913) Uma homenagem a um lutador contra o totalitarismo: Alexander Solzhenitsyn

Dois textos em homenagem a um simples escritor, mas um dos mais poderosos do século XX: primeiro Christopher Hitchens, depois o The Economist.

The Man Who Kept On Writing
Alexander Solzhenitsyn lived as if there were such a thing as human dignity.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, Aug. 4, 2008

Every now and then it happens. The state or the system encounters an individual who, bafflingly, maddeningly, absurdly, cannot be broken. Should they manage to survive, such heroes have a good chance of outliving the state or the system that so grossly underestimated them. Examples are rather precious and relatively few, and they include Nelson Mandela refusing an offer to be released from jail (unless and until all other political detainees were also freed) and Alexander Solzhenitsyn having to be deported from his country of birth against his will, even though he had become—and had been before—a prisoner there.

Two words will always be indissolubly connected to the name of Alexander Isayevich: the acronym GULAG (for the initials of the Stalinist system of penitentiary camps that dotted the Soviet landscape like a pattern of hellish islands) and the terse, harsh word Zek, to describe the starved and overworked inhabitants of this archipelago of the new serfdom. In an especially vivid chapter of his anatomy of that ghastly system, Solzhenitsyn parodied Marxist-Leninist theories of self-determination to argue that the Zeks were indeed a nation unto themselves. In his electrifying first book, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, he did in a way delineate the borders and customs of an undiscovered country with a doomed and unknown citizenry. He became an anthropologist of the totalitarian in a way not understood since David Rousset's L'Univers Concentrationnaire. If you are interested in historical irony, you might care to notice that any one chapter of Ivan Denisovich, published in Novy Mir during the Khrushchev de-Stalinization, easily surpassed in its impact any number of books and tracts that had taken "Socialist Realism" as their watchword. The whole point about "realism"—real realism—is that it needs no identifying prefix. Solzhenitsyn's work demonstrates this for all time.

To have fought his way into Hitler's East Prussia as a proud Red Army soldier in the harshest war on record, to have been arrested and incarcerated for a chance indiscretion, to have served a full sentence of servitude and been released on the very day that Stalin died, and then to have developed cancer and known the whole rigor and misery of a Soviet-era isolation hospital—what could you fear after that? The bullying of Leonid Brezhnev's KGB and the hate campaigns of the hack-ridden Soviet press must have seemed like contemptible fleabites by comparison. But it seems that Solzhenitsyn did have a worry or a dread, not that he himself would be harmed but that none of his work would ever see print. Nonetheless—and this is the point to which I call your attention—he kept on writing. The Communist Party's goons could have torn it up or confiscated or burned it—as they did sometimes—but he continued putting it down on paper and keeping a bottom drawer filled for posterity. This is a kind of fortitude for which we do not have any facile name. The simplest way of phrasing it is to say that Solzhenitsyn lived "as if." Barely deigning to notice the sniggering, pick-nose bullies who followed him and harassed him, he carried on "as if" he were a free citizen, "as if" he had the right to study his own country's history, "as if" there were such a thing as human dignity.

And, once he succeeded in getting The Gulag Archipelago into print, even in pirate editions overseas, it became obvious that something terminal had happened to the edifice of Soviet power.

Of course, one cannot have everything. Nelson Mandela has been soft on Daniel arap Moi, Fidel Castro, Muammar Qaddafi, and Robert Mugabe, and soft on them even when he doesn't need them anymore as temporary allies in a difficult struggle. When Solzhenitsyn came to the United States, he was turned away from the White House, on Henry Kissinger's advice, by President Gerald Ford. But, rather than denounce this Republican collusion with Brezhnev, he emptied the vials of his wrath over Americans who liked rock music. The ayatollahlike tones of his notorious Harvard lecture (as I called them at the time) turned out not to be misleading. As time went by, he metamorphosed more and more into a classic Russian Orthodox chauvinist, whose work became more wordy and propagandistic and—shall we be polite?—idiosyncratic with every passing year.

His most recent book, Two Hundred Years Together, purported to be a candid examination of the fraught condition of Russian-Jewish relations—a theme that he had found it difficult to repress in some of his earlier work. He denied that this inquiry had anything in common with the ancient Russian-nationalist dislike of the cosmopolitan (and sometimes Bolshevik-inclined) Jew, and one must give him the benefit of any doubt here. However, when taken together with his partisanship for Slobodan Milosevic and the holy Serb cause, his exaltation of the reborn (and newly state-sponsored) Russian Orthodox Church, and his late-blooming admiration of the cold-eyed Vladimir Putin, the resulting mixture of attitudes and prejudices puts one in mind more of Dostoyevsky than of Tolstoy. Having denounced "cruel" NATO behavior in the Balkans, without ever saying one word about the behavior of Russian soldiers in Chechnya, Solzhenitsyn spent some of his final days in wasteful diatribes against those Ukrainian nationalists who were, rightly or wrongly, attempting to have their own Soviet-era horrors classified as "genocide."

Dostoyevsky even at his most chauvinistic was worth a hundred Mikhail Sholokhovs or Maxim Gorkys, and Solzhenitsyn set a new standard for the courage by which a Russian author could confront the permafrost of the Russian system. "A great writer," as he put it in The First Circle, "is, so to speak, a secret government in his country." The echo of Shelley's remark about poets being the "unacknowledged legislators of the world" may or may not be deliberate. But it serves to remind us that writers, however much they may disown the idea, are nonetheless ultimately responsible for the political influence that they do choose to exert. Therein lies the germ of tragedy.


An icon of his age
The Economist,Aug 4th 2008

The death of Alexander Solzhenitsyn gives Russia a chance to reflect on authoritarianism

PROPHETS are without honour in their own country—at least until they die. For most of his adult life in the Soviet Union, Alexander Solzhenitsyn was persecuted. In exile in the West from 1974, his gloomy philippics and increasingly turgid prose aroused more bafflement than appreciation. After he returned to Russia in 1994, he was welcomed but then ignored.

His death is a chance to make amends, although whether a Russia that is increasingly nostalgic for its totalitarian past will chose to take it is another matter. In an online poll (admittedly wildly unscientific) taken in recent weeks, the totalitarian leader Joseph Stalin is a front-runner for the title of greatest Russian. It was criticism of Stalin, expressed privately in a letter to a friend, that landed Mr Solzhenitsyn with an eight-year sentence in the camps. It counted for little that he was a twice-decorated artillery officer, on the front-line of the Red Army's triumph over Nazi Germany.

Having experienced the crimes of Stalinism at first hand, he exposed them in both fiction and factual form. "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich", published in 1962, gave Soviet citizens their first opportunity to read about the brutality, squalor, humiliation and fear of daily life in a prison camp, all told in the matter-of-fact style of a Russian folk tale. "The Gulag Archipelago" described the system, its tortures, rules and subculture, in relentless, gruesome, encyclopedic form. Modern scholars, able to research the subject with a freedom that Mr Solzhenitsyn could never have dreamed of, say it is astonishingly accurate.

His other books are more patchy. Although he detested the ravages of communist rule on Russian language and culture, the clunky techniques of Socialist Realism are all too visible in works such as "The Cancer Ward". His later works are mostly panoramic histories of Russia in the past century that most readers found impenetrable. His latest work, a lengthy series of reflections on Jewish-Russian relations, prompted charges of anti-semitism that he furiously denied.

Mr Solzhenitsyn was a loyal communist in his youth. As a young man, he dreamed of writing a history of the Russian revolution, oblivious to the Stalinist terror going on around him. As a bright, young maths student, he once said he could easily have ended up being recruited by the NKVD, the secret police, to perpetrate terror. Instead he became its most potent critic. His political awakening came from long talks in prison with Arnold Susi, an Estonian lawyer jailed for being a minister in a non-communist government. That friendship survived for many years after both men were released.

As well as the gulag, Mr Solzhenitsyn's titanic willpower triumphed over other adversaries: cancer, censorship and Soviet bureaucratic intimidation. In 1970 he won the Nobel prize for literature, but declined to accept it in person for fear that he would not be allowed to return to the Soviet Union. But by 1974, the Soviet authorities had had enough: he was bundled onto a plane to West Germany, to spend two decades abroad. Those in the West who had championed his cause were disconcerted to find that he saw the capitalist system as little better than communism. He denounced materialism and moral emptiness, and lived in increasing seclusion in a remote corner of New England.

As communism collapsed, his books, once read only in flimsy, blurred carbon copies, could all be published legally inside the Soviet Union. But he detested the man who brought that about: Boris Yeltsin, the first freely-elected leader in Russia's history, spurning his offer of a state decoration. He could not, he said accept honours from a man who had brought misery on his people.

To the consternation of some of his supporters, he did accept an award from the ex-KGB officer who became Mr Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin. He even seemed to downplay Mr Putin's role in the KGB, saying that every country needed an intelligence service. Yet, although he praised the self-respect and stability that Russia had regained under Mr Putin, he remained deeply critical of its politics and the corruption and greed that capitalism had exposed and fuelled.

That message, often delivered in sententious, near messianic tones, had little appeal. A television programme consisting largely of all but unwatchable monologues lingered painfully on the airwaves and then died, unlamented. Few read his books.

But his death is a chance for Russia's rulers to say what they think about totalitarianism. Was the collapse of the Soviet Union the "geopolitical catastrophe" of the last century? Or is the real disaster the failure of an independent Russia to cast off the chains of authoritarianism and empire? If Russia's new president, Dmitry Medvedev, goes beyond simply offering condolences to the Solzhenitsyn family, his thoughts on that would be eagerly awaited.

912) Os democratas nem sempre foram protecionistas...

OPINION
Democrats Once Did Free Trade
By DOUGLAS A. IRWIN and AMITY SHLAES
The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2008; Page A11

The failure of the Doha Round of trade negotiations seven years after its launch does not call for despair. The removal of trade barriers and the reduction of subsidies remain worthwhile objectives, and past experience has shown that difficult multilateral negotiations can be completed. But turning talks into agreements will require leadership that can endure a long, lurching process, without instant success.

Cordell Hull, America's longest serving secretary of state (1933 to 1944), was one such leader. Even today, the Tennessee Democrat should be a model for politicians of all backgrounds.

Hull believed that trade was one of the best ways to prevent a repeat of the carnage of World War I. He wrote: "Though realizing that many other factors were involved, I reasoned that, if we could get a freer flow of trade -- freer in the sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions -- so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another, and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance for lasting peace."

Removing obstacles to trade was not easy. Congress kept tight control over its ability to write the tariff laws that governed imports of thousands of itemized products. The Republicans ruled the 1920s and were committed to protectionism. Britain turned against free trade and adopted discriminatory imperial preferences. Other countries kept wartime controls on trade in place.

Franklin Roosevelt named Hull secretary of state in 1933, but at first lent scant support to Hull's cause. New Dealers, believing that the government should manage trade and not free it, were suspicious of him. But Hull fought a hard battle to get the administration to propose and Congress to enact the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.

This legislation, a forerunner to what we today call Trade Promotion Authority, authorized the executive branch to undertake trade agreements. It also got Congress out of the business of determining tariffs on an item-by-item basis that bred the infamous Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930. After the act, Hull traveled to Latin America and negotiated tariff reductions that strengthened the credibility of America's "Good Neighbor Policy."

Hull's efforts to reduce trade barriers were not a big success in his day. Then, as now, Democrats were divided in their support for freer trade. With Europe heading toward war, the secretary of state's initiatives were too little too late.

Hull understood that trade was a long-term project whose benefits might emerge after he and Roosevelt left the stage. During World War II, he continued to work to foster multilateral cooperation by creating the United Nations as well as promoting trade. He worked himself sick, but Roosevelt so appreciated his drive that he nominated Hull to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, which he won in 1945.

Even after Hull retired, his spirit continued to animate U.S. policy. In 1947, the U.S. and 22 other nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, to finalize the text of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, or GATT. It did not go smoothly. The defiant Republican Congress passed legislation restricting imports of wool. Australia, a major wool exporter, threatened to walk out of the negotiations and bring the British Commonwealth with it, dooming the GATT.

In what Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton called "the greatest act of political courage that I have ever witnessed," President Harry Truman not only vetoed the bill, but snubbed Congress by authorizing a 25% reduction in the wool tariff. Many other stumbling blocks were overcome to conclude the agreement.

According to one recent study, the initial GATT agreements increased the trade of participating countries by nearly 100% relative to nonparticipants in the late 1940s. Nevertheless, the American plans to fold the GATT into a broader agreement under a new body, the International Trade Organization, failed completely by 1950.

Still, there was mounting evidence of the validity of Hull's ideas. Trade fostered postwar economic recovery, which ensured that Western Europe remained our ally. West Germany and Japan began to move from basket cases to economic miracles. We tend to take all this for granted today, but it did not happen by accident.

Those who are frustrated by the pace of the Doha trade negotiations today might take comfort in knowing that the U.S. and its trading partners did not reach a major tariff-reduction agreement until the conclusion of the Kennedy Round in 1967, 20 years after the original Geneva conference. One of those who fought for those advances was Sen. Al Gore (D., Tenn.) a friend of Hull and the father of Vice President Al Gore.

In light of this history, the collapse of the Doha Round should be viewed as a temporary setback. With persistence, the goal of liberalizing world trade can still be reached.

Mr. Irwin, an economics professor at Dartmouth, is co-author of "The Genesis of the GATT," just published by Cambridge University Press. This article is excerpted from "Cordell Hull and the Case for Optimism," a working paper published this week by the Council on Foreign Relations, where Ms. Shlaes is a senior fellow.

============

From the Council of Foreign Relations website:

Trade Liberalization: Cordell Hull and the Case for Optimism
A CGS Working Paper
Author:
Douglas A. Irwin, Robert E. Maxwell ’23 Professor of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Dartmouth College
Council on Foreign Relations Press
July 2008
35 pages

DOWNLOAD THE FULL TEXT OF THE PAPER HERE (178K PDF)

Overview:
The news that the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization has broken down in Geneva has made many Americans pessimistic about the future of multilateral trade agreements. Politicians on both sides view such protracted negotiations as not worth the effort. Still, multilateral trade agreements are indeed worth pursuit. Often, rounds that appear to have failed in the end do succeed—that holds for the Uruguay Round, which preceded the current one. Over the past seventy-five years trade agreements have helped the United States not only on the economic front but also as a tool in foreign policy. Binding Europe within a multilateral framework, for example, helped secure European nations as allies for the duration of the Cold War. In the multilateral discussion, not only governance but also individual people have mattered. The key to advancing the free-trade cause is political leadership of the sort demonstrated by a heroic but near-forgotten figure, the late secretary of state Cordell Hull of Tennessee.

In this Center for Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper, Douglas A. Irwin of Dartmouth makes the case for optimism. He traces Cordell Hull’s path through the decades and shows how Hull’s legacy lights the way for leaders of both political parties.

The Author:
Douglas A. Irwin is the Robert E. Maxwell professor of arts and sciences in the department of economics at Dartmouth College. He is coauthor of The Genesis of the GATT and author of Free Trade Under Fire and Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, and is currently working on a history of U.S. trade policy from colonial days to the present.

911) Observatorio das independências ibero-americanas: 200 anos de historia

O Real Instituto Elcano, da Espanha, dá início a uma série que pode demorar muitos anos, talvez 15 anos, uma vez que se trata de comemorar os 200 anos do início dos processos de independência das colônias ibéricas das Américas.
Abaixo os dois primeiros artigos da série.

Análisis: América Latina

Los riesgos de España frente a los bicentenarios: populismos, nacionalismos e indigenismos
Carlos Malamud
Los Bicentenarios de la independencia son importantes conmemoraciones de carácter nacional y en esta oportunidad tendrán un alto contenido simbólico para la mayor parte de los socios hispanoamericanos de España, dado su carácter fundacional. Se trata, además, de una conmemoración que incumbe a la vez a España y a los países hispanoamericanos como protagonistas de los mismos hechos históricos.

Materiales de interés
Observatorio de los Bicentenarios
A partir de 2008 y a lo largo de más de 15 años, las repúblicas latinoamericanas conmemorarán los bicentenarios de su independencia de las coronas ibéricas. Se trata de unas celebraciones cuyo protagonismo recae fundamentalmente en los países de América Latina, pero a las que España, en virtud de sus tradicionales lazos históricos, culturales y lingüísticos, y dada la importancia de sus relaciones actuales, quiere sumarse. Para ello, piensa asociarse a algunas iniciativas impulsadas desde diversos ámbitos sociales destinadas a acercar más las dos orillas del Atlántico.

El 4 de mayo pasado, el Consejo de Ministros creó la Comisión Nacional para la Conmemoración de los Bicentenarios, encargada de implementar el programa de actividades conmemorativas. Esta Comisión, de la que forma parte el Real Instituto Elcano a través de su presidente, Gustavo Suárez Pertierra, tiene como finalidad la preparación, programación, organización y coordinación de todo tipo de actividades para conmemorar estos acontecimientos, impulsando y coordinando las acciones que se lleven a cabo desde las Administraciones Públicas, así como desde otras privadas. Preside la Comisión, en calidad de embajador extraordinario plenipotenciario, el ex presidente del Gobierno Felipe González, figura de gran prestigio en España y América Latina.

Elcano y los Bicentenarios

La actuación del Real Instituto Elcano en relación a los Bicentenarios no se agota en la Comisión Nacional. El Instituto cuenta con un plan de actuación propio a través del cual, y en colaboración con otras instituciones, pretende participar en las celebraciones fomentando –en su calidad de Centro de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégicos–, el diálogo y la reflexión para impulsar el acercamiento de las visiones sobre nuestro pasado común y las relaciones presentes y futuras entre España y América.

Dentro de este plan más amplio de actividades, que incluye conferencias, seminarios y mesas redondas, además de publicaciones monográficas, presentamos este Especial, pensado como un observatorio desde el que mirar, dar a conocer y poner en común las propuestas y debates sobre la temática de los Bicentenarios que vayan surgiendo. Para ello hemos diseñado una sección de fichas–país, con amplia información y análisis de la independencia de los diferentes países así como actos y otras iniciativas públicas de conmemoración. Igualmente, incluimos una sección de noticias, bibliografía y enlaces seleccionados a través de los cuales queremos ofrecer a nuestros lectores toda la información y herramientas de análisis que se vayan produciendo desde ahora y en los próximos años.

Calendario de las independencias
Argentina: 25 de mayo de 1810
(Primer Gobierno Patrio)
9 de Julio de 1816
(Declaración de la Independencia)

Bolivia: 5 de mayo de 1809
(Grito de Independencia en la antigua ciudad de Chuquisaca, hoy Sucre)

Brasil: 7 de septiembre de 1822
(Declarada)

Chile: 18 de septiembre de 1810
(Primera Junta)
12 de febrero de 1818
(Declaración de la Independencia)

Colombia: 20 de julio de 1810
(Declaración)
7 de agosto de 1819
(Definición)

Ecuador: 10 de agosto de 1809
24 de mayo de 1822
(Batalla de Pichincha)

Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: 15 de septiembre de 1821
1 de julio de 1823
(El Congreso Centroamericano declara la independencia de España, México y de cualquier otra nación)

México: 16 de septiembre
(Grito de independencia)
27 de septiembre de 1821
(Declaración de la Independencia)

Paraguay: 14 de mayo de 1811
(Alzamiento militar)
3 de octubre de 1813
(celebración del Congreso)

Perú: 28 de julio de 1821
9 de diciembre de 1824
(consolidada – Batalla de Ayacucho)

Uruguay: 25 de agosto de 1825
28 de agosto de 1828
(reconocida – Convención Preliminar de Paz)

Venezuela: 5 de julio de 1811
(Firma del Acta de Declaración de Independencia)

910) Off topic: pausa para uma boa causa, a do direito dos cidadãos a conhecer a vida pregressa (e a ficha corrida) dos seus candidatos...

Secao direitos do cidadao:
votar em quem merece ser votado.

Tentei acessar há pouco a página da Associação dos Magistrados Brasileiros, que traz a lista de candidatos envolvidos em algum tipo de processo:
neste link.

Deu isto: HTTP/1.1 Server Too Busy
Ou a lista é muito longa, ou tem muita gente interessada em ver. Talvez os proprios, interessados em que ela nao seja vista...
Opçoes abertas para apostas...

Parece que um conhecido político paulista, prefeito, governador, prefeito e governador novamente, candidato a presidente contra Tancredo Neves na última eleição presidencial indireta do regime militar, lidera a lista dos transgressores, com muitos processos por crimes financeiros e outras falcatruas...

909) I Encontro de Historiadores Sul-Americanos. Rio de Janeiro, 24 de julho de 2008

A Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão e o Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais
convidam para

I Encontro de Historiadores Sul-Americanos
“200 Anos de Independência. Olhar o Futuro numa Perspectiva Sul-Americana”
Rio de Janeiro, Palácio Itamaraty, 24 de Julho de 2008

Programa:
9 horas - Abertura
Embaixador Jeronimo Moscardo, Presidente da Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão
Embaixador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Secretário-Geral do Ministério das Relações Exteriores
Embaixador Carlos Henrique Cardim, Diretor do Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais

9 e 30 às 13 horas - Debate

Debatedores:
Argentina – Professor Doutor Mário Rapoport
Bolívia – nome a confirmar
Brasil – Professor Doutor Amado Cervo (UnB)
Chile – Professor Doutor Luciano Tomassini
Colômbia – nome a confirmar
Equador – Professor Marco Naranjo
Guiana – Professor Doutor Tato C. Mangar
Paraguai – Professor Doutor Juan Carlos Herken Krauer
Peru – Professor Doutor Manuel Burga
Suriname – Professor Doutor Jerome Egger
Uruguai – Professor Doutor Gerardo Caetano
Venezuela – Professor Doutor Jorge Pérez Mancebo

Convidados:
Professor Doutor Gilmar Masiero (UnB)
Professora Doutora Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida (USP)
Professora Doutora Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo (UNESP)
Jornalista Mauro Santayana (JB) – falta confirmar
Professor Doutor Eiiti Sato (UnB)
Professor Doutor Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (UCAM)
Professor Doutor Willians Gonçalves (UERJ)

Encerramento – 13 horas

Local: Palácio Itamaraty Rio de Janeiro
Data: 24 de julho de 2008 às 9 horas
Contato e dúvidas: funag@mre.gov.br ou ipri@mre.gov.br
Telefone de contado: (61) 3411-9124 ou 3411-9115

Download dos Textos Acadêmicos
An Overview of Suriname’s Economy in the 19th and 20th Century - Jerome Egger, Suriname
La História económica del Paraguay: balance de realizaciones y desafios - Juan Carlos Herken Krauer, Paraguai
Una Historia Económica de Venezuela: balance de realizaciones y desafios - Jorge Perez Mancebo, Venezuela
Argentina: Economia y Política Internacional, los procesos históricos - Mário Rapoport Argentina
A História Econômica do Brasil: balanço de realizações e desafios - Amado Luiz Cervo, Brasil
Economia y Sociedad en Chile: un bosquejo histórico - Luciano Tomassini, Chile

908) O Brasil visto pela Stanley Foundation

Brazil and the Changing Global Order
Stanley Foundation
July 2008

Across politics, economics, culture, military strength, and more, a new group of countries have growing influence over the future of the world. And a number of issues vital to US and global security are rapidly evolving due to a changing global order. "Rising Powers: The New Global Reality" takes an in-depth look at the rapidly changing global order and what it means for the United States. This article is a part of a series related to this Stanley Foundation effort.

Brazil is one of nine countries that the Stanley Foundation sees as changing the global scene. With vast natural resources the country has seemingly unending potential to grow and develop. Brazil is already flexing its muscle as a regional leader and a real player in key international venues.

Today, Brazil is one of the fastest growing parts of the global economy, a bio-fuels pioneer on the fast track to energy self-sufficiency, a booming haven for foreign investment, and a test case for a new approach to governance in Latin America. On the other hand, barriers to global leadership for Brazil include a long history of political volatility with only a short tenure of democratic rule coupled with unstable economic growth and high levels of poverty, inequality, and crime.

Still, it is clear that Brazil is already playing an influential role in international affairs, and it has a place among major global players if it can overcome its obstacles to growth and keep itself on a path toward stable development.

The foundation has produced a one-hour public radio documentary about Brazil titled "Brazil Rising." The full audio and transcript are available here. And our Rising Powers special Web feature has even more about Brazil including video, interviews, and suggested articles from around the world.

Please send us your thoughts about Brazil, the changing global order, and the materials offered in our Rising Powers effort. Comments may be reprinted on the Web, in this newsletter, and in related materials.

Radio Documentary
Brazil Rising (Now Available)
Produced by the Stanley Foundation with KQED Public Radio and KUT Austin

But a new Brazil is emerging on the world stage. Brazil today is one of the fastest growing players in the global economy, a bio-fuels pioneer on the fast track to energy self-sufficiency, a booming haven for foreign investment, and a test case for a new approach to governance in Latin America.

Can Brazil successfully chart a new path that overcomes the country’s grinding poverty and its tide of violent crime, while still preserving the country’s unique environment?

Will the new Brazil continue as a strategic partner for the United States or could it become a formidable competitor? How will the rest of the world accommodate Brazil’s seemingly unstoppable growth?

In “Brazil Rising,” released in June 2008, veteran public radio journalist David Brown takes listeners on a personal journey across the country, exploring Brazil’s view of itself, its neighbors, and the world.

“Brazil Rising”—produced by Simon Marks, Kristin McHugh, and Keith Porter —is a Stanley Foundation production in association with KQED Public Radio and KUT Austin.

The full program is available as a MP3 file here. A complete transcript is available here.

For radio stations, the full program along with promotional materials are now available on PRX.

More information about Brazil's role in the shifting global order is here.

907) Forcas navais: capacidade de projecao de poder externo

Um excelente artigo do historiador da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, publicado originalmente no blog Mundorama Net, neste link.

Os porta-aviões e o domínio dos mares: estratégia naval contemporânea
João Fábio Bertonha
16 Jul 2008

Até a Segunda Guerra Mundial, uma grande potência naval se media pelo número e a qualidade dos seus encouraçados. Assim, todas as grandes Marinhas, como a francesa ou a dos Estados Unidos, procuravam reunir o maior número possível desses navios e de suas unidades de apoio, como cruzadores e destróieres. Do mesmo modo, países que procuravam ascender ao domínio dos mares não podiam se furtar a adquiri-los. Foi este o caso da Alemanha pré-1914, que se lançou numa verdadeira corrida com a Inglaterra pela posse da maior frota de encouraçados, e mesmo o de Brasil, Argentina e Chile, que tiveram sua própria corrida naval, em escala menor, no início do século XX.
No decorrer da Segunda Grande Guerra, contudo, a capacidade dos aviões embarcados em porta-aviões de eliminarem, com bombas e torpedos, as grandes frotas de encouraçados, cruzadores e navios menores mudou de vez o cenário da guerra naval. Nos ataques britânicos à frota italiana em Taranto, em 1940, ou no bombardeio japonês em Pearl Harbour, em 1941, esta capacidade ficou evidente e a batalha de Midway, em 1942 - a primeira grande batalha naval na qual as duas frotas não viram uma a outra - é simbólica da transição entre um mundo dominado por encouraçados para outro onde o domínio dos mares se centra na posse de porta-aviões, o que não se modificou até os dias atuais.
O que se alterou, com certeza, foi a capacidade destes navios de combate, cada vez maiores, com mais aviões e armas, e os custos e capacidade industrial e logística para a sua construção e manutenção. Se, na Segunda Guerra Mundial, era possível construir um porta-aviões leve a partir do casco de um navio mercante, essa possibilidade é muito menor atualmente.
De qualquer modo, a simples verificação de uma listagem dos porta-aviões construídos, em atividade e planejados, disponível em sites como Wikipédia e outros, é um excelente canal para verificarmos as pretensões navais e estratégicas da maioria das potências do planeta e a evolução dessas pretensões no passado, no presente e no futuro.
Em primeiro lugar, temos os países que tiveram algum tipo de contato com porta-aviões, mas que acabaram por abdicar da sua posse. É o caso da Alemanha ou do Japão, cujas experiências com porta-aviões foram suspensas pós-1945 ou de países como Argentina, Canadá e Holanda, que não operam mais porta-aviões há alguns anos.
Temos aqui claramente, no primeiro caso, um reflexo da derrota na Segunda Guerra Mundial, que levou Japão e Alemanha a abdicarem de um papel mais ativo no cenário mundial, e, no segundo, a incapacidade de certos países para dar conta das imensas despesas necessárias para a manutenção de uma força embarcada e/ou a decisão de concentrar os recursos navais em outras missões. No caso argentino, a decisão de não substituir o seu antigo porta-aviões por outro, em 1999, foi quase uma admissão de derrota na tradicional corrida naval com o Brasil.
Temos também o caso de um país que começou a construir, ainda que em caráter embrionário, uma força de porta-aviões que ambicionava disputar o domínio dos mares com o Ocidente, mas cuja decadência econômica e implosão política levou o projeto a um final melancólico: a União Soviética. Ela começou a experimentar com porta-aviões e porta-helicópteros de menor capacidade nos anos 70 e estava caminhando para construir modelos mais poderosos quando da ruína do Estado.
Hoje, a sua herdeira, a Rússia, tem apenas um navio deste tipo. É um barco - o Almirante Kuznetsov - muito superior aos projetos soviéticos anteriores, mas, ainda assim, tem capacidade limitada de projeção de poder. Se, nos anos 70 e 80, a URSS imaginou contestar o domínio ocidental nos mares, a Rússia, hoje, não tem mais esta pretensão, o que se reflete na renúncia, ao menos por agora, a uma grande força aeronaval.
Certas potências emergentes, até por desejarem uma maior participação nos assuntos mundiais e saberem da importância de alguma capacidade de projeção de poder nos oceanos para dar sustentação a esta, já estão experimentando, há algum tempo, com porta-aviões. É o caso de Brasil, Índia e China.
No caso brasileiro, a compra de um porta-aviões, nos anos 50, foi mais uma questão de política interna do que outra coisa. A decisão, contudo, de substituí-lo por um mais moderno, em 2000, talvez reflita as crescentes aspirações internacionais do país. É claro que a compra do atual São Paulo também atendeu a interesses corporativos da Marinha. Também está claro que a capacidade de projeção de poder que o Brasil dispõe com seu porta-aviões - que tem antigos caças A-4; eletrônica, em geral, ultrapassada e pouca, ou nenhuma, capacidade de ação longe das costas brasileiras - é, com certeza, mínima ou nula. Mas o simples fato de o Brasil ser um dos poucos países a dispor de uma aviação embarcada - e o único na América Latina - talvez indique algum desejo de maior projeção internacional.
No caso indiano, sua Marinha opera antigos porta-aviões desde os anos 60 e ela adquiriu um modelo ex-soviético em 1997. Mais importante, contudo, é que ela encomendou duas unidades da classe Vikrant, de quase 40 mil toneladas, para entrada em serviço nos próximos anos. Aqui, parece evidente o esforço de dotar o país de capacidade real de projeção de poder, ao menos no oceano Índico.
A China ainda não está construindo uma força real de porta-aviões, até porque isto, provavelmente, geraria imensa desconfiança por parte dos Estados Unidos, o que não interessa a Pequim no momento. Mas o fato de eles terem adquirido cascos de antigos porta-aviões soviéticos da Rússia e da Ucrânia para desmonte e estudo (depois de que se tornaram, curiosamente, atrações turísticas) indica que eles sabem que suas pretensões de grande potência demandarão, no futuro, uma marinha oceânica e que esta só será viável com uma forte aviação embarcada, pelo que eles parecem estar interessados em acumular know-how sobre o assunto.
Antigas potências européias também parecem estar procurando alternativas para recuperar alguma capacidade de projeção oceânica, mas tentando dar conta das realidades financeiras e econômicas. Itália e Espanha, por exemplo, após experiências com porta-aviões leves, normalmente com aviões de decolagem vertical e helicópteros, estão agora construindo navios um pouco maiores e com maior capacidade. A Austrália também parece retomar este caminho. Estes países não têm os recursos para construírem grandes porta-aviões, mas o fato de procurarem adquirir unidades um pouco maiores é um reconhecimento de que elas são necessárias para as ambições internacionais de seus países.
Ninguém parece ter entendido melhor esta lição, contudo, do que França e Inglaterra. A França, sempre desejosa de garantir o seu espaço no cenário internacional, tem operado com porta-aviões convencionais desde 1945 e, em 2001, com o Charles de Gaulle, passou a contar com o maior porta-aviões convencional que não pertence à Marinha dos EUA. Ainda que seja um barco pequeno perto dos gigantes americanos, é imenso frente aos pequenos porta-aviões dos outros países da Europa, num sinal claro das ambições da França no terreno naval.
Outro país europeu que reconheceu que a posse de pequenos porta-aviões com meia dúzia de aeronaves de decolagem vertical pode ser útil em alguns casos (como quando da Guerra das Malvinas), mas que é insuficiente para sustentar uma real política de projeção de poder foi a Inglaterra. País com tradição naval conhecida e que operou uma forte aviação embarcada por todo o século XX, o governo inglês havia optado, nas últimas décadas, por renunciar aos porta-aviões convencionais em favor dos menores e mais baratos. Hoje, contudo, o governo inglês planeja a construção de duas unidades dos gigantes da classe Queen Elisabeth, que, quando em serviço, voltarão a dar à Royal Navy uma real capacidade oceânica.
A grande senhora dos oceanos, contudo, é ainda a Marinha dos Estados Unidos. Com seus doze super porta-aviões, quase todos da classe Nimitz, e seus grupos de batalha, sua capacidade de controle dos oceanos é insuperável. O mesmo número de navios de desembarque anfíbio e controle de área marítima, das classes Wasp e Tarawa, com mais ou menos o mesmo tamanho e a mesma combinação de aeronaves de decolagem vertical e helicópteros dos novos porta-aviões leves europeus, garante ainda maior capacidade de projeção de poder.
Com a construção de mais um porta-aviões da classe Nimitz e outro da classe Wasp e a projetada entrada em serviço da classe Gerald Ford (ainda maior e mais poderosa), a Marinha dos EUA procura garantir o controle dos oceanos ainda por muitas décadas no futuro. Dada a imensa superioridade dos seus porta-aviões e de sua Marinha em geral sobre todos os outros, parece provável que os esforços americanos serão bem sucedidos. Se os EUA continuarão a ser o centro do sistema internacional nos anos a seguir, é ponto em aberto, mas seu controle dos oceanos é um excelente ativo a favor desta pretensão.

João Fábio Bertonha é Professor da Universidade Estadual de Maringá - UEM (fabiobertonha@hotmail.com).