O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

quinta-feira, 8 de agosto de 2019

Meridiano 47: número especial sobre o Juca Paranhos de Luis Claudio Villafañe

 Roundtable Review do livro “Juca Paranhos: o Barão do Rio Branco”, de Luis Cláudio Villafañe Gomes Santos

Introdução
·       Antonio Carlos LessaUniversidade de Brasília, Instituto de Relações Internacionais
·       Rogério de Souza FariasUniversidade de Brasília, Instituto de Relações Internacionais
Palavras-chave: História da Política Exterior do Brasil, Barão do Rio Branco, Política Externa da Primeira República

Resumo
Introdução ao Roundtable Review do Introdução ao Roundtable Review do livro “Juca Paranhos: o Barão do Rio Branco”, de Luis Cláudio Villafañe Gomes Santos (Villafañe, L.C. Juca Paranhos: o Barão do Rio Branco. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2018, 560p.).
Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. A economia política de Rio Branco. Meridiano 47, 20: e20007, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e20007
Burns, E. Bradford. The unwritten alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. 
Alsina Junior, João Paulo. Rio Branco, grande estratégia e poder naval. São Paulo: Editora da FGV, 2015. 
Farias, Rogério de Souza. A esfinge reexaminada: o Barão do Rio Branco e a política doméstica. Meridiano 47, 20: e20002, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e20002
Ferreira, Gabriela Nunes. (Barão do) Rio Branco, entre a Monarquia e a República. Meridiano 47, 20: e20003, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e20003
Franchini Neto, Helio. Realpolitik e o instrumento militar na vida e na obra do Barão do Rio Branco. Meridiano 47, 20: e20004, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e20004
Pontes, Kassius Diniz da Silva . Fracasso Relativo? A política de Rio Branco para os Estados Unidos. Meridiano 47, 20: e20005, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e20005
Santoro, Maurício. Rio Branco, jornalista. Meridiano 47, 20: e20006, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e20006
Santos, Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Juca Paranhos: o Barão do Rio Branco. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2018, 560p. 
Santos, Luís Cláudio Villafañe G. Juca Paranhos, o Barão do Rio Branco: os comentários do autor. Meridiano 47, 20: e20008, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.20889/M47e20008
Rocha, Antônio Jorge Ramalho da e Lessa, Antônio Carlos. Meridiano 47: Relações Internacionais sob o prisma de Brasília. Meridiano 47, v. 1, n. 1, p. 1-2. 2000.


Hong Kong pode provocar mudança de regime na China Gordon Chang

The National Interest, Washington DC – 8.8.2019
In Hong Kong, It’s Now a Revolution
“In Hong Kong, revolution is in the air. What started out as an unexpectedly large demonstration in late April against a piece of legislation—an extradition bill—has become a call for democracy in the territory as well as independence from China and the end of communism on Chinese soil.”
Gordon G. Chang

Defying stern warnings from both the local government and Beijing, people in seven districts in Hong Kong—most notably teachers, airport workers, and civil servants—participated in a general strike Monday, shutting down portions of the territory. For instance, more than a hundred flights were cancelled. 
The strike followed weeks of sometimes violent protests in the territory, a semi-autonomous region of the People’s Republic of China. Youthful demonstrators over the weekend surrounded and attacked police stations, and enraged residents drove riot police from their neighborhoods.
Roving protesters, dressed for urban combat, created a series of confrontations across the territory, even closing the main tunnel linking Hong Kong Island with the rest of the territory. A beleaguered police force, demoralized and fatigued, was unable to keep up with the mobile bands of radicalized youth.
Some of the protest messages were impossible to miss. In Wanchai’s Golden Bauhinia Square, a magnet for tourists from other parts of China, kids spray-painted a statue with provocative statements such as “The Heavens will destroy the Communist Party” and “Liberate Hong Kong.”
In Hong Kong, revolution is in the air. What started out as an unexpectedly large demonstration in late April against a piece of legislation—an extradition bill—has become a call for democracy in the territory as well as independence from China and the end of communism on Chinese soil.
Almost nobody thinks any of these things can happen, but they forget that Chinese rebellions and revolutions often start at the periphery and then work their way to the center. The Qing dynasty of the Manchus, the last imperial reign, unraveled from the edges, as did others.
Hong Kong, perched on the edge of the Asian continent far from the center of communist power in Beijing, may be where the end of Chinese communism begins.

How could the mighty Communist Party of China fall?

Xi Jinping, the Chinese ruler, knows that very few in the rest of China, the “mainland” as it is called, sympathize with the Hong Kong protestors, especially because they challenge “China,” as the party likes to call itself. Yet the demonstrators in Hong Kong have succeeded at pushing their government around, almost at will, forcing Carrie Lam, the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to “suspend” consideration of the extradition legislation.
 And that is why Xi must be concerned. Mainland residents have grievances of their own, especially now that the economy is crumbling fast, and might become inspired to treat their own leaders roughly.
Hong Kong protestors, worryingly for Xi, seemed determined to spread their provocative message. Recently, they have been targeting mainland tourists to Hong Kong, seeking to inform them of their grievances. Demonstrators have, for instance, gathered in placeswhere Chinese visitors congregate, including a rail station, and have used the AirDrop app to spread protest posters to mainlanders.
 Perhaps in response, Beijing late last month stopped trying to prevent those “inside the Great Firewall” from knowing about the Hong Kong disturbances and instead attempted to tar the protestors by publicizing their violent acts.
Are mainlanders encouraged by the Hong Kong “riots,” as Beijing calls them? In the first week of July, up to ten thousand residents of Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province, took to the streets for days to protest a proposed waste-incineration plant.
The mass demonstration there did not spread, as other protests in China have in the past, but in the future cascading disturbances could overwhelm an already troubled political system. As Arthur Waldron of the University of Pennsylvania told the National Interest, “the disintegration of the People’s Republic of China is now under way.”
Xi might be able to end, or at least tamp down, the Hong Kong protests by forcing Lam to capitulate—formally “withdrawing” the extradition bill from consideration and resigning—but he is unlikely to do that. He does not want anyone, especially mainlanders, to think they are also able to overpower their leaders.
In an especially tone-deaf press conference Monday, Lam, standing next to eight grim-faced ministers, made no further concessions, either symbolic or substantive, as she struck all the wrong notes if she was trying to calm the situation in her embattled city. Her stern and sometimes ominous words—Lam warned the territory was on the “path of no return”—seemed aimed at an audience of one: Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.
Xi, it appears, will keep Lam in power. Her resignation, demanded by many, would undoubtedly trigger calls for universal suffrage for the election of a successor. Lam was “elected” in 2017 by the Election Committee, a body of only twelve hundred members in a city of more than seven million. Due to various mechanisms, the resulting “small-circle election” effectively gives Beijing a decisive voice in choosing the chief executive.
The demand for an all-inclusive electorate in fact started seventy-nine days of wide-scale protests in 2014, the “Occupy Central” demonstrations.
That protest, sometimes called the “Umbrella Revolution,” did not look like a revolution—sustained action to change the form of government—but today’s protests are starting to do so. Popular attitudes have visibly hardened this year as Hong Kong residents have taken the view that this is, as they say, the “last stand” for their society. There are traditional pro-Beijing elements in the city, such as the triads and triad-like organizations, but few in the Hong Kong mainstream now trust China. In the middle of June, one pro-democracy march drew an estimated two million people.
At the end of that month, Ho-Fung Hung of Johns Hopkins University noted that the authorities then thought they could outlast the protestors but he disagreed with their assessment, believing the demonstrations could last until September, the fifth anniversary of the Umbrella movement, or even to October 1, when Beijing plans to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.
Now, Hung looks prescient. There is no end to the demonstrations, now in their ninth-straight week, in sight.
Sustainability is the key for the protestors if they want to win freedom from China. “They keep saying ‘be like water,’” Michael Yon, the American war correspondent and author, told the National Interest over the weekend, noting young protestors are modeling themselves after martial arts legend Bruce Lee. “I keep telling them be like Poland. Never quit and you can actually be free. Maybe. But never quit.”
Yon, now reporting from the streets in Hong Kong, is on to something. Hong Kong people may be able to inspire just enough disgruntled mainlanders to shake their regime to the ground. If one thing is evident after months of protests, the youthful pro-democracy demonstrators are determined, as are millions of residents of the territory.
In a contest where neither side will concede, anything can happen. Chinese regimes, let us remember, fray at the edges and then sometimes fall apart. It could happen this time as well.

Gordon G. Chang is the author of ‘The Coming Collapse of China’.

quarta-feira, 7 de agosto de 2019

Quem vai invadir o Brasil para salvar a Amazonia? - Stephen Walt (Foreign Policy)

O mais ridículo é que militares, nacionalistas e soberanistas vão começar a atacar o autor, como se o que ele proclama fosse factível...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Who Will Save the Amazon (and How)?

It's only a matter of time until major powers try to stop climate change by any means necessary.

Aerial view of the Transamazonica Road (BR-230) near Medicilandia, Para State, Brazil on March 13, 2019.
Aerial view of the Transamazonica Road (BR-230) near Medicilandia, Para State, Brazil on March 13, 2019.  MAURO PIMENTEL/AFP/Getty Images
Aug. 5, 2025: In a televised address to the nation, U.S. President Gavin Newsom announced that he had given Brazil a one-week ultimatum to cease destructive deforestation activities in the Amazon rainforest. If Brazil did not comply, the president warned, he would order a naval blockade of Brazilian ports and airstrikes against critical Brazilian infrastructure. The president’s decision came in the aftermath of a new United Nations report cataloging the catastrophic global effects of continued rainforest destruction, which warned of a critical “tipping point” that, if reached, would trigger a rapid acceleration of global warming. Although China has stated that it would veto any U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Brazil, the president said that a large “coalition of concerned states” was prepared to support U.S. action. At the same time, Newsom said the United States and other countries were willing to negotiate a compensation package to mitigate the costs to Brazil for protecting the rainforest, but only if it first ceased its current efforts to accelerate development.
The above scenario is obviously far-fetched—at least I think it is—but how far would you go to prevent irreversible environmental damage? In particular, do states have the right—or even the obligation—to intervene in a foreign country in order to prevent it from causing irreversible and possibly catastrophic harm to the environment?
I raise this issue in light of the news that Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is accelerating development of the Amazon rainforest (60 percent of which is in Brazilian hands), thereby imperiling a critical global resource. As those of you with more respect for science than Bolsonaro know, the rainforest is both an important carbon sink and a critical temperature regulator, as well as a key source of fresh water. Deforestation has already damaged its ability to perform these crucial roles, and scientists in Brazilian estimate that increasingly warm and dry conditions could convert much of the forest to dry savanna, with potentially catastrophic effects. Last week, the pro-business, free market-oriented Economist magazine’s cover story was “Deathwatch for the Amazon,” which frames the issue rather nicely. To restate my original question: What should (or must) the international community do to prevent a misguided Brazilian president (or political leaders in other countries) from taking actions that could harm all of us?
This is where it gets tricky. State sovereignty is a critical element of the current international system; with certain exceptions, national governments are free to do whatever they want inside their own borders. Even so, the hard shell of sovereignty has never been absolute, and various forces have been chipping away at it for a long time. States can be sanctioned for violating international law (e.g., by defying U.N. Security Council resolutions), and international law authorizes countries to go to war for self-defense or when the Security Council authorizes military action. It’s even legal to attack another country’s territory preemptively, provided there is a well-founded basis for believing it was about to attack you first.
More controversially, the “responsibility to protect” doctrine sought to legitimate humanitarian intervention in foreign powers when the local government was unable or unwilling to protect its own people. And as a practical matter, states routinely accept infringements on their own sovereignty in order to facilitate beneficial forms of international cooperation.
When push comes to shove, however, most states resent and resist external efforts to get them to change what they are doing inside their own borders. And even though destroying the Amazon rainforest presents a clear and obvious threat to many other countries, telling Brazil to stop and threatening to take action to deter, punish, or prevent it would be a whole new ballgame. And I don’t mean to single out Brazil: It would be an equally radical step to threaten the United States or China if they refused to stop emitting so many greenhouse gases.
It’s not as if world leaders haven’t recognized the seriousness of the problem. The U.N. long regarded environmental degradation as a “threat to international peace and security,” and the former European Union foreign-policy representative Javier Solana argued in 2008 that halting climate change “should be in the mainstream of EU foreign and security policies.” Scholars have already identified various ways the Security Council could act to prevent it. As the researchers Bruce Gilley and David Kinsella wrote a few years ago, “it is at least legally feasible that the Security Council could invoke its authority under Article 42, and use military force against states it deemed threats to international peace and security by virtue of their unwillingness or inability to curb destructive activities emanating from their territories.”
The question, therefore, is how far would the international community be willing to go in order to prevent, halt, or reverse actions that might cause immense and irreparable harm to the environment on which all humans depend? It might seem far-fetched to imagine states threatening military action to prevent this today, but it becomes more likely if worst-case estimates of our climate future turn out to be correct.
But here’s a cruel paradox: The countries that are most responsible for climate change are also the least susceptible to coercion, while most of the states that might conceivably be pressured into taking action aren’t significant sources of the underlying problem. The top five greenhouse gas emitters are China, the United States, India, Russia, and Japan—four of them are nuclear weapons states, and Japan is a formidable military power in its own right. Threatening any of them with sanctions isn’t likely to work, and threatening serious military action against them is completely unrealistic. Moreover, getting the Security Council to authorize the use of force against much weaker states is unlikely, because the permanent members wouldn’t want to establish this precedent and would almost certainly veto the proposal.
This is what makes the Brazilian case more interesting. Brazil happens to be in possession of a critical global resource—for purely historical reasons—and its destruction would harm many states if not the entire planet. Unlike Belize or Burundi, what Brazil does could have a big impact. But Brazil isn’t a true great power, and threatening it with either economic sanctions or even the use of force if it refused to protect the rainforest might be feasible. To be clear: I’m not recommending this course of action either now or in the future. I’m just pointing out that Brazil might be somewhat more vulnerable to pressure than some other states are.
One can also imagine other remedies for this problem. States could certainly threaten or impose unilateral trade sanctions against environmentally irresponsible states, and private citizens could always try to organize voluntary boycotts for similar reasons. Some states have taken steps in this direction, and it is easy to imagine such measures becoming more widespread as environmental problems multiply. Alternatively, states that happen to govern environmentally sensitive territory could be paid to preserve it, in the interest of all mankind. In effect, the international community would be subsidizing environmental protection on the part of those who happen to possess the means of doing something about it.
This approach has the merit of not triggering the sort of nationalist backlash that a coercive campaign might provoke, but it might also give some countries an incentive to adopt environmentally irresponsible policies, in the hope of obtaining economic payoffs from a concerned international community.
This is all pretty speculative, and I’ve just begun thinking through some of the implications of these dilemmas. Here’s what I think I do know, however: In a world of sovereign states, each is going to do what it must to protect its interests. If the actions of some states are imperiling the future of all the rest, the possibility of serious confrontations and possibly serious conflict is going to increase. That doesn’t make the use of force inevitable, but more sustained, energetic, and imaginative efforts will be needed to prevent it.
Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.

More from Foreign Policy

Read More
A strong wind blows embers around a resident hosing his burning property during the Creek Fire in Sunland, California, on Dec. 5, 2017.

Trump’s Shadow War on Climate Science

The resignation of a State Department official is the latest instance of a systematic suppression of evidence, former officials and whistleblowers say.
A cattle farmer and director of the local wind farm talks with a regional historian on Aug. 8, 2013, on Pellworm Island, northern Germany, where a shift toward a zero-carbon future has been driven by locals, not energy companies.

The Public Can Solve Climate Change if We Let It

The most efficient way of spreading renewable energy? Getting local communities involved.
A wind farm in Jacobsdorf, Germany, on Feb. 27. PATRICK PLEUL/AFP/Getty Images

Climate Change Requires Big Solutions. But Baby Steps Are the Only Way to Go.

Dramatic projects to mitigate global warming often don’t work. Slow, quiet, incremental policies are the planet’s best hope.

terça-feira, 6 de agosto de 2019

Biografia vetada pelo Itamaraty por causa de prefácio de Ricupero será publicada pela Record

Record publicará livro vetado pelo Itamaraty por causa de prefácio de desafeto de chanceler

Obra com texto de Rubens Ricupero foi escrita por um dos maiores historiadores da diplomacia brasileira

Patricia Campos Mello
Folha de S. Paulo, 6/08/2019


Para compartilhar esse conteúdo, por favor utilize o link https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/08/record-publicara-livro-vetado-pelo-itamaraty-por-causa-de-prefacio-de-desafeto-de-chanceler.shtml ou as ferramentas oferecidas na página. Textos, fotos, artes e vídeos da Folha estão protegidos pela legislação brasileira sobre direito autoral. Não reproduza o conteúdo do jornal em qualquer meio de comunicação, eletrônico ou impresso, sem autorização da Folhapress (pesquisa@folhapress.com.br). As regras têm como objetivo proteger o investimento que a Folha faz na qualidade de seu jornalismo. Se precisa copiar trecho de texto da Folha para uso privado, por favor logue-se como assinante ou cadastrado.

segunda-feira, 5 de agosto de 2019

A destruição da Amazonia no governo Bolsonaro - The Economist

Deathwatch for the Amazon
Brazil has the power to save Earth’s greatest forest—or destroy it
The Economist, Londres – 1.8.2019

Although its cradle is the sparsely wooded savannah, humankind has long looked to forests for food, fuel, timber and sublime inspiration. Still a livelihood for 1.5bn people, forests maintain local and regional ecosystems and, for the other 6.2bn, provide a—fragile and creaking—buffer against climate change. Now droughts, wildfires and other human-induced changes are compounding the damage from chainsaws. In the tropics, which contain half of the world’s forest biomass, tree-cover loss has accelerated by two-thirds since 2015; if it were a country, the shrinkage would make the tropical rainforest the world’s third-biggest carbon-dioxide emitter, after China and America.
Nowhere are the stakes higher than in the Amazon basin—and not just because it contains 40% of Earth’s rainforests and harbours 10-15% of the world’s terrestrial species. South America’s natural wonder may be perilously close to the tipping-point beyond which its gradual transformation into something closer to steppe cannot be stopped or reversed, even if people lay down their axes. Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, is hastening the process—in the name, he claims, of development. The ecological collapse his policies may precipitate would be felt most acutely within his country’s borders, which encircle 80% of the basin—but would go far beyond them, too. It must be averted.
Humans have been chipping away at the Amazon rainforest since they settled there well over ten millennia ago. Since the 1970s they have done so on an industrial scale. In the past 50 years Brazil has relinquished 17% of the forest’s original extent, more than the area of France, to road- and dam-building, logging, mining, soyabean farming and cattle ranching. After a seven-year government effort to slow the destruction, it picked up in 2013 because of weakened enforcement and an amnesty for past deforestation. Recession and political crisis further pared back the government’s ability to enforce the rules. Now Mr Bolsonaro has gleefully taken a buzz saw to them. Although congress and the courts have blocked some of his efforts to strip parts of the Amazon of their protected status, he has made it clear that rule-breakers have nothing to fear, despite the fact that he was elected to restore law and order. Because 70-80% of logging in the Amazon is illegal, the destruction has soared to record levels. Since he took office in January, trees have been disappearing at a rate of over two Manhattans a week.
The Amazon is unusual in that it recycles much of its own water. As the forest shrivels, less recycling takes place. At a certain threshold, that causes more of the forest to wither so that, over a matter of decades, the process feeds on itself. Climate change is bringing the threshold closer every year as the forest heats up. Mr Bolsonaro is pushing it towards the edge. Pessimists fear that the cycle of runaway degradation may kick in when another 3-8% of the forest vanishes—which, under Mr Bolsonaro, could happen soon. There are hints the pessimists may be correct (see Briefing). In the past 15 years the Amazon has suffered three severe droughts. Fires are on the rise.
Brazil’s president dismisses such findings, as he does science more broadly. He accuses outsiders of hypocrisy—did rich countries not fell their own forests?—and, sometimes, of using environmental dogma as a pretext to keep Brazil poor. “The Amazon is ours,” the president thundered recently. What happens in the Brazilian Amazon, he thinks, is Brazil’s business.
Except it isn’t. A “dieback” would directly hurt the seven other countries with which Brazil shares the river basin. It would reduce the moisture channelled along the Andes as far south as Buenos Aires. If Brazil were damming a real river, not choking off an aerial one, downstream nations could consider it an act of war. As the vast Amazonian store of carbon burned and rotted, the world could heat up by as much as 0.1°C by 2100—not a lot, you may think, but the preferred target of the Paris climate agreement allows further warming of only 0.5°C or so.
Mr Bolsonaro’s other arguments are also flawed. Yes, the rich world has razed its forests. Brazil should not copy its mistakes, but learn from them instead as, say, France has, by reforesting while it still can. Paranoia about Western scheming is just that. The knowledge economy values the genetic information sequestered in the forest more highly than land or dead trees. Even if it did not, deforestation is not a necessary price of development. Brazil’s output of soyabeans and beef rose between 2004 and 2012, when forest-clearing slowed by 80%. In fact, aside from the Amazon itself, Brazilian agriculture may be deforestation’s biggest victim. The drought of 2015 caused maize farmers in the central Brazilian state of Mato Grosso to lose a third of their harvest.
For all these reasons, the world ought to make clear to Mr Bolsonaro that it will not tolerate his vandalism. Food companies, pressed by consumers, should spurn soyabeans and beef produced on illegally logged Amazonian land, as they did in the mid-2000s. Brazil’s trading partners should make deals contingent on its good behaviour. The agreement reached in June by the EU and Mercosur, a South American trading bloc of which Brazil is the biggest member, already includes provisions to protect the rainforest. It is overwhelmingly in the parties’ interest to enforce them. So too for China, which is anxious about global warming and needs Brazilian agriculture to feed its livestock. Rich signatories of the Paris agreement, who pledged to pay developing ones to plant carbon-consuming trees, ought to do so. Deforestation accounts for 8% of global greenhouse-gas emissions but attracts only 3% of the aid earmarked for combating climate change.

The wood and the trees

If there is a green shoot in Mr Bolsonaro’s scorched-earth tactics towards the rainforest, it is that they have made the Amazon’s plight harder to ignore—and not just for outsiders. Brazil’s agriculture minister urged Mr Bolsonaro to stay in the Paris agreement. Unchecked deforestation could end up hurting Brazilian farmers if it leads to foreign boycotts of Brazilian farm goods. Ordinary Brazilians should press their president to reverse course. They have been blessed with a unique planetary patrimony, whose value is intrinsic and life-sustaining as much as it is commercial. Letting it perish would be a needless catastrophe.