Odobrecht, agora Novonor, a empresa mais corrupta e corruptora do mundo. Deve estar no Guiness Record of Corruption.
Leiam a informação enviada por Rogerio Pinto – ex-FGV-Rio, com extensa carreira internacional como funcionário de organismos internacionais como OEA, BID, Banco Mundial – a partir de informe recente da Trasnparency International.
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Odebrecht confessed. Then what?
Transparency International newsletter@transparency.org
20/11/2026
Finance. Procurement. Legal. But a department for paying bribes? Odebrecht, one of Latin America's largest construction companies, had one.
In December 2016, the Brazilian conglomerate and Braskem, its petrochemical affiliate, pleaded guilty in a US court and agreed to pay US$3.5 billion to US, Brazilian and Swiss authorities. Odebrecht admitted paying US$788 million in bribes in 12 countries in Latin America and Africa.
Envelopes of cash would not have been enough at that scale. The company's Division of Structured Operations developed a sophisticated system: secret software, coded messages, pseudonyms, shell companies and offshore bank accounts to arrange and disguise payments. Intermediaries delivered money to officials and politicians in exchange for contracts to build highways, residential buildings and gas pipelines. The resulting profits were substantial.
Odebrecht admitted paying US$788 million in bribes in 12 countries. (Photo: Transparency International)
Who paid the highest price?
Contracts won through bribery often cost more than genuinely competitive procurement. The "extra cost" is money missing from schools, public housing, transport or health care.
Citizens also pay in lost time. In Colombia, the government terminated the contract for the Ruta del Sol II highway in 2017 after the Odebrecht revelations. A new contract followed years later. The highway is still under construction. A 2018 analysis by Colombia’s Comptroller General Office found that each year of delay costs Colombians between US$180 million and US$250 million.
In Cusco, Peru, residents waited more than 13 years for the extension to the Antonio Lorena hospital.
In Venezuela, the metro line meant to link Caracas with Guarenas and Guatire remains unfinished.
In Panama City, the Curundú housing renovation went over budget by more than US$23 million. Two years after the flats were handed over, residents reported leaks and cracks in the ceilings.
Corruption cases leave another bill: the progress lost to deficient construction or services never delivered. Missing funds can be counted and even recovered. The human impact of cases like Odebrecht is far harder to measure.
Who has been held accountable?
Politicians, executives and intermediaries in the Odebrecht case have been prosecuted in several countries, and some have been convicted.
In October 2024, Peru's former president Alejandro Toledo was sentenced to 20 years and six months in prison over bribes. In April 2025, former president Ollanta Humala was sentenced to 15 years in prison for money laundering linked to illegal campaign funding. He was released from prison in July 2026, after the Constitutional Court overturned the sentence.
In Ecuador, in 2017, former vice-president Jorge Glas was sentenced to 6 years in prison for his part in the Odebrecht bribery scheme.
In Panama, two sons of former president Ricardo Martinelli were sentenced in the United States for laundering Odebrecht-related money. Panama has also secured convictions through plea agreements, but its major trial involving 21 defendants ended in February 2026 and the verdict is still pending.
Outcomes and speed differ between countries.
In the Dominican Republic, Odebrecht admitted paying US$92 million in bribes. A court convicted two people in 2021. The Supreme Court acquitted both in 2024, and the Constitutional Court upheld the acquittals in February 2026.
In Argentina, three former officials received first-instance convictions over gas pipeline contracts awarded nearly 20 years earlier. The ruling can be appealed.
The challenges of cross-border corruption
The scandal came to light in Brazil in 2014 during Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato). What began as a money laundering case grew into an inquiry involving bribery, public contracts, politicians, state-owned companies and business executives.
The biggest setback came from Brazil. In September 2023, a justice of Brazil's Supreme Federal Court invalidated evidence from Odebrecht's secret accounting systems, handed over under its leniency agreement. The reason: irregularities in how the material was obtained and handled.
Since then, more than 100 defendants have benefited from the decision. At least 28 people and companies in eight countries have obtained favourable rulings, according to a report by Transparency International Brazil sent to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Map by Transparency International Brazil
In September 2026, our Brazilian chapter and 29 other organisations from 21 countries wrote to the OECD Working Group on Bribery, warning that Brazil's Supreme Federal Court decision on Odebrecht could result in widespread impunity.
How to avoid another Odebrecht
Odebrecht is one of the world's best-documented corruption cases. The conglomerate exploited gaps in public procurement and political financing. Contract changes escaped scrutiny.
Even with a confession, Odebrecht shows how hard it is for countries to deliver justice when wrongdoing crosses borders.
Beyond Brazil, other Transparency International chapters keep pressing for solutions. In Colombia, Transparencia por Colombia analysed the enablers of the Ruta del Sol II scheme. Proética, our chapter in Peru, has worked with the Vortex Foundation to map the connections between companies, political organisations and individuals. And a report with 10 human rights and anti-corruption organisations shows how corruption has harmed people across Latin America.
We want more than accountability and compensation: we want to change the conditions that allowed the scandal to happen.
Corruption investigations involving several countries need stronger cooperation between law-enforcement agencies and financial intelligence units, including effective mechanisms to share timely information and evidence.
Clear legal frameworks are also necessary to allow financial intelligence, including intelligence shared across borders, to support the opening of investigations and, where appropriate, to be used in judicial proceedings.
Authorities must enforce penalties, not merely announced them. Corporate settlements – an alternative to full-fledged criminal proceedings – cannot result in weaker safeguards: agreements should be public, respect the rights of people harmed and be open to review by judges.
Governments should provide more information about public contracts, including early decisions, tenders, amendments, delivery and independent audits. They should also make it possible to identify who owns companies and who funds political campaigns.
Independent courts, prosecutors and oversight bodies, together with protected whistleblowers and journalists, are essential to making these reforms to work.
Odebrecht – renamed Novonor in 2020 – confessed in 2016. That was the beginning. Many of those responsible still haven't faced meaningful consequences. Much public money hasn't been recovered. Communities are still seeking redress.
Watchdogs and governments must close the loopholes that allow such bribery to flourish. Until they do, the gaps that made the Odebrecht scandal possible will remain in place to be exploited again.