domingo, 29 de dezembro de 2013

As guerras delongadas do colonialismo na logica da Guerra Fria e da teoria do domino - book review

Bullet Diplomacy

‘Small Wars, Faraway Places,’ by Michael Burleigh

Photographs, from left: Haywood Magee/Picture Post—Getty Images; Rolls Press/Popperfoto—Getty Images
Soldiers of the Scots Guards patrol in Malaya, 1950; American Marines north of Da Nang, 1965.
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In “Small Wars, Faraway Places,” Michael Burleigh recounts the violent end of the British and French empires in Africa and Asia, and their partial replacement by the United States in its often ill-informed and costly efforts to combat Communism during the early stages of the Cold War. Burleigh surveys many of the major international wars and anticolonial insurgencies between 1945 and 1965, but opts to focus most on those involving America, Britain and France, and how they related to the rivalry with the Soviet Union. The result is a well-researched and readable account of two tumultuous decades. Burleigh judges most of these wars, both small and large, to have been futile and destructive. But while he clearly has no interest in defending or rehabilitating such conflicts, he nonetheless offers a fair, thoughtful assessment of the motives and interests behind them. He also takes care to understand and explain the grievances of the insurgents.

SMALL WARS, FARAWAY PLACES

Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World, 1945-1965
By Michael Burleigh
Illustrated. 587 pp. Viking. $36.
Burleigh, the author of “The Third Reich: A New History” and several other books, begins with the collapse of Japanese rule at the end of World War II. Japanese conquest had briefly swept away the European colonial powers, which made it impossible for those governments to reimpose their authority over their former colonies for very long once hostilities ended. Burleigh proceeds episodically, jumping from one conflict to the next with each new chapter. Though this has the potential to be disorienting, he keeps the narrative moving along. He capably introduces each new subject without assuming too much prior knowledge, and uses brief biographical sketches of the key political and military actors to illustrate the experiences that informed their decisions. By the end of the book, the United States has begun its escalation in Vietnam, and is assuming much the same role that France had just abandoned.
Some conflicts from this period are inevitably left out or mentioned only in passing. For example, even though they began during the period covered by the book, the anticolonial wars against Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique are omitted. This is a deliberate choice on Burleigh’s part, which he explains as “favoring depth of field rather than a wide-angled focus,” and for the most part it succeeds. There is one short chapter on India and Pakistan that doesn’t seem to fit Burleigh’s subject all that well, but it doesn’t detract from the book as a whole, much of which is usefully concerned with the reconstruction of lesser-known conflicts in the postwar Philippines, Algeria and Malaya. All in all, Burleigh has synthesized a wide range of material to create a valuable introduction to the political and military events of the early Cold War.
Introducing a contemporary note, Burleigh makes several criticisms of current efforts to imitate the tactics of previous counterinsurgency campaigns, suggesting that “this may only involve selectively raiding the past to justify the prescriptions of the present.” For every limited and atypical “success” of counterinsurgency in Malaya, there were several extremely costly total failures. As he notes in his chapter on Vietnam, “there were actually few meaningful lessons to be drawn from Malaya, where the Communist insurgents were ethnic Chinese and the majority population Malay.” If there is a lesson to be drawn from these experiences, it is that no single conflict from the past can serve as a reliable model for struggles in the present. The particular circumstances of each country are far more important in determining the outcomes of wars.
Anti-Communist “domino” theories also come in for repeated criticism, since they were based almost entirely on an irrational alarmism rather than informed political analysis. Colonial governments had an incentive to stoke American fears of Communism among the insurgents, and American policy makers were inclined to imagine a monolithic global Communism that never existed. Because of this, the United States backed doomed efforts to shore up empires, and then ignored national differences that could, and later did, split the Communist powers. In a subtle nod to George Kennan’s criticisms of the time, Burleigh emphasizes that a belief in monolithic Communism was one of the main errors of American policy makers during this period.
His recounting of John F. Kennedy’s time in office, when the notion of monolithic Communism dominated strategic thinking, is notable for being quite negative. He is even more unsparing in expressing a low opinion of Anthony Eden and his handling of the Suez crisis of 1956. One of Burleigh’s recurring themes is how often postwar leaders blundered because they made misguided comparisons with appeasement at Munich. In the confrontation over Suez, Burleigh notes, “men with little or no knowledge of modern Egyptian history accommodated every assertive move by Nasser to a misleading Hitlerian template.” As it has done many times since then, a visceral fear of appeasement has led to entirely avoidable disasters. For Burleigh, the key to Britain’s role at Suez was that Eden failed to recognize global political realities had changed, and that Britain was no longer the great power it once had been.
While all of the relevant governments and leaders come in for their share of deserved rebukes throughout the book, Burleigh doesn’t seek to demonize any of the figures he describes. As he explains in the introduction, his is “not a work of advocacy history.” He consistently condemns both official and insurgent atrocities in no uncertain terms. Among the strengths of Burleigh’s account is that he has no interest in, and no patience with, romanticizing or whitewashing either side.
There is one curious remark in Burleigh’s discussion, however, that stands out as uncharacteristically inaccurate. It concerns the 1952 presidential campaign, when Dwight Eisenhower wrested the Republican nomination from Senator Robert Taft. Burleigh writes that Taft “was the last serious anti-interventionist presidential candidate in U.S. history, at least,” he adds, “until George W. Bush, who started out with such views.” This would surely be news to Bush, as well as to Taft’s admirers, since Bush would have rejected what Taft represented even before he became president.
The final chapters of “Small Wars, Faraway Places” inevitably focus on the increasing American involvement in Vietnam under Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In light of contemporary debates about Washington’s “credibility” in the Middle East, it is worth remembering that American officials issued the same warnings about Southeast Asia, insisting that a failure to act in Vietnam would undermine American credibility in Europe and elsewhere around the world. Burleigh wholly rejects this argument. It “was a lie. Britain and France opposed escalating the war, and de Gaulle was a firm advocate of Vietnam’s neutralization.” Appealing to credibility is often the last refuge of a policy maker who knows his argument lacks merit.
Burleigh concludes that the United States “profited little and lost much from its misconceived adoption of liberal imperialism.” But his book does a great deal to explain why Washington’s policy makers then — and perhaps now — couldn’t resist blundering into unnecessary small wars in faraway places.
Daniel Larison is a senior editor at The American Conservative.

sábado, 28 de dezembro de 2013

O dificil nascimento do capitalismo no Estado Mafioso da Russia -NYTimes

Em certos países é difícil ser um simples capitalista: quando o proprio Estado é mafioso, as coisas se complicam. Já vi isso em algum outro lugar...
Ah, me lembro: no Estado nazista, que tinha um guia genial que sabia o que era melhor para o país, e seus companheiros se ocupavam em roubar, e não apenas judeus...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Signs of a Russian Thaw (Toward Business)


James Hill for The New York Times
Ruslan Telkov outside a warehouse near Moscow that he rented for his fabrics business. He was charged with copyright infringement in 2011.


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It was just after 9 on a mid-May morning in 2011 when Ruslan Telkov got into his car and headed toward one of his upholstery company’s warehouses near Moscow. His parents had warned him not to start his own business, that only frustration and heartache awaited, if not worse. But it was not the 1990s anymore, he told them; the days of bandit capitalism in Russia were over. “I decided it’s what I wanted, and that was that,” he said.
James Hill for The New York Times
Boris Titov, Russia’s new presidential commissioner for entrepreneurs’ rights, shown in his Moscow office.
Steffi Loos/Reuters
Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, who led Yukos Oil,  was pardoned by President Vladimir V. Putin after 10 years in prison.
Sergei Ilnitsky/European Pressphoto Agency
Mikhail Khodorkovsky addressed an appeal hearing by video from a prison cell in August.
James Hill for The New York Times
Mr. Titov at an anti-corruption seminar.
And business was good. A year earlier, Mr. Telkov, who has tightly cropped brown hair and the shoulders of a hockey player, traveled to Guangzhou, on China’s southern coast — he speaks Mandarin, along with Arabic and English — to attend a trade show and meet with local fabric manufacturers. He negotiated a production contract on the spot. By cutting out the middlemen, Mr. Telkov was able to sell fabric for less than half the price charged by his more-established Russian competitors: around $5 per linear meter, as opposed to $12. In less than a year, Mr. Telkov had recouped his start-up capital of around $1 million and had a fleet of trucks, three warehouses and 18 employees. “I saw no limits to how big it could get,” said Mr. Telkov, now 33.
That May morning, not long after Mr. Telkov got to his warehouse, a convoy of speeding cars pulled up. Out came 10 police officers, some carrying automatic weapons. The officers told Mr. Telkov that he was under suspicion of copyright violations and that they would have to confiscate some of his goods as evidence.
Other men in plain clothes walked around and pointed to rolls of fabric: Take this, take that. The search lasted the whole day and continued into the next. In the end, the police carried away 527 rolls of fabric. Mr. Telkov was confused, not to mention panicked: a big furniture exhibition in Moscow was two days away, and he had just lost 80 percent of his inventory. He went from one government office to another, as he put it, “knocking on doors and saying, ‘Guys, you stole my goods, where are they?’ ” He got no answers.
Two months later, in July, investigators officially charged Mr. Telkov with copyright infringement. The indictment cites designs for five styles of fabric that Mr. Telkov had supposedly stolen; among them was a leopard-print pattern, as well as one that resembled a slab of marble. It was funny, absurd even, but it was also uncomfortably serious. If found guilty, Mr. Telkov could spend up to six years in prison.
Some 100,000 Russian businesspeople are either in prison or have been subject to criminal prosecution. Among the most famous is Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, the former head of the Yukos oil company, who had been in prison for more than a decade until he was unexpectedly released this month by President Vladimir V. Putin. The pardon, coming as it did on the cusp of the Winter Olympics to be held in Sochi, Russia, was viewed more as a political expedient than as a harbinger of reform.
Mr. Telkov says that in his situation, investigators seemed more interested in pressuring him to plead guilty than in building a case; he says he was promised a suspended sentence, in which he would avoid prison but lose his confiscated goods. That’s how Russian businesspeople who find themselves in the middle of such cases often choose to plead. But Mr. Telkov was, simply put, a nuisance, filing requests and demanding to see the fabric that had been taken from him. If someone wanted to intimidate him or wear him down, it wasn’t working.
Finally, in January, at the request of investigators, a judge ordered Mr. Telkov arrested and held in pretrial detention. He was put into a cell with 10 other men, most of whom were facing drug charges. As Mr. Telkov remembers, investigators suggested that it was his own fault — if he would only make a deal, he could go home.
Weeks passed, then months. Mr. Telkov’s wife, Adilya, said she was sure that the court would see the absurdity of the case and release her husband. “At first I was absolutely certain that if not at this hearing, then the next one. If not there, then one more,” she said. After a few months, though, she said she “stopped being naïve.”
A Well-Placed Advocate
When Boris Titov heard about Mr. Telkov’s case, it struck him as a clear reminder of why his job is necessary. Mr. Titov, who holds the official title of presidential commissioner for entrepreneurs’ rights, was appointed to his position — which reports directly to Mr. Putin — in June 2012. Fighting corruption and easing the way for business are among the main priorities, at least in rhetoric, of Mr. Putin’s current economic agenda. After years of oil-fueled growth and rising consumption, the economy is slowing, with growth in gross domestic product falling to just over 1 percent. Kremlin officials hope that an improved climate for small business will help save the country from a prolonged period of stagnation, thus preserving social and political stability.
But that will not be easy, in no small part because of policies enacted by Mr. Putin over the years. According to a global survey of entrepreneurship released in the spring, 7 percent of Russians are engaged in entrepreneurial activity and just 3.8 percent have plans in the next three years to open their own businesses. (For comparison, the overall average in the so-called BRICs countries — Brazil, Russia, India and China — is 21 percent, and 24 percent for Eastern Europe.) Most university graduates say they want jobs in government service or as managers in large corporations.
Mr. Putin’s decision this month to pardon Mr. Khodorkovsky was long awaited by the business and investment community, but does little to lift the many hurdles to entrepreneurship in Russia: a large state sector that crowds out private investment, an unwieldy thicket of regulation and bureaucracy, and a police force and court system that can often seem like the persecutors of businesspeople as much as their protectors.
One rainy afternoon this fall, I went to see Mr. Titov in his office tucked inside a small, leafy park just beyond Moscow’s central ring road. Russia’s entrepreneurs, he said, “wouldn’t have asked the president to create this position if everything was great.” One day, he said, he hopes his work won’t be required anymore. But for now, he imagines his office, with its staff of a few dozen people, as a kind of “joint venture” between business and the state in an effort to make entrepreneurship more “comfortable, profitable and safe.”
A 53-year-old businessman, Mr. Titov began his career in the 1980s, selling oil and petroleum products abroad for the Soviet foreign trade ministry. After the Soviet collapse, he helped found a company that sold mineral fertilizers and lubricants; he often worked from London. In recent years, he started a lobbying group, Business Russia, and had several notable successes in saving individual businessmen from criminal investigations.
At the same time, Mr. Titov has good relations with the state, enjoying access to the highest levels of power, Mr. Putin included. In May 2012, to celebrate Mr. Putin’s inauguration, he supplied to the Kremlin 5,000 bottles of sparkling wine, produced by a vineyard Mr. Titov owns.
Mr. Titov is fighting against a deep societal hostility toward private business that goes back to the Soviet days, when the sale of anything for even a kopeck of profit could be considered illegal speculation. But the animus really sharpened in the 1990s, a period of chaotic and murky deal-making in which a few became rich and most everyone else was left gasping to stay afloat. Suspicion toward private enterprise is so widespread, said Olga Romanova, who founded the group Russia Behind Bars after her husband was sent to prison on economic charges, that “even the guy who owns the local convenience store in a village is seen as a kind of oligarch.”
While speaking on a panel at an investment conference where Mr. Titov was also present, Igor Zubov, a deputy minister of internal affairs, said that many criminals simply take on the cover of business, and suggested that businesspeople are to blame for corruption since they are the ones giving bribes. But while many in the police and security services are sincere in such beliefs, just as often these attitudes can provide a cynical opening for corruption. “If nobody loves a private businessman,” Mr. Titov said, “then you can go to him and ask for a bribe, and he can’t say anything.”
But Mr. Titov argues that a majority of improper legal cases against entrepreneurs — he has said as many as 80 percent — originally stem from disputes among businesspeople themselves. A conflict arises, and one side goes to the police, who, as Mr. Titov said, “have learned very well how to take advantage of this.”
That appears to have been the case with Mr. Telkov. He didn’t think much of it at the time, but he later remembered that while attending a Moscow trade fair, some men came up to him and said: “You have very low prices. We suggest you raise them, otherwise you will have problems.” While in jail, after studying the case materials, he realized that those men in civilian clothes who pointed at the fabric to confiscate were representatives of his competitors. What’s more, Mr. Telkov learned that under Russian law, if investigators don’t have the room to store evidence before trial, they are allowed to use private spaces. In his case, police investigators decided to hold the fabric confiscated from Mr. Telkov in his competitors’ warehouses.
After Mr. Telkov had been in jail for several months, his wife wrote to Mr. Titov. Over the last year, Mr. Titov’s office has received several thousand such pleas and taken on many hundreds. Right away, Mr. Titov said, he could tell that Mr. Telkov’s was a “unique case.” It was almost unheard-of for a businessman to be charged with this particular violation of copyright law, let alone held in jail. The evidence seemed odd, and, as Mr. Titov remembered, the case struck him “clearly as an attack by competitors.”
Mr. Titov’s involvement made a difference right away, because, like it or not, police and investigators have to provide him with answers. “It’s one thing for an accused person to write from jail on a piece of toilet paper,” said Sergei Tayt, the head of Mr. Titov’s advisory secretariat. “But if a commissioner who reports to the president writes about some sort of outrageous situation, that’s a different status entirely.” Over the coming months, Mr. Titov would indeed be able to help, but the case would also reveal the limits in a system that favors the state at the expense of private businesspeople.
‘The Fires Are Burning’
As the months in jail went on, Mr. Telkov tried to keep himself from turning into a “zombie,” as he put it. His lawyer, Alkhas Abgadzhava, would have him look through the case materials and help write motions.
It didn’t take long to notice incongruities in the charges. Even the copyrights in question seemed odd: they were based on letters of unclear provenance from the United States and Turkey, where the original copyrights were said to be held. One copyright, for the pattern “Pemberton,” was registered on June 3, 2011. But the search of Mr. Telkov’s warehouse happened almost a month earlier, on May 12. Another copyright document from Turkey is dated from 2004 yet mentions a design registered two years later, in 2006. The case file contained two separate analyses of the fabrics, supposedly written by two different independent experts. But the analyses were word-for-word identical.
Mr. Titov and his staff were convinced of what had happened. “One of his competitors simply began to use criminal prosecution against Telkov,” Mr. Titov told me.
Mr. Tayt said it seemed as if “someone showed up, jump-started some investigators, and then they closed their eyes to the law.” Mr. Titov wrote letters to the general prosecutor’s office and the interior ministry on behalf of Mr. Telkov. At one meeting, he pushed for law enforcement officials to take another look at the case materials, with an eye toward dropping the charges. Mr. Tayt, who was also present, said some of the officials were themselves “puzzled” by the investigation.
Still, it was hard for Mr. Titov to win a conclusive victory for Mr. Telkov. The police and prosecutors have grown accustomed to a degree of unquestioned impunity, and the Russian justice system is permeated by a sense of inevitability. Proceedings chug along according to the logic of bureaucratic formalism, in which judges are wary of ruining their own statistics and thus instinctively paper over sloppiness on the part of the police and investigators. Mr. Titov, while not changing the fundamental system, is at least a voice — a “challenge to impunity and to this sense of quiet,” said Vladislav Korochkin, the vice president of the Moscow chapter of Opora, a nongovernmental organization that defends private business. “He is making certain people think about having to change their habits.”
In his first weeks on the job, Mr. Titov spoke to police officials in Ufa, a city of one million people 725 miles southeast of Moscow. He chastised the officials about suspicious cases against local businesses. Yana Yakovleva, the head of Business Solidarity, a nongovernmental organization that defends the rights of entrepreneurs, attended the meeting and told me that Mr. Titov produced a palpable sense of “discomfort” among the officers and bureaucrats present. “It wasn’t clear who this new figure is,” she said, “who at one moment appears on television meeting with Putin and in the next is issuing a reprimand.”
But Ms. Yakovleva compared Mr. Titov to a man who wakes up in the middle of the night to find cockroaches all over his kitchen. He starts hitting them with his slipper, she said, “but you could go crazy fighting these cockroaches every night.”
Mr. Titov himself once compared his office to a brigade of firefighters: “The fires are burning and burning, and new ones are being produced all the time,” he said. But he is proud to talk about successes that he has been able to achieve. And one of them, he says, is the case of Mr. Telkov.
On Jan. 26, 2013, after letters and pressure from Mr. Titov, months of work by Mr. Abgadzhava, as well as coverage in the local press, a judge ordered Mr. Telkov freed from pretrial detention. He had spent a year in jail. After being released, he went directly to a restaurant for lunch with his wife and friends. “The only thing I wanted was to eat fried potatoes,” he told me.
Now a free man, he was able to spend more time working with Mr. Abgadzhava on his defense, as well as trying to slowly rebuild his business, which was effectively destroyed. But despite his release, the charges remained. Mr. Telkov was still a defendant awaiting trial.
A Very Costly Ad Campaign
More than any individual case, the signal achievement of Mr. Titov’s tenure as ombudsman has been a so-called business amnesty, under which those prosecuted for a range of economic crimes would be freed and their records expunged. Mr. Titov says that more than 1,500 people have been freed since the law was passed in July, but that number is potentially misleading; just 116 have actually left jail or a prison colony, whereas the rest had their convictions lifted but already had suspended sentences or had served out their prison terms.
The amnesty law, while pathbreaking, emerged with several major caveats. For starters, instead of a blanket amnesty that would apply to nearly all economic crimes, it was whittled down to exclude many categories, including the overarching charge for fraud, which Mr. Titov estimates applies to 70 percent of prosecuted businesspeople. Another requirement says that only first-time offenders are eligible. (At the time, some wondered if the purpose of this technicality was to exclude Mr. Khodorkovsky, who was tried in two separate cases.) And then, to be eligible, the convicted person — or even one who is merely accused — must pay back whatever losses they are alleged to have caused their victims.
Mr. Titov pushed to have the little-used copyright article included in the amnesty law, an addition meant specifically to aid Mr. Telkov. That means he is eligible for amnesty, which would close the case against him and expunge the charges — but only if he pays back the supposed damages, in his case claimed by investigators to be around $338,000. Mr. Telkov has refused.
The question for those watching Mr. Titov is how much he can achieve within the current political order, which arguably depends on allowing for a certain level of corruption among law enforcement for its stability. Moreover, the very creation of an ombudsman’s office is symptomatic of the habits of a highly centralized system, which thinks to solve problems by means of a single, powerful figure — an even stronger bureaucrat to defeat the evils of bureaucratism.
“Of course it’s easier to name Titov to his position than reform the courts,” said Mr. Korochkin, whose nongovernmental organization defends private business. But he acknowledged that “the first will help the second,” pointing to Mr. Titov’s efforts to change parts of the criminal code  and his ability to represent the perspective of small-business owners to high-ranking officials.
Mr. Abgadzhava, the lawyer for Mr. Telkov, is doubtful. “He can’t directly say to Putin that your whole system is constructed in such a way that makes it impossible for an entrepreneur to survive,” he told me. For Mr. Titov to bring about real change, Mr. Abgadzhava said, he would, in effect, have to join the political opposition.
When I asked Mr. Titov about that, he grew frustrated. He cited the thousand businesspeople who have been released from criminal prosecution as part of the amnesty as proof of his effectiveness. “We use our mechanism,” he said. “If we were to get involved in political work, that’s an entirely different type of activity.” He also argues that as Russia’s entrepreneurial class grows and matures, it will demand more from state institutions.
As for Mr. Telkov, he still doesn’t have his fabric back. After months of delay and refusal, investigators allowed him to see the fabric that had been stored as evidence at the warehouses of his competitors. According to Mr. Telkov, it wasn’t his fabric at all. Some rolls were stamped with production dates of November 2012, some 10 months after he was arrested. He suspects that the fabric originally confiscated from him was sold long ago. Mr. Tayt told me that although Mr. Titov’s office could not confirm that theory, “we haven’t heard refutation of this thesis either from his competitors or from investigative bodies.”
(The allegations against Mr. Telkov are based on copyright filings that come from four foreign companies — one in Turkey and three in the United States. One, a fabric producer based in Winston-Salem, N.C., called Microfibres, referred all questions to a law firm in Moscow, Sovetnik. Attempts to reach the firm were unsuccessful. Attempts to get comment from Docuswatch, in New Hampshire, and Arben, registered on Long Island, were also unsuccessful.)
In essence, investigators have two choices: Send the case to court, but the evidence appears flimsy and the prosecutor’s office has already twice declined to present the case to a judge; or close down the investigation, but that would hurt the careers of the officers involved and could make Mr. Telkov eligible for compensation for the year he spent in jail. Dropping the case would be the “optimal option,” Mr. Titov said. “But if the ministry of internal affairs” — the state body that oversees the police and the investigators working on the case — “has a different opinion, then, unfortunately, there’s nothing we can do.” Ultimately, his office can act only as an advocate for entrepreneurs, not take on the power of the courts.
Mr. Telkov told me that he was trying to look at the ordeal as a “very costly advertising campaign” that revealed his honesty and bravery to potential partners and investors. In recent months, he has received several offers to work as a manager for large multinational companies in Europe, but after running his own business, he said, he has no desire to work for someone else.
He has also become more involved in civic activism and would like to help other businesspeople avoid ordeals like his. “It’s impossible to break the machine,” he said of Russia’s criminal justice system. “But you can modify it, make life a little more comfortable for business.” It sounded, in a way, like something Mr. Titov might say.
But Mr. Telkov’s optimism has its limits. I asked what his overall advice was for anyone in Russia thinking of starting a business. He paused for a moment. “My general advice,” he said, “is that for now, better not to.”

Mentiras, mentiras e publicidade enganosa, eis a politica economica oficial... - Rolf Kuntz

Além de muita incompetência, claro, dessas que só se aprende (ou desaprende) depois de anos vivendo de ilusões econômicas fornecidas pelo keynesianismo de pacotilha que caracteriza os "çabios" do governo.
Vamos pagar, e já estamos pagando, um alto preço por tudo isso.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

O modelo é feito de botox, maquiagem e remendos

28 de dezembro de 2013 | 2h 03
ROLF KUNTZ - O Estado de S.Paulo
Maquiagem, botox e remendos são os principais componentes do chamado modelo de crescimento em vigor há uma década, aperfeiçoado nos últimos três anos e pelo menos tão eficiente quanto a pedra filosofal procurada pelos alquimistas. Segundo se dizia, essa pedra, ou fórmula, poderia transformar em ouro metais menos valiosos. Com o tal modelo, o governo converteu um déficit primário de R$ 6,2 bilhões num superávit mensal de R$ 28,8 bilhões, um recorde. A mágica foi realizada basicamente com a inscrição de duas receitas atípicas - R$ 15 bilhões do bônus de concessão do campo de Libra, no pré-sal, e R$ 20,4 bilhões de pagamentos do novo Refis, o programa de parcelamento de impostos atrasados. Com esse resultado em novembro, a administração federal terá uma chance muito maior de fechar o ano com R$ 73 bilhões de resultado primário, o dinheiro destinado ao pagamento parcial dos juros da dívida pública.
As contas de novembro do governo central foram apresentadas pelo secretário do Tesouro, Arno Augustin, principal auxiliar do ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega, no setor de alquimia contábil. Mas o modelo composto principalmente de botox, maquiagem e remendo serve também para embelezar a inflação e as contas externas. Por sua aplicação variada, esse instrumento sintetiza as propriedades da pedra filosofal e do Bombril, o das mil e uma utilidades. O noticiário do dia a dia tem confirmado suas virtudes.
Neste ano o Brasil acumulou um superávit comercial de US$ 1,02 bilhão até a terceira semana de dezembro, segundo as últimas informações do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior. No fim de novembro o saldo acumulado era um déficit de US$ 93 bilhões. O resultado continuou fraquinho nas duas semanas seguintes, mas na terceira foi registrada mais uma exportação de plataforma de exploração de petróleo e gás, no valor de US$ 1,15 bilhão. Pronto. De repente, a conta comercial passou do vermelho para o azul. Mas essa plataforma, como outras exportadas neste ano e em 2012, nunca deixou o País, porque a operação é meramente contábil e seu propósito é a geração de um benefício fiscal.
Neste ano, até a terceira semana de dezembro, as exportações dessas plataformas proporcionaram receita de US$ 7,73 bilhões, 351,41% maior que a obtida com o mesmo produto um ano antes. Terá sido um surto de sucesso comercial ou uma emergência na conta de comércio exterior? Outro detalhe notável: em 2013, essas plataformas foram a maior fonte de receita com as vendas externas de manufaturados.
Automóveis de passageiros apareceram em segundo lugar, com US$ 5 bilhões, e óleos combustíveis em terceiro, com US$ 3,46 bilhões. Em seguida apareceram partes e peças para veículos e tratores (US$ 3,1 bilhões) e aviões (US$ 3,02 bilhões). Mas todos esses produtos foram para fora. Muitos brasileiros devem ter voado, no exterior, em aviões da Embraer. Muito mais difícil será encontrar uma daquelas plataformas.
Sem essa operação quase milagrosa, o saldo comercial até a terceira semana de dezembro teria sido um déficit de US$ 6,71 bilhões. O resultado teria sido menos mau, é claro, se parte das importações de petróleo e derivados tivesse sido contabilizada - corretamente - em 2012, em vez de só aparecer neste ano (esta é mais uma bizarria das contas brasileiras). Mas esses produtos de fato foram comprados e chegaram ao País. Se essas compras tivessem entrado nas contas de 2012, o saldo comercial do ano passado teria ficado abaixo dos US$ 19,4 bilhões oficialmente registrados.
Problemas da Petrobrás, incluída a necessidade de importação de óleo e derivados, também têm relação com o uso do modelo de botox, maquiagem e remendo. Preços dos combustíveis têm sido politicamente contidos, há anos, como parte do esforço para administrar os índices de inflação (coisa muito diferente de combater as pressões inflacionárias). Essa política impôs perdas à empresa, reduziu sua geração de caixa e diminuiu sua capacidade de investir com recursos próprios. Além disso, prejudicou os investimentos na produção de etanol, porque a contenção dos preços da gasolina se refletiu na formação de preços do álcool. Depois de muita pressão, os novos dirigentes da Petrobrás conseguiram autorização para elevar os preços, mas em proporção inferior à necessária. A depreciação das ações da empresa, nas bolsas, é consequência dessa e de outras interferências políticas na administração da estatal.
O modelo de enfeite foi aplicado amplamente no esforço de controle dos índices de inflação. O governo forçou a redução das tarifas de eletricidade ao impor às concessionárias um novo esquema de renovação de contratos. Também manobrou para retardar os aumentos de passagens de transporte público e para anular, no meio do ano, os ajustes concedidos.
Esse esforço produziu algum efeito imediato. Os indicadores de inflação subiram mais lentamente durante alguns meses, mas a quase mágica logo se esgotou. Os índices de preços ao consumidor voltaram a aumentar cada vez mais velozmente a partir de agosto. O IPCA-15, uma espécie de prévia do Índice de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo, a medida oficial de inflação, acumulou alta anual de 5,85% até dezembro. Se o resultado final do IPCA será igual ou inferior ao do ano passado (5,84%) só se saberá no começo de janeiro, quando conhecidos os números de todo o mês de dezembro. Mas, na melhor hipótese, a inflação será muito parecida com a do ano passado e as pressões continuarão fortes em 2014.
Nenhuma pessoa informada leva a sério o tabelamento de preços, o disfarce das contas externas e o enfeite das contas públicas. Operações atípicas podem gerar ganhos fiscais imediatos, mas corroem a credibilidade de quem governa. Com botox e maquiagem, alguns números ficam mais apresentáveis para os ingênuos. Paras os outros a cara do governo se torna cada vez mais disforme.
*JORNALISTA

Nacionalismo japones e arrogancia chinesa vao insuflar corridaarmamentista na Asia Pacifico

Ninguem vai ganhar, só os mercadores de armas. Não haverá guerra, talvez apenas escaramuças e gastos inuteis com Defesa.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


Japan Fights a Political Battle Using History Texts

Taketomi is resisting a textbook that it considers too revisionist on World War II.
KO SASAKI FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
TAKETOMI, Japan — Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s conservative government has begun to pursue a more openly nationalist agenda on an issue that critics fear will push the country farther from its postwar pacifism: adding a more patriotic tone to Japan’s school textbooks.
The proposed textbook revisions have drawn less outcry abroad than Mr. Abe’s visit on Thursday to a shrine that honors war dead, including war criminals from World War II. However, though Mr. Abe’s supporters argue that changes are needed to teach children more patriotism, liberals warn that they could undercut an antiwar message they say has helped keep Japan peaceful for decades.
“Prime Minister Abe is feeling the heat from his political base, which feels betrayed that he has not pursued a more strongly right-wing agenda,” said Nobuyoshi Takashima, a professor emeritus at the University of the Ryukyus in Okinawa who has studied the politics of textbooks. “Classrooms are one place where he can appease ultraconservatives by taking a more firmly nationalist stance.”
Mr. Abe and the nationalists have long argued that changes in the education system are crucial to restoring the country’s sense of self, eroded over decades when children were taught what they call an overly negative view of Japan’s wartime behavior.



The latest efforts for change started slowly, but have picked up speed in recent weeks.
In October, Mr. Abe’s education minister ordered the school board here in Taketomi to use a conservative textbook it had rejected, the first time the national government has issued such a demand. In November, the Education Ministry proposed new textbook screening standards, considered likely to be adopted, that would require the inclusion of nationalist views of World War II-era history.
This month, a government-appointed committee suggested a change that would bring politics more directly into education: putting mayors in charge of their local school districts, a move that opponents say would increase political interference in textbook screening. And just days ago, an advisory committee to the Education Ministry suggested hardening the proposed new standards by requiring that textbooks that do not nurture patriotism be rejected.
The moves come at a time when China is asserting its growing strength, directly challenging Japanese territorial claims and its standing as a regional power. The proposed educational changes are the latest that nationalists in both countries have pushed and that some fear will, over time, harden views and deepen tensions between Asia’s two strongest countries.



The history issue may also be fraught with political danger for Mr. Abe, who had initially focused on the economy rather than an ultraconservative agenda.
He has already seen his popularity levels fall since the recent passage of a secrecy bill that some local media criticized as a throwback to wartime censorship laws. And a battle over textbooks helped drive Mr. Abe from power in 2007 after less than a year the last time he was in office; in that case, his government tried to delete mention of the Japanese military’s forcing Okinawan civilians to commit mass suicide during the war.
But at least so far, the latest efforts have engendered little backlash from the public, a reflection, teachers say, of increasing anxieties about China’s more confrontational stance toward Japan.
The new screening standards proposed by the education minister, Hakubun Shimomura, a longtime advocate for teaching patriotism, require that elementary, junior high and high school textbooks give a “balanced picture” of disputed historical facts.
In an interview, ministry officials said that in practice this would require that textbooks include viewpoints of nationalist scholars on two highly contested historical issues. One is the death toll of the 1937 massacre in Nanjing of Chinese civilians by Japanese soldiers that the Chinese government says stands at 300,000, a figure many Japanese scholars see as grossly exaggerated.
Textbooks would also be required to state that there is still a dispute about whether the Japanese Army played a direct role in forcing so-called comfort women from Korea and elsewhere to provide sex to its soldiers, even though most foreign historians say the brothels could not have been run without the military’s cooperation.
Educators worry that the vague wording of the standards could lead to more widespread changes in tone.
The suggested changes follow years of nationalist attempts — long backed by Mr. Abe — to whittle away at negative depictions of Japan’s wartime activities. Those who oppose textbook revisions say they are beginning to see the contours of a new strategy: forcing change at the local level that has sometimes failed at the national level.
Taketomi, a township of eight tiny islands that had been best known for its water-buffalo-drawn carts and placid coral lagoons, appears to have become ground zero for that battle.
The trouble began two years ago, when a newly elected conservative mayor on the neighboring island of Ishigaki appointed a new head of a local education district who selected a ninth-grade social studies textbook published by a right-wing company. Taketomi, whose school system is part of that district, immediately rejected the book for what its teachers called overly revisionist content, including the portrayal of the antiwar Constitution as an alien document imposed by Allied occupiers who wanted to keep Japan weak.
Replacing the postwar Constitution has been a careerlong goal of Mr. Abe’s.
Taketomi’s school board voted that its ninth graders, who this year number 32, would keep using the current text, which praises the Constitution and the pacifist message that it enshrines.
At first, the national government ignored the quiet insurrection. But since Mr. Abe’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party returned to power last year, analysts say members of his government have appeared increasingly determined to make an example of Taketomi in their campaign to roll back what they call an excessively left-leaning tilt in education.
So far, Taketomi has refused to bend to the central government’s demand that it follow the district’s orders. The town’s school superintendent, Anzo Kedamori, says the conservative book fails to teach children the hatred of war that his generation learned from bitter experience. During the Battle of Okinawa, hundreds of people in Taketomi perished when Japanese soldiers forced them to evacuate into malaria-ridden jungles.
“We have an obligation to teach the horrors of war to future generations,” said Mr. Kedamori, 72, who remembers watching playmates die while shivering with malarial fever.
Mr. Kedamori and other local educators say rightists in the Abe government are targeting Taketomi to score a politically symbolic victory in a small corner of Okinawa, long a bastion of antimilitary sentiments. Members of the governing party counter that Taketomi is breaking the law by refusing to obey the district’s decision and that it is Taketomi’s school board, led by a leftist teachers union, that is imposing its ideological agenda.
“This is not about going back to militarism, but just teaching the love of country that is normal in the United States and other nations,” said Hiroyuki Yoshiie, a governing party lawmaker.
The proposal to put mayors in charge of their local school districts, analysts say, is a further attempt to bring Taketomi to heel, but it could also serve what critics see as a larger agenda. They say empowering sympathetic local leaders will allow the nationalists to adopt more nationalistic textbooks that have so far fallen flat.
Ikuhosha, the publisher of the conservative textbook chosen by the district, provides only 4 percent of the 2.5 million history and social studies books used nationally by grades seven to nine, according to the Education Ministry. By contrast, Tokyo Shoseki, the publisher of Taketomi’s antiwar textbook, prints more than half of the school books used nationwide.
“The conservatives want to use Taketomi as a manual for imposing Ikuhosha textbooks on other districts,” said Toshio Ohama, a former head of the Okinawa prefectural teachers union.
Mr. Kedamori, Taketomi’s superintendent, said the town lacked the resources for a prolonged battle with the national government, but he vowed not to give in.
“Why can’t they leave us alone,” he said, “to teach the value of peace to our children?”

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