Vamos ver, nos próximos dias, o que acontece com o mentiroso, ou irresponsável chefe do serviço de inteligência dos EUA. Em princípio, quem faz investigações internas é o FBI, sendo que a CIA apenas realiza atividades externas aos EUA.
Neste caso, funcionários seus penetraram computadores do Comitê congressual justamente encarregado do monitoramento das atividades de inteligência.
Ele já deveria ter sido demitido, ou ter apresentado sua demissão.
Vamos ver quanto tempo vai demorar essa nova novela do governo Obama.
Numa democracia, tem de ser assim.
Em outros países, ao contrário, não apenas funcionários da presidência mantém atividades criminosas, como os chefes políticos mentem a respeito.
Uma pequena diferença...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
CIA Chief John Brennan Needs to Go
The Lighthouse (The Independent Institute) - Volume 16, Issue 32 - August 12, 2014
The Central Intelligence Agency has made a mockery of the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers. The basic facts of its latest known abuses are undisputed: the agency's own inspector general admits the CIA broke into computers used by the Senate Intelligence Committee--a chamber tasked with ensuring that spy agencies comply with the law. This outrage warrants the immediate firing of CIA Director John Brennan, whether or not he knew the agency was engaging in the misconduct, according to Independent Institute Senior Fellow Ivan Eland. A former congressional investigator tasked with helping to monitor the U.S. intelligence community, Eland calls for stronger congressional oversight of the CIA and lauds members of the Senate Intelligence Committee for calling out the agency on its blatantly unconstitutional malfeasance--a scandal that, constitutionally speaking, is worse than Iran-Contra and Watergate.
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Mostrando postagens com marcador CIA. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador CIA. Mostrar todas as postagens
segunda-feira, 11 de agosto de 2014
domingo, 6 de abril de 2014
Doutor Jivago, agente da CIA? - Washington Post
Uma história da Guerra Fria, absolutamente verdadeira. A CIA ajudou a divulgar o romance famosos do Prêmio Nobel de literatura que foi impedido de receber esse prêmio pelo totalitarismo soviético.
Independentemente do que a CIA fez, e isso fazia parte do jogo da Guerra Fria, cabe, antes de tudo, reconhecer o totalitarismo intrínseco do sistema soviético, mesmo na desestalinização conduzida nesses anos por Kruschev. Os companheiros aprenderam nessas fontes, e fariam as mesmas coisas se pudessem.
Muitos gostariam de fechar este blog, que os incomoda bastante, mas eu nunca deixarei de denunciar a fraude e a mentira onde mentira e fraude existem.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
During Cold War, CIA used ‘Doctor Zhivago’ as a tool to undermine Soviet Union
A secret package arrived at CIA headquarters in January 1958. Inside were two rolls of film from British intelligence — pictures of the pages of a Russian-language novel titled “Doctor Zhivago.”
The book, by poet Boris Pasternak, had been banned from publication in the Soviet Union. The British were suggesting that the CIA get copies of the novel behind the Iron Curtain. The idea immediately gained traction in Washington.
“This book has great propaganda value,”a CIA memo to all branch chiefs of the agency’s Soviet Russia Division stated, “not only for its intrinsic message and thought-provoking nature, but also for the circumstances of its publication: we have the opportunity to make Soviet citizens wonder what is wrong with their government, when a fine literary work by the man acknowledged to be the greatest living Russian writer is not even available in his own country in his own language for his own people to read.”
The memo is one of more than 130 newly declassified CIA documents that detail the agency’s secret involvement in the printing of “Doctor Zhivago” — an audacious plan that helped deliver the book into the hands of Soviet citizens who later passed it friend to friend, allowing it to circulate in Moscow and other cities in the Eastern Bloc. The book’s publication and, later, the awarding of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Pasternak triggered one of the great cultural storms of the Cold War.
Because of the enduring appeal of the novel and a 1965 film based on it, “Doctor Zhivago” remains a landmark work of fiction. Yet few readers know the trials of its birth and how the novel galvanized a world largely divided between the competing ideologies of two superpowers. The CIA’s role — with its publication of a hardcover Russian-language edition printed in the Netherlands and a miniature, paperback edition printed at CIA headquarters — has long been hidden.
The newly disclosed documents, however, indicate that the operation to publish the book was run by the CIA’s Soviet Russia Division, monitored by CIA Director Allen Dulles and sanctioned by President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Operations Coordinating Board, which reported to the National Security Council at the White House. The OCB, which oversaw covert activities, gave the CIA exclusive control over the novel’s “exploitation.”
The “hand of the United States government” was “not to be shown in any manner,” according to the records.
The documents were provided at the request of the authors for a book, “The Zhivago Affair,” to be published June 17. Although they were redacted to remove the names of officers as well as CIA partner agencies and sources, it was possible to determine what lay behind some of the redactions from other historical records and interviews with current and former U.S. officials. Those officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss material that remained classified.
A voice from the past
During the Cold War, the CIA loved literature — novels, short stories, poems. Joyce, Hemingway, Eliot. Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Nabokov.
Books were weapons, and if a work of literature was unavailable or banned in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, it could be used as propaganda to challenge the Soviet version of reality. Over the course of the Cold War, as many as 10 million copies of books and magazines were secretly distributed by the agency behind the Iron Curtain as part of a political warfare campaign.
In this light, “Doctor Zhivago” was a golden opportunity for the CIA.
Both epic and autobiographical, Pasternak’s novel revolves around the doctor-poet Yuri Zhivago — his art, loves and losses in the decades surrounding the 1917 Russian Revolution. At times, Zhivago is Pasternak’s alter ego. Both the character and the writer, who was born in 1890, were from a lost past, the cultured milieu of the Moscow intelligentsia. In Soviet letters, this was a world to be disdained, if summoned at all.
Pasternak knew that the Soviet publishing world would recoil from the alien tone of “Doctor Zhivago,” its overt religiosity, its sprawling indifference to the demands of socialist realism and the obligation to genuflect before the October Revolution.
But Pasternak had long displayed an unusual fearlessness: visiting and giving money to the relatives of people who had been sent to the gulag when the fear of taint scared so many others away, intervening with authorities to ask for mercy for those accused of political crimes, and refusing to sign trumped-up petitions demanding execution for those designated enemies of the state.
“Don’t yell at me,” he said to his peers at one public meeting where he was heckled for asserting that writers should not be given orders. “But if you must yell, at least don’t do it in unison.”
Pasternak felt no need to tailor his art to the political demands of the state. To sacrifice his novel, he believed, would be a sin against his own genius. As a result, the Soviet literary establishment refused to touch “Doctor Zhivago.”
Fortunately for Pasternak, a Milan publisher had received a copy of the manuscript from an Italian literary scout working in Moscow. In June 1956, Pasternak signed a contract with the publisher, Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, who would resist all efforts by the Kremlin and the Italian Communist Party to suppress the book.
In November 1957, an Italian-language edition of “Doctor Zhivago” was released.
CIA SAW A WEAPON
In Washington, Soviet experts quickly saw why Moscow loathed “Doctor Zhivago.”
In a memo in July 1958, John Maury, the Soviet Russia Division chief, wrote that the book was a clear threat to the worldview the Kremlin was determined to present.
“Pasternak’s humanistic message — that every person is entitled to a private life and deserves respect as a human being, irrespective of the extent of his political loyalty or contribution to the state — poses a fundamental challenge to the Soviet ethic of sacrifice of the individual to the Communist system,” he wrote.
In an internal memo shortly after the appearance of the novel in Italy, CIA staff members recommended that “Doctor Zhivago” “be published in a maximum number of foreign editions, for maximum free world distribution and acclaim and consideration for such honor as the Nobel prize.”
While the CIA hoped Pasternak’s novel would draw global attention, including from the Swedish Academy, there was no indication that the agency’s motive for printing a Russian-language edition was to help Pasternak win the prize,something that has been a matter of speculation for some decades.
Giant stars hanging over broad promenades added a bright touch to the Brussels Universal and International Exposition in 1958. (Associated Press)
Prince Rainier III of Monaco, holding his glasses and looking skyward, and Princess Grace, with a bouquet, at the Vatican pavilion at the Brussels exposition. (Associated Press)
As its main target for distribution, the agency selected the first postwar world’s fair, the 1958 Brussels Universal and International Exposition. Forty-three nations were participating at the 500-acre site just northwest of central Brussels.
After first attempting to arrange a secret printing of the novel through a small New York publisher, the CIA contacted the Dutch intelligence service, the BVD. Agency officials had been following reports of the possible publication of “Doctor Zhivago” in Russian by an academic publishing house in The Hague and asked whether it would be possible to obtain an early run of copies.Both the United States and the Soviet Union had built huge pavilions to showcase their competing ways of life. What was especially interesting to the CIA: The fair offered one of those rare occasions when large numbers of Soviet citizens traveled to an event in the West. Belgium had issued 16,000 visas to Soviet visitors.
The two intelligence agencies were close. CIA subsidies in 1958 paid for about 50 of the BVD’s 691 staff members, and new Dutch employees were trained in Washington. Joop van der Wilden, a BVD officer, was dispatched to the U.S. Embassy at The Hague to discuss the issue with Walter Cini, a CIA officer stationed there, according to interviews with former Dutch intelligence officials.
Cini told him it would be a rush job, but the CIA was willing to provide the manuscript and pay well for a small print run of “Doctor Zhivago.” He emphasized that there should be no trace of involvement by the U.S. or any other intelligence agency.
The blue linen cover of the 1958 Russian-language edition of “Doctor Zhivago.” (Tim Gressie/Tim Gressie)
In early September 1958, the first Russian-language edition of “Doctor Zhivago” rolled off the printing press, bound in the signature blue linen cover of Mouton Publishers of The Hague.
The books, wrapped in brown paper and dated Sept. 6, were packed into the back of a large American station wagon and taken to Cini’s home. Two hundred copies were sent to headquarters in Washington. Most of the remaining books were sent to CIA stations or assets in Western Europe — 200 to Frankfurt, 100 to Berlin, 100 to Munich, 25 to London and 10 to Paris. The largest package, 365 books, was sent to Brussels.
“Doctor Zhivago” could not be handed out at the U.S. pavilion at the world’s fair, but the CIA had an ally nearby: the Vatican.
The Vatican pavilion was called Civitas Dei, the City of God, and Russian emigre Catholics had set up a small library “somewhat hidden” behind a curtain just off the pavilion’s Chapel of Silence, a place to reflect on the suppression of Christian communities around the world.
There, the CIA-sponsored edition of “Doctor Zhivago” was pressed into the hands of Soviet citizens. Soon the book’s blue linen covers were littering the fairgrounds. Some who got the novel were ripping off the cover, dividing the pages, and stuffing them in their pockets to make the book easier to hide.
The CIA was quite pleased with itself. “This phase can be considered completed successfully,” read a Sept. 10, 1958, memo.
In the Soviet Union, meanwhile, word of the novel’s appearance quickly reached Pasternak. That month, he wrote to a friend in Paris, “Is it true that Doctor Zhivago appeared in the original? It seems that visitors to the exhibition in Brussels have seen it.”
Children view a statue of Pope Pius XII at the Vatican pavilion at the world’s fair in Brussels. (Associated Press)
CONTRACTUAL PROBLEMS
There was only one problem: The CIA had anticipated that the Dutch publisher would sign a contract with Feltrinelli, Pasternak’s Milan publisher, and that the books handed out in Brussels would be seen as part of that print run.
The spies in Washington watched the coverage with some dismay, and on Nov. 15, 1958, the CIA was first linked to the printing by the National Review Bulletin, a newsletter supplement for subscribers to the National Review, the conservative magazine founded by William F. Buckley Jr.The contract was never signed, and the Russian-language edition printed in The Hague was illegal. The Italian publisher, who held the rights to “Doctor Zhivago,” was furious when he learned about the distribution of the novel in Brussels. The furor sparked press interest and rumors, never confirmed, of involvement by the CIA.
A writer using the pseudonym Quincy observed with approval that copies of “Doctor Zhivago” had been quietly shipped to the Vatican pavilion in Brussels: “That quaint workshop of amateur subversion, the Central Intelligence Agency, may be exorbitantly expensive but from time to time it produces some noteworthy goodies. This summer, for instance, [the] CIA forgot its feud with some of our allies and turned on our enemies — and mirabile dictu, succeeded most nobly. . . . In Moscow these books were passed from hand to hand as avidly as a copy of Fanny Hill in a college dormitory.”
The CIA concluded that the printing was, in the end, “fully worth trouble in view obvious effect on Soviets,” according to a Nov. 5, 1958, cable sent by Dulles, the director. The agency’s efforts, after all, had been re-energized by the awarding of the Nobel Prize in Literature to Pasternak the previous month.
The Kremlin treated the award as an anti-Soviet provocation, vilified the author, and forced Pasternak to turn it down.
The CIA provided elaborate guidelines for its officers on how to encourage Western tourists to talk about literature and “Doctor Zhivago” with Soviet citizens they might meet.
“We feel that Dr. Zhivago is an excellent springboard for conversations with Soviets on the general theme of ‘Communism versus Freedom of Expression,’ ” Maury wrote ina memo in April 1959. “Travelers should be prepared to discuss with their Soviet contacts not only the basic theme of the book itself — a cry for the freedom and dignity of the individual — but also the plight of the individual in the communist society.”
The miniature paperback edition of “Doctor Zhivago” that the CIA printed at its headquarters in 1959.(Courtesy of the CIA)
CLANDESTINE EDITION
Prompted by the attacks on Pasternak in Moscow and the international publicity surrounding the campaign to demonize him, the CIA’s Soviet Russia Division began to firm up plans for a miniature paperback edition. In a memo to the acting deputy director for plans, the chief of the division, Maury, said he believed there was “tremendous demand on the part of students and intellectuals to obtain copies of this book.”
Officials at the agency reviewed all the difficulties with the Mouton edition published in the Netherlands and argued against any outside involvement in a new printing. “In view of the security, legal and technical problems involved, it is recommended that a black miniature edition of Dr. Zhivago be published at headquarters using the first Feltrinelli text and attributing it to a fictitious publisher.”
By July 1959, at least 9,000 copies of a miniature edition of “Doctor Zhivago” had been printed “in a one and two volume series,” the latter presumably to make it not so thick and easier to split up and hide. The CIA attempted to create the illusion that this edition of the novel was published in Paris by a fictitious entity, the Société d’Edition et d’Impression Mondiale. A Russian emigre group also claimed it was behind the publication.The agency already had its own press in Washington to print miniature books, and over the course of the Cold War it had printed a small library of literature — each book designed to fit “inside a man’s suit or trouser pocket.”
CIA records state that the miniature books were passed out by “agents who [had] contact with Soviet tourists and officials in the West.” Two thousand copies of this edition were also set aside for dissemination to Soviet and Eastern European students at the 1959 World Festival of Youth and Students for Peace and Friendship, which was to be held in Vienna.
There was a significant effort to distribute books in Vienna — about 30,000 in 14 languages, including “1984,” “Animal Farm,” “The God That Failed” and “Doctor Zhivago.” Apart from a Russian edition, plans also called for “Doctor Zhivago” to be distributed in Polish, German, Czech, Hungarian and Chinese at the festival.
The New York Times reported that some members of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna festival “evinced a great curiosity about Mr. Pasternak’s novel, which is available here.” Occasionally it was not only available, but unavoidable. When a Soviet convoy of buses arrived in sweltering Vienna, crowds of Russian emigres swarmed them and tossed copies of the CIA’s miniature edition through the open windows.
On another occasion, a Soviet visitor to the youth festival recalled returning to his bus and finding the cabin covered with pocket editions of “Doctor Zhivago.”
“None of us, of course, had read the book but we feared it,” he wrote in an article many years later.
Soviet students were watched by the KGB, who fooled no one when these intelligence operatives described themselves as “researchers” at the festival. The Soviet “researchers” proved more tolerant than might have been expected.
“Take it, read it,” they said, “but by no means bring it home.”
Adapted from “The Zhivago Affair: The Kremlin, the CIA and the Battle Over a Forbidden Book,” by Peter Finn and Petra Couvée. Couvée is a writer and translator who teaches at Saint Petersburg State University in Russia.
sábado, 15 de março de 2014
Golpe de 1964: participacao americana - documentos do governo Johnson (NSA)
O National Security Archives, que funciona junto à Universidade George Washington, vem realizando um formidável trabalho de liberação de documentos relativos às relações dos EUA com todos os países do mundo. Em relação à América Latina já foram liberados, naturalmente, ou por recurso ao Freedom of Information Act, dezenas de milhares de páginas que revelam a extensão do envolvimento americano com os governos da região, e a constante preocupação de Washington com possíveis governos comunistas em certos países.
Almas cândidas, como diria Raymond Aron se espantam e ficam indignadas com o anti-comunismo do governo americano.
Seria surpreendente se fosse de outra forma.
Que capitalistas em geral, militares em particular, e em especial os governos americanos não gostem de comunistas é o natural.
Aqui abaixo documentos liberados aos 40 anos do golpe, em 2004:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/
Almas cândidas, como diria Raymond Aron se espantam e ficam indignadas com o anti-comunismo do governo americano.
Seria surpreendente se fosse de outra forma.
Que capitalistas em geral, militares em particular, e em especial os governos americanos não gostem de comunistas é o natural.
Aqui abaixo documentos liberados aos 40 anos do golpe, em 2004:
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/
BRAZIL MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY OF MILITARY COUP
DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT ON U.S. ROLE
Audio tape: President Johnson urged taking "every step that we can" to support overthrow of Joao Goulart
U.S. Ambassador Requested Pre-positioned Armaments to aid Golpistas; Acknowledged covert operations backing street demonstrations, civic forces and resistance groups
Edited by Peter Kornbluh
peter.kornbluh@gmail.com / 202 994-7116 |
Washington D.C., 31 March 2004 - "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding preparations for a coup in Brazil on March 31, 1964. On the 40th anniversary of the military putsch, the National Security Archive today posted recently declassified documents on U.S. policy deliberations and operations leading up to the overthrow of the Goulart government on April 1, 1964. The documents reveal new details on U.S. readiness to back the coup forces.
The Archive's posting includes a declassified audio tape of Lyndon Johnson being briefed by phone at his Texas ranch, as the Brazilian military mobilized against Goulart. "I'd put everybody that had any imagination or ingenuity…[CIA Director John] McCone…[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara" on making sure the coup went forward, Johnson is heard to instruct undersecretary of State George Ball. "We just can't take this one," the tape records LBJ's opinion. "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little."
Among the documents are Top Secret cables sent by U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon who forcefully pressed Washington for direct involvement in supporting coup plotters led by Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Castello Branco. "If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here-which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s-this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed," Gordon wrote to high State Department, White House and CIA officials on March 27, 1964.
To assure the success of the coup, Gordon recommended "that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo." In a subsequent cable, declassified just last month, Gordon suggested that these weapons be "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence," to be used by paramilitary units and "friendly military against hostile military if necessary." To conceal the U.S. role, Gordon recommended the arms be delivered via "unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo south of Santos."
Gordon's cables also confirm CIA covert measures "to help strengthen resistance forces" in Brazil. These included "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business." Four days before the coup, Gordon informed Washington that "we may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future." He also requested that the U.S. send tankers carrying "POL"-petroleum, oil and lubricants-to facilitate the logistical operations of the military coup plotters, and deploy a naval task force to intimidate Goulart's backers and be in position to intervene militarily if fighting became protracted.
Although the CIA is widely known to have been involved in covert action against Goulart leading up to the coup, its operational files on intervention in Brazil remain classified-to the consternation of historians. Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh called on the Agency to "lift the veil of secrecy off one of the most important episodes of U.S. intervention in the history of Latin America" by completely declassifying the record of CIA operations in Brazil. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations conducted significant declassifications on the military regimes in Chile and Argentina, he noted. "Declassification of the historical record on the 1964 coup and the military regimes that followed would advance U.S. interests in strengthening the cause of democracy and human rights in Brazil, and in the rest of Latin America," Kornbluh said.
On March 31, the documents show, Gordon received a secret telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that the Administration had decided to immediately mobilize a naval task force to take up position off the coast of Brazil; dispatch U.S. Navy tankers "bearing POL" from Aruba; and assemble an airlift of 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment including "CS agent"-a special gas for mob control. During an emergency White House meeting on April 1, according to a CIA memorandum of conversation, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told President Johnson that the task force had already set sail, and an Esso tanker with motor and aviation gasoline would soon be in the vicinity of Santos. An ammunition airlift, he reported, was being readied in New Jersey and could be sent to Brazil within 16 hours.
Such U.S. military support for the military coup proved unnecessary; Castello Branco's forces succeeded in overthrowing Goulart far faster and with much less armed resistance then U.S. policy makers anticipated. On April 2, CIA agents in Brazil cabled that "Joao Goulart, deposed president of Brazil, left Porto Alegre about 1pm local time for Montevideo."
The documents and cables refer to the coup forces as "the democratic rebellion." After General Castello Branco's takeover, the military ruled Brazil until 1985.
Note: Documents are in PDF format. You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
Hear/Read the Documents
l) White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964
This audio clip is available in several formats:2) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Rio De Janiero, March 27, 1964
Windows Media Audio - High bandwidth (7.11 MB)
Windows Media Audio - Low bandwidth (3.57 MB)
MP3 - (4.7 MB)
In this 5:08 minute White House tape obtained from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, President Johnson is recorded speaking on the phone from his Texas ranch with Undersecretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Thomas Mann. Ball briefs Johnson on that status of military moves in Brazil to overthrow the government of Joao Goulart who U.S. officials view as a leftist closely associated with the Brazilian Communist Party. Johnson gives Ball the green light to actively support the coup if U.S. backing is needed. "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do" he orders. In an apparent reference to Goulart, Johnson states "we just can't take this one." "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little," he instructs Ball.
Ambassador Lincoln Gordon wrote this lengthy, five part, cable to the highest national security officers of the U.S. government, including CIA director John McCone and the Secretaries of Defense and State, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk. He provides an assessment that President Goulart is working with the Brazilian Communist Party to "seize dictatorial power" and urges the U.S. to support the forces of General Castello Branco. Gordon recommends "a clandestine delivery of arms" for Branco's supporters as well as a shipment of gas and oil to help the coup forces succeed and suggests such support will be supplemented by CIA covert operations. He also urges the administration to "prepare without delay against the contingency of needed overt intervention at a second stage."3) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Amb. Lincoln Gordon, March 29, 1964
Ambassador Gordon updates high U.S. officials on the deterioration of the situation in Brazil. In this cable, declassified on February 24, 2004 by the LBJ Presidential Library, he reiterates the "manifold" need to have a secret shipment of weapons "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence" to be "used by paramilitary units working with Democratic Military groups" and recommends a public statement by the administration "to reassure the large numbers of democrats in Brazil that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist revolution here."4) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerias," March 30, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil transmitted this field report from intelligence sources in Belo Horizonte that bluntly stated "a revolution by anti-Goulart forces will definitely get under way this week, probably in the next few days. The cable transmits intelligence on military plans to "march toward Rio." The "revolution," the intelligence source predicted, "will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody."5) State Department, Secret Cable to Amb. Lincoln Gordon in Rio, March 31, 1964
Secretary of State Dean Rusk sends Gordon a list of the White House decisions "taken in order [to] be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done." The decisions include sending US naval tankers loaded with petroleum, oil and lubricants from Aruba to Santos, Brazil; assembling 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment for pro-coup forces; and dispatching a naval brigade including an aircraft carrier, several destroyers and escorts to conduct be positioned off the coast of Brazil. Several hours later, a second cable is sent amending the number of ships, and dates they will be arriving off the coast.6) CIA, Secret Memorandum of Conversation on "Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964 Subject-Brazil," April 1, 1964
This memorandum of conversation records a high level meeting, held in the White House, between President Johnson and his top national security aides on Brazil. CIA deputy chief of Western Hemisphere operations, Desmond Fitzgerald recorded the briefing given to Johnson and the discussion on the progress of the coup. Defense Secretary reported on the movements of the naval task force sailing towad Brazil, and the arms and ammunition being assembled in New Jersey to resupply the coup plotters if necessary.7) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," April 2, 1964
The CIA station in Brazil reports that the deposed president, Joao Goulart, left Brazil for exile in Uruguay at l pm, on April 2. His departure marks the success of the military coup in Brazil.
quinta-feira, 9 de janeiro de 2014
A censura que os companheiros gostariam de ter: controle de livros nos paises socialistas durante a Guerra Fria
Este link:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7829/j.ctt2tt25z.14
se refere a um dos capítulos sobre a Guerra Fria no terreno cultural, ou seja, como a CIA financiou a edição de livros para alimentar o debate de ideias nos países da Cortina de Ferro na era "clássica" (se isso existe) da Guerra Fria, dos anos 1950 ao final da década seguinte.
Toda a censura soviética era ainda moldada no padrão leninista da Tcheka, ou seja, repressão total contra os inimigos do regime.
O capítulo 9 do livro se chama
A Lasting Enemy
e faz o histórico da censura e dos censores de 1956 a 1968.
Os companheiros gostariam, mas não podem, fazer o mesmo no Brasil.
Mas de certa forma já fazem aquilo que os soviéticos sempre fizeram: lavagem cerebral nos incautos e desprevenidos, como aliás são todos os alunos de vários níveis de ensino.
Eterna vigilância, recomendam os prevenidos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7829/j.ctt2tt25z.14
se refere a um dos capítulos sobre a Guerra Fria no terreno cultural, ou seja, como a CIA financiou a edição de livros para alimentar o debate de ideias nos países da Cortina de Ferro na era "clássica" (se isso existe) da Guerra Fria, dos anos 1950 ao final da década seguinte.
Toda a censura soviética era ainda moldada no padrão leninista da Tcheka, ou seja, repressão total contra os inimigos do regime.
O capítulo 9 do livro se chama
A Lasting Enemy
e faz o histórico da censura e dos censores de 1956 a 1968.
Os companheiros gostariam, mas não podem, fazer o mesmo no Brasil.
Mas de certa forma já fazem aquilo que os soviéticos sempre fizeram: lavagem cerebral nos incautos e desprevenidos, como aliás são todos os alunos de vários níveis de ensino.
Eterna vigilância, recomendam os prevenidos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
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