O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

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terça-feira, 5 de novembro de 2024

A linguagem de Trump, como a de Hitler, de Stalin e outros ditadores - Anne Applebaum

 

On vermin 

Some closing thoughts 

A couple of weeks ago, I downloaded a collection of Hitler’s speeches and started going through them. I also searched my own files, especially the notes I took when working years ago in Russian archives. I was looking for the word “vermin.” Also “parasite.” And, in the Hitler speeches, references to “blood.” 

The result was an article that mostly just quoted Donald Trump, noting that some of language he uses comes directly from the 1930s. Not just Hitler but Stalin, Mao and the East German Stasi liked to talk about their enemies as vermin and parasites who “poison the blood” of the nation: 

The word vermin, as a political term, dates from the 1930s and ’40s, when both fascists and communists liked to describe their political enemies as vermin, parasites, and blood infections, as well as insects, weeds, dirt, and animals. The term has been revived and reanimated, in an American presidential campaign, with Donald Trump’s description of his opponentsas “radical-left thugs” who “live like vermin.”

This language isn’t merely ugly or repellent: These words belong to a particular tradition. Adolf Hitler used these kinds of terms often. In 1938, he praised his compatriots who had helped “cleanse Germany of all those parasites who drank at the well of the despair of the Fatherland and the People.” In occupied Warsaw, a 1941 poster displayed a drawing of a louse with a caricature of a Jewish face. The slogan: “Jews are lice: they cause typhus.” Germans, by contrast, were clean, pure, healthy, and vermin-free. Hitler once described the Nazi flag as “the victorious sign of freedom and the purity of our blood.”

Stalin used the same kind of language at about the same time. He called his opponents the “enemies of the people,” implying that they were not citizens and that they enjoyed no rights. He portrayed them as vermin, pollution, filth that had to be “subjected to ongoing purification,” and he inspired his fellow communists to employ similar rhetoric. In my files, I have the notes from a 1955 meeting of the leaders of the Stasi, the East German secret police, during which one of them called for a struggle against “vermin activities (there is, inevitably, a German word for this:Schädlingstätigkeiten), by which he meant the purge and arrest of the regime’s critics. In this same era, the Stasi forcibly moved suspicious people away from the border with West Germany, a project nicknamed “Operation Vermin.”

This kind of language was not limited to Europe. Mao Zedong also described his political opponents as “poisonous weeds.” Pol Pot spoke of “cleansing” hundreds of thousands of his compatriots so that Cambodia would be “purified.”

In each of these very different societies, the purpose of this kind of rhetoric was the same. If you connect your opponents with disease, illness, and poisoned blood, if you dehumanize them as insects or animals, if you speak of squashing them or cleansing them as if they were pests or bacteria, then you can much more easily arrest them, deprive them of rights, exclude them, or even kill them. If they are parasites, they aren’t human. If they are vermin, they don’t get to enjoy freedom of speech, or freedoms of any kind. And if you squash them, you won’t be held accountable.

I also tried to find previous examples US presidents or presidential candidates over the past century talking like this. But I found that even the most openly racist figures did not.

George Wallace’s notorious, racist, neo-Confederate 1963 speech, his inaugural speech as Alabama governor and the prelude to his first presidential campaign, avoided such language. Wallace called for “segregation today, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever.” But he did not speak of his political opponents as “vermin” or talk about them poisoning the nation’s blood. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, which ordered Japanese Americans into internment camps following the outbreak of World War II, spoke of “alien enemies” but not parasites.

This was a fairly straightforward argument, mostly just quotations. Read the whole thing here:

Trump's language, from The Atlantic

I was not the only person to hear these historical echoes in Trump’s speech. General John Kelly, the former chief of staff in Trump’s White House, has also described, on the record, in both the New York Times and the Atlantic, how Trump would frequently praise Hitler’s generals. Not only did Kelly use the word ‘fascist’ to describe Trump, thirteen former Trump White House officials signed a statement agreeing with him. 

But not everybody agreed. Normally I wouldn’t write about reactions to my writing: I have opinions and others have them too. But this time, the response of Trump supporters - or rather, people who are going to vote for Trump because he might lower their taxes – interested me, because it reminded me of things I’ve seen in other places.  Other than the usual suspects – posters on 4chan, the website of Russia Today, and Elon Musk - I also got a response from the Wall Street Journal editorial page. Under the headline “the fascist meme re-emerges,” the editorial board dismissed my article and others as “hyperbole,” said that there’s nothing to worry about and, tellingly, threw some insults at Joe Biden. A couple of weeks later the historian Niall Ferguson, writing in the Daily Mail, dismissed the whole conversation about “fascism” and then attacked Kamala Harris as undemocratic on the grounds that some people around her have argued for constitutional change. This is a phenomenon that the Poles call symmetrism: whenever something ugly emerges about  someone in your political camp, search immediately for something ugly to say about your opponents, whether or not it is equivalent. 

Something else was going on too. These are intelligent, well-read Trump supporters; they also hear the echoes from history, but they don’t want to draw conclusions from what they are hearing. They belittle, undermine, excuse and ignore his language, his scorn for the rule of law, his allusions to violence and his constant predictions of chaos because if they were to take this language seriously, then they would also have to draw uncomfortable conclusions about themselves. 

With just a few days to go, let me step back and make the case, once again, for why Trump’s language, and Trump’s propaganda, matter so much. Do note that, despite the criticism, it has not stopped. Right up until the final moments of the campaign, Trump was still casting his opponents as “enemies,” as was everyone around him. At his Madison Square Garden rally, one speaker after the next described Puerto Rico as “garbage,” Harris as “the anti-Christ” and Hillary Clinton as a “sick son of a bitch.” At an event with Tucker Carlson on Thursday, he called for violence against Liz Cheney: "Let's put her with a rifle standing there with 9 barrels shooting at her. Let's see how she feels about it. You know, when the guns are trained on her face."

Trump will not personally try to kill Cheney. But he wants us to get used to the idea that someone might, and that would be ok. Also, he wants us to get used to the idea that he might transgress, break the law - or try, once again, to steal the election. 

As I wrote, again in the Atlantic, 

You are meant to accept this language and behavior, to consider this kind of rhetoric ‘baked in’ to any Trump campaign. You are supposed to just get used to the idea that Trump wishes he had ‘Hitler’s generals’ or that he uses the Stalinist phrase ‘enemies of the people’ to describe his opponents. Because once you think that’s normal, then you’ll accept the next step. Even when that next step is an assault on democracy and the rule of law.’”

This campaign has had a purpose. It has prepared Americans - even serious, establishment historians, or members of the Wall Street Journal editorial board - to accept what comes next. If Harris wins on Tuesday, you can expect a massive campaign to change the result. Accusations that “illegal immigrants” are voting, for which there is absolutely no evidence; shenanigans with vote certification; maybe even games played by the House of Representatives. 

Again, read the whole article here: 

Trump Wants You To Think This is Normal

And if Trump wins? He and the people around him have already told us what they will do. They will seek to transform the federal government into a loyalty machine that serves the interests of himself and his cronies. This was the essence of the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, and it will become reality. The Justice Department, the FBI, the IRS and maybe others will focus on harassing Trump’s enemies in the media and in politics. Whole branches of the federal government will be farmed out to cronies who will build kleptocracy on a new scale. 

These changes will not come overnight. They will happen slowly, over time, as they did in Hungary, Venezuela or Turkey. And at each stage, there will be people arguing that we should accept or ignore them. 

Don’t listen to them. And do vote. 

Read my book, Autocracy Inc

Listen to Autocracy in America

Open Letters, from Anne Applebaum is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

sábado, 29 de julho de 2023

Sobre alguns deslizes da História - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 Sobre alguns deslizes da História 

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Nota sobre as tragédias provocadas pelos autoritários da História.

  

A tragédia presente da Ucrânia, assim como a anterior e atual do Afeganistão não foram provocadas pelo “imperialismo estadunidense”, ou pelos povos desses dois países, imersos em problemas de identidade nacional e de lenta e difícil construção de um Estado viável para uma nação fraturada por divisões internas. 

A razão principal da violência e da imensa perda de vidas humanas é a prepotência de senhores da guerra, que, sim, ainda existem e insistem na violência pura.

Aliás, tem sido assim desde a guerra de Troia, mas a Helena não tem nada a ver com a guerra total entre gregos e troianos. São as paixões e os interesses dos senhores da guerra, do ódio e da ambição, que motivam esses empreendimentos guerreiros, exclusivamente masculinos.

No caso do Talibã é primitivismo puro.

No caso de Putin, são os instintos primitivos de um mero serviçal de uma máquina totalitária que ficou frustrado com a derrocada, por auto implosão, de um império baseado na opressão e na mentira.

Até hoje os russos atribuem a derrocada e o afundamento da Grande Rússia a um personagem trágico em sua tentativa de reforma: Gorbatchov. 

Ainda não se conscientizaram que fizeram parte de um dos experimentos mais cruéis e extraordinários de toda a história da humanidade: a instalação, por acidente (mas também pelo sentido trágico da História) e o funcionamento por mais de três gerações de um regime escravista contemporâneo, em paralelo a um outro sistema similar, se não semelhante ao bolchevismo: o nazifascismo, este baseado numa suposta identidade de raça, aquele de “classe”. 

Dois irmãos siameses, ou univitelinos, e que ainda deixaram marcas duráveis em certos povos ou indivíduos.

O caso da China é diferente, mas até coerente com suas tradições seculares de um “despotismo oriental” guiado por um mandarinato recrutado com base no mérito individual. O marxismo-leninismo foi mais passageiro no caso do maoísmo e mais superficial, a despeito do leninismo burocrático do Estado atual. A racionalidade tende a predominar sobre os instintos dos dirigentes.

A História, obviamente, não é a autora dessas monstruosidades, é apenas uma espectadora das loucuras dos homens.

Não estamos tão longe assim da guerra de Troia, ou até das tribos primitivas lutando pela sua sobrevivência. 

A humanidade, no conceito civilizatório do termo, é ainda relativamente recente, talvez 50 mil anos ou mesmo o dobro. 

Ainda não tivemos tempo de domar nossos instintos, de nos civilizarmos totalmente.

O caminho é longo, como o provam os feminicídios ainda largamente disseminados em diferentes sociedades.

Desculpem a longa reflexão.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4444, 29 julho 2023, 2 p.


 

 

sábado, 23 de janeiro de 2016

Venezuela: os impasses politicos e economicos se aprofundam; o que faz o Brasil? - Janaina Figueiredo (O Globo)

Não se sabe o que pretende fazer o governo ou a diplomacia brasileira, em face dos problemas crescentes na Venezuela, com um impasse total entre a Assembleia eleita democraticamente e os dois outros poderes, dominados pelo chavismo e até agora apoiados pelos militares.
Argentina deveria assumir o protagonismo diplomático para tentar resolver os impasses.
Depois do golpe contra o governo Chávez, em 2002, o Brasil dos companheiros, ainda que explicitamente favorável ao governo chavista, liderou um esforço de pacificação, chamado "Amigos da Venezuela" (que era majoritariamente de amigos do Chávez).
E agora, o que se faz?
Aparentemente nada...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília 23 de janeiro de 2016

Rejeição a decreto aprofunda embate entre chavismo e Legislativo
POR JANAÍNA FIGUEIREDO, CORRESPONDENTE
O Globo, 23/01/2016 7:00 / atualizado 23/01/2016 7:00

Maduro fica sem opção na Assembleia para aprovar emergência econômica

BUENOS AIRES - Depois de uma semana de forte tensão e troca de acusações entre Executivo e Legislativo, a bancada majoritária da oposição na Assembleia Nacional (AN) da Venezuela rejeitou ontem, por 107 votos contra 53, o decreto de emergência econômica enviado há uma semana pelo presidente Nicolás Maduro. No debate prévio à votação, congressistas do governista Partido Socialista Unido da Venezuela (PSUV) acusaram a Mesa de Unidade Democrática (MUD) de “estar virando as costas para o país”. Deputados opositores reiteraram que o polêmico decreto daria “amplos poderes ao presidente para, até mesmo, expropriar empresas” e denunciaram o que consideram uma “armadilha” do governo Maduro “para tentar transferir a responsabilidade da crise”.
Já durante a semana, quando as mais altas autoridades da AN anteciparam a rejeição do decreto, o chefe de Estado assegurou lamentar muito “este giro negativo, muito negativo, que tem mais a ver com outros planos e não com os que possam permitir sair desta situação”. O governo chegou a consultar antecipadamente o Tribunal Supremo de Justiça (TSJ), que decidiu pela constitucionalidade do decreto. A maioria opositora na AN, entretanto, avisou que a prerrogativa de aprovar ou rejeitar a medida é do Legislativo, abrindo caminho a um novo embate também com o Judiciário, controlado pelos chavistas.

— Criar um novo confronto seria um erro por parte do governo, a última coisa de que precisamos neste momento é de confronto. Nós estamos dispostos a dialogar e fizemos uma série de propostas ao Executivo — disse ao GLOBO o deputado da MUD Elias Mata, que integrou a comissão parlamentar de avaliação do decreto.
O presidente da comissão, deputado José Guerra, defendeu ontem a necessidade de “ter uma nova política fiscal e, principalmente, de fazer um esforço conjunto para ter um novo modelo de país, um modelo de progresso”.
— Este governo nos colocou num atoleiro e hoje está desnorteado, não sabe o que fazer com o país — afirmou Guerra. — Seria irresponsável aceitar um decreto desta magnitude às cegas, amputaríamos as competências da AN. Quem passou por uma faculdade de Economia não pode redigir um documento como esse.

Em seu relatório entregue ao Legislativo, a comissão comandada pelo deputado deixou claro que o decreto não podia obter sinal verde por várias razões: implicaria a anulação das funções do Parlamento; não protege o gasto social; omite causas centrais da crise econômica, como o modelo cambial; deixa espaço para gastos descontrolados do governo; e não garante a estabilidade da moeda.
— A rejeição do decreto não deveria gerar um conflito, já que a Assembleia está usando suas competências constitucionais e foi dada ao governo a possibilidade de explicar o decreto, algo que o Executivo não fez — disse o deputado da MUD Enrique Márquez.

Com um resultado que era esperado, a minoria parlamentar do PSUV, autoproclamada “bancada patriótica”, aproveitou o debate para insistir num ponto central do discurso chavista: acusar a oposição de não querer colaborar com o governo para superar a crise.
— Ninguém duvida de que estamos atravessando uma emergência econômica, e vocês, como oposição, devem decidir que atitude tomam. Estão contrariando as ações de um governo que pretendem derrubar num prazo de seis meses, como disse próprio o presidente da AN, Henry Ramos Allup — criticou o deputado Héctor Rodríguez, líder do bloco.
Em meio a aplausos de seus colegas de bancada, Rodríguez disse que a oposição venezuelana “deve optar entre estar a favor ou contra o povo venezuelano”. Para os congressistas do PSUV, ontem a MUD “virou as costas para o país”.
As acusações foram rebatidas por vários deputados da oposição, entre eles Omar Barboza, que insistiu na “armadilha de Maduro para tentar se livrar da culpa de uma crise que foi provocada por seu governo”.
— Por que o governo não decretou a emergência econômica antes, quando tinha maioria parlamentar? Por que não discutiu o decreto com a nova AN, sabendo que já não tinha maioria? Vejo muito cálculo político em tudo isso — alfinetou Barboza.
A oposição deixou claro que não vai abrir mão de suas faculdades constitucionais e pediu ao Palácio de Miraflores a negociação de um “pacto para respeitar as atribuições constitucionais de cada um dos Poderes que existe no país”.

A Venezuela viverá um conflito permanente de Poderes que poderia incluir, até mesmo, uma tentativa da Assembleia Nacional (AN) de destituir ministros do governo do presidente Nicolás Maduro. Essa é a avaliação de Luis Vicente León, diretor da empresa de consultoria Datanálisis, que ainda vê o chefe de Estado “com poder político suficiente para permanecer no Palácio de Miraflores”.

A oposição acusou o governo de enviar o decreto de emergência sabendo que seria rechaçado para, assim, poder culpar a Mesa de Unidade Democrática (MUD) pela crise...
Isso está bastante claro. A aprovação do decreto era praticamente impossível. Teria permitido o uso de créditos e recursos do Estado sem controle; a intervenção de empresas privadas sem passar pela Justiça; e até mesmo a implementação de confiscos.
O que vai acontecer agora?
Acho que o governo adotará as mesmas medidas que pretendia aplicar com o decreto, mas sem ele.
Mas isso seria legal?
O governo pode usar o Tribunal Supremo de Justiça (TSJ) para obter a aprovação. Legal não é, porque o decreto foi rechaçado pela AN. Mas na Venezuela de hoje assim é como se governa. Maduro dirá que a oposição é culpada pelo agravamento da crise e isso vai ajudá-lo a unificar o chavismo e confundir setores independentes.
Haverá um choque de Poderes permanente?
Sim. O governo vai continuar usando o TSJ para boicotar a AN.
E a oposição avançará com seu plano de buscar uma maneira de tirar Maduro do poder?
A oposição já disse que vai buscar os mecanismos para tirar Maduro nos próximos seis meses. Mas não está claro se conseguirá isso. O presidente ainda tem poder político para permanecer. Ele controla o TSJ, tem dinheiro, o apoio dos militares, de meios de comunicação...
Qual poderia ser o próximo conflito de Poderes?
A AN poderia pedir o impeachment dos ministros da equipe econômica. Com a maioria qualificada, a MUD pode fazer isso. E o governo pode apelar ao TSJ para impedir uma ação desse tipo. As tensões serão cada vez maiores.


sexta-feira, 4 de setembro de 2015

Tiranos podem ser lideres eficientes? Ou apenas senhores da guerra? - Book review (Jessica L. P. Weeks)

Um livro interessante, mas que padece, como muitas outras obras de cientistas políticos americanos, dessa mania de querer modelizar, estilizar todos os tipos de eventos e processos históricos, criando categorias ou tipos-ideais de "tiranos" enquanto líderes políticos ou militares, e seu sucesso relativo em sua tirania.
Acho interessante que se estudem os tiranos da História, e os regimes autoritários, de modo geral, mas eu seria mais circunspecto quanto a essa mania de modelizar a história para encaixar os exemplos concretos disponíveis numa determinada categoria estanque, numa célula do modelo formal, para encaixar tudo bonitinho.
A História é muito mais caótica e imprevisível do que isso, mas esse tipo de exercício não deixa de ter sua utilidade para os estudiosos acadêmicos, e apenas para eles.
Nós, os cidadãos comuns, queremos apenas entender, e eventualmente impedir, que o mesmo aconteça com o nosso país.
Por exemplo, os "tiranos potenciais" que comandam o Brasil desde 2003: não tenho nenhuma dúvida de que são peronistas de botequim, mas se fossem outras as circunstâncias e as condições, estariam se comportando como esses caudilhos do Caribe, como os fascistas de Mussolini, como os nazistas de Hitler, nas suas tentativas de tomar o poder (vários conseguiram), e de levar suas respectivas sociedades para o desastre humano, político e social que sempre constroem.
No caso do Brasil, o que temos são mafiosos travestidos em líderes políticos.
Vale a leitura do livro aqui apenas resenhado.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

H-Net
Greetings Paulo Almeida,
New items have been posted in H-Diplo.

Table of Contents

McKoy on Weeks, 'Dictators at War and Peace' [review]
by System Administrator

Jessica L. P. Weeks. Dictators at War and Peace. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Series. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014. 264 pp. $24.95 (paper), ISBN 978-0-8014-7982-3; $75.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-8014-5296-3.

Reviewed by Michael McKoy (Wheaton College)
Published on H-Diplo (September, 2015)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach

Western victory in the Cold War produced a flood of triumphalist literature on Western liberal-democratic exceptionalism. American social scientists produced a myriad of arguments and hypotheses explaining how and why liberal democracies outlasted and triumphed over its ideological competitors. Authoritarian regimes, in turn, were cast as mere foils and given little analytical attention. However, in the past decade, as nascent democracies stumbled, authoritarian regimes persisted, and Chinese and Iranian ascent threatened US hegemony, political scientists have begun to give authoritarian politics more attention.

Dictators at War and Peace by Jessica L. P. Weeks is one of the most significant contributions to this literature. Weeks argues that not all authoritarians are created equal, and this difference affects their likelihood of initiating and winning military conflicts. Building on research from Barbara Geddes and Brian Lai and Dan Slater, Weeks organizes a typology for authoritarian regimes, categorizing them as either “machines” (civilian leaders constrained by civilian elites), “juntas” (military leaders constrained by military elites), “bosses” (unconstrained civilian leaders), or “strongmen” (unconstrained military leaders).[1] She develops a meticulous questionnaire to ascertain a regime’s type, asking about the military affiliation of the leader and governing elites (militarism), and whether the leader controlled political appointments or created loyalist security institutions (constraints). Weeks argues that machines and juntas are less likely to start international conflicts than bosses and strongmen, because leaders in machines and juntas will face greater domestic punishment for failure, and bosses (e.g., Saddam Hussein) and strongmen (e.g., Muammar Qaddafi) are likely to be more aggressive and risk-prone, given the qualities necessary to become an absolute ruler in the first place. Weeks further hypothesizes that this should make constrained authoritarians more militarily successful than absolute dictators, because they are more prudent about the wars they choose to fight. Thus, while China (machine regime) might pose a greater military threat to its neighbors, it is North Korea (boss regime) that may pose the bigger threat,  because it is more likely to fight ... but also more likely to lose.

Furthermore, between machines and juntas, Weeks expects juntas to be more aggressive, because military leaders are selected and acculturated to value force and distrust diplomacy, while civilians are likely more wary of conflict and amenable to diplomacy. This makes juntas less selective in the military conflicts than machines and thus less successful in wars. Indeed, Weeks ultimately posits that machines should be just as conflict-averse and militarily successful as stable democracies. As long as the civilian leader is accountable to a conflict-averse audience, s/he is likely to be more mindful about getting involved in foreign adventures. This flies in the face of much of the democratic exceptionalism literature of the post-Cold War era.[2]

Weeks’s statistical results bear this out, showing machines to be just as conflict-averse and militarily successful as stable democracies. (Regimes undergoing transitions are counted as “others.”) Bosses and strongmen are much more conflict-prone and militarily unsuccessful, with bosses losing 56 percent of their wars and strongmen losing 73 percent versus machines and democracies losing 25 percent and 28 percent, respectively, from 1921 to 2007 (p. 61). The results for juntas are more mixed and less clear, largely due to the limited number of them in the past century. Weeks does an excellent job explaining the statistical results in accessible terms, but the mechanics will likely be difficult for non-statisticians. She also controls for other factors known to explain conflict initiation and success—capabilities, alliances, and geographic contiguity, among others—along with testing the possibility that involvement in conflicts may instead encourage dictatorial consolidation. She finds that none of these are significant factors, though it would have been helpful for her to consider this reverse causality in the subsequent case studies.

Weeks complements her statistical analysis with several in-depth case studies. The cases include wars involving Argentina (democracy/junta), Iraq (boss), Japan (machine/junta), the Soviet Union (boss/machine), and Vietnam (machine). All are well researched and well written, and they largely establish the effect regime type can have on military performance. However, the cases vary in how well they test the causal connection between regime type and war initiation. The Argentina and Japan cases are the strongest in this regard. Weeks effectively demonstrates that their transitions from a democracy and machine, respectively, to junta regimes increased their faith that military action would overcome diplomatic impasses. She also successfully challenges the long-standing argument that Argentina’s initiation of the Falklands/Malvinas war was a diversionary strategy, and instead argues that the military leadership’s genuine belief in the efficacy of force—a belief not shared by the previous democratic regime—was determinative. Likewise, Japanese civilian elites in the 1930s were wary of risky foreign adventures, but were eventually overruled and overthrown by the military, who led Japan into war first against China and then the United States. These cases clearly demonstrate the effect regime type had on foreign policy.

Weeks is less successful in demonstrating that the Soviet transition from the Stalinist boss regime to the post-Stalinist machine regimes increased Soviet aggressiveness and military incompetence. Of the four Soviet-initiated invasions from Josef Stalin to Mikhail Gorbachev—against Finland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan—all but one occurred under collective leadership. Moreover, under Leonid Brezhnev, whom Weeks lauds as leading the most collectively oriented Soviet regime, Moscow issued the Brezhnev Doctrine, declaring its right to intervene in any socialist country. The Brezhnev regime then followed through by invading Afghanistan in 1979, initiating the Soviet Union’s longest foreign military conflict. Quite surprisingly, Weeks does not examine this war in much detail, explaining that “the Soviets interceded at the invitation of the Afghan government” (p. 166). Yet this was clearly an engineered invitation, and even if not, the Soviet invasion, escalation, and subsequent debacle run directly counter to Weeks’s arguments about military initiation and performance. This would have been an ideal least-likely case for Weeks to better elaborate on her causal mechanisms, but this may be left for future scholars to consider.

In contrast to the other cases, the Vietnam and Iraq cases include no variation in either regime type or war initiation/performance. This is less problematic in the Vietnam case, because Weeks notes that General Secretary Le Duan preferred a more aggressive approach toward South Vietnam earlier than others in the government. This suggests a counterfactual that had Le Duan been less constrained, he may have initiated a direct confrontation sooner. The Iraq case, however, has a difficult time fully testing the connection between regime type and conflict initiation. In an earlier chapter, Weeks references Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans’s argument in Leaders and International Conflict (2011) that vulnerability to harsh domestic punishment makes leaders more likely to “gamble for survival” by engaging in risky foreign adventures (p. 74), as opposed to her argument that invulnerability makes leaders more risk-prone. While she tests Chiozza and Goemans’s argument in the junta cases and convincingly rejects it, she does not apply it to the Iraq case. Yet the vulnerability argument is a plausible alternative explanation for the foreign policy of Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Arguably, Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait was motivated more by fear than greed. Saddam’s absolute rule required paying rents to critical domestic constituencies; Kuwait’s over-pumping and slant-drilling drove down Iraq’s oil revenues, threatening Saddam’s hold on power. In addition, invading Kuwait allowed Saddam to redirect his battle-hardened and increasingly disgruntled majority-Shi’a army elsewhere. Fear of domestic punishment also offers an alternative explanation of his refusal to withdraw. Saddam justifiably feared revolt, which later came to pass. Weeks acknowledges that there were grumblings among the Sunni generals about a coup as the crisis escalated. The Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings may in fact have saved Saddam, as they rallied the military and Sunni population behind Saddam, who under different circumstances may have overthrown him themselves.

These critiques do not detract from Weeks’s extraordinary contribution. Rather, they provide fruitful avenues for future research in an important and still developing research area. Weeks’s typology and analysis have laid the foundation for understanding the diversity of authoritarian international politics, and Dictators at War and Peace will undoubtedly become the standard for such analysis. Weeks concludes with a brief but very insightful discussion of the policy implications of this authoritarian diversity. Among them is a recommendation to foreign leaders to engage in direct, face-to-face diplomacy with bosses and strongmen, in order to more effectively communicate both threats and assurances. She reasonably worries that sycophantic underlings may water down foreign communications, particularly threats, to appeal to their leaders’ existing views. Face-to-face interactions may do a better job of convincing unconstrained dictators that while they may face little domestic punishment for dangerous behavior, there will be severe foreign consequences. It is good advice for a world that is unlikely to be rid of authoritarian governance for the foreseeable future, if ever.

Notes
[1]. Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144; and Brian Lai and Dan Slater, “Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 1 (January 2006): 113-126. Weeks borrows her terminology from Lai and Slater but develops different hypotheses regarding international behavior.

[2]. For a survey, see Michael Brown, Owen Coté, Sean Lynne-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., Do Democracies Win Their Wars? (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2011).

Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=44347

Citation: Michael McKoy. Review of Weeks, Jessica L. P., Dictators at War and Peace. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. September, 2015.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=44347

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terça-feira, 22 de julho de 2014

Atencao pessoal: sem sorrisos no dia 8 de julho: Kim Jong-un ordenou

Só a simples ideia de proibir o riso num dia determinado já incita ao riso, desopilante em alguns casis.
Mas atenção, se vc for visitar a RPDC nesse dia não tente sorrir ou fazer piada com essa ideia, pois vc pode ir parar num dos muitos Gulags desse ditadorzinho ridículo, o que não seria piada...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

O dia em que é proibido dar risada

Ditador norte-coreano Kim Jong-un visita um centro de cultivo de cogumelos e sorri
No dia 8 de julho é proibido sorrir na Coreia do Norte. Isso mesmo, por mais surreal que possa soar, a risada é vetada neste dia. O motivo é que este dia marca a morte de Kim Il-sung, o fundador do país, avô do atual ditador Kim Jong-un. O decreto existe desde 1994 e proíbe sorrir, levantar a voz na rua, beber álcool e dançar porque todo o país está de luto. Neste dia, a rede de televisão estatal norte-coreana dedica o dia transmitindo a solene – e chata – cerimônia oficial em homenagem ao 'presidente eterno'.



segunda-feira, 5 de março de 2012

Ditadores: grudai no poder (e nao largai, mas alguem pode derrubar...)

A revista Economist é sempre muito precisa quanto aos números, mas de uma metodologia toda inglesa. A Venezuela, por exemplo, trocou muito até 1999; se dependesse do Chávez, agora, ele ficaria até 2030. Não é por vontade própria que ele ficará menos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
Daily chart

Staying power

Mar 5th 2012, 17:12 by The Economist online
How long leaders stay in office in different countries
OMAN’s name is thought to derive from a word meaning “a man residing permanently in the homeland"—but "presiding” might be more apt. Since 1945, the starting point for our analysis, the sultanate has only had two rulers, making it the country with the lowest turnover of leaders in the world. Countries in the Middle East tend to hold on to their leaders longer than anywhere else (a little over eight years on average). Africa comes next at more than seven years. Latin America, cursed for decades by coups, has in a more democratic era maintained its tendency to swap rulers every four years or so. Europeans tire of their leaders quicker than any other region, in part due to a general predominance of prime ministers over presidents, but also to power-sharing arrangements in countries like Switzerland. Our methodology, however, looks at individuals rather than terms, so does not fully account for the variations of revolving-door presidencies like that of Russia under Vladimir Putin.