Os dez maiores bancos do mundo, 2023

 World's largest banks, 2023.

1. 🇨🇳 ICBC

2. 🇨🇳 China Construction Bank

3. 🇨🇳 Agricultural Bank of China

R. 🇺🇸 Bank of America

6. 🇺🇸 JPMorgan Chase

7. 🇯🇵 Mitsubishi 

8. 🇬🇧 HSBC

9. 🇫🇷 BNP

10. 🇫🇷 Crédit Agricole

(S&P Global Market Intelligence)

O tamanho da crise econômica da China - Paul Krugman (NYT, OESP)

O Brasil seria mais impactado por uma crise chinesa do que os EUA (pouco) ou o Japão e a Alemanha, que vendem muito para a China. Ou seja, o Brasil é um perdedor se a China entrar em recessão. 

O tamanho da crise econômica da China

Paul Krugman

O Estado de S. Paulo | Internacional

30 de agosto de 2023

Paul Krugman 

É colunista e ganhador do prêmio Nobel de Economia de 2008

The New York Times

Graças à baixa exposição da economia dos EUA, é difícil que problemas chineses se tornem globais

O efeito da crise seria maior em países que vendem mais para a China, como Alemanha e Japão

A s agruras econômicas dos anos pós-pandêmicos têm ocasionado intensos debates intelectuais e sobre políticas. Algo com que quase todos concordam, porém, é que a crise póscovid se assemelha pouco à crise financeira de 2008. Mas a China – segunda maior economia do planeta – parece balançar à beira de uma crise muito parecida.

Eu não confio no meu próprio entendimento sobre a China para julgar se o país vive seu momento Minsky, o ponto em que todos de repente se dão conta de que uma dívida insustentável é, de fato, insustentável. E, de fato, duvido que alguém ? incluindo as autoridades chinesas ? saiba responder a essa questão.

Mas acho que somos capazes de responder a uma pergunta mais condicional: se a China realmente passa por uma crise em estilo 2008, ela transbordará para o restante do mundo? E a resposta é clara: não. Por maior que seja a economia chinesa, os EUA estão pouco expostos aos problemas chineses. Antes de chegar aí, contudo, falemos sobre por que a China de 2023 se assemelha às economias americana e europeia de 2008.

BOLHA. A crise de 2008 foi ocasionada pelo estouro de uma bolha imobiliária transatlântica. Os efeitos foram amplificados por perturbações financeiras, especialmente o colapso dos ditos "shadow banks" – instituições que agiam clandestinamente como bancos, criando riscos de uma corrida bancária, mas prescindindo de regulamentações e de redes de segurança.

E agora chega a China, com um setor imobiliário ainda mais inchado que o dos países ocidentais em 2008. A China também tem um atribulado setor de "shadow banking", além de problemas peculiares, como dívidas enormes de governos locais.

A boa notícia é que a China não é a Argentina ou a Grécia, que deviam quantias imensas a credores estrangeiros. A dívida em questão aqui é de dinheiro que a China deve para si mesma. E deveria ser possível, em princípio, para o governo nacional resolver a crise por meio de alguma combinação entre resgates de devedores e abatimentos para credores.

Mas o governo da China tem competência para gerir o tipo de reestruturação financeira? As autoridades chinesas têm determinação ou clareza intelectual para fazer o que é necessário? Eu me preocupo especialmente com a segunda questão.

A China precisa substituir o investimento imobiliário insustentável por maior demanda de consumo. Mas alguns relatos sugerem que autoridades chinesas mais graduadas continuam suspeitas em relação a gastos de consumo "supérfluos" e resistem à ideia de "dar poder para os indivíduos tomarem mais decisões a respeito de como gastar seu dinheiro".

E não é nada tranquilizador o fato de as autoridades chinesas estarem respondendo à possível crise pressionando os bancos para emprestar mais, basicamente continuando a política que levou a China à situação em que ela se encontra.

EXPOSIÇÃO. Portanto, a China poderá entrar em crise. Se entrar, como isso afetará os EUA? A resposta, até onde eu consigo perceber, é que a exposição dos americanos a uma possível crise chinesa é surpreendentemente pequena.

Quanto os EUA têm investido na China? O investimento direto é de US$ 215 bilhões. Investimentos em carteira – ações e obrigações –, pouco mais de US$ 300 bilhões. Então, estamos falando de um total de US$ 515 bilhões.

Este número pode parecer grande, mas, para uma economia enorme, não é. Considerem uma comparação. Neste momento, há muitas preocupações a respeito do setor imobiliário comercial dos EUA, especialmente em relação aos prédios de escritórios ? que provavelmente encaram uma redução permanente na demanda em virtude do aumento do trabalho remoto. Os prédios de escritórios dos EUA valem hoje US$ 2,6 trilhões, aproximadamente cinco vezes mais que o nosso investimento total na China.

Por que uma economia tão grande atraiu tão pouco investimento dos EUA? Basicamente, porque, dadas as arbitrariedades das políticas chinesas, muitos possíveis investidores temem a possibilidade de a China se tornar uma armadilha: você consegue entrar, mas não consegue sair.

Mas o que dizer da China enquanto mercado? A China é uma importante jogadora no comércio mundial, mas não compra muito dos EUA – apenas US$ 150 bilhões, em 2022, menos de 1% do nosso PIB. Portanto, uma crise não surtiria muito efeito direto na demanda por produtos americanos.

O efeito seria maior em países que vendem mais para a China, como Alemanha e Japão, e algo poderia ricochetear nos EUA por meio das vendas a esses países. Mas o efeito geral ainda seria pequeno.

DIFERENÇAS. 

Uma crise poderia até surtir um pequeno efeito positivo nos EUA, porque reduziria a demanda por matérias-primas, especialmente petróleo, o que reduziria a inflação. Nada disso significa que devamos aplaudir a possibilidade de uma recessão chinesa ou tripudiar sobre os problemas de outro país.

Mesmo que por razões puramente egoístas, devemos nos preocupar com o que o regime chinês poderá fazer para distrair a atenção de seus cidadãos dos problemas domésticos. Mas, em termos econômicos, parece que estamos diante de uma possível crise interna na China, não de um evento global em estilo 2008. 

TRADUÇÃO DE GUILHERME RUSS

Participação do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva na Cúpula do G7: Hiroshima 2023 - Nota do MRE

Ministério das Relações Exteriores

Assessoria Especial de Comunicação Social

 

Nota nº 170

05 de maio de 2023

 Participação do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva na Cúpula do G7

 

 

A convite do Primeiro-Ministro do Japão, Fumio Kishida, o Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva participará do segmento de engajamento externo da Cúpula do G7, em Hiroshima, no Japão, nos dias 20 e 21 de maio corrente.

De acordo com o governo japonês, além dos demais países do G7 e do Brasil, foram convidados para a reunião Austrália, Comores, Ilhas Cook, Índia, Indonésia, República da Coreia e Vietnã, além de representantes das Nações Unidas, do Fundo Monetário Internacional, do Banco Mundial, da Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico, da Agência Internacional de Energia, da Organização Mundial de Saúde, da Organização Mundial do Comércio e da União Europeia.

O Brasil compartilha valores que congregam os países do G7 – como o fortalecimento da democracia, a modernização econômica e a proteção do meio ambiente e dos direitos humanos – e mantém com seus membros permanente coordenação sobre temas da agenda internacional, seja de forma bilateral, seja no âmbito do G20 e de organismos internacionais nos quais o Brasil e os membros do G7 interagem.

O Brasil foi convidado a participar de Cúpulas do G7 em diversas ocasiões no período entre 2003 e 2009. Esta será a sétima participação do Presidente Lula em cúpulas do grupo, marcando a retomada do engajamento do Brasil com o G7 e consolidando a percepção de equilíbrio no posicionamento do país em temas sensíveis do cenário internacional. Deverão ser discutidos no segmento de engajamento externo do G7, entre outros, os desafios enfrentados pela comunidade internacional em temas como paz e segurança, saúde, desenvolvimento, questões de gênero, clima, energia e meio ambiente.

Anexo:

Histórico de participações do Brasil em Cúpulas do G7:

• 2003: Cúpula de Évian-les-Bains, a convite da França;

• 2005: Cúpula de Gleneagles, a convite do Reino Unido;

• 2006: Cúpula de São Peterburgo, a convite da Rússia (então membro do G8);

• 2007: Cúpula de Heiligendamm, a convite da Alemanha;

• 2008: Cúpula de Hokkaido, a convite do Japão;

• 2009: Cúpula de L’Aquila, a convite da Itália.

 

[Nota publicada em: https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/participacao-do-presidente-luiz-inacio-lula-da-silva-na-cupula-do-g7] 

O Japão deixa oficialmente de ser uma nação pacifista - Signal GZero

 Mais de um século e meio atrás, o Japão deixou de ser uma nação reclusa para se tornar um perigoso império expansionista, militarista e fascista, que evoluiu para a agressão contra os vizinhos. O resultado foi de guerras e destruição. Recuperou-se, mas agora, devido à postura agressiva de um China recuperada e ascendente, resolveu rearmar-se. 

Para os dois países, serão gastos inuteis com armas que nunca serão usadas, mas que só servem para intimidar e dissuadir. Um pacto conjunto de não agressão e de investimentos sociais seria bem melhor. 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Japan to go the way of the samurai: Why and at what cost?

   GZero, Signal, Dec 27, 2022

After decades of pacifism, Japan recently announced that it will double its military budget over the next five years to become the world’s third-biggest defense spender behind the US and China.

How did Tokyo, whose commitment to pacifism is enshrined in the country’s post-war constitution, get here? And what are the implications – at home and abroad – of the world’s third-largest economy embarking on a major military buildup?

Japan’s move towards beefing up its military posture has been incremental. Tokyo's transition to increasing its fighting capacity has taken decades of debate by successive governments. Politically, the measures have been slow but steady, with many initiated during the long tenure of recently slain former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, including a more enhanced role of the National Security Council, which has translated into the loosening of arms controls, the constitutional re-definition of collective defense to fight alongside partners, and Tokyo’s founding membership of the Quad. More recently, Tokyo unveiled its first new national security strategy in a decade.

What is Prime Minister Fumio Kishida actually pushing for? In short, doubling the defense budget to 2% of GDP by 2027. For starters, $315 billion are earmarked for multi-dimensional defense over the next five years, including the acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles that could hit targets in mainland China. Critically, besides filling a major gap through a 20,000-strong cyber force, Japan would also build counter-strike capabilities to conduct retaliatory attacks on and across the Korean Peninsula, with the ability to penetrate Chinese defenses.

This isn’t just a military tech upgrade. It’s the end of the country’s pacifist foreign policy. “For years, Japan talked the talk — about increasing defense spending and acquiring counter-strike missile capabilities — without walking the walk,” says David Boling, director of Japan & Asia Trade at Eurasia Group. “Now it's walking the walk. Maybe even starting to run.”

Why is famously pacifist Japan beefing up at this rate? For more than half a century, Tokyo has refused to call its military a military – referring to it as a self-defense force – and has limited its uniformed engagements to multilateral peacekeeping missions aligned closely with the US.

“The reason for Japan’s new hawkishness can be explained in one word: China,” Boling says. 

“China’s constant intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters, its rapid military buildup, and its firing five ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone in August during the military exercises around Taiwan — all these combined to reach the tipping point for Japan,” adds Boling.

But China’s buildup isn’t just rapid and advanced. For a Japan haunted by memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it’s increasingly nuclear too. Considering that Japan has long supported Taiwanese democracy, the more Beijing threatens Taiwan, the more imperiled Japan feels. This is due to both the political and geographical proximity between Tokyo and Taipei. 

The problem on the peninsula. Japan is also feeling increasingly threatened by Pyongyang. Experts think a fresh nuclear test looks inevitable – which would be the seventh since Pyongyang went nuclear in 2006 (the last one was carried out in 2017). North Korea has conducted 86 missile tests this year, an all-time high, with many projectiles launched into Japanese airspace. 

Add Russia’s actions in Ukraine, as well as China’s saber-rattling with India in the Himalayas to the contemporary geopolitical mix, and the messaging for Tokyo is clear: Aggression isn’t a mere policy option. On the Eurasian landmass, when strong armies confront a weaker force, it’s an actual policy. 

The politics of it all. Kishida is already facing pushback at home. Influential members of his Liberal Democratic Party have already renounced his solution for paying for the spending hike by increasing taxes. The pushback from within the ruling party may also be connected to Kishida’s low approval ratings, which are hovering in the 30s and have been hammered by a year of controversial decisions, a weak economy, and a spiraling yen. 

Critically, more than 60% of Japanese favor the newly proposed counter-strike capability. In a new poll released after the proposed militarization, the majority of respondents favored Kishida’s plan to boost defense, with 55% endorsing the new national security plan.

Moreover, Eurasia Group’s Boling surmises that Kishida has some other factors in his corner, including a weak opposition, growing national support for sanctions against Russia, and years of experience in navigating national security as a former foreign minister. Kishida’s also wary of recent China-centric and defense-based polling: According to a recent survey, a third of the Japanese population thinks that there will be a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

Indeed, according to Boling, the recent intra-party controversy over raising taxes for defense is a sign of what’s to come. 

“It augurs increased friction between Kishida and other leading LDP members in 2023,” he says.

G4, mais uma tentativa inutil para reformar o Grand Machin - Nota do MRE e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Desde o início, ainda em 2004 ou pouco depois disso, eu considerei contraprodutiva a constituição desse grupo, que em minha opinião mais afastava do que aproximava o Brasil de seu objetivo último: reformar a Carta da ONU, ampliar o seu Conselho de Segurança e colocar o Brasil como membro permanente do CS dessa “grande geringonça”, como o general De Gaullese referia à ONU.

Eu dizia que era melhor o Brasil estar sozinho nos esforços do que unir-se a países com problemas e obstáculos muito maiores do que os nossos, como era manifestamente o caso de Japão, Índia e mesmo Alemanha.

O chanceler do lulopetismo tinha verdadeiro ódio por eu expressar tal opinião, publicamente e sem restrições.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Ministério das Relações Exteriores

Departamento de Comunicação Social

 

 

Nota nº 116

22 de setembro de 2021

 

Comunicado Conjunto da Reunião Ministerial do G4 – Nova York, 22 de setembro de 2021

 

1. Em 22 de setembro de 2021, os chanceleres dos países do G4, Exmo. Sr. Carlos Alberto Franco França, Ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Exmo. Sr. Heiko Maas, Ministro Federal do Exterior da Alemanha, Exmo. Sr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Ministro dos Negócios Exteriores da Índia, e Exmo. Sr. Motegi Toshimitsu, Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros do Japão, reuniram-se durante a 76a sessão da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas (AGNU), em Nova York. Os Ministros sublinharam a urgência da reforma do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, de modo a torná-lo mais legítimo, eficaz e representativo, ao refletir a realidade do mundo contemporâneo, incluindo países em desenvolvimento e os principais contribuintes.

2. Os Ministros do G4, ao passarem em revista os trabalhos da 75a Sessão da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas, acolheram que, em sua Decisão 75/569, a Assembleia refletiu o comprometimento de todos os Chefes de Estado e Governo em “injetar vida nova nas discussões sobre a reforma do Conselho de Segurança”, conforme mencionado na Declaração de comemoração do 75o aniversário das Nações Unidas (A/RES/75/1). Nesse contexto, os Ministros celebraram, também, a prontidão do Secretário-Geral da ONU em oferecer o apoio necessário à reforma, segundo expresso em seu relatório “Nossa Agenda Comum”, de 10 de setembro de 2021. Os Ministros acolheram, ainda, o fato que o Documento de Elementos preparado pelas cofacilitadoras das Negociações Intergovernamentais (IGN) apresentou avanços, com atribuições parciais das posições e propostas dos Estados Membros.

3. Os Ministros do G4 expressaram sua forte determinação em trabalhar para o lançamento, sem delongas, de negociações baseadas em texto no âmbito das IGN, com base em um documento único, com vistas à sua adoção pela Assembleia Geral. Para este fim, os Ministros instruíram suas delegações junto às Nações Unidas a apoiarem os esforços do Presidente da 76a sessão da AGNU e das cofacilitadoras das IGN, assim como a identificarem caminhos para se elaborar documento único e consolidado, que servirá de base para projeto de resolução. Os Ministros decidiram intensificar o diálogo com todos os Estados Membros interessados, incluindo outros países e grupos alinhados à defesa da reforma do Conselho, com o objetivo de buscar conjuntamente resultados concretos em um prazo determinado. 

4. Os Ministros reafirmaram o caráter indispensável da reforma do Conselho de Segurança, por meio da expansão de ambas as categorias de assentos, permanentes e não-permanentes, de modo a habilitar o Conselho a lidar com a complexidade e os crescentes desafios à manutenção da paz e segurança internacionais, e assim, exercer seu papel de maneira mais efetiva. Nesse contexto, os Ministros expressaram seu firme apoio à Posição Comum Africana (CAP), conforme estabelecida no Consenso de Ezulwini e a Declaração de Sirte.

5. Os Ministros do G4 reiteraram seu apoio às candidaturas dos membros do grupo a novos assentos permanentes em um Conselho de Segurança reformado.

 

-

 

G4 Ministerial Joint Press Statement

1. On 22 September 2021 the Foreign Ministers of the G4 countries, H.E. Mr. Carlos Alberto Franco França, Foreign Minister of Brazil, H.E. Mr. Heiko Maas, Federal Foreign Minister of Germany, H.E. Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Minister for External Affairs of India, and H.E. Mr. Motegi Toshimitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, met during the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Ministers underlined the urgency of reforming the Security Council in order to make it more legitimate, effective and representative by reflecting the reality of the contemporary world including developing countries and major contributors.

2. The G4 Ministers, reviewing the work of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, welcomed that the Assembly reflected in its Decision 75/569 the commitment of all Heads of State and Government to “instil new life in the discussions on the reform of the Security Council”, as mentioned in the Declaration on the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the United Nations (A/RES/75/1). In this context, the Ministers also welcomed the readiness of the UN Secretary-General to provide necessary support, as expressed in his report “Our Common Agenda” of 10th September 2021. The Ministers further welcomed that the Elements Paper prepared by the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) has evolved, with partial attributions of the positions and proposals of Member States.

3. The G4 Ministers expressed their strong determination to work towards launching text-based negotiations without further delay in the IGN, on the basis of a single document, with a view to its adoption in the General Assembly. The Ministers instructed, to this end, their delegations to the United Nations to support the efforts of the President of the 76th General Assembly and the Chair(s) of the IGN, and to identify ways to develop a single consolidated text as a basis for a draft resolution. The Ministers decided to intensify dialogue with all interested Member States, including other reform-minded countries and groups, in order to seek concrete outcomes in a definite time-frame.

4. The G4 Ministers reaffirmed that it is indispensable to reform the Security Council through an expansion of both categories, permanent and non-permanent seats, to enable the Security Council to better deal with the ever-complex and evolving challenges to the maintenance of international peace and security, and thereby to carry out its duties more effectively. In this context, the Ministers expressed their strong support to the Common African Position (CAP) as enshrined in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration.

5. The G4 Ministers reiterated their support for each other’s candidatures as aspiring new permanent members in a reformed Security Council.

[Nota publicada em: https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/canais_atendimento/imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/comunicado-conjunto-da-reuniao-ministerial-do-g4-2013-nova-york-22-de-setembro-de-2021 ]

Por que a China nunca vai admitir o Japão no CSNU: crimes contra a humanidade, iguais ou piores que o nazismo - Lessons from History

 

Inside Unit 731 — Japan’s Disgusting Human Experiment Concentration Camp

Exposing the horrors inside the worst concentration camp of World War Two

Hdogar

May 9 · Lessons from History

Medical trials being conducted on a test subject in unit 731 (Credits: Allthatsinteresting)

Nazi Germany is often held at the top of the list for its abhorrent crimes against humanity. In truth, Hitler was not alone in the inhuman treatment of their enemies. The Japanese leadership committed similar crimes, perhaps even worse.

One such act of brutality is the biological experimentation that happened in a Japanese medical facility called Unit 731. It was set up in 1938 in Japanese-occupied China under the disguise of being a research facility, its actual aim was to develop biological weapons. Prisoners from China, Mongolia, and Russia were brought in and lethal experiments were conducted on them.

Vivisection on Conscious Human Beings

Japanese Doctors studying a prisoner they infected (Credits: LAD)

Vivisection is the act of dissecting a human being or animal unanesthetized while he or she is still alive.

The Japanese doctors opened up conscious human beings to study the effects of diseases on them. The subjects were referred to as “logs.” They were usually first injected with a disease such as cholera and then the effects of were observed by operating on the patient while they were still conscious.

In some cases, the limbs of the victims were mutilated, attached to the other side of the body or their circulation cut off to observe the effect of gangrene. When the subjects remained of no use to the doctors, they killed him by shooting or by giving him a lethal injection.

A 72-year-old farmer who used to be a medical assistant in the unit recounts: “I cut him open from the chest to the stomach, and he screamed terribly, and his face was all twisted in agony. He made this unimaginable sound, he was screaming so horribly. But then finally he stopped. This was all in a day’s work for the surgeons, but it really left an impression on me because it was my first time.” — (Nytimes)

Frostbite Experiments

Unit 731 (Credits: Atomic Heritage)

The Japanese doctors were not mad scientists that needlessly just inflicted horror on the subjects.

These experiments were strategic and designed to study the effects of various phenomena on human body. Since, the cold was something the soldiers often had to endure, brutal trials were conducted to observe the effects and treatment of frostbite.

The subjects were taken out in extremely cold weather and cold water was thrown on them until their limbs were frozen solid. Sometimes of their limbs was submerged in ice-cold water until, according to the eyewitnesses, it made the sound of a plank of wood when struck with a cane. Different methods were then used to thaw the limbs or the victims were left untreated and the time and temperature required for their limbs to reheat were noted.

The Japanese concluded that the water of temperature 100–122-degree Fahrenheit was most suitable to defrost the frozen appendages.

Target Practice On Prisoners

A staked prisoner being shot (Credits: Pinterest)

Weapons were tested on people. They were tied to stakes and blasted with various weapons from different ranges to study wound patterns and the effect of bullet penetrations. Japanese also tested effects of poisonous gasses on Chinese prisoners.

Germ testing

Although biological warfare, even during the war had been banned in the 1925 Geneva Convention, the Japanese did not honor this agreement and infected the Chinese with various diseases during the war.

Planes dropped cholera, typhoid, and plague cultures in parts of eastern China. Sometimes plague-infected animals were also released in the various villages of china that were under Japanese occupation.

To develop and study the effectiveness of these cultures, inmates in Unit 731 were infected with the most lethal pathogens known to mankind. After being infected, the victims were put under observation until they showed symptoms of the disease. They were then opened up and their blood was fed to fleas who would carry the infection to the Chinese troops and innocent civilians.

Syphilis Testing

The doctors in Unit 731 were particularly interested in studying the effects and transmission of syphilis.

They focused on devising a treatment for it. They ordered the victims invested with syphilis to rape other subjects. The newly infected patients were then not treated to observe the progression of the disease.

Forced pregnancies

The Japanese doctors raped and impregnated women of childbearing age. They then experimented on them to understand how they affected both the mother and the fetus.

They shot them, infected them with various diseases, and made them suffer other types of injuries. The female subjects were then opened up to study how the fetus had reacted to all this.

They even experimented on infants as young as three days old as a recently published book says:

“Usually a hand of a three-day-old infant is clenched into a fist,” the booklet says, “but by sticking the needle in, the middle finger could be kept straight to make the experiment easier.”

Aftermath

By the time the war ended in 1945, none of the prisoners survived and the death count is reported to as high as 3000 people. The doctors and the supervisors were never tried for their crimes mainly because the US government agreed not to prosecute them in exchange for the results and the reports of the experiments that were conducted.

References

“https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/17/world/unmasking-horror-a-special-report-japan-confronting-gruesome-war-atrocity.html”

“https://unit731.org/”

“https://allthatsinteresting.com/unit-731/2"

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O cinismo de Mao: sem a mortandade provocada pelos japoneses, o PCC não teria chegado ao poder - livro de Ian Buruma

 

Year Zero by Ian Buruma. China’s Communist Party prevailed against Chiang Kai-shek and China’s Nationalists in some part because of the damage inflicted upon the Nationalists by Japan in World War II:

"And in China? When the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei, in 1972, apologized to Chairman Mao for what his country had done to the Chinese during the war, Mao, who was not without a macabre sense of humor, told his foreign guest to relax: It is us who should thank you, he said; without you we would never have come to power.

"Mao was right. What happened in China was the most dramatic example of unintended consequences. The Japanese shared with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists a horror of communism; there were even some attempts at collaboration; one faction of the Nationalists did, in fact, collaborate. But by fatally wounding the Nationalists, the Japanese helped the Communists win the civil war which was simmering in 1945 and came to a climax soon after."

author: Ian Buruma
title: Year Zero: A History of 1945
publisher: A Penguin Random House Company
date: Copyright 2013 by Ian Buruma
page(s): 102

Quando o Japão parecia superar os EUA: anos 1980-90

A Brief History of Doom by Richard Vague.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, many Americans thought Japan was going to surpass the United States to become the world's largest economy, and some even arranged Japanese language lessons for their children to prepare them for a new world order: "In 2016, as I was beginning to think concertedly about this book, my wife, Laura, and I found ourselves in Hawaii. I had with me The Bubble Economy, Christopher Wood's excellent book on Japan's 1990s financial crisis, and was reading it as I looked out over the ocean. I came to a passage about the Japanese luxury hotel craze of that period and realized that a neighboring hotel, the just-opened Four Seasons Resort at Ko Olina, had been part of that building frenzy. Japanese developers had built the building as a high-end luxury hotel and ambitiously created its artificial ocean peninsulas -- but the hotel had been shuttered or used for less than its original high-end purpose for almost twenty-five years. Nothing close to the demand for luxury hotels projected by the Japanese had materialized. The hotel was built because banks were making loans hand over fist and not basing their decisions on realistic projections of use. "Vestiges of Japan's 1980s lending frenzy remain in other places: in old American magazine cover stories, such as the February 2, 1987, issue of Newsweek, which intoned, 'Your next boss may be Japanese'; or with adults who grew up in the 1980s and can still remember bits of Japanese because their ambitious parents enrolled them in Japanese-language courses as children to prepare them for the new economic world order. America seemed in the grips of a Japanese corporate takeover. As the Japanese bought more and more high-profile U.S. properties, outraged old-school columnist Paul Harvey warned that Japan's growing financial presence in the United States was 'an economic Pearl Harbor,'

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"The hotel in Hawaii, like empty skyscrapers in New York and Chicago in the late 1920s, was a relic of an explosion in private lending that was all but unprecedented in the twentieth century. From 1985 to 1990, Japan's pri­vate debt-business and household loans-catapulted from 143 percent to 182 percent, an increase of ¥343 trillion, or $2.4 trillion. That percentage increase was far higher than in the years leading up to the Great Depression or Great Recession. "Japan's runaway lending was concentrated in commercial real estate, the profligate construction of office buildings, hotels, and apartments and the de­velopment of tracts of land both in Japan and abroad. From 1985 to 1990, commercial real estate (CRE) loans more than doubled from ¥75 trillion to ¥187 trillion. Japan's loans of this era created building after building that would not be sold or filled for years and even decades. But Japan's use of real estate as collateral went far beyond CRE and conventional household mort­gages. It extended to trillions of total yen in household nonmortgage loans and small- and medium-sized business loans.' Even bank loans for finance and leasing companies were largely tied to activity in the real estate industry. "Further, Japanese banks were eager, often naive participants in the financ­ing of U.S. leveraged buyout transactions. Japan's lending frenzy drove up real estate prices by an astonishing 300 percent in that compressed period and created a short-term economic surge that Japan and the rest of the world misconstrued as an economic miracle. Its banks, businesses, and households became overleveraged, and the country was fully overbuilt by 1990, as were other markets, such as California and Hawaii, targets of Japan'shyperactive lending. "By the late 1980s, five of the world's ten largest commercial banks by total assets were Japanese. In the 1990s, Japan's economy reached 18 percent of world GDP, yet by 2007, it was a mere 7.9 percent. Japan followed the well-trodden boom trajectory in the 1980s but then distinguished itself by delay, denial, and delusion in the bust in the 1990s. Japan's struggles with its crisis and efforts at bank recapitalization took as long as fifteen years -- a distinct inflection from the Great Depression. Japan's financial crisis is a parable of when, and how, policy decisions matter in the postboom phases of financial crisis."

A Brief History of Doom Author: Richard Vague Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press Copyright 2019 University of Pennsylvania Press Pages: 71-72

Japão-Coreia do Sul: as feridas não cicatrizadas da ocupação, agora em guerra fria econômica

Japão impõe barreiras à Coreia do Sul
O Estado de S. Paulo, 3/08/2019

O governo do Japão decidiu ontem aumentar o controle sobre produtos tecnológicos de ponta exportados para a Coreia do Sul. A medida, que segundo analistas deve aumentar a tensão diplomática entre os países vizinhos, afetou diversas bolsas de valores pelo mundo. O episódio é o mais recente na escalada de desconfiança provocada pela decisão da Suprema Corte sul-coreana de autorizar vítimas de trabalho forçado da ocupação japonesa do país durante a 2.ª Guerra de buscar indenizações junto a empresas do Japão. A decisão da Justiça sul-coreana provocou protestos no Japão, para quem as disputas da ocupação foram resolvidas em um acordo de 1965, no qual os japoneses pagaram uma indenização de US$ 500 milhões aos sul-coreanos.
Com a medida, a partir do dia 28 a Coreia do Sul estará fora da lista de países que recebem tratamento preferencial para importar produtos tecnológicos de ponta, essenciais para a indústria sul-coreana. O presidente sul-coreano, Moon Jae-in, condenou a decisão, que qualificou de sabotagem. “Se o Japão prejudicar intencionalmente nossa economia, também sofrerá os danos”, disse. “Nunca perderemos para o Japão outra vez.” Ao anunciar o veto às importações sul-coreanas, o governo japonês disse ter preocupações relacionadas à segurança nacional com o uso militar do material por empresas sul-coreanas, sem detalhar qual seria esse uso.
Entre as possíveis reações de Seul à decisão japonesa está a interrupção do compartilhamento de inteligência militar com o Japão, segundo o assessor de segurança nacional Kim Hyunchong. “Não faz sentido compartilhar segredos de inteligência com um país que não confia na gente”, disse. As bolsas de valores caíram num reflexo da medida, com o temor dos investidores de que o veto japonês prejudique o fluxo de produtos sul-coreanos para outros países. Autoridades japonesas, no entanto, relativizaram o impacto da decisão, em uma tentativa de acalmar os mercados. “Não haverá efeito nas redes de fornecimento globais ou nos negócios japoneses”, disse o ministro da Economia do Japão, Hiroshige Seko. Os Estados Unidos, por sua vez, temem que a disputa amplie a influência da China no Leste Asiático e prejudique as negociações com a Coreia do Norte. Em Washington, há o temor de que a disputa prejudique a cooperação militar entre Coreia do Sul e Japão, segundo a especialista em Leste Asiático Celeste Arrington, da Universidade George Washington.

Crise Japao-Coreia do Sul se agrava: pode ficar pior - Reuters, Kyodo, July 29, 2019

Korean Air to suspend flights between South Korea’s Busan and Japan’s Sapporo as trade row deepens

• Reuters, Kyodo, July 29, 2019
• The airline cited falling demand amid the trade conflict as a reason, and said it was also considering cutting the number of flights between both countries
• The move comes as several South Korean cities said they would suspend administrative exchanges with Japan until the bilateral relationship improved

Korean Air Lines will suspend its flights between the South Korean city of Busan and Japan’s Sapporo from September 3 because of falling demand amid a worsening diplomatic and economic row between the two neighbours.

South Korea’s top carrier is also considering cutting the number of flights between the two countries or shifting to smaller aircraft from mid-August, a spokesman said.

The number of travellers from South Korea was second only to those from China, accounting for 24.2 per cent of visits last year, according to data from Japan National Tourism Organisation.

The carrier revealed this as several South Korean cities said they would suspend administrative exchanges with Japan including its officials’ visits to the neighbouring country until the bilateral relationship improved.

Among the schemes suspended was the signing of an accord on goodwill exchanges between Busan, South Korea’s second-largest city, and Nagasaki Prefecture.

Busan, connected to Fukuoka city in southwestern Japan by high-speed boats, is known for its active exchanges with Japan.

Its mayor, Oh Keo Don, last Tuesday criticised Japan’s tightening of export controls and indicated the city would consider whether to continue its exchange programmes with Japan.

Japanese chief cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga on Monday expressed regret over Busan’s suspension.

“Although ties between Japanese and South Korean governments are in a tough situation, municipal and people-to-people exchanges should continue as the basis of mutual understanding,” said the top Japanese government spokesman.

The East Asian neighbours have been at loggerheads over compensation for wartime labour during Japan’s 1910-1945 colonial rule of the Korean peninsula.

Last month, Japan tightened controls of exports of hi-tech materials to South Korea, in apparent retaliation for a South Korean court ruling over wartime forced labour.

Such disputes have prompted a widespread boycott of Japanese products and services, from beer to clothes and travel in South Korea.

A student visit to Ogaki in Gifu Prefecture by some 20 students from Changwon, South Korea, was also postponed “due to the difficult relationship between Japan and South Korea”, according to the central Japan city.

The students were expected to play football and stay at private lodgings during the four-day trip from Sunday under the exchange programme that began in 1996. But an athletic association of Changwon requested its counterpart in Ogaki last Friday to postpone the visit.

Adding to the export curbs, Japan is preparing for Cabinet approval as early as August 2 to 

remove South Korea from a so-called white list status  with minimum trade restrictions, Japanese media have reported.

Seoul has protested against the plan, saying it would undermine their decades-old economic and security cooperation and threaten free trade.

Japanese daily Sankei on Monday reported that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was unlikely to meet South Korean President Moon Jae-in during the United Nations general assembly in September, the latest sign of frosty relations between the key US allies.

Abe will not hold talks with Moon unless Seoul takes constructive steps over forced labour and other issues, the paper said.

Abe will also forgo meeting Moon during other opportunities, including an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting in October and an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) gathering in November for the same reason, the Sankei said.

Additional reporting by Associated Press

This article appeared in the South China Morning Post print edition as: Korean Air mulls reducing flights to Japan as cities downgrade relations