Rui Barbosa e o direito internacional: "Entre os que destroem a lei e os que a observam não há neutralidade admissível." - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Rui Barbosa e o direito internacional 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, julho de 2016

 

         Há cem anos, quando a Argentina comemorou o primeiro centenário de sua independência, o governo brasileiro designou o senador Rui Barbosa como seu representante nos festejos. Além de participar das cerimônias oficiais, Rui Barbosa foi convidado a palestrar na Faculdade de Direito de Buenos Aires, ali pronunciando uma das mais importantes alocuções da história do direito internacional no Brasil. Dada a contribuição de suas reflexões para a construção da doutrina jurídica que sustenta a essência da política externa brasileira, bem como para a afirmação de valores e princípios da diplomacia defendida pelo Itamaraty, vale relembrar alguns conceitos fundamentais dessa conferência, ainda válidos em nossos dias.

         Em 1983 a Casa de Rui Barbosa publicou o texto definitivo, traduzido do espanhol, dessa palestra, Os Conceitos Modernos do Direito Internacional, durante muito tempo denominada como “O Dever dos Neutros”. Rui já era conhecido na Argentina, onde vivera entre 1893 e 1894, fugindo da perseguição que lhe movia o governo de Floriano por sua posição em defesa dos revoltosos da Armada. Depois de repassar os episódios mais relevantes do itinerário independentista argentino – iniciado em 1806, avançando em 1810 e consagrado definitivamente no Congresso de Tucuman, em 9 de julho de 1816, quando se proclamou a autonomia do país em face da Espanha –, Rui Barbosa cita Juan Bautista Alberdi, que condenava, no panfleto “A Onipotência do Estado”, o culto ao Estado como “a negação da liberdade individual”. 

Ele chega então ao cerne de sua exposição: a condenação formal do uso da força, representada pela violação da neutralidade da Bélgica por tropas do Império alemão, em total desrespeito aos princípios discutidos poucos anos antes na Segunda Conferência da Paz da Haia, na qual Rui fora o chefe da delegação brasileira. Suas palavras, em defesa desse princípio, foram muito claras: “Entre os que destroem a lei e os que a observam não há neutralidade admissível. Neutralidade não quer dizer impassibilidade; quer dizer imparcialidade; e não há imparcialidade entre o direito e a injustiça. (...) O direito não se impõe... com o peso dos exércitos. Também se impõe, e melhor, com a pressão dos povos. (...) Não há duas morais, a doutrinária e a prática. A moral é uma só: a da consciência humana, que não vacila em discernir entre o direito e a força.”

         Essa conferência de Rui Barbosa foi relembrada pelo chanceler Oswaldo Aranha, em 1942, no exato momento em que o Brasil se viu confrontado à extensão da guerra europeia ao continente americano, instando, então, o país a assumir suas responsabilidades no plano dos princípios do direito internacional e em consonância com os deveres da solidariedade hemisférica. A Alemanha tinha, mais uma vez, violado a neutralidade da Bélgica, para invadir a França. A postura de Aranha – que havia recepcionado Rui, como jovem estudante no Rio de Janeiro, quando o jurista desembarcou em sua volta ao Brasil –, foi decisiva para que, ao contrário da vizinha Argentina, então controlada pelo Grupo de Oficiais Unidos, de orientação simpática ao Eixo, o Brasil adotasse uma postura compatível com a construção doutrinária iniciada por Rui e de acordo a seus interesses nacionais, nos contextos hemisférico e global, em face do desrespeito brutal ao direito internacional cometido pelas potências nazifascistas na Europa e fora dela.  

         Vinte anos depois, o chanceler San Tiago Dantas, um dos grandes tribunos do pensamento jurídico da diplomacia brasileira, defende o respeito ao princípio da não intervenção nos assuntos internos de outros Estados, que estava então em causa nas conferências e reuniões pan-americanas em torno do caso de Cuba. Outros juristas e diplomatas brasileiros, ao longo do século, a exemplo de Raul Fernandes, Afrânio de Melo Franco, Afonso Arinos e Araújo Castro, participaram dessa construção doutrinal e pragmática dos valores e princípios da diplomacia brasileira. Há que se reconhecer, no entanto, que Rui Barbosa foi um dos responsáveis pela contribuição das grandes diretrizes políticas e jurídicas que hoje integram plenamente o patrimônio da diplomacia brasileira.

 

A postura da diplomacia brasileira continua VERGONHOSA! Não existe condenação da agressão: as partes são julgadas equivalentes

 Não vejo, EM NENHUM MOMENTO, nenhuma denúncia da invasão russa, da violação do Direito Internacional, dos crimes de guerra e contra os direitos humanos já perpetrados pelas tropas russas, inclusive NENHUMA REFERÊNCIA à ameaça de uso de ARMAS NUCLEARES.

A diplomacia brasileira continua INTIMIDADA pelos celerados, aloprados e desequilibrados dirigentes que infelicitam o Brasil e isolam o país no cenário internacional. 

VERGONHA! VERGONHA! VERGONHA!

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata e professor

Brasília, 27/02/2022

NOTA À IMPRENSA Nº 33

Declaração do Representante Permanente do Brasil junto às Nações Unidas, Embaixador Ronaldo Costa Filho, em reunião do Conselho de Segurança da ONU sobre a situação na Ucrânia - 27 de fevereiro de 2022 (texto em inglês)

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Publicado em 27/02/2022 18h01

Statement by the Permanent Representative Ambassador Ronaldo Costa Filho in the Security Council Debate on the Question of Ukraine

27 February 2022

Mr. President, 

Last Friday, my delegation laid out before this Council a comprehensive view of its concerns regarding the security developments in and around Ukraine.  Nothing in the intervening period has led us to having had those concerns allayed.

On the contrary, in fact. As we speak, the number of casualties, the human suffering and the risks to international peace and security keep increasing by the hour. UNHCR already places the number of refugees at 422,000.

We have voted in favour of the draft resolution before the Council despite misgivings about its timing and its contribution to achieving peace. These misgivings stem ultimately from our unyielding commitment of respect for, and interest in upholding, the Charter and the role of the Security Council itself.

The urgency of the situation has convinced us of the need to add the voice of the General Assembly to that of the Security Council in seeking solutions to the crisis in and around Ukraine.  

This in no way detracts from our firm belief that the Council, with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has not yet exhausted the instruments and mechanisms at its disposal to contribute to a negotiated and diplomatic solution towards peace.

Therefore, we reiterate our call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, for full respect to humanitarian law, and for a renewed attempt within the Council for the promotion of, and support to, a process of dialogue between the parties involved, a role that the Council is inherently better equipped to provide in order to bring a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian conflict. The Security Council and General Assembly must work together.

As we renew our calls for an immediate ceasefire, we also appeal to Ukraine and Russia to facilitate the withdrawal of all persons who want to leave the Ukrainian territory. Brazil already wishes to express its gratitude to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova, Romania and others who are facilitating the exit of people fleeing the conflict, in particular Brazilians and Latin Americans. 

Let us be exceedingly cautious in moving forward in the General Assembly. The supply of weapons, the recourse to cyberattacks, and the application of selective sanctions, which could affect sectors such as fertilizers and wheat, with a strong risk of famine, entail the risk of exacerbating and spreading the conflict and not of solving it. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that these measures enhance the risks of wider and direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. It is our duty, both in the Council and in the General Assembly, to stop and reverse this escalation. We need to engage in serious negotiations, in good faith, that could allow the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, security guarantees for Ukraine and Russia, and strategic stability in Europe. 

I thank you.

========

PRA: I do NOT thank you, Mister Costa, but I regret that you have to comply to INSANE instructions from Brasília.

O Arquivo Nacional na Independência do Brasil: debates, publicações, eventos e exposições

O ano de 2022 marca o bicentenário da independência do Brasil.

O #ArquivoNacional preparou um calendário de eventos e lançamentos para discutir o tema, com atividades que vão até o mês de setembro.

#historia #arquivos #independencia200anos

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/arquivo-nacional-do-brasil_arquivonacional-historia-arquivos-activity-6902913072437288960-1JPY

 

Lourival Sant’Anna antecipa o que pode acontecer: a Ucrânia como Estado Falido

 A guerra de Putin fará da Ucrânia um Estado falido

Estou sofrendo, e me sinto pessoalmente ofendido por aqueles que confundem agressor e agredido, verdade e mentira, concluindo que tudo não passa de uma 'guerra de narrativas'

Lourival Sant'Anna, O Estado de S.Paulo, 26/02/2022

No dia 16 de janeiro, iniciei minha coluna afirmando que “a pergunta sobre a intervenção russa na Ucrânia se deslocou da categoria do ‘se’ para do ‘quando’ e ‘como’”.

Agora, está igualmente evidente que o objetivo de Vladimir Putin é instalar em Kiev um governo que o obedeça. No prazo médio, ele fracassará e focará no plano B: converter a Ucrânia num Estado falido.

Os militares ucranianos estão impondo uma resistência inesperada para os russos, mas não para quem observou nos últimos meses o ânimo deles de defender a liberdade e a dignidade de quem eles amam. Quando enfrentam a morte contra um inimigo muito mais forte, as pessoas levam no coração o amor pelos seus. Só é possível fazer esse sacrifício por esse amor.

A Rússia faz uma guerra de escolha de um homem, Vladimir Putin, que precisa concretizar suas fantasias sadomasoquistas de masculinidade, arrastando consigo o seu país e os seus vizinhos. “Goste ou não, é seu dever, minha beleza”, disse Putin num recado ao presidente ucraniano, Volodmir Zelenski. A citação é de uma música que glorifica o estupro e a necrofilia.

Os ucranianos não têm escolha a não ser derramar o próprio sangue enquanto tentam impor o maior custo possível ao invasor. No fim, a Rússia prevalecerá, e a resistência servirá de incentivo para um castigo ainda mais perverso contra os ucranianos.

Putin foi claro: “Apelo aos militares da Ucrânia: não permitam que neonazistas ucranianos usem seus filhos, esposas e idosos como escudos humanos. Tomem o poder em suas próprias mãos. Será mais fácil para nós chegarmos a um acordo”. Volodmir Zelenski é judeu.

Putin encontrará uma junta militar para chamar de sua. Não conseguirá estabilizar a Ucrânia. Mas impedirá o surgimento de uma democracia liberal próspera com a mesma matriz histórica, cultural e geográfica da Rússia, a servir de inspiração para um levante dos russos contra o seu jugo e contra a extorsão da cleptocracia que o rodeia.

Nada do que digo é resultado de algum tipo de “faro” e muito menos do meu desejo, mas do aprendizado de 22 anos de Putin no poder, combinado com a análise de informações no terreno, de imagens de satélite vendidas por empresas privadas e vídeos feitos por testemunhas, confirmados por técnicas de geolocalização. 

Estou sofrendo, e me sinto pessoalmente ofendido por aqueles que confundem agressor e agredido, verdade e mentira, concluindo que tudo não passa de uma “guerra de narrativas”. 

Carrego comigo a dor de ter presenciado incontáveis vezes pessoas morrendo como estão morrendo agora ucranianos e russos pela vaidade de um homem. Diante disso, a indiferença é uma forma de agressão.

Ex-chanceler (ministro das relações exteriores) da Alemanha Federal denuncia o projeto imperial da Rússia - Joschka Fischer

 The Telegraph, Londres – 25.2.2022

Russia's Stolen Future

By invading Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin is challenging not only that country's independence but also the broader European system, which rests above all on the inviolability of borders and the law of nations. There has been no comparable event in Europe since the Hitler era.

Joschka Fischer

 

Berlin – Russian President Vladimir Putin has made his choice. He has brought war to Ukraine. This is a watershed moment for Europe. For the first time since the Balkan wars of the 1990s, which were limited to the area of the disintegrating Yugoslavia, the continent is once again confronted with bombardments of cities and rolling tank divisions. But this time, it is a nuclear superpower that started the fighting.

By ordering an invasion, Putin is showing a brazen disregard for international treaties and the law of nations. There has been no comparable event in Europe since the Hitler era. According to Putin’s latest declarations, Ukraine has no right to exist as a sovereign state – even though it is a member of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe; and even though Russia itself (under Boris Yeltsin) has recognized the country’s independence.

Putin now claims that Ukraine is an inseparable part of Russia. Whatever the majority of Ukrainians think is irrelevant to him; Russia’s greatness and international standing are all that matter. But make no mistake: Putin wants more than Ukraine. His war is about the entire European system, which rests above all on the inviolability of borders. In seeking to redraw the map by force, he hopes to reverse the European project and re-establish Russia as the preeminent power, at least in Eastern Europe. The humiliations of the 1990s are to be erased, with Russia once again becoming a global power, on par with the United States and China.

According to Putin, Ukraine has no tradition of statehood, and has become a mere tool of American and NATO expansionism, thus posing a threat to Russia’s security. In a bizarre speech the day before his troops stormed across the border, Putin even went so far as to claim that Ukraine is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, when the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, Ukraine – home to the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal at the time – surrendered its nuclear weapons to Russia with the active diplomatic support of the “evil” US.

Ukraine did so because it had received “guarantees” of its territorial integrity, as stated in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of December 5, 1994. That document was signed by the guarantor powers: the US, the United Kingdom, and Russia, alongside Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (the latter two relinquished the smaller nuclear arsenals they had inherited from the USSR).

Set against the historical facts, Putin’s statements are nonsense. His primary purpose, clearly, is to give his own population a justification for invading Ukraine.Putin knows that if ordinary Russians were given a choice between a war to dominate Eastern Europe and a better, more prosperous life at home, they would prefer the latter. As so often in Russian history, the country’s people are having their future stolen by their rulers.

Russia’s ascent to global power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries resulted in numerous tragedies not only for the neighbors it subjugated and gradually absorbed, but also for its own people. China’s current leaders, in particular, should be mindful of this history, considering that imperial Russia seized more territory from China than from anyone else.

What Putin does not seem to realize is that Russia’s longstanding policy of dominating foreign peoples in its sphere of influence makes other countries focus on how to escape the Kremlin’s geopolitical prison at the first opportunity, by securing protection from NATO. The alliance’s eastward expansion after 1989 attests to this dynamic. Ukraine wants to join NATO not because NATO intends to attack Russia, but because Russia increasingly demonstrated its intention to attack Ukraine. And now it has.

It is worth remembering that in the 1990s, Russian propaganda accused the West of harboring all manner of evil plans. None of these plots was realized at the time, when Russia was down, because no such Western scheme ever existed. The accusations were fearmongering nonsense.

The Russian imperial project has always been characterized by a mixture of domestic poverty, brutal oppression, florid paranoia, and aspirations of global power. And yet, it has proved to be exceptionally resistant to modernization – not just under the czars and then under Lenin and Stalin, but also under Putin.

Just compare Russia’s economy to China’s. Both are authoritarian systems, yet Chinese per capita incomes have grown robustly while Russian standards of living have been declining. In historical terms, Putin is taking Russia hurtling back toward the nineteenth century, in search of past greatness, whereas China is forging ahead to become the defining superpower of the twenty-first century. While China has achieved unprecedentedly rapid economic and technological modernization, Putin has been pouring Russia’s energy-export revenues into the military, once again cheating the Russian people out of their future.

Ukraine has tried to escape this never-ending cycle of poverty, oppression, and imperial ambition with its increasingly pronounced orientation toward Europe. A well-functioning European-style liberal democracy in Ukraine would jeopardize Putin’s authoritarian rule. The Russian people would ask themselves and their leaders, “Why not us?”

Putin would have no good answer to give them, and he knows it. That is why Russia is in Ukraine today. (P.S.)

 

Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, was a leader of the German Green Party for almost 20 years.

 

A guerrilha dos ucranianos contra os invasores russos - Douglas London (Foreign Affairs)

 Foreign Affairs, Nova York – 25.2.2022

The Coming Ukrainian Insurgency

Russia’s Invasion Could Unleash Forces the Kremlin Can’t Control

Douglas London

 

Russian forces have struck targets across Ukraine and seized key facilities and swaths of territory. The Ukrainian military is no match for this Russian juggernaut. Although some reports suggest Ukrainian troops have rebuffed attacks in certain parts of the country, it seems more likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin will decide just how far Russia goes into Ukraine. As a retired Russian-speaking CIA operations officer, who served in Central Asia and managed agency counterinsurgency operations, I did not think Putin would have attacked Ukraine unless he had already devised a reliable end game, given the costs of an intractable conflict. But Putin’s best laid plans might easily unravel in the face of popular Ukrainian national resistance and an insurgency.

If Russia limits its offensive to the east and south of Ukraine, a sovereign Ukrainian government will not stop fighting. It will enjoy reliable military and economic support from abroad and the backing of a united population. But if Russia pushes on to occupy much of the country and install a Kremlin-appointed puppet regime in Kyiv, a more protracted and thorny conflagration will begin. Putin will face a long, bloody insurgency that could spread across multiple borders, perhaps even reaching into Belarus to challenge Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko, Putin’s stalwart ally. Widening unrest could destabilize other countries in Russia’s orbit, such as Kazakhstan, and even spill into Russia itself. When conflicts begin, unpredictable and unimaginable outcomes can become all too real. Putin may not be prepared for the insurgency—or insurgencies—to come.

 

WINNER’S REMORSE

 

Many a great power has waged war against a weaker one, only to get bogged down as a result of its failure to have a well-considered end game. This lack of foresight has been especially palpable in troubled occupations. It was one thing for the United States to invade Vietnam in 1965, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, likewise for the Soviet Union to enter Afghanistan in 1979; it was an altogether more difficult task to persevere in those countries in the face of stubborn insurgencies.

Russia can likely seize as much of Ukraine’s territory as it chooses. But plans to pacify Ukraine will require far more than the reserve forces Putin has suggested might occupy the territory as “peacekeepers” after initial combat objectives are met. Thanks to Putin’s aggression, anti-Russian fervor and homegrown nationalism have surged in Ukraine. Ukrainians have spent the last eight years planning, training, and equipping themselves for resisting a Russian occupation. Ukraine understands that no U.S. or NATO forces will come to its rescue on the battlefield. Its strategy doesn’t depend on turning back a Russian invasion, but rather in bleeding Moscow so as to make occupation untenable.  

Any future insurgency will benefit from Ukraine’s geography. The country is bordered by four NATO states: Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Belarus, a Russian ally, is itself bordered by Poland on the west and another NATO member Lithuania on the north. These long borders offer the United States and NATO an enduring way to support Ukrainian resistance and a long-term insurgency and to stoke unrest in Belarus should the United States and its allies choose to covertly aid opposition to Lukashenko’s regime.

Moldova, to the southwest of Ukraine, is also an intriguing player. Although nominally neutral (neutrality is written into its constitution), Moldova has cooperated in the past with the United States and NATO; it has a somewhat frigid relationship with Moscow thanks to ongoing tensions over the breakaway republic of Transnistria, a narrow strip of land along the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. Moscow props up this separatist entity, which is garrisoned by Russian troops in the name of “peacekeeping.” Its role in Transnistria is pushing Moldova toward the West. Last November, Maia Sandu, a former Moldovan prime minister, defeated the Russian-backed incumbent president. Moldova is not likely to overtly provoke the Kremlin, but Sandu might be willing to covertly cooperate with Ukraine’s resistance.

As the United States learned in Vietnam and in Afghanistan, an insurgency that has reliable supply lines, ample reserves of fighters, and sanctuary over the border can sustain itself indefinitely, sap an occupying army’s will to fight, and exhaust political support for the occupation at home. Russia would also have to think twice before trying to chase insurgents across the border in Poland, for instance, since such actions could trigger war with NATO.

 

LINES OF SUPPORT

 

The United States will invariably be a major and essential source of backing for a Ukrainian insurgency. During the Obama and Trump administrations, the United States acted with restraint in responding to Russian cyberattacks, disinformation, and military expansionism. Washington did not want to unleash a spiral of escalation it could not control, risking Russian reprisals against U.S. banks, businesses, and infrastructure. The Biden administration, however, has so far been less tentative in its dealings with Russia. To counter Russian moves, it has exposed Russian-associated hackers and recovered funds stolen through cyberattack ransoms, extradited Russian oligarchs to stand trial in the United States, and declassified intelligence on Russian plans in Ukraine to unify support among allies and shape the media narrative.

If a viable, independent Ukraine remains standing, whether ruled from Kyiv or Lviv (the largest city in the western part of the country), the United States and its NATO allies can openly aid in its in defense with weapons, training, and cash. It’s reasonable to deduce that the CIA’s legal charter to partner with foreign intelligence counterparts has allowed it to provide training and materials to its Ukrainian partners for years, just as U.S. military trainers have worked with and supplied their Ukrainian counterparts.

This aid will have to become covert if Russia seizes the government and fully occupies the country. Military support for action against a sovereign country with which the United States is not at war has to be clandestine, much like U.S. support for the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, for Iraq’s Kurds prior to the 2003 invasion, and, less successfully, for rebels in Syria a decade ago. Attacking behind enemy lines would require a presidential covert action finding funded by Congress. Of course, a version of this authorization probably already exists and might at most need modification by the White House as a new Congressional Memorandum of Notification to accommodate the shifting circumstances.

Supporting an insurgency is in the CIA’s DNA. Its forerunner, the Office of Strategic Services, came into its own during World War II through supporting resistance forces in France, the Netherlands, and East Asia. The CIA’s recent experience in both supporting insurgencies and fighting them in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria prepares it well for opposing Russia’s modern, conventional forces. The United States can help Ukrainian insurgents in hitting targets with the greatest military value and psychological impact.

A Yahoo News report in January described a covert CIA training program for elite Ukrainian special operations forces and other intelligence personnel that was launched in 2015 by the Obama administration following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. According to the report, the effort included the deployment of CIA paramilitary officers to Ukraine. Such programs mature over time as trust grows between the trainers and their foreign counterparts and as the recipients teach what they have learned to others.

U.S. and Ukrainian officials have long planned for this day. In all likelihood, a covert program to help organize the resistance to Russia already has communications infrastructure, intelligence collection capabilities, and operational plans in place. And the tactics developed to support defensive operations against an invader can transition to those aimed at hobbling an occupying force.

 

FORCES UNLEASHED

 

An anti-Russian insurgency will no doubt face obstacles and endure setbacks. Putin is aware of the possibility of Ukrainian resistance to a wider Russian occupation. U.S. officials have alleged that the Russian government maintains lists of Ukrainian political and security officials it would arrest—or even assassinate—once it has seized the country and those of pro-Kremlin figures it would hope to install. Russia would seek to undermine any insurgency by moving expeditiously to eliminate likely leaders and enablers of the resistance.    

An insurgency against Russian forces in Ukraine will take time to gather steam and achieve its goals. Resistance movements can take years—not months—to mature, organize, and achieve a meaningful offensive tempo. Even as an American, I could have easily walked the streets or dined in the cafes of Kabul in 2002 and Baghdad in 2003 without a care in the world. But a year or two later, I had to wear body armor and be accompanied by a protective security detail that ferried me around in heavily armored vehicles hoping to avoid ambushes and improvised explosive device strikes.

Ukrainian insurgents will have to reckon with advances in modern technology that make their work more difficult. During World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, organized bands of partisans could disperse to the countryside or to the hills. Escaping the reach of occupying forces is harder now thanks to drones, satellites, and thermal imagery. Insurgents will undertake cross-border raids but sustained military operations further behind enemy lines will require help from those living in such areas—people leading ostensibly normal lives who secretly have access to weapons and secure communications and can thereby evade Russian detection. The Russians will label the attacks of these operatives as acts of terrorism while people in the West will applaud them as the deeds of freedom fighters.

Early on, it is likely the Russians will uncover many rings of insurgents, quickly unmasking the insurgency’s initial leaders after years of Russian intelligence collection. But insurgencies adapt swiftly—far faster than the large, structured armies they are fighting—and new leaders emerge molded by their adverse early experiences. Their agility becomes an enormous advantage.

Russia would hope to either limit its incursion to parts of Ukraine whose populations might be more inclined to accept Russian rule or act with such lightning speed so as to seize and pacify the country before a viable resistance can find its legs. But Russia’s military advantages over Ukrainian forces will diminish as the enemy it fights changes from an organized army to a decentralized and mobile resistance. Occupation forces will be subject to harassing attacks designed to both inflict casualties and undermine military discipline. An influence campaign replete with horrific images of carnage—of both civilian Ukrainian and Russian military deaths—will aim to sow antiwar sentiment in Russia and counter Moscow’s narrative that their forces were welcomed as liberators by grateful locals.

Putin’s motivations in starting this war of choice remain the subject of great debate. They may become clearer in the coming days and weeks as Russia continues its offensive. But if his aims are maximalist—redrawing borders or even toppling the current government—an insurgency is inevitable. For both Putin and his enemies, it will be hard to control the forces that have now been unleashed. 

 

DOUGLAS LONDON was a Senior Operations Officer in the CIA Clandestine Service for over 34 years, assigned to the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and Central Eurasia. He is the author of The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence.

 

Putin, não luta contra a OTAN ou contra a Ucrânia; ele luta contra a DEMOCRACIA - Jérôme Fenoglio, directeur du "Monde"

 Le Monde, Paris – 25.2.2022

Guerre en Ukraine : la double dérive de Vladimir Poutine

L’intervention de l’armée russe en Ukraine, jeudi 24 février, est la conséquence du durcissement continu du régime en place à Moscou et de l’obsession de Vladimir Poutine contre l’évolution démocratique des pays voisins, explique Jérôme Fenoglio, directeur du « Monde », dans son éditorial.

Jérôme Fenoglio, directeur du "Monde"

 

 La guerre, frontale, est de retour en Europe. L’offensive déclenchée, à l’aube du 24 février, par les forces russes sur de multiples sites du territoire ukrainien constitue une agression militaire d’une ampleur inédite sur notre continent depuis la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale. Elle est préméditée, soigneusement planifiée et assumée cette fois sans aucun faux-semblant,

Ce ne sont plus des soldats dépourvus d’insignes d’appartenance à une armée, comme en Crimée en 2014, qui sont entrés en action. Le déploiement de force ne se dissimule plus derrière les combattants des deux républiques fantoches du Donbass. La guerre est cette fois assumée dans chacun des mots du chef de l’Etat russe, Vladimir Poutine. Son objectif est limpide : briser l’Ukraine. Et ses menaces envers toute entrave à cette volonté sont également explicites : « Quiconque entend se mettre sur notre chemin ou menacer notre pays et notre peuple doit savoir que la réponse russe sera immédiate et aura des conséquences jamais vues dans votre histoire », a-t-il martelé dans sa brève allocution marquant le déclenchement des opérations – de fait une déclaration de guerre.

Il faut l’écrire aussi clairement qu’il l’assume en paroles : Vladimir Poutine est bien le responsable de ce conflit majeur. Aucune maladresse occidentale, aucune erreur historique, aucun des arguments avancés par le régime russe et ses défenseurs depuis des années ne sauraient justifier l’attaque qui vient de commencer.

 

Evolution clanique

 

Cette volonté d’imposer la loi du plus fort, ce mépris affiché du droit international trouvent en réalité leur origine dans la double dérive de Vladimir Poutine depuis son accession au pouvoir en 2000. La première est la tournure autocratique de plus en plus prononcée qu’a prise son régime, organisé autour de sa personne et de ses obsessions. Au fil des années et des mandats, Poutine a imposé un contrôle absolu sur la société civile. L’assassinat en 2006 de la journaliste d’investigation Anna Politkovskaïa portait déjà la marque de ce système. La tentative d’empoisonnement en août 2020 du critique du régime Alexeï Navalny, aujourd’hui emprisonné, et le harcèlement de ses soutiens, était un autre signe de cette dérive permanente. Début 2022, un humoriste a dû fuir la Russie pour avoir critiqué l’un des oligarques, proche du chef de l’Etat, Evgueni Prigojine, dont les mercenaires, les Wagner, se sont déployés de la Syrie au Mali en passant par la Centrafrique et la Libye, au prix d’exactions jamais assumées par 

Opposants, journalistes et aujourd’hui parlementaires, conseillers : au cours des années, tous les acteurs d’une vie politique tempérée par des règles et des contraintes ont été écartés, de plus en plus brutalement, d’un cercle restreint obnubilé par la défense de ses richesses et de ses privilèges. La seconde dérive découle directement de cette évolution clanique. Depuis sa « révolution orange » de 2004, la démocratie ukrainienne est devenue le repoussoir absolu du Kremlin. Ses évolutions sont vécues comme une menace existentielle. C’est à cette indépendance, de vue, d’esprit, de comportement, que Poutine entend aujourd’hui mettre fin par la force.

C’est donc bien le droit international qui est ici violé. C’est bien l’ordre européen de sécurité issu de la fin de la guerre froide qui est aujourd’hui défié. Que peut faire l’Occident ? Les pays démocratiques paient aujourd’hui la faiblesse de leur réaction aux précédentes violations du droit international par Vladimir Poutine.

Lorsque, sur ordre de M. Poutine, les forces russes ont occupé une partie du territoire géorgien en 2008, cette agression est restée impunie. Lorsque, en 2014, sur ordre de M. Poutine, la Russie a annexé la Crimée puis est intervenue dans le Donbass en appui aux séparatistes prorusses, la riposte européenne et américaine à cette violation flagrante de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité du territoire ukrainien s’est limitée à des sanctions certes inconfortables mais calculées, pour ne pas causer de dégâts majeurs aux économies occidentales.

On le constate aujourd’hui, ces sanctions ont échoué. Elles n’ont pas détourné Vladimir Poutine de son dessein profond, qui est de redessiner la carte de l’Europe en se réappropriant une sphère d’influence. Les démocraties occidentales doivent aujourd’hui prendre acte de cet échec et adopter contre le régime de M. Poutine des mesures beaucoup plus fortes, en assumant le coût qu’elles auront pour leurs propres économies. C’est le prix minimum à payer si l’on veut vraiment faire respecter les principes fondamentaux du droit international.

Ex-Consultora Jurídica do UK Foreign Office expõe as violações da Rússia ao Direito Internacional e à Carta da ONU - Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Chatham House)

  Ukraine: Debunking Russia’s legal justifications

Russia is violating international law in Ukraine using baseless allegations, and states’ responses should be guided accordingly.

Elizabeth Wilmshurst

Chatham House, Londres – 24.2.2022

 

Russia has begun a large-scale military attack on Ukraine, having first declared it recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as separate states. It scarcely needs saying Russia is violating international law – violating the prohibition in the United Nations (UN) Charter on the use of force, violating the obligation to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states, and violating the prohibition on intervention.

But Russia is using the language of the law to defend its actions. In all the recent verbiage of President Vladimir Putin, some attempts at legal arguments can be elicited – but they do not stand up to scrutiny.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with the only two Charter exceptions to this prohibition being self-defence and action mandated by the UN Security Council. In his speech on 23 February, Putin points to two grounds on which Russia relies on self-defence – defence in aid of the two breakaway republics and self-defence in the light of threats against Russia itself.

Putin said ‘the people’s republics of Donbass turned to Russia with a request for help’ and went on to seek to justify his military action under Article 51 of the Charter. But it is only in respect of states that the right of collective self-defence exists – humanitarian intervention on behalf of individuals in a state has not gained a place in international law. And it is only Russia which has recognized the statehood of the two regions.

Putin repeated on 23 February his earlier allegation that the people of the two breakaway republics are being repressed by the Ukraine government, and even that genocide is being committed against them. This baseless allegation is relevant not only to the claim of self-defence on behalf of these regions but also to Russia’s ‘recognition’ of them as separate states.

International law does not give the inhabitants of a part of a state the right to secede from that state. The aspect of self-determination which allows for independence of a ‘people’ applies to peoples in colonies and other overseas territories under the occupation of another state. The other aspect of self-determination is ‘internal’ and comprises the right to freely choose political status and pursue economic, social, and cultural development within the state – as the Minsk accords sought to provide for Donetsk and Luhansk.

There is a somewhat controversial theory in international law that would give a right of secession from a state if the people in question were subject to extreme abuse of human rights and systematic oppression. This is the theory of remedial secession, which some countries, such as Switzerland, used in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in relation to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia – an independence still not recognized by Russia.

But the theory has no support from the international courts and, even if it did, Russia itself has stated previously that a right of remedial secession is ‘limited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the parent State, threatening the very existence of the people in question’(see Russia’s submissions to the ICJ in the Kosovo case, para 88).

The facts do not substantiate Russia’s claims anyway. The law is as stated on behalf of the UN Secretary-General on 21 February – that Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions is a ‘violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’ There are no ‘states’ which can request the use of military force.

 

Is Ukraine a threat against Russia?

 

Putin refers to the ‘further expansion of the infrastructure of the North Atlantic Alliance, the military development of the territories of Ukraine’ as creating an ‘anti-Russia’ comprising a ‘real threat not just to our interests, but to the very existence of our state, its sovereignty’.

Article 51 allows for self-defence ‘if an armed attack occurs’. This has been interpreted by many states to include defence against the threat of an imminent attack – for example, there is no requirement to wait until a nuclear strike has begun. But under no interpretation of ‘imminence’ can the situation in Ukraine constitute a threat to Russia. There have been no threats of force against Russia from Ukraine nor from NATO member states. There is nothing to support a legal justification for Russia’s military attack against Ukraine.

The myth of Ukraine never having had ‘real statehood’ also does not give any legal justification for Russian aggression. The UN is based on the ‘principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Art. 2(1) of the UN Charter). Ukraine retained its membership in the UN at the dissolution of the USSR, having been one of the founding members of the UN as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

 

What are the legal consequences of Russia’s actions?

 

Within the UN, it is the Security Council which has the mandate to uphold international peace and security, and act when there is a threat to the peace. But there will be no help from there with Russia’s status as a permanent member holding a veto.

The UN General Assembly may act instead. Since 2014 it has adopted a series of resolutions (the latest on 9 December 2021) requiring Russia to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Crimea. But the General Assembly does not have the powers of the Security Council, and cannot mandate peacekeepers or the use of force.

In due course there may be the need for inquiries to be launched by the UN Human Rights Commission if there are breaches of human rights law and international humanitarian law, and human rights cases may be brought against Russia at the European Court of Human Rights. But international institutions do not have the necessary powers to stop what is going on right now.

International law gives the right to Ukraine, being attacked, to call for support from other states. And as well as imposing sanctions, states may wish to consider cyber countermeasures. Some of the recent cyber activity against Ukraine has been attributed by the US, UK, and Australia to the Russian Main Intelligence Unit (GRU).

 

On the negative side, international law (specifically, Article 41(2) of the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility which reflects customary international law) imposes obligations on states not to recognize situations resulting from the use of force. This includes the obligation not to recognize the independence of the two breakaway republics.

Putin complains in his 23 February speech about past violations of international law by the West – and his reference to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is telling. But the naked aggression exhibited against Ukraine cannot be justified by any violations of international law in the past.

Russia has presented itself as a defender of international law – in 2016, Russia and China made a joint declaration ‘on the Promotion of International Law’. Russia would do well now to call to mind the reaffirmation in its declaration of ‘the principle that States shall refrain from the threat or use of force in violation of the United Nations Charter’ as well as the statement that ‘sovereign equality is crucial for the stability of international relations’.

 

Elizabeth Wilmshurst CMG was a legal adviser in the United Kingdom diplomatic service between 1974 and 2003. Between 1994 and 1997 she was the Legal Adviser to the UK mission to the United Nations in New York.

She took part in the negotiations for the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Her experience has been in public international law generally, with a particular emphasis on the use of force, international criminal law, the law of the United Nations and its organs, consular and diplomatic law, State and sovereign immunity, international humanitarian law.

 

4 Historical Maps that Explain the USSR - Nick Routley (Visual Capitalist)

4 Historical Maps that Explain the USSR

Visual Capitalist, February 26, 2022

By Nick Routley 

The eyes of the world are now fixed on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The motivations of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, are now the biggest unanswered question of this geopolitical event. One prominent line of thinking is that Putin is looking to reclaim the territory lost after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the Russian leader’s own words appear to support this claim:

Ukraine is not just a neighboring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space. Since time immemorial, the people living in the south-west of what has historically been Russian land have called themselves Russians.

The disintegration of our united country was brought about by the historic, strategic mistakes on the part of Bolshevik and Soviet leaders […] the collapse of the historical Russia known as the USSR is on their conscience.

For anyone born after the 1970s, memories of that era range from hazy to non-existent, so it’s worth answering the question: What was the USSR anyway?

Below, we’ll use historical maps from three specific eras to build context for how the USSR was structured, which modern countries were a part of this sprawling country, and how its history relates to Russia’s present day pushes for territorial expansion. 

Let’s dive in.

The Early Days of the Soviet Union

The USSR was first born in 1922, in the aftermath of the fallen Russian Empire. A civil war between the Bolshevik Red Army and anti-Bolshevik forces across the region ended with the former coming out victorious. This resulted in the unification of a number of republics to form the Soviet Union.

After a number of tumultuous years during the reign of Joseph Stalin, which include a devastating famine which killed millions of people, we arrive at our first snapshot in time: the late 1930s.

For more detail, view the full-sized version of this map

The USSR was set up as a federation of constituent union republics, which were either unitary states, such as Ukraine, or federations, such as Russia.

Below, we can see how this organizational structure was laid out.

For more detail, view the full-sized version of this diagram

While nominally a union of equals, in practice the Soviet Union was dominated by the Russian Republic (RSFSR). This massive republic contained most of the country’s economic and political power, as well as the largest population and landmass. As shown below, its borders weren’t vastly different from the modern day Russian Federation.

For more detail, view the full-sized version of this map

The geopolitical history of the USSR is inexorably bound with territorial disputes with neighboring regions. In the map above, from 1938, we can see that Soviet troops are clashing with Japan on the eastern edge of the country. On the other end, Stalin had annexed half of Poland, the three Baltic States, and portions of Romania, following the pact with Adolf Hitler.

This sequence of events set the stage for World War II.

The Soviet Empire

The USSR achieved victory in WWII, but at a great cost. An estimated 14% of the prewar population perished in the conflict.

By the end of the 1950s though, the Soviet Union was riding high on a string of impressive achievements on the world stage, from launching the first satellite into space to developing missiles that were a credible threat to American cities. As well, the country’s GDP growth was outpacing its Cold War rival.

This map is a snapshot of the USSR just prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1962.

For more detail, view the full-sized version of this map

Above, in orange, we see how much territory the USSR ended up with after the war. This map is especially informative as it lists the populations of the territories at the time. Large portions of Eastern Europe—including more than 22 million people—were rolled behind the iron curtain.

The Waning Days of the USSR

After a prolonged period of stagnation, Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to reform the Soviet political and economic system with perestroika, which literally translates to “reconstruction”. This movement began a slow process of democratization that eventually destabilized Communist control through the late 1980s, hastening the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The map below is a snapshot of the USSR two years prior to its official dissolution in 1991.

For more detail, view the full-sized version of this map

Many of the republics, shown in various colors above, were already seeing independence movements and unrest by this time, and would eventually declare independence one by one.

Here’s a list of the major regions that seceded from the USSR:

USSR Subdivision	Present Day Country	Seceded from the USSR
Estonian SSR	Estonia	8 May 1990
Lithuanian SSR	Lithuania	11 March 1990
Latvian SSR	Latvia	4 May 1990
Azerbaijan SSR	Azerbaijan	30 August 1991
Georgian SSR	Georgia	9 April 1991
Russian SFSR	Russian Federation	12 December 1991
Uzbek SSR	Uzbekistan	31 August 1991
Moldavian SSR	Moldova	27 August 1991
Ukrainian SSR	Ukraine	24 August 1991
Byelorussian SSR	Belarus	10 December 1991
Turkmen SSR	Turkmenistan	27 October 1991
Armenian SSR	Armenia	21 September 1991
Tajik SSR	Tajikistan	9 September 1991
Kazakh SSR	Kazakhstan	16 December 1991
Kirghiz SSR	Kyrgyzstan	31 August 1991

Since these regions seceded with their borders largely intact, a current map of this part of the world doesn’t look too different from the one above.

That said, even as borders remain static, the war in Ukraine demonstrates that power dynamics in this region are still very much in flux.