História: Crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba: o dia mais perigoso do mundo - Tom Blanton (H-Diplo)

 

National Security Archive: The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60: The Most Dangerous Day

by Michael Evans

Joint Chiefs: “The president has a feeling that time is running out”

Cascade of human errors, nuclear-armed flashpoints on October 27 nearly started World War III by accident

JFK: “always some SOB who doesn’t get the word”

By Tom Blanton

Washington, D.C., October 27, 2022 - The most dangerous 24 hours of the Cuban Missile Crisis came on Saturday, October 27, 1962, 60 years ago today, as the U.S. moved closer to attacking Cuba and nuclear-armed flashpoints erupted over Siberia, at the quarantine line, and in Cuba itself—a rapid escalation that convinced both John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev to strike the deal that would stop events from further spiraling out of control.

The surviving notes of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on that day, October 27, depict a six-and-a-half-hour cascade of crises where human error, miscalculation, reckless deployment of nuclear weapons, and testosterone ruled the day. The JCS notes from October and November 1962, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and published today by the National Security Archive, are all that survive after the Chiefs’ decision, in the 1970s, to destroy the tapes and transcripts from over two decades of JCS meetings.

The notes depict how top U.S. military officials reacted to the unfolding crisis in real time, including the shootdown of a U-2 spy plane over Cuba that afternoon—seen as a major escalation—while at the same time the JCS were unaware that U.S. naval forces were dropping grenades on a Soviet sub armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo near the quarantine line. As they continued to prepare for a full-scale invasion of Cuba, JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor told the Chiefs that President Kennedy was “seized with the idea of trading Turkish for Cuban missiles” and “has a feeling that time is running out.”

Today’s posting features the JCS notes along with photographs and additional context about the most dangerous day of the missile crisis, and the sequence of events that persuaded both Kennedy and Khrushchev to reach the trade that would ultimately end the superpower confrontation.

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Book Review: Wallace J. Thies. Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War - Dorle Hellmuth (H-Diplo)

A contenção funciona? Talvez de um país grande a um país pequeno. Entre os EUA e a China dificilmente funcionará.

H-Diplo Review Essay 455, Hellmuth on Thies, Why Containment Works

by christopher ball

H-Diplo REVIEW ESSAY 455

27 October 2022

Wallace J. Thies. Why Containment Works: Power, Proliferation, and Preventive War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020  ISBN13: 9781501749483

https://hdiplo.org/to/E455
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Andrew Szarejko | Production Editor: Christopher Ball

Review by Dorle Hellmuth, The Catholic University of America

In Why Containment Works, Wallace Thies convincingly shows that there was never a need for the 2003 invasion of Iraq had Bush administration policymakers stuck to the containment and deterrence concepts that had been utilized during much of the Cold War. But this powerfully argued book is not merely about the contentious Iraq invasion that has been much debated elsewhere; Thies makes a compelling case for containment as an invaluable policy tool, and one that is easier to craft and sustain than commonly thought. 

In a world where states’ military assets rely on finite resources, Thies contrasts two vastly different strategic outlooks—theories of victory—of how these military resources are best utilized strategically: The Bush Doctrine which centered on action-oriented preventive use of force versus the more nuanced, long-term application of containment. 

Thies defines containment strategy “as a form of managed conflict that seeks to prevent the target state from overturning the local, regional, or global distribution of power” (vii). It is a long-term approach which is often slow and requires a lot of patience, and in true George Kennan fashion, the containing state will focus on defending vital interests and tailor its responses accordingly. In short, it is best understood as a game of “move and countermove” (10). Containment also defies more traditional, clearcut measures of success aimed at the immediate elimination of a threat: A containment policy is deemed successful as long as the target state does not manage to do anything that the container state would consider unacceptable. But that’s precisely what might make it less appealing to policymakers or the public, and a seeming relict of the Cold War: It is grey as opposed to black and white; drawn out instead of quick; often more passive rather than about initiative. It is not designed to win conclusively, but rather to live with problem states. 

As the contest is fluid and the various moves and countermoves are often staged simultaneously, a containment strategy may “seem disjointed, reactive, overtaken by events,” (10) improvised, or even worse, the containing state may appear in over its head and outplayed by the target state. There is room for error and failure, to be sure: Containing states might become exasperated and randomly rush on to the next tactic(s); upcoming elections might create pressures for action; or containment policies might resemble too much of a watered-down compromise to be effective. Most of the time, however, there is much potential, vast room for creativity, and remarkable versatility: “A containment policy is bounded only by the imagination and the resourcefulness of those who set it in motion and then carry it out,” (18) Thies explains. What is more, policy options available to the container state usually increase when containment works. Generally involving a mix of “threats (verbal and nonverbal), sanctions or rewards, and if need be, forceful actions,” containment resembles “the art of thwarting an adversary’s plots and schemes, and not just once but again and again” (7). In the case of pre-2003 invasion Iraq, the US containment toolbox came with no less than five different options: United Nations WMD inspections of Iraqi offices and suspected WMD facilities; UN control of oil revenues and imports; multinational naval interdictions of WMDs and ballistic missile technology; and the enforcement of no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq which, starting in 2001, also featured US and British airstrikes against Iraqi command-and-control centers near the capital as well as numerous other military targets. 

Chapter 1 (fittingly titled Preventive War vs. Containment) develops the conceptual framework of the book. What policy prescriptions flow from the 2002 Bush Doctrine when viewed as a theory of victory, and how do they compare to an alternative theory of victory based on containment and deterrence? According to the Bush Doctrine, containment and deterrence had run its course in a world with “unbalanced dictators” (2), “outlaw regimes” (3), rogue states in possession or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and “shadowy terrorist networks” (3) without country allegiances, putting a high prize on the proactive, unilateral, and preventive use of swift and decisive force.  

Having examined the claims that make up the Bush Doctrine, Thies argues the opposite: Containment and deterrence are neither outdated, weakened, nor unsustainable concepts; buying time and wait-and-see approaches are often preferable to (rushing into) action; defense is the preferable, often superior choice to offense (precisely because superpowers like the US can rely on seemingly infinite supplies of resources against often smaller states and wear them down over time, usually without the use of military force); and preventive wars do not hold answers for the many unresolved issues and uncertainties that follow military strikes and invasions. Thies’s ‘anti-Bush Doctrine’ thus boils down to four essential factors: the willingness to 1., engage in a long-term contest against a target state via constant moves and countermoves; 2., relinquish the initiative as it often reduces the need for fighting in the first place; 3., identify potential allies and build coalitions; while being able to 4., rely on the innovative and tenacious nature of democracies (Thies is especially partial to the US separation of powers system, whose features, he argues, bring about such vetted policymaking that only the best policy ideas can survive). In fact, creating and sustaining a long-term containment strategy is not as difficult as conventional wisdom might suggest because relinquishing the initiative to the target state is “an effective way of thwarting an opponent’s plots and schemes”; regional allies increasingly threatened by the target state will opt to assist the US; and democratic containing states are especially well equipped to negate the “rise of would-be hegemons” (19) due to their resourcefulness and staying power. 

Chapters 2 to 6 are devoted to testing these claims as part of five case studies from the Cold and post-Cold War world, each spanning at least two decades: the containment of Libya (1979-2003), the dual containment of Iraq and Iran (1981-2003), the containment of Iraq (1980-2003), the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing containment of Iran (since 1979). Thies measures containment success by whether the US was able to block aggressive actions by Libya, Iraq, and Iran, including “support for terrorist or other military operations,” (46) or whether those countries’ quest for nuclear weapons ceased or significantly decreased. Because the United States can rely on such a massive array of resources, there usually is no need to resort to blunt force let alone preventive war, allowing for a more cost-effective and variable approach when dealing with smaller states. 

Based on evidence obtained in the five case studies, Chapter 7 reappraises containment by revisiting Thies’s alternative claims – the powerful value of ‘move and countermove’ amid constant bargaining; the willingness to relinquish the initiative because it forces the dreadful responsibility of having to fire the first shot and start a war upon the target state; the importance of attracting regional allies; and the sustaining strengths and ingenuity of (especially presidential) democracies – further reiterating that containment works best under the aforementioned conditions. Like chapter 1, the final chapter is peppered with examples, anecdotes, and debates from the Cold War, essentially tying the Cold War and post-Cold War lessons of containment together. 

Why Containment Works offers rigorous analysis, meticulously researched case studies, and a crisp, succinct structure. Thies pays close attention to the many fascinating nuances, or ‘nooks and crannies,’ that have made up US containment strategy during the Cold War and after, against especially smaller regional states, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, but also vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. Another major strength of the book is that Thies explores the different arguments presented by containment optimists and pessimists from all possible angles. 

Above all, Thies’s findings come with crucial policy implications and should give US decisionmakers pause. When contemplating the next preventive war, containment should be considered first – because, under the right circumstances, it can work and has worked so many times. This has particular relevance for the ongoing Iranian nuclear dilemma, which continues to haunt the United States and the international community. Thies’s analysis of US containment of Iran ends in 2016, and President Trump withdrew the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018. While the US and Iran have returned to the negotiation table under President Biden, the future of the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, and the Iranian nuclear program is arguably further along than ever. Preventive military action is likely bound to become a hot button issue once again in the foreseeable future. 

Even if Thies portrays the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate of the Iranian nuclear program or the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in too much of a positive light, the bottom line remains: Fifteen years later, there is no Iranian bomb, and Iran was willing to restrain its ambitions by conceding to the 2015 nuclear deal. Furthermore, containment does not have to end even if Iran were to go nuclear. While Thies does associate containment success with Iran’s not having produced a nuclear weapon, the historical record, according to Thies, still suggests a nuclear Iran could be contained and deterred like the Soviet Union and others before.

As the scope of any book is naturally limited, this excellent work comes with only few potential weaknesses that may best be considered avenues for further research. Since the Bush Doctrine placed such importance on preventing the next terrorist attack by striking first, such future research might examine under which circumstances terrorist networks and/or insurgent groups can be contained. Even more, what would an assessment of contemporary US policies involving larger adversaries, such as a resurgent, bellicose Russia and an increasingly assertive China, tell us about the potency of containment?  Even if the United States has a larger containment arsenal, and therefore more policy options, than any other opponent, presidential democracy in the US has been in decline in recent years; this leads to questions as to whether US democracy is still robust enough – and still allowing for only the best ideas to become policy despite significant political polarization -- to weather drawn-out cat-and-mouse-games that make up containment contests with large states?

Having said that, the book fills a crucial gap precisely because it demonstrates the overall value of containing smaller states, both during and after the Cold War, as well as containment during the Cold War (against a fellow superpower, the Soviet Union, and major regional player, China). In other words, this is an invaluable contribution to the literature on containment theory. I have no doubt that this exquisite book will become a must-read standard work, alongside John Lewis Gaddis’ Strategies of Containment^[1] (2005) widely considered the seminal work on the Cold War containment of the Soviet Union. While several other noteworthy works since 9/11 have concentrated on the global war on terror, ^[2] Thies’s book offers a refreshing take on containment against traditional state opponents and challenges pre- and post-9/11. Thies’s comprehensive account of U.S. containment practices involving five different countries also goes beyond other recent books with a more limited focus on Iran.^[3]

On a more personal note, I consider this book Wallace Thies’s final masterpiece. A leading NATO specialist and scholar (Why NATO Endures and Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO),^[4] Thies sadly passed away in July 2020. When he told me about the manuscript that would turn into Why Containment Works a few months before his retirement, Thies humbly referred to his book project as a compilation of lecture notes (accumulated during decades of teaching international relations classes at The Catholic University of America). This book clearly goes above and beyond that. As a former doctoral student and colleague of Wallace Thies, I am incredibly grateful that his critical analysis will continue to inspire and assist current and future policymakers and students of IR theory. I highly recommend this book to any decisionmaker involved in the crafting or implementation of containment policies, as well as any serious student of containment strategy. 

Dorle Hellmuth is Associate Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America and the author of Counterterrorism and the State (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016). Her research and teaching interests include (counter)terrorism and -radicalization; political violence; NATO; transatlantic security; and US foreign policy. 

  

---

[1] John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[2] Ian Shapiro, Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; Jonathan Stevenson, Counter-terrorism: Containment and Beyond, Adelphi Paper 367 (London: Routledge: 2005).

[3] Kenneth Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy (London: Schuster & Schuster, 2013); Ehud Eilam, Containment in the Middle East (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2019). 

[4] Wallace Thies, Why NATO Endures (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2009); Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (London: Routledge: 2015).

Russia faz conscrição forçada de estrangeiros Tadjik para enviá-los lutar na Ucrânia - Francesca Ebel (WP)

Mercenários, é tudo o que restou a Putin para levar avante a sua guerra insana. 

Mass shooting in Belgorod exposes Russia’s forced mobilization of migrants 

By  Francesca Ebel

The Washington Post, October 29, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EDT

A poster showing a soldier with the slogan “Glory to the Heroes of Russia” in front of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow, on Oct. 18. (Yuri Kochetkov/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock.

Ehson Aminzoda seemed to be following the path of many Central Asian immigrants in Russia — initially working as a bricklayer after arriving in Moscow earlier this year, then at a local restaurant, saving his modest earnings in hope of returning to his native Tajikistan to marry. On Oct. 10, he headed out to meet friends, and was seen leaving the Lyublino subway station in southeast Moscow. Then, he disappeared.

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Five days later, according to Russian authorities, Aminzoda, 24, was in Belgorod, just 24 miles from the Ukrainian border, where he and another man, Mehrob Rakhmonov, 23, allegedly opened fire at a military training base, killing nine and injuring 15 others. The alleged shooters were also killed.

The Russian defense ministry said the shooting took place during a training session for a group of volunteers “who wished to participate in the military operation in Ukraine.” Russian authorities quickly branded the incident a terrorist attack, deliberately highlighting the nationality of the alleged gunmen, who were Tajik.

Officially, little else has been disclosed about the shooting, which has been overshadowed by the ongoing death and destruction of Russia’s war in Ukraine.But rights activists and relatives of the alleged gunmen believe they were forcibly conscripted. They said the mere presence of the two Tajik men at the base in Belgorod points to pervasive abuses against migrant workers in Russia and to long-simmering ethnic tensions, which have worsened as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chaotic and much-criticized military mobilization.

While many men of fighting age have fled Russia to avoid being sent to fight in Ukraine — creating a new, reverse migration of Russians to Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan — some migrants in Russia have been swept into the ranks of the Russian military despite having no obligation to serve.

Some appear to have volunteered to fight, potentially induced to enlist by a new law offering a “fast track” to Russian citizenship for foreigners who sign a one-year military contract.

In other cases, advocates say, men seeking help from Russia’s Federal Migration Service were tricked into signing military papers, while still other migrants have been caught up in the botched mobilization drive and illegally issued draft orders despite not being Russian citizens.

It is unclear how Aminzoda ended up in Belgorod, which is a major staging ground for the war in Ukraine. Relatives said they have no idea.

“How he ended up in Belgorod, we do not know,” Firuz Aminzoda, a brother of the alleged gunman told Radio Ozodi, RFE/RL’s Tajik service. “My brother was not a terrorist, and he did not have such thoughts. He [was] an ordinary immigrant who wanted to work and build his life.” He emphasized that Ehson Aminzoda was not a Russian citizen and therefore not eligible to be mobilized.

Ksenia Sobchak, Russian star linked to Putin, fled using Israeli passport

The alleged Belgorod shooters disappeared around the same time that authorities in Moscow began raiding offices and hostels, and grabbing men off the streets in what appeared to be a mad push to reach the mobilization’s targets. (On Friday, defense minister Sergei Shoigu declared it completed).

Shortly before Putin issued his mobilization decree on Sept. 21, the Russian military opened a recruitment office at Moscow’s main migrant service center. Since the opening of that center, lawyers and activists say they have been inundated with pleas for help from migrants who say they have been detained, coerced or tricked into signing up for the army.

A policeman in St. Petersburg accompanies a group of migrant laborers on their way to renew work permit in April 2020. (Dmitri Lovetsky/AP)

Videos on social media from Ukraine also appear to show Russian prisoners of war who claim they are workers from Central Asia and were sent to fight because they did not have their documents in order.

Valentina Chupik, the director of Tong Jahoni, a nonprofit organization that helps Central Asian migrants in Russia, said she has received at least 70 requests for assistance from migrants, some saying they were beaten and tortured.

According to Chupik, who is based Yerevan, Armenia, after being deported from Russia, one man from Kazakhstan was bundled into a van, where police beat him, electroshocked his genitals, and forced him to sign a draft order.

The Washington Post could not independently verify Chupik’s account. The alleged victim has fled back to Kazakhstan and could not be reached.

But other migrants from Central Asia living in Russia said in interviews that they were detained by the police and pressured to enlist. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because of security risks.

A 35-year-old food deliveryman from Uzbekistan who has lived in Russia for 15 years, said that when he went to the migrant center officials marked his passport, fingerprinted him, and without explanation announced that he had just signed a contract to serve.

The man said he refused and left the center. He was then apprehended by the police who tried to intimidate him into signing the documents. He was released and is now trying to leave Russia.

“When I first heard the words of ‘mobilization,’ I didn’t feel anything, because my situation is far worse than any mobilization drive in Russia,” the man said. “Here, the attitude toward migrants is very harsh.”

He added: “I would never fight on a foreign land and for the sake of foreign people.”

A second man, a 36-year-old dual Russian-Tajik citizen who works as an electrician and gives legal advice to other migrants in Moscow, said that he was detained during a raid by the police at the construction site where he works, on account of his ethnic Caucasian appearance. The man said he was brought to a police wagon where officers threatened to beat him and forced him to sign the summons.

“I’m not going to serve, I am against it,” he said, adding that he was trying to leave Russia as soon as possible. “Why take someone else’s land for yourself in the first place?”

“But if they catch me again, I will have to serve,” he said. “It’s either that or years in prison.”

Lawyers said that the Russian authorities are using several methods to pressure migrant workers to enlist including falsifying criminal cases against them, promising money, and threatening deportation.

Russian arrested by Norway attended seminar on hybrid attacks, pipelines

Karimjon Yorov, a Moscow-based lawyer and human rights activist helping Tajik migrants, said that some migrants had signed up voluntarily, drawn by the promise of money or citizenship but that others have had their residency permits canceled if they refused to enlist.

Chupik called the heavy-handed methods “a bunch of crimes rolled into one.”

“Firstly, it is mercenarism, which is prohibited by Russian law,” Chupik said. “Secondly, when a person is forced into military service, this is already, of course, a crime, and this is coercion to commit the crime of mercenarism. Thirdly, violent crimes have reportedly been committed including the abuse of authority and torture.”

Chupik said that forcing migrants to fight in a war was just the latest example of cruelty and injustice that they face living in Russia, where they are always in an “extreme position of oppression.”

“Naturally, in a war, they are the first victims, because they are defenseless,” Chupik said. “Who will come out for them at a rally? Who will defend them? To whom can they complain so that their voice is heard?”

How the E.U. has fallen short on promises to Ukrainian refugees

Military analysts say that a disproportionate number of Russian fighters in the war in Ukraine are ethnic minorities from regions outside the main cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, including Buryatia in Siberia, and Chechnya and Dagestan in the North Caucasus. These regions have suffered heavy casualties.

Putin had long resisted declaring a mobilization in part to avoid the war being felt by middle class Russians from Moscow and St. Petersburg who are more likely to criticize and resist. Following September’s decree, however, protests broke out in Dagestan and Yakutia, and governors in several regions acknowledged that many men were mobilized by mistake.

A recent report from the Institute of the Study of War, a U.S.-based research group, found that the shooting in Belgorod was likely a consequence of the Kremlin’s “continual reliance” on ethnic minority communities to bear the burden of mobilization.

“Ethnic minorities that have been targeted and forced into fighting a war defined by Russian imperial goals and shaped by Russian Orthodox nationalism will likely continue to feel alienation, which will create feedback loops of discontent leading to resistance followed by crackdowns on minority enclaves,” the report stated. “The Belgorod shooting is likely a manifestation of exactly such domestic ramifications.”

Details about the shooting remain scarce. Russian media and war-focused Telegram channels have reported that it may have been set off by a dispute between volunteer fighters who were being trained at a shooting range and a senior officer who made disparaging remarks about Allah.

“I think that we will not know the truth about the shooting or shooters for a while, if ever, as this is not in the interests of the military or the state” said Yorov, the lawyer and rights activist. “But the Russian authorities will surely make life even harder for migrants in Russia, especially Muslims.”

Fortaleza de papel: uma vida através dos livros - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Fortaleza de papel: uma vida através dos livros

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Esquema de obra sobre a minha trajetória intelectual, misturando leituras de livros e episódios de vida.

 

Comecei a elaborar, quatro anos atrás, um esquema do que poderia ser um relato, de tipo memorialístico, centrado em fases de minha vida, mas sempre através de livros, obras que eu fui lendo, ao longo dos anos, e outras obras que foram sendo publicadas em cada um dos anos, sem que eu necessariamente as tenha lido, naquele momento, ou mesmo depois, mas que marcaram o mercado editorial ou os debates culturais naqueles anos sequenciais. O esquema é tentativo, inclusive porque não foi terminado em julho de 2018, tendo ficado incompleto nos capítulos específicos a cada uma das partes. Transcrevo, portanto, as grandes divisões desse projetado relato, mudando aqui e ali algumas poucas palavras. Não se trata de um esquema devidamente preparado, e sim notas rápidas num caderninho de bolso, apenas um registro a ser desenvolvido posteriormente, o que nunca cheguei a fazer. Vale apenas como reflexo de minha preocupação em registrar para a posteridade, e eventual benefício de descendentes familiares e curiosos, uma espécie de síntese de minha formação intelectual, que foi feita basicamente por meio de leituras, livros, de revistas, de jornais, mas também por meio de viagens de todos os tipos, uma intensa observação do mundo, com reflexões a cada momento, das quais comecei a deixar registro apenas tardiamente.

 

Fortaleza de papel: uma vida através dos livros

 

[Brasília, 11/07/2018]

 

Apresentação: por que uma trajetória através de livros e por que a fortaleza?

            Palavras voam, escritos permanecem

 

            Parte I – Origens e formação (1949-1961)

1. Uma casa sem livros (1949-1955)

            Origens familiares, a pobreza como cenário natural

2. A descoberta da escrita: uma biblioteca para brincar (1956-1957)

            Biblioteca Infantil Municipal Anne Frank

3. Devorando a biblioteca: os atraentes objetos de desejo (1957-1961)

            Como me tornei um rato de biblioteca

 

            Parte II – Consolidação do conhecimento (1962-1970)

4. Construindo minhas vantagens comparativas (1961-1962)

            Leituras e contato com os problemas do mundo

5. Navegando na escrita, nas leituras, nas viagens (1962-1965)

            A experiência fundamental do Ginásio Vocacional Oswaldo Aranha

6. Autonomia no estudo (1966-1968)

            A definição política e por uma trajetória de vida

7. O ingresso na universidade e o ativismo nas sombras (1969-1970)

            Os anos de chumbo, a resistência e a decisão de partir

 

            Parte III – Engajamento (1970-1977)

8. Oceanos à frente (1970-1971)

            Contando comigo mesmo, sem um roteiro preciso

9. Um longo exílio na Europa (1971-1977)

            Cadernos e mais cadernos de leituras em bibliotecas; viagens

 

            Parte IV – Le Grand Tournant (1977-1999)

10. A decisão de voltar ao Brasil (1977)

            Um doutoramento interrompido; trabalho acadêmico e nova carreira

11. Uma súbita ascensão à elite do mandarinato (1977-1985)

            Ingresso na carreira; reversão de expectativas, vida familiar, doutoramento

12. Maturidade intelectual e profissional (1986-1992)

            Dois grandes postos na carreira, o aprendizado na prática, o aprofundamento 

13. Nascimento de um escrevinhador (1992-1996)

            A especialização nos estudos, as primeiras obras de peso

14. Uma dupla militância: diplomática e acadêmica (1996-1999)

            Defendendo ideias e participando do debate público

 

            Parte V – Racionalidade e maturidade (2000-2006)

15. A democracia na América (1999-2003)

            Um segundo grande aprendizado, reforçando convicções, valores e princípios

16. Uma experiência no mandarinato oficial (2003-2006)

            Núcleo de Assuntos Estratégicos da PR, de um governo muito confuso

 

            Parte VI – Travessia do deserto (2006-2016)

17. Um deserto para chamar de seu (2006-2010)

            De volta a uma biblioteca e à profissão de escrevinhador 

18. O Oriente é vermelho: um estágio na China (2010)

            Estada em Xangai, leituras e viagens

19. Um novo exílio, acadêmico e turístico (2011-2012)

            Aulas em Paris, viagens por toda a Europa

20. De volta à América (2013-2015)

            Mais escritos, mais viagens, novas reflexões

 

            Parte VII – Retomada do prazer intelectual (2016-2022)

21. O trabalho ideal: pensando a diplomacia (2016-2018)

            Ativismo editorial e intelectual na direção do IPRI

22. Uma pequena travessia em mar revolto (2019-2021)

            Uma sucessão de livros sobre o bolsolavismo diplomático

23. Da liberdade dos antigos e dos modernos (2022-?)

            De volta à fortaleza de papel: a diferença que o estudo faz

 

Conclusões: minha trajetória intelectual, uma tentativa de síntese

 

Linha do tempo, profissional e acadêmica

Principais obras publicadas

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4269: 11 julho 2018, 29 outubro 2022, 3 p.

 

The Dragon Dance: U.S.-China Security Cooperation - James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment)

Revendo meus "sites preferidos" no Blogspot, acabei caindo num que alimentei entre 2009 e 2012, período em que estudei bastante a, e morei, durante algum tempo, na  China. Curiosamente a última postagem no blog, no final de 2012, se referia ao primeiro encontro entre o ex-presidente Obama e aquele que se tornaria no novo imperador da China, como reproduzo abaixo. Quem quiser percorrer, tem coisas muito interessantes sobre a China de dez anos atrás...

Ao todo foram 560 postagens, a maior parte em 2010, quando residimos, Carmen Lícia Palazzo e eu, em Shanghai por 8 meses, com muitas viagens pela China, e até em Hong Kong, Macau e o Japão. Neste link: http://shangaiexpress.blogspot.com/

SHANGHAI EXPRESS

NEWS, COMMENTS, DISCUSSIONS, INFORMATION AND ANALYSES ABOUT THE EMERGING ORIENT, THAT IS, ASIA PACIF, AND ESPECIALLY CHINA, AND THEIR MOST RELEVANT ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS. A SPACE TO FOLLOW THE DYNAMICS AND THE RICHES OF AN ENTIRE WORLD, WHICH WAS, IN THE PAST, THE MOST DEVELOPED REGION IN THE PLANET, AND IS PRONE TO REGAIN A RENEWED IMPORTANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2012

The Dragon Dance: U.S.-China Security Cooperation - James M. Acton 

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The Dragon Dance: U.S.-China Security Cooperation

By: James M. Acton 

Carnegie Endowment, Thursday, November 29, 2012 2

China’s nuclear modernization concerns the United States and its Asian allies, but Washington has largely failed to engage Beijing effectively on nuclear strategy. The failure stems at least in part from China’s view that engagement narrowly focused on nuclear issues is a losing proposition. To make progress in his second term, President Obama should offer a broader vision for strategic cooperation that includes reducing nuclear risks by restraining competition in the conventional realm.  

James M. Acton

Senior Associate
Nuclear Policy Program

More from Acton...

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• Beyond Treaties: Immediate Steps to Reduce Nuclear Dangers

• Transparency and Strategic Stability

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Over the last ten or fifteen years, the possibility of a conflict with China has become an ever more important focus of U.S. defense planning. With long-running wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, preparing for such a contingency has not always been the highest-profile item on the Pentagon’s agenda. But, the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia is clear evidence of where it believes the risk of interstate warfare, defined in terms of both likelihood and consequence, is greatest.
Sino-American military competition primarily plays out in the conventional domain, and escalation to nuclear use in a U.S.-Chinese conflict is thankfully much less likely than it was during the U.S.-Soviet standoff. Yet both Washington and Beijing still plan for a nuclear war—the ultimate in low-probability, high-consequence catastrophes. For this reason more than any other, the administration of Barack Obama, like the George W. Bush administration before it, has sought to manage the risk by engaging China in a strategic dialogue. The administration is virtually certain to continue these efforts in Obama’s second term.
Certainly, the Obama administration is also driven in part by a desire to create political and security conditions that would enable deep reductions in nuclear weapons, eventually leading to their abolition. One of these conditions is the integration of China’s nuclear arsenal into an arms control framework. However, other reasons to engage China on nuclear deterrence command broader political support. China is slowly expanding and modernizing its nuclear forces, sparking concern in both the United States and among Washington’s Asian allies, most notably Japan. These concerns are exacerbated by Beijing’s refusal to provide information about the size and structure of its arsenal. As long as these trends continue, all U.S. administrations—Democratic and Republican—are likely to try to press Beijing to be more transparent and to explain its motivations and intentions for modernization.

The Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia is clear evidence of where it believes the risk of interstate warfare is greatest.

As part of this modernization, China is in the process of deploying road-mobile missiles and developing submarine-launched ones to replace its older silo-based weapons, thereby significantly enhancing the survivability of its nuclear forces. It is also developing technologies to defeat U.S. ballistic missile defenses in an attempt to ensure that, should these missiles ever be used, their warheads would reach their targets.
China is also slowly expanding its nuclear forces. In 2002, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China had twenty intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States,¹ and in 2010, a report placed that number between 30 and 35.² In addition, China is developing the capability to place multiple warheads on a single missile. If Beijing deployed this technology, it could rapidly expand its nuclear forces, but there is no evidence it has yet done so.
So far, U.S. efforts to engage China on nuclear strategy have had limited success. Part of the reason may be that, given the United States’ huge qualitative and quantitative advantages in nuclear forces, China appears to view engagement narrowly focused on nuclear issues as a zero-sum game that it will likely lose. Strategic cooperation might appear more obviously mutually beneficial if it were based on a broader strategy of reducing nuclear risks by restraining competition in the conventional realm. Of course, there is a real possibility that an ambitious U.S. proposal to expand cooperation would be rebuffed by China. But, if Beijing does engage, the United States and China could make real progress toward managing a genuinely existential threat to both of them.

A Decade of Limited Progress

American efforts to engage China—at both the official and nongovernmental levels—have often attempted to separate nuclear deterrence from the rest of the bilateral relationship. The aim has been to discuss it either completely by itself or, occasionally, alongside other “strategic” issues, such as cybersecurity, space weapons, and missile defense. Most obviously, U.S. officials believe—and regularly and publicly exhort Beijing to understand—that greater transparency about China’s nuclear arsenal would, on its own, help stabilize the two states’ nuclear relationship.
This belief has influenced the way Washington has attempted to engage Beijing in private. The Bush administration sought a dialogue with China focused solely on nuclear strategy. Only one round of this dialogue was ever conducted, and that was in April 2008. The Obama administration’s efforts appear to have been somewhat broader but are still tightly focused compared to the full range of issues in the bilateral military relationship. Specifically, the United States and China held two rounds of a “strategic security dialogue” in May 2011 and May 2012. Very little information about the discussions is available, but the meetings seem to have originated with a suggestion made in January 2011 by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to his counterpart, General Liang Guanglie, that the two states should engage on “nuclear, missile defense, space, and cyber issues.” Whatever its agenda, the absence of information about this dialogue suggests it is at a fairly nascent stage.

Strategic cooperation might appear more obviously mutually beneficial if it were based on a broader strategy of reducing nuclear risks by restraining competition in the conventional realm.

At a marginally more advanced stage is a dialogue between the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including both China and the United States. Formally, this dialogue is focused on topics covered by the treaty (disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy), not bilateral U.S.-Chinese strategic issues. But, China has agreed to lead work on a glossary of nuclear terminology, which could help promote understanding during future bilateral discussions on nuclear deterrence.
In short, a decade’s worth of U.S. efforts to engage China on nuclear deterrence has led to three rounds of intermittent dialogue and a commitment to develop a glossary: hardly impressive progress. Rightly or wrongly, China apparently does not share the U.S. belief that narrowly focused engagement on nuclear issues would be mutually beneficial.
Why China has been reluctant to engage on nuclear issues is a matter for legitimate debate. Virtually all Chinese and many American analysts—particularly those who have studied Chinese documents—believe that Beijing’s policy is driven, to a significant degree, by a perceived threat from the United States. They argue that Beijing is genuinely concerned that, in a deep crisis, the United States might attempt to eliminate China’s nuclear arsenal with a preemptive “first strike” and that greater transparency could further undermine the survivability of its nuclear forces. In 2003, for instance, Chinese analyst Li Bin wrote that:
The survivability of [China’s] current ICBM force . . . relies on ambiguity surrounding numbers. Because China will not confirm or deny reports on the number of its ICBMs, other states cannot have confidence in any estimates. An attacker considering launching a first strike against China would be uncertain of China’s retaliatory capacity. This is how China’s nuclear deterrent works today.³
By contrast, other U.S. analysts believe that China’s opacity and its modernization program are geared toward unilateral gain. They worry Beijing has concluded that a more robust Chinese nuclear arsenal would deter the United States from intervening in a regional conflict, thus undermining U.S. defense commitments in East Asia.
While less discussed, it is also possible that internal considerations, not just external ones, shape Chinese policy significantly. After all, U.S. and Soviet/Russian nuclear weapons decisions—particularly over procurement—were not based solely (or perhaps even mostly) on cold-blooded cost-benefit calculations. They were shaped by bureaucratic and political factors. The administration of John F. Kennedy, for example, increased defense spending, which included the construction of more nuclear weapons, to stimulate the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, according to an authoritative study of Soviet nuclear policy based on interviews with senior decisionmakers conducted just after the collapse of communism, Soviet acquisitions policy was largely driven by the defense-industrial sector’s use of “its political clout to deliver more weapons than the armed services asked for and even to build new weapon systems that the operational military did not want.”⁴ While the specific internal factors at play in China may be rather different, there is little reason to suppose that they are absent.
Whatever the reason for China’s recalcitrance, there are advantages to presenting Beijing with an agenda for strategic cooperation that is more attractive than the one currently on offer. If China’s policy is defensively orientated, it might respond positively to a proposed agenda that is more obviously mutually beneficial. If engagement is currently being stymied by internal factors, a more attractive agenda might motivate it to overcome political or bureaucratic roadblocks. By contrast, Beijing’s refusal to engage with a more attractive offer would provide some evidence that Chinese policy is offensively orientated, which would be a potentially valuable insight—although such evidence, it must be recognized, would hardly be conclusive.

The Inseparability of Nuclear and Conventional Security Dynamics

Conventional weapons that are not usually deemed “strategic” can be inextricably linked to nuclear dynamics. At the most general level, the overall state of the conventional balance can significantly affect nuclear doctrine. Many nuclear-armed states facing a conventionally stronger adversary—including the United States during the Cold War and Russia and Pakistan today—have openly advertised their nuclear weapons as an offset for their weakness.
China has been an exception in this regard because it has pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, although there is a debate within the United States about the credibility of this commitment. In particular, some analysts believe that China would resort to the use of nuclear weapons to avoid defeat in a major conventional war. This debate aside, however, it is possible that if China fails in its current efforts to close the United States’ conventional advantage in the western Pacific, it may openly place a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons. Conversely, if China succeeds in gaining a meaningful conventional advantage, the United States might revert to a much greater role for nuclear weapons in fulfilling defense commitments to its allies.
Beyond these high-level dynamics, there are some much more direct—and pernicious—linkages between conventional and nuclear weapons in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. There is a vigorous conventional competition in the western Pacific, with the United States seeking to retain the ability to project power throughout the region and China seeking to deny it the ability to do so. In turn, Chinese efforts to deter and defeat U.S. power-projection capabilities are leading the United States to develop “strategic conventional” capabilities, which Beijing argues are forcing it to expand and modernize its nuclear forces.
To be concrete, China is developing both anti-satellite weapons and anti-access/area-denial capabilities. By using the former to destroy American communications, guidance, and reconnaissance satellites, China might hope to deny or impede the United States’ ability to project power. Chinese anti-access/area-denial capabilities are designed to hinder U.S. access to the western Pacific and its freedom of movement within the region. The highest-profile Chinese system designed to contribute to these operations is an anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D. Chinese military writings suggest that its primary target would be U.S. aircraft carriers.
Both anti-satellite weapons and anti-access/area-denial capabilities constitute important arguments within the United States for developing long-range, very fast conventional weapons in a program known as Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS). Two commanders of U.S. Strategic Command have, in public testimony before Congress, stated that CPGS weapons could be used to prevent further attacks in the event that China destroys a U.S. satellite. Meanwhile, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review lists experimenting “with conventional prompt global strike prototypes” among its efforts to develop long-range strike capabilities to combat anti-access/area-denial threats.
Whether Chinese defense strategists concerned with “counterintervention” (as they term anti-access/area-denial operations) view CPGS as a particular threat is unclear. However, Chinese officials and analysts working on nuclear deterrence issues have expressed deep worries about the effect that CPGS could have on the survivability of China’s nuclear arsenal. In fact, Chinese concerns about the effect of advanced conventional capabilities on the nuclear balance may be more acute than more documented concerns about ballistic missile defense.⁵

Chinese concerns about the effect of advanced conventional capabilities on the nuclear balance may be more acute than more documented concerns about ballistic missile defense.

Moreover, U.S. missile defense deployments in East Asia are driven, at least in part, by Chinese conventional regional ballistic missiles, which include not only the DF-21D but also land-attack weapons that could be used to target U.S. and allied assets in Taiwan, Japan, and Guam. In public, U.S. officials have stressed the threat from North Korea in justifying recent plans to expand missile defenses in the region. Yet, the presence of missile defense assets in Taiwan is clear evidence that missiles from North Korea are not the only ones that the United States seeks to defeat. Indeed, in an oblique reference to a conflict with China, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has acknowledged that missile defense is designed to help “forward-deployed U.S. forces.”

Chinese analysts and officials certainly assume this to be the case. Li Bin, for example, has argued that the locations of planned U.S. radar installments provide evidence that Chinese ballistic missiles are targets for American defenses.⁶ However, Chinese concerns are not limited to the impact that these defenses may have on its arsenal of regional missiles. Beijing is also concerned that U.S. defenses could eventually be able to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads, thus undermining China’s nuclear deterrent. There is little doubt that this concern partly motivates well-connected Chinese analysts’ criticism of U.S. plans to expand missile defenses in East Asia.

The Security Dilemma

These dynamics may be manifestations of a burgeoning “security dilemma.” A security dilemma is created when a state procures weapons for defensive purposes, inducing an adversary, who fears the buildup might be offensively oriented, to do likewise. The adversary’s buildup can, in turn, spark a countervailing reaction in the first state, resulting in an arms race.
Almost by definition, it is impossible for a state with a security dilemma to definitively identify it as such at the time. Washington cannot know for sure that China’s nuclear modernization or lack of transparency is a defensive reaction to a perceived first strike threat from the United States. For that matter, Beijing cannot be certain that U.S. strategic conventional weapons programs, not to mention the pivot, are defensively oriented and geared toward preventing China from using force to change the status quo. But it is clear that the United States and China have a shared interest in creating a process that will allow each to test the other’s intentions. Such cooperation could help mitigate the security dilemma, if indeed there is one.
For its part, Beijing would benefit from calming the U.S. security concerns that are helping to drive American programs that it finds threatening—including CPGS and ballistic missile defense. Because these programs might be catalyzing Chinese modernization efforts and precluding transparency, Washington has an interest in easing Chinese concerns.

It is clear that the United States and China have a shared interest in creating a process that will allow each to test the other’s intentions.

These negative feedback loops are already creating friction in the extremely complex U.S.-China relationship. If left unchecked, they could create a qualitative or quantitative nuclear arms race. The U.S. Congress has already held hearings on—and expressed concern about—China’s nuclear modernization program. If this program continues unabated it could become a powerful domestic argument in the United States for the development of new nuclear warheads (if for no other reason than to symbolize that the United States still takes nuclear deterrence seriously). China’s modernization program is also creating concern that it seeks numerical parity with the United States and Russia, complicating further U.S.-Russian arms control—something that China certainly benefits from, even if it is not a party to any agreement. Both Beijing and Washington have a mutual interest in preventing these outcomes, the latter for reasons of cost if nothing else given the state of the U.S. budget.

Broadening the Agenda

A broadened agenda for U.S.-China strategic cooperation that includes the conventional domain should be viewed by leaders in both states as attractive. The basic principle of turning a perceived zero-sum game into a mutually beneficial one by linking issues is common to all areas of negotiation, from labor relations to nuclear arms control. That said, addressing the whole range of interlinked military issues in the U.S.-Chinese relationship is truly daunting—impossibly so for the time being.
Over the long term, it might be possible—through treaty or restraint—to develop a durable balance of conventional forces so that each state is confident in its ability to protect its vital interests without nuclear weapons. But profound political change will be needed to achieve such an outcome, much like in Europe toward the very end of the Cold War. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were only able to negotiate limits on conventional forces that effectively precluded the possibility of a surprise attack by either party after Moscow had started the process of internal reform that led to a thawing of the Cold War (and, ultimately, the Soviet Union’s demise). Today, realistically speaking, the United State and China should identify more modest steps that could help mitigate some of the most risky interactions between conventional and nuclear weapons.
For example, while the linkage between Chinese anti-access/area-denial capabilities, particularly the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, and the U.S. CPGS program could produce a potentially destabilizing buildup cycle, it could also be leveraged to enable strategic cooperation. The two states could inform one another about the number of weapons they intend to procure and deploy each year for, say, the next five years. A data exchange like this could help mitigate tendencies to base procurement on worst-case intelligence assessments.
Chinese involvement in this kind of transparency arrangement would not be as unprecedented as widely believed. In 1997, for instance, China, Russia, and three Central Asian Republics negotiated an agreement on conventional force limitations near their borders. This extremely long and detailed document (it runs to over 17,000 words in English) contains extensive provisions for data exchange and demonstrates that Beijing will agree to transparency measures if it views them to be in its interests.
Much more ambitiously, the United States and China could enact a ban on the encryption of diagnostic data, known as telemetry, transmitted during tests of agreed-upon long-range high-precision conventional weapons (such as the DF-21D and a U.S. CPGS system) to allow for more accurate capability assessments. Clearly, such a ban would require a substantial degree of trust to be built first and so cannot be a short-term ambition. But, the U.S.-Soviet agreement to ban telemetry encryption as part of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) demonstrates that, over time, confidence building on the necessary scale is possible.
One particular advantage of broadening the scope of strategic cooperation to include conventional forces is that it becomes possible to pair roughly symmetric capabilities. China’s nuclear arsenal is much smaller and less sophisticated than that of the United States, complicating efforts to persuade Beijing that it is in China’s interest to become more transparent. By contrast, while the DF-21D is less sophisticated than any of the systems being developed under the CPGS program, it is at a significantly more advanced stage of development. This rough symmetry makes confidence-building measures involving these capabilities more obviously beneficial to both parties.
Other linkages—such as the connection between Chinese regional ballistic missiles and U.S. regional missile defenses—could also be exploited for strategic cooperation. Crucially, however, a necessary prerequisite to any progress in this direction is an official Sino-American dialogue broad enough to encompass all the relevant strategic interactions. The existing strategic security dialogue, while a step in the right direction, probably does not go far enough. While it appears to include nuclear weapons, missile defense, and space, it leaves out a number of critical pieces of the puzzle in the form of conventional U.S. power-projection capabilities and various Chinese efforts to defeat them.
Analysts and some government officials (particularly in Russia) have recently discussed bringing China into negotiations toward a multilateral arms control treaty. While this is a desirable long-term goal (that discussions among nuclear-armed states at both an official and unofficial level can advance), it is also a premature one. For multilateral arms control to have any chance of success, the dynamics that are driving Chinese modernization must be addressed. To the extent that these dynamics are related to Sino-U.S. strategic competition they must be addressed bilaterally.
Moreover, there are still large quantitative and qualitative gaps between U.S. and Chinese nuclear forces. For example, while China has 30 to 35 missiles, each armed with a single warhead, capable of reaching the United States according to the most recent detailed estimate from Department of Defense, the United States has over 1,000 deployed warheads capable of reaching China. Efforts by the United States in cooperation with Russia are needed to close this gap before China can reasonably participate in the negotiation of a limitations treaty.
The asymmetry between U.S. and Chinese nuclear forces also argues strongly against attempting to import the Cold War arms control framework wholesale into the U.S.-China relationship. While U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian treaties can provide useful ideas, such as the ban on telemetry encryption, the United States needs to take a novel approach to have a reasonable chance of receiving the reassurance it wants about China’s modernization.

Prospects for Success

It would be naïve to believe that expanding the scope or depth of strategic cooperation between the United States and China would be anything other than extremely difficult. While there is a compelling case to be made that expanded cooperation would be mutually beneficial, there is also the potential for significant resistance. Within the United States and among its allies, there would unquestionably be opposition to any form of cooperation that requires the United States to provide China with valuable information about U.S. plans and programs—even though China would be required to provide equally valuable information in return. Indeed, confidence-building measures that connect, for instance, Chinese regional ballistic missiles to U.S. regional missile defenses would probably be harder to “sell” than confidence-building measures purely within the nuclear realm. There is also absolutely no guarantee that Beijing will agree to participate; it might doubt U.S. sincerity, be unable to circumvent domestic obstacles, or, conceivably, view cooperation as fundamentally undesirable.

The potential benefits of trying to start wide-ranging strategic cooperation with China dwarf the downside risks.

That said, the potential benefits of trying to start wide-ranging strategic cooperation with China dwarf the downside risks. Strategic competition between the United States and China is not only expensive but adds friction to the bilateral relationship—a relationship that simultaneously holds more promise and carries more risk than any other. If strategic cooperation does nothing more than curb some pernicious aspects of this competition it would be worthwhile. If it catalyzes a co-evolutionary process in which deep cooperation builds strategic trust and strategic trust enables deeper cooperation, it could usher in a sea change.

¹ Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” 2002, www.defense.gov/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf, 27.
² Department of Defense, “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2010, www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_cmpr_final.pdf, 66. If weapons capable of reaching Alaska are included, the number rose from about 30 in 2002 to between 45 and 65 in 2010.
³ Li Bin, “China and Nuclear Transparency,” in Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions, edited by Nicholas Zarimpas (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2003), 55.
⁴ John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull, Soviet Intentions 1965–1985, Volume I, An Analytical Comparison of U.S.–Soviet Assessments During the Cold War (McLean, Va.: BDM Federal, 1995), 24–25, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb285.
⁵ Lora Saalman, China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, Carnegie Paper (Beijing: Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/china_posture_review.pdf, 9.
⁶ Li Bin, “China and the New U.S. Missile Defense in East Asia,” Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 6, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/06/china-and-new-u.s.-missile-defense-in-east-asia/drth.