quinta-feira, 15 de maio de 2014

Books: Stefanie Zweig, uma vida entre dois continentes e tres mundos


Stefanie Zweig, Author Who Fled Nazis to Kenya, Dies at 81
By PAUL VITELLOMAY 1, 2014


Stefanie Zweig, in 2012. She wrote “Nowhere in Africa.”CreditUwe Zucchi/European Pressphoto Agency

Stefanie Zweig, the author of “Nowhere in Africa,” a best-selling autobiographical novel about the life of a Jewish family in Kenya after their escape from Nazi Germany and the inspiration for an Oscar-winning film, died on Friday in Frankfurt. She was 81.
Her publisher in the United States, the University of Wisconsin Press, confirmed her death.
“Nowhere in Africa,” published in 1995, hewed closely to the story of her parents’ escape from Frankfurt with their 6-year-old daughter in 1938, and the family’s adjustment to life as farmers in British colonial Africa. The parents endured grinding work and bouts of depression. Stefanie, who had been withdrawn, blossomed into a venturesome, Swahili-speaking teenager.
The novel, the first of a dozen by Ms. Zweig, sold about 5 million copies. A German film adaptation with the same title, directed by Caroline Link, won the Academy Award for best foreign language film in 2003. Ms. Zweig and Ms. Link wrote the screenplay.
In a sequel novel, “Somewhere in Germany,” published in 1996, Ms. Zweig described the reverse adjustment the family had to make when, in 1947, her father, a lawyer, was appointed a judge in Frankfurt. As her father explained it to her at the time, she wrote, his credentials as a German lawyer with no Nazi affiliations made him one of the few people qualified for such a position afterWorld War II.
In fact, she wrote, he missed “the sounds and memories of home,” which everyone except her oddly naïve father seemed to know were beyond recovery.
Returning to bombed-out Frankfurt in 1947, the family joined a hungry, traumatized population in rebuilding the country. Scores of their German relatives were missing. None had been heard from since the start of the war in 1939, except a grandmother, who got a letter out in 1941 with the help of the Red Cross.
“They were only allowed to write 20 words,” Ms. Zweig told an interviewer in 2003. “My grandmother wrote — ‘We are very excited. We are going to Poland tomorrow.’ ” Reading that, she continued, “my father said Poland meant Auschwitz.”
But her father cautioned her against indiscriminate hatred, she wrote in an essay in The Guardian in 2003. As a child she was not allowed to hate all Germans, she said, “only the Nazis.”
For a year after returning to Frankfurt, the family lived in one room at the city’s former Jewish hospital. She wrote, “We spent our days hunting for food and our evenings wondering why nearly every German we talked to told us that they had always hated Hitler and had felt pity for the persecuted Jews.”
Stefanie Zweig was born on Sept. 19, 1932, in Leobschütz, a German-speaking town in disputed territory belonging to Germany at the time and to Poland since the end of the war. Her family moved to Frankfurt when she was a toddler. After a decade of speaking English (and some Swahili) in Kenya, she had to relearn German on returning to Frankfurt at 15, she wrote.
Ms. Zweig was for many years the arts editor and film reviewer for a Frankfurt newspaper, Abendpost Nachtausgabe. She wrote children’s books in her spare time and began writing novels only after the newspaper closed in 1988. She lived for many years with a companion, Wolfgang Hafele, who died in 2013. She had no known survivors.
Ms. Zweig wrote “Nowhere in Africa” in German, as she did all her books, but admitted to remaining unsure throughout her life whether English or German was her true native language.
“I count in English, adore Alice in Wonderland, am best friends with Winnie-the-Pooh,” she wrote in her Guardian essay, “and I am still hunting for the humor in German jokes.”
A version of this article appears in print on May 1, 2014, on page A23 of the New York edition with the headline: Stefanie Zweig, 81, Author Who Fled Nazis to Kenya.

O cartoon do dia: Obama e a economia congelada - Branco

Sem palavras...

Eleicoes 2014: a política externa brasileira e os candidatos - Marcelo de Paiva Abreu

Política externa do outro lado das eleições
Marcelo de Paiva Abreu*
O Estado de São Paulo, quarta-feira, 14.5.2014

Em um mundo de sonhos, programas eleitorais deveriam refletir as reais intenções dos candidatos quanto às políticas que implementariam caso fossem eleitos. Na prática, preocupações com os interesses de curto prazo dos eleitores tendem a complicar esse quadro. Não é surpreendente que políticos em campanha omitam ou mesmo deformem a verdade, de olho no impacto eleitoral de suas promessas. Isso é agravado quando a disputa se refere a um país que enfrenta situação crítica.
No Brasil de 2014 observa-se um caso extremo dessa situação. No terreno econômico, o cenário é de inflação alta e crescimento medíocre, contas públicas deterioradas, carga tributária excessiva e investimento reduzido. Isso à beira da crise energética que pode revelar-se desastrosa e em meio à mais grave que a Petrobrás já enfrentou. Na política, a queda da popularidade da presidente reflete-se na fragmentação da "Armata Brancaleone" que caracterizava o rolo compressor governista desde 2003. Há um clima de intensa insatisfação popular.
A candidata da situação optou por estratégia que combina a distribuição de benesses eleitoreiras com, no melhor dos casos, postura de avestruz. Recusa-se a ver a gravidade da situação que o País enfrenta. Os candidatos da oposição têm consciência das dificuldades a enfrentar, mas têm sido comedidos quanto ao que seria necessário para colocar o País de volta aos trilhos da viabilidade. Isso se aplica especialmente à área econômica. A explicitação em detalhe das políticas necessárias, por exemplo, para que a inflação volte ao centro da meta ou para que, sem aumento da carga tributária, se melhore o desempenho do governo conflita com os objetivos eleitorais.
Há, entretanto, temas que são menos marcados pelo realismo dos cálculos eleitorais. Um deles é a política externa. É difícil de imaginar que diferentes propostas sobre o que será a futura política externa possam fazer a diferença na votação dos diferentes candidatos, embora sejam importantes para avaliar a sua adequação para ocupar a Presidência.
A política externa brasileira entre 2003 e 2014, alegada projeção externa da preponderância interna do PT, é considerada competente por Dilma Rousseff, ao alinhar o Brasil ao "Terceiro Mundo", em especial aos regimes populistas de esquerda na Venezuela e na Argentina, e distanciar-se dos países desenvolvidos. Pode-se, portanto, esperar que a política externa continue sendo formulada no Itamaraty do B, dentro do Palácio do Planalto, e sem grandes reorientações. Medíocre está, medíocre continuará.
A candidatura Eduardo Campos enfrenta problemas quanto ao tema. Há uma ala do PSB que endossa a política externa do atual governo e outra que percebe a sua mediocridade. Haveria o risco de Roberto Amaral passar a ocupar o lugar de Marco Aurélio Garcia? Marina Silva seguramente terá aí um papel.
Aécio Neves foi o candidato que mais claramente explicitou suas ideias sobre o tema: o Itamaraty deveria recuperar a sua posição central no processo decisório relativo à política externa, abandonando o viés ideológico. Deveria defender os efetivos interesses nacionais e buscar celebrar acordos comerciais com países desenvolvidos.
Será tão simples? O que explica a captura do Itamaraty - a despeito da sua tradição de "esprit de corps" - por um reduzido grupo de funcionários que colaboraram com a estratégia definida no Palácio do Planalto? O que é mesmo interesse nacional? Qual poderia ser o papel de um conselho com representação independente do governo para a definição da política externa? Será que o Itamaraty deveria ser o principal responsável pela política comercial? Ou o tema seria mais bem tratado no Ministério da Fazenda? Ou em uma versão brasileira do United States Trade Representative? São perguntas cujas respostas vão bem além de declarações de boas intenções.
*Marcelo de Paiva Abreu é doutor em Economia pela Universidade de Cambridge e é professor titular no departamento de Economia da PUC-Rio. 

A transicao do socialismo ao capitalismo na Europa oriental: grandes e pequenas transformacoes - Anders Aslund

Apenas um extrato deste relato sobre importante conferência-balanço sobre a passagem do comunismo ao (semi-, em alguns casos) capitalismo, que merece todo o destaque, por retratar uma parte da terrível realidade de países ainda dominados pela máfia que sobrou do antigo regime e seus apparatchiks reconvertidos no capitalismo promíscuo (às vezes criminoso):

A striking insight at the conference was the importance of disrupting the old communist elites, who were corrupted by their hypocrisy of obedience to an ideology that nobody believed in. The worst part of the old elite has turned out to be the secret police, being the least transparent, the most lawless, the most ruthless, and also the most international. The continuing power of secret police networks is particularly apparent in Russia and Bulgaria.

Um bom resumo, esperando que saia logo o livro: The Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of Capitalism Over Communism.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Transition in Perspective: 25 Years after the Fall of Communism

by 
Petersen Institute for International Economics, May 15th, 2014
Transition in Perspective conference participants
Twenty-five years after the fall of communism, a clear consensus has arisen about what kind of economic policies were most successful in helping countries make the transition into stable and prosperous market economies. Countries with visionary leadership, willing to take major and comprehensive steps rather than incremental reforms, achieved the best outcomes, and privatization of state-owned enterprises and deregulation were essential to their success. But another consensus exists that is more ominous. Recent developments, notably the renationalization in Russia and the reversal of both economic and democratic reforms in Hungary, have humbled reformers and cast a shadow over the legacy of the transition a quarter century ago.
These were some of the conclusions of a two-day symposium of political leaders, policymakers, and scholars to assess lessons learned and the road ahead. The conference—entitled "Transition in Perspective" and held in Budapest, Hungary, on May 6–7, 2014—drew an extraordinary group of former leading policymakers and specialists from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, and other countries. It was organized by Simeon Djankov and me of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, together with Wolfgang Reinicke of the School of Public Policy at Central European University. Participants discussed 10 country studies and 5 theme papers in 8 different sessions on such aspects as the future of Ukraine, why many economic reforms in Russia and elsewhere are being reversed, and the role of privatization of government enterprises. We plan to produce a book of essays from the conference later this year, tentatively entitled The Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of Capitalism Over Communism.
Among the participants (photographed above) were Leszek Balcerowicz, Vaclav Klaus, and Anatoly Chubais, architects of economic reform in the 1990s in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic and Russia respectively. (See the conference program attached [pdf].) Although the discussions were off-the-record, I can offer a brief summary of the proceedings based on permission obtained from the participants.
Several speakers pointed out that overall transition can be considered a success in terms of economic performance because each subregion has increased its share of the global economy. Five countries have not reached their GDP per capita level of 1990 as yet, however. Daniel Treisman, political science professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, noticed that countries have tended to converge with their neighborhoods: Central and Eastern Europe has converged with the European Union, and Central Asia with its neighbors Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a whole, the conference discussed the rise of anti-capitalist and nationalist sentiments in Russia and Hungary but also new opportunities for reform, especially in Ukraine.
Poland and Estonia stand out as the greatest economic and political successes today. Polish reform leader, twice finance minister and also chairman of the central bank, Leszek Balcerowicz, repeated his longstanding contention that radical approaches work the best, noting: “A risky strategy is always better than a hopeless one.” In order to work, reforms need to move on several tracks: deregulation, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and institution building.
Hungary was a reform leader together with Poland in the 1990s, but since 2001 the country has regressed. Former Finance Minister Lajos Bokros and preeminent Hungarian economist Professor Janos Kornai discussed this disturbing trend. In the early 1990s, Kornai coined the phrase “premature social welfare state” for Hungary, describing its excessive tax burden and social expenditures. Today these attributes have resulted in low growth and high public debt, although Hungary developed excellent European institutions. Since 2010, the accumulated pension funds have been abolished or nationalized, and the government is creating new monopolies and nationalizing enterprises. Predatory taxes are chasing away foreign investors, and utility prices are being fixed at low levels. Is this a temporary setback or a secular decline? A Hungarian in the audience argued that the change has been profound. Half the Hungarians reject modernity in all its forms, and 60 percent are strongly dependent on the state and support a paternalistic society. The April 2014 election results reflected a revolt of Hungarian villagers against urban elites.
Former Czech Prime Minister and President Vaclav Klaus laid out his case for radical reform and stated that one prerequisite for reform was the unconditional liquidation of the communist system as a whole. He said the key for success was avoiding rent seeking and gradualism and to ensure that political and economic reforms move in parallel. The decisive part of the transition was the privatization of all state-owned firms.
Former Slovak Finance Minister Ivan Miklos (1998–2006) explained how Slovakia had lagged in economic reforms in the 1990s but caught up by adopting reforms in 2003–04, producing the highest economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe in 2000–2010. The reform breakthrough had been preconditioned on the elaboration of a reform program in opposition, the propagation of reform ideas, and finally swift implementation when the political preconditions existed. Miklos emphasized the importance of political leadership, referring to Klaus and his Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda. He quoted Benjamin Disraeli: “Whereas politicians care only about the next election, statesmen think of the next generation.”
A striking insight at the conference was the importance of disrupting the old communist elites, who were corrupted by their hypocrisy of obedience to an ideology that nobody believed in. The worst part of the old elite has turned out to be the secret police, being the least transparent, the most lawless, the most ruthless, and also the most international. The continuing power of secret police networks is particularly apparent in Russia and Bulgaria.
Both Treisman and Gerard Roland, professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley, showed in their papers that democracy and market economic reform go together. Treisman argued that the causality runs from democracy to market reforms, rebutting arguments that radical democracy and market economic reform are inherently incompatible. Leadership matters, they agreed. The three leaders who stood out for that quality were Yegor Gaidar of Russia, Dimitar Popov in Bulgaria, and Balcerowicz of Poland. Roland and Oleh Havrylyshyn, former deputy finance minister for Ukraine, emphasized the positive impact of a strong civil society and national cohesiveness.
Will reforms in Ukraine succeed despite disputes with Russia over borders? The case of Georgia may be instructive. The near-failure of the Georgian state made radical reforms even more necessary. The main impetus for reform must be domestic, on the other hand. Little can be done without a parliamentary majority. The European Union and the International Monetary Fund are important tools, but they cannot do the job on their own. The European Union has proven most effective in requiring adjustments before a country accedes to it. A dividing line persists between the Central and East European countries that have become members of the European Union or are on that track and the former Soviet republics, which are far more corrupt. Though among the latter, Georgia greatly improved after its Rose Revolution in 2003 and to some extent so did Moldova while adjusting to the European Union.
While the importance of deregulation and macroeconomic stabilization is unquestioned, issues surrounding privatization remain controversial, raising concerns about fairness, justice, and trust because of the way that state-owned enterprises have been handed to oligarchs and insiders in too many cases. Russia and Hungary stand out as examples of the fragility of the post-communist transition and the fact that privatization can be reversed. Hungary and Kazakhstan have nationalized all the mandatory private pension savings, and Poland has nationalized half of these funds. Many countries have reduced the financing of mandatory pension savings, and Bulgaria has frozen the gradual increase in the retirement age.
One lesson from the transition is that economic policymakers need to explain and disseminate their ideas more intensely, using old and modern social media. Economists must be able to sell their proposals to a broad public. Few achievements are safe from being reversed. As the grand old man of East European economics, Professor Kornai, pointed out: “Anything can happen. Low probability events do occur.”

A Franca e seu secular namoro com a Russia: vendendo a corda...?

Europe goes its own way

By Jennifer Rubin 

The Washington Post, May 15, 2014


France’s attempt to sell warships to Russia is both a “sell the rope to hang themselves” moment and a comment on U.S. stature these days.
In a closed-door meeting in February 2010, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates urged his French counterpart not to proceed with the sale of two amphibious assault ships to Russia because it “would send the wrong message to Russia and to our allies in Central and East Europe.”
The French official, Hervé Morin, acknowledged that each of the ships — so-called Mistral-class vessels built for the French Navy to carry troops, landing craft, and helicopters — was “indeed a warship for power projection,” according to a confidential diplomatic cable on the meeting, which was made public by WikiLeaks. But Mr. Morin “asked rhetorically how we can tell Russia we desire partnership but then not trust them,” the cable added
With Russia’s annexation of Crimea and some 40,000 Russian troops deployed near Ukraine, Western officials are no longer putting their trust in Russia’s intentions. But despite American objections, the sale is still on track, and the first ship is scheduled for delivery late this year.
On one level it is remarkable that even before President Obama’s calamities in Syria and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (but after its invasion and occupation of part of Georgia), our European allies were contemptuous of our wishes. And it is even more remarkable that after Russia’s invasion and endless discussion on sanctions, the French still seem committed to going forward.
Germany is no better, of course. Out of deference to German business interests, Chancellor Angela Merkel has resisted serious sanctions on sectors of Russia’s economy. Reports suggest France and Germany are finally prepared to do more, but  given their track record, don’t get your hopes up.
This is yet one more bit of evidence that when the United States fails to lead there is no substitute to counter international aggression. Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute, calling the French sale “a slap in Washington’s face,” observed via e-mail, “The Obama administration has always labored under the illusion that when it retreats from the world, the Frances and the Germanys would step up.  And the answer is that they will – they’ll step up to sell anything to anyone at any time, even as they mouth condemnations of Washington’s failure to lead.” When the United States appears unsteady, unwilling to draw definitive lines, then our allies go their own way, looking out for what they perceive as in their immediate self-interests.
European powers aren’t going to act against Russia on their own own, and maybe not even in concert with us. Why stick their necks out when support from the United States, if Russia retaliates, is uncertain at best? France is selling warships to Russia. Sunni Arab states threaten to go nuclear if they see Iran become a threshold national state. It is every man for himself and, ironically, multilateral and bilateral alliances crumble without strong direction from the United States.
Obama who chastised the Bush administration for insufficient consultation with allies, is now at odds with European allies, looked on as untrustworthy by Asian friends and deemed unreliable by Middle East allies for taking military action if need be against Iran. Once U.S. credibility is shot, things go downhill. Fast.

Encore Piketty, and a predecessor from the 19th century: Henry George - Charles Lane (WP)

Thomas Piketty identifies an important ill of capitalism but not its cure



The year 2014 marks the 50th anniversary of the Beatles’ arrival in the United States. The Allies liberated Paris 70 years ago. And, of course, it’s been 135 years since “Progress and Poverty,” by the American journalist Henry George, was published in 1879.
What’s that? Never heard of George or his treatise on the causes of inequality? It sold 3 million copies. Perhaps you missed “Progress and Poverty’s” anniversary while perusing this year’s equally improbable bestseller, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century ” by French economist Thomas Piketty.
With its sweeping review of historical data, culminating in a warning about capitalism’s inexorable, destabilizing, tendency toward inequality — to be cured by a global wealth tax — Piketty’s book has earned comparisons with “Das Kapital,” by Karl Marx.
Yet Piketty’s project may have more in common with George’s book than Marx’s, and not only because each tome reached U.S. readers six years after a ruinous financial crisis — the Panic of 1873 for George, the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers for Piketty.
Analyzing the stagnant economy and rich-poor gap of his day, George blamed not free markets, which he considered efficient and fair, but their corruption by a privileged few.
Specifically, George argued, land owners commanded a high and growing share of U.S. income even though their claim to it was based on something as unproductive as mere ownership — as opposed to the laborer’s work effort or the investor’s risk-taking.
For George, the solution was to abolish all taxes except a “single tax” on the value of land. Since land could neither be created nor destroyed, taxing it would reduce neither society’s total wealth nor owners’ incentives to put property to productive use — buildings and other improvements wouldn’t be taxed.
To the contrary, taxing land, and only land, to pay the government’s bills would liberate labor and capital to seek their most productive use and thus to grow the economy. A huge source of unearned wealth would be curbed, if not eliminated. Capitalism would be redeemed and democracy saved.
“It is not enough that men and women should vote,” George wrote (including a gender that could not, at that time, cast ballots). “They must have liberty to avail themselves of the opportunities and means of life; they must stand on equal terms with reference to the bounty of nature. . . . This is the lesson of the centuries. Unless its foundations be laid in justice, the social structure of the United States or any other country cannot stand.”
Similarly, Piketty’s concern about the tendency of the return on capital (which he defines to include real estate as well as financial wealth) to exceed economic growth is essentially a worry about growing unearned claims on society’s resources.
To Piketty, like George an admirer of market efficiency and opponent of protectionism, the resulting accumulation of wealth in relatively few hands threatens economic fairness, economic dynamism — and democracy. “Extreme inequality makes it impossible to have proper working of democratic institutions,” Piketty told a recent meeting at Washington’s Urban Institute.
And so, updating Henry George’s single tax, Piketty proposes a global wealth tax, making similar claims about its benefits for both equality and growth.
For Piketty and George, the bottom line, both moral and economic, is to socialize “rent” — rent, that is, not in the colloquial sense but in the economic sense of income disconnected from productivity.
It’s an attractive vision: an egalitarian, productive society, purged of parasitical rent-seeking through the expedient of well-aimed taxes.
Alas, Piketty’s global wealth tax and George’s single tax suffer from the same defect, and it’s not political impracticality — after all, George nearly got himself elected mayor of New York City in 1886.
It’s the inherent difficulty of separating the productive, untaxed component of the return on land or capital from the unproductive, taxed part.
Clear in the pages of a treatise, the distinction is murkier in practice. The market price of a vacant lot can reflect potential productive uses, as well as the risk a buyer takes by betting on them. A similar analysis applies to the rate of return on capital.
As a result, it’s hard to devise a tax on wealth that raises a significant amount of revenue but doesn’t discourage at least some socially beneficial saving or entrepreneurship. The potential for adverse unintended consequences — economic and political — is greater than Piketty seems to realize.
Great private fortunes can indeed entitle their owners to an undue share of society’s current income and political power. At times, however, private wealth can serve as a font of charity or, indeed, a bulwark against government overreach.
We’ve been debating the right balance since the 19th century and probably will be long after the 21st.
Charles Lane
Lane is a Post editorial writer, specializing in economic policy, financial issues and trade, and a contributor to the PostPartisan blog.

O modo petista de governar: incompetencia, improvisacao, superfaturamento, desvio de dinheiro, tudo isso junto e muito mais... - Editorial Estadao

Atrasos e perdas em refinarias

15 de maio de 2014 | 2h 10
Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo
 
Mais de seis anos depois de seu anúncio como um dos maiores empreendimentos do governo do PT na área de energia e mais de quatro depois de ter sua pedra fundamental lançada pelo então presidente Lula numa festa de nítido caráter político - era o início do ano em que Dilma Rousseff disputaria sua primeira eleição -, é possível que, finalmente, comecem as obras civis da Refinaria Premium I, no Maranhão. O atraso já é enorme. De acordo com as promessas feitas por Lula em 2008, a que será a maior refinaria da Petrobrás, com custo previsto em R$ 41 bilhões e capacidade para processar 600 mil barris por dia, deveria estar com sua primeira etapa em operação em setembro de 2013 e a segunda, dois anos depois.
Com o agravamento da crise operacional e financeira da Petrobrás - cuja produção e capacidade de refino ficaram estagnadas e cujas receitas foram comprimidas pelo longo congelamento dos preços dos combustíveis, enquanto cresciam suas necessidades financeiras para sustentar os investimentos no pré-sal -, o programa de novas refinarias foi desacelerado. Como a demanda interna de combustíveis continuou a crescer, por causa dos estímulos do governo ao setor automobilístico, mas sua capacidade de refino se estagnara, a Petrobrás passou a importar volumes cada vez maiores de derivados, a um custo maior do que o preço da venda nas bombas. Isso aprofundou sua crise e limitou seus investimentos. No Plano de Negócios e Gestão 2013-2017, anunciado no ano passado, a refinaria do Maranhão e a do Ceará (Refinaria Premium II, com capacidade para processar 300 mil barris por dia) foram apresentadas como "projetos em avaliação".
Talvez esse quadro esteja começando a mudar. No plano de negócios de 2014-2018, as duas foram classificadas como "projetos em licitação". Em fevereiro, a presidente da empresa, Maria das Graças Foster, havia informado que a licitação para a construção da refinaria maranhense em Bacabeira, a 60 quilômetros de São Luís, estava programada para abril. Na segunda-feira (12/5), o diretor de Abastecimento, José Carlos Cosenza, anunciou que a licitação será lançada em maio. A se confirmar a informação, as obras de construção da Refinaria Premium I começarão em 2015. A primeira etapa (primeiro trem, como diz a Petrobrás) deverá entrar em operação em 2018.
Mesmo sem ter sido assentado nenhum tijolo e só agora a empresa confirme que tem um projeto executivo - a planta, segundo Cosenza, passou por simplificação, para se enquadrar nos novos padrões internacionais -, a Premium I já custou R$ 1,6 bilhão. Esse dinheiro, como mostrou o jornal O Globo (11/5), foi gasto em terraplenagem (R$ 583 milhões) e em projetos, treinamento, transporte e estudos ambientais (cerca de R$ 1 bilhão).
Contratada em julho de 2010 por R$ 711 milhões, a terraplenagem foi considerada concluída em abril do ano passado, com 80% dos serviços executados. De acordo com a Petrobrás, os serviços restantes "serão executados após a otimização do projeto básico".
Relatório de fiscalização do Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU) concluído há um ano apontou indícios de irregularidades na terraplenagem. As falhas seriam decorrentes da pressa da empresa em iniciar as obras de uma refinaria que não tinha nem projeto básico, o que, na avaliação dos fiscais do TCU, teria provocado danos de R$ 84,9 milhões.
Em certo trecho, o relatório sintetiza o modo de proceder da Petrobrás - e também do governo do PT - em muitos casos em que obras são contratadas sem o necessário projeto executivo, sem a adequada previsão de custos e sem a prévia licença ambiental. No caso da refinaria do Maranhão, os auditores disseram que "a gênese de todo o problema parece estar na decisão de iniciar-se uma obra desse porte sem um planejamento adequado, passível de toda sorte de modificações". Em abril do ano passado, cinco anos depois dos primeiros estudos, ainda não havia um projeto definido para a refinaria - o que, como reconhece a diretoria da Petrobrás, só agora está sendo concluído

Petrobras: privatizada pelos companheiros, saqueada pelos quadrilheiros- Guilherme Fiuza


Privatizaram a Petrobras

Dilma Rousseff falou grosso. Declarou que considera “inadmissível” a privatização da Petrobras. Com toda a bravura do seu gesto, a presidente, infelizmente, está atrasada. A Petrobras já foi privatizada.
A maior empresa brasileira pertence hoje, majoritariamente, a um consórcio de franco-atiradores que prosperaram no seio do governo popular. Se não, vejamos: uma empresa que, numa única transação, transfere a terceiros mais de 500 milhões de dólares, a fundo perdido, de patrimônio público, é uma empresa dos brasileiros?
Poderia ser. Mas, e se essa empresa perde metade do seu valor de mercado sob um governo que asfixia seus preços para mascarar a inflação? Considerando-se que, em tal manobra, essa empresa foi utilizada por um grupo partidário para se perpetuar no poder, ela está servindo aos brasileiros? Quais brasileiros?
E se um grupo de fornecedores e intermediários investigados pela Polícia Federal, com contratos suspeitos com essa empresa, faturou mais de 30 bilhões de reais nos últimos dez anos? Você ainda acha que essa empresa é sua? Tudo bem, talvez você ache que o Land Rover do Silvinho Pereira também é seu. Aliás, agora você tem também o Land Rover do ex-diretor da empresa Paulo Roberto Costa, presente do doleiro Alberto Youssef. Pode escolher com qual dos dois você não levará sua mãe para passear no dia dela.
A maior empresa brasileira pertence, na maioria, a um consórcio de franco-atiradores que prosperaram no governo
Segundo a Polícia Federal, o esquema centralizado por Costa, que está preso, funciona desde 2004. Era o segundo ano do governo Lula, e a nova presidente do Conselho de Administração da Petrobras era Dilma Rousseff. Nesses dez anos, floresceram os negócios do doleiro Youssef, regendo uma formidável orquestra de contratos superfaturados, propinas e dinheiro de graça para políticos amigos do povo. Um deles era André Vargas, que o PT de Dilma tirou do anonimato e aninhou na vice-presidência da Câmara dos Deputados, nada menos. O governo popular sabe valorizar um bom engenheiro de prospecção de dólares. O petróleo é deles.
Aí vem a oposição pedir a CPI da Petrobras. Pura inveja. Choro de quem não participou desse bem-sucedido processo de privatização. Muitos não entenderam por que, em meio às revelações sobre lucrativos negócios privados com esse doce de mãe que é a Petrobras, Dilma veio falar que não admite a privatização da empresa. Alguns acharam até que a presidente estivesse esclerosada, respondendo a coisas que ninguém perguntou. Nada disso. Pensando bem, a lógica de Dilma está perfeita: é inadmissível privatizar algo que já foi privatizado.
Lula e Dilma escalaram Renan Calheiros para barrar a CPI da Petrobras, ou, pelo menos, sabotá-la. É a pessoa certa no lugar certo. O presidente do Senado entende dessa matéria de prospecção de vantagens privadas à sombra do Estado (já provou que um eficiente servidor da nação não deixa ex-namorada sem pensão). E o cenário político é o melhor possível para barrar essa tentativa de fuxicar a petrolífera dos companheiros. Os novos manifestantes e revolucionários urbanos, que, segundo se lê por aí, vieram vocalizar um poderoso anseio de mudança, não estão nem aí para a CPI da Petrobras. O governo popular está cozinhando o assunto há dois meses, tranquilo, sem nenhum ninja, mascarado ou tranca-rua para lhe causar nem um sorriso amarelo.
O Brasil está satisfeito com o padrão petista de concubinato estatal (em comunhão de bens). A privatização do Banco do Brasil pelo valerioduto, por exemplo, encheu o PT de dinheiro público e foi saudada pela nação com a reeleição de Lula. A entrega do PAC à conexão Delta-Cachoeira foi chancelada com aprovação recorde a Dilma em 2012. A CPI do Cachoeira, aliás, não levou às ruas um gato pingado com cartolina de protesto. A mulher do bicheiro virou musa, e a farra dos superfaturamentos no Ministério dos Transportes retornou no ano seguinte, nova em folha. A CPI da Copa, que trataria da privatização do BNDES na jogada dos estádios bilionários, foi engavetada pelo Congresso — sem nenhuma alma penada gritando que não vai ter Copa.
É claro que, com todas essas privatizações estatais do governo popular, está ficando difícil fechar as contas públicas (mesmo com a maquiagem contábil). Mas não tem problema. O ministro da criatividade fazendária, Guido Mantega, já anunciou que pode haver um aumento de impostos sobre bens de consumo. Perfeito. O contribuinte precisa ser chamado a completar o caixa, porque os sócios de Youssef não podem morrer de fome.
Agindo assim, o governo Dilma está em consonância com a coqueluche mundial dos progressistas, o best-seller “O capital no século XXI” — obra de mais um autor da bondosa esquerda francesa. Basicamente, ele propõe mais impostos para quem consegue juntar dinheiro. É isso aí. Preservem Youssef, Rousseff e demais companheiros do povo. Como diria Thatcher, o socialismo será eterno enquanto durar o dinheiro dos outros.
Fonte: O Globo, 10/5/2014

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