Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas. Ver também minha página: www.pralmeida.net (em construção).
What is, who is Putin, what he is doing, and what think most of Russians who believe in Putin?
If power was sold in a pharmacy, then you would have to write in lowercase side effects: "Authority cripples your brain."
What is happening in Russia now says one thing - Putin has gone crazy. This is not an insult. This is a diagnosis. The circle of insanity, like a funnel, has drawn in Putin's entire surroundings. Surroundings “mirrors” them, shows loyalty, and mask what’s really going on in their minds. All for the sake of one thing - to keep oneself safe and survive until the day when the "Mirror" either breaks itself or will be broken.
Failure to understand Putin's inner essence leads to trying to put Ukraine at the negotiating table with him, believing that it's all about some mythical "inherently Russian" lands. Putin believes in the correctness of all his actions. It's useless for him to use morals as an argument. He has his own idea of good that may contradict widely with the generally accepted moral norms. When will Trump and the EU understand that putting Putin at the negotiating table will never work? So we must solve the issue of ending the war based only on Putin's personality and character, understanding that Putin's madness is reality.
Putin is dangerous not only for Ukraine. Putin is dangerous for Russia and the whole world. His only wish is to humiliate everyone: Ukrainians - with bombs and deaths; all Russians, including his own, - with hundreds of bans, taxes, Internet shutdowns. It's like pouring poison into water dams to kill your enemies in the country. And it doesn’t matter that his supporters will die as well.
If Putin finally gets cornered, he won't hold his own hands. And he is mentally prepared for it and afraid of it. You can't predict when he will be at this point. But when it comes, he will either run away, or he will want to tear everything down and go all the way. Putin is waiting on Ukraine's side for an erroneous step, which in the eyes of the majority of Russians will give him the right to any answer. But this should be something more serious than just blows on Russia.
Putin is panically afraid of the forceful change of his power. The first shock from such a possibility came with the death of Gaddafi. And now - with the death of Khamenei. Putin knows that the country has millions of his supporters, but there are even more of those who want him to leave. This information drove him into one of the corners of the cage of insanity. This is a total disbelief. And fear. He's afraid. That's why he needs all these rockets, bombs, intelligence agencies, and the entire army.
The threat of nuclear weapons is the last argument in trying to control people. If you don't do what I want, if you are not controlled by my control, I will blow everybody, I will destroy everybody, everybody will perish! It's just a threat - to make others fear him. Putin's mental state has long been a danger.. Putin is not insane. He just really lost his mind. He doesn't have the permission frame anymore. He is willing to go to anything to achieve his goal, prefers to play ahead unless he meets worthy resistance. He often raises the stakes even when it seems there is nowhere to go. This brings the conflict to a new level of aggravation. Putin used to hold back Putin himself when he reminded him who he was before.
By analyzing Putin's gesticulation and facial expressions at his latest meetings and speeches, it is clear that he is struggling with nervousness. He begins to stutter, congestion, cough, does not know how to properly convey his thought. He reads only the text prepared for him. You can tell that he is reading it either for the first time or forgot that he watched it recently. He has a constant doubt. He keeps repeating the same phrases as if he is afraid to say anything in particular. It's obvious that he is losing his mind, losing his healthy connection with reality. He has no idea of the real events on the frontline. He doesn't doubt his decisions, doesn't admit his mistakes and doesn't try to justify themselves for them. Blame everything on others. He considers his actions quite rational. Dictators and the most violent representatives of the criminal world, scientists have found out, have something in common.
Putin's panic state and his threats are already the finish line. He'll raise a degree, because there's no other way. All the dictators who did not die a similar path. On every corner people die because of their politics and on every corner the reaction becomes more and more violent. At the same time, the dictator has fewer and fewer supporters.
The last day of the dictator is spent with random people - an officer on duty, a stenographer, a secretary. None of those who stood by him in the reception room yesterday will want to see him again. In a situation of helplessness, he will resist to the end, and when "insurmountable circumstances" arise, he will try to drag us into his hell. But in such circumstances, the Minister of Defense's phone stops working or the nuclear button "breaks". Or something else. Anyway, it's always been that way until today. And we have to believe that it will be the case this time as well.
Logo ao início do governo militar, em
junho de 1964, o primeiro general-presidente do regime militar, Castelo
Branco, resolveu enviar o “último tenente”, Juracy Magalhães, como seu
embaixador em Washington. Perguntado por um jornalista com que espírito
assumia seu novo posto, o embaixador designado foi cândido: “O Brasil
fez duas guerras como aliado dos Estados Unidos e nunca se arrependeu.
Por isso eu digo que o que é bom para os Estados Unidos é bom para o
Brasil.” (Cf. Juracy Magalhães, em depoimento a J. A. Gueiros, O Último Tenente.
3ª ed., Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1996, p. 325). Ele foi, quase de
imediato, devidamente “massacrado” por todos, não só pela esquerda
antiamericana, como um vil entreguista, sabujo dos interesses
americanos.
Sua frase infeliz passou à história, como a
própria confirmação da subserviência do governo militar à política do
Império. Cabe, contudo, restabelecer o devido copyright da
frase, que nunca foi, exatamente, de Juracy Magalhães, mas provinha da
afirmação do novo presidente da General Motors, em 1946, Charles Wilson,
ao inverter a famosa declaração de um antigo dirigente, Alfred Sloan,
entre 1923 e aquele ano, segundo quem “what was good for our country was
good for General Motors”, acrescentando Wilson, “and vice-versa”.
A frase se tornou um ícone da suposta
colusão de interesses entre a grande indústria e o governo dos EUA e,
após sua recuperação infeliz por Juracy Magalhães, um exemplo entre
outros, ainda que envergonhado, da colusão de interesses entre os
governos do regime militar brasileiro inaugurado em 1964 e os interesses
da grande potência americana. Assim foi, pelo menos durante algum
tempo, mas a corporação do Itamaraty soube restabelecer, em pouco tempo,
os saudáveis princípios da diplomacia brasileira. Já no segundo governo
da “Revolução”, sob o pouco instruído Costa e Silva, os “itamaratecas”
conseguiram, sob o medianamente instruído chanceler Magalhães Pinto,
retomar as grandes linhas da “Política Externa Independente” em
praticamente todas as ações empreendidas doravante.
A propósito dessa frase, venho agora a um
episódio ao qual assisti pessoalmente, pois que, exercendo o cargo de
ministro-conselheiro na embaixada em Washington, em 2002, acompanhei a
primeira visita a Washington, ainda como presidente eleito, de Lula, a
convite de George Bush. Ao ser confrontado, no National Press Club, a
uma pergunta marota de um jornalista, Lula utilizou-se dessa frase
infeliz para revertê-la em seu favor. Perguntado por qual razão o PT
havia estabelecido uma parceria com o Partido Comunista da China, ele
saiu-se da seguinte maneira, tendo sido muito aplaudido, durante e após
sua resposta: “Eu não conhecia a China muito bem, até que o governo
americano fez da China seu parceiro comercial preferencial. E eu pensei
comigo mesmo: ‘se é bom para os americanos, deve ser bom para os
brasileiros.’ Nós vamos trabalhar muito estreitamente com a China,
porque ela é um parceiro importante para os nossos objetivos
comerciais.” (Transcrição parcial da seção de perguntas e respostas
ocorrida no National Press Club, Washington, em 10/12/ 2002)
Não tenho certeza de que essa resposta
tenha sido ensaiada pelo presidente eleito ou se ela foi espontânea, mas
vários observadores brasileiros registraram a recuperação, de modo
inteligente, da antiga frase infeliz de Juracy Magalhães. A pergunta
tinha sido dirigida ao relacionamento político entre o PT e o Partido
Comunista Chinês, e ela foi respondida em sua vertente puramente
comercial, o que não estava em causa na indagação feita em Washington
(que incluía igualmente uma referência ao Foro de São Paulo). Não pude,
entretanto, deixar de reconhecer a notável capacidade do presidente
eleito em adaptar de maneira simpática, e com bastante bom-humor, uma
frase colocada no índex da “sabujice imperialista” ao novo contexto do
relacionamento entre os dois maiores países do hemisfério.
Abordando, agora, a essência do
relacionamento entre os Estados Unidos e o Brasil, não se pode deixar de
reconhecer que, entre um império de um lado e uma potência média do
outro, os interesses dos dois países podem coincidir em grande medida, e
assim voltamos à frase paradigmática. Com efeito, o que é bom para os
EUA – uma ordem internacional aberta aos fluxos de bens, capitais,
serviços e pessoas, dotada de estabilidade e caracterizada por valores
comuns compartilhados, como parecem ser a democracia, os direitos
humanos e a defesa do meio ambiente – também o é para o Brasil, sem
qualquer exclusivismo nesse plano mais geral das relações internacionais
(ou pelo menos deveria ser, mas obviamente menos na era Trump). Logo
depois da visita de Lula, as políticas externas dos dois países
começaram a desalinhar rapidamente, começando pela invasão do Iraque e
tudo o que se seguiu.
Registro mais uma curiosidade, antes de
chegar o título deste artigo, a submissão ao Império, que foi e voltou
ao longo do tempo. A historiografia do golpe de 1964 é consensual quanto
ao apoio dos Estados Unidos à intervenção militar, sobretudo se ela
resultasse numa guerra civil, caso houvesse “resistência”, com o apoio
direto dos americanos aos golpistas, por parte da frota deslocada ao
Atlântico Sul. Mas, existe ainda pouca adesão à “tese” – que
modestamente é minha – de que os Estados Unidos interviram uma segunda
vez no processo político brasileiro, desta vez a favor da democracia e
contra um novo golpe, mais exatamente pelo envio, feito pelo presidente
Joe Biden, de dois dos seus assessores, com o objetivo precípuo de
garantir a continuidade das eleições brasileiras em 2022, na devida
forma.
Primeiro foi o diretor da CIA, William
Burns, que veio ao Brasil em meados de 2021 para um encontro sigiloso e
de alto nível com o próprio Bolsonaro, além de outros generais: algumas
informações confidenciais revelam que Burns teria dito a Bolsonaro que
os EUA confiavam inteiramente no sistema de votação do Brasil, então em
fase de aberta contestação pelo presidente brasileiro. Depois, no auge
dos preparativos de um golpe, mal preparado pelo golpista covarde e
incompetente, foi a vez do conselheiro de Segurança Nacional dos EUA,
Jake Sullivan, no início de dezembro de 2022, que se reuniu com o
presidente eleito, Lula, convidando-o, novamente, para uma visita a
Washington. Ambos devem ter deixado muito claro, aos generais, que os
EUA não tolerariam um golpe que interrompesse o processo democrático no
Brasil. Desta vez, os gringos acertaram.
Volto ao passado, mas mais recente, para
ressaltar o quanto a tradicional aliança do Brasil com os Estados
Unidos, inquestionável durante dois séculos, transmutou-se numa
declarada submissão, não ao país, mas ao seu bizarro presidente, durante
os mandatos parcialmente coincidentes de Trump 1 e Bolsonaro, de 2019 a
2020. Aliás, desde antes de 2019, pois que a partir da campanha de
2018, Bolsonaro e os olavetes já prometiam total submissão a Trump e aos
interesses exclusivamente unilaterais dos Estados Unidos, a começar por
uma hostilidade ímpar à China “comunista” e uma adesão doentia às
“teses” da franja lunática da extrema-direita americana. Elas eram
propagadas no Brasil, nessa fase, pelo guru preferencial dos
bolsonaristas, Olavo de Carvalho, que indicou ao governo o patético
chanceler acidental, aquele que quase destruiu nossa diplomacia, e que
não se envergonhava de converter o Brasil num “pária internacional”.
Não vou retomar aqui todas as críticas que
formulei, assim que exonerado de meu cargo de diretor do Instituto de
Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais do Itamaraty (Funag), contra a
inacreditavelmente submissa política externa pró-trumpista, em pelo
menos cinco livros, começando por Miséria da Diplomacia: a destruição da inteligência no Itamaraty(2019) até Apogeu e Demolição da Política Externa (2021), passando por O Itamaraty num labirinto de Sombras, Uma certa ideia do Itamaraty e O Itamaraty Sequestrado
(2020-2021). O que cabe ressaltar, neste momento de início de uma nova
campanha eleitoral presidencial, é o perigo latente de uma nova recaída
numa diplomacia submissa tão destruidora das diretrizes fundamentais, e
históricas, de nossa política externa, como foi aquela, sobretudo
durante a gestão do chanceler acidental (até março de 2021), mas
continuada, de forma mais atenuada, sob a administração de seu sucessor,
mas ainda submetido ao chefe da nação, felizmente contido, pelo menos
parcialmente, pelo governo Joe Biden, a partir de 2021.
Os impulsos intervencionistas de Trump 2
são ainda mais poderosos, e não contidos por assessores também
submissos, do que já tinham sido de 2017 a 2020, quando ocorreram os
primeiros passos do protecionismo comercial, mas ainda sem a destruição
completa do sistema multilateral de comércio, e do próprio
multilateralismo político onusiano, como vem sendo o caso desde janeiro
de 2025, culminando em agressões armadas contra os supostos inimigos do
Império, espelhando, aliás, a guerra de agressão de seu amigo Putin
contra os infelizes vizinhos do finado império soviético. Aquele que se
crê “imperador do mundo” já enviou um inquisidor ao Brasil para se
encontrar com o golpista fracassado e encarcerado, provavelmente dando
início a uma nova fase de intervenção na política brasileira, desta vez
em favor de uma direita talvez menos “carnívora”, e disfarçadamente
“herbívora”.
O que Trump conseguiu obter numa Venezuela
pós-madurista, ou seja, sua tutela sobre dirigentes complacentes, ele
gostaria de lograr num Brasil novamente bolsonarista, embora ele tenha
muito pouca chance de impor alguma “Delcy Rodriguez iraniana” na sua
atual guerra de agressão contra a ditadura dos aiatolás e da Guarda
Revolucionária Islâmica. O Brasil certamente não tem nada a ver com a
trajetória da Venezuela chavista, da revolução à submissão, mas a
rendição dos bolsonaristas a Trump, pessoalmente, promete se manter num
eventual retorno dessa extrema-direita ao poder, o que representaria um
novo episódio de sujeição de nossa política externa aos interesses, não
essencialmente americanos, mas basicamente trumpistas. Tudo ainda é uma
hipótese, mas em minha condição de diplomata comprometido com a
dignidade de nossa credibilidade internacional, sinto-me terrivelmente
preocupado com a possibilidade de que o Brasil de Rio Branco, de Oswaldo
Aranha e de San Tiago Dantas possa vir a integrar-se ao “Escudo das
Américas”, o novo órgão de controle imperial sobre seu “quintal”
latino-americano, o que certamente ocorreria com o retorno dos
bolsonaristas ao governo, em 2027.
Retomando a frase fatídica, pode ser que o que
é bom para os Estados Unidos talvez seja igualmente bom para o Brasil –
como argumentou instintivamente o presidente-eleito Lula em seu
primeiro périplo americano, em 2002, ao mencionar a relação dos EUA com a
China, ainda relativamente convergente naquele começo de século –, mas
cabe aos brasileiros examinar atentamente, não o lado puramente formal
da relação bilateral, mais distante ou mais próxima, segundo os
governos, mas a substância desse quê, uma vez que soberania e dignidade nacionais passam na frente de qualquer modalidade de interação diplomática.
Putin intends to authorise missile strikes or ‘special operations’ abroad to save himself and his accomplices from a jail cell in The Hague.
The Kremlin’s proposal to use the armed forces to "protect" arrested citizens abroad is not a defense of rights. It’s a desperate, nuclear-edged signal to the world that Russia’s leaders view themselves as above international law.
The masquerade is officially over. By proposing a bill to use the Russian military to shield its citizens from foreign courts, putin is not acting as the protector of his people. He is acting as the boss of a criminal enterprise, issuing a violent threat to the global community: Do not try to hold us accountable.
This move by the Ministry of Defense, approved by a government commission and destined to slide through the Duma, is the logical—and grotesque—conclusion of a regime built on impunity.
Having crushed domestic law into submission, the Kremlin is now attempting to leverage brute military force to rewrite international justice.
The rhetoric is, as always, a twisted mirror. The bill claims to offer "protection" against the "illegal" actions of foreign judiciaries.
Yet, who are the "citizens" they aim to protect? Not the countless ordinary Russians they have drafted into a senseless war.
No, this bill is designed with a specific guest list in mind: the top brass, the inner circle, and the supreme leader himself.
This is the desperate gambit of a wanted man.
When the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant for putin for war crimes, it shattered the myth of his untouchable power.
This new bill is his retaliation—a brazen declaration that any attempt to enforce an ICC warrant will be treated not as a judicial action, but as a provocation of war.
It is a stunning admission of fear, especially after Maduro's arrest.
For all his theater of strength, putin has spent the last years legally isolating his nation to construct a fortress for himself.
He first allowed Russia to ignore foreign rulings, then shielded foreign mercenaries from prosecution, and now intends to authorise missile strikes or special operations to save himself and his accomplices from a jail cell in The Hague.
To the countries of the world that still believe in accountability and the rule of law, the message is chillingly clear. Russia is no longer just a nation that commits war crimes. It is formalising a doctrine to defend those crimes by military force. This is not a state acting in self-defense. It is an outlaw state creating a permanent license to operate outside the civilized world, demanding that its leaders be guaranteed impunity, enforced at the barrel of a gun.
In this speech during his visit to the Netherlands in November 2005, at the Peace Palace in The Hague, putin explicitly calls for the "supremacy of law" to be a "mandatory standard." Critics today point to the irony of this statement, as the Russian Ministry of Defense now seeks to pass a bill that would allow the use of military force abroad to "protect" Russian officials from the very type of international judicial oversight he praised in 2005.
putin: “You are well aware that Russia, as a participant in the 2005 Summit, has once again confirmed its commitment to the principle of the supremacy of international law. In Russia, this principle is one of the foundations of the constitutional order. In accordance with Part 4 of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, universally recognised principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation are an integral part of its legal system.
Moreover, if an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules other than those provided for by Russian law, the rules of the international treaty apply. Commitment to international law is also laid at the basis of the concept of our foreign policy and national security.”
( Transcript of the full speech in the comments.)
=======
Here Putin’s 2005 speech in Netherlands:
“ 2/2
You well know that Russia's participation in the Summit 2005 once again confirmed its adherence to the principle of supremacy of international law. In Russia, this principle is one of the fundamental bases of the constitution. According to Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the commonly recognized principles and norms of the Moreover, if an international treaty of the Russian Federation stipulates other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty apply. Adhering to international law is the fundamental concept of our foreign policy and national security.
I shall especially emphasize that the International Court of Justice's decisions and advisory opinions play a major role in strengthening and developing international legal principles and norms, and in making the rights and duties of states explicit. This has a positive influence on the universality of international law.
Once again I shall point out that very existence of the International Court of Justice is a most important condition for the UN’s stability and legitimacy, including with regard to developing and implementing a complex strategy to counteract the new threats and challenges that humanity faces today.
The International Court of Justice makes a huge contribution to preventing international conflicts and to the peaceful resolution of existing disputes. Finally, your activities promote international justice. This is possible due to the Court's independence, its special status and the unique composition of its judges.
Russia supports strengthening the role of the International Court of Justice and actively supported including the obligation of member states to resolve their disputes by peaceful And Mr Chairman, you have now told us about the very serious, major questions of international relations in which the Court is presently engaged.
Mr Chairman, we give great value to being represented in the International Court of Justice and consider the Russian legal school's contribution to the Court's activities a very important one.
In connection with this I am grateful to you for the kind words you addressed to the Russian judge, Mr Vereshchetin, and his predecessors. We hope that our tradition of participation in the Court will continue.
In conclusion, allow me to express once again my deep respect for the activities of the International Court of Justice and to thank you both for the invitation and for allowing me the opportunity to speak here.
I wish you success, and thank you very much for your attention.”
A derrocada do populismo de esquerda e das ditaduras socialistas na América Latina
Lula e o PT já contaram, na condição de aliados na América Latina, com muitos neopopulistas de esquerda que parasitavam regimes eleitorais não-liberais e alguns ditadores ditos socialistas. Agora não contam mais. Vejamos.
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3 - Petro (na Colômbia) - Mas seu candidato pode perder a próxima eleição.
DITADORES
4 - Ortega e Murillo (na Nicarágua),
5 - Díaz-Canel (em Cuba) - Não se sabe por quanto tempo.
6 - Delcy Rodriguez (na Venezuela) - Não se pode contar mais com ela (pois virou refém de Trump).
Balanço na América Latina
De 12 que já foram (ainda que nem sempre simultaneamente) podem restar apenas 2 ou 3 (simultaneamente). Ou menos, se Lula perder a eleição de 2026. Eis a queda. Talvez a maior derrocada que já se viu na história em uma mesma região do mundo em tão pouco tempo.
No mundo
No plano mundial o lulopetismo está alinhado aos autocratas de esquerda (e socialistas) que estão em governos, como Xi Jinping (na China), Pham Minh Chinh (no Vietnã), Sonexay Siphadone (no Laos), Kim Jong-un (na Coreia do Norte), Lourenço (em Angola). Além disso, está alinhado aos neopopulistas de esquerda que parasitam regimes eleitorais não-liberais, como Subianto (na Indonésia) e Ramaphosa (na África do Sul). Por último, o lulopetismo é defensor de Putin (na Rússia) e de Lukashenko (na Bielorrússia) e seus demais satélites centro-asiáticos (como Cazaquistão, Uzbequistão etc.), de Khamenei pai e agora filho (no Irã) e não condena o Corpo da Guarda da Revolução Islâmica (IRGC) e seus braços terroristas (como Hamas, Jihad Islâmica, Hezbollah, Houthis etc.).
O que há de comum a todos eles? São, todos, inimigos das democracias liberais ou plenas.
Conclusão
Dizer que Lula e o PT defendem a democracia ou é mentira pura e simples ou revela um profundo desconhecimento do que é democracia.
Bastaria perguntar por que os lulopetistas não se alinham, preferencialmente, aos regimes (democracias liberais ou plenas) vigentes nos seguintes países (não por acaso os mais desenvolvidos do mundo): Alemanha, Áustria, Bélgica, Chéquia, Dinamarca, Espanha, Estônia, Finlândia, França, Grécia, Holanda, Irlanda, Itália, Letónia, Lituânia, Luxemburgo, Portugal, Suécia, Reino Unido, Noruega, Suíça, Islândia, Canadá, Barbados, Costa Rica, Suriname, Chile, Uruguai, Japão, Coreia do Sul, Taiwan, Austrália e Nova Zelândia.
Revista ID é uma publicação apoiada pelos leitores.
Relação linear, cronológica, de minhas colaborações com a revista Crusoé
Destino: Blog Diplomatizzando
A relação que segue, puramente recapitulativa, recolhe, a partir da minha lista geral de trabalhos, todos os textos, entrevistas ou interações com os editores e redatores da revista Crusoé, com a qual colaborei, regularmente, durante um par de anos. Segue apenas a linha cronológica natural, do mais antigo ao mais recente, sendo que o último é uma coletânea dos artigos (escritos, publicados) oferecidos à revista, editada em formato de livro digital. Acho que tem coisas ainda válidas nesse ajuntamento de textos de circunstância. Vou pensar em retomar essas colaborações voluntariamente, apenas como diversão, o que sempre faço segundo a recomendação de Montaigne e de José Mindlin: Je ne fais rien sans gaieté. Paulo Roberto de Almeida Brasília, 10 de março de 2026.
3424. “‘Ernesto Araújo enganou o presidente’, diz embaixador demitido”, Brasília, 5 março 2019, 6 p. Entrevista ao jornalista Caio Junqueira da revista Crusoé (link: https://crusoe.com.br/diario/ernesto-araujo-enganou-o-presidente-diz-embaixador-demitido/); Postado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2019/03/ernesto-araujo-enganou-o-presidente-diz.html).
3442. “Sobre as intervenções de militares na política brasileira”, Brasília, 31 março 2019, 5+6 p. Introdução histórica Academia.edu comentários de Mario Sabino (Crusoé, n. 48, 31/03/2019) ao texto da Ordem do Dia das FFAA a propósito do dia 31 de marçAcademia.edu no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2019/03/para-ler-os-militares-em-1964-e-em-2019.htmAcademia.eduado no Facebook (link: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks/posts/2387247414672028). Disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/s/f60c55b452/sobre-as-intervencoes-de-militares-na-politica-brasileira). Transcrita de forma parcial no Blog Diplomatizzando (18/04/2019; link; https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2019/04/as-forcas-armadas-e-sociedade-cel.html).
3930. “Sobre a política externa e a diplomacia brasileira: uma entrevista”, Brasília, 16 junho 2021, 14 p. Respostas a questões do jornalista Duda Teixeira, em formato de entrevista para a revista Crusoé sobre temas de diplomacia e de política externa, seguida de entrevista oral, combinando os dois formatos em matéria publicada na seção “Entrevista da Semana” da Revista Crusoé (edição 164, 18/06/2021; link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/164/mudanca-a-forca/0). Sobre a política externa e a diplomacia brasileira, disponível na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/49299957/MudancaaforçaentrevistadePauloRobertodeAlmeidaparaRevistaCrusoe). Parte relativa aos militares, divulgada de forma independente, sob o título de “Existe algum risco de golpe miliar no Brasil? Não, embora o capitão gostaria que ocorresse”, no blog Diplomatizzando (18/06/2021; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2021/06/existe-algum-risco-de-golpe-militar-no.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1406.
4188. “O Brics e o Brasil: quem comanda?”, Brasília, 28 junho 2022, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé. Enviado a Duda Teixeira, via WA. Editado pelo jornalista, sob o título de “A ampliação do Brics e o interesse nacional”, com pequenas edições em pontos específicos; salvo como “4188aBricsInterNacional”. Publicado na revista Crusoé (1/07/2022; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/secao/reportagem/a-ampliacao-do-brics-e-o-interesse-nacional/); transcrito no blog Diplomatizzando (1/07/2022; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/07/a-ampliacao-do-brics-e-o-interesse.html). Relação de publicados n. 1461.
4275. “Programa Latitude: entrevista sobre política externa de Lula III”, Brasília, 19 novembro 2022, 9 páginas. Notas sobre questões colocadas pelo jornalista Duda Teixeira, da revista Crusoé, para entrevista oral no dia 21/11/2022. Versão reduzida, sob o título de “A diplomacia de Lula, 2023-2026: mais do mesmo?”, postada na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/91326453/4275_A_diplomacia_de_Lula_2023_2026_mais_do_mesmo_2022_) e no blog Diplomatizzando (21/11/2022; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2022/11/a-diplomacia-de-lula-2023-2026-mais-do.html). Emissão divulgahttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7tzEZV3P9Q; erros diplomáticoshttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7tzEZV3P9Q&t=1433s;e.com/watch?v=O7tzEZV3P9Q; outro link geral: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7tzEZV3P9Q&t=1433s; lihttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZ6I78fplEI;r o líder da América Latina”, 1,8 mil visualizações: https://www.youtube.cohttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=21jP70kzLVU;rge com grandes catástrofes”, 5,3 mil visualizações: https://www.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cssPH_lTXJYrios da Oxfam são hipócritas”, 1,1 mil visualizações: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cssPH_lTXJY ). Relação de Publicados n. 1479.
4290. “Haverá paz no mundo em 2023?”, Brasília, 16 dezembro 2022, 5 p. Artigo para a revista digital Crusoé, a pedido do jornalista Duda Teixeira. Revisto e publicado, sob o título “Paz impossível, guerra improvável”, na revista Crusoé (n. 244, sexta-feira, 30/12/2022, link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/244/paz-impossivel-guerra-improvavel/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (12/03/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/03/havera-paz-no-mundo-em-2023-artigos-na.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1487.
4292. “Fórum de Davos: o piquenique invernal do capitalismo bem-comportado”, Brasília, 20 dezembro 2022, 4 p. Artigo sobre o Fórum Econômico Mundial de 2023, para a revista Crusoé. Publicado sob o título de “O capitalismo bem-comportado de Davos”, revista Crusoé (13/01/2023; https://crusoe.uol.com.br/secao/reportagem/o-capitalismo-bem-comportado-de-davos/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (12/03/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/03/forum-de-davos-o-piquenique-invernal-do.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1491.
4300. “De repente, o mundo descobre um brasileiro pouco cordial”, Brasília, 9 janeiro 2023, 4 p. Nota sobre o vandalismo produzido pelos terroristas bolsonaristas na Praça dos Três Poderes, no domingo 8/01/2023. Publicado na revista Crusoé (9/01/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/diario/de-repente-o-mundo-descobre-um-brasileiro-pouco-cordial/); reproduzido no blog Diplomatizzando (9/01/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/01/de-repente-o-mundo-descobre-um.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1490.
4304. “O Brasil e o seu vizinho mais importante, a Argentina, talvez distante”, Brasília, 16 janeiro 2023, 4 p. Artigo sobre as relações Brasil-Argentina, no contexto da primeira viagem de Lula, para a revista Crusoé. Publicado, sob o título “O bloco do Cambalacho”, na revista Crusoé (n. 247, 20/01/2023, link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/247/o-bloco-do-cambalacho/); versão original, sob o título “O Brasil e o seu vizinho mais importante, a Argentina, talvez distante”, publicada no blog Diplomatizzando (14/02/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/02/o-brasil-e-o-seu-vizinho-mais.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1492.
4314. “O que o Brasil deixou de aprender com a Alemanha?”, Brasília, 31 janeiro 2023, 4 p. Nova colaboração com a revista Crusoé, a propósito da visita ao Brasil do chanceler Olaf Scholz, enfatizando educação de qualidade na Alemanha e trajetórias diferentes do SPD e do PT. Publicado em 3/02/2023 (link: https://oantagonista.uol.com.br/brasil/crusoe-o-que-o-brasil-deixou-de-aprender-com-a-alemanha/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (12/03/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/03/o-que-o-brasil-deixou-de-aprender-com.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1493.
4320. “Diplomacia de Lula 3: la nave va..., mas para onde?”, Brasília, 14 fevereiro 2023, 5 p. Artigo sobre as repetições da diplomacia ativa e altiva. Publicado, sob o título de “A mesma coisa, tudo de novo”, na revista Crusoé (17/02/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/251/a-mesma-coisa-tudo-de-novo/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (12/03/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/03/diplomacia-de-lula-3-la-nave-va-mas.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1494.
4326. “O Brasil e a China: até onde vai a relação estratégica?”, Brasília, 20 fevereiro 2023, 5 p. Publicado na revista Crusoé (3/03/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/253/o-encanto-de-lula-pelo-duvidoso-modelo-chines/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (12/03/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/03/o-brasil-e-china-ate-onde-vai-relacao.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1496.
4342. “O Brasil como um imenso Portugal?”, Brasília, 23 março 2023, 4 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé, a propósito da visita do presidente Lula a Portugal. Publicado em 27/04/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/secao/colunistas/o-brasil-como-um-imenso-portugal/). Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (21/04/2024; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2024/04/o-brasil-como-um-imenso-portugal-2023.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1506.
4344. “O que Putin quer de Lula? O que ele vai conseguir?”, Brasília, 25 março 2023, 6 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé, sobre a próxima visita do chanceler Lavrov ao Brasil, tratando do Brics e da guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia. Publicado na Crusoé (31/03/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/257/o-que-putin-quer-de-lula-o-que-ele-vai-conseguir/?fbclid=IwAR0HUZLik-L-mAziepagvbW2FtPFh-mtymnqIQHUhNSGKuu2dxVGndG0dKk?utm_source=crs-site&utm_medium=crs-login&utm_campaign=redir); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (18/04/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/o-que-putin-quer-de-lula-o-que-ele-vai.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1499.
4354. “‘A Guerra Perpétua’, segundo Putin, ou o projeto de uma ‘nova ordem mundial’, como vontade e como representação”, Brasília, 7 abril 2023, 3 p. Publicado na revista Crusoé (14/04/2023; link: https://oantagonista.uol.com.br/mundo/paulo-roberto-de-almeida-na-crusoe-guerra-perpetua-de-putin/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (23/04/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/a-guerra-perpetua-segundo-putin-ou-o.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1504.
4358. “O retorno da diplomacia presidencial nos cem dias de Lula”, entrevista com o jornalista Duda Teixeira da revista Crusoé (emissão em 9/04/2023, 14:29; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/diario/o-retorno-da-diplomacia-presidencial-nos-100-dias-de-lula/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/o-retorno-da-diplomacia-presidencial.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1503.
4365. “Potências revisionistas e rupturas da ordem global”, Brasília, 17 abril 2023, 4 p. Ensaio sobre os momentos de rupturas históricas em ordens políticas estabelecidas. Para aula no curso de mestrado em Relações Internacionais da UFABC, a convite do prof. Mohammed Nadir, via online, em 18/04/2023. Primeira parte aproveitada para um pequeno texto sobre a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia; postado, sob o título de “Lula tem certeza de que seria uma boa ideia colocar o Brasil do lado da Rússia e da China na construção de uma nova ordem mundial?”, no blog Diplomatizzando (26/04/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/deve-o-brasil-aderir-ideia-de-uma-nova.html); segunda e terceira partes, aproveitadas para novo artigo para a revista Crusoé, sob o título “Por que a tal de 'nova ordem mundial' é uma má ideia?”, sob o número 4374. Aproveitado para aula no curso CACD, sob número 4596/2024.
4368. “A reunificação da Alemanha e a construção de Brasília”, Brasília, 21 abril 2023, 3 p. Quanto custou a reunificação da Alemanha, quanto custou a construção de Brasília, e quanto custa Brasilia ainda hoje. Artigo para a revista Crusoé. Enviado a Duda Teixeira sob a forma pró-bono. Publicado revista Crusoé (22/04/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/diario/a-reunificacao-da-alemanha-e-a-construcao-de-brasilia/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/04/a-reunificacao-da-alemanha-e-construcao.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1505.
4374. “Por que a tal de ‘nova ordem mundial’ é uma má ideia?”, Brasília, 26 abril 2023, 4 p. Artigo publicado na revista Crusoé (9/06/2023; link: https://oantagonista.uol.com.br/mundo/crusoe-por-que-a-tal-de-nova-ordem-mundial-e-uma-ma-ideia-2/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (14/06/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/06/por-que-tal-de-nova-ordem-mundial-e-uma_14.html); divulgado novamente no blog Diplomatizzando (8/07/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/07/por-que-tal-de-nova-ordem-mundial-e-uma.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1511. 4375. “Se eu quiser falar com o tal de Sul Global, telefono para quem?”, Brasília, 27 abril 2023, 3 p. Publicado na revista Crusoé (edição 265, 25/05/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/secao/paulo-roberto-de-almeida/se-eu-quiser-falar-com-o-sul-global-telefono-para-quem/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (25/10/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/10/e-como-anda-o-tal-de-sul-global-muito.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1509. 4376. “Lula no G7: falta discutir a relação?”, Brasília, 27 abril 2023, 3 p. Publicado na revista Crusoé (12/05/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/263/lula-no-g7-falta-discutir-a-relacao/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (25/10/2023;.link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/10/lula-no-g7-falta-discutir-relacao-paulo.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1508.
4412. “Ah, esse ambicionado Prêmio Nobel da Paz...”, Brasília, 11 junho 2023, 3 p. Artigo sobre os prêmios Nobel e a pretensão de Lula de conquistar um da Paz para si. Publicado na revista Crusoé (23/06/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/secao/paulo-roberto-de-almeida/ah-esse-ambicionado-nobel-da-paz/?utm_source=crs-site&utm_medium=crs-login&utm_campaign=redir); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (23/06/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/06/ah-esse-ambicionado-premio-nobel-da-paz.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1513.
4414. “Grandezas e misérias da diplomacia presidencial: o caso do Brasil”, Brasília, 11 junho 2023, 4 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé. Publicado em 7/07/2023 (link: https://oantagonista.uol.com.br/opiniao/crusoe-grandezas-e-miserias-da-diplomacia-presidencial/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (7/07/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/07/grandezas-e-miserias-da-diplomacia.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1515.
4415. “O Brasil aos olhos do mundo: como era antes, como ficou agora?”, Brasília, 13 junho 2023, 3 p. Artigo sobre a diminuição da credibilidade diplomática do Brasil de Lula 3, para a revista Crusoé. (4/08/2023; link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/275/o-brasil-aos-olhos-do-mundo-como-era-antes-como-ficou-agora/). Relação de Publicados n. 1518.
4430. “Política externa e diplomacia brasileira: uma visão de três décadas”, São Paulo, 7 julho 2023, 4 p. Resumo de uma evolução com altos e baixos. Publicado na revista Crusoé (29/09/2023, link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/283/politica-externa-e-diplomacia-brasileira-uma-visao-de-tres-decadas/); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (30/09/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/09/politica-externa-e-diplomacia.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1525.
4434. “O Brasil, a América Latina e a União Europeia: alguma novidade?”, Brasília, 14 julho 2023, 3 p. Artigo sobre a cúpula Celac-UE para a revista Crusoé. Publicado sob o título de “O irmão menor da União Europeia” (21/07/2023, link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/edicoes/273/o-brasil-a-america-latina-e-a-uniao-europeia-alguma-novidade/). Relação de Publicados n. 1516.
4459. “A cúpula do Brics e o projeto mirabolante de uma moeda comum”, Brasília, 17 agosto 2023, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé, com base nos trabalhos 4343 (“Questões sobre Brics e Mercosul”, Brasília, 25 março 2023, 3 p.) e 4309 (“Sobre o “projeto mágico” da moeda comum do Mercosul”, Brasília, 22 janeiro 2023, 2 p.) Enviado a Ricardo Ortega. Publicado na revista Crusoé (edição 270, 18/08/2023; link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/277/a-cupula-do-brics-e-o-projeto-mirabolante-de-uma-moeda-comum/). Relação de Publicados n. 1520.
4465. “O Brasil de Lula 3 no G20 da Índia”, São Paulo, 31 agosto 2023, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé sobre o G20 e o Brasil. Publicado em 1/09/2023 (link: https://oantagonista.com.br/mundo/crusoe-o-brasil-de-lula-3-no-g20-da-india/); divulgado parcialmente no blog Diplomatizzando (1/09/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/09/the-dawn-of-bric-world-order.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1521.
4472. “Parlamento e política externa: a experiência do Brasil”, Brasília 8 setembro 2023, 4 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé sobre a participação do Poder Legislativo na diplomacia. Publicado na revista Crusoé (edição 281; 15/09/2023; link: https://oantagonista.com.br/brasil/paulo-r-de-almeida-na-crusoe-parlamento-e-politica-externa-a-experiencia-do-brasil/ e https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/281/parlamento-e-politica-externa-a-experiencia-do-brasil/) Relação de Publicados n. 1523.
4489. “O mau terrorismo e o terrorismo tolerável pelas esquerdas”, Brasília, 10 outubro 2023, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé, publicado sob o título “O terrorismo que as esquerdas toleram, (13/10/2023, link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/285/o-terrorismo-que-as-esquerdas-toleram/); divulgado integralmente no blog Diplomatizzando (23/12/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/12/o-terrorismo-que-as-esquerdas-toleram.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1529.
4491. “O Sul Global não existe”, Brasília, 12 outubro 2023, 3 p. Artigo sobre uma realidade criada por ideólogos que não apresenta consistência suficiente para ser chamado de grupo político. Artigo para a revista Crusoé, publicado sob o mesmo título (n. 287, 27/10/2023, link: https://crusoe.uol.com.br/Colunistas/o-sul-global-nao-existe); divulgado parcialmente no blog Diplomatizzando (30/10/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/10/o-sul-global-nao-existe-paulo-roberto.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1530.
4505. “Desafios da diplomacia brasileira na atualidade”, Brasília, 4 novembro 2023, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé que pode servir para subsidiar palestra a convite do Prof. Matheus Atalanio, do curso de Direito da UNIT-Fortaleza, em 7/11/2023. Revisão em 7/11, para submissão à Crusoé. Publicado na revista Crusoé (10/11/2023; link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/289/desafios-da-diplomacia-brasileira-na-atualidade/); divulgado integralmente no blog Diplomatizzando (23/12/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/12/desafios-da-diplomacia-brasileira-na.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1531.
4509. “Por que o Brasil ainda não é um país desenvolvido? (1)”, Brasília, 13 novembro 2023, 3 p. Primeiro de uma série de trabalhos sobre as razões do atraso brasileiro, com base em fatores estruturais e históricos. revista Crusoé (n. 301, 9/02/2024, link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/301/por-que-o-brasil-ainda-nao-e-um-pais-desenvolvido/); divulgado parcialmente no blog Diplomatizzando (9/02/2024; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2024/02/por-que-o-brasil-ainda-nao-e-um-pais.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1546.
4510. “Por que o Brasil ainda não é um país desenvolvido? (2)”, Brasília, 13 novembro 2023, 3 p. Segundo de uma série de trabalhos sobre as razões do atraso brasileiro, com base em fatores estruturais e históricos. revista Crusoé (n. 303, 23/02/2024, link: https://crusoe.com.br/cronica/por-que-o-brasil-ainda-nao-e-um-pais-desenvolvido-segunda-parte/); divulgado parcialmente no blog Diplomatizzando (23/02/2024; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2024/02/por-que-o-brasil-ainda-nao-e-um-pais_23.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1547.
4511. “Diferenças entre a ‘velha’ e a ‘nova’ diplomacia de Lula”, Brasília, 16 novembro 2023, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé; publicado em 24/11/2023 (link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/291/diferencas-entre-a-velha-e-a-nova-diplomacia-de-lula/); divulgado integralmente no blog Diplomatizzando (23/12/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/12/diferencas-entre-velha-e-nova.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1533.
4513. “Imigrantes na construção do Brasil e na política”, Brasília, 16 novembro 2023, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé. Publicado no n. 293, sob o título de “O ponto de fusão” (8/12/2023; link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/293/o-ponto-de-fusao/); divulgado integralmente no blog Diplomatizzando (23/12/2023; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/12/o-ponto-de-fusao-imigrantes-na.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1535.
4523. “O Brasil em 2023: avanços e retrocessos”, Brasília, 5 dezembro 2023, 3 p. Artigo de síntese conjuntural, para o Livres e a revista Crusoé. Revisto em 17/12/2023. Encaminhado a Duda Teixeira. Publicado em 22/12/2023 (link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/295/o-brasil-em-2023-avancos-e-retrocessos/). Relação de Publicados n. 1537.
4530. “O que falta para o Brasil ser um país desenvolvido?”, Brasília, 25 dezembro 2023, 5 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé. [Não publicado]
4531. “O que aguarda o Brasil em 2024?”, Brasília, 26 dezembro 2023, 3 p. Possível artigo para a revista Crusoé, mas capítulo final do livro reunindo todos os artigos escritos para a revista ao longo do último ano. [Não publicado]
4532. “Apresentação ao livro O Brasil no contexto regional e mundial: artigos sobre nossa dimensão internacional, Brasília, 27 dezembro 2023, 2 p. Incorporado ao livro reunindo uma seleta de artigos previamente publicados na revista Crusoé (n. 4533).
4533. O Brasil no contexto regional e mundial: artigos sobre nossa dimensão internacional (Brasília: Diplomatizzando, 2023, 167 p.; ISBN: 978-65-00-89870-5; ASIN: B0CR1Z682R). Livro organizado a partir de artigos preparados para e publicados na revista Crusoé. Disponível na Amazon.com.br (link: https://www.amazon.com.br/dp/B0CR1Z682R/ref=sr_1_1?__mk_pt_BR=%C3%85M%C3%85%C5%BD%C3%95%C3%91&crid=2525JS64IRCBA&keywords=O+Brasil+no+contexto+regional+e+mundial&qid=1703782535&s=books&sprefix=o+brasil+no+contexto+regional+e+mundial%2Cstripbooks%2C228&sr=1-1); divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2023/12/novo-livro-publicado-paulo-roberto-de.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1538.
4543. “Um Brasil ambientalista se torna associado à OPEP”, Brasília, 4 janeiro 2024, 3 p. Artigo para a revista Crusoé sobre a nova postura pouco ambientalista do governo Lula. Publicado, sob o título de “Governo Lula entra para o cartel dos chantagistas do petróleo” na Crusoé (n. 299, 26/01/2024, link: https://crusoe.com.br/edicoes/299/governo-lula-entra-para-o-cartel-dos-chantagistas-do-petroleo/). Divulgado parcialmente no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2024/01/um-brasil-ambientalista-se-torna.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1545.
4594. “O que falta para o Brasil ser um país desenvolvido? (1)”, Brasília, 7 março 2024, 4 p. Continuidade da série sobre o desenvolvimento brasileiro, a partir do trabalho n. 4530, focando nos elementos estruturais e institucionais. Revista Crusoé (n. 305, 8/03/2024; link: https://crusoe.com.br/o-caminho-do-dinheiro/o-que-falta-ao-brasil-para-ser-um-pais-desenvolvido-terceira-parte/); transcrito parcialmente no blog Diplomatizzando (9/03/2024; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2024/03/o-que-falta-para-o-brasil-ser-um-pais.html). Relação de Publicados n. 1551.
4595. “O que falta para o Brasil ser um país desenvolvido? (2)”, Brasília, 7 março 2024, 3 p. Continuidade da série sobre o desenvolvimento brasileiro, a partir do trabalho n. 4530, focando nos elementos de políticas macroeconômicas e setoriais para um processo de desenvolvimento sustentado. Revista Crusoé (n. ?, 2?/03/2024; link: ?). Relação de Publicados n. ?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida Brasília, 5237, 10 março 2026, 8 p. Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (10/03/2026; link:
A Strategic Learning Deficit: Western Military Institutions Ignored Ukraine War Lessons.
The Big Five, Futura Doctrina, 8 March edition
My weekly update on war and strategic competition. This week, ignoring Ukraine war lessons hurts, battlefield and long-range strike, PLA operations in the Pacific and my Big 5 reading recommendations.
Ukrainians have been fighting against “shahed” drones for years now, and everyone recognizes that no other country in the world has this kind of experience. We are ready to help, and we expect that our people will also receive the support they need. Protecting life must be a shared priority, and it is very important to coordinate for security both in Europe and in the Middle East.President Zelenskyy, 8 March 2026.
The week of 2–8 March 2026 continued to show that the war in Ukraine has a level of dynamism that is not reflective of the ‘frozen conflict’ narratives popular in some areas. On the frontline, Ukrainian ground forces demonstrated a quiet resurgence while continuing to hold the line against the Russian offensive machine. Long range strike forces executed one of the most operationally significant maritime strikes of the war.
Diplomacy collapsed under the weight of a new Middle East war. 300 Ukrainian prisoners of war returned home, and, President Zelenskyy visited his frontline soldiers again - something Putin has shown no inclination to do, and no courage to do, in the past four years.
In the Pacific, Taiwan is focussed on integrating its defences within a larger First Island Chain defensive strategy, and China halted its aerial incursions into Taiwan’s airspace for a week.
Welcome to this week’s update and Big Five!
Ukraine
Image: Wild Hornets
Interceptor Drones and the Systemic Learning Deficit in Western Military Institutions. This week revealed fully just how poor western and Middle East military institutions have been at learning from the war in Ukraine. I have written several times about how western military organisations have shown a lack of humility in learning from Ukraine, but the past week has provided the best evidence yet of that phenomenon.
Therefore, it was an extraordinary development this week when the United States formally asked Ukraine for help defeating Iranian drones. When the U.S. and Israel launched their attack on Iran on 28 February, Iran responded with a barrage that included over 500 ballistic missiles and approximately 2,000 unmanned aerial systems in the first five days, according to US Central Command. American air defences — designed for the threat environments of the late 20th century — struggled with the volume of cheap, slow-moving Shahed-type drones. A strike in Kuwait killed six American servicemembers. Drone strikes damaged the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. The Washington Post reported on 5 March that both the United States and its Middle Eastern allies had approached Ukraine seeking expertise and practical support in countering Iranian drones.
Zelenskyy responded shrewdly. He confirmed that Ukraine would provide assistance, directed officials to present options, and announced that Ukrainian specialists and technology would be deployed to the region. He then offered a proposition that was equal parts pragmatic and diplomatically elegant: Kyiv offered to send its best drone interceptors to the Gulf — in exchange for Patriot air defence missiles. ‘It is an equal exchange,’ Zelenskyy said.
Image: @DefenceU
The irony is huge. Ukraine has been defending itself against Shahed drones since 2022. Russia initially imported them from Iran; Iran has since supplied an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 of the weapons to Moscow, with Russia also producing modified variants (the Geran) domestically. Ukraine has built a layered, cost-effective counter-drone architecture over four years of trial and error. For at least a year, Ukraine has employed low-cost drone interceptors, which are an order of magnitude cheaper than Shaheds, as part of this air defence system. It is exactly what the United States and some of its partners lack in the Gulf. CNN reported on 7 March that the US had also decided to deploy its Merops anti-drone system — proven in combat against Russian drones in Poland and Romania — to the Middle East, citing lessons learned from the Ukrainian theatre.
This was a highly predictable threat from Iran which was not paid sufficient respect by the Americans and others, and as a result, they were unprepared. But at least the U.S. military demonstrated some capacity for learning by using Shahed copies (the LUCAS drones) against Iran. The situation is much worse in other countries (particularly Australia), where these has been a systemic effort to downplay or ignore learning from Ukraine. It is an example of a systemic learning deficit in western military organisations which has bitten America and countries in the Middle East.
Just in case we are led to believe that the drone interceptors are the only example of a lack of learning, there was another good example of this systemic learning deficit during the week. A British politician visiting Ukraine tweeted from a previously undeclared maintenance site for British military equipment. For four years, both Ukraine and Russia have employed simple and widely available geolocation from social media posts (and images / videos in those posts) to prime their targeting process. How had they not learned this? As a result, it is highly likely the Russians will target this location, and more lives might be put at threat. At the minimum, the site will have be relocated.
In conclusion, ignoring lessons of modern wars - in an era when war has never been more visible - will hurt you at some point. America and Middle East nations found this out the hard way during the week. What other nations out there have also engaged in willing ignorance of what Ukraine can teach us?
Image: @DefenceU
Ukraine Armed Forces Strategic Research Priorities 2026. This week, the Ukrainian Armed Forces released its research priorities for the coming year. The briefing provided a look back at 2025, noting that:
The main change in 2025 is the transition from chaotic developments to a holistic state system…Last year, the Armed Forces of Ukraine completed the formation of a holistic system that allows them to respond instantly to the challenges of war. The key principle is feedback.
The key priorities for research funding (and percentage of research funding received) in 2025 were:
UAV – 28%.
Robotic systems (RCS) – 15%.
Communication and information protection – 11%.
Electronic warfare and countermeasure systems – 8%.
This year, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will focus on four strategic areas:
Improvement of the innovation management system.
Scaling of research activities.
Deep implementation of Artificial Intelligence technologies.
Further development and integration of unmanned systems in all branches of troops.
Reckoning in the South: The Ground War. This week Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, General Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces captured more territory in February 2026 than Russian forces were able to seize during the same period. This represents the best relative territorial performance for Ukraine’s ground force since the Kursk operation in August 2024. He described it as having survived a ‘difficult battle of the winter.’
This matters because the pattern of Russian winter advances has been consistent (and often demoralising) in the past couple of years. The Ukrainian gains have broken that pattern, at least for 2026. According to Russia Matters, which cross-references ISW data, Russian forces gained just 46 square miles of Ukrainian territory in the period from 3 February to 3 March 2026 compared with 123 square miles in the previous four-week period. Russian monthly gains of Ukrainian territory have nearly collapsed from their late-2025 peak.
The most consequential Ukrainian gains occurred in the south — in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. ISW’s assessment of 6 March assessed that Ukrainian forces have liberated 244 square kilometres in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions since 1 January 2026, while Russian forces seized 115 square kilometres in the same region and time period. This is a net Ukrainian gain of nearly 130 square kilometres on this axis of advance. Ukrainian forces cleared Russian positions west of the Haichur River and likely liberated the settlements of Ternuvate and Kosivtseve.
Along the northern and eastern regions of the frontline, the picture was mixed. ISW’s daily assessments throughout the week tracked Ukrainian advances in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Kupiansk, while Russian forces continued to press their advance on the Pokrovsk and in the Slovyansk axes of advance. The grinding combat on the ground in Donetsk continues.
Long Range Strike. Russia has probably failed to achieve the objectives it set for its Winter 2025–2026 long-range missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This assessment is supported by an ISW report from the week, which also noted that the Russian military command ‘continues to operate in an alternate reality, setting wildly unrealistic deadlines that do not match Russia’s actual battlefield capabilities.’
President Zelenskyy also warned this week that Russia intends to shift its strike campaign toward Ukrainian logistics and water infrastructure as spring arrives — a potentially significant escalation that could threaten civilian supply chains and Ukraine’s ability to sustain frontline forces. He issued that warning in ISW’s 2 March assessment, and Ukrainian authorities have since been taking steps to harden railway junctions and water facilities against attack.
The most significant long range strike event of the week occurred on 2 March, when Ukrainian forces executed a large-scale drone strike against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s primary operating base at Novorossiysk. It was a complex, large-scale attack of a type we must all learn from.
According to Ukrainska Pravda, citing sources within the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), the operation involved approximately 200 aerial and maritime drones, coordinated across multiple Ukrainian agencies including Special Operations Forces, the State Border Guard Service, Defence Intelligence, and the Unmanned Systems Forces. The Ukrainians claim to have hit Russian naval vessels, air defence systems, as well as energy infrastructure at the Sheskharis oil terminal.
The key strike was against the frigate Admiral Essen, which is a Burevestnik-class warship carrying eight Kalibr cruise missiles. UNITED24 Media reported that the frigate’s midsection superstructure was hit, triggering an 18-hour fire. The SSU stated that: ‘The ship sustained critical damage that significantly limits its ability to use Kalibr cruise missiles. At present, the frigate cannot carry out strikes on the territory of Ukraine.’
This is a good outcome. The Admiral Essen has been a persistent source of Kalibr strikes against Ukrainian cities since 2022. Its effective removal from the Russian strike fleet — even temporarily — has operational consequences. The same strike also damaged the minesweeper Valentin Pikul, the anti-submarine corvettes Yeysk and Kasimov, hit a guidance radar from an S-300PMU-2 air defence system, and set fire to six of seven oil loading arms at the Sheskharis terminal.
Later in the week, the Ukrainians hit a key Russian Shahed drone hub near Donetsk Airport. The site was used to store, prepare, and launch strike UAVs against Ukraine.
The broader strategic significance of these strikes is that another Russian Black Sea Fleet refuge is no longer a safe harbour for the Russian Navy. Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian rear areas with significant air, missile and drone defences by using complex multi-domain drone swarms represents one of the most important military developments of this war. The Ukrainian long range strike capability, something I have written about for three and a half years, continues to mature.
And it offers many insights for other military institutions – if they are willing and humble enough to learn.
Diplomacy Interrupted. The diplomatic track of the Ukraine War, which had been dragging on with little progress across the Coalition of the Willing summit in Paris in January and three rounds of US-brokered talks, came to an abrupt halt this week as the war against Iran commenced.
A fourth round of trilateral talks between Ukrainian, Russian, and American representatives had been scheduled for 5–6 March in Abu Dhabi. Bloomberg reported on 5 March that Zelenskyy formally confirmed the talks were postponed indefinitely. “For now, because of the situation with Iran, the necessary signals for a trilateral meeting haven’t come yet. As soon as the security situation and the broader political context allow us to resume the trilateral diplomatic work, it will be done.”
The venue for the talks was part of the problem. The UAE, which had hosted two prior rounds of talks, had largely closed its airspace as Iranian ballistic missiles and drones targeted Gulf states. Indeed, as I write this, another strike against the Dubai airport occurred. Modern Diplomacy reported this week that Ukrainian officials were exploring alternative venues for the talks, including Turkey and Switzerland, both of which have previously hosted negotiations related to the conflict. But the deeper problem with the talks now is not geography — it is political bandwidth.
The Trump administration, which had been the primary diplomatic driver of the Ukraine peace process, is now absorbed by its war against Iran. American attention, American assets, and American political capital have been redirected. Zelenskyy was direct about the risk: speaking to Novaya Gazeta Europe, he warned that a prolonged U.S.-Iran war could deprive Ukraine of key air defence systems it needs to intercept Russian missiles, as Washington would prioritise supplying the Middle East with Patriots and other interceptors.
The Kremlin quickly exploited the disruption. ISW’s 5 March assessment noted that Kremlin officials are ‘using the escalation in the Middle East to set conditions to blame the United States for any future failures in negotiations for a peace in Ukraine.’ Russian officials are working to rhetorically place Russia and the United States in opposition, attempting to discredit U.S.-led mediation efforts by painting Washington as an aggressive power unfit to serve as a neutral broker.
Peace in 2026 is looking even more unlikely – and I began the year with low hopes for this.
Despite the war in Iran, the war in Ukraine continues. Image: @ZelenskyyUa
Strategic Assessment. Ukraine is performing better on the battlefield than the narrative of inevitable victory from Russia describes. As I noted in a piece this week, strategic narratives are not strategy. Russia, likely to launch its spring offensives soon, will be doing so having failed to achieve its strategic objectives for winter. Diplomacy, interrupted by the war in Iran and a global security environment that is changing rapidly, is unlikely make significant progress in the short term.
Three conclusions are worth noting.
First, Ukrainian military performance is holding up and in some areas improving. The Novorossiysk strike, and the counter attacks in the south (now largely halted because of clearer weather) all point to a force that is learning, adapting, and finding ways to strike the Russians in new ways. This is an army that continues to take punches but remains standing and continues hitting back. We can learn from that.
Second, the diplomatic window is narrowing. The Iran War has not killed the Ukraine peace process, but it has disrupted it at a critical point. Russia still shows no signs of genuine compromise on the territorial question that is the heart of any potential settlement, however. The United States remains a crucial broker but is currently otherwise occupied.
Finally, the new Iran War shows that Ukraine’s hard-won expertise has global strategic value. Kyiv is leveraging it intelligently to extract air defence resources from Middle East nations, and to maintain its relevance in a Washington increasingly consumed by a different war. Whether this translates into meaningful gains — Patriot systems, continued military support, sustained American diplomatic engagement — remains to be seen.
The Middle East
Because I have published a few articles on this topic throughout the week, I will focus on the statistics of the war for this section of the update. The first is an update from the UAE Ministry of Defence (as at 7 March) that covers the drone and missiles strikes against the country since the start of the new Iran War.
Next, is the update from Saudi Arabia that contains similar data. Attacks on Saudi Arabia are an order of magnitude lower than those in UAE. However, just a few well placed drones and missiles hitting oil production facilities can reverberate around the world.
Finally, the latest info-graphic from The Institute for the Study of War covering where U.S. and Israeli forces have conducted strikes against Iran in the past 24 hours.
First Island Chain Integration Strategy. Taiwan Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung’s interview with The Japan Times articulated a diplomatic strategy acknowledging changed strategic circumstances. Lin argued that effectively deterring China’s expansion into the Pacific requires embedding Taiwan more fully into Indo-Pacific security frameworks, particularly with First Island Chain partners. This represents not just political announcements but recognition that Taipei cannot rely solely on bilateral U.S. security commitments given contemporary American strategic ambiguity.
Foreign Minister Lin called for enhanced cooperation in intelligence-sharing, joint exercises, defense-industry tie-ups, data links, and dealing with hybrid threats such as China’s grey-zone activities. The emphasis on mini-lateral frameworks reflects Taiwan’s assessment that distributed deterrence through multiple partnership nodes offers greater resilience than dependence on a single alliance relationship.
Yet this strategy confronts structural constraints: Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic recognition from most First Island Chain states, limiting the depth and transparency of security cooperation.
China’s Low Tempo Air Operations Around Taiwan. This week, PLA aircraft activity near Taiwan showed a fascinating pattern. After an eight-day absence of detected flights—the longest such stretch since systematic tracking began—Chinese military aircraft resumed operations on 7 March. The pause has generated speculation about causes ranging from mechanical maintenance cycles to deliberate strategic signalling. Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo cautioned legislators that absence of air incursions should not imply absence of PLA activity, noting that sea-based operations continued without pause.
This pause naturally sparked speculation, however many popular theories are as of yet unsupported by observable patterns and regional events. Observers have forwarded several possible explanations, to include the ongoing operations in Iran, the upcoming summit between President Trump and Xi, an inability to operate routinely following a series of major officer purges, and domestic politics in Taiwan.
You can read their full analysis on this pause (which is now over) at this link.
Monthly Update on PLA Air and Maritime Maneuvers Around Taiwan. During the week,@KTristanTang released his latest monthly update on Chinese activity around Taiwan. His conclusion: “PLA air and maritime activity around Taiwan has declined, but this does not necessarily imply that combat readiness has been seriously weakened by the recent purges. Rather, it appears to reflect a shift in training planning toward exploring joint operational modes.”
Middle Power Security and Carney’s Asia-Pacific Visit. This week the Canadian Prime Minister visited the Pacific region, including stops in Australia, India and Japan. Pitching a middle power approach to regional security, he seeks to address the fundamental question confronting Pacific security affairs. Is a network of distributed, minilateral security agreements a viable substitute for weakened bilateral alliance credibility. Manila, Tokyo, Canberra, and Taipei are building networked relationships precisely because long-standing hub-and-spoke arrangements in the region, of which America is a critical component, appear insufficient.
Yet networked resilience of the type discussed this week depends on each nations’ individual capability and collective coordination. The transition from American-guaranteed stability to a more distributed form of deterrence against Chinese aggression will either produce more robust security or dangerous gaps. This week suggests allies and partners understand the challenge, but have not yet invested in solving it.
Japan’s defence spending has doubled from 1% to 2% of GDP, and the current Japanese PM is looking at further enhancements to the budget as well as constitutional change. Unfortunately, few other countries in the region, including Canada or Australia, have shown an inclination to drastically increase defence spending or a willingness to take more strategic risk in seeking to deter China.
First, I published an article on 2 March which examined initial insights and questions from the initial phase of the new U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran. You can read that article here.
Next, I published a piece yesterday that explored what Putin and Xi might be learning from the war in Iran. Called Selective Belligerence and Unconditional Surrender, you can read this article at the following link.
*******
It’s time to explore this week’s recommended readings.
In this week’s Big Five, I have included an excellent new report from RAND that examines Chinese perspectives on the military applications of AI. There are also articles on how the Chinese leader might approach his upcoming summit with President Trump, insights into how AI will impact on army officers and a good piece of FICINT from Peter Singer and August Cole.
As always, if you only have the time available to read one of my recommendations, the first is my pick of the week.
Happy reading!
1. PLA Perspectives on AI
In this new report from RAND, the authors explore integration into the PLA from the perspective of Chinese military leaders. The review indicates that the PLA will use AI to enhance its kill chains by strengthening joint AI integration, multi-agent collaboration, and improved, secure data transmission. There is also examination of the use of AI in military logistics. Finally, the authors propose several targetable vulnerabilities in the PLA approach to AI implementation. You can read the full report at this link.
2. Will China Overplay Its Hand?
In this article published by Foreign Affairs, the author examines how the Chinese leader might approach the forthcoming summit with President Trump. The author notes that “the most significant factor that will shape the upcoming Trump-Xi meetings will be Beijing’s perception of its own apparent success in 2025 in responding to U.S. threats with resolute counterthreats…Many Chinese experts believe that Beijing, unlike other capitals subjected to Trump’s threats, managed to back Washington into a corner and that this outcome signaled China’s arrival as a global power on par with the United States.” How this will influence the coming summit remains to be seen. You can read the full article here.
3. Effects of Private Quantum Encryption
Peter Singer and August Cole have been working with Defense One this year to produce a series of short stories that examine key national security and military issues. This FICINT (fictional intelligence) is designed to be an accessible yet thought-provoking means to drive conversions in government and beyond about the impacts of new technologies on national security and societies more broadly. The latest story, The Quantum Curtain, has just been published and can be read at this link.
4. The Impact of AI on Army Officers
A new report was released by the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP) that explores the impact of AI on Army officers and the army profession more generally. As the author of the report notes, “these changes will affect not only which jobs warfighters perform, but how they perform them, requiring the U.S. military to rethink how it organizes, trains, and equips its future workforce, as well as how it designs its forces.” You can read the full report at this link.
5. Responsible Procurement of AI in Military Institutions
This report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) explores the intersection of military procurement and responsible use of military AI. The authors propose that procurement process can be a mechanism for states to implement political commitments and legal obligations, and therefore, also a mechanism for implementing responsible use of AI in military institutions. You can read their full report here.