ISBNs solicitados para livros de
Paulo Roberto de Almeida, 2020-21
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quinta-feira, 15 de julho de 2021
ISBNs solicitados para livros de Paulo Roberto de Almeida, 2020-21
quarta-feira, 14 de julho de 2021
José Carlos Brandi Aleixo (SJ): 60 anos de ordenação - missa comemorativa, 16/07, 18h30
José Carlos Brandi Aleixo (SJ): 60 anos de ordenação
How Will Brazil Navigate the US-China Rivalry? - Hussein Kalout (Americas Quarterly)
Americas Quarterly, Washington DC – 14.3.2021
How Will Brazil Navigate the US-China Rivalry?
Both superpowers are pivotal to the country. Choosing is not an option.
Hussein Kalout
Historians may one day describe the escalating rivalry between the United States and China as the most important driver of contemporary international relations. As the mightiest power in the Western world since the fall of the Roman Empire, the U.S. is fighting to preserve its hegemony. As a challenger, China aims to restore its imperial might – not only as the greatest empire in the history of the East, but as a rising global superpower in its own right.
Their battle for the 21st century has begun, and – for better and for worse – Latin America has already become a critical staging ground. China seems to have gained the upper hand in recent years as a distracted Washington channeled most of its resources into unsuccessful military interventions in the Middle East, the global “War on Terror” and confronting a resurgent Russia as well as numerous crises at home.Throughout the past three U.S. administrations, the White House and State Department assigned only peripheral importance to Latin American countries, despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary. This strategic inertia has allowed China to overtake the U.S. as the main trading partner of Brazil and Argentina – the two largest economies in South America – and some other countries as well.
In Brazil, a new and pressing question has arisen: How to navigate this growing rivalry?
An array of internal and external actors seeks to frame Brazil’s path forward as a binary choice – that is, forcing Brazil to develop a deep relationship with either Washington or Beijing, but not both. The Donald Trump administration certainly framed this as a mutually exclusive choice. Since taking office in January, the Joe Biden administration seems to perceive Beijing in a broadly similar light. In Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s government has welcomed and even encouraged this Manichean view.However, it has met with stiff resistance in Brazil’s National Congress, business sector, and in the Foreign Ministry, where many believe that making such a binary choice violates the Brazilian national interest and reduces Brazil’s leeway amid the intensifying geostrategic clash of titans.
The magnitude and complexity of Brazil-U.S.-China relations are immense. For Brazil, navigating these relationships is not about making a binary choice. It is about fine-tuning the nation’s indispensable relationships with the two greatest powers in the world.
This may be particularly true at a time when Brazil’s economy, stagnant or shrinking for the past decade, cannot afford to alienate large partners. In the trade sphere, Brazil’s dependence on China is significantly greater than its dependence on the United States. Brazilian exports to China in 2020 were more than triple its shipments to the U.S.
Of the 15 most exported Brazilian commodities, China is the main importer of 11, while the U.S. is the main importer of only two. Moreover, U.S. companies are the main competitors of Brazilian companies in the Asian and European markets. And, of the total investments in infrastructure in Brazil – a fundamental part of the country’s continued development – China by far surpasses the U.S., even though the latter continues to be a much larger source of foreign direct investments overall. These numbers reveal Brazil’s deep dependence on China when it comes to structural elements of the economy such as job creation, income, credit and investments.
But of course, trade and business cannot be the only aspects of Brazil’s relationships with foreign powers. The equation facing the country’s foreign policy thinkers is in fact much more complex.
A complex relationship
U.S.-Latin America relations have gone through numerous ups and downs, despite generally positive sentiment and some improvements in recent years. Today’s political classes are still scarred by the history of U.S. interventions in Latin America, often involving the overthrow of democratically elected governments such as Salvador Allende in Chile and João Goulart in Brazil during the Cold War. More recently, the Trump administration resuscitated the idea of the Monroe Doctrine while making threats of military intervention in Venezuela and lending support to Jeanine Áñez’s coup in Bolivia. Even among friends, the U.S.’ record as a dependable, trustworthy power has been put in doubt because of its history of betraying and abandoning its former allies. The examples in this list are plentiful: Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Kurds in Syria, and the criticism of NATO and Europe, to name but a few. In contrast, Latin American governments tend to view China as both more consistent in its relationships and more prone to boost the region’s economies without staining its hands with the blood of their people.
At the same time, many Brazilians retain an admiration for the Founding Fathers of the United States – particularly for their construction of a nation based on the rule of law, the unequivocal separation of powers, democratic solidity and an enviable educational system. Similar admiration is not generally expressed towards China, in part because its long and storied history is not widely known or studied in Brazil. China is seen by the public as a faraway, mysterious, and exotic country.
The Brazilian view towards Washington, of course, is not monolithic. Internal political divisions frame many of the differing opinions on how the nation should interact with the United States. For instance, the Brazilian left is divided into two currents. The most radical see the U.S. as a constant threat to regional political stability. The influence of this group in Brazilian policymaking, however, is practically nonexistent. The second current, with a more pragmatic view, understands that despite having valid reasons to distrust the U.S., it is necessary for Brazil to maintain good relations with Washington. This latter group believes that the two countries have considerable room for cooperation, particularly in the fields of human rights, education, trade, and the environment.
We can identify two distinct views on the political right as well. The first, a minority position, claims that the subordination of Brazilian interests to those of the U.S. during the Cold War saved Brazil from “communism” and domestic subversive elements – ostensibly including in that group anyone who opposed Brazil’s authoritarian military regime. Juracy Magalhães, a well-known conservative politician in Brasília and foreign minister under the military regime, had a famous phrase that is sometimes still invoked by adherents of this belief: “What is good for the U.S. is good for Brazil.” Today, the most prominent proponents of these sentiments are President Jair Bolsonaro and his supporters. For them, a close and friendly relationship between Brasília and Washington is not enough. They believe Brazil should instead pledge unconditional alignment to the U.S. policy, something Bolsonaro sought to create while Trump was in office.
The less radical viewpoint found on the Brazilian right – and, I believe, the more commonly held one, frames the relationship with the U.S. as a source of prosperity, opportunity, and development, but still tends to harbor some reticence about the supercilious behavior of the U.S. towards developing countries. Adherents to such a view tend to favor a close bilateral relationship, but not one of automatic and unconditional alignment with Washington.
Critically, the radicals on the left and the right alike constitute only a minority. Taken together, those who prefer unconditional alignment and those who advocate for staunch U.S. containment may represent the views of less than a fifth of the Brazilian population. This minority can be noisy and disruptive, though. The right-wing extremists were able to gain decisive influence in the decision-making process, as we have seen under the Bolsonaro administration and in the beginning of the military cycle inaugurated in 1964. The other two subgroups, more realistic and pragmatic, represent the majority viewpoint of those who find themselves on the right and the left of the political spectrum. The more moderate positions are even stronger in the most influential segments of Brazilian society, such as the private sector, parliamentarians, the military, diplomats, journalists, academics, scientists and public intellectuals. This is not a guarantee that a more moderate view will always prevail, but it is a powerful undercurrent force that should be reckoned with.
Global stage
For Brazilian state institutions, whose raison d’être involves upholding the country’s national interest, the current majority assessment holds that Brazil should not treat the two relationships as mutually exclusive – now or in the future. Any effort to determine a possible preference between the U.S. and China should be based on past practical experiences, objective data, and the treatment of Brazil by each power.
In the view of the Brazilian diplomatic corps, for example, the relationship between Brasília and Washington over the last 20 years has not lived up to expectations. During this period, Brazil has waited for a recognition that has never materialized. The U.S. has consistently supported rivals against Brazilian candidates in elections to multilateral forums such as the WTO and FAO. The Chinese, on the other hand, offered their votes to the Brazilian candidates in these elections. Furthermore, U.S. support for Japan and Germany, and more recently India, to hold permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council in a hypothetical reform has disappointed Brazilian diplomats. Brazil’s own aspirations for such a position were never recognized or supported by the United States. In the Brazilian view, this unequal treatment constitutes a reminder that the United States does not consider Brazil to be a power worth respecting.
Although China has never expressed explicit support for Brazilian claims to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Beijing has sought to treat Brazil as a rising power comparable to China – even when China is undoubtedly the more powerful nation. The Chinese establishment, in the last 20 years, has been able to more accurately understand how the hearts and minds of Brazilian public agents work. This is not to say that China never practices protectionist measures or blocks Brazilian interests, but the way in which these actions are carried out and the language used to express them are important. The experience of high-level diplomatic missions to Beijing tends to be more respectful and honorable when compared to the treatment offered by Washington – especially when considering the latter’s far more ceremonious conduct towards officials from nations such as India. Deepening diplomatic connections between Brazil and China are reflected in the frequent high-level interactions between the two countries as well. In the last 20 years, the number of Brazilian head of state missions to Beijing was at least double the number of missions to Washington.
Washington’s hesitation to endorse Brazil’s accession to the OECD is an additional example, and another instance appeared when the Bolsonaro administration attempted to support a Brazilian candidate for the presidency of the Inter-American Development Bank. This move was unsuccessful because the United States chose to support Mauricio Claver-Carone, Donald Trump’s candidate for the regional forum. In the view of the Brazilian diplomatic community, this was an unmistakable sign that the U.S. did not have much interest in supporting even the most pro-U.S. Brazilian government in history. The move to support Claver-Carone not only undermined Brazilian regional leadership in the Latin American context, but also reignited the classic distrust of the region’s countries towards the United States.
5G conundrum
Another important factor is the incessant pressure that Washington has placed on Brazil and other countries to disallow Huawei’s participation in the bidding process for 5G networks. Following such commands would completely ruin Brazil’s relationship with China. Not to mention that Washington’s warnings of Chinese espionage and data theft – risks that Brazil could potentially be exposed to – seem wildly hypocritical in the face of the U.S. espionage operation against the former Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, revealed to the public in 2013. This pressure and the hypocritical argument used to justify it have seriously damaged the U.S.-Brazil diplomatic relationship, in the eyes of Brazilian establishment officials.
This is not to say that past and present Chinese misdeeds are ignored in Brazil. Brazilians certainly view the Chinese government as authoritarian, a regime that engages in serious persecution of minorities and violates the sovereignty of its neighbors. Many Brazilians know that Beijing may have not-so-friendly policies toward Africa (the so-called debt trap) and has supported the Maduro regime, albeit not as decisively as Russia. However, in the Brazilian view, the Chinese government has not tended to invoke moralistic, holier-than-thou rhetoric in the same way the U.S. often has. Despite China’s flaws, Brazilian leaders believe today that they can maintain a pragmatic stance towards Beijing – a decision motivated by much of the same pragmatism that leads Washington to defend allied dictatorships in the Middle East in order to safeguard U.S. economic and political interests.
It is important to remember that Brazil has always offered unwavering solidarity in the most heart-wrenching moments of American national life, such as the Second World War and the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11. Brazil fought with the Allies with Brazilian soldiers serving alongside American troops in the fight against Nazi forces in Italy. Military cooperation with the U.S. and its allies has long been a cornerstone of Brazilian doctrine. In the eyes of the Brazilian military, the alignment of interests with the U.S. for defense cooperation is infinitely greater than that between Brazil and other powers such as China and Russia. Partnership with these strategic rivals of the U.S. is extremely limited – and even during left-leaning Brazilian governments, this preference remained unchanged.
The U.S. Senate recently passed a unique bipartisan bill – the Innovation and Competition Act – designed to combat China’s growing economic influence around the world. But Washington’s new strategy could also benefit from incorporating a renewed emphasis on Latin America – and especially the largest economy in the region, Brazil. Increasing the bilateral trade between the two countries is certainly possible, but it will ultimately depend on how the U.S. chooses to navigate the issue in the coming years – perhaps, for instance, by gradually eliminating commercial barriers for Brazilian goods, helping to revamp Brazilian infrastructure, connecting Brazilian innovation ecosystem with American tech hubs, and providing incentives for renewable energy and sustainable development.
When considering areas of potential cooperation, environmental issues have often been an area where visions and goals have overlapped. The current situation is an obvious exception, with the Biden administration making combating climate change a vital priority, while the Bolsonaro government has adopted decidedly non-environmentally friendly policies fueling the destruction of the Amazon. But looking more in the medium term, it is important to emphasize that in this field in particular, Brazil has opportunity to cooperate both with the U.S. and with China.
Vaccine diplomacy will continue to be another important factor. So far, Brazil has made better progress with China following the partnership established between the Butantã Institute and the Chinese company Sinovac Biotech. As the pandemic continues to wreak havoc in Latin America, Brazil’s dependence on China has become increasingly evident. The import of input materials to produce the CoronaVac vaccine in Brazil depended exclusively on supplies from China. The Biden administration has recently made progress in expanding its provision of vaccines around the world, but China still holds a lead in the realm of vaccine diplomacy in Brazil and Latin America in general.
In the last two decades, Brazil’s relations with China have evolved in an unprecedented manner. But these trends are not set in stone. It is time for the U.S. to make up for lost time and bet on a closer relationship with Brazil to reverse this situation in the two decades ahead. While China values ??Brazil among its international priorities, the U.S. continues to attribute low strategic relevance to the country. If this dynamic persists, Brazil will have little choice but to deepen its relationship with the dragon at the expense of the eagle. And trying to impose a binary choice on Brazil, as the Trump administration attempted to do, will not succeed in the long run. The Brazilian governmental and economic establishment will not opt ??for the exclusion of one of the two most powerful countries on Earth. To do so would run contrary to Brazil’s long history of pendular diplomacy – carefully fostering relations with both sides of an international competition for as long as possible to increase Brasília’s strategic leverage. The best strategy, and the one that respects the Brazilian national interest, is certainly one that involves a balanced relationship between both the United States and China. But the precise nature of that balance will depend in large part on how Washington chooses to proceed.
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Kalout is a political scientist and research scholar at Harvard University and a former special secretary of strategic affairs of Brazil (2016-2018)
terça-feira, 13 de julho de 2021
Prioridades possíveis em uma administração racional (2006) - Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Quinze anos atrás, em julho de 2006, eu escrevia um texto chamado:
Prioridades possíveis em uma administração racional
Figura como capítulo 2 de meu livro:
Um contrarianista no limbo: artigos em Via Política, 2006-2009
Brasília, 26 dezembro 2019, 240 p. Nova coletânea em Edição de Autor, no formato Kindle (ASIN: B083611SC6). Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2019/12/um-contrarianista-no-limbo-artigos-em.html) e na plataforma Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/41459572/Um_contrarianista_no_limbo_artigos_em_Via_Politica_2019_).
Transcrevo aqui apenas a parte propositiva e remeto os interessados ao restante do artigo, como acima.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Escala de prioridades com o máximo de retorno social e econômico
1) Melhoria da qualidade da educação com gerenciamento eficiente dos recursos
(a) alcançar a cobertura máxima de crianças escolarizáveis, entre 2 e 17 anos, o que implica ampliar a pré-escola e redimensionar a rede escolar espacialmente; concentrar recursos no básico (fundamental e médio) e no técnico-profissional;
(b) ampliar a permanência escolar no ciclo fundamental público, estendendo o período de estudo efetivo na escola; vincular programas do tipo bolsa-escola aos programas de assistência social;
(c) aperfeiçoar a formação dos professores dos ciclos infantil, fundamental, médio e técnico-profissional públicos, com incentivos financeiros segundo o desempenho, medido pelo aproveitamento efetivo do estudante (abolido o critério da aprovação automática); recursos de tecnologia de informação devem estar concentrados no professor e nos centros de documentação e bibliotecas das escolas;
(d) mudanças curriculares de molde a reforçar o núcleo básico de estudos (língua nacional, ciências, matemáticas e estudos sociais), com opções de disciplinas suplementares disponíveis segundo os recursos apresentados, e decisão a ser tomada de forma descentralizada pelos conselhos de educação em nível municipal e associações de pais e mestres nos diversos centros escolares;
(e) eficiência na gestão escolar, com estímulos financeiros e funcionais em função da melhoria no desempenho (mais em escala relativa do que absoluta).
2) Melhoria dos padrões de saúde da população mais carente
(a) ampliar a rede de serviços básicos de saúde, num sentido preventivo e educativo; integração dos serviços de saneamento básico para prevenir doenças infectocontagiosas e prover água de qualidade a todas as comunidades;
(b) programa nacional de nutrição e alimentação, com seguimento das crianças, integrado aos serviços escolares; formação de recursos humanos em economia doméstica e produção local de alimentos;
(c) rede integrada de saúde familiar e de hospitais comunitários; equipes volantes permanentes para o controle das doenças transmissíveis e contagiosas; vigilância integrada das gestantes e crianças na primeira idade;
(d) programas permanentes de riscos de gravidez – com ampla oferta de meios preventivos – e seguimento integral em casos de parto não desejado; programas integrados de abrigo e adoção de crianças;
(e) melhoria da gestão das redes de saúde e hospitalar, para reduzir a corrupção e os desvios e aumentar a eficiência dos recursos disponibilizados; transparência total das despesas efetuadas, com seguimento integral das operações financeiras e transferências de recursos via Siafi, aberto ao nível das unidades.
3) Eficiência na gestão estatal, com redução da carga fiscal
(a) Reforma tributária para a redução da carga total sobre o sistema produtivo, segundo programa progressivo em dez anos, com redução de dez pontos do PIB, sendo meio ponto a cada semestre;
(b) Combate à corrupção no sistema público, por meio de redução ampla da mediação dos recursos pela via política e ampliação da transparência dos gastos públicos, com seguimento integral pela internet; elaboração e execução orçamentárias igualmente disponíveis na internet;
(c) ampliação do sistema de parcerias público-privadas (PPPs), para o maior número possível de setores envolvidos nos serviços públicos (que não necessitam ser estatais); privatização de atividades que não sejam tipicamente estatais ou públicas;
(d) consolidação da independência da autoridade monetária como guardiã exclusiva da estabilidade da moeda e da defesa do poder de compra da população;
(e) ampliação e aprofundamento da legislação sobre responsabilidade fiscal, com desdobramento dos mecanismos preventivos de controle de desequilíbrios potenciais;
(f) reforma administrativa com diminuição do número de ministérios, redução dos gastos com os corpos legislativos federal, estaduais e municipais e da própria representação política, hoje superdimensionada; atribuição de diversas funções estatais a novas agências reguladoras independentes; início progressivo do fim da estabilidade no serviço público, com exceção de algumas carreiras de Estado, estritamente definidas; reforma do sistema judiciário para melhoria de sua eficiência.
4) Reformas microeconômicas para a melhoria do ambiente de negócios
(a) ampla reforma trabalhista num sentido mais contratualista do que com base no diploma legal; eliminação do imposto sindical e da justiça trabalhista, com amplo recurso ao sistema arbitral e criação de varas especializadas na justiça comum;
(b) redução da informalidade empresarial e trabalhista mediante reformas tributária, regulatória e burocrática; redução dos custos de transação impostos pelo Estado;
(c) descentralização dos sistemas de compras públicas, com uso ampliado dos mecanismos eletrônicos de oferta, aquisição e controle dos gastos efetuados;
(d) eliminação dos tratamentos diferenciados entre setores, de maneira a eliminar distorções e competição fiscal danosa aos orçamentos públicos e aos regimes tributários;
(e) ampliação da competição interna e externa, com eliminação de cartéis e setores oligopolizados, redução do protecionismo alfandegário e maior integração à economia mundial, com abertura ampliada aos investimentos estrangeiros.
5) Segurança pública
(a) reformulação dos aparelhos policial, penitenciário e de justiça, num sentido preventivo, repressivo e restaurativo;
(b) diminuição da idade de imputabilidade legal;
(c) redução dos casos de prescrição de pena e ampliação dos prazos;
(d) integração do sistema preventivo com os mecanismos de assistência social e de incorporação escolar, para diminuir a delinquência juvenil e a criminalidade envolvendo crianças.
(...)
Dicionário político dos novos pecados capitais - Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Dicionário político dos novos pecados capitais
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 1543: 26 janeiro 2006, 2 p.
Via Política (Porto Alegre, 23/07/2006)
Como todos sabem, os sete pecados capitais da tradição cristã são, sem ordem particular de prioridade, os seguintes:
1) inveja;
2) avareza;
3) cobiça;
4) orgulho (ou soberba);
5) preguiça;
6) luxúria;
7) gula.
Sobre eles não precisamos nos alongar indevidamente, tendo em vista toda a exegese já registrada na história, a começar por São Tomás de Aquino até exemplos mais recentes na literatura. Pode-se questionar, inclusive se esses “pecados” continuam sendo “capitais” ou se a sua presença na vida diária já não vem sendo admitida com alguma tolerância pelos mais diversos personagens da vida pública. Afinal de contas, todos eles, com alguma discrição para a luxúria, vêm sendo exibidos por esses personagens, até mesmo com certa desfaçatez, sem que autoridades morais ou religiosas venham a público condenar atos e atores com a veemência que seria de se esperar.
Deixando de lado esses pecados da velha tradição, proponho-me agora listar alguns novos pecados da moderna vida política, da brasileira em particular. Os políticos, em geral, exibem uma penca deles, não todos os políticos, em bloco, nem todos os pecados, ao mesmo tempo, mas vários desses personagens da vida pública ostentam alguns de forma cumulativa e, o que é pior, de maneira reincidente.
Não vou deter-me agora sobre casos concretos da vida pública brasileira, tanto porque eles estão sendo expostos de maneira recorrente, nas comissões parlamentares de inquérito e nas páginas da imprensa e em outros meios de comunicação.
Parafraseando uma frase famosa, pode-se dizer que nunca, tantos podres da vida pública foram assumidos de forma tão aberta, para o conhecimento de tantos cidadãos, estupefatos. Assistimos, desde vários meses, a uma enxurrada de denúncias, várias delas já substanciadas por provas contundentes, sem que se tenha visto, até aqui, nenhuma condenação moral, ou qualquer condenação de fato. Resta saber se velhos e novos pecados serão, de alguma forma, julgados e condenados no futuro previsível.
Esperando que chegue o “dia do julgamento final”, proponho-me, assim, a apresentar alguns novos pecados da vida política brasileira que, numa lista não exaustiva, poderiam ser identificados com os seguintes:
1) corrupção
2) hipocrisia
3) fraude
4) desfaçatez
5) volubilidade
6) inconstância
7) mentira
8) mediocridade
9) transferência de encargos para terceiros
10) ignorância deliberada de fatos de sua competência
11) irresponsabilidade quanto ao desempenho de funções
12) pretensão
13) eleitoralismo desenfreado
14) propaganda indireta, com meios públicos
15) uso da máquina estatal para fins particulares
16) populismo (velho e novo)
17) demagogia (aparentemente, uma segunda natureza)
18) arrogância
19) clientelismo
20) fisiologia
21) nepotismo
22) fuga da realidade (autismo político)
23) esquizofrenia (defesa de objetivos conflitantes na vida política)
24) ofensa à inteligência alheia (“eu não sei”, “eu não vi”, “não estou sabendo”...)
Paro provisoriamente por aqui, e não pretendo, no momento, elaborar sobre cada um desses novos pecados, esperando ao menos que eles sejam autoexplicativos. Os fatos que poderiam substanciar cada um desses verbetes do novo dicionário de costumes políticos da vida brasileira são conhecidos de todos e não requerem nova descrição.
Termino parafraseando Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), o poeta italiano, autor de A divina comédia, que em uma de suas frases memoráveis disse o seguinte:
“Não menos do que saber, me agrada duvidar.”
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 26 de janeiro de 2006
segunda-feira, 12 de julho de 2021
A crise argentina, em toda a sua amplitude - Joaquín Morales Solá (La Nación)
La Nación, Buenos Aires – 11.7.2021
El Presidente, ante una sociedad sublevada
Joaquín Morales Solá
El campo se le sublevó. La mayoría de la clase media está impaciente y crispada. Sus viajes al interior debe hacerlos dentro de una burbuja de seguridad porque lo rodea la protesta. Sucedió hace unos días en Salta y, hace algún tiempo, en Córdoba. Volvió a ocurrir el viernes en Tucumán. “Es el peor momento del Presidente”, dice un funcionario cercano a Alberto Fernández. A la crisis de la pandemia, que puso en vilo a los gobiernos de todo el mundo, se le sumó la crisis económica propia de la Argentina. Y la incapacidad de la administración para resolver con sentido común, y sin gestos autoritarios, tales conflictos. Como un portero de la vieja escuela, al Gobierno solo se le ocurre cerrar las puertas. Cierra la exportación de carnes. Cierra el Aeropuerto de Ezeiza. Las sublevaciones de los productores rurales y de los sectores medios de la sociedad pueden explicarse en esas medidas. Son grupos sociales no solo afectados por decisiones económicas, sino también sensibles ante la mutilación de las libertades y la retórica vacía de sustancia.
El campo es el sector más emprendedor y eficiente de la economía. En los últimos treinta años quintuplicó su producción de granos y oleaginosas: pasó de 30 millones de toneladas a casi 150 millones. Es una actividad que descubrió la globalización antes de la globalización. También apostó a la modernización hasta convertir al campo argentino en el más moderno del mundo tecnológicamente. El propio Alberto Fernández pudo respirar con un mercado cambiario más o menos tranquilo durante varios meses gracias al aporte de dólares genuinos de los productores rurales. Es el único sector económico que no necesita la ayuda del Gobierno para salir a los mercados internacionales y vender sus productos.
Para un gobierno que proyectó una inflación del 29 por ciento y que finalmente tendrá una del 50 por ciento, la economía es una derrota
Sin embargo, para el kirchnerismo es un enemigo. Para algunos, por razones ideológicas tan viejas como inservibles; para otros, porque es una buena cantera de recaudación de dinero para un Estado insaciable. El precio de la soja (que ya no está en los niveles extraordinarios de 600 dólares la tonelada) pierde valor para los productores por los altísimos niveles de los derechos de exportación. Las retenciones están en el 33 por ciento y amenazan con llevarlas al 35; pero las “retenciones cambiarias”, producto de la diferencia entre el tipo de cambio oficial y el paralelo, las llevan al 38 por ciento. Semejante exacción no estaba prevista ni en la resolución 125, que significó en 2008 una revuelta popular y la primera derrota política del kirchnerismo. Los industriales se pueden ir a Brasil o a Uruguay si aquí las cosas van mal; los productores rurales no pueden, en cambio, trasladar sus campos a otro país. Quedarse y protestar. No les dejan otro camino. El acto de San Nicolás del viernes fue expresivo de la magnitud del malestar campesino y de numerosos sectores sociales.
También la carne argentina es la que tiene más prestigio en Europa. Los restaurantes europeos suelen promocionar en sus menús que la carne que ofrecen es argentina. No obstante, son mercados difíciles de conquistar. No hay un monopolio argentino de la carne en el mercado internacional ni mucho menos. Debe competir con otros fuertes productores, como Estados Unidos y Brasil. Son los productores de carne argentinos los que pierden los mercados que habían conquistado. El Gobierno cerró parcialmente las exportaciones de carne cuando su precio local empezó a subir para una sociedad que perdió capacidad de consumo. Se agregó un hecho nuevo: la presencia de China entre los compradores de carne. Antes, la Argentina solo exportaba cortes de carne caros que no se consumían popularmente en el país. Pero China compra la vaca entera, y compra la vaca vieja o joven. Eso es lo que explica el aumento del precio de los cortes populares de la carne. ¿Es un problema nuevo? Lo es, sin duda. Pero ningún problema se resuelve clausurando la puerta y creando adentro otro problema (o un problema peor). Cerrar las exportaciones es un manotazo que ya lo dio en su hora Guillermo Moreno; el resultado fue el fracaso. Hay soluciones más inteligentes que imponer decisiones arbitrarias. Los productores rurales conservan, además, la tradición de resistir al método de ordeno y mando. No son dóciles ni disciplinados, como otros sectores de la economía.
El problema está directamente asociado a una crisis del consumo argentino. Para igualar el actual nivel del salario real debe retrocederse 17 años. En los últimos cuatro años la caída del consumo fue permanente; lo será también en este año. Se están firmando aumentos salariales del 45 por ciento. Al principio, parecían estrafalarios para un presupuesto que prevé una inflación anual del 29 por ciento. La Argentina se convertía, según la letra oficial, en el país que más promovía la distribución de la riqueza. La realidad es otra. La estimación de los economistas privados es que la inflación anual de 2021 será de entre el 50 y el 51 por ciento. Otra vez perderán los salarios frente a la inflación. El año electoral llevará al Gobierno a repartir mayores cantidades de dinero. La contracara de esa decisión será una inflación aún más alta. Para un gobierno que proyectó una inflación del 29 por ciento y tendrá una del 50, la economía es una derrota. Por eso, entre otras razones, los productores rurales no estuvieron solos en su protesta.
La clase media debe pagar impuestos como no se paga en ningún país del mundo con tan pocas contraprestaciones por parte del Estado. Los sectores medios son los que sufragan los gravámenes más altos porque tienen que enfrentar hasta un impuesto al salario, además del impuesto anual a las ganancias. Están también los impuestos indirectos, como el IVA y los que acompañan el precio de cada producto o servicio. Un argentino que trabaja en blanco con un sueldo relativamente bueno termina entregándole al Estado casi el 50 por ciento de sus ingresos. Sin duda, la pobreza es un lugar peor todavía. Casi la mitad de la sociedad argentina está sumida en la pobreza. El 70 por ciento de los niños de la provincia de Buenos Aires son pobres. La sociedad argentina está formada por una clase media cada vez más chica y más acorralada por la caída de su capacidad de consumo, y por una clase baja sumida en la pobreza y la dependencia. Si a esos problemas se les agrega la incompetencia oficial para manejar la pandemia, se explica el estado de ánimo de gran parte de la sociedad argentina.
Cinco de cada diez jóvenes argentinos quieren irse del país, y dos lo logran. Comienza a notarse que matrimonios de edad madura con buena situación económica piensan también en radicarse en otro país, no por ellos, sino por sus hijos. “No podemos dejar a nuestros hijos en este país”, es una frase que resulta ya dramáticamente frecuente. No solo influye el presente desolador, sino también el discurso de una clase gobernante aferrada al pasado. Nadie promete ni siquiera el esbozo de un futuro posible y mejor.
A todo esto, el Gobierno pierde el tiempo tratando de crear escándalos artificiales. El conflicto con Bolivia es increíble. La nota de agradecimiento de un jefe militar boliviano al gobierno de Mauricio Macri (falsificada, según el militar) por el supuesto envío de armas está fechada el 13 de noviembre de 2019. Evo Morales cayó el 11 de noviembre de ese año. El gobierno de Macri habría mandado armas y municiones para reprimir a los bolivianos partidarios de Evo Morales en menos de un día, porque al día siguiente ya recibió el agradecimiento. Otra historia habría sucedido si la administración macrista hubiera sido tan rápida y eficiente. El Presidente no evitó de nuevo la precipitación de pedirles disculpas a los bolivianos por lo que presuntamente hizo Macri. No averiguó ni chequeó ni confirmó. Solo necesitaba un urgente cambio en la agenda de la discusión pública. No logró ni siquiera eso.
Portal dos Arquivos Espanhóis - Gretchen Pierce -(H-Net)
Os Arquivos Gerais das Indias (AGI), em Sevilha, também tem material sobre o Brasil, da época da União Iberica (1580-1640), agora tudo digitalizado.
BLOG: Navigating the Portal de Archivos Españoles by William Cohoon [blog post]
William Cohoon earned his Ph.D. in colonial Latin American history at Texas Christian University and teaches History of the Americas at Uplift Williams Preparatory School in Dallas, Texas. His research focuses on the emergence of the early modern surveillance state for the purposes of social and spatial control in Bourbon Peru. Historia y Cultura recently published his work “Los caminos borbónicos y el esfuerzo para mejorar la infraestructura de comunicaciones del Perú, 1718–1809’ which demonstrates how the Bourbon monarchy hoped to use infrastructure as a means to expedite communication and to ‘civilize’ provincial Peru. For his article, he used digitized documents from the audiencia de Lima through the website known as the Portal de Archivos Españoles.
Navigating the Portal de Archivos Españoles
In 2006, Spain’s Ministerio de Cultura y Deporte (Ministry of Culture and Sport) established the Portal de Archivos Españoles (PARES, see Figure 1). As of today, PARES provides public access to more than five million descriptions of sources and over thirty-five million total images of digitized documents, photographs, art, and maps that are located in twelve archives throughout Spain.1 The vastness of the PARES collections can make them difficult and cumbersome to navigate, so for the purposes of this post I will refer to my experience working with materials from the Archivo General de Indias (AGI).2 Located in Seville, Spain, the AGI’s holdings contain information pertaining to the empire’s overseas colonial administration and PARES has made available all eighteen fondos (subsections) of the archive’s resources (although not all documents within each fondo have been digitized). On the homepage researchers receive the option to carry out research either in Spanish or English and the choice to conduct a búsqueda sencilla (simple search) or búsqueda avanzada (advanced search) (see Figure 2) from here as well.3 Additionally, users not only have the option to search by specific words but also to narrow these criteria down by description, producer, archive, and date. At the bottom of the advanced search page, you can also select sources by digitized, undigitized, or all documents as well. Typically, I prefer to conduct my searches using all documents, which allows me to see the variety of sources available on my subject.
Figure 1: Screenshot of PARES homepage.
Figure 2: Screenshot of Advanced Search Engine.
For my research on roads in the Viceroyalty of Peru’s provinces of Guamanga and Tarma, I used the advanced search engine. To begin I entered “Guamanga” in the word search while selecting the Archivo General de Indias. In this initial search, I left the fondos (source) subsection blank (see Figure 3), but at the bottom of the page I included a date range of 1700 to 1821 to avoid pre-Bourbon rule documents. Once submitted, my search generated seventy-nine sources in the correos (royal mail), estado (government administration), contratación (governing body of trade), audiencia de Lima (judicial court), mapas y planos (maps and diagrams), and indiferente(various correspondence) (see Figure 3). On the result page’s righthand side, users can sort materials by digital and nondigital sources, levels of description, start and end date, and by text. Each category informs the user about the quantity of materials available.
Figure 3: Screenshot of results page.
Once a source is selected to examine, users then proceed to that document’s homepage. The homepage allows individuals to email the page’s link, view the image, or add the reference to your notepad, a subject I will discuss at the end of this post. On this page, scholars will find information that pertains to the material. This data includes an Identity Statement area that contains the source’s supplied title, reference number, date of creation, level of description, and a reference code with a link to the location in the archive. Additionally, scholars will find a Context section that offers archival history, biography/administrative history, and a hyperlink to the name of the creator(s)—for instance the government entity that generated the source. Following this portion of the page, the Content and Structure segment presents brief descriptions of each letter, who wrote a letter and who received it, plus the origin and end date of the exchange. The Conditions of Access and Use section offers another helpful feature with the description of indices. Here researchers will find subtopics affiliated with their search (see Figure 4). For my topic on roads, I found hyperlinks to themes on public works, urban environments, and my region of study. Once I clicked public works, I found related documents in seven additional archives, such as the Archivo General de Simancas, that often contains materials on the Americas and the Atlantic and Pacific Worlds.4These related documents had materials that focus on Cuba, the Philippines, Peru, and Spain, to name a few of the countries.
Figure 4: Screenshot of a document’s homepage.
After reaching the document’s homepage, researchers can then click on the camera icon to view the image(s). If your source has multiple pages users will see a thumbnails section on the left-hand side of the highlighted folio. Above the selected picture is a tool bar with a series of icons that allow individuals to zoom in or out from an image, increase or decrease the brightness, alter the contrast, print, save, and/or add the entire document to your notepad (see Figure 5). There are several ways to save the documents to your desktop for your research files. One method requires you to save each photograph individually, and then you can make one large pdf file. Naturally, for a large document this process will prove time-consuming. Another possible approach is to click on the printer icon over the thumbnails section and when the print page appears you may select save as pdf.
Figure 5: Screenshot of document, thumbnails.
A new aspect on the results page is the Add to Notepad feature and the ability to share your discovery on Facebook and/or Twitter. To use the notepad, scholars need to create an account, which then allows them to save any searches, catalog descriptions, and/or images (see Figure 6) by topical categories. In addition to these options, users are able to add notes to each item saved in the category, delete, or relocate a search to a new category folder. For my own personal research, I prefer to save art and maps in the Saved Images section and documents in the Catalogue Description section. The latter shows the archive, dates, and reference number that is associated with any image or document. In contrast, the Saved Images section provides the source’s affiliated description. Although I have only recently started to use this new feature, my initial reaction is that this tool will prove incredibly useful for my future searches on PARES.
Figure 6: Screenshot of notepad feature.
While working on my dissertation and now on other projects, I have found that conducting research online is incredibly beneficial due to the difficulties in finding sufficient funding and time to travel to distant archives. Furthermore, with the COVID-19 pandemic still leaving many scholars in limbo with long quarantines and limited space in the archives that have opened, digital archives will continue to gain importance. Since the Archivo General de la Nación del Perú (AGNP) and the Portal de Archivos Españoles have made many of their sources available to the public on a global scale, I feel that my work has not been hindered by these limitations. While nothing replaces the experience of personally working in the archives, I have been fortunate to expand my own research with online sources. In my next post, I will update readers on the process of purchasing digitized documents from the AGNP. I will provide a step-by-step process to help readers navigate the process on the AGNP’s website, and comment on my overall experience and how long it takes to receive my sources.
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1The archives are as follows: Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica, Archivo General de Simancas, Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza, Archivo General de la Administración, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Bizkala, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Álava, Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Archivo General de Indias, Archivio Histórico Provincial de Gipuzkoa, and the Archivo Central del Ministerio de Cultura. For a more detailed information on the number of images and how much PARES has grown since 2006 please click the Estadísticas tab on the PARES homepage.
2 Of the twelve archives that PARES offers access to, the AGI possesses the most materials on Latin America. However, in several instances of searching for sources on Mexico and Peru, I discovered documents and images located in Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Álava, Archivo de la Real Chancillería de Valladolid, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Archivo General de Simancas, and Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza.
3 For the AGI, the eighteen subsections are as follow: Casa de Contración, Consulados, Contaduría, Correos, Diversos, Escribanía de Cámara de Justicia, Estado, Galería de Retratos de los Gobernadores y Capitanes Generales de Cuba (1771-1893), Gobierno, Justicia, Juzgado de Arribadas de Cádiz, Papeles de Cuba, Patronato Real, Títulos de Castilla, Tribunal de Cuentas, Ultramar, and Mapas, Planos, Documentos Iconográficos, y Documentos Especiales.
4 The other archives in my case included the Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica, Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza, Archivo de la Corona Aragón, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Álava, Archivo Real Chancillería de Valladolid, and the Archivo Histórico Nacional.
domingo, 11 de julho de 2021
Para 70% dos brasileiros, há corrupção no governo Bolsonaro - Veja
Datafolha: Para 70% dos brasileiros, há corrupção no governo Bolsonaro
Para 70% dos brasileiros, há corrupção no governo de Jair Bolsonaro. O percentual é de pesquisa Datafolha divulgada neste domingo, 11, que mostra que 63% acham que há corrupção também no Ministério da Saúde e que outros 64% acreditam que Bolsonaro sabia da existência dessa prática. Os resultados surgem após uma série de outras pesquisas mostrarem que o presidente passa por seu pior momento desde o início do mandato. O levantamento foi feito entre os dias 7 e 8 de julho e foram ouvidas 2.074 pessoas com mais de 16 anos. A margem de erro da pesquisa é de dois pontos percentuais para mais ou menos.
Segundo o Datafolha, entre os que reprovam o governo, 92% acham que há corrupção na gestão Bolsonaro. Na sequência, os maiores percentuais registrados nos grupos estratificados foram entre moradores do Nordeste, jovens (ambos com 78%) e mulheres (74%). O resultado mais favorável ao presidente está entre os empresários, grupo no qual 50% acham que há malfeitos no governo.
Os que acham que não há corrupção no governo federal correspondem a 23% dos entrevistados na pesquisa. Nesse grupo, essa crença é maior entre moradores das regiões Norte e Centro Oeste (31%), evangélicos (30%), pessoais com mais de 60 anos (29%) e homens (28%). Entre os que aprovam o governo, o percentual de quem acha que não há corrupção é de 60% — no caso dos que confiam na palavra de Bolsonaro, o percentual é de 74%.
O Datafolha também perguntou aos entrevistados qual a percepção que eles tinham em relação à prática de corrupção no Ministério da Saúde. A resposta foi afirmativa para 63% deles, enquanto 25% disseram que não e 12% não souberam responder. As suspeitas da existência de corrupção são maiores entre quem tem curso superior (68%) e, de acordo com as respostas, 64% dos entrevistados acreditam que Bolsonaro sabia dos problemas — 25% não acreditam nisso e 11% não opinaram.
Os maiores percentuais que registrados para o conhecimento presidencial estão entre os jovens de 16 a 24 anos (72%) e os nordestinos (71%), enquanto os menores estão entre os que têm remuneração de 5 a 10 salários mínimos (36%) e os empresários (44%).
Os resultados mostram a percepção da população em relação a suspeitas de cobranças de propinas na compra de vacinas pelo Ministério da Saúde e sobre as acusações de que o presidente teria sido avisado, mas não teria tomado nenhuma providência. Os casos vieram à tona no âmbito das investigações da CPI da Pandemia.