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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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sexta-feira, 13 de dezembro de 2013

Jesus era um homem branco? - Reza Aslan e seu livro sobre Jesus

WorldViews

Reza Aslan on Jesus’s skin color: ‘Megyn Kelly is right. Her Christ is white’

A mural of Jesus Christ hangs outside a home near the village of Mondesore, in eastern India. (Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images)
A mural of depicting Jesus is displayed outside a home near the village of Mondesore, in eastern India. (By Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images)
Fox News host Megyn Kelly caused some controversy when she declared, on her Wednesday evening show: "Jesus was a white man, too. It's like we have, he's a historical figure. That's a verifiable fact, as is Santa. I just want kids to know that."
Santa comments aside, Kelly's insistence on a white Jesus has offended a number of people, who counter that Jesus's Middle Eastern ethnicity would likely have given him a darker complexion than that of, say, Kelly herself.
But the question of Jesus's ethnicity turns out to be far more complicated than simply identifying his ethnic background. It gets into issues of history, religion and the particular metaphysics of Christianity. I discussed the issue with Reza Aslan, a scholar of religions and author of the recent bestseller "Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth." His answers surprised me. A lightly edited transcript of our conversation follows.
WorldViews: What, as far as we know, did Jesus look like? What do we actually know about him?
Reza Aslan: Well, what we know about him is that he was Galilean. As a Galilean, he would have been what is referred to as a Palestinian Jew. He would look the way that the average Palestinian would look today. So that would mean dark features, hairy, probably a longer nose, black hair. To put it in the simplest way possible, he would've looked like me. [Laughs]
You're very modest.
But I want to make a larger point, which might be interesting to you or may not be interesting. What I just described is Jesus. What Megan Kelly described is the Christ. And they're different people! In other words, the Christ can be whatever you want him to be.
When you go to, for instance, the Church of the Annunciation at Nazareth. They have commissioned Christian communities from all over the world to paint a depiction of Jesus and his mother Mary. They've displayed all those paintings, and when you look at, for instance, the painting from the United States, what you see is a blonde and blue-eyed Jesus.
When you look at the painting from Guatemala, what you see are Jesus and Mary as migrant farm workers. I don't mean they look like migrant farm workers I mean they are migrant farm workers. When you look at the painting from China, Jesus and Mary are Chinese, literally Chinese. When you look at the painting from Thailand, Jesus and Mary are blue, as though they are Hindu gods.
So, it's a much more interesting issue that arises from her statement: Megyn Kelly is right. Her Christ is white.
What is it about Christ, historically or religiously, that leads people to want to convey him in their own images?
That is the entire point of the Christ.
The reason that Christianity spread so rapidly in the first two or three hundred years before the Roman adoption of Christianity is precisely because it was an infinitely malleable idea. As everybody knows, before Roman Orthodoxy, there were a thousand different kinds of Christianity. It could mean whatever you wanted it to mean. And that is precisely why it is now the largest religion in the world, because it has the ability to be whatever a worshipful community wants it to be.
Let me put in in a little bit more of a metaphysical way, but I think it will make more sense. The foundational metaphor for God in Christianity is man. What is God? Christianity tells you God is man, and so man is the metaphor for what God is in Christianity, because God became a man in the form of Jesus. How do you know, how do you define God? Think of the perfect man. God is infinitely good, infinitely caring, infinitely compassionate. God is all the greatest human attributes that you can imagine. That's what God is. It's a sort of a central metaphor.
What that does, however, is that by saying that God is man, God is a man, it allows you to then define what man is. If you're Chinese, then God is a Chinese man. If you're Middle Eastern, then God is a Middle Eastern man. If you're a blond, blue-eyed, white suburbanite woman, then God is a blond, blue-eyed suburbanite.
This is precisely why Christianity is the largest religion in the world. Because that central metaphor allows you to then thoroughly absorb this conception of Jesus as God into whatever your own particular understanding of humanity is.
This is, by the way, why the fastest-growing Protestant movement in the United States is the Prosperity Gospel, this notion that Jesus wants you to be materially wealthy. Which, of course, goes against everything Jesus ever said or did, but is nevertheless enormously successful because, if you are a white, middle-class suburbanite, then so is your Jesus.
But doesn't that risk burying or ignoring the historical Jesus, who had a specific ethnicity, as distinct from the Christ?
They are distinct. I think that might be uncomfortable for some Christians to admit, and it may be weird for people to think about. But the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history are two different characters. And that's okay!
They are two different characters, and that's sort of the principle argument of my book, that Jesus of history was a Jew preaching Judaism to other Jews. That's the Jesus of history.
The Christ of faith can be anything, anything that you want him to be, and has been whatever you want him to be throughout the last 2,000 years of Christian history. He is a rebel against the state, he is the state, he's both of those things.
But it seems like that distinction between the historical Jesus and the metaphysical Christ can create a lot of arguments because people will confuse the one for the other. And they want the historical Jesus to be like the Christ, or to be like their Christ. But he might not be.
Right, exactly. I know they want that, and that's why people like me, who write books like "Zealot," get in trouble. It's precisely because of that notion.
But I think there's this larger sort of fundamental misunderstanding that is at the root of what you're talking about, and that is this: There is a misperception that prophets create religions. Jesus did not create Christianity; his followers created Christianity. Jesus was a Jew preaching Judaism. The prophet Mohammad did not create Islam; his followers created Islam. Prophet Muhammad was reforming the Judeo-Christian traditions of the Arab region. The Buddha did not create Buddhism. The Buddha was a Hindu; he was reforming Hinduism. His followers created Buddhism.
Religions are man-made – literally – man-made institutions that are built long after the death of the prophet for which they are named. So the reason that I, as a scholar, don't have a problem with that differentiation between Jesus and Christ – these are two different things, and you can go back and forth between them – is based precisely on that one fundamental fact. Which is that Jesus didn't create Christianity -- his followers created Christianity. And so, of course, Christ of Christianity is different from the Jesus of history. And that's okay.

Darkness at Noon: Arthur Koestler reenacted in North Korea: o stalinismo como forma de arte política

A Coreia do Norte, um país que conseguiu superar até mesmo as mais aviltadas formas do stalinismo em sua fase mais grandiosa dos delírios totalitários - no imediato pós-Segunda Guerra, quando o Marechal de Ferro Stalin recebia ditirâmbicos elogios de sabujos como Jorge Amado e Pablo Neruda -- consegue fazer coisas que nem o mais distópico dos romancistas conseguiria imaginar.
Vejam o comunicado de imprensa sobre o assassinato do tio do ditador corrente, o terceiro na linha de sucessão desde Kim Il-Sung, aliás seu neto, um roteiro completo para um Ionesco do teatro de absurdos que representa esse pobre país, provavelmente o mais alienado da face da terra. Até Lênin se surpreenderia... mas talvez gostasse...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

An intolerable mockery’: the wild-eyed worldview of North Korean propaganda


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (KNS/AFP/Getty Images)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (KNS/AFP/Getty Images)
The scribes at North Korea's official state news agency have long elevated hyperbole into an art form, but even by their high standards, this week's pronouncement was something special.
Here's a typical sentence from the Korean Central News Agency's 1,000-word release announcing the execution of Jang Song Thaek, the uncle of leader Kim Jong Un: "Despicable human scum Jang, who was worse than a dog, perpetrated thrice-cursed acts of treachery in betrayal of such profound trust and warmest paternal love shown by the party and the leader for him." The report denounced Jang's alleged crimes large and very small, from "counter-revolutionary factional acts" to "half-heartedly clapping."
The phrase "thrice-cursed acts of treachery" turns out to be a common one in official North Korean releases, suggesting the propagandists are driven more by routine procedure and less by passion than we might think.
North Korean state propaganda is well-known for its permanent pose of righteous outrage, its odd proclivity for piling on metaphors and colloquialisms, and for language so wordy and over-the-top it verges on self-parody. But there is a certain internal logic to North Korea's official declarations, a worldview that makes sense from within the country even if it can seem absurd from outside.
"For all the hyperbole in which it is couched, and the histrionics with which it is proclaimed, North Korean propaganda is not nearly as outlandish as the uninitiated think," the scholar B.R. Myers wrote in his groundbreaking 2010 study of the North's propaganda, "The Cleanest Race." Beneath the flowery language, Myers argued, is a state ideology so simple it can be summarized in a single sentence: "The Korean people are too pure blooded, and therefore too virtuous, to survive in this evil world without a great parental leader."
That ideology helps explain the sense of victimhood and grievance that seems to drive so much of the outrage voiced by the KCNA. Consider this line from a release condemning Western sanctions that blocked North Korea from importing Swiss ski lifts:
This is an intolerable mockery of the social system and the people of the DPRK and a serious human rights abuse that politicizes sports and discriminates against the Koreans.
In the state media's view, the North Korean state and people are the ultimate embodiment of good in the world, constantly besieged by forces of evil from within and without. It's a high-stakes drama meant to enlist every citizen, unifying them against their many common enemies and imbuing their lives with a sense of great purpose that just happens to demand absolute loyalty. Defector accounts suggest it is widely taken in earnest.
One of the more confusing habits of North Korean state media, though, may be the profusion of mixed metaphors and colloquialisms in their native-produced English-language editions. See, for example, this line from Pyongyang's "declaration of war," issued in March against the United States:
The important decision made by [Kim Jong Un] is the declaration of a do-or-die battle to provide an epochal occasion for putting an end to the history of the long-standing showdown with the U.S. and opening a new era. It is also a last warning of justice served to the U.S., south Korean group and other anti-reunification hostile forces. The decision reflects the strong will of the army and people of the DPRK to annihilate the enemies.
Native English speakers are, naturally, extremely rare in North Korea. But propagandists often borrow from American media -- repurposing images and music from U.S.-made video games, for example -- suggesting a wide audience for such things in state media offices. Perhaps Pyongyang's non-native speakers feel that colloquialisms lend color and authority their rhetoric -- so they use as many as they can.
But where North Korean media most excel may be the realm of threat and insult. The country's military is far too weak to survive an actual war, but Pyongyang needs to instill a sense of conflict, both to affirm the official ideology of constant threat and to promote a much-desired rally-around-the-flag effect. And no one wages verbal war like KCNA.
"Let Us Cut Off Windpipes of the Lee Myung Bak-led Swarm of Rats," declared one of many headlines threatening South Korea's president from 2008 to earlier this year. Pledging to cut windpipes is something of a North Korean specialty. So is threatening to turn various locales into "seas of fire." This is from just last month, on the anniversary of North Korea's apparently random shelling of a small South Korean community on the island of Yeonpyeong:
If the South recklessly provokes us again, the sea of fire at Yeonpyeong will turn into a sea of fire at the Blue House. ... [President] Park Geun-Hye and her clique must find a painful lesson in the shameful defeat inflicted upon the South.
Even we in the Western media have not gone untouched. In March, a lengthy KCNA release repeatedly condemned the "despicable reptile media" for, in its word, "jabbering."

Economia brasileira: uma declaracao rosea e dois estudos realistas sobre sua situacao - Jose Roberto Afonso

Recebo, do sempre competente economista José Roberto Afonso, esta chamada para três textos importantes sobre a economia brasileira, apenas dois válidos para a leitura atenta; o do governo, como sempre, peca pelo total irrealismo da apresentação.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Economia Brasileira (Tombini)
Audiência Pública - Comissão de Assuntos Econômicos do Senado Federal apresentação feita por Alexandre Tombini (12/2013). "Sinais de recuperação da economia global em 2014; Crescimento da economia brasileira tem se materializado de forma gradual, apesar da retração na margem observada no terceiro trimestre; Interesse dos investidores observado nos leilões de concessão aponta para perspectivas promissoras do investimento nos próximos anos; A consolidação do crescimento depende ainda do fortalecimento da confiança das famílias e dos empresários..."

LEIA MAIS

Endividamento da Petrobras (Barbosa)
O endividamento da Petrobras com o BNDES no período pós-2008 por Paula Barbosa publicado pela FGV/IBRE (11/2013). "A delicada situação econômico-financeira da Petrobras, evidente na forte perda de valor no mercado acionário e na reduzida lucratividade, vem se acentuando nos últimos cinco anos. Este processo decorre, principalmente, da falta de liquidez no auge da crise de 2008/09, de dificuldades na gestão operacional e de projetos, do maior endividamento e das políticas que prejudicam a rentabilidade dos negócios."

LEIA MAIS

Brazilian Exports (Canuto et al.)
Brazilian exports: climbing down a competitiveness cliff by Otaviano Canuto, Matheus Cavallari and José Guilherme Reis published by SSRN (01/2013). "This note examines in detail Brazil's export performance over the past 15 years, focusing not only growth and composition, but also on different performance dimensions, including diversification, sophistication, and firm dynamics. The analysis uses international comparisons to better situate the Brazilian performance, and explores different databases, including firm-level data recently published by the World Bank."

LEIA MAIS

Ucrania: entre o sonho europeu e o pesadelo sovietico - Michael Weiss(Foreign Policy)


Back in the USSR

The Ukraine protests aren’t about the dream of Europe, but the fear of a Belarusian nightmare.

The marriage of nationalism with supranational bureaucracy is a strange sight for most Americans to behold. Who rallies for an idea such as "Europe," much less one embodied by an institution that from these shores seems to function like a giant, overweening Department of Motor Vehicles spanning two dozen countries?
Try finding a cohesive working cultural definition of Europe and see where that gets you. No one's ever spoken seriously of the "great European novel," except maybe Susan Sontag. "Lie back and think of Europe" is a phrase that's probably only ever uttered by right-wing commentators terrified of supposed Muslim demographic trends on the continent. Even the apocryphal commentoften attributed to Henry Kissinger -- "Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?" -- was meant to inspire titters about the prospect of getting nations that used to love to go to war with one another to act as collective decision-makers on matters of foreign policy. 
And yet, Ukraine is now entering its third week of protests in thermometer-shattering cold, and risking a nasty state crackdown, all because President Viktor Yanukovych put the kibosh on an association agreement that would have given Ukraine greater trade opportunities with the European Union. That this is an event both intelligible and singular for a former Soviet satellite that lies on the fault line between East and West was best captured by Timothy Snyder, that great historian of fault-line nations (and fault-line national tragedies), in a short essay in the New York Review of Books: "Would anyone anywhere in the world be willing to take a truncheon in the head for the sake of a trade agreement with the United States?" Implicit in the question is an acknowledgement that for the countries of the former Soviet Union, identity is shaped as much by what one does not aspire to be as by what one does.
Ukrainians, after all, aren't just protesting for an easier flow of goods with Brussels -- they're protesting against the hegemonic protectionism of Moscow, which wants (and may have already forced) Kiev to join its own shabby, shadow syndicate, the Customs Union, in exchange for cut-rate oil and gas and an end to a Kremlin-imposed "customs terror" that has seen Ukrainian imports halted at the Russian border since last summer. Through his stock-in-trade of bribery, blackmail, and threats, President Vladimir Putin has prompted this present state of civic unrest in a neighboring country, which he described as "not really a state" at the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008. Where Putin may fetishize the concept of "sovereignty" when it comes to, say, counteracting U.S. pressure on Syria, he views it as little more than a risible rhetorical flourish when applied to Russia's former colonial possessions. The Orange Revolution, to which the Euromaidan protests are inevitably being compared, terrified him in 2004 because he saw Ukraine's political trajectory as a harbinger for Russia's demise -- all brought on by those conspiratorial democratizers in Langley and Foggy Bottom.
The Putinists certainly have their own insane definition of what Europe means: impotence in 12 year olds, scatological TV programming for tots, CIA agents from aristocratic Swedish families, and a civilizational suicide pact. But they've also got populism on their side in the form of Euroskeptics of all ideological persuasions within the European Union. Far left and far right political parties advocating withdrawals from the E.U. and/or "exits" from the common euro currency, have gained seats in local and parliamentary elections in Britain, France, Holland, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Belgium in the last five years. People in these countries can't fathom why anyone would want to move closer to a project that's tenuously hung together since the 2008 credit crunch and -- as is even now whispered by an ever-growing number of nervous centrists -- might not have been such a hot idea in the first place.
But just tell that to the E.U.'s newest members, the ones that used to be occupied by foreign totalitarian regimes. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the cyber-savvy and Twitter-proficient president of Estonia, is one of the most outspoken proponents of the E.U. (Estonia joined enthusiastically in 2004, then joined the eurozone in 2010, two years after the Lehman Brothers implosion). I asked him why Europe mattered for Tallinn a decade ago. "There was very strong civilizational element of 'return,'" Ilves replied. "Return after 50 years of occupations, deportations, deceit and corruption. We spent, after all, some 800 years in a German Kulturraum. The Hanseatic League, our architecture, Lutheranism, literacy, Kleinbürgerlichkeit [bourgeois mass culture], Rechtsstaat, a.k.a. the rule of law. The Soviets destroyed it all. So the narrative, if you will, was getting back to where we all had been anyway, where the Soviet period was like a Crazy Eddie's commercial in the middle of a Mozart Concerto."
If 2004 is the obvious calendar comparison with events now unfolding in Kiev, 1991 and the unfinished business of post-Soviet consolidation looms large in the Ukrainian imagination, too. "Goodbye, Communist legacy!" is how opposition MP Andriy Shevchenko greeted the toppling of a statue of Lenin on Shevchenko Boulevard this past weekend, an event Prime Minister Mykola Azarov bizarrely compared with the Taliban's razing of the Buddhas of Bamiyan. And it pays to remember that a rejection of Russian imperialism -- and the ironic recognition that Kiev was actually the birthplace of the Russian Empire -- has been the leitmotif of renascent Ukrainian literature for the past 20 years. The curtain raiser was Yuri Andrukhovych's 1993 novel The Moscoviad, whose protagonist, with his unmistakably European name Otto von F., vomits on the streets of Moscow before boozily boarding a train to a newly independent Ukraine. (It's clear that he's not just throwing up cheap Russian hooch but the metaphorical remnants of a crumbling superpower.)
Another celebrated Ukrainian novelist, Oksana Zabuzhko, whose debut fiction, Fieldwork in Ukrainian Sex, managed to filter national identity through the alembic of feminism, told me in no uncertain terms that "the European vector here stands for the irretrievable de-Sovietization of the country. No matter what means Mr. Putin uses to charm Mr. Yanukovych, the message has been immediate and clear: back to the restored 'neo-USSR,' with a Kremlin asset for a president, and the political class ruling in the old Soviet Russian way. That's exactly what Ukrainians won't accept, and what they have revolted against."
While a fear of succumbing to the undertow of neo-USSR designs is part of the story, there are more practical matters also driving the Euromaidan protests. Igor Pomerantsev, a Ukrainian intellectual and radio host, told me that young Ukrainians -- many of whom don't speak Russian but do speak English as a second language -- aren't out in force for some mythical concept of a United States of Europe, nor are they in the dark about the shortcomings of the treaties of Rome, Lisbon, or Maastricht, which have ungirded the E.U. They're out in force because they demand the basic political concomitants of economic integration -- the rights and privileges that people in liberal democracies take for granted. "Closeness with the E.U. gives better chances to get Schengen visas in future, opens future possibilities to study in European colleges, gives a hope to get legal jobs in the West. Most Ukrainians know that citizens of the E.U. have higher living standards, live longer, have better flats and medical treatment," Pomerantsev emailed me. 
Few people will willingly march for dictatorship, African-levels of corruption, higher mortality rates, stagnation, and a foreign policy driven by alliances with mass murderers. (Note this BBC broadcast in which correspondent Steve Rosenberg can't get a single pro-Yanukovych supporter to explain what it is that he or she is demonstrating for.) Nor does any sensible person wish to have his national destiny shaped by foreign extortionists and their domestic handmaids. Yanukovych relies on hired goons, known as titushkas, who rough up people at protests or act as agents provocateurs to make the protests look inherently violent or putschist. Meanwhile, state security services raided the offices of a Ukrainian opposition party headquarters and seized computers. No doubt laying the groundwork for such repression, Putin last week called the demonstrations "pogroms," even as Russia continues to be roiled by anti-migrant riots that live up to letter and spirit of that word. Meanwhile, the Kremlin-owned media churns out the usual nonsense about what's "really" happening next door, as Ukrainians openly mock Russian broadcasters.
Another problem is this: Yanukovych is a crook. According to a stellar investigation by Sergii Leshchenko at OpenDemocracy, the president's private residence, Mezhyhirya, an enormous wooden mansion built by a Finnish company, is estimated to have cost $75 million to $100 million dollars. Yet his official salary for most of his political career never exceeded $2,000 a month. A road built connecting the capital to this Byzantine log cabin was evidently constructed for Yanukovych's personal benefit out of money that originated in Ukraine's exchequer and was slated for use for the Euro 2012 soccer tournament. All of this while Ukraine has remained an economic "basket case."
"You have in Ukraine a country that for 20 years has really suffered a lot from corruption, lack of democratic practice and -- for I think a large portion of the Ukrainian people -- it's not just E.U. living standards that are sought but the boring, regulatory rule of law," said Steven Pifer, the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and now the director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiativeat the Brookings Institution. "The Russians offer nothing to compete with that." 
David Kramer, the president of Freedom House, who advocates Yanukovych's resignation, adds that even democratically elected autocrats reach a point where their choices are no longer driven by considerations of national interest or popular will but by the simple imperative that they cannot abdicate because the system will cannibalize them if they do. "You've stolen too much, you've enriched yourself to such an extraordinary degree that there can't be future transfers of power," Kramer said. He meant not just Yanukovych but also Putin and Belarus's Alexander Lukashenko, another grim holdover from the bad old days and a warning of what post-Soviet Europe can still become.
* * *
Indeed, if Russia can be cast as both the Ghosts of Christmas Past and Future in Ukraine's geopolitical drama, Belarus is the Ghost of Christmas Present. Lying just to the north, right in the middle of Europe, it's the only country on the continent that still employs the death penalty, was a charter member of the Putin's Customs Union, and today represents a tyranny of a more classical design and disposition.
For the last three years, and following a similar democratic ferment in its capital city, Belarus has idled in neo-Soviet authoritarianism as the E.U. has largely given up on trying to cajole or incentivize political and human rights reforms. In December 2010, Belarusians went to the polls to elect their president. Instead, the election was rigged to give Lukashenko -- known by his sobriquet "Europe's last dictator" -- 80 percent of the vote, when independent observers said he'd have otherwise gotten less than 50 percent. Belarusians were furious. As many as 50,000 took to the streets of Minsk to protest. Prior to the election, of course, Russia and the E.U. were enjoined in a similar, albeit quieter, face-off, with the former artificially lowering customs on oil and fixing a below-market price for gas as a douceur for Lukashenko to play by their rules; the latter offering an aid package, more porous borders, and the chance to deepen and widen the E.U.-Belarusian partnership in exchange for a free and fair vote. (This was part of a short-lived "thaw" in relations between Brussels and Minsk.) 
As with Yanukovych in 2013, Lukashenko banked on Russian guarantees in 2010 and went ahead with his plans for self-preservation at any cost. His crackdown was severe. More than 20 journalists were arrested for covering the protests. One of these was Irina Khalip, the local correspondent for the independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta. She and her husband, the presidential candidate Andrei Sannikov, who "officially" came in second in the election and ought to have gone into another round of voting, joined in the demonstrations until pro-Lukashenko provocateurs stormed the government building, thereby inviting a pre-planned police retaliation. Sannikov was forced to the ground and beaten horribly about the head and legs with a metal shield. Khalip tried to escort him to the hospital while also broadcasting a live interview with the Russian radio station Ekho Moskvy, but the car they were in was trapped by a police phalanx. Sannikov was pulled from the vehicle, beaten again, and then arrested. Despite doctors' recommendations in a prison facility where those arrested were initially brought that he be given urgent medical care, he was put into a police car and driven not to any hospital but to a Stalinist prison known as the Amerikanka, which is run by Belarus's secret police, still helpfully known in the 21st century as the KGB. 
Originally sentenced to five years for "inciting mass disorder," he ended up serving 16 months under gulag conditions. "They always handcuffed you even if you were taken to see the warden," Sannikov told me from Warsaw, Poland, where he now occasionally stays. (He was "pardoned" by Lukashenko in 2012, and soon gained political asylum in London.) "They used the so-called 'swallow' method, where they handcuff you behind your back, then raise your arms quite high so that you have to bow. It's extremely painful to walk." Random searches of his cell and person were also forms of physical and psychological torture. "The prison guards would take you down to this basement, to an extremely cold room which was all concrete. They'd tell you to strip off all your clothes and you're standing naked against the wall with your legs widespread. This was especially painful because my leg was badly hurt. But they'd keep you in this position for 20, 30, 40 minutes -- maybe an hour." He was also forced to watch state propaganda television, which consisted of Clockwork Orange-style marathon viewings of images of violence and atrocities, including scenes from Russian wars in Chechnya. 
At one point, the government threatened to take custody of his and Khalip's 3-year-old son, Dania, whom the KGB also threatened to murder if Sannikov didn't sign a false confession. Khalip served three and a half months of house arrest with alternating KGB agents living with her and Dania in their apartment.
Sannikov credits his release to E.U. sanctions imposed on Belarusian officials and companies owned by oligarchs close to Lukashenko. Unfortunately, the pressure was neither sufficient nor lasting to effect any real loosening of the noose around civil society's neck. Conditions for any opposition inside Belarus are still "very poor," Sannikov told me.
Despite a call in the New York Times by Sweden's Carl Bildt, Poland's Radek Sikorski, Germany's Guido Westerwelle, and the Czech Republic's Karel Schwarzenberg -- the first three once again prominent players in the current E.U.-Ukrainian standoff -- that "[t]here can be no business-as-usual between the European Union and Belarus's president" after Lukashenko's barbarism, business-as-usual is what indeed transpired. Certain key enterprises close to Lukashenko, such as those belonging to petroleum magnate Yuri Chizh, were eventually dropped from the sanctions lists. Belarus continued to trade with the E.U., its second biggest partner after Russia, all throughout 2012. Exports amounted to over $17.5 billion; the trade surplus hit a healthy $8 billion. Lukashenko even spent half of 2012 hawking cheaply imported Russian oil products to Europe as normally priced paint thinners and solvents, a self-enrichment racket that Putin himself put an end to in the second half of last year. Not that this has had any measurable long-term benefit on Belarus's dire economy. GDP is now projected to grow by a measly 1 percent in the next year; total exports will shrink by 20 percent.
According to Sannikov, E.U. diplomats made the mistake of falling for vague reassurances by Lukashenko that he was on the mend and would eventually release more political prisoners in exchange for better economic cooperation: oil-for-dissidents, in essence. (A hyperactive lobbying campaign waged by Minsk has also helped turned the spotlight down.) Yet today, there are still a dozen political prisoners -- including one other presidential candidate from 2010 -- languishing in KGB jails, where torture is reputedly standard practice. Journalists, activists, and lawyers are still being arbitrarily rounded up and roughed up by Lukashenko's police. The U.N. Human Rights Committee's complaints about deteriorating conditions have all been thoroughly ignored by Minsk, which also does not recognize the mandate of the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur for Belarus.
* * *
In "The Abduction of Europe," a depressing but insightful essay he wrote for E.U. Observer just before Yanukovych squashed the association agreement and the Euromaidan protests kicked off, Sannikov lamented the absence of tougher U.S.-E.U. guidelines for engaging newborn democracies or pseudo-democracies in the former Soviet sphere. Belarus, he pointed out, was a kind of canary-in-the-mineshaft example of how accommodating thugs fails to change their bad behavior. 
Interestingly, Russia's current opposition leader Alexey Navalny has drawn the same analogy in labeling Lukashenko a tutor to Putin as a destroyer of dissent. "It could be said that Europe created Lukashenko, and Lukashenko created Putin's Russia," Sannikov wrote for E.U. Observer. "The experience of the Belarusian dictatorship shows that after any flare-ups with the West, after putting down peaceful demonstration, putting more political prisoners into jail, someone will come forward in Europe to defend the bankrupt Belarusian regime, and appeasers would be found domestically, who would join efforts to make the EU to revert to the Realpolitik mode." 
Sannikov hopes that Brussels avoids that path with Ukraine's Yanukovych, now apparently eager to compromise with the Euromaiden opposition and establish a "platform of mutual understanding." What this must not lead to is the E.U.'s backing down on first principles, including on the politicized imprisonment of former Orange Revolutionary Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, or Brussels trying to outbid Moscow as most-favored benefactor. Sannikov believes that Brussels should now reach out to the Ukrainian people directly. "Fundamentally it's not about Europe," he said. "It's not about the E.U. It's not about the association agreement. It's not even about power. It's about not wanting to go back to the Soviet Union."

Sistema politico fica um pouco "mais pior" (e com o nosso dinheiro,caro leitor)

O eixo OAB-PT-STF
Reinaldo Azevedo
Folha de S.Paulo, 13/12/2013

Ouvir o texto
OAB, STF e PT resolveram se juntar contra a democracia. O tribunal está prestes a declarar inconstitucional a doação de empresas para campanhas eleitorais, aprovada em 1993, e a restringir a de pessoas físicas. Se acontecer, o primeiro e óbvio efeito será o aumento brutal do caixa dois. O sistema político voltará à clandestinidade da qual havia parcialmente saído há 20 anos e que resultou, por exemplo, no Collorgate. Essa "conspiração dos éticos" de calça curta chega a ser asquerosa. Trata-se de um truque vulgar na América Latina bolivarianizada. Na região, não se dão mais golpes com tanques, mas com leis. Usa-se a democracia para solapá-la. E o Judiciário tem sido peça fundamental da delinquência política.
Se o financiamento não pode ser privado, terá de ser público. O STF, que não foi eleito para legislar, definirá que o Congresso é livre para fazer a escolha única. O "novo constitucionalismo" é só bolivarianismo com sotaque praieiro. Engana trouxas com seu jeitinho beagle de ser. Um rottweiler do estado democrático e de direito logo reage. O PT já havia tentado extinguir as doações privadas. Não deu certo. Agora a OAB, que pede a inconstitucionalidade da atual lei, serve-lhe de instrumento para o golpe togado, no tapetão. O que o partido tem com isso? Explica-se.
Numa argumentação confusa, preconceituosa, Luiz Fux, o relator, vituperou contra a participação do dinheiro privado em eleições. Ele acha que o capitalismo distorce a democracia, cantilena repetida por outros. Falta-lhes bibliografia para constatar que, felizmente, a democracia é que distorceu o capitalismo. Fux sustenta que partidos com mais financiamento privado têm mais votos. Toma o efeito como causa: quem tem mais votos é que tem mais financiamento privado. Sob a lei atual, uma legenda com então seis anos de existência, o PSDB, venceu a eleição presidencial de 1994 e se reelegeu em 1998. Em 2002, perdeu para uma outra, nascida nanica em 1980: o PT. Está em seu terceiro mandato.
A consequência natural do acolhimento da ADI é o financiamento público. Os petistas apresentarão uma emenda popular com esse conteúdo. É operação casada com a OAB. Como distribuir o dinheiro? Ou o critério seria o tamanho da bancada na Câmara ou o número de votos na eleição anterior. O principal beneficiado seria o PT. Uma vantagem presente e transitória seria transformada em ativo permanente.
Sindicatos, movimentos sociais e ONGs já atuam como cabos eleitorais do PT, e a massiva propaganda institucional é mera campanha eleitoral disfarçada. O partido quer agora que a supremacia alcançada ao longo de 20 anos de financiamento privado impeça seus adversários de tentar o mesmo caminho. Eles se tornariam reféns do status alcançado pelo petismo.
Há um aspecto adicional: partidos que têm de se financiar na sociedade obrigam-se a dialogar, a estabelecer pactos, a modular a ação segundo os valores da comunidade que pretendem governar. Se o dinheiro é garantido por um cartório, amplia-se o espaço do seu arbítrio, não o de sua independência.
Fux atribuiu até a ainda pequena presença de mulheres na política ao financiamento privado. Sei. O capital é feio, sujo, malvado e machista. É um caso de falácia lógica, sintetizada na expressão latina "post hoc ergo propter hoc" - ou: "depois disso, logo, por causa disso". Dilma é presidente "apesar do capital" ou "por causa do capital"? Nem uma coisa nem outra. As duas conclusões são estúpidas. De resto, de 1994 a esta data, na vigência do financiamento privado, o número de mulheres na política aumentou. Por causa dele ou apesar dele?
P.S. - "Você já elogiou o STF e agora ataca." Desculpem este modo de ser: quando gosto, digo "sim"; quando não, "não". Parece exótico?
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reinaldo azevedo
Reinaldo Azevedo, jornalista, é colunista da Folha e autor de um blog na revista "Veja". Escreveu, entre outros livros, "Contra o Consenso" (ed. Barracuda), "O País dos Petralhas" (ed. Record) e "Máximas de um País Mínimo" (ed. Record). Escreve às sextas-feiras.

Instituto Hayek Brasil: coisas que pareciam impossiveis alguns anos antes...

Assim como o Ku-Klux-Kan reforçou a mafia e a luta pelos direitos civis nos EUA, com seu racismo criminoso e sua pieguice idiota, o PT está conseguindo algo que julgávamos impossível no Brasil de alguns anos atrás: reforçar o movimento liberal e a recusa do estatismo desenfreado.
Eis aqui:

Instituto Hayek Brasil



Friedrich August von Hayek
Friedrich August von Hayek
O Instituto Hayek Brasil se organiza no formato de uma associação voltada à produção e à disseminação de estudos das áreas das ciências humanas e sociais aplicadas que promovam os princípios de uma sociedade livre e democrática.
Nosso norte político e filosófico está pautado por uma concepção de sociedade liberal conservadora, caracterizada pela defesa de livre mercado, a propriedade privada, a liberdade de expressão e religiosa, o Estado de Direito, a democracia representativa e o Estado mínimo.
Assim, somos defensores das liberdades individuais de forma ampla, sempre com base no respeito às leis e nas limitações naturais que a liberdade individual encontra ao se chocar com a liberdade de terceiros.

Oliver Stuenkel: previsoes para o mundo em 2014

Eu ainda preciso postar aqui as minhas previsões imprevidentes para 2014, algo fantasiosas, mas já tenho aqui algumas mais sérias, do professor de RI da FGV-SP.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

International Politics in 2014: Ten Predictions

2013 DECEMBER 12
by Oliver Stuenkel
Post-Western World, 12/12/2013
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future
 

In 2014, four large democracies in the Global South will organize general elections: Brazil, India, Indonesia and South Africa. During election years, policy makers tend to focus more on internal challenges and less on foreign affairs. Neither outgoing leaders nor recent winners are likely to propose important international initiatives.My guess: Indonesia and India will see leadership transitions. Brazil and South Africa will reelect Dilma Rousseff and Jacob Zuma, respectively.
9. The future of internet governance
After the spying revelations that dominated the global debate during the second half of the year, the future of internet governance will be discussed at several international fora, including the UN, during the coming year. Brazil and Germany have taken a leadership role by drafting a resolution that promotes the right of privacy in the internet, and Brazil will organize a summit in April in São Paulo. Laws that seek to keep data in-country could threaten the cloud system – where data stored by US internet firms is accessible from anywhere in the world. My guess:China and Russia will propose rules to increase government control over the internet, a move that is unlikely to find much support in the rest of the world.
8. Where are the BRICS?
In 2014 the United States will add more to global economic growth than China (at market exchange rates) and Japan will add more than India. Growth in Brazil and South Africa is poised to remain low. In the midst of all the gloom, the BRICS grouping will hold its 6th Summit in Brazil and launch the BRICS Development Bank, marking the most important step towards institutionalization in its young history. Still, most observers will remain skeptical about the grouping's future, particularly now that growth rates are unimpressive. My guess: Intra-BRICS cooperation will continue, though most of it under the radar, ranging from issues such as agriculture, education, public health to voting behavior in international institutions.
7. Will Iran join the international community?
The historic interim agreement concluded in late November between six world powers and Iran is an important step in the right direction. The West will provide  “limited, temporary and reversible” relief from some economic sanctions, and Iran will not only stop its work on nuclear weapons, but revert some of the steps. The political leadership in Tehran accepts a more intrusive inspection regime; this makes the deal very different from the one reached with North Korea in 2005, which the Koreans broke. Reintegrating Iran into the international community would transform politics in the Middle East, making US support for an Israeli attack against Iran unlikely. A deal could possibly help obtain Iranian support to broker a peace deal in Syria. My guess: Guarded optimism is permitted and Iran may see a reduction of its painful isolation from the international community.
6. What's next for Syria?
As the civil war in Syria continues, the United States and Europe have three priorities: a negotiated peace agreement to end the violence; a reduction of Iran’s influence in the region; and the removal of Bashar Assad. My guess: Obtaining all three will be impossible. Since stopping the carnage is most important of all, a peace accord will, if reached at all, most likely involve both the Syrian President and Iran.
5. The Global Protests
After the massive protests that shook Brazil and Turkey, where will they continue in 2014? Particularly countries with a growing yet angry middle class that do not invest enough in education and infrastructure are at risk. Protests against austerity measures (such as Spain), corruption (as in India and China), police violence (U.K.) and oppression (Egypt and Russia, among others) will become ever more frequent as technology allows protesters to organize very quickly, leaving policy makers with little time to prepare. Host countries of big political summits and sporting events face additional risk of widespread protests. My guess: Brace for protests across the world, including Brazil (though not as large as in 2013, since Brazil's World Cup triumph will limit public rage there).
4. Africa's rise
Africa is the last economic frontier of the global economy. It possesses 40 percent of the world's raw materials and 60 percent of its uncultivated arable land. No other continent has developed as rapidly in the last decade as Africa, where real economic growth was between 5% and 10% per year. When the Cold War ended, just three out of 53 African nations had halfway functional democracies. Today, that figure is 25 out of 54. More than 300 million Africans are now part of the middle class, roughly the population of the United States. No important global actor can afford not to build a strong presence in Africa. My guess: As growth in South Africa falters, fast-growing economies such as Angola, Nigeria and Ethiopia will seek to play a stronger role in international affairs. Africa's role in global affairs will increase further.
3. Can Merkel fix Europe?
As the economic crisis lingers on in Europe, all eyes are on Germany. Angela Merkel is demonized across Europe for her determined enforcement of austerity. Critics say Germany is too austere, too insistent on fiscal consolidation even in recession, too prone to put the burden of adjustment on deficit countries, too dominated by lawyers, not economists. She keeps pointing out that Europe has 7% of the world’s population, 25% of its GDP and 50% of its social spending, and that it cannot continue to be so generous. My guess: Germany's chancellor remains overwhelmingly popular at home and is set to remain so next year, so very little indicates that she will change her strategy vis-à-vis the EU.
2. Will China liberalize?
After a promising start, the world will expect Xi Jinping to implement the reforms announced in 2013 and continue his battle against corruption and better public services. Furthermore, the world's largest economy in waiting has to leave Deng's model of cheap labor, capital and focus on export markets behind. Wages are increasing, capital is becoming too expense, and domestic demand will have to pick up in order to keep economic growth as high as it used to be over the past decades. For the first time since the 70s, many argue, playing it safe means undertaking some more substantial economic reforms. The Central bank is expected to formally launch financial liberalizations in the new Shanghai free-trade zone in early 2014, with the hope of soon extending the reforms to other parts of the country if the trial run proves successful. My guess: Despite continuing protests in many parts of the country (against corruption, pollution and censorship), the reforms will succeed and China will grow at 7%.
1. The US is back on track
While long-term predictions about China's rise remain valid, the United States' economic recovery (partly driven by shale gas) is likely to provide policy makers in Washington with additional assertiveness in international affairs. My guess: If history is any guide, Obama will focus more on foreign affairs in his second term and seek to build a global legacy. That may include attempting to follow-up on the Iran deal, adopting a more reasonable Cuba policy and building a stronger presence in China's backyard. In addition, the United States may take important steps towards promoting free trade across the Atlantic and the Pacific, mediate tensions between China and Japan, end the war in Syria, and even try to bring Israel and Palestine to the table.

Papa Francisco: precisa de um bom manual de economia, ou de boas leituras...

Eu poderia recomendar uns dois ou três livros de economia ao papa, para ajudá-lo a reajustar sua visão profundamente equivocada do mundo econômico. Se nenhum conselheiro econômico corrigi-lo, ele vai continuar a falar bobagens; a menos que seja intencional.
Seria bem jesuítico isso...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


Le pape François, le 27 novembre 2013, au Vatican. REUTERS/MAX ROSSI

Le pape dénonce l’abandon d’une « saine économie »

Blog : Digne de foi

Le pape va-t-il une nouvelle fois être traité de " marxiste et de néo-socialiste " par les néo-cons américains ? Après son texte programmatique du 26 novembre, qui lui a valu ses accusations,  et dans lequel François dénonçait " la main invisible du marché " et " la culture du déchet ", le pape renouvelle sa charge contre les méfaits de la crise financière dans son premier message pour la paix, publié jeudi 12 décembre et qui sera lu dans toutes les églises le 1er janvier.
Pour de nouveaux "modes de vie"
Intitulé La fraternité, fondement et route pour la paix, ce texte dénonce " les éthiques contemporaines caractérisées par un individualisme diffus, un égocentrisme et un consumérisme matérialiste, qui affaiblissent les liens sociaux, en alimentant cette mentalité du “ déchet ”, qui pousse au mépris ". "La succession des crises économiques doit nous amener à repenser nos modèles de développement économique et à changer nos modes de vie", exhorte-t-il donc en s'appuyant abondamment sur les textes de ses prédécesseurs et sur la doctrine sociale de l’Eglise, sans rupture sur le fond.
Selon le pape, " ces graves crises financières et économiques qui trouvent leur origine dans l’éloignement progressif de l’homme vis-à-vis de Dieu et la recherche avide des biens matériels " poussent de nombreuses personnes à " rechercher la satisfaction, le bonheur et la sécurité dans la consommation et dans le gain, au-delà de toute logique d’une saine économie ". S’en prenant aux très hauts revenus, il insiste donc sur la nécessité de mettre en œuvre " des politiques qui servent à atténuer une répartition inéquitable excessive du revenu ".
Les biens privés comme biens communs
A l’appui de sa démonstration, qui risque de lui attirer de nouvelles critiques de la part de certains milieux économiques, François livre un rapide rappel de la doctrine sociale de l’Eglise. " Nous ne devons pas oublier l’enseignement de l’Église sur ce qu’on appelle l’hypothèque sociale, sur la base de laquelle, comme le dit saint Thomas d’Aquin, il est permis et même nécessaire " que l’homme ait la propriété des biens " ; quant à l’usage, " il ne doit jamais tenir les choses qu’il possède comme n’appartenant qu’à lui, mais les regarder aussi comme communes, en ce sens qu’elles puissent profiter non seulement à lui mais aussi aux autres " ". 
Dans un long catalogue des maux du monde, que seule " la fraternité " peut résoudre, le pape François, dans la lignée de ses prédécesseurs, s’inquiète des " graves atteintes aux droits humains fondamentaux, surtout au droit à la vie et à la liberté religieuse ", du " tragique phénomène du trafic des êtres humains ", de la " mondialisation de l’indifférence ", du " drame déchirant de la drogue sur laquelle on s’enrichit dans le mépris des lois morales et civiles ", de " la dévastation des ressources naturelles et de la pollution ", de "la tragédie de l’exploitation dans le travail ", des " trafics illicites d’argent comme la spéculation financière ", de " la prostitution qui chaque jour fauche des victimes innocentes ", de " l’abomination du trafic des êtres humains, des délits et abus contre les mineurs, de " l’esclavage ", de " la tragédie souvent pas entendue des migrants sur lesquels on spécule indignement dans l’illégalité ", des " conditions inhumaines de tant de prisons, où le détenu est souvent réduit à un état sous-humain ", de " la persistance honteuse de la faim dans le monde ".
S’appuyant sur la théologie, le pape considère que la " fraternité ", gage de " paix et de justice " s’apprend " au sein de la famille", soulignant au passage "les  rôles responsables et complémentaires de tous ses membres, en particulier du père et de la mère ". Enfin, dans un contexte marqué par divers conflits qui mettent aux prises des groupes religieux à travers le monde, notamment en Centrafrique, le pape réitère la demande traditionnelle du Vatican pour " la non prolifération des armes et du désarmement de la part de tous, en commençant par le désarmement nucléaire et chimique ".
Stéphanie Le Bars

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