O ocaso do lulopetismo diplomatico? - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Fim de reino na política externa: o ocaso do lulopetismo diplomático

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

(www.pralmeida.org; http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

 [Objetivo: compilação de textos; finalidade: divulgação]

Não é desconhecida de colegas, profissionais ou acadêmicos, assim como de leitores, ocasionais ou regulares, de meus textos, no blog Diplomatizzando– que eu sempre chamei de “quilombo de resistência intelectual” – ou em outros veículos, a minha aversão ao que (não só eu) designei de “lulopetismo diplomático”, o que, por si só, ao aceitar o conceito, parece conceder muita honra a esse animal bizarro em nossa paisagem política do início do presente século. Muitos dos que me leem regularmente, ou entre os que conhecem meus escritos pelos meios mais diversos, pensam que eu me posiciono tão acerbamente contra esse avatar medíocre de nossa política externa porque eu seria “de direita”, ou que eu sou contra o lulopetismo diplomático apenas porque este seria de esquerda, ou progressista, ou seja lá o que for nessa linha.

Nada mais equivocado. Nem o lulopetismo diplomático, nem a sua versão mais completa, nos terrenos político ou econômico, merecem o meu repúdio porque eles são, ou seriam, “de esquerda”, ou porque eu supostamente seria “de direita”. Errado! Eu sou visceralmente contra essas deformações políticas e diplomáticas implementadas no Brasil nos últimos três lustros (e um pouco mais, desde a formação desse bizarro animal partidário) basicamente porque ele apresenta duas características insanáveis no plano da doutrina política, no domínio das políticas públicas, assim como no terreno moral, ou ético, de ambas as dimensões: o lulopetismo é fundamentalmente inepto, como ator ou promotor de políticas públicas, mas principalmente ele é profundamente corrupto, em todos os aspectos que se possa conceber. Apenas por isto que eu sou contra todas as manifestações dessa gigantesca fraude que dominou o Brasil – e de certa forma ainda domina – nas últimas décadas, sendo ainda um fenômeno mais do que residual, um fator poderoso a influenciar corações e mentes de alguns milhares de abnegados militantes e de alguns milhões de brasileiros ingênuos, capturados pelo gênio do mal e seus fieis sequazes no empreendimento fraudulento e mistificador.

Eu teria, obviamente, como professor de economia política nos últimos 14 anos nos programas de mestrado e doutorado em direito de uma instituição universitária de Brasília, muito a dizer sobre os imensos equívocos cometidos pelo lulopetismo nos terrenos econômico e político, inclusive porque segui, passo a passo, cada uma das políticas macroeconômicas e setoriais implementadas pelos seguidores do culto e sacerdotes da doutrina, um bando de beócios conduzidos por um medíocre “flautista de Hamelin”, levando atrás de si uma tropa de seguidores descerebrados (pois que eles renunciaram a pensar com suas próprias cabeças, obedecendo disciplinadamente ao chefe da tropa sem sequer emitir um pio de contestação). Mas, por razões de ofício, dediquei-me também, ao lado da análise de alguns crimes econômicos cometidos pelo bando de aloprados (que se parecem, em vários casos, com crimes comuns), a um seguimento muito atento da política externa implementada pelos lulopetistas (os profissionais e os “sócios” na carreira), mesmo estando totalmente afastado de qualquer contato com a diplomacia prática, durante toda a duração do reino lulopetista no Brasil.

Minha atenção era um misto de olhar acadêmico e de visão profissional, tendo eu juntado essas duas vertentes numa observação tópica e geral de cada uma das ações e iniciativas tomadas por eles na frente externa. Como sempre fiz durante toda a minha vida adulta, sempre consignei tais observações em registros pontuais que eu guardava para mim, ou que eram apresentados sob a forma de artigos e comentários publicados ou divulgados de diversas formas, inclusive no formato de livros que foram sendo acumulados ao longo das últimas três décadas. Uma síntese desses meus escritos aparece no livro Nunca Antes na Diplomacia...: a política externa brasileira em tempos não convencionais (Curitiba: Appris, 2014), mas diversos outros textos – ensaios, notas, resenhas, comentários rápidos em postagens dispersas – foram sendo agregados à série de análises que eu fiz sobre esse nosso “acidente de percurso”, numa trajetória política também errática, como foi a do Brasil nas três décadas desde a redemocratização.

Muitos desses escritos foram compilados em “livros de autor” oferecidos e disponibilizados livremente nas redes de comunicação social, ou nas plataformas acadêmicas às quais me filio e das quais me sirvo para divulgar minha produção de natureza intelectual (e quase toda ela o é). Um exemplo é o “livro” Miséria da diplomacia: apogeu e declínio do lulopetismo diplomático (Brasília, 18 fevereiro 2018, 188 p.), tornado disponível, como vários outros, em plataformas acadêmicas (ver lista abaixo). Suponho que eles sejam acessados ocasionalmente ou regularmente pelos interessados na “literatura” sobre o lulopetismo em geral e sobre o lulopetismo diplomático em especial, o que na verdade conforma uma comunidade bastante reduzida de acadêmicos e alguns outros curiosos no assunto. Raramente recebi, dos leitores ocasionais, comentários a respeito de minhas opiniões, análises e críticas feitas contra (sim, contra) o lulopetismo diplomático, embora eu imagine que esses trabalhos sejam lidos por aderentes ou adversários desse animal bizarro que contaminou durante algum tempo nossa diplomacia e nossa política externa. 

Sem pretender agora retomar o núcleo central de minhas críticas a esse avatar tremendamente prejudicial às tradições de nossa política externa, e sem pretender me arvorar em porta-voz de um “purismo” diplomático que pareceria arrogante, tenciono apenas neste momento apresentar uma pequena lista de meus escritos sobre esse fenômeno, que agora entendo estar em seu ocaso, como forma de, mais uma vez, esclarecer minhas posturas sobre um período que eu reputo negativa em nossa trajetória diplomática, o que pode não parecer evidente aos olhos de toda uma geração que nasceu e se formou sob o lulopetismo (uma vez que 15 anos é o tempo normal de formação de uma geração no plano educacional). Como sempre, meu ânimo é puramente o de manter um diálogo de alto nível, ou seja, no plano das ideias, sobre temas, conceitos e práticas que apresentam extrema relevância para a inserção global do Brasil, tanto no plano estritamente econômico, quanto no plano propriamente político. 

O que segue, portanto, é uma seleção de escritos diversos, com seus respectivos links de localização, começando pelas duas compilações que já reproduzem a íntegra desses trabalhos selecionados. Bom proveito.

1) Quinze anos de política externa: ensaios sobre a diplomacia brasileira, 2002-2017 (Brasília: Edição do Autor, 2017, 366 p.) Blog Diplomatizzando(http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/05/quinze-anos-de-politica-externa-ensaios.html).

2) Miséria da diplomacia: apogeu e declínio do lulopetismo diplomático (Brasília, 18 fevereiro 2018, 188 p.) Academia.edu (link: https://www.academia.edu/s/e421c22bd9/miseria-da-diplomacia-apogeu-e-declinio-do-lulopetismo-diplomatico), Research Gate (link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323252005_Miseria_da_Diplomacia_apogeu_e_declinio_do_lulopetismo_diplomatico_2018), blog Diplomatizzando(https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2018/02/miseria-da-diplomacia-apogeu-e-declinio.html).

3) “Política externa brasileira recente: algumas questões tópicas” (Brasília, 10 fevereiro 2018, 12 p.) Diplomatizzando(link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2018/02/politica-externa-brasileira-recente.html).

4) “Depois da diplomacia companheira: o que vem pela frente?” (Brasília, 26 novembro 2017, 3 p.) Gazeta do Povo (28/11/2017, link: http://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/opiniao/artigos/depois-da-diplomacia-companheira-o-que-vem-pela-frente-di5ffopc0ywu56cc29s8s5hsr), blog Diplomatizzando(28/11/2017; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/11/depois-da-diplomacia-companheira-o-que.html).

5) “Crimes econômicos do lulopetismo na frente externa” (Brasília, 12 maio 2017, 7 p.; resenha do livro de Fabio Zanini, Euforia e fracasso do Brasil grande: política externa e multinacionais brasileiras na era Lula. São Paulo: Contexto, 2017, 224 p.; ISBN: 978-85-7244-988-5). Blog Diplomatizzando(link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/05/crimes-economicos-do-lulopetismo-na.html).

6) “A política externa e a diplomacia brasileira no século XXI” (Brasília, 24 março 2017, 12 p.) Blog Diplomatizzando(link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/04/a-politica-externa-e-diplomacia.html).

7) “O Itamaraty e a nova política externa brasileira” (Brasília, 19 novembro 2016, 18 p.) Blog Diplomatizzando(15/08/2017; link: https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2017/08/o-itamaraty-e-nova-politica-externa.html).

8) “O lulopetismo diplomático: um experimento exótico no Itamaraty” (Porto Alegre, 4 setembro 2016, 5 p.) Blog Diplomatizzando(link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/09/o-lulopetismo-diplomatico-um.html).

9) “Auge e declínio do lulopetismo diplomático: um depoimento pessoal” (Brasília, 26/06/2016: 19 p.) Blog Diplomatizzando(1/07/2016; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/07/ufa-um-depoimento-meu-sobre-o.html).

10) “Política externa e política econômica no Brasil pós-PT” (Brasília, 29 maio 2016, 6 p.) Blog Diplomatizzando(link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/06/politica-externa-e-politica-economica.html).

11) “O renascimento da política externa” (Brasília, 25 maio 2016, 14 p.) RevistaInteresse Nacional(ano 9, n. 34, julho-setembro de 2016) blog Diplomatizzando(link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/08/o-renascimento-da-politica-externa.html).

12) “Do lulopetismo diplomático a uma política externa profissional” (Brasília, 22 maio 2016, 7 p.) Diplomatizzando(http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/05/do-lulopetismo-diplomatico-uma-politica.html).

13) “O Itamaraty e a diplomacia profissional brasileira em tempos não convencionais” (Brasília, 15 maio 2016, 10 p.) Entrevista concedida ao Jornal Arcadas;Diplomatizzando(http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/05/um-anarco-diplomata-fala-sobre.html).

14) “Epitáfio do lulopetismo diplomático” (Brasília, 2 maio 2016, 3 p.) O Estado de S. Paulo(17/05/2016); blog Diplomatizzando(link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/05/epitafio-do-lulopetismo-diplomatico.html).

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 7 de julho de 2018

Russia-EUA; as relacoes ambiguas ou indefinidas - Carnegie Endowment

Os EUA de Trump configuram o primeiro caso de um império quase universal que renuncia deliberadamente à liderança em seus próprios termos – que no caso da América tradicional deveriam ser os de uma ordem liberal democrática fundada sobre a liberdade de mercados – e adere a uma visão do mundo introvertida, introspectiva, de abandono de suas obrigações com os satélites.
Curioso caso de suicídio imperial...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Brasília, 7 de julho de 2018

Can the Trump-Putin Summit Restore Guardrails to the U.S.-Russian Relationship?

Carnegie Endowment, July 6, 2018

President Donald Trump’s habit of challenging the Washington establishment and upending decades of U.S. foreign policy conventions is by now well documented. Equally well documented is his desire to change the course of U.S.-Russian relations. Therefore, his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki on July 16 should not come as a surprise to anyone. Trump’s many pronouncements on Russia and Putin over the years leave no doubt that he is eager to turn the page on any number of hot-button issues, including Putin’s annexation of Crimea, the wars in eastern Ukraine and Syria, the multiple rounds of sanctions, and Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.

Moreover, Trump’s desire “to get along” with Russia is hardly unprecedented. Since the end of the Cold War, every U.S. and Russian president has similarly attempted to develop a cooperative bilateral and personal relationship. Each attempt has ended in bitter disappointment, leaving U.S.-Russian relations in even worse shape. The relationship has been through a series of booms invariably followed by busts, highlighting very real differences between them that no amount of presidential bonhomie can overcome.

What is needed today is not another symbolic handshake or commitment to move past the old differences, but rather a sober look at the root causes of successive crises in U.S.-Russian relations as well as a clearer understanding of why major disagreements have lingered despite both sides’ attempts at reconciliation.

Putting those disagreements aside is not the same as resolving them. The underlying causes of past crises have been ignored. If the relationship between Moscow and Washington is to move beyond the boom-bust cycle, the key question is whether these differences and their causes can be addressed. Observers are skeptical that the meeting in Helsinki can accomplish that but hope that the two presidents can launch a much-needed yet long-delayed dialogue about the true state of the U.S.-Russian relationship. That alone could be a major accomplishment of the first full-fledged Trump-Putin summit.

A Clash of Visions

At the heart of the long-standing conflict between Russia and the United States is a disagreement about their respective approaches to the conduct of foreign affairs. Until Trump arrived on the scene, the United States traditionally championed (even though admittedly it has not always adhered to it) the international liberal order—including political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberalism in international relations—and actively promoted liberal values beyond its borders. Russia has adhered to a very different—realist—philosophy and stressed the importance of national interests rather than liberal values in the conduct of its foreign policy. As much as the United States has sought to promote the international liberal order, Russia has resisted its expansion, especially in areas that could touch on Russian interests.

This fundamental disagreement has hardly been addressed, let alone resolved in the course of the entire post–Cold War history of the bilateral relationship. (While there are abundant signs that Trump sees the international liberal order as fundamentally harmful to the political and economic vitality of the United States, he is learning that its continued existence is hard to wish away or dismantle overnight.)

The U.S. national security establishment—buoyed by a perceived victory in the Cold War and the failure of the Soviet Union and its discredited ideology—took largely a laissez-faire approach to this problem, firmly believing that Washington was on the right side of history. The establishment believed that any opponents would sooner or later realize the errors of their ways and embrace its worldview. And if they did not, they would eventually pay the price for resisting the forces of history.

Their Russian counterparts rejected the proposition that they had lost the Cold War and refused to accept the consequences of the West’s victory. Moscow’s vision has been deeply affected by its experience at the end of the Cold War and guided by a firm resolve to prevent it from being repeated. Since the mid-1990s, resistance to the U.S.-led liberal order has been the centerpiece of Russia’s foreign policy. With neither side willing or able to compromise and each convinced that it has chosen the only viable path, their fundamental disagreement has put a powerful brake on successive attempts to repair the relationship and set it on a sustained, mutually beneficial track.

Cycles of Frustration

And such attempts by U.S. presidential administrations have been made repeatedly. Bill Clinton’s administration’s partnership for reform with Russia was intended to help Russia transform itself into a market economy and democratic society, which was expected, in turn, to make it a willing member of the international liberal order. The offer of partnership with NATO was intended to assuage Russian concerns about NATO as a threatening military alliance, as it expanded into Central Europe. These pursuits were premised on the expectation that Russia would change and follow the U.S. lead.

George W. Bush’s administration had hoped to transform the relationship in the wake of 9/11 and redefine the strategic nuclear relationship with Russia by moving away from the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) and the legacy of what it believed were obsolete, binding arms control agreements inherited from the Cold War. As a practical matter, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which the Russians regarded as a cornerstone of strategic stability. The underlying logic of this approach was that if the two countries were no longer in an adversarial relationship and no longer threatened each other, they could dispense with that legacy. Beyond the nuclear realm, the Bush administration engaged in democracy promotion as a means of spreading stability and prosperity. Russia rejected both the idea of moving past MAD and the historical inevitability of democratic change as profoundly threatening to its interests.

Barack Obama’s administration’s attempt to “reset” the relationship with Russia in the aftermath of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war also paid little heed to the underlying causes of the conflict between Russia and the United States. With “modernization” as its principal theme, this policy, just as its predecessors, was premised on the idea of encouraging domestic change in Russia that would ultimately lead to changes in its foreign policy and acceptance of the U.S.-led international liberal order. None of this happened.

U.S. policymakers were not the only ones frustrated. Their Russian counterparts too had many frustrations and complaints about U.S. handling of the bilateral relationship, which they have voiced repeatedly over the past three decades. The Russian narrative includes broken U.S. promises not to expand NATO, interference in Russian domestic politics and use of double standards when criticizing it for its democracy deficit, refusal to treat Russia as a peer, reliance on economic sanctions to achieve desired political and diplomatic outcomes, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, unilateral use of military force, and regime change and destabilization under the guise of democracy promotion in countries within Russia’s self-proclaimed sphere of interests or that are simply friendly to it.

Different Approaches, Same Result

Aside from unrealistic expectations, the successive attempts to improve U.S.-Russian relations often had a significant structural flaw, reflecting important differences between U.S. and Russian policymaking. The U.S. approach to the relationship typically favors small steps and modest initiatives that bubble up from within the national security establishment and seek to promote understandings on a relatively narrow set of issues. If progress is achieved, it can serve as a springboard for expanding the conversation and hopefully achieving further progress on a broader agenda. Eventually, the series of incremental successes will build up to a broad, U.S.-driven strategic agenda and rise to the level of a presidential deliverable.

The Russian approach to the relationship is exactly the opposite. It begins with a broad understanding about the quality of the relationship at the highest level, which provides strategic guidance for lower-level policymakers to reach agreements on individual components of the jointly designed overall agenda. It is an approach that favors grand bargains among equals and unvarnished realpolitik rather than small steps.

Regardless of whose approach is more likely to result in an improved relationship, it is dubious that the Kremlin or the White House is actually in a position to test it at the moment. Instead, both appear poised to sustain the tensions, each blaming the other side for the current state of affairs. The political atmosphere in both capitals is such that any proposal for a compromise with the other side is certain to trigger charges of surrender and betrayal of national interest. A corrosive lack of trust is omnipresent.

In Russia, the United States is widely portrayed as a country governed by a “deep state,” an entrenched elite guided by profound antipathy toward Russia and intent on marginalizing Russia on the world stage, destabilizing its domestic politics, and undermining its economy. This entrenched elite is so powerful, according to this narrative, that it can thwart presidential initiatives aimed at improving relations with Russia. Under these circumstances and congressional moves to tie Trump’s hands, the Kremlin appears to have written off the United States as a potential partner for the foreseeable future. Consequently, there is very little chance for another reset, and the current state of affairs between Moscow and Washington is here to stay.

In the United States, Russia has emerged as both the “geopolitical enemy number one” and, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s, not just a source of external threats to U.S. national security and interests abroad but also a threat to its domestic political order. The list of U.S. concerns includes, but is not limited to, Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, the use of social media by Russian state-sponsored actors to sow internal U.S. political divisions, Russian cyber intrusions aimed at disrupting U.S. critical infrastructure and networks, the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, support for President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, suppression of civil liberties in Russia, and, more broadly, Russian efforts to undermine the U.S.-championed international liberal order. Taken together, these concerns amount to a powerful indictment and, quite understandably, help cement doubts in many quarters about the wisdom of seeking better relations with Russia.

Emphasis on Managing

Nevertheless, further tensions between Russia and the United States are fraught with dangers that neither side would welcome. As demonstrated by the choreography involved in U.S. and Russian activities in Syria, neither side is seeking an outright military confrontation. Should such a confrontation occur, it would be as a consequence of a miscalculation or an accident. Both sides’ interests would be better served by mutual efforts focused on managing an inherently competitive, and oftentimes adversarial, relationship rather than engaging in brinkmanship.

Such efforts could build on some modest accomplishments that have already proved effective in tense and potentially dangerous situations. For example, military-to-military contacts at the highest level—between Russia’s Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov and his U.S. counterpart, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford—have created an effective channel for communication and for lower-level efforts to deconflict the two militaries’ activities in Syria. (A deadly incident in Deir Ezzor on February 7, 2018, involving Russian private military contractors was a crucial exception to the rule.) A similar effort is urgently needed to manage U.S. and Russian military activities in the airspace and at sea in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. With neither side willing to cease its military activities in either region yet evidently not interested in an outright collision, both sides should, in theory, have incentives to avoid an accident there.

In the words of Dmitri Trenin,

The issue is not that Russian daredevils are performing acts of hooliganism in the air or that NATO pilots in international airspace are unaware that they are coming too close to Russian borders or assets. Each side seeks to make a point to the other, and neither is willing to step back, thus continuing the dangerous game. The only way out of this situation lies in a mutual understanding to stop testing each other’s nerves and aerobatic skills and instead to observe a protocol under which neither party provokes the other. This could be a first, relatively easy step toward military de-escalation.

Beyond the immediate danger of an unintended military confrontation on Europe’s southern and northern flanks, one other issue requiring immediate attention is arms control. Mutual accusations of violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the approaching expiration of the New START Treaty in 2021 underscore the precarious state of the entire bilateral arms control structure the United States and Russia have inherited from the Cold War era. Even though it is increasingly inadequate to constrain the reemerging arms race between the two nuclear superpowers, and leaves out other nuclear powers, including China, that structure could provide an indispensable foundation for future efforts to manage and contain their arms race, as well as possibly involve other nuclear powers in these efforts. The collapse of that structure would cause irreparable harm to future bilateral and multilateral arms control and U.S.-Russia strategic stability. It would not serve the interests of either side.

Although the political climate in both capitals is not propitious for seeking compromises, there is no plausible argument for not engaging in dialogue about the INF Treaty, each side’s charges of the other’s violations, the future of arms control, and strategic stability. It would be unrealistic to expect such a dialogue to produce a resolution of the dispute about the INF Treaty. However, if conducted in good faith, it could clarify each side’s position and concerns and, potentially, lead to the development of a conceptual framework for resolving the dispute. It is difficult to see the risk entailed in such a dialogue, while it could produce substantial benefits. U.S. and Russian official delegations met in September 2017 for strategic stability talks. Another meeting was scheduled for April 2018 but postponed without a new date. This dialogue should be resumed. The potential agenda should comprise new issues, including the risk that new cyber capabilities pose to strategic command and control and long-standing Russian concerns about U.S. missile defense deployments and conventional strategic systems.

Moreover, official dialogue should be supplemented by Track II or Track 1.5 engagement between U.S. and Russian experts. In the past, such contacts were useful for testing concepts and exploring new ideas in an unofficial setting, which subsequently fed into official exchanges. In the current atmosphere of tensions reminiscent of the Cold War, unofficial contacts could once again prove useful, assuming that they actually have buy-in from officials on both sides.

While useful and urgently needed, none of the measures sketched out in the preceding paragraphs is likely to repair the relationship or amount to more than minimal steps necessary for managing it and preventing it from deteriorating further and causing irreparable damage to its key components. Moreover, while necessary, they may not be sufficient to avert further setbacks in the relationship.

The real work to repair U.S.-Russian relations will have to be done at the political level. It will have to begin with lowering the heat of political rhetoric in both Washington and Moscow and conducting a high-level dialogue about the nature of major disagreements and mutual grievances and about their goals, expectations, and desired rules of the road for the relationship. Such a dialogue could can be advanced by more informal discussions between senior U.S. and Russian figures who are less constrained by official roles.

In preparation for political dialogue, each side could take some significant steps to signal the seriousness of its intent and lack of interest in further escalation of tensions. Such steps would not have to be symmetrical but could instead be aimed at addressing some of the other side’s more significant concerns. Conceivably, both sides could take proactive steps to signal their interest in deescalating tensions and halting the destructive cycle.

For example, the military stand-off between Russia and the West is becoming a permanent feature of increased tensions between the two sides. This is a direct result of Russia’s ongoing military modernization efforts and troop deployments and NATO’s efforts to reestablish the credibility of Article 5 commitments for frontline member countries in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. It is unlikely that either side will have an incentive to scale back or defer deployments or training activities along the NATO-Russia frontier any time soon. Still, it is possible that Trump will make a grand gesture akin to his spontaneous decision at the June 2018 summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to suspend major military exercises with South Korea.

It’s also conceivable that the Kremlin could begin to exercise greater restraint in deliberate harassment of U.S. ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Such a move by the Kremlin would be cost-free and entail no permanent changes to its operations in either region but would send an important signal to Washington about the Russian leadership’s desire for deescalation or at least not escalation. For its part, NATO could underscore that the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act’s “three no’s” commitment—which pledged that no nuclear or substantial combat forces would be deployed on the territory of new member states as long as NATO and Russia “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security”—is still in effect and that the alliance’s post-2014 forward deployments constitute a response to Russian actions.

Sanctions, which have become the central tool of U.S. policy toward Russia, represent an even more complicated challenge. For the Kremlin, the U.S. sanctions constitute both a challenge and an opportunity. They restrict Western investment and technology transfer, but they also have a rallying-around-the-flag effect that consolidates Russian elites. Furthermore, they prompt Moscow to look for partners beyond the West and redefine Russia’s position as a non-Western global player operating from its base in northern and central Eurasia.

On the one hand, the sanctions program has provided an effective tool for curtailing business as usual, punishing Russia for various actions, and, some would claim, probably deterring future disruptive behavior (at least, on the margins). On the other hand, Western sanctions are not, in and of themselves, a substitute for an effective policy unless they are paired with a coherent diplomatic strategy. For example, the Iran nuclear deal, now abandoned by the Trump administration but otherwise viewed widely as a diplomatic success, was achieved with the help of a dual-track approach that combined increasingly severe sanctions with sustained negotiations. The diplomatic track included a multilateral road map with sanctions relief and other incentives. Such concepts are conspicuously missing from current U.S. policy toward Russia. Policymakers must begin to articulate practical policy outcomes that inform the future use of sanctions.

Prospects

The current state of affairs between Russia and the United States is somewhat of a paradox. There is a deep reluctance in both capitals to admit that they are once again in a Cold War. Yet there is broad consensus that the differences between them are real and profound. Voices in both capitals point out the dangers associated with the current state of affairs, the lack of reliable political channels of communications, and the risk of unintended escalation. These sensible voices are realistic about the likelihood of the relationship being repaired overnight as a result of a brief meeting between the two presidents.

The experience of the Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore suggests that such a brief encounter cannot resolve the differences that have accumulated in the course of decades. But the experience of the Singapore summit also suggests that such encounters can create a positive atmosphere for the real hard work of repairing relations to begin. The Trump-Putin summit potentially can accomplish the same, very important results. It can empower the reasonable voices to begin the conversation in earnest about the state of the relationship, about ways to repair it, and, at the very least, a mutually acceptable way for managing it. If that is the outcome of the Trump-Putin summit, it should rightly be called a success.

Russia: a dificil gestacao de um Estado democrático, e de uma sociedade liberal - Democracy Digest

Dois autocratas, Putin e Trump, um representando uma autocracia tout court, o outro uma democracia liberal (mas atualmente muito confusa, em sentimentos e ações), vão se encontrar proximamente, para discutir não se sabe bem o que, uma vez que Mister Trump possui uma agenda própria, misturada com seus negócios obscuros, no tratamento com a Rússia e o neoczar russo Putin, que possui uma visão clara, antiliberal, do que seja a Rússia e o seu império em reconstrução.
Pena que a política americana esteja praticamente dominada pela obsessão de impedir a China de ascender pacificamente como ela pretende fazer, elegendo o novo império de Mister Xi, como um adversário estratégico. Isso complica um pouco as coisas, porque congela a atual geopolítica mundial num jogo entre três impérios nacionalistas, dotados de líderes autocratas.
O que fazer nesse triângulo pouco afetivo? Nada a não ser procurar uma relação correta com a UE e outros parceiros, que vivem nas fímbrias dos três grandes impérios da atualidade.
Não, não estamos num novo equilíbrio de potências, como alguns pensam. A História NUNCA se repete, ainda que observadores superficiais estejam sempre buscando (falsas) analogias entre situações antigas e situações presentes. Difícil caracterizar o estado atual das relações internacionais, embora nossa primeira função seja focar estritamente os interesses nacionais nesse jogo de damas, bem mais do que de xadrez.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Brasília, 7 de julho de 2018

Why Putin abandoned Russia’s Western orientation

Less than a decade ago, it seemed self-evident that Russia, despite all of its cultural and political differences, was reclaiming its rightful place as part of the Western world. In a piece for a German newspaper, Vladimir Putin wrote of a “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” that aspires to free trade and shares common values, notes analyst Yaroslav Trofimov.

But now Russia is increasingly looking East, toward an uneasy alliance with an illiberal and much more powerful China, he writes in a must-read Saturday essay for the Wall Street Journal:

Wikipedia

The impulse to abandon Russia’s Western orientation was recently articulated by Vladislav Surkov [right], a close aide of Mr. Putin who advised him on the Ukrainian crisis. “Russia spent four centuries heading toward the East, and then another four centuries toward the West, without taking root in either place,” Mr. Surkov wrote in a much-discussed academic article in April. From now on, Russia—an eternal “half-breed”—will face “a hundred (two hundred? three hundred?) years of geopolitical solitude.”…..The profound disillusionment also stems from the failure of policies that aimed to bring Russia closer to the West following the Soviet Union’s breakup—a failure that many Western officials now admit wasn’t just Moscow’s.

“The West was not sufficiently imaginative or creative in how to embrace Russia back when Russia had the intention of becoming a normal country,” said Lithuania’s former foreign minister Vygaudas Usackas, the European Union’s former ambassador to Moscow, who now heads the Institute of Europe think-tank. “As a result, we are finding a Russia that is searching for its identity between Europe and Asia—and that, in the meantime, has become an assertive and aggressive power with the stamina and the resources to discredit and undermine Western democracies.”

Institute of Modern Russia

President Donald Trump’s summit with President Vladimir Putin on July 16 suggests that the U.S. is courting autocratic and illiberal states like North Korea and Russia because “Washington wants as many states as possible to maintain their strategic distance from Beijing,” according to Reuben Steff, Lecturer in International Relations and Security Studies at the University of Waikato.

“This is a task that will become more difficult as China’s power continues to rise and America finds it harder to reassure its allies that it can maintain its dominance in the region,” he writes for the Conversation:

A number of these states have authoritarian governance systems, forms of illiberal democracy or may be trending in this direction. They do not share America’s governing liberal ideology. This ideological difference could complicate America’s efforts to keep these states out of China’s orbit, which claims to have no interest in the domestic affairs of other states.

Some observers are worried that the summit will see the U.S. concede recognition of Russia’s invasion of Crimea.

RFE/RL

Daniel Fried (left), a former assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs [and a National Endowment for Democracy board member], is worried there is no clarity within the administration about the goals of the summit, he tells Foreign Policy. “I can’t tell you there’s no chance” the U.S. would recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea, he adds.

Placing responsibility for the rapid deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations squarely on the shoulders of the Russian president has its appeal, notes Daniel Beer, a reader in Russian history at Royal Holloway, University of London.” It holds out the promise that Kremlin policy toward the West might pivot once again when Putin finally retires or is pushed out, he writes in a NY Times review of Michael McFaul’s From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia:

Maybe so, but the more pessimistic view is that Putin represents a now-entrenched revanchist nationalism that sees the liberal international order as a mere smokescreen for the advancement of Western political agendas. Deep-rooted antagonism toward the United States might well endure long after Putin has gone. 

As McFaul himself laments, “the hot peace, tragically but perhaps necessarily, seems here to stay.”

Like many of its predecessors, the Bush administration engaged in democracy promotion as a means of spreading stability and prosperity. But Russia rejected both the idea of moving past MAD and the historical inevitability of democratic change as profoundly threatening to its interests, according to Carnegie analysts Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin and Andrew S. Weiss.

Instead, the Kremlin developed and articulated an alternative, illiberal, anti-Western narrative, they suggest:

The Russian narrative includes broken U.S. promises not to expand NATO, interference in Russian domestic politics and use of double standards when criticizing it for its democracy deficit, refusal to treat Russia as a peer, reliance on economic sanctions to achieve desired political and diplomatic outcomes, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, unilateral use of military force, and regime change and destabilization under the guise of democracy promotion in countries within Russia’s self-proclaimed sphere of interests or that are simply friendly to it.

Russia’s leader may be capable of change, says Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 55, Putin’s most prominent opponent in exile, who has sought to promote democracy Russia through the Open Russia movement.

“My aim is not the overthrow of the president, but the establishment of parliamentary democracy. If Putin is prepared tomorrow to democratize the country himself, then I’m all for it,” he tells Der Spiegel.

But the Kremlin’s reaction to Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution suggests otherwise, he concedes.

“I had hoped that Ukraine would become a model for Russian society. Unfortunately, Putin has succeeded in preventing this. And, unfortunately, some people in Ukraine helped him to do so — out of greed,” he said.

“Other than that, though, I’m not disappointed. Ukraine is a large country, and no rapid changes could be expected. If the Ukrainians prevent a relapse into authoritarianism, the country will become a normal democracy after one or two changes of government.”

A divided EU – with an unstable Germany, a UK on its way out and renegade central eastern member states – indicates the dead end of the normative approach to foreign relations, according to analyst Vessela Tcherneva. Europe appears to be only of interest to the US as an ally in the competition with Russia and China, she writes for the European Council on Foreign Relations.

As the highly anticipated Putin-Trump summit nears, pundits are discussing the main challenges of the meeting and potential outcomes for the U.S-Russia relationship, the Institute of Modern Russia reports:

On the domestic front, as negative opinions about the pension reform persist, the Kremlin prepares to respond. One of the key political developments in the capital was the announcement of the list of candidates who will run for the Mayor’s and the Moscow Region Governor’s offices in the September elections. No member of the liberal opposition passed the electoral filter. RTWT

At the heart of the long-standing conflict between Russia and the United States is a disagreement about their respective approaches to the conduct of foreign affairs, the Carnegie analysts add.

While the United States has “traditionally championed (even though admittedly it has not always adhered to it) the international liberal order—including political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberalism in international relations—and actively promoted liberal values beyond its borders,” they notes, “Russia has adhered to a very different—realist—philosophy and stressed the importance of national interests rather than liberal values in the conduct of its foreign policy.”

“As much as the United States has sought to promote the international liberal order, Russia has resisted its expansion.” RTWT

Status e Redes na Política Internacional - palestra no IRel-UnB

iREL-UnB promove palestra sobre o tema “Status e Redes na Política Internacional”

06/07/2018 Mundorama Eventos

A Professora Marina Guedes Duque, docente da Florida State Univesity, proferirá palestra sobre o tema “Status e Redes na Política Internacional”, no dia 09/07, a partir das 10h, na Sala Multiusos do Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de Brasília.

Na sequência, haverá uma sessão de esclarecimento com dicas para fazer pós-graduação nos Estados Unidos. 

Marina Guedes Duque Mestre pelo Irel/UnB e PhD pela Ohio State University (Orientador: Alexander Wendt), com pós-doutorado nas universidades de Harvard e Princeton, atualmente é professora da Florida State University.

Sobre o tema da palestra:

How do states achieve status? Although we rely on status to explain important phenomena in international politics—such as wars and the foreign policy of emerging powers—we still do not understand what status is or where it comes from. Previous research treats status as a function of state attributes, such as wealth and military capability. Following Weber, I argue that status depends on social recognition: it concerns identification processes in which an actor gains admission into a club once they follow the rules of membership. Therefore, systematic social processes, which cannot be reduced to state attributes, influence status. In particular, status is self-reinforcing. Moreover, social closure influences status—which implies that (1) a state’s existing relations influence its ability to achieve status and (2) states recognize similar states rather than states with the most impressive portfolio of certain attributes. To investigate the determinants of international status, I move beyond ranking states based on attributes to examine quantitatively how status emerges from state relations. Leveraging inferential network analysis, I examine state practices that express recognition—specifically, the network of embassies. The analysis indicates that self-reinforcing dynamics and social closure, rather than state attributes directly, drive status recognition.

Ver artigo sobre o tema aqui.

https://academic.oup.com/isq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/isq/sqy001/4962448

NET, uma empresa irresponsável e assediadora: M#*!"%^...

Uma semana atrás recebi em minha caixa de entrada uma fatura de cobrança por pagamento atrasado com toda a aparência de ser uma dessas faturas eletrônicas recebidas da NET, abaixo reproduzido.
Deduzi imediatamente alguma irregularidade, mas resolvi telefonar para a NET para esclarecer o episódio, já alertando para a ocorrência de uma fraude, como exposto a seguir: 

From: fatura1530669422@faturasnet.com

Date: July 3, 2018, 22:57

Subject: Fatura NET em atraso.

Evite o bloqueio do seu serviço. Informamos que o pagamento da sua fatura ainda não consta no nosso sistema.

Se o seu sinal já está bloqueado, realize o pagamento desta fatura, e seu sinal será reabilitado em até 24h.

E para sua comodidade anexamos o PDF da 2ª via de sua fatura.

O novo "boleto", enviado pela "NET", foi apresentado desta forma: 

Data de vencimento: 05/07/2018 Valor: 427,93 Email: pralmeida@mac.com Código de barras: 00190.00009 02839.057011 31491.634171 1 75770000042793

Utilize o código de barras acima, ou baixe o PDF para efetuar o pagamento da fatura em caixas eletrônicos, Internet Banking ou pelo atendimento telefônico do seu banco.

Deduzindo a fraude evidente, liguei para a NET para esclarecer o assunto e denunciar a tentativa de fraude de que eu estava sendo vítima.

O descaso com que fui tratado foi surpreendente. Sequer quiseram tomar nota da denúncia, sendo que eu insistia em que eles atentassem para o domínio do envio – @faturasnet.com – e para a conta correspondente ao código de barras, acima indicada.

Mas o pior não foi isso.

Após a minha chamada passei a receber, insistentemente, chamadas e mais chamadas de "representantes" da NET, querendo que eu assinasse um serviço do qual já sou beneficiário. Dezenas de chamadas no celular e no telefone de serviço, ao qual a NET tem acesso e informou a todas as suas centrais de chamadas, situadas em diferentes partes do país.

Não surpreende, assim, assim, que uma companhia tão vorazmente interessada em capturar novos clientes, seja tão IRRESPONSÁVEL ao disseminar e-mails e telefones de seus clientes, o que acaba redundando na FRAUDE que detectei, e sobre a qual eles NÃO DERAM A MÍNIMA IMPORTÂNCIA.

Vou denunciá-los por assédio e irresponsabilidade na agência de controle.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brasília, 6 de julho de 2018

As Leis Fundamentais da Estupidez Humana, versão brasileira

O historiador italiano Carlo Maria Cipolla ficaria orgulhoso ao ver que nossas elites dirigentes são extremamente pródigas em lhe oferecer de graça brilhantes (sic?) exemplos de grandes idiotices para acrescentar ao seu livro homônimo ao título desta postagem.
Grato ao meu amigo e colega de blog Orlando Tambosi.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O frete, o ataque à liberdade econômica e o silêncio do STF.

Com a MP 832, o poder público interfere na atividade econômica e na livre concorrência, em clara oposição à Constituição. É absurdo que o Congresso pretenda aprová-la. Editorial da Gazeta do Povo, ressaltando que o STF, sempre tão intervencionista, neste caso se mantenha calado:

De nada adiantou o alerta do procurador-chefe do Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), Walter de Agra Junior, sobre o perigo do surgimento de um cartel com o tabelamento dos preços do frete rodoviário. O aviso foi feito na quarta-feira, em audiência promovida pela Comissão de Minas e Energia da Câmara dos Deputados, mas pouco depois, naquele mesmo dia, a Comissão Mista de deputados e senadores que analisa a Medida Provisória 832 aprovaria o texto que determina o tabelamento, sob responsabilidade da Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres (ANTT). A sessão que aprovou o substitutivo do relator, deputado Osmar Terra (MDB-RS), durou menos de cinco minutos, para se ter uma ideia do desprezo com que os parlamentares tratam questões que afetam a liberdade econômica no país.

O texto que vai ao plenário da Câmara apresenta diferenças pontuais em relação ao publicado pelo governo federal na tentativa de encerrar a greve dos caminhoneiros, em maio. Poderá haver pisos diferentes para determinados tipos de cargas, e foram incluídas duas “anistias” – multas e outras penalidades aplicadas aos caminhoneiros parados, seja pela Justiça, seja pela Polícia Rodoviária, serão anuladas (um tipo de perdão que é tão frequente em outras negociações que não chega a surpreender) ; os caminhoneiros, por sua vez, abriram mão de cobrar o passivo acumulado desde a edição da MP, que previa indenização em dobro no caso de cargas transportadas por preços inferiores aos da primeira tabela publicada pela ANTT, situação que ocorreu com muita frequência, segundo os envolvidos nas negociações.

A MP ainda absorveu uma série de emendas destinadas a dar algum verniz de legalidade ao tabelamento. O texto deixará bem claro que se trata de preços mínimos, não obrigatórios (os transportadores poderão cobrar mais); a elaboração da tabela exigirá a participação de todos os setores envolvidos, e os critérios para o estabelecimento dos pisos precisarão ter ampla publicidade, incluindo todos os custos decorrentes da operação rodoviária; além das atualizações previstas para os dias 20 de janeiro e 20 de julho, a ANTT poderá publicar tabelas excepcionais sempre que o preço do diesel oscilar mais de 10%, para mais ou para menos. Mas mesmo essas ressalvas não anulam o fato de que a MP contém evidentes inconstitucionalidades.

Ao determinar preços mínimos para uma atividade contratada entre entes privados, o poder público interfere na atividade econômica e na livre concorrência em clara oposição à Constituição. O inciso IV do artigo 1.º afirma que “os valores sociais do trabalho e da livre iniciativa” são fundamentos da República Federativa do Brasil. A defesa da livre concorrência figura no artigo 170, incluída entre os princípios basilares da atividade econômica no Brasil. O artigo 174, ainda, diz que competem ao Estado “as funções de fiscalização, incentivo e planejamento, sendo este determinante para o setor público e indicativo para o setor privado” – ou seja, o Estado não pode determinar preços, ainda que se trate de um piso, para uma atividade como a do frete rodoviário. Além da Carta Magna, a própria lei que criou a ANTT (10.233/2001) determina que serviços como o transporte rodoviário devem se desenvolver “em liberdade de preços dos serviços, tarifas e fretes, e em ambiente de livre e aberta competição” (artigo 43), e que “os preços dos serviços autorizados serão livres, reprimindo-se toda prática prejudicial à competição” (artigo 45).

Tudo isso, no entanto, foi ignorado pelo relator, que, na análise de constitucionalidade, preferiu se ater apenas aos aspectos mais técnicos da MP, considerando-a constitucional apenas por não abordar nenhum tema vedado pela Constituição, e por não se tratar de matéria reservada a lei complementar.

E, enquanto o Congresso caminha para aprovar um texto claramente inconstitucional, o Supremo Tribunal Federal silencia. Sempre pronto a interferir nas competências de outros poderes, e ultimamente muito disposto a agir como legislador, o STF se omite justamente quando poderia cumprir o papel para o qual foi criado, o de guardião da Constituição. Depois que o ministro Luiz Fux mandou suspender todas as ações que tramitavam em instâncias inferiores da Justiça contra a MP 832, limitou-se a convocar uma reunião e nada mais fez, deixando correr o tempo até o início do recesso judiciário – isso apesar de estarem presentes todos os elementos que justificariam a concessão de uma liminar.

Tabelamentos, pisos, tetos, interferência estatal em geral nos preços, ainda mais quando se trata da negociação entre entes particulares, não são apenas inconstitucionais; são um desastre historicamente comprovado para a economia. O avanço da MP 832, ainda que ligeiramente alterada para disfarçar seu caráter de violação da livre concorrência, é sintoma da mentalidade que puxa o Brasil para mais perto de seus vizinhos venezuelanos que dos países que deveríamos imitar, aqueles onde vigora a liberdade econômica, chave para a prosperidade de uma nação.