Venezuela: more chavismo without Chavez - Foreign Affairs

More Chavismo than Chávez

Letter From Caracas

By Boris Muñoz

Foreign Affairs, December 7, 2013

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro greets supporters during a meeting outside Miraflores Palace in Caracas, November 12, 2013. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins / Courtesy Reuters)

Throughout the fall, things looked bad for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. His popularity was tanking; most Venezuelans blamed his government for the economic crisis that had been plaguing the country since the end of 2012. In just one year, inflation had soared from 20 percent to more than 50 percent, and shortages of electricity, food, and other essentials had become a part of everyday life. Efforts to control pandemic criminal violence hadn’t yielded significant results, either. The majority of Venezuelans believed that their country was headed in the wrong direction. One could be forgiven for thinking that the Maduro administration was set to lose the upcoming December 8 local elections -- and big time.
Then, at the beginning of November, Maduro launched an aggressive campaign to fix his image problems. He proclaimed an “economic war” against private businesses. He forced them to slash prices on their merchandise and urged the public to “empty the shelves.” Long lines of consumers have done exactly that, draining stores of electronics and appliances, clothing, and even toys. To be sure, Maduro’s campaign addressed the real needs of those looking to buy plasma TVs at rock-bottom prices, and it helped him take control of one of Venezuela’s biggest electronics importers. But he is gambling that his plan will be enough to convince the public that he is capable of steadying his country’s tumbling economy and protecting the interests of the disenfranchised.
The long-term effects of Maduro’s populist strategy are yet to be seen. But the war on private businesses seems to have paid off in the short term. According to the latest polls, Maduro likely has the momentum he needs to win this weekend’s elections and give Chavismo a much-needed boost of energy.
AFTER CHÁVEZ

To be sure, Maduro’s campaign addressed the real needs of those looking to buy plasma TVs at rock-bottom prices.

Maduro is used to cutting it close. In 2012, a dying President Hugo Chávez bequeathed on Maduro a solid electoral majority, a party with an immense political propaganda machine, and the virulent rhetoric of Chavismo. To Chávez, Maduro was an obvious successor. He had been Chávez’s closest aid and had spent more time with Chávez than any other member of the inner circle during Chávez’s long treatments for cancer in Havana. But none of that came with charisma or strategic vision. In elections held just weeks after Chávez’s Pharaonic funeral, Maduro won merely 50.61 percent of the vote. 
Once in office, Maduro tried to undo the damage done by his tepid victory. His initial objective was to demobilize the opposition. He tried to do so in two ways: first, by convincing any would-be protesters that they would be targeted and that their leaders would bear the costs (including through imprisonment) and, second, by persuading civil and military Chavista elites that he wouldn’t tolerate any threats to the system that keeps them in power. After that, Maduro has attempted to strengthen his control of almost every facet of life in Venezuela.
In April, just a few days after Maduro’s election, his government authorized the purchase of Globovisión, a small news station that was one of the opposition’s last media bastions, by a group of businessmen linked to the so-called boli-bourgeoisie, the economic class that has flourished under the protection of Chavismo. Since then, the opposition has virtually disappeared from TV screens. A march of thousands in Caracas two weeks ago, for example, went unreported. In 2013, there have been more than 160 reported attacks on journalists and media personnel. Most of the cases have been directly or indirectly linked to the government. And so Maduro has managed to manufacture an appearance of consent around his official version of reality.
In early September, Venezuela officially withdrew from the Human Rights Convention of the Organization of American States, thus preventing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from addressing any violations in Venezuela. Chávez had announced the country’s retirement from the body in June 2012 after the court issued a ruling in favor of Raul Diaz, a Venezuelan whom the regime had accused of bombing the Caracas-based Embassy of Spain and Consulate of Colombia in 2003. The court found that Venezuela had treated him inhumanely while he was in prison.
At the end of last September, Maduro decreed the creation of the Strategic Center for the Defense of the Homeland (CESPPA), an intelligence and counterintelligence organization that is supposed to “foresee and neutralize potential threats to [Venezuela’s] vital interests.” CESPPA’s mission is to censor information and events that may be considered a threat to the country’s security. Opposition representatives have denounced the agency as an instrument for spying on them.
And finally, last month, Maduro asked Venezuela’s National Assembly to award him special powers to govern by decree. One of his first executive orders was to turn Chávez’s Plan de la Patria (Homeland Plan) into law. The plan, which Chávez first presented during his electoral campaign of 2012, is a road map for the construction of the socialist state. It aims to further the country’s independence and develop Venezuela as a regional superpower but also to preserve life on earth and save the human race. Maduro’s new law includes the creation of a system for training, organizing, and mobilizing the population to defend the homeland during a state of emergency.
For all his attempts to take power, however, Maduro’s grasp on Venezuela is still shaky. The reason is primarily economic. In February, as acting president, Maduro ordered a currency devaluation to try to put the brakes on the rising price of the dollar on the black market. Instead, its value shot up to ten times the official rate. Since then, Maduro’s inability to manage Venezuela’s economy has become even more apparent. According to the country’s central bank, international reserves are at their lowest since 2003, in the months after some pro-business elites and military officials attempted to push Chávez out of power and before a boom in oil prices allowed Chávez to create and finance a number of social programs to win mass appeal.
Chávez might have been able to get away with economic incompetence. Thanks to the oil bonanza, he could always dip into state coffers to ensure public support. (In fact, he dipped into those coffers so often that he set the stage for today’s economic crisis.) Maduro can proclaim that he is the son of Chávez, but he has nothing to pay the public to get it to believe him. This year, Venezuelans have faced soaring prices and a scarcity of basic goods, such as sugar, milk, coffee, toilet paper, and medicine. Trips from one supermarket to the next in search of those products have given Venezuelans lots of time to think about Maduro’s economics.
SEIZING MOMENTUM
The opposition takes for granted that Chavistas will win most municipalities in this weekend’s elections. It nevertheless hopes to at least double its number of mayors and increase its vote share. A month ago, it had a good chance of doing so. But Maduro’s radicalism and war on prices have changed things. Luis Vicente León, president of Datanálisis, one of the most reliable polling firms, says that recent economic measures have helped Maduro’s image as leader and have motivated Chavista voters to go to the polls. (Both blocs expect low turnout, so their ability to mobilize voters will be the key factor in the result.) Time is of the essence, though. The public was more excited about the bargains before the stores were emptied of most of their goods.

Maduro can proclaim that he is the son of Chávez, but he has nothing to pay the public to get it to believe him.

The stakes in this election are high. After Maduro’s power grabs, there are no counterweights left to the executive branch. If Chavismo wins the day on November 8, Maduro’s government will be even more empowered to continue down its radical path. But that is not the only way the upcoming vote could end. If the opposition achieves its aims and wins a large share of the total vote and a significant number of the municipalities, it would deal a major blow to Maduro. The opposition could then try to use its momentum to oust Maduro from power in a presidential referendum at the end of 2015.
Because the opposition fears a harsh crackdown and because Chavismo is still popular in much of the country, the Venezuelan political dynamic is unlikely to change overnight. For Maduro, stability depends on a Chavista success this Sunday. If he doesn’t get one, the opposition will rise -- from the public and from the factious civil and military groups within Maduro’s party. And if that happens, Venezuelans’ long struggle for democracy could end with a military resolution.

Livro: O Jurista que Calculava - Gustavo Ribeiro, Ivo Gico (orgs.)

O JURISTA QUE CALCULAVA
Autor(es): Gustavo Ferreira Ribeiro, Ivo T. Gico Jr. (orgs.)
ISBN: 978-85-8042-831-5
Editora: EDITORA CRV
Número de páginas: 208
Ano de Edição: 2013

Sinopse

“Quem é o Jurista que calculava? E por que ele faz isto? Sabemos que ele estudou Direito, domina a doutrina jurídica e entende bem o funcionamento da Lei e das instituições do Judiciário. Mas por que calcular? Ou seja, por que complicar as coisas adicionando a este arcabouço, já tão tradicional e estabelecido, o instrumental da teoria microeconômica? Talvez seja por que ele percebeu que as leis criadas e administradas pelos juristas necessariamente geram custos monetários ou não (preços implícitos) para toda espécie de comportamento de indivíduos e grupos na sociedade. Estes preços implícitos influenciam de maneira crucial os incentivos e restrições que os agentes enfrentam no dia a dia. Como o objeto da Economia é exatamente a análise de como indivíduos reagem a incentivos, faz sentido unir as duas abordagens. De fato, os onze capítulos deste livro, O Jurista que Calculava, são evidência de que há um enorme valor adicionado em se combinar elementos das ciências jurídicas e das ciências econômicas, chegando à abordagem conhecida como Direito e Economia (Law and Economics) ou alternativamente Análise Econômica do Direito.”

Prof. Dr. Bernardo Mueller. Universidade de Brasília (UnB). Departamento de Economia

 Sumário e Prefácio neste link: http://www.editoracrv.com.br/?f=produto_detalhes&pid=3983

Economia brasileira: o mundo da fantasia dos governantes - Editoral Estadao

Dilma e os fatos da vida

12 de dezembro de 2013 | 2h 09

Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo

Fatos da vida podem ser chocantes, mas, com algum cuidado, alguém deveria contar à presidente da República a verdade sobre a meta da inflação: ela é 4,5%, nunca foi alcançada no atual governo e dificilmente será nos próximos dois anos. Sendo uma pessoa forte, a presidente poderia assimilar o choque rapidamente e em seguida repassar a informação a seu ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega. Ambos continuam falando - e isso ocorreu ontem, de novo, no Encontro Nacional da Indústria - como se o alvo oficial fosse qualquer número até 6,5%, limite superior da escandalosa margem de tolerância adotada no País. Os dois apresentaram aos empresários, ao Brasil e ao mundo, como de costume, um país cor-de-rosa, com inflação controlada, contas públicas em ordem, economia saudável e puxada por investimentos e indústria fortalecida por um eficaz programa de desonerações.

Se esse país brilha menos do que poderia, é só por causa da crise internacional e da escassez do crédito ao consumo, as "duas pernas mancas" da economia brasileira, segundo o ministro Mantega. O ministro e sua chefe insistem no esforço de atribuir os problemas brasileiros principalmente a causas externas, como o baixo crescimento do mercado global e a alta de preços das commodities agrícolas, consequência de uma seca nos Estados Unidos. Mas as cotações agrícolas já se acomodaram e o nível geral de preços no País continua a subir. Outros países emergentes têm crescido bem mais que o Brasil, apesar da crise externa, mas o ministro continua discursando como se essa diferença inexistisse.

Além de cor-de-rosa, esse mundo é muito estranho. A produção teria avançado mais, se o crédito ao consumo tivesse crescido, nos últimos meses, tanto quanto vinha crescendo? Acreditar nessa tese é insistir em viver no mundo da fantasia. Em outubro a produção industrial foi 0,6% maior que em setembro, mas a expansão ainda ficou em 1,6% no ano e em 1% em 12 meses. Não há como atribuir esses números a uma desaceleração do consumo. Da mesma forma, é preciso buscar em outros fatores a explicação dos maus resultados da indústria no comércio exterior. A questão relevante é: por que a produção industrial brasileira perde espaço dentro e fora do País?

A resposta é conhecida até em Brasília, mas, segundo a presidente e seus ministros, tudo está sendo feito para elevar a produtividade e melhorar o desempenho do setor. De alguma forma, apesar do discurso tortuoso, a necessidade de mais investimentos é reconhecida pelas autoridades. A presidente mencionou aos industriais o programa de ampliação e modernização da infraestrutura, além da oferta de recursos para o investimento empresarial. Mas deixou de mencionar o enorme atraso na implementação do plano de logística, os erros de concepção das licitações e os fracassos na tentativa de elevar a taxa de investimentos.

No ano passado o País investiu 4% menos que em 2011. O aumento esperado para este ano será, na melhor hipótese, pouco mais que suficiente para neutralizar a queda de 2012. O total investido continuará, quase certamente, inferior a 20% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB), uma proporção pífia. Nem as estatais, subordinadas à autoridade presidencial, cumprem seu papel. Até outubro, o Grupo Eletrobrás desembolsou apenas 43% do previsto para o ano. Em conjunto, as estatais investiram 75% dos R$ 111 bilhões programados. Desde 2006, a média, em dez meses, era de 82,3% da meta do ano.

Confortável em seu mundo de fantasia, o governo tem errado e continua errando em seu diagnóstico dos problemas econômicos. Insiste em estimular o consumo quando os entraves estão do lado da oferta interna. Reconhece um tanto obscuramente a necessidade de mais investimento para mais produtividade, mas é incapaz de apontar um rumo aos empresários e de oferecer segurança aos investidores. No ano passado os juros foram baixos, pelos padrões históricos, mas o investimento caiu. Impossível, para quem tem alguma percepção, desconhecer a inflação elevada, a piora das contas públicas e a maquiagem como instrumento de política. Nenhum discurso cor-de-rosa anula esses dados.

Brasil: o pior desempenho economico do G20 em dados da OCDE

PIB do G-20 cresce 0,9% no terceiro trimestre; Brasil tem o pior desempenho

12 de dezembro de 2013 | 10h28

Gustavo Santos Ferreira

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A produção de bens e serviços (PIB) do grupo das 19 economias mais poderosas do mundo mais a Rússia (G-20) avançou 0,9% no terceiro trimestre em relação ao anterior – calcula aOrganização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE). No segundo trimestre, a variação havia sido positiva em 0,8%.

A China foi a economia que mais cresceu no período: 2,2%. A Índia, em segundo lugar, avançou 1,9%. A indonésia, na sequência, teve expansão de 1,3% no intervalo.

No Brasil, dono da rabeira da lista, o PIB foi negativo em 0,5% no terceiro trimestre - como divulgado recentemente pelo IBGE.

Veja no gráfico abaixo como evoluíram as economias do G-20 que já tiveram o PIB do terceiro trimestre calculado.

Venezuela: governos paralelos oficialistas para punir vitorias daoposicao

Existem inumeros paralelos entre a Venezuela atual e a ascensão do nazismo na Alemanha de 1933.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Maduro nomeia aliados para “governos paralelos” em cidades da oposição 

Em atitude autoritária, presidente da Venezuela escolhe justamente os candidatos derrotados nas eleições municipais para controlar algumas regiões

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Presidente venezuelano Nicolás Maduro comparece a um centro de votação em Caracas durante as eleições municipais - Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters

O venezuelano Nicolás Maduro está aperfeiçoando os métodos de seu antecessor Hugo Chávez para trapacear resultados eleitorais. Depois da divulgação dos primeiros resultados das eleições municipais que renderam algumas importantes vitórias da oposição em grandes centros da Venezuela, Maduro começou a nomear partidários para governos “paralelos” em cidades onde a oposição saiu vitoriosa. Os escolhidos para os cargos são justamente os candidatos do governo que foram rejeitados pelos eleitores no último domingo. 

Os casos começaram o ocorrer na Grande Caracas, onde o opositor Antonio Ledezma foi reeleito, e em Sucre, na região metropolitana da capital, onde Carlos Ocariz também conquistou um novo mandato. Em Caracas, Maduro nomeou como prefeito “paralelo” o jornalista e ex-ministro de Comunicação e Informação Ernesto Villegas. Já em Sucre, nomeou para o chamado cargo de “Protetor de Petare” (nome de um bairro da cidade) o ex-jogador de beisebol profissional Antonio Álvarez, conhecido como El Potro, informou o jornal espanhol El País.

Chávez já havia usado tal expediente em 2008. À época, furioso com a vitória anterior de Ledezma para a prefeitura de Caracas, ele ordenou mudanças na divisão do país e despojou o novo prefeito de seus poderes, retirando seu orçamento e criando um cargo de chefe de governo da região metropolitana, apontado pelo presidente. Foi para esse cargo que Maduro resolveu agora indicar Villegas.

Os governos paralelos também existem no âmbito estadual. O próprio chefe da oposição, Henrique Capriles, foi vítima desse tipo de manobra durante seu mandato como governador de Miranda, quando chavistas nomearam um de seus adversários para comandar uma estrutura paralela. Na prática, esses governos acabam concentrando os repasses de recursos federais e as atividades normalmente reservadas aos prefeitos, esvaziando o poder dos oposicionistas e funcionando como uma punição para o eleitorado. No caso de Caracas, Ledezma chegou a ser expulso do prédio da prefeitura, que acabou sendo cedido para um órgão federal. 

Segundo o El País, Maduro considera a ideia de nomear prefeitos paralelos também para outras cidades conquistadas pela oposição, como Maracaibo. E mesmo os prefeitos oposicionistas que conseguirem manter seus poderes, o presidente anuncia um futuro difícil. Maduro já avisou que só vai colaborar com aqueles que trabalharem para a aplicação do Plano da Pátria 2013-2019, o programa de governo que pretende acelerar a construção do bolivarianismo na Venezuela. 

Resultado - A contagem final dos votos nas eleições municipais ainda não foi divulgada, mas os números preliminares indicam que a oposição conseguiu conquistar cidades importantes, aumentando o número de municípios em seu poder em até 30%. Entretanto, eles não atingiram o objetivo de conquistar mais votos que os chavistas - considerando a contagem total de municípios. Tal vitória poderia significar um impulso para uma tentativa de referendo revogatório do mandato de Maduro a partir de 2015. 

Já para os chavistas, o resultado acabou servindo de teste para a legitimidade de Maduro, que conquistou a Presidência com uma margem apertada em abril deste ano. Embora não tenha conseguido uma margem tão confortável como nos tempos de Chávez, o governo conquistou mais de 200 municípios entre os 335 da Venezuela.

Venezuela: a herança maldita de Chávez 

Hugo Chávez chegou ao poder na Venezuela em fevereiro de 1999 e, ao longo de catorze anos, criou gigantescos desequilíbrios econômicos, acabou com a independência das instituições e deixou um legado problemático para seu sucessor, Nicolás Maduro. Confira:

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PDVSA em ruínas

O petróleo, extraído quase inteiramente pela PDVSA, a Petrobras da Venezuela, é responsável por 50% das receitas do governo venezuelano. Além do prejuízo de uma economia não diversificada, Chávez demitiu em 2003 40% dos funcionários da companhia após uma greve geral e os substituiu por aliados. A partir daí, as metas de investimento não foram cumpridas e a produção estagnou.

O plano de investimentos da PDVSA divulgado em 2007 previa a produção de 6 milhões de barris por dia este ano, mas entrega menos da metade. A exploração de petróleo caiu de 3,2 milhões de barris diários (em 1998) para 2,4 milhões (dado de 2012). O caudilho foi beneficiado, no entanto, pelo aumento do preço do produto e usou a fortuna para financiar programas assistencialistas e comprar aliados na América Latina. 

O presidente Nicolás Maduro deu continuidade às 'misiones', como são conhecidos os programas assistencialistas. O desafio será mantê-los e ainda investir na petrolífera e aumentar a produção. 

Leia também:
Maduro usa até vídeo natalino para impor redução de preço
Novo plano de governo ameaça criar Constituição paralela 
Maduro estreia superpoderes com leis contra crise econômica

Edward Snowden, a thinker? You are kidding... - Foreign Policy prize

Edward Snowden não é seguramente um pensador, embora ele tenha tido um papel útil ao alertar as sociedades sobre os exageros do Estado orwelliano.

A segurança só é considerada importante quando ela nos falta, justamente, como sempre recordaremos por causa do Onze de Setembro, de Madrid, Londres, Buenos Aires e tantos outros lugares que já sofreram ataques terroristas.

Nesse sentido, Snowden pode ter pensado errado, embora movido por outras preocupações também legítimas.

Mas, e se como resultado de suas ações, atentados não puderem ser prevenidos pelos constrangimentos que agora, graças a Snowden, serão postos aos serviços de segurança?

Os que agora o incensam irão censurá-lo?

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Edward Snowden's Statement to FP on His Selection as a Global Thinker

Foreign Policy / by Shane Harris 

/ December 12, 2013

Edward Snowden, who has become the public face of an international debate over surveillance, tops the list of Foreign Policy's Global Thinkers for 2013. The former National Security Agency contractor who disclosed the inner workings of the U.S. intelligence operations has been living in Russia since June and is currently wanted by U.S. law enforcement authorities and faces charges in federal court. In lieu of attending a reception in Washington on Wednesday for this year's Global Thinkers, Snowden sent the following statement:

It's an honor to address you tonight. I apologize for being unable to attend in person, but I've been having a bit of passport trouble. Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras also regrettably could not accept their invitations. As it turns out, revealing matters of "legitimate concern" nowadays puts you on the list for more than "Global Thinker" awards.

2013 has been an important year for civil society. As we look back on the events of the past year and their implications for the state of surveillance within the United States and around the world, I suspect we will remember this year less for the changes in policies that are sure to come, than for changing our minds. In a single year, people from Indonesia to Indianapolis have come to realize that dragnet surveillance is not a mark of progress, but a problem to be solved.

We've learned that we've allowed technological capabilities to dictate policies and practices, rather than ensuring that our laws and values guide our technological capabilities. And take notice: this awareness, and these sentiments, are held most strongly among the young--those with lifetimes of votes ahead of them.

Even those who may not be persuaded that our surveillance technologies have dangerously outpaced democratic controls should agree that in democracies, surveillance of the public must be debated by the public. No official may decide the limit of our rights in secret.

Today we stand at the crossroads of policy, where parliaments and presidents on every continent are grappling with how to bring meaningful oversight to the darkest corners of our national security bureaucracies. The stakes are high. James Madison warned that our freedoms are most likely to be abridged by gradual and silent encroachments by those in power. I bet my life on the idea that together, in the light of day, we can find a better balance.

I'm grateful to Foreign Policy Magazine and the many others helping to expose those encroachments and to end that silence.

Thank you.

Mandela, um cristao - a explicacao de Guy Sorman, para um homem detodas as estacoes...

Comunista, pacifista, tolerante, graças à sua fé cristã, segundo Sorman.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Nelson Mandela, Christian

A little-appreciated factor in his political development

GUY SORMAN
The City Journal, 9 December 2013

Nelson Mandela lived several lives: Communist militant, pacifist prisoner, and charismatic president. He was also the only recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize to receive both the USSR’s International Lenin Peace Prize and the American Presidential Medal of Freedom. What was the thread linking these successive and somewhat contradictory lives? Let me propose a hypothesis that his prison guards would certainly confirm, as would the Afrikaners who negotiated the end of apartheid with him: Mandela’s Christian faith led him from violence to redemption.
Mandela was a Christian, as I learned during a long conversation with him at a 1992 meeting in Durban of the South African Foundation, a business-backed anti-apartheid organization. The aura surrounding him then, felt by all who spoke with Mandela, was more mystical than political. Most South Africans, whatever their skin color, are Christians. The country’s ruling Afrikaners saw themselves as a tribe of Israel in exile. They adhered to an assiduous reading of the Old Testament, and an understanding of Christianity that they spread throughout South Africa. The reconciliation between the African National Congress (ANC) and the apartheid government of F.W. de Klerk (president until 1991) was an act of shared faith between two men who belonged to the same syncretic Christian tradition. The West’s economic blockade contributed to ending apartheid but did not bring Mandela and de Klerk together. It was not only the boycott of South African oranges by European and American consumers that overcame apartheid, but also belief in Christ.
Faith also explains and clarifies the path that led Mandela from Communism to liberal democracy and from violent action to peaceful reconciliation. Recall that in 1962, Mandela was sentenced to life in prison for his role in organizing bombings of police stations—a very real crime. In the years when Mandela played a significant but not leading role in the organization, the ANC was a branch of the Communist International. With Soviet support, the ANC preached violent revolution. Mandela’s incarceration was politically unjust, but it was well-founded legally, as Mandela himself never denied. While in prison, he lost faith in revolution and in Communism. Was this because of the collapse of the USSR, as his adversaries believed at the time? Or was it the result of a personal meditation? The latter seems more likely: Mandela’s prison cell on Robben Island, filled with his books and manuscripts, had something of a monastic spirit.
Christ was not the only prophet who served as inspiration to Mandela in his cell. There was also Gandhi, who, like Mandela, had practiced law in South Africa. In his work in the Indian community of Durban, where he conceived of and applied the principle of nonviolence to overcome white racism, Gandhi acknowledged the direct inspiration of Christ’s Sermon on the Mount. The lesson was not lost on Mandela: non-violence and the force of truth (satyagraha) are more effective than violent confrontation, but only when applied within a society that shares the same Christian and humanist values. As Mandela would, Gandhi appealed to the conscience of whites, both in South Africa and beyond; he won effective recognition by the British as the figurehead of Indian independence before he arrived in India. Similarly, Mandela was “recognized” outside of South Africa as the obvious leader of national liberation, before achieving this status domestically. (Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu, who succeeded in persuading American and British Protestants that the end of apartheid was an ethical imperative, played a key role as well.)
Mandela’s faith made possible not only the reconciliation of blacks and whites under the same national flag, but also—and this is often overlooked in Europe and America—the reconciliation of enemy groups among South Africa’s numerous black factions and communities. In the age of apartheid, hostility between the Xhosas (Mandela’s ethnic group) and the Zulus (ethnic group of the current president, Jacob Zuma), was at least as intense as that between blacks and whites. In those days, the Zulus often sided with whites against the Xhosas, Indians, and other “mixed” minorities. South Africa was then, and remains, an ethnic puzzle.
The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, founded by President Mandela and led by Bishop Tutu, is perhaps the most concrete example of Mandela’s Christian faith. Instead of the vengeance and reprisals that were expected and feared after years of interracial violence, the commission focused on confession and forgiveness. Most of those who admitted misdeeds and even crimes—whether committed in the name of or in opposition to apartheid—received amnesty. Many returned to civil life, exonerated by their admission of guilt.
Few twentieth-century statesmen have improved our world. Even fewer were inspired by religious faith rather than ideology. The European Union’s Christian founders —France’s Robert Schuman, Italy’s Alcide De Gasperi, and Germany’s Konrad Adenauer—prayed together before making decisions. Poland’s Lech Walesa and South Korea’s Kim Dae-Jung, both fervent Catholics and Nobel Peace Prize winners, forgave their Soviet and military oppressors by explicitly referring to their faith. This is the paradox of an age we call secular, but which is in truth haunted by transcendence.

Guy Sorman, a City Journal contributing editor and French public intellectual, is the author of many books, including Economics Does Not Lie. His article was translated by Alexis Cornel.