela parece propia del Dr. Doom. No está de acuerdo. “Como apodo, Dr. Doom era lindo y me gustó durante un tiempo, pero en lo que ahora insisto es que soy el Dr. Realist (Dr. Realista)”.

En otras palabras, Roubini ahora quiere que se lo conozca como el sabio que puede dar consejos provechosos y prácticos, en vez del que es capaz de anticipar el desastre. Ciertamente, el día que nos conocimos él había escrito un artículo para el FT, en el que acuciaba a Europa a permitir que Grecia reestructurase su deuda. Y recién regresó de Washington, donde se entrevistó con un grupo de ministros de finanzas y banqueros centrales de Occidente. “Lo que me importa es que, cuando escribo algo, la gente me escuche. Les doy mi sabiduría, con independencia de que coincidan con ella o no”.

Mientras le agrega cucharadas de yogur a la granola, voy directo al grano. ¿Cómo es posible que esta elevada “sabiduría” económica conviva con la fama que recientemente descubrió y lo catapultó a las noticias de chismes? Suspira: “La fama se volvió una carga; el horario es más exigido. La gente cree que viajar en avión a distintos lugares es glamoroso. Pero no lo es, pues aun cuando uno viaje en clase business y se hospede en hoteles fantásticos, uno está a 10.000 millas de su hogar”. Admite que está de viaje casi las tres cuartas partes de cada año; no sorprende saber que su nueva obra se escribió, en su mayor parte, a bordo de un avión.

Como salvar os paises dos mercados irracionais, dos especuladores gananciosos e desse louco mundo capitalista

De como ajudar povos mais infelizes do que o nosso...

O Brasil, como não nos deixa esquecer o presidente, passou incólume (bem, ele não usaria esta palavra) pela crise, e, se ela não foi a marolinha prevista, pelo menos fomos os "últimos a entrar na crise e os primeiros a dela sair" (enfim, tiramos da jogada a China, a India e vários outros mais, que não ouviram falar da crise, e vamos em frente).
Tudo isso graças à nossa preclara (Dicionário, presidente) política econômica (que começou em 2003, como todo mundo sabe), graças, SOBRETUDO (bota TUDO nisso) à ousadia de nossos sábios dirigentes (que investiram pesadamente na manutenção da demanda agregada, contratando um bocado de gente no serviço público, dando aumentos, enfim, colaborando com o consumo e a atividade industrial) e graças, também, não se pode olvidar (dicionário de sinônimos...), àquela que vai suceder o "nuncaantesneste...", pela sua clarividência e antevisão, já fazendo dois PACs de uma vez, com bilhões de reais (dos outros) para vencer a malvada crise.
Nem todo mundo no mundo é assim inteligente, e tem país que entra em crise sem nem saber como e por que (mas só pode ser devido às loucuras cometidas por esses brancos de olhos azuis que ficam especulando em mercados desregulados).
Pois aqui estamos nós, prontos a ajudá-los com nossa tecnologia econômica salvadora, nossos mecanismos inovadores e nosso nou-rau desenvolvimentista absolutamente genial.

Apresento em primeiro lugar a contribuição impagável (isso porque ele não estipulou um preço para sua consultoria brilhante dada graciosamente ao governo de Sua Majestade) do Adolfo Sachsida, um economista da Católica de Brasília comprometido com as boas causas (e como...).

Mas, não apenas os ingleses, pois os gregos também merecem igual ajuda ou talvez ainda maior. Não é porque eles são mediterrâneos, moreninhos, adeptos de um sol e de uma praia, acostumados com emprego público, que eles devem morrer na praia, sem desfrutar das benesses de nossa tecnologia de combate às crises. O pessoal da Trilha Liberal, um blog dedicado à "Liberdade Individual, Liberdade de Mercado e Liberdade de Expressão", se encarrega de mandar uma equipe inteira de especialistas brasileiros para resgatar a Grécia de sua desgraça atual.
Vale ler com atenção esses dois manuais de ajuda emergencial, pois aprendendo a coisa, você também poderá fazer parte de uma dessas operações de salvamento e integrar uma brigada ligeira tupiniquim especializada em resgate de países que se deixaram tentar pelo neoliberalismo e foram para o brejo.
Com inteligências assim, não temos por que nos preocupar.
Ou não???!!!
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Sachsida Ajuda o Reino Unido
Blog Adolfo Sachsida - Opiniões
segunda-feira, 3 de maio de 2010

O Reino Unido, outrora berço do liberalismo econômico, é hoje um baluarte das regulações, intervenções do governo e impostos. Evidentemente um local como esse não pode prosperar, e logo se vê envolto em problemas econômicos. Essa é exatamente a situação atual dessa outrora majestosa ilha. A recente crise financeira ainda não mostrou o pior de sua face nas terras de sua majestade, mas isso logo logo irá ocorrer. Sabendo desse problema crônico, o parlamento britânico acaba de me pedir ajuda. Abaixo segue, em primeira mão para os meus leitores, o Plano Sachsida para o resgate do Reino Unido.

1ª Parte: Torrar o dinheiro público
O resgate do Reino Unido começa com um maciço pacote de gastos do governo. Se gastar uma libra é bom para estimular a demanda, então gastar 10 bilhões deve ser melhor ainda. O fundamental é gastar muito, mas ao mesmo tempo devemos retirar da contabilidade os gastos emergenciais, os gastos prioritários, os gastos com saúde, os gastos com educação, os gastos militares, os gastos com infra-estrutura, e os gastos com pagamento de juros. Após isso, o Reino Unido (apesar de executar gastos monstruosos) apresentará ao público uma aparência impecável de responsabilidade fiscal.

2ª Parte: Inundar o mercado com crédito barato
Usando a experiência de sucesso do BNDES brasileiro, criaremos no Reino Unido o BNDES inglês. Sua principal tarefa seria captar compulsoriamente recursos dos trabalhadores e destiná-los a projetos gigantescos, que por alguma miopia de mercado não encontra financiadores no setor privado. Ao mesmo tempo o BNDES inglês faria operações de empréstimo junto ao Tesouro britânico (similar ao que já ocorre no Brasil), visando aumentar ainda mais os recursos (com juros subsidiados) postos a disposição de projetos ousados que necessitam de ajuda estatal (afinal os empresários privados não estão preparados para terem lucros apenas no longo prazo).

3ª Parte: Criação da Caixa Econômica Federal da Inglaterra
Para dinamizar o mercado imobiliário iremos criar um banco com o objetivo de usar recursos do Tesouro, e dos trabalhadores, para expandir o crédito subsidiado para a compra de imóveis. Crédito que será usado também para financiar pessoas que não tem condição de pagar tal empréstimo. Campanhas como “Imóvel nunca perde valor” e “Imóvel é 100% seguro” serão vinculadas na mídia para estimular a demanda por imóveis. Bancos privados serão pressionados a extender crédito imobiliário a todos, sob ameaça de processos judiciais.

4ª Parte: A contribuição das Organizações Não-Governamentais
Atenderemos todas as demandas das organizações não-governamentais referentes ao meio ambiente. Isto é, limitaremos ao extremo a quantidade de terrenos livres para a construção. E limitaremos também o tamanho das construções. Essa medida preserva a beleza arquitetônica do Reino, ao custo de aumentar o preço dos imóveis. Tal medida irá requerer ainda mais crédito para a compra de imóveis.

5ª Parte: Banco Central sem medo do desenvolvimento econômico
Não podemos ter um Banco Central com medo do desenvolvimento econômico. Assim, as taxas de juros serão mantidas artificialmente baixas durante todo o período (independentemente das enormes pressões por mais crédito).

Seguindo esse plano simples teremos, em uns 4 ou 5 anos, uma bolha imobiliária gigantesca no Reino Unido, aliada a enormes fragilidades no setor financeiro, e uma situação fiscal insustentável. Assim que o caos se instalar, basta o primeiro ministro fazer o seguinte pronunciamento: “O mercado mostrou sua verdadeira face... confiamos demais no liberalismo econômico e agora estamos arruinados. Isso é culpa dos ganaciosos especuladores. Ou o FMI, o Banco Mundial, os EUA, o Japão, a Alemanha e a Comunidade Européia nos ajudam, ou teremos uma crise financeira de proporções mundiais, com o temível efeito contágio levando todo o mundo civilizado para a ruína”. Após 3 dias de intensos debates, sem ouvir os contribuintes, o resto do mundo decide enviar uma ajuda emergencial de 10 trilhões de euros para o Reino Unido para evitar o colapso financeiro a nível mundial.

Com os 10 trilhões de euros, coletados do resto do mundo, sanearemos as finanças inglesas, daremos casas ao pobres, pagaremos enormes dividendos aos ricos, melhoraremos a infra-estrutura inglesa e diminuiremos os impostos cobrados da classe média. Ai esta o resultado do Plano Sachsida: após 4 anos de farra na Inglaterra o resto do mundo paga pelo ajuste. Claro que em alguns anos outros países irão a bancarrota, mas isso não é problema inglês.... quem mandou não serem fiscalmente responsáveis?

=================

Pacote de ajuda brasileira para a Grécia
Trilha Liberal
7 de maio de 2010

Está embarcando hoje para Atenas uma delegação de especialistas brasileiros, enviados como cortesia pelo Itamaraty. Economistas do IPEA estão preparando apresentações ao governo Grego provando que o gasto público grego é da mais alta qualidade, e que a produtividade do servidor público grego é mais alta do que a do setor privado, o que garantirá taxas de crescimento do PIB acima da expectativa do mercado, e resolverá supostos problemas fiscais. 'O problema são os juros', concluirá o palestrante.

O adjunto econômico da UNASUL acompará a delegação brasileira e fará uma apresentação expondo as experiências do Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas da Argentina, em sua constante missão de esclarecer alguns numeros mal-entendidos e mal-interpretados pelo mercado, usando estatísticas macroeconômicas socialmente responsáveis e da mais alta qualidade.

Especialistas da FGV irão fazer uma apresentação mostrando que o endividamento grego, embora relativamente alto, é apenas uma consequência do modelo de estado escolhido democraticamente pelos gregos que, afinal, inventaram essa estória toda, logo sabem o que estão fazendo e merecem respeito.

Portando, os especialistas brasileiros mostrarão com seus estudos econométricos precisos que o mercado está redondamente enganado sobre uma suposta deterioração nas contas públicas gregas.

Técnicos do BNDES vão apontar para a Grécia o caminho brasileiro, comprovadamente uma invenção tupiniquim como a palavra saudade e a jabuticaba. A receita brasileira diz que em tempos de crise, é essencial que o estado tome a liderança dos investimentos tanto no setor público quanto privado. E em épocas sem crise, com mais motivos ainda é necessário que o estado faça o mesmo.

Através dos recursos espontaneamente recolhidos dos trabalhadores pelo Fundo de amparo ao trabalhador português, irlandês e grego (FAT PIG) os brasileiros demonstrarão que investimentos estatais em grandes empresas européias garantirão um sólido crescimento para estes países e para a Europa como um todo.

O BNDES também já anunciou o interesse brasileiro em investimentos em parceria no setor de azeite de oliva, desde que a tecnologia seja compartilhada com o Brasil. A Petrobrás anunciou o interesse de investir no azeite de oliva como um combustível alternativo bastante econômico.

Uma delegação da JBS-Friboi acompanhá os representantes brasileiros para conhecer técnicas de preparo do churrasco grego, e sondar um possível investimento em uma unidade de processamento de alimentos, com o aval do banco, para produzir churrasco grego usando picanha 100% brasileira.

A Caixa Econômica Federal mostrará seus planos de habitação no Brasil para os próximos anos, que de acordo com a Caixa e o governo, formam a estratégia ótima para sair da crise. Todos precisam de casas para morar, e é evidente que o sonho da casa própria gera um ciclo virtuoso na economia, gerando empregos e renda. Portanto, é extremamente necessário que o setor de habitação tenha juros mais baixos, para que os gregos deixem para trás suas casinhas brancas nos morros, e passem a morar em habitações de qualidade.

Para não atrair a atenção dos repórteres, que não o deixam em paz um minuto sequer após sua consagração como grande líder internacional, a delegação brasileira transportará o presidente Luís Inácio Lula da Silva dentro do compartimento executivo de um cavalo gigante de madeira.

O presidente explicará, em termos simples, que nunca antes na história da Grécia houve tanto progresso quanto nos últimos anos, e que todos estes problemas não passam de especulação dos mercados e da imprensa européia que não aceitam que os países mais pobres da Europa possam ter direito a ter uma vida digna.

============

Se depois dessas, gregos e goianos, ops, ingleses, não se recuperarem, não é por culpa das brigadas de salvamento, e sim do complô neoliberal, que continua a rondar esses países, com espiões do FMI, de Wall Street, até da PUC-Rio...
Atenção aos traidores, moçada, vamos chamar o pessoal do Ipea, da Unicamp e da UFRJ para expulsar os vendilhões do templo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Panicos em bolsas e queda dos mercados: licoes da historia

Acabo de receber o seguinte alerta do Washington Post sobre mais uma "sexta-feira negra" nos mercados de valores:

News Alert: Dow Jones industrial average falls below 10,000 at open
09:32 AM EDT Friday, May 21, 2010
--------------------
The Dow Jones industrial average fell below 10,000 at open after major stock indexes posted their biggest drops in more than a year and pushed the market to “correction” mode.
Investors again looked to Europe for direction. The German parliament approved the country's share of a $1 trillion plan to help contain debt problems in the European Union but major stock indexes fell more than 1 percent in Europe. Traders are worried stronger countries like Germany and France will be saddled with heavy debts to help weaker EU countries.

Por acaso estava lendo este livro excelente, que comprei em Hong Kong, de

Liaquat Ahamad:
Lords of Finance: 1929, The Great Depression, and the Bankers Who Broke the World
(London: Windmill Books, 2009)

e lá pela página 48, tratando das quedas nas bolsas e seu fechamento na Europa, nos dias imediatamente precedentes da Primeira Guerra Mundial, em 1914, o autor escreve:

"The first signs of crisis hit New York on Tuesday, July 28, when Austria declared war on Serbia. The Dow fell by 3 points, from 79 to 76, a decline of 4 percent... (...) On Thursday, July 30, the United States woke to news of a Russian general mobilization, and stocks experienced their single largest down day since the panic of 1907, falling 7 percent".

Ou seja, nada de extraordinário em relação ao que está acontecendo agora, com esses tremores causados pela Grécia e aqueda geral nos mercados.
Capitalismo é isso, sempre balançando.
O mais patético é que tem gente que ainda afirma, com toda a pose do mundo, que:

"Os mercados não funcionam, precisamos controlá-los".

Mas essas são precisamente as provas de que os mercados funcionam perfeitamente. Cada vez que existe um sinal de algo estranho, os mercados reagem imediatamente, e no sentido correto, tentando proteger ativos que estariam sendo ameaçados. O comportamento de manada amplifica os movimentos, mas isso é mais um sinal de que os mercados funcionam perfeitamente.
Eles estão punindo os excessos das pessoas -- podem chamar de especuladores, mas todos nós somos especuladores, a qualquer momento -- em pretender ganhos em discordância dos dados econômicos fundamentais.
Mercados são certeiros, e sempre penalizam os incautos...

Bem, espero não ter angustiado ninguém...