Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.
quarta-feira, 22 de dezembro de 2010
Economia no limite - Edmar Bacha
Os problemas do "made in Brazil" sao made in Brazil: portanto...
Enfrentar nossas mazelas é tarefa para a póxima presidente: veremos se ele está à altura dos desafios.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Pressões pelo protecionismo
A movimentação de sindicalistas em favor de uma ação oficial contra as importações já é ostensiva, como indicou reportagem publicada segunda-feira no Estado. A presença crescente de produtos importados no mercado brasileiro é apontada como ameaça ao emprego. O risco pode ser pouco perceptível para a maioria das pessoas, neste momento, mas tende a crescer e é preciso levá-lo em conta.
Dirigentes de entidades empresariais também têm pedido socorro e tendem a articular-se com os sindicalistas na cobrança de medidas defensivas e de benefícios tributários aos produtores brasileiros.
Articulações desse tipo são perigosas. Induzem os governos a produzir respostas políticas para atender os grupos mais articulados, em vez de tomar providências mais eficazes para fortalecer a economia nacional. Protecionismo e subsídios são bons para alguns setores empresariais e para algumas categorias de trabalhadores, mas custam muito para o consumidor, para os trabalhadores de outras áreas e para os contribuintes em geral.
Para responder ao desafio, o novo governo terá de enfrentar com urgência tarefas prometidas e jamais cumpridas de forma satisfatória pelas autoridades nos últimos anos. O País dispõe oficialmente de uma Política de Desenvolvimento Produtivo, mas a ação oficial nunca foi muito além das palavras e da formulação de esquemas ambiciosos. O crescimento econômico dos últimos oito anos foi muito mais uma consequência da ação dos empresários do que das iniciativas governamentais. O ambiente internacional favorável até 2008 também ajudou muito.
Em vez de esperar pressões de sindicalistas e de empresários, a equipe do novo governo deveria examinar as deficiências da economia brasileira e pensar em como combatê-las. Pode-se encontrar um bom inventário dos problemas no estudo comparativo de competitividade publicado na sexta-feira passada pela Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp).
Nesse estudo, o Brasil aparece em 36.º lugar numa lista de 43 países. Esse conjunto corresponde a cerca de 90% do produto bruto global. O País subiu um degrau nessa classificação, desde o levantamento anterior, mas continuou no grupo dos países de baixa competitividade (nos outros grupos estão os de competitividade alta, satisfatória e média).
A posição brasileira seria provavelmente melhor, se a classificação fosse baseada só nos atributos das empresas. Mas o poder de competição do setor produtivo é determinado por numerosos fatores, como a carga tributária, a qualidade das finanças públicas, as condições de financiamento, a qualidade e a extensão da infraestrutura, a taxa de poupança e a oferta da mão de obra adequada. Em todos esses itens o Brasil perde para as economias desenvolvidas e para a maior parte das emergentes.
O Brasil, uma das dez maiores economias do mundo, tem hoje mais influência do que há oito ou dez anos. Mas isso não lhe assegura vantagem permanente no confronto com os competidores. Os dados são muito claros: o produtor nacional vem perdendo a corrida tanto no mercado externo quanto no interno. Sem as boas condições de preços dos produtos básicos, a receita de exportações teria crescido bem menos neste ano e as perspectivas seriam piores em 2011.
Há poucos dias o ministro da Fazenda anunciou estímulos ao financiamento de longo prazo. A medida é oportuna, mas o programa é limitado e não produzirá efeitos imediatos. Além disso, é preciso agir numa frente muito mais ampla. Se for rápido, o novo governo poderá desenvolver uma política racional e eficaz. Se for lento, ficará exposto a pressões perigosas.
terça-feira, 21 de dezembro de 2010
America Latina: crescimento empurrado pela Asia
Mas, a Asia é claramente responsável pelo crescimento da AL: em outros termos, continuamos a ser uma economia "reflexa", como já proclamava, desde os anos 1940, um economista preclaro como Eugenio Gudin...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
70% DO CRESCIMENTO DA AMÉRICA LATINA EM 2010 SE DEVEU À ÁSIA!
Trechos do artigo de Jorge Castro, analista e ex-ministro argentino no Clarín (19).
1. A América Latina cresceu 6% este ano, com um aumento da renda per capita de 4,8%, depois de cair -1,9% em 2009. A expansão da região ultrapassou todas as previsões, segundo a Cepal, e as únicas exceções a este crescimento generalizado são a Venezuela e o Haiti, que caíram -1,6% e -7%, respectivamente. É um crescimento heterogêneo. A América do Sul vai crescer 6,6%, enquanto o México e a América Central, 4,9%.
2. A diferença entre as duas dinâmicas é que na América do Sul estão os países exportadores de commodities (agrícolas, minerais e energia), que tiveram uma extraordinária melhora em termos de intercâmbio e um valor recorde em suas exportações. Mais de 70% do crescimento sul-americano este ano é devido à demanda de países emergentes (China / Índia).
3. Isso significa que o PIB mundial cresceu em 2010 em U$S 69.947 bilhões (poder de compra doméstico -PPP), dos quais os países avançados têm 49,3%, e os demais, 50,7%. Neste quadro, a China tem, medida em PPP, uma porcentagem maior do que a dos EUA da produção mundial (U$S 15.203 bilhões/21,7% versus U$S14.369 bilhões/20,5%). Devido a isso, o crescimento da China este ano representa 59% do total mundial, enquanto que o crescimento dos EUA equivale a 15%.
(da coluna diaria do ex-blog de Cesar Maia, 21.12.2010)
Europa: razoes das agruras economicas - Stratfor
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Europe, The New Plan
By Peter Zeihan
Stratfor, December 21, 2010
Europe is on the cusp of change. An EU heads-of-state summit Dec. 16 launched a process aimed to save the common European currency. If successful, this process would be the most significant step toward creating a singular European power since the creation of the European Union itself in 1992 — that is, if it doesn’t destroy the euro first.
Envisioned by the EU Treaty on Monetary Union, the common currency, the euro, has suffered from two core problems during its decade-long existence: the lack of a parallel political union and the issue of debt. Many in the financial world believe that what is required for a viable currency is a fiscal union that has taxation power — and that is indeed needed. But that misses the larger point of who would be in charge of the fiscal union. Taxation and appropriation — who pays how much to whom — are essentially political acts. One cannot have a centralized fiscal authority without first having a centralized political/military authority capable of imposing and enforcing its will. Greeks are not going to implement a German-designed tax and appropriations system simply because Berlin thinks it’s a good idea. As much as financiers might like to believe, the checkbook is not the ultimate power in the galaxy. The ultimate power comes from the law backed by a gun.
Europe’s Disparate Parts
This isn’t a revolutionary concept — in fact, it is one most people know well at some level. Americans fought the bloodiest war in their history from 1861 to 1865 over the issue of central power versus local power. What emerged was a state capable of functioning at the international level. It took three similar European wars — also in the 19th century — for the dozens of German principalities finally to merge into what we now know as Germany.
Europe simply isn’t to the point of willing conglomeration just yet, and we do not use the American Civil War or German unification wars as comparisons lightly. STRATFOR sees the peacetime creation of a unified European political authority as impossible, since Europe’s component parts are far more varied than those of mid-19th century America or Germany.
Northern Europe is composed of advanced technocratic economies, made possible by the capital-generating capacity of the well-watered North European Plain and its many navigable rivers (it is much cheaper to move goods via water than land, and this advantage grants nations situated on such waterways a steady supply of surplus capital). As a rule, northern Europe prefers a strong currency in order to attract investment to underwrite the high costs of advanced education, first-world infrastructure and a highly technical industrial plant. Thus, northern European exports — heavily value added — are not inhibited greatly by a strong currency. One of the many outcomes of this development pattern is a people that identifies with its brethren throughout the river valleys and in other areas linked by what is typically omnipresent infrastructure. This crafts a firm identity at the national level rather than local level and assists with mass-mobilization strategies. Consequently, size is everything.
Southern Europe, in comparison, suffers from an arid, rugged topography and lack of navigable rivers. This lack of rivers does more than deny them a local capital base, it also inhibits political unification; lacking clear core regions, most of these states face the political problems of the European Union in microcosm. Here, identity is more localized; southern Europeans tend to be more concerned with family and town than nation, since they do not benefit from easy transport options or the regular contact that northern Europeans take for granted. Their economies reflect this, with integration occurring only locally (there is but one southern European equivalent of the great northern industrial mega-regions such as the Rhine, Italy’s Po Valley). Bereft of economies of scale, southern European economies are highly dependent upon a weak currency to make their exports competitive abroad and to make every incoming investment dollar or deutschemark work to maximum effect.
Central Europe — largely former Soviet territories — have yet different rules of behavior. Some countries, like Poland, fit in well with the northern Europeans, but they require outside defense support in order to maintain their positions. The frigid weather of the Baltics limits population sizes, demoting these countries to being, at best, the economic satellites of larger powers (they’re hoping for Sweden while fearing it will be Russia). Bulgaria and Romania are a mix of north and south, sitting astride Europe’s longest navigable river yet being so far removed from the European core that their successful development may depend upon events in Turkey, a state that is not even an EU member. While states of this grouping often plan together for EU summits, in reality the only thing they have in common is a half-century of lost ground to recover, and they need as much capital as can be made available. As such variation might suggest, some of these states are in the eurozone, while others are unlikely to join within the next decade.
And that doesn’t even begin to include the EU states that have actively chosen to refuse the euro — Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom — or consider the fact that the European Union is now made up of 27 different nationalities that jealously guard their political (and in most cases, fiscal) autonomy.
The point is this: With Europe having such varied geographies, economies and political systems, any political and fiscal union would be fraught with complications and policy mis-prescriptions from the start. In short, this is a defect of the euro that is not going to be corrected, and to be blunt, it isn’t one that the Europeans are trying to fix right now.
The Debt Problem
If anything, they are attempting to craft a work-around by addressing the second problem: debt. Monetary union means that all participating states are subject to the dictates of a single central bank, in this case the European Central Bank (ECB) headquartered in Frankfurt. The ECB’s primary (and only partially stated) mission is to foster long-term stable growth in the eurozone’s largest economy — Germany — working from the theory that what is good for the continent’s economic engine is good for Europe.
One impact of this commitment is that Germany’s low interest rates are applied throughout the currency zone, even to states with mediocre income levels, lower educational standards, poorer infrastructure and little prospect for long-term growth. Following their entry into the eurozone, capital-starved southern Europeans used to interest rates in the 10-15 percent range found themselves in an environment of rates in the 2-5 percent range (currently it is 1.0 percent). To translate that into a readily identifiable benefit, that equates to a reduction in monthly payments for a standard 30-year mortgage of more than 60 percent.
As the theory goes, the lower costs of capital will stimulate development in the peripheral states and allow them to catch up to Germany. But these countries traditionally suffer from higher interest rates for good reasons. Smaller, poorer economies are more volatile, since even tiny changes in the international environment can send them through either the floor or the roof. Higher risks and volatility mean higher capital costs. Their regionalization also engenders high government spending as the central government attempts to curb the propensity of the regions to spin away from the center (essentially, the center bribes the regions to remain in the state).
This means that when the eurozone spread to these places, theory went out the window. In practice, growth in the periphery did accelerate, but that growth was neither smooth nor sustainable. The unification of capital costs has proved more akin to giving an American Express black card to a college freshman: Traditionally capital poor states (and citizens) have a propensity to overspend in situations where borrowing costs are low, due to a lack of a relevant frame of reference. The result has been massive credit binging by corporations, consumers and governments alike, inevitably leading to bubbles in a variety of sectors. And just as these states soared high in the first decade after the euro was introduced, they have crashed low in the past year. The debt crises of 2010 — so far precipitating government debt bailouts for Ireland and Greece and an unprecedented bank bailout in Ireland — can be laid at the feet of this euro-instigated over-exuberance.
It is this second, debt-driven shortcoming that European leaders discussed Dec. 16. None of them want to do away with the euro at this point, and it is easy to see why. While the common currency remains a popular whipping boy in domestic politics, its benefits — mainly lower transaction costs, higher purchasing power, unfettered market access and cheaper and more abundant capital — are deeply valued by all participating governments. The question is not “whither the euro” but how to provide a safety net for the euro’s less desirable, debt-related aftereffects. The agreed-upon path is to create a mechanism that can manage a bailout even for the eurozone’s larger economies when their debt mountains become too imposing. In theory, this would contain the contradictory pressures the euro has created while still providing to the entire zone the euro’s many benefits.
Obstacles to the Safety Net
Three complications exist, however. First, when a bailout is required, it is clearly because something has gone terribly wrong. In Greece’s case, it was out-of-control government spending with no thought to the future; in essence, Athens took that black card and leapt straight into the economic abyss. In Ireland’s case, it was private-sector overindulgence, which bubbled the size of the financial sector to more than four times the entire country’s gross domestic product. In both cases, recovery was flat-out impossible without the countries’ eurozone partners stepping in and declaring some sort of debt holiday, and the result was a complete funding of all Greek and Irish deficit spending for three years while they get their houses in order.
“Houses in order” are the key words here. When the not-so-desperate eurozone states step in with a few billion euros — 223 billion euros so far, to be exact — they want not only their money back but also some assurance that such overindulgences will not happen again. The result is a deep series of policy requirements that must be adopted if the bailout money is to be made available. Broadly known as austerity measures, these requirements result in deep cuts to social services, retirement benefits and salaries. They are not pleasant. Put simply: Germany is attempting to trade financial benefits for the right to make policy adjustments that normally would be handed by a political union.
It’s a pretty slick plan, but it is not happening in a vacuum. Remember, there are two more complications. The second is that the Dec. 16 agreement is only an agreement in principle. Before any Champagne corks are popped, one should consider that the “details” of the agreement raise a more than “simply” trillion-euro question. STRATFOR guesses that to deliver on its promises, the permanent bailout fund (right now there is a temporary fund with a “mere” 750 billion euros) probably would need upwards of three trillion euros. Why so much? The debt bailouts for Greece and Ireland were designed to completely sequester those states from debt markets by providing those governments with all of the cash they would need to fund their budgets for three years. This wise move has helped keep the contagion from spreading to the rest of the eurozone. Making any fund credible means applying that precedent to all the eurozone states facing high debt pressures, and using the most current data available, that puts the price tag at just under 2.2 trillion euros. Add in enough extra so that the eurozone has sufficient ammo left to fight any contagion and we’re looking at a cool 3 trillion euros. Anti-crisis measures to this point have enjoyed the assistance of both the ECB and the International Monetary Fund, but so far, the headline figures have been rather restrained when compared to future needs. Needless to say, the process of coming up with funds of that magnitude when it is becoming obvious to the rest of Europe that this is, at its heart, a German power play is apt to be contentious at best.
The third complication is that the bailout mechanism is actually only half the plan. The other half is to allow states to at least partially default on their debt (in EU diplomatic parlance, this is called the “inclusion of private interests in funding the bailouts”). When the investors who fund eurozone sovereign debt markets hear this, they understandably shudder, since it means the European Union plans to codify giving states permission to walk away from their debts — sticking investors with the losses. This too is more than simply a trillion-euro question. Private investors collectively own nearly all of the eurozone’s 7.5 trillion euros in outstanding sovereign debt. And in the case of Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal and Greece, debt volumes worth half or more of GDP for each individual state are held by foreigners.
Assuming investors decide it is worth the risk to keep purchasing government debt, they have but one way to mitigate this risk: charge higher premiums. The result will be higher debt financing costs for all, doubly so for the eurozone’s more spendthrift and/or weaker economies.
For most of the euro’s era, the interest rates on government bonds have been the same throughout the eurozone, based on the inaccurate belief that eurozone states would all be as fiscally conservative and economically sound as Germany. That belief has now been shattered, and the rate on Greek and Irish debt has now risen from 4.5 percent in early 2008 to this week’s 11.9 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively. With a formal default policy in the making, those rates are going to go higher yet. In the era before monetary union became the Europeans’ goal, Greek and Irish government debt regularly went for 20 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Continued euro membership may well put a bit of downward pressure on these rates, but that will be more than overwhelmed by the fact that both countries are, in essence, in financial conservatorship.
That is not just a problem for the post-2013 world, however. Because investors now know the European Union intends to stick them with at least part of the bill, they are going to demand higher returns as details of the default plan are made known, both on any new debt and on any pre-existing debt that comes up for refinancing. This means that states that just squeaked by in 2010 must run a more difficult gauntlet in 2011 — particularly if they depend heavily on foreign investors for funding their budget deficits. All will face higher financing and refinancing costs as investors react to the coming European disclosures on just how much the private sector will be expected to contribute.
Leaving out the two states that have already received bailouts (Greece and Ireland), the four eurozone states STRATFOR figures face the most trouble — Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Austria, in that order — plan to raise or refinance a quarter trillion euros in 2011 alone. Italy and France, two heavyweights not that far from the danger zone, plan to raise another half-trillion euros between them. If the past is any guide, the weaker members of this quartet could face financing costs of double what they’ve faced as recently as early 2008. For some of these states, such higher costs could be enough to push them into the bailout bin even if there is no additional investor skittishness.
The existing bailout mechanism probably can handle the first four states (just barely, and assuming it works as advertised), but beyond that, the rest of the eurozone will have to come up with a multitrillion-euro fund in an environment in which private investors are likely to balk. Undoubtedly, the euro needs a new mechanism to survive. But by coming up with one that scares those who make government deficit-spending possible, the Europeans have all but guaranteed that Europe’s financial crisis will get much worse before it begins to improve.
But let’s assume for a moment that this all works out, that the euro survives to the day that the new mechanism will be in place to support it. Consider what such a 2013 eurozone would look like if the rough design agreed to Dec. 16 becomes a reality. All of the states flirting with bailouts as 2010 draws to a close expect to have even higher debt loads two years from now. Hence, investors will have imposed punishing financing costs on all of them. Alone among the major eurozone countries not facing such costs will be Germany, the country that wrote the bailout rules and is indirectly responsible for managing the bailouts enacted to this point. Berlin will command the purse strings and the financial rules, yet be unfettered by those rules or the higher financing costs that go with them. Such control isn’t quite a political union, but so long as the rest of the eurozone is willing to trade financial sovereignty for the benefits of the euro, it is certainly the next best thing.
Wikileaks-Brasil: Honduras-EUA: Itamaraty atordoado...
Este relato sobre essas "liaisons dangereuses" são sempre saborosas em sua leitura retrospectiva...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Chegada de Zelaya a embaixada atordoou Itamaraty, revela WikiLeaks
Tensão. Missão brasileira em Honduras chegou a sofrer ameaça de bomba e ministro de Relações Exteriores insistiu com os EUA para que adotassem medidas mais duras contra o regime de facto, como a interrupção do envio de dinheiro de imigrantes
O conjunto de relatos mostra o governo brasileiro "perdido", "sem planos" e ansioso por ações mais efetivas da Casa Branca. Os telegramas vazados foram redigidos entre 4 de setembro de 2009 e 19 de fevereiro de 2010, período em que as relações entre o Brasil e os EUA foram contaminadas pela crise em Honduras. Destituído por um golpe militar e exilado em junho do ano passado, o então presidente, Manuel Zelaya, retornara a Tegucigalpa e pedira abrigo na embaixada brasileira em 21 de setembro. A autorização partira do então secretário-geral das Relações Exteriores, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, apontado em outros telegramas como um "antiamericano" e "obstrutor" da relação Brasil-EUA.
Com o título "Brasil carece de estratégia em Honduras", o texto de 2 de outubro de 2009 não traz maiores detalhes sobre a ameaça de bomba na embaixada em Tegucigalpa. O diplomata dos EUA mostra ter sido informado sobre o assunto pela Divisão de México e América Central. Também é informado que o Brasil, naquele momento, não havia uma estratégia para lidar com a crise e o Brasil esperava uma posição mais forte do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas. O americano conclui que esse setor do Itamaraty transformara-se em uma "sala de crise". Mas apenas para processar as informações - não para planejar uma solução.
"O Brasil parece perdido sobre o que fazer. É incrível que o governo brasileiro não tenha feito esforços para envolver a região ou para ter um papel mais decisivo na busca de uma solução", diz o telegrama. "Ao contrário, parece que o Brasil está procurando que os EUA, a OEA e a ONU salvaguardem seus interesses e espera uma solução de longo prazo", completou.
Em telegrama de 20 de novembro de 2009, o embaixador Antonio Patriota, secretário-geral das Relações Exteriores - hoje, futuro chanceler -, afirma a um diplomata americano que a situação de Honduras "não era positiva para a relação Brasil-EUA". Mas, sugere que a postergação das eleições presidenciais hondurenhas, poderia favorecer uma solução porque daria tempo para o retorno de Zelaya ao poder. Segundo Patriota, sem essa medida, o Brasil não teria como reconhecer o novo governo do país. A eleição acabou ocorrendo no dia marcado.
Pelo menos dois telegramas mostram que, tanto o chanceler Celso Amorim quanto o assessor da Presidência para Assuntos Internacionais, Marco Aurélio Garcia, insistiram com autoridades americanas para que os EUA adotassem medidas mais duras contra Honduras. Em texto enviado em 25 de setembro de 2009, um diplomata brasileiro esclarece a um colega da embaixada britânica que o Brasil queria dos EUA o corte das remessas de dinheiro de hondurenhos ao país - o que não aconteceu.
Em conversa com o general James Jones, então conselheiro de Segurança Nacional da Casa Branca, Amorim acusou Washington de fazer concessões e "arranhões superficiais" ao governo de facto em vez de lhe causar danos. Marco Aurélio argumentou a Jones não ser Zelaya um "revolucionário perigoso" e seu retorno à presidência não provocaria "mudanças significantes". Um diplomata brasileiro, entretanto, informou que o Itamaraty estava irritado com a suspeita de que o presidente da Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, estava por trás das ações de Zelaya.
Universidades brasileiros: caminhos para a mediocridade
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Unicamp, que doutorou Mercadante, ocupa um sofrível 248o. lugar no ranking mundial da qualidade.
New Google Database Puts Centuries of Cultural Trends in Reach of Linguists
Nunca antes na história do mundo -- com perdão da paráfrase -- foi possível aceder ao conhecimento pleno dos conceitos mais utilizados pelas civilizações e sociedades com tal facilidade, graças às novas "enciclopédias do saber universal" do tipo Google.
Word-Wide Web Launches
New Google Database Puts Centuries of Cultural Trends in Reach of Linguists
By ROBERT LEE HOTZ
The Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2010
(ver as imagens neste link)
Language analysts, sifting through two centuries of words in the millions of books in Google Inc.'s growing digital library, found a new way to track the arc of fame, the effect of censorship, the spread of inventions and the explosive growth of new terms in the English-speaking world.
A new report reveals how researchers are using Google's immense digital library to track cultural trends and catalogue human culture over the last 200 years. WSJ's Robert Lee Hotz discusses the cutting edge endeavor with WSJDN's Kelsey Hubbard.
In research reported Thursday in the journal Science, the scientists at Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Google and the Encyclopedia Britannica unveiled a database of two billion words and phrases drawn from 5.2 million books in Google's digital library published during the past 200 years. With this tool, researchers can measure trends through the language authors used and the names of people they mentioned.
It's the first time scholars have used Google's controversial trove of digital books for academic research, and the result was opened to the public online Thursday.
Analyzing the computerized text, the researchers reported that they could measure the hardening rhetoric of nations facing off for war, by tracking increasing use of the word "enemy." They also could track changing tastes in food, noting the waning appetite for sausage, which peaks in the 1940s, and the advent of sushi, the mentions of which start to soar in the 1980s. They documented the decline of the word "God" in the modern era, which falls sharply from its peak in the 1840s.
"We can see patterns in space, time and cultural context, on a scale a million times greater than in the past," said Mark Liberman, a computational linguist at the University of Pennsylvania, who wasn't involved in the project. "Everywhere you focus these new instruments, you see interesting patterns."
The digital text also captured the evolving structure of a living language, and almost a half-million English words that have appeared since 1950, partly reflecting the growing number of technical terms, such as buckyball, netiquette and phytonutrient.
"It is just stunning," said noted cultural historian Robert Darnton, director of the Harvard University Library, who wasn't involved in the project and who has been critical of Google's effort to digitize the world's books. "They've come up with something that is going to make an enormous difference in our understanding of history and literature."
All told, about 129 million books have been published since the invention of the printing press. In 2004, Google software engineers began making electronic copies of them, and have about 15 million so far, comprising more than two trillion words in 400 languages.
"We realized we were sitting on this huge trove of data," said Google Books engineering manager Jon Orwant. "We want to let researchers slice and dice the data in ways that allow them to ask questions they could not ask before."
The online library project has been hobbled by lawsuits, copyright disputes and fears over the potential for the company to have an information monopoly. "There have been computational hurdles, scientific hurdles, organizational and legal hurdles," said mathematician Erez Lieberman Aiden at the Harvard Society of Fellows, who helped create the database.
To avoid copyright violations, the scientists are making available the vast catalog of frequency patterns of words and phrases, not the raw text of books. Google Labs posted freely downloadable data sets and a special viewer at http://ngrams.googlelabs.com Thursday. These data sets consist of short phrases—up to five words —with counts of how often they occurred in each year.
Journal Community - DISCUSS
What an amazing tool for analyzing culture! Understanding ourselves better could be a tremendously postive development. The dark sides though, are the opportunities for molding thought patterns en masse and social engineering that such an understanding presents. Onward ho! May we be able to preserve original thought and free will.
—Vincent P. Emmer
They currently include Chinese, English, French, German, Russian and Spanish books dating back to the year 1500—about 4% of all books published. The database doesn't include periodicals, which might reflect popular culture from a different vantage.
By calculating how frequently famous personalities appear in Google's digitized texts, the Harvard researchers discovered that people these days become famous at a younger age than in previous eras and reach unprecedented peaks of notoriety. "The flip side is that people forget about you faster," said Harvard lead researcher J.B. Michel.
Measuring occurrences of prominent names, Mr. Michel and his colleagues found that Jimmy Carter leapt from obscurity around 1974, at the onset of his run for the U.S. presidency, to overtake Mickey Mouse, Marilyn Monroe and astronaut Neil Armstrong in published mentions. Once out of office, Mr. Carter began an equally sharp decline in mention. By contrast, the cartoon character, the astronaut and the movie star have continued their steady rise up the slope of fame.
In the same way, they identified instances of censorship by charting the abrupt disappearance of controversial figures from the written record.
Mentions of the popular Jewish artist Marc Chagall, for example, virtually disappear from German literature during the era of Nazi power between 1936 and 1944, when his work was banned, but not from English books of the same period.
Other scholars are using the new database to chart social and emotional concepts over the past 200 years.
"Empathy has shot up since the 1940s," said Harvard University cognitive scientist and linguist Steven Pinker, who is experimenting with the data in his own research. "Will power, self-control and prudence have declined."
Write to Robert Lee Hotz at sciencejournal@wsj.com
Copyright 2010 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
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Cuba e o comunismo: a quadratura do circulo (e a total falta de logica)
Depois comento a falta de lógica.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Raul Castro defende abertura, não capitalismo, em Cuba
Em discurso na Assembleia, líder cubano diz que 'geração histórica' precisa corrigir 'erros dos últimos 50 anos'.
O presidente de Cuba, Raúl Castro, defendeu mudanças no regime cubano, sem abrir mão do socialismo.
Em um discurso de duas horas encerrando os trabalhos da Assembleia Nacional, no sábado, Raul Castro disse que não foi eleito para "restaurar o capitalismo em Cuba", mas reconheceu que foi um erro "estatizar quase toda a atividade econômica do país".
"Temos o dever fundamental corrigir os erros que cometemos nessas cinco décadas de construção do socialismo em Cuba", afirmou o líder cubano.
Castro lembrou que tanto Karl Marx quanto Vladimir Lênin, ideólogos do comunismo, definiram que o Estado só deveria "manter a propriedade sobre os meios fundamentais de produção".
Entretanto, o presidente cubano estabeleceu o limite das mudanças. "O planejamento, e não o mercado, será o traço definitivo da economia e não se permitirá a concentração da propriedade. Mais claro que isso, nem água".
Mudanças
Em seu discurso, Castro delineou a estratégia política que seu governo continuará no ano que vem, tanto no plano econômico quanto no social e político.
Segundo o presidente, as mudanças estruturais continuarão: créditos e subsídios serão eliminados, as funções do partido e do governo serão separadas, o emprego autônomo será promovido e o governo colocará um ponto final em restrições "desnecessárias".
Entre os anúncios mais importantes feitos por Raul Castro está o de que ele pretende separar as estruturas do governo e do Partido Comunista - que atualmente se confundem em todos os níveis, dos municípios para à Presidência da República.
"O partido deve dirigir e controlar, e não interferir nas atividades de governo, em qualquer nível", disse Raúl Castro.
Presidente disse que quer separa o partido e o governo
O tema será discutido na Conferência Nacional do Partido Comunista, em meados do próximo ano, o último do qual participará o que ele chamou de "geração histórica".
Descentralização
Castro assegurou que promoverá uma descentralização do poder de Havana, "aumentando gradualmente a autoridade dos governos provinciais e municipais, dando-lhes maiores poderes para administrar seus orçamentos."
Hoje, a dependência dos governos municipais em relação a Havana é tal que os seus representantes não têm sequer autoridade para comprar ou receber um carro doado, ou para abrir uma conta bancária em Cuba.
Para o presidente cubano, estes governos devem assumir o controle real de suas regiões, cobrar impostos de empresas localizadas em sua jurisdição e até mesmo investir em projetos de desenvolvimento regional.
Para implementar algumas das novas políticas econômicas, Cuba teria de mudar a Constituição. Castro informou que as leis serão adaptadas para permitir as mudanças.
Sobre as relações com Washington, Raul Castro disse não ver sinais de distensão, porque nos EUA "não existe a menor vontade de corrigir a política contra Cuba, mesmo para eliminar os seus aspectos mais irracionais".
* Com reportagem de Fernando Ravsberg, da BBC Mundo em Havana. BBC Brasil - Todos os direitos reservados. É proibido todo tipo de reprodução sem autorização por escrito da BBC.
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Comento:
Como é possível restaurar a economia da ilha miserável sem abandonar o socialismo, que é, justamente, o responsável pela situação deplorável ali vivida?
Mas a falta de lógica continua, de modo alucinante:
Raul Castro "reconheceu que foi um erro "estatizar quase toda a atividade econômica do país". "Temos o dever fundamental corrigir os erros que cometemos nessas cinco décadas de construção do socialismo em Cuba", afirmou o líder cubano."
Se eles querem corrigir os erros cometidos DURANTE 50 ANOS, como, então, afirmar que "O planejamento, e não o mercado, será o traço definitivo da economia..."
Ou seja, ele pretende que algo mude, mas não quer mudar nada???!!!
Mas, a maior dislexia mental, a total falta de lógica aparece nesta frase de Raúl Castro"
"O partido deve dirigir e controlar, e não interferir nas atividades de governo, em qualquer nível".
Ou seja, o partido deve dirigir e controlar, mas não vai interferir???!!!
Alguém entendeu?
Prêmio IgNóbil de falta de lógica.
Falta algum remédio no menu do gerontocrata...
Estudos de Defesa: encontro em Fortaleza (agosto 2011)
Simpósios Temáticos
· Atlântico Sul: espaço estratégico de cooperação e desafios de segurança.
· Base Logística de Defesa
· Bloqueio Tecnológico: Indústria de Defesa, Ciência e Tecnologia, Políticas Públicas e Política Internacional
· Cultura Estratégica e de Defesa Comparada na América do Sul
· Defesa e a Ordem Legal
· Defesa e Forças Armadas na Amazônia Brasileira
· Educação e Formação Militar
· Educação, Doutrina Militar e Regimes Políticos
· Em busca da paz securitária: As ações do Rio de Janeiro e a utilização das forças militares em ambientes urbanos interestatais.
· Gênero, Sociedade e Forças Armadas
· História Militar
· Novos conflitos internacionais: guerra e estudos estratégicos no século XXI
· Os desafios da atividade de inteligência no século XXI
· Política Externa estadunidense e seus reflexos para a América do Sul
· Reconhecimento de territórios de ocupação tradicional indígena: dilemas e impasses em regiões de fronteiras nacionais ou/e em terras com alto valor comercial
· Sociologia das Forças Armadas