V Congresso Latino-Americano de Historia Economica (SP, 19-21/07/2016)

Acabo de receber um convite para participar de uma mesa redonda neste Congresso:

Quinto Congresso Latino-Americano de História Econômica (CLADHE V)

O Quinto Congresso Latino-Americano de História Econômica (CLADHE V) será realizado na cidade de São Paulo, Brasil, entre os dias 19 e 21 de Julho de 2016. As instituições organizadoras são as associações de História Econômica da Argentina, do Brasil, do Chile, do Caribe, da Colômbia, do México, do Peru e do Uruguai, assim como da Espanha e de Portugal, como convidadas. A Associação Brasileira de Pesquisadores em História Econômica – ABPHE – e a Faculdade de Economia, da Universidade de São Paulo – FEA/USP, com sede na cidade de São Paulo, são as instituições anfitriãs.

Seguindo a tradição dos congressos anteriores realizados, desde 2007, o CLADHE V é um espaço acadêmico para debater as recentes pesquisas de história econômica da América Latina, assim como para abordar as perspectivas globais e comparativas com outras regiões. A organização do CLADHE busca incentivar a participação conjunta de pesquisadores dos países latino-americanos e de outras partes do mundo para difundir e discutir seus trabalhos bem como estabelecer agendas de pesquisa comuns. Pesquisadores de História Econômica e áreas afins são convidados a apresentar suas pesquisas.

Os idiomas oficiais do CLADHE V serão o espanhol e o português; entretanto, são bem-vindos também trabalhos em inglês. O congresso será organizado por meio de simpósios, mesas redondas e conferências.

Submissões

CHAMADA PARA APRESENTAÇÃO DE PROPOSTAS DE SIMPÓSIOS (PRORROGAÇÃO)

As propostas de simpósios temáticos serão recebidas até 15 de setembro de 2015 no seguinte endereço eletrônico: cladhe5@gmail.com

Com a finalidade de promover a participação conjunta de pesquisadores de diversos países e regiões do mundo, cada simpósio deverá contar com ao menos (2) coordenadores de nacionalidades distintas (com no máximo três coordenadores).

A proposta de simpósio temático deverá ser encaminhada com os seguintes documentos:

• Resumo com justificativa da proposta do simpósio;
• Curriculum vitae breve dos coordenadores: devem demostrar uma trajetória acadêmica reconhecida relacionada ao tema proposto;
• Lista dos potenciais participantes e possíveis comentaristas, especificando em cada caso a filiação institucional.

As sessões devem contar com a participação de apresentadores de diversos países, com no máximo 50% procedente de um mesmo país e os simpósios deverão conter entre 10 e 18 apresentadores.

A aprovação dos simpósios ficará a cargo do Comitê Organizador Internacional (COI) e será comunicada por meio de email aos coordenadores conforme as datas especificadas. A aprovação deverá ser ratificada com a recepção dos trabalhos completos, atendendo ao número máximo e mínimo previsto. Os prazos devem ser cumpridos para que a publicação dos artigos possa ser realizada na página do evento.

Os coordenadores dos simpósios temáticos serão os responsáveis pela avaliação do conteúdo e da qualidade dos textos, bem como da organização dos simpósios. O Comitê Organizador Local deve receber a lista dos apresentadores e de seus artigos, assim como o cronograma de apresentação do Simpósio para publicação no site e no material do congresso.

Informações

A sede do congresso será a Faculdade de Administração, Economia e Contabilidade da USP (FEA). Faculdade criada em 1946, atualmente oferece os cursos de graduação de Administração de Empresas, Ciências Econômicas, Ciências Contábeis e Atuária, e de pós-graduação em Economia, implantado em 1966, e de Administração e de Ciências Contábeis, ambos fundados em 1970. A FEA fica no campus da Universidade de São Paulo, na Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908, CidadeUniversitária.

Para outras informações: http://www.fea.usp.br/

Cronograma:

Chamada para apresentação de propostas de simpósios: até 15 de setembro de 2015.

2015	01 de Julho 15 de setembro	Período de inscrição de propostas de simpósios temáticos
	15 de Outubro	Divulgação dos simpósios aprovados e abertura de inscrição de resumos
2016	01 de Março	Data limite para submissão de resumos para os coordenadores dos simpósios
	01 de Abril	Divulgação dos resumos aprovados para os simpósios
	15 de Maio	Data limite para envio de artigos completos para os coordenadores dos simpósios Divulgação da programação preliminar do CLADHE V e início das inscrições
	19 de Junho	Limite para pagamento da inscrição com desconto
	19-21 Julho	Realização do CLADHE V

Exchange regimes in the US: book review (EH-Net Diplo)

Published by EH.Net (August 2015)

Michael D. Bordo, Owen F. Humpage and Anna J. Schwartz:
Strained Relations: U.S. Foreign-Exchange Operations and Monetary Policy in the Twentieth Century 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. x + 442 pp. $97.50 (cloth), ISBN: 978-0-226-05148-2.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Hali J. Edison, International Monetary Fund.

This book is clearly destined to become a classic, leaving a mark on future research on foreign-exchange operations. In 1990, Michael Bordo (Rutgers University and NBER) and Anna Schwartz (NBER) began their collaboration to document the evolution of U.S. intervention. Ten years later, Owen Humpage of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland joined the team. Regrettably, in 2012, before the book was finalized Anna Schwartz passed away.

The book explores the evolution of foreign-exchange intervention in the United States in the twentieth century. During this period, the United States transitioned from participating in the international gold standard regime to fixed exchange rates (“dollar standard”) and finally to a regime of floating exchange rates. Policymakers around the world during this period grappled with the choice of exchange rate regime, the role of monetary policy, and international capital mobility — often referred to as the trilemma. The book traces the changes in U.S. institutional arrangements and policymakers’ thinking to the economic and political events drawing extensively from Federal Reserve documents.

Chapter 1 lays out the plan of the book. It starts by describing how attitudes about foreign-exchange intervention and monetary policy evolved over the decades and how this was eventually reflected in theories of intervention and institutional arrangements.

Chapter 2 explains that the model for modern foreign-exchange-market operations can be linked to the operations under the gold standard. The authors argue that the historical evolution of exchange-market operations before 1934 yields important insights into understanding modern-day practices. For instance, the chapter illustrates early uses of secrecy, sterilization, and forward transactions, all of which became important methods of modern intervention.

The creation of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) in the United States is described in Chapter 3. This chapter was written by Anna Schwartz and maintains the same rich details as contained in her 1963 seminal book with Milton Friedman, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. It clarifies the role of the ESF and elaborates on the institutional arrangements. Two key features of the ESF are that it is under exclusive control of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and is self-financing, such that ESF funding is outside of the congressional appropriation process.

After outlining the background of the institutional arrangements, chapters 4 through 6 discuss the evolution of U.S. foreign-exchange operations since the end of World War II. Each of the chapters captures a distinct episode, describing the economic and political developments and the evolution of institutional arrangements. Chapters 5 and 6 also evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. intervention, drawing heavily from the methodology laid out in research conducted by the authors.

Chapter 4 focuses on the Bretton Woods era from 1944 to 1973. During this period countries attempted to maintain par values for their currencies, promote free cross-border financial flows, and achieve domestic macroeconomic objectives such as full employment. Intervention was one of the policy instruments used to achieve these objectives. According to the authors, intervention may have been successful in the sense that it delayed the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system but it did not fix the problem: Current account surplus countries did not want to undermine their domestic macroeconomic objectives to maintain fixed exchange rates.

Chapter 5 covers the foreign-exchange-market operations during the early float period (1973 to 1981). On March 12, 1973, the Bretton Woods era fixed-exchange-rate system ended. During much of the period, policymakers viewed that foreign-exchange markets were subject to bouts of disorder, requiring intervention to direct the exchange rate along a path they viewed consistent with their domestic policy objectives. The chapter describes the evolution of the institutional arrangement, including the Federal Reserve’s swap line with the U.S. Treasury, known as the warehousing facility.

Chapter 6 considers the currency operations and the ongoing debates during the Volcker and Greenspan era (1981 to 1997). Early in the period, between 1981 and 1985, the U.S. adopted a minimalist approach that was spearheaded by the U.S. Treasury. As the dollar strengthened in 1985, the United States assumed an activist approach, intervening frequently. The chapter includes details of the 1983 Jurgensen Report, commissioned by G7 officials to study intervention. In addition, it provides a rich discussion of the 1989-1990 conversation within the Federal Reserve of its involvement in U.S. intervention operations, partly reflecting the report from a staff Task Force on System Foreign Exchange Operations. The United States essentially stopped intervening in the mid-1990s, but has never officially ruled out intervention.

Overall, this book describes the evolution of U.S. policy regarding currency-market interventions, the institutional arrangements, and the interaction of currency-market policy with monetary policy. It documents how U.S. intervention and exchange rate policy changed over time, reflecting a learning process. The work leaves open many interesting doors for more analysis that could and should engage future scholars.

Hali J. Edison (Hedison@imf.org), International Monetary Fund, is author of The Effectiveness of Central-Bank Intervention: A Survey of the Literature after 1982 (Special Papers in International Economics, Princeton University Press).

Copyright (c) 2015 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (August 2015). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://eh.net/book-reviews/

A Grande Estrategia dos EUA - book review

H-Net

Greetings Paulo Almeida,
New items have been posted in H-Diplo.

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Kelanic on Martel, 'Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy'[review]

William C. Martel. Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 530 pp. $38.99 (paper), ISBN 978-1-107-44221-4; $115.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-107-08206-9.
Reviewed by Rosemary A. Kelanic (Williams College)
Published on H-Diplo (August, 2015)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach
In Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy, William C. Martel examines the history of grand strategic thought—both internationally and in the United States—to draw lessons for contemporary US policymakers. Such a review is both timely and necessary, Martel argues, because the United States has failed to formulate a coherent grand strategy since the end of the Cold War, when the strategy of containment expired alongside its primary inspiration, the Soviet Union. In Martel’s view, countries unable to adapt their foreign policies in times of transition inevitably suffer. Thus, the grave stakes of getting grand strategy wrong warrant a comprehensive reevaluation on the level of first principles, a return to the drawing board—not just for US policy but in our overall conception of what grand strategy is, and what it should be.
Martel’s ambitious book fills the blank drawing board with all of the information a person might want to analyze if rebuilding American grand strategy from scratch. Remarkable in breadth and scope, it does this in three parts. First, the book defines the concept of grand strategy and traces its intellectual lineage from Sun Tzu and Thucydides to Henry Kissinger and Bernard Brodie. The goal of the exercise is to provide a general framework applicable to all great powers across time and space. Yet, because Martel rejects universal theories and embraces American exceptionalism, his review of grand strategy in general terms cannot suffice to get him where he wants to go—namely, to offer recommendations for present-day US policymakers. Consequently, the next section of the book takes a second sweep at history, focusing this time on the grand strategies of pivotal American presidents beginning with George Washington and concluding with Barack Obama. This is the heart of the book and perhaps its strongest part. Whereas the first section largely synthesizes from existing approaches, here Martel develops the three principles that, he argues, represent the essence of a specifically “American” grand strategy: a strong nurturance of the domestic foundations of national power, an interest in preserving the status quo international order, and multilateralism in confronting the “sources of disorder” challenging the system. These are the basics to which Martel urges a return in the third and concluding section, where he lays out his recommendations for future grand strategy.
Martel defines grand strategy as “a coherent statement of the state’s highest political ends to be pursued globally over the long term” (p. 32). The means of achieving political ends include not just military forces but all aspects of a state’s capabilities that can be brought to bear for the declared purpose, such as diplomatic, technological, and economic efforts. These nonmilitary means are left vague, unfortunately, and Martel offers no examples or guidelines on how to differentiate them from run-of-the-mill policies. In other words, whereas in the military realm, strategy can be distinguished from operations, tactics, and technology, no ready hierarchy exists to separate, say, a “grand strategic” economic policy from lower-order policies with mundane origins. Nor does Martel construct one. Resultantly, whereas Martel can chide historical figures like Napoleon for the mistake of confusing grand strategy with operations, nearly anything a leader does in the nonmilitary arena can be swept up into grand strategy. The author himself commits this error by arguing in the concluding chapter that infrastructure (“world-class roads, bridges, electric power grids, national broadband, and mass transit systems”) and the social safety net (“education, health care, and retirement systems”) among other things count as grand strategy because they form the domestic foundations of national power (p. 355). These claims resemble campaign-speak more than grand strategy.
Another element absent from the book, aside from a clear rubric to sift grand strategy from the soil of mundane policy, is a discussion of how policymakers should think about uncertainty, chance, and tradeoffs. Leaders operate with incomplete information in an unpredictable world. Martel would not deny that, yet he provides no real discussion of risk or how policymakers might evaluate strategies under uncertainty. Martel also glosses over the problem of making tradeoffs in achieving political objectives. Instead of acknowledging that tradeoffs are an inescapable part of policymaking, he seems to assume that technocratic solutions can allow leaders to have their cake and eat it too. Put together, grand strategic success is achievable—and countries can attain their full range of goals—simply if competing objectives are properly balanced and means finely calibrated. When strategy fails, in the sense that political objectives are not achieved, it is because leaders failed to find the correct balance of policies, not because of unlucky breaks, incomplete information, or a high propensity for risk. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish poorly designed grand strategies from well-designed ones that simply came up unlucky at the craps table.
The best part of Martel’s book is his discussion of American grand strategy since the country’s founding. Here, Martel succinctly lays out the core challenges facing presidents from Washington onward and explains the grand strategies chosen by each. Though he largely synthesizes from secondary sources rather than primary accounts, Martel presents the long and complex history with admirable clarity. Anyone looking for a primer on historical US grand strategy would learn a great deal from this book. Yet the section does more than simply sum up the American experience. It distills from the history what Martel argues are the three common principles underlying US grand strategy across changing times: a strong emphasis on the domestic sources of power, a status quo disposition, and multilateralism in defending the status quo. These three principles are Martel’s most original contribution and they merit consideration and debate by scholars with competing views.
An obvious point for criticism of Martel’s three principles, for which he surprisingly offers no “pre-buttal,” is his characterization of the United States as a status quo power from its founding. Such scholars as John J. Mearsheimer point out that the United States acted quite aggressively to push European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere up through the end of the nineteenth century.[1] Only after the United States achieved regional hegemony by ejecting Spain from the Americas in the 1898 Spanish-American War did it transform into a status quo power. Curiously, Martel writes extensively about Manifest Destiny, or the belief that the United States should annex territory all the way to the Pacific Coast, and the 1846-48 Mexican-American War, which accomplished this vision by wresting New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Nevada, and California from Mexico. He even admits these are cases of expansionism. Yet he classifies them as efforts to “build the domestic foundations of the nation’s power”—sweeping them into the same category as social spending and infrastructure projects (p. 195). These territories were not “domestic” until they were conquered, which means forcibly overturning the status quo. In light of this, it is odd, to say the least, that Martel proceeds to argue that the United States is, at its essence, a status quo power.
In all, while not perfect, Martel’s book provides a magisterial history of grand strategy since ancient times with a particular focus on the nature and origins of American grand strategy today. Commendable in breadth and ambition, it offers students of American statecraft a handy, readable account from which they will learn much.
Note
[1]. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated ed. (New York: Norton, 2014), 238. 
Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=43417
Citation: Rosemary A. Kelanic. Review of Martel, William C., Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. August, 2015.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=43417

Regimes economicos na historia do Brasil: artigo de Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um dos meus artigos de história econômica publicados numa revista da área:

“Mudanças de regime econômico na história do Brasil: transformações estruturais, evolução institucional”

Revista de Economia Política e História Econômica 

(ano 10, n. 34, agosto de 2015, p. 169-225; ISSN: 1807-2674; 

link para a revista: https://sites.google.com/site/rephe01/; 

arquivos em pdf: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2cUT02EXXyLVHRrSDNldTJHTzg/view). 

Relação de Originais n. 2701; Publicados n. 1189. 

Enquanto isso, no reino da diplomacia: "Meia volta, volver..." - Concurso do Rio Branco imita o governo...

Questão sobre corrupção no Brasil é anulada em concurso para diplomata
FLÁVIA FOREQUE
Folha de S. Paulo, 24/08/2015

Alvo de crítica de candidatos, a questão sobre os "altos níveis de corrupção" no Brasil, segundo a visão do governo do Reino Unido, foi anulada em concurso para a carreira de diplomata.
Nesta segunda-feira (24), foi divulgada no "Diário Oficial da União" a lista de candidatos aprovados para a segunda etapa da prova do Instituto Rio Branco. O Cespe, responsável pelo exame, divulgou ainda o gabarito definitivo, após análise de recursos dos concorrentes.
O item sobre a política externa britânica foi motivo de polêmica no início do mês, quando a prova objetiva foi realizada.
A afirmação, retirada do site oficial do Reino Unido para potenciais exportadores, afirmava que o governo daquele país considerava como desafios para realizar negócios os "altos níveis de corrupção" e a "importância das relações pessoais" no Brasil. Para muitos candidatos, o tom fugia do discurso diplomático e do histórico do relacionamento entre os países.

At Bar Harbor, Maine, Regency Hotel, with Carmen Lícia Palazzo.

Precisa descrever?

O Brasil na OCDE: a hora da plenitude - Alberto Pfeifer, Paulo Roberto de Almeida (OESP)

Meu artigo mais recente, sob iniciativa e em colaboração com Alberto Pfeifer, professor no IRel-USP, membro do Gacint:

“O Brasil na OCDE: a hora da plenitude”, com Alberto Pfeifer.

 O Estado de S. Paulo (22/08/2015, p. E2; link: ). 

Relação de Originais (parcial) n. 2854; Publicados n. 1190. 

O Brasil na OCDE: a hora da plenitude

Alberto Pfeifer, membro do Grupo de Análise da Conjuntura Internacional (Gacint) da USP;

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor no Uniceub (Brasília).

O que fazer ante a grave crise brasileira, combinação de recessão econômica e impasse político? Como retomar a confiança dos investidores?  Ante tanta incerteza, existe uma possibilidade virtuosa, com efeitos de curto prazo e a baixo custo, que de modo concomitante: (1) subsidia a validade de manter o grau de investimento, de parte das agências classificadoras de risco; (2) atua como antídoto face à tentação a se lançar mão de medidas econômicas heterodoxas, do tipo nova matriz e pedaladas; (3) alavanca o poder relativo do Brasil no sistema internacional, elevando-o a um padrão de relações e práticas virtuosas; (4) embora com implicações na agenda econômica externa, constitui ato autônomo do Estado brasileiro, ou seja, independe de Mercosul.

Trata-se do ingresso do Brasil como membro pleno da OCDE, a Organização para a Cooperação e o Desenvolvimento Econômico -- regime internacional de adesão voluntária, por convite, que gabarita e certifica os membros ao redor de boas práticas e boas companhias no que tange a políticas públicas e temas afins.

Após uma aproximação nos anos noventa, a postura em relação ao chamado “clube dos ricos” estagnou a partir do governo Lula, quando o fortalecimento econômico consolidou a convicção quanto à nossa capacidade de trilhar caminhos próprios. Cerzimos uma nova geografia do comércio por meio da diplomacia do Sul-Sul, de alianças com outros emergentes, em contraponto ao mundo desenvolvido e suas instituições do pós-guerra -- cuja expressão mais bem-acabada é justamente a OCDE.

Em 3 de junho passado, os ministros Joaquim Levy e Mauro Vieira assinaram um acordo-marco para graduar o relacionamento Brasil/OCDE, por meio da adesão a um maior número de comitês e a aceitação do acompanhamento mais profundo das políticas governamentais. De fato, a OCDE pode ajudar-nos a emergir do emaranhado intervencionista e do descalabro do gasto público. Para isso é preciso saber o que a OCDE pode e o que não pode fazer pelo Brasil.

Ela pode, pela via do exame periódico das ações governamentais dos 34 membros – incluindo o México, o Chile e a Turquia– contribuir para a sua melhoria e assim conferir um “selo de qualidade” relevante no esforço para manter o grau de investimento. Ela pode prestar assessoria em medidas conjunturais de ajuste – através de seu comitê de política fiscal, ao qual o Brasil ainda não aderiu.  Pode ainda mapear o terreno das reformas estruturais, inclusive nas áreas trabalhista, administrativa e educacional, por meio de estudos comparados e simulações.

A OCDE não pode se substituir às autoridades nacionais na determinação do nível e do ritmo de correção e de reformas, nem a necessidade de mudanças legais, inclusive constitucionais. Contudo, além de ter aderido a diversas convenções da OCDE, na prática o Brasil já reconhece o valor de certos padrões de condutas em termos setoriais similar ao de sociedades inseridas plenamente na globalização produtiva -- um claro avanço em relação ao protecionismo mercantil de anos recentes.  Falta apenas oficializar.

Quanto à inserção externa brasileira, juntar-se à OCDE constitui um acréscimo de inclusão sem prejuízo a qualquer vinculação alternativa. Não será exigido abandono dos BRICS ou de outros grupos. O processo OCDE independe do Mercosul ou de qualquer acordo comercial, mas poderia beneficiar a evolução das negociações com a União Europeia. Mais ainda: ao converter-se no único sócio comum da OCDE e dos BRICS, o Brasil credencia-se a atuar como ponte entre dois modos de abordagem da ordem econômica e política internacional, mantendo sua reputada equidistância e reforçando a postura universalista e conciliatória no sistema global: o ingresso na OCDE cumpriria o duplo objetivo de qualificar a projeção de seu lugar no mundo no longo prazo e auxiliar a gradação econômica no curto prazo.

[O Estado de S. Paulo, 22 de agosto de 2015, caderno de Economia, p. E2]

A Grande Corrupcao em graficos dinamicos no Estadao - visualize, e divulgue...

 O jornal O Estado de São Paulo preparou gráficos dinâmicos sobre a Operação Lava Jato.

Quando clicar nos tópicos à esquerda, aguarde alguns segundo para a informação surgir.

No item políticos, coloque o cursor sobre a foto para saber o nome dele.

 

http://infograficos.estadao.com.br/public/politica/operacao-lava-jato/?nucleo=&situacao=&partido=

Die brasilianische Diplomatie: meu livro sobre a diplomacia brasileira em alemao (Akademiker Verlag)

Recebi a capa. Nada de extraordinário, mas acredito que o conteúdo é melhor.

Die brasilianische Diplomatie aus historischer Sicht: Essays über die Auslandsbeziehungen und Außenpolitik Brasiliens 
(Saarbrücken: Akademiker Verlag, 2015, 196 p.; Übersetzung aus dem Portugiesischen ins Deutsche: Ulrich Dressel; ISBN: 978-3-639-86648-3). 

O Sumário, tal qual:

Inhalt

Vorwort                                                                                                                          7

Einführung: Die brasilianische Diplomatie in all ihren Stadien                                  11

1. Die Auslandsbeziehungen Brasiliens aus historischer Sicht                                    15

2. Entscheidungsprozesse in der Geschichte der brasilianischen Außenpolitik           53

3. Eine neue diplomatische Architektur: Änderungen in der Außenpolitik                   73

4. Denken und Handeln der engagierten Diplomatie: eine evolutive Perspektive       91

5. Die brasilianische Diplomatie im 21. Jahrhundert: Saldo und Wertung               111

6. Eine engagierte Auslandspolitik: ihre institutionellen Auswirkungen                    139

7. Die Präferenz für die Option Süd: ein neuer geografischer Determinismus?       173

Allgemeine Literaturhinweise                                                                                     191

The New Yorker: um numero imperdivel, a ler, a descarregar e a guardar...

Eu já recebo o meu exemplar impresso. Mas vou descarregar a edição digital e guardar, depois de ler toda ela. Está imperdível e excelente. Vejam vocês mesmos.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

A selection of stories from The New Yorker's archive. View this message on a Web browser.   Perspectives on War The United States bombed Hiroshima seventy years ago this month, on August 6, 1945. Later that year, John Hersey, a reporter for The New Yorker, travelled to Japan to write about the bombing and its aftermath. When “Hiroshima” was published, a year later, it filled a whole issue of the magazine, and it told the story of the bombing from six different points of view. In that way, it captured something fundamental about war. War seems impersonal, but its burdens are shouldered by individuals. No one sees the whole of it. It’s always, ultimately, a matter of perspective. This week, we’ve assembled a collection of archive pieces called “Perspectives on War.” Many of them, like “Hiroshima,” attempt to come to grips with war’s vastness and violence. “Soldiers’ Stories,” the most recent piece in the collection, is a selection of writings by troops stationed in Iraq. Their writing is full of questions. They want to know what their war means, and how their actions fit into the larger picture. “I wonder often what they think about all of this,” one soldier writes, about a group of children he met in Iraq. Judging from these pieces, those kinds of questions are an inevitable part of war. The work of answering them continues long after the battle is over. —Erin Overbey and Joshua Rothman, Archivists  DISPATCHES FROM IRAQJUNE 12, 2006 SOLDIERS’ STORIES BY VARIOUS AUTHORS  “The worst thing here is not the searing heat or the cold nights. It’s the waiting. Waiting for the wind to quit blowing and the sand to quit grinding against your skin . . . .” ANNALS OF WARJUNE 20, 1988 AN AMERICAN SOLDIER IN VIETNAM I—THE ROOSTER AND THE TIGER BY NEIL SHEEHAN  John Vann had no physical fear. In the course of the decade, he was to acquire a reputation for invulnerability. Time and again, he took risks that killed other men, and he always survived. The odds, he said, did not apply to him. Paid Post Let’s Go! Introducing the new, improved Goings On About Town app. Sponsored by MasterCard®. Download now.

A REPORTER AT LARGEJANUARY 22, 1972 COVERUP—I BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH  The G.I.s mainly kept to themselves what they had done, but there had been other witnesses to the atrocity—American helicopter pilots and Vietnamese civilians. Within four months, many details had been uncovered by Army investigations.

A REPORTER AT LARGEFEBRUARY 16, 1963 EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM BY HANNAH ARENDT  On trial are his deeds, not the sufferings of the Jews, not the German people or mankind, not even anti-Semitism and racism.

A REPORTER AT LARGESEPTEMBER 7, 1946 EXTRAORDINARY EXILE BY REBECCA WEST  Something is happening all over the world; one reads of it constantly in the newspapers, but here in Nuremberg one can feel it. A machine is running down, a great machine, the greatest machine that has ever been created—the war machine, by which mankind, in spite of its infirmity of purpose and its frequent desire for death, has defended its life.

A REPORTER AT LARGEAUGUST 31, 1946 HIROSHIMA BY JOHN HERSEY  A hundred thousand people were killed by the atomic bomb, and these six were among the survivors. They still wonder why they lived when so many others died. Each of them counts many small items of chance or volition—a step taken in time, a decision to go indoors, catching one streetcar instead of the next—that spared him.

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