O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Suprema Corte. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Suprema Corte. Mostrar todas as postagens

quarta-feira, 18 de junho de 2014

Consequencias Economicas da Argentina (do seu calote da divida mais exatamente) e da Suprema Corte americana

Diz o velho ditado que a Justiça tarda, mas não falha, o que é altamente duvidoso no caso do Brasil: ela é mais do que tardia (8 anos, em média, para a resolução de um caso, o que indica que pode ir até 16 anos), e geralmente falha também, como se pode ver pelo casos dos quadrilheiros mafiosos do partido totalitário, que provavelmente vão continuar aparecendo como vítimas de um sistema politizado (o que não deixa de ser verdade, cada vez mais).
Mas a Justiça americana costuma ser rápida e implacável: o bandido do Ben Maddoff, que roubou bilhões, em menos de seis meses foi condenado a apenas 150 anos de cadeia. Poderia ser mais...
Agora é a Argentina, que pensou escapar impune do maior calote da história financeira.
Pois é: as consequências são mundiais e a Argentina entra na história econômica pelos dois lados, mas pouco gloriosamente.
Trata-se de uma coisa boa para o mundo: banqueiros e países emprestadores deixarão de ser tão irresponsáveis...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Argentina’s Debts: US Supreme Court Sets New Ground Rules for Sovereign Debt Management Worldwide

by 
Petersen Institute of International Economics, June 17th, 2014
On Monday, June 16, the US Supreme Court rang the curtain down on two key parts of the drama surrounding Argentina and its creditors, which had dragged on since the country’s debt default in 2001. First, the Court refused [pdf] to review decisions by the federal appeals court for the Second Circuit in New York, ordering Argentina to pay creditors holding defaulted bonds in full whenever it pays its new restructured bonds. The next payment on the restructured bonds is scheduled for June 30. Second, in a separate case involving the same parties, argued before the Supreme Court in April, the Court ruled 7–1 to let creditors subpoena banks for information about Argentina’s assets around the world—even if these assets later turn out to be immune from seizure by the courts.
The opinion was written by Justice Scalia[pdf] Justice Ginsburg was the lone dissenter. Justice Sotomayor took no part in either decision. The first decision pointedly ignored interventions by Brazil, France, Mexico, Euroclear, the Jubilee Movement, and Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz, among others. The second decision rejected arguments by the United States about the potential harm of allowing creditors unfettered discovery.
The two decisions together highlight the limits of US courts’ tolerance of foreign governments using sovereignty to avoid their contracts. However the decisions do not guarantee that the creditors would be paid. Instead, they bless a debt enforcement regime that relies on sanctioning third parties who deal with the sovereign in default. This new regime is based on the idea that dealing with a defaulted sovereign will become so risky and expensive that it is simply not worth it. As a result, the country will become a financial pariah, unable to do basic financial business outside its borders. In sum, the decisions leave the prevailing system for sovereign debt management badly shaken. What happens between Argentina and its creditors from now on is not nearly as important as the way in which the international financial system adapts to the new reality.
In this new reality, governments trying to restructure New York–law debt contracts have less scope to threaten default. In the past, a government could tell creditors that if they did not accept its restructuring offer, they could be stuck in default without recourse. After the Supreme Court refused to disturb the Second Circuit decisions, a government launching a debt restructuring should expect creditors who refuse to try blocking payments to the participating creditors. Participating creditors will worry that their payments might be blocked, and will seek compensation for the risk. Pending litigation against Grenada may limit this risk to a subset of debtors, but not yet.
After the Supreme Court decisions, financial market service providers have become sovereign debt enforcement agents. Clearinghouses, banks, trustees, and fiscal agents in and outside the United States dealing with a government in default under its New York debt contracts should expect orders and subpoenas targeting the sovereign’s assets and activities anywhere and everywhere.
Creditors who previously held unenforceable debt now have a promising tool to sanction a defaulting sovereign, though this does not guarantee that they will collect what they are owed. If dealing with a sovereign in default is a headache for market participants, many will avoid it, or will charge more for it. The result is an effective boycott. It becomes so costly for a sovereign to live a normal financial life outside its borders that it just pays up. As with any boycott, the pain threshold is in large part a function of domestic politics.
In sum, Argentina and its most determined creditors have destabilized the sovereign debt management system, which has relied on informal customs, ad-hoc problem solving, and sovereign immunity in lieu of sovereign bankruptcy. It remains unclear how the system will adapt to a world where sovereign debt is enforceable, albeit indirectly, by threatening to harm a wide range of third parties.
To be sure, Argentina and its creditors will keep fighting smaller battles in the lower federal courts for the next few months. These will have to do with timing (when will the court order payments to holdout creditors?) and Argentina’s attempts to get around the injunction to keep paying the restructured bonds—something President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner promised to do again in her speech reacting to the decision. The timetable has become much more compressed. Federal courts at all levels have lost patience. The trial judge may now require Argentina to pay everyone by June 30 or soon thereafter, with no appetite to intervene to protect Argentina up the appellate chain. There is similarly no indication that US courts would allow Argentina to reroute its bond payments outside the United States to avoid the injunctions. The sympathy well ran dry a long time ago. All the third parties who might help Argentina do the rerouting have been warned.
In the past, Argentina had threatened to default on all its debt rather than pay the holdouts. It might still do so, though the damage to its economy would be enormous. The government’s recent settlements with investors in utilities and other creditors suggest that Argentina is more likely to settle with the bond holdouts as well. It would be hard-pressed to settle with the plaintiffs in the one case decided by the courts, however. They are owed less than $1.5 billion, while leaving close to $15 billion in similarly situated holdout debt hanging. Any deal would have to reassure the markets that all the holdout litigation is put to bed—which means settling closer to $15 billion in claims, rather than $1.5 billion. Argentina’s reserves were under $30 billion [pdf] in April, which means that any large settlement would have to be in bonds. Such a transaction would take time to design and execute, and Argentina is just about out of time.
Perhaps most important, there is no time for a face-saving political transition that would allow the current president to exit the stage and for her successor to do what she had sworn not to. The time pressure might raise the risk of inadvertent default.
Financial market service providers may in the future change their contracts and policies to limit the risk of getting caught up in another Argentina-style mess. They could demand more indemnities from governments and their creditors, but these would not be too useful when the government is in default. The better way is to refuse to handle contracts exposing them to litigation, and to have clear exit procedures if the risk materializes.
Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the G-7 governments, and others in the official sector should rethink their reliance on sovereign immunity for sovereign debt restructuring. The most likely policy response will be to encourage more contract reform, to limit opportunities for Argentina-style disruption. The IMF plans a paper on contract reform shortly (a companion paper on debt restructuring policy was discussed last week). A major trade group has floated a contract reform proposal within the past year. More may come. As with any contract change, transition looms large. It is implausible that all sovereigns will exchange all their outstanding bonds for ones with new, less vulnerable terms. Thus the fallout from Second Circuit decisions will continue until the existing debt stock runs off.
On the other hand, courts in the United Kingdom, Belgium, and elsewhere are in a bind. They are not bound by the US decisions, but cannot ignore the highest court in the United States blessing a contract interpretation and a remedy that might conflict with their own jurisprudence[pdf] or, in the case of Belgium, with national legislation shielding the Euroclear system [pdf] from the kinds of remedies issued by the New York courts. It will be interesting to see how they resolve the conflicts.
The next month or two will bring more noisy Argentina news. But the full ramifications of Argentina’s crisis and default for the global financial system are coming into focus at long last. We have a glimpse of the sovereign debt world after Argentina[pdf] It is a world fraught with uncertainty, perhaps more so than at any time since the early 1990s. On the other hand, the Supreme Court decisions also present an opportunity for market participants and policymakers to design a better framework for sovereign debt management, one that does not rely entirely on unenforceable contracts.
A version of this essay was posted on Credit Slips.

sábado, 17 de maio de 2014

Segregacao escolar nos EUA: 60 anos de uma decisao da Suprema Corte

Ao adotar esse ruling, em 1954, a Suprema Corte corrigia seu erro monumental de mais ou menos 60 anos antes.
Leiam toda a matéria, para vocês terem consciência do horror que foi a segregação oficial nos EUA, nos estados e mesmo na União.
Depois desse ruling, dois estados do Sul declararam que preferiam acabar com as escolas públicas a terminar com a segregação, tal o ódio das populações brancas contra os negros.
Não surpreende, assim, que os negros tenham desenvolvido uma cultura particular, separada e à parte da cultura geral da sociedade americana, majoritariamente branca e protestante.
Esse tipo de Apartheid mental nunca existiu no Brasil.
Mas os militantes negros estão se esforçando para criá-lo no Brasil. Com a ajuda do governo federal.
Ambos racistas, a favor do Apartheid racial.
Uma vergonha...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

On This Day: May 17

The New York Times, May 17, 2014
On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court issued its landmark Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka ruling, which declared that racially segregated public schools were inherently unequal.
Go to article »

High Court Bans School Segregation; 9-to-0 Decision Grants Time to Comply



1896 Ruling Upset

'Separate but Equal' Doctrine Held Out of Place in Education

By LUTHER A. HUSTON
Special to The New York Times
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Washington, May 17 -- The Supreme Court unanimously outlawed today racial segregation in public schools.
Chief Justice Earl Warren read two opinions that put the stamp of unconstitutionality on school systems in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia where segregation is permissive or mandatory.
The court, taking cognizance of the problems involved in the integration of the school systems concerned, put over until the next term, beginning October, the formulation of decrees to effectuate its 9-to-0 decision.
The opinions set aside the 'separate but equal' doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in 1896.
"In the field of public education," Chief Justice Warren said, "the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
He stated the question and supplied the answer as follows:
"We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does."
States Stressed Rights
The court's opinion does not apply to private schools. It is directed entirely at public schools. It does not affect the "separate but equal doctrine" as applied on railroads and other public carriers entirely within states that have such restrictions.
The principal ruling of the court was in four cases involving state laws. The states' right to operate separated schools had been argued before the court on two occasions by representatives of South Carolina, Virginia, Kansas and Delaware.
In these cases, consolidated in one opinion, the high court held that school segregation deprived Negroes of "the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
The other opinion involved the District of Columbia. Here schools have been segregated since Civil War days under laws passed by Congress.
"In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools," the Chief Justice said, "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.
"We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteeing by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution."
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Fifth Amendment says that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
The seventeen states having mandatory segregation are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia.
Kansas, New Mexico, Arizona and Wyoming have permissive statutes, although Wyoming never has exercised it.
South Carolina and Georgia have announced plans to abolish public schools if segregation were banned.
Although the decision with regard to the constitutionality of school segregation was unequivocal, the court set the cases down for reargument in the fall on questions that previously were argued last December. These deal with the power of the court to permit an effective gradual readjustment to school systems not based on color distinctions.
Other questions include whether the court itself should formulate detailed decrees and what issues should be dealt with. Also whether the cases should be remanded to the lower courts to frame decrees, and what general directions the Supreme Court should give the lesser tribunals if this were done.
Cases Argued Twice
The cases first came to the high court in 1952 on appeal from rulings of lower Federal courts, handed down in 1951 and 1952. Arguments were heard on Dec. 9-10, 1952.
Unable to reach a decision, the Supreme Court ordered rearguments in the present term and heard the cases for the second time on Dec. 7-8 last year.
Since then, each decision day has seen the courtroom packed with spectators awaiting the ruling. That was true today, though none except the justices themselves knew it was coming down. Reporters were told before the court convened that it "looked like a quiet day."
Three minor opinions had been announced, and those in the press room had begun to believe the prophesy when Banning E. Whittington, the court's press information officer, started putting on his coat.
"Reading of the segregation decisions is about to begin in the court room," he said. "You will get the opinions up there."
The courtroom is one floor up, reached by a long flight of marble steps. Mr. Whittington led a fast moving exodus. In the court room, Chief Justice Warren had just begun reading.
Each of the Associate Justices listened intently. They obviously were aware that no court since the Dred Scott decision of March 6, 1857, had ruled on so vital an issue in the field of racial relations.
Dred Scott was a slave who sued for his freedom on the ground that he had lived in a territory where slavery was forbidden. The territory was the northern part of the Louisiana Purchase, from which slavery was excluded under the terms of the Missouri Compromise.
The Supreme Court ruled that Dred Scott was not a citizen who had a right to sue in the Federal courts, and that Congress had no constitutional power to pass the Missouri Compromise.
Thurgood Marshall, the lawyer who led the fight for racial equality in the public schools, predicted that there would be no disorder and no organized resistance to the Supreme Court's dictum.
He said that the people of the South, the region most heavily affected, were law-abiding and would not "resist the Supreme Court."
Association Calls Meetings
Mr. Marshall said that the state presidents of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, would meet next week-end in Atlanta to discuss further procedures.
The Supreme Court adopted two of the major premises advanced by the Negroes in briefs and arguments presented in support of their cases.
Their main thesis was that segregation, of itself, was unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment, which was adopted July 28, 1868, was intended to wipe out the last vestige of inequality between the races, the Negro side argued.
Against this, lawyers representing the states argued that since there was no specific constitutional prohibition against segregation in the schools, it was a matter for the states, under their police powers, to decide.
The Supreme Court rejected the "states rights" doctrine, however, and found all laws ordering or permitting segregation in the schools to be in conflict with the Federal Constitution.
The Negroes also asserted that segregation had a psychological effect on pupils of the Negro race and was detrimental to the educational system as a whole. The court agreed.
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments," Chief Justice Warren wrote. "Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education in our democratic society. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
"In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, must be made available to all on equal terms."
As to the psychological factor, the high court adopted the language of a Kansas court in which the lower bench held:
"Segregation with the sanction of the law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system."
1896 Doctrine Demolished
The "separate but equal" doctrine, demolished by the Supreme Court today, involved transportation, not education. It was the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson, decided in 1896. The court then held that segregation was not unconstitutional if equal facilities were provided for each race.
Since that ruling six cases have been before the Supreme Court, applying the doctrine to public education. In several cases, the court has ordered the admission to colleges and universities of Negro students on the ground that equal facilities were not available in segregated institutions.
Today, however, the court held the doctrine inapplicable under any circumstances to public education.
This means that the court may extend its ruling from primary and secondary schools to include state-supported colleges and universities. Two cases involving Negroes who wish to enter white colleges in Texas and Florida are pending before the court.
The question of "due process," also a clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, had been raised in connection with the state cases as well as the District of Columbia.
The High Court held, however, that since it had ruled in the state cases that segregation was unconstitutional under the "equal protection" clause, it was unnecessary to discuss "whether such segregation also violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
However, the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment was the core of the ruling in the District of Columbia case. "Equal protection" and "due process," the court noted, were not always interchangeable phrases.
Liberty Held Deprived
"Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which an individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective," Chief Justice Warren asserted.
"Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the due process clause."
Two principal surprises attended the announcement of the decision. One was its unanimity. There had been reports that the court was sharply divided and might not be able to get an agreement this term. Very few major rulings of the court have been unanimous.
The second was the appearance with his colleagues of Justice Robert H. Jackson. He suffered a mild heart attack on March 30. He left the hospital last week-end and had not been expected to return to the bench this term, which will end on June 7.
Perhaps to emphasize the unanimity of the court, perhaps from a desire to be present when the history-making verdict was anounced, Justice Jackson was in his accustomed seat when the court convened.

quinta-feira, 27 de março de 2014

Calotes e sancoes: Argentina depende da Suprema Corte dos EUA, mas nao apenas ela...

A propósito de uma antiga postagem neste espaço,
Argentina perde nas cortes de New York: o fim da Doutrina Calvo? (ver no instrumento de busca)
um leitor me manda o seguinte comentário, via Google+:

Netto Soares compartilhou a postagem de seu blog no Google+
Professor, México, Brasil e França anunciaram que vão respaldar a Argentina nesse caso. O México argumento que a decisão da corte americana ameaça a soberania dos países para negociarem a reestruturação de dívidas, e pode elevar os custos para a emissão de títulos.
Mexico said it is backing Argentina in a legal dispute with creditors, arguing that a New York court's decision ordering Argentina to pay in full holdouts from its debt restructuring threatens future sovereign workouts and could push up the cost of borrowing for other issuers such as Mexico.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304688104579463771537655770?mod=rss_latin_america&mg=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702304688104579463771537655770.html%3Fmod%3Drss_latin_america
Como o senhor vê o desenrolar dessa questão no plano da política e do direito internacional?
Parabéns pelo blog.

Comento (PRA):
Não sou especialista em Direito Internacional, sequer em mercados financeiros, mas costumo atuar com base na lógica, no bom senso, e num conhecimento talvez modesto, mas suficiente da história econômica.
Toda e qualquer ameaça de inadimplência, quanto a dívidas contratuais, provocam consequências econômicas e financeiras, quando não retaliações, diretas ou indiretas.
Cem anos atrás, canhoneiras europeias bombardeavam Maracaibo, próximo a Caracas, na Venezuela, quando um antecessor legítimo de Hugo Chávez (talvez ele se tenha inspirado no personagem), o coronel Cipriano Castro, que tinha tomado o poder num golpe e repudiado a dívida externa da Venezuela. Os credores reclamaram, ele desprezou, e não teve outra: bombas no porto venezuelano. Não sei o que houve depois, mas no seguimento da cláusula Calvo -- que se referia à imunidade soberana dos Estados -- veio a doutrina Drago (do nome do ministro argentino das relações exteriores à época), que denunciava retaliações armadas contra devedores relapso (estou resumindo: a coisa era expressa em termos juridicamente mais corretos).
Esse tipo de retaliação armada já não se encontra mais em voga, mas retaliações econômicas são possíveis.
Nos casos mais normais, que são dívidas não soberanas, a consequência imediata é o aumento dos custos para todos os tomadores, e o reforço dos mecanismos de solução de disputas, arbitrais ou judiciais.
Neste caso em espécie, se a Argentina for protegida pela Suprema Corte dos EUA -- ou seja, tiver reconhecida sua soberania integral -- o certo é que os custos para os tomados e as condicionalidades devem aumentar, pois aumentam os riscos e as incertezas sobre os próximos empréstimos e as condições das emissões soberanas.

Uma coisa é certa: o Brasil, ao apoiar a Argentina, está contribuindo para o aumento de custos de seus futuros empréstimos e emissões internacionais.
Não existe outra hipótese.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

quinta-feira, 14 de novembro de 2013

Vergonha da nossa Justica, alias, esse nome nao lhe cabe...

Assistindo hoje à sessão da TV Justiça sobre o julgamento do Mensalão, ou Ação Penal 470 -- o maior crime político já cometido na história do Brasil (mas acredito que existem piores, que ainda vão vir, ou que já existiram mas não foram julgados, como por exemplo o fato de o chefe da máfia não fazer parte deste julgamento) -- cheguei a ficar constrangido, e sentir vergonha, ao imaginar diplomatas, jornalistas, observadores de outros países assistindo o triste espetáculo protagonizado hoje pelos que passam por ministros do Supremo (alguns certamente não mereciam estar lá).
Quando penso nas sessões extremamente objetivas da Suprema Corte dos EUA -- existe audios posteriores das sessões, não esse espetáculo pirotécnico que é a nossa TV Justiça em ação --, quando penso no extremo recato da Corte Constitucional da França, na Corte de Heidelberg, quando comparo tudo isso e veja o teatro lamentável oferecido por nossos "juízes", me dá esse mesmo sentimento de vergonha alheia já mencionado por um jornalista conhecido.
Quem duvidar de mim, veja a página da Suprema Corte dos EUA, leia o seu regimento (Rules, objetivas, em menos de 60 páginas), leiam as súmulas dos julgamentos, com menos de 20 páginas, e vejam o trabalho primoroso conduzido pelos juízes nos julgamentos, perfeitamente objetivo, conciso, sem floreios, sem demagogia.

Independentemente de quantos bandidos possam ir para a cadeia agora, o espetáculo da nossa "justiça" é algo deplorável, sob todos os aspectos.
E sabemos que não só pelo bandido principal que escapou, mas pelos vários outros estão soltos, que todos os prejuízos que eles provocaram para as nossas instituições -- e não só os as centenas de milhões roubados, mas a prostituição dos mecanismos do Estado conduzida pela banda de criminosos que nele se instalou -- tudo isso é mínimo se comparado com a imensa perda de credibilidade que agora temos, no Estado, na justiça, na decência moral neste país...
O Brasil é um país que anda para trás, e isso se reflete também nos juízes histriônicos que exibimos ao mundo todo. Que bandidos eleitos ocupem o poder, isso é de certa forma esperado. Que responsáveis pela suprema corte tenham um comportamento de serviçais dos primeiros, isso já é deplorável.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida