Desde os tempos da confrontação nuclear com a finada União Soviética, nos primeiros anos da década de 1960, não se via tamanha obsessão americana com a questão da sua primazia estratégica e supremacia militar, especialmente nuclear.
Não se compreende tal obsessão a não ser como demonstração de fraqueza em relação ao seu próprio futuro. Os generais do Pentágono têm o direito de ser paranóicos. Mas os acadêmicos parecem ter absorvido toda essa paranoia também. Vivem falando na "armadilha de Tucídides", como se fosse um precedente fatal.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
“No matter what strategies the two sides pursue or what events unfold, the tension between the United States and China will grow, and competition will intensify; it is inevitable. War, however, is not,” writes Kevin Rudd, the former prime minister of Australia and current president of the Asia Society, in a new essay.
As their relationship enters its most dangerous phase yet, Washington and Beijing must find ways to carry out their competition within a set of ground rules that both respect—or, Rudd warns, “the alternatives are likely to be catastrophic.”
Read more from Foreign Affairs on the United States’ approach to China:
“The Sources of Chinese Conduct” by Odd Arne Westad
“China Thinks America Is Losing” by Julian Gewirtz
“Can China’s Military Win the Tech War?” by Anja Manuel and Kathleen Hicks
“How America Can Shore Up Asian Order” by Kurt M. Campbell and Rush Doshi
“The Age of Uneasy Peace: Chinese Power in a Divided World” by Yan Xuetong
“How to Prevent a War in Asia” by Michèle A. Flournoy
“Competition Without Catastrophe” by Kurt M. Campbell and Jake Sullivan
