Eu estou terminando de revisar um "velho" (2003) Guia dos Arquivos Americanos sobre o Brasil, que organizei quando ainda estava trabalhando em Washington. Estou, mais exatamente, verificando todas as fontes e links de sítios de pesquisa e de materiais de referência, com respeito ao Brasil nos EUA. Isso inclui, portanto, não apenas os materiais do NARA (National Archives and Records Administration), mas fontes importantes, como a Library of Congress, que edita, anualmente, o Handbook of Latin American Studies, um importante diretório de estudos sobre a região.
Apenas como teste sobre a eficiência dos instrumentos de busca dessa publicação, coloquei meu próprio nome para um search rápido (neste link: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query), e deu o que vai abaixo:
Handbook of Latin American Studies
Search Results:
34 Items containing the exact phrase Almeida Paulo Roberto .
2 Items containing all of the words: Almeida Paulo Roberto .
464 Items containing one or more of the words: Almeida Paulo Roberto
Items 1 through 20 of 500
Items containing the exact phrase Almeida Paulo Roberto .
1. Almeida. A formação da diplomacia econômica do Brasil.
2. Almeida. Brasil y el Mercosur de cara al TLC.
3. Almeida. Brazil and the future of Mercosur:dilemmas and options.
4. Almeida. A diplomacia financeira do Brasil no Império.
5. Almeida. O Brasil e a diplomacia do tráfico, 1810-1850.
6. Almeida. A estrutura constitucional das relações internacionais...
7. Almeida. Uma política externa engajada:a diplomacia do governo L...
8. Almeida. Relações internacionais do Brasil:ensaio de síntese s...
9. de Almeida. As relações econômicas internacionais do Brasil do...
10. Almeida. Uma nova "arquitetura" diplomática?:interpretações di...
11. Almeida. O Brasil e o multilateralismo econômico /Paulo Roberto ...
12. Almeida. Internacionlismo proletario no cone sul:a experiência i...
13. Almeida. Une histoire du Brésil :pour comprendre le Brésil cont...
14. Almeida. Formação da diplomacia econômica no Brasil:as relaç...
15. Almeida. O Brasil e o Mercosur em face do NAFTA.
16. Almeida. Estudos de relações internacionais do Brasil:etapas de...
17. Almeida. A economia da política externa:a ordem internacional e ...
18. Pour comprendre le Brésil de Lula /Denis Rolland et Joëlle Chass...
19. Almeida. O legado do Barão:Rio Branco e a moderna diplomacia bra...
20. Almeida. Relações internacionais do Brasil:introdução metodol...
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Items 21 through 40 of 500
21. Almeida. O estudo das relações internacionais do Brasil.
22. Almeida. MERCOSUR y la Unión Europea:de la cooperación a la aso...
23. Almeida. Os primeiros anos do século XXI:o Brasil e as relaçõe...
24. Almeida. Relações internacionais e política externa do Brasil:...
25. Almeida. A política internacional do Partido dos Trabalhadores:d...
26. Almeida. Os partidos políticos nas relações internacionais do ...
27. Almeida. Relações internacionais e política externa do Brasil:...
28. Almeida. O Mercosul no contexto regional e internacional.
29. Almeida. Propiedade intelectual:os novos desafios para a América...
30. Almeida. Mercosul:antecedentes, desenvolvimento e crise; uma aval...
31. Almeida. O Brasil e a construção da ordem econômica internacio...
32. Almeida. MERCOSUR, ALCA y Brasil:una evaluación política sobre ...
33. Envisioning Brazil:a guide to Brazilian studies in the United Stat...
34. O Brasil dos brasilianistas:um guia dos estudos sobre o Brasil nos...
(depois seguem os itens em que meu nome aparece ocasionalmente, ou sob outros nomes)
Abrindo um item ao acaso, o que se tem é a ficha da obra em questão, a exemplo desta, relativa ao meu primeiro livro publicado, informando que esta informação foi publicada no HLAS n. 55:
Item 28 of 500
Citation: Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. O Mercosul no contexto regional e internacional. São Paulo: Edições Aduaneiras, 1993. 204 p.:. bibl.. 22 cm..
Annotation: Useful general work on Mercosul written during the transitional phase. Discusses founding, basic structures, and provisions, as well as challenges faced. Places Mercosul in the context of the preceding Argentina-Brazil Integration program and broader trade agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Latin American Free Trade Area.
Subjects:
Mercosur
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Economic Integration--South America
Trade Policy--South America
LC Call No: HC165.A43 1993
LC Control No: 94831192
Bibl. Info.: (Includes bibliographical references (p. [199]-204).)
HLAS Volume: 55 HLAS Item#: bi 94009586
HLAS Editor/Code: birch six
Um outro livro meu, recebeu esta avaliação generosa do resenhista, que desconheço quem seja:
Item 23 of 500
Citation: Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. Os primeiros anos do século XXI: o Brasil e as relações internacionais contemporâneas. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2002. 283 p.:. bibl..
Annotation: This prolific author, a Brazilian diplomat, surveys the country's stances in international relations post-Cold War and post- 9/11. Using perspectives in international political economics, the work links historical developments with systemic forces shaping Brazil's foreign relations in the new century.
Subjects:
International Economic Relations--Brazil
Brazil--Foreign relations--1985-
Brazil--Foreign economic relations.
LC Call No: F2523.A45 2002
LC Control No: 2005344459
Bibl. Info.: (Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-283).)
HLAS Volume: 63 HLAS Item#: bi2006001865
HLAS Editor/Code: Costa stu
Já esta ficha, igualmente generosa, foi preparada por um acadêmico de minhas relações, Scott Tollefson, que colaborou com um capítulo sobre a produção brasilianista em relações internacionais do Brasil no livro que organizei com Marshall Eakin sobre os brasilianistas (Envisioning Brazil, também generosamente apreciado por outro colaborador):
Item 21 of 500
Citation: Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. O estudo das relações internacionais do Brasil. São Paulo: Unimarco Editora, 1999. 299 p.:. bibl..
Annotation: Insightful and thorough review of the study of Brazil's international relations, both in Brazil and abroad. Much more than a reference book, it is essential reading. Chap. 4 focuses on Brazilian contributions to the literature and is especially noteworthy.
Subjects:
International Relations--Brazil
International Relations--Research
Brazil--Foreign relations.
Brazil--Foreign economic relations.
LC Call No: F2523.A44 1999
LC Control No: 99886260
Bibl. Info.: (Includes bibliographical references (p. 255-299).)
HLAS Volume: 61 HLAS Item#: bi2002000568
HLAS Editor/Code: Tollefson stu
Organizados esses americanos. Gostaria que tivéssemos instituições semelhantes, mas acredito que ainda estamos a anos-luz desse tipo de realização. Nossas universidades e instituições públicas de pesquisa são muito lentas e muito preguiçosas...
domingo, 10 de outubro de 2010
A Petrobras a servico da politica (da má politica, quero dizer)
A manipulação política da Petrobras: minhas explicações (fundamentadas)
Paulo Roberto de Almeida (10.10.2010)
Meu post anterior, que deveria ser uma simples transcrição do sério editorial do Estadão sobre a perda de valor patrimonial da Petrobras em função de sua manipulação pelo presidente da república,acabou se estendendo nos comentários condenatórios da ação do dito cujo, mais pelo lado das invectivas do que pelo lado das explicações.
Muitos leitores poderão, portanto, ter pensado assim: "ah, esse gajo [eu] é contra a Petrobras estatal, ele pretende vê-la privatizada, por isso diz essas coisas; ele é contra estatais em geral e a Petrobras em particular; pior, é contra o presidente da república, que quer preservar uma estatal num setor estratégico como o petróleo".
Certo? É o que pensaram vários de vocês?
Errado, eu digo, e me disponho aqui a dar algumas explicações sobre como eu vejo a (má) utilização da Petrobras pelo presidente da república, um ignorante em economia, um primário em gestão empresarial e, no entanto, presidente da república (uma coisa não impede a outra; já tivemos outros ignaros na presidência, e países ao lado tem jumentos).
Já escrevi alguma coisa sobre o petróleo, assim que me dispenso de retomar aqui meus argumentos sobre a essencialidade e o caráter estratégico dessa commodity. Ponto.
Desde 1997, a Petrobras foi levada a atuar como empresa, o que ela deveria ter feito desde a origem, e não fez, pois foi utilizada politicamente -- e para fins de política econômica -- por vários governos. Pois bem: desde que ganhou uma gestão isenta, profissional, isolada da política, a Petrobras cresceu, tremendamente, e se tornou a grande companhia que é hoje, isso num ambiente em que, pesem as mudanças no sentido da liberalização, as regras do jogo ainda são distorcidas, em função do enorme poder oligopolista dessa companhia, que de certa forma consegue "fixar" os preços de mercado, mesmo o mercado sendo teoricamente livre. Mas, sabemos que de fato não existe concorrência e que mesmo as distribuidoras privadas são obrigadas a seguir a Petrobras em seus preços.
Pois bem: todo mundo deve se lembrar - e se não se lembrarem eu me encarrego disso -- que depois de se ter convertido em companhia "comercial" -- parece óbvio mas não é -- a Petrobras disse que seguiria os preços do mercado internacional como referência para sua contabilidade interna, refletindo, portanto, no preço da gasolina ofertada internamente os altos e baixos dos mercados internacionais.
Isso de fato ocorreu, mas com algumas distorções, pois num mercado ainda oligopolista como esse, o preço dos combustíveis tem grande impacto nos índices de inflação.
Todo mundo também deve se lembrar que nas eleições de 2006, o governo fez pressão para que a Petrobras não aumentasse os preços internos, isso a despeito do enorme aumento do preço do barril nos mercados internacionais. Ele foi de 25 dólares em 2002 a mais de 140 dólares em 2006-2007, descendo um pouco depois disso. Todo mundo deve estar lembrado disso, mas aqui não houve alteração no preço da gasolina, durante a campanha eleitoral, o que deve ter gerado perdas para a Petrobras, ou pelo menos uma contabilidade distorcida.
Depois das eleições o preço subiu, subiu muito, e quando o petróleo despencou para menos de 60 dólares o barris, o preço interno não se moveu.
Conclusão: o brasileiro paga hoje uma das gasolinas mais caras do mundo, porque o governo resolveu "capitalizar" a Petrobras, que retem assim o dinheiro que deveria estar sendo "devolvido" aos consumidores.
Em qualquer hipótese, os preços no Brasil há muito deixaram de refletir as flutuações dos mercados internacionais (como aliás ocorre em países surrealistas no plano econômico como Venezuela e Irã).
Preços alinhados com os mercados internacionais são essenciais para refletir as verdadeiras condições econômicas em curso, para sinalizar aos investidores onde colocar o seu dinheiro, para estimular o uso de energias alternativas, enfim, por simples racionalidade econômica.
Se o governo mantem preços artificialmente baixos durante muito tempo, dá prejuizos à companhia, subsidia indevidamente a classe média que usa carro e estimula além da conta o consumo de um bem relativamente raro.
Se o governo por outro lado mantém preços absurdamente elevados, como faz agora, ele está extorquindo os consumidores, encarecendo o processo produtivo das empresas nacionais, fazendo-as menos competitivas no plano internacional.
Enfim, num ou noutro caso, ele deforma completamente as regras do jogo econômico e distorce as condições sob as quais uma empresa faz seus cálculos microeconômicos.
Existem muitas outras razões para a manipulação da Petrobras, algumas até de natureza mafiosa -- como o financiamento de sindicatos e de ONGs partidárias -- todas elas lamentáveis no plano da ética, da racionalidade econômica, da simples gestão administrativa.
Por essas e outras razões, os investidores internacionais -- que não são bobos ou mal informados como a média dos brasileiros (e isso não é preconceito, mas a simples realidade) -- tem desinvestido de ações da Petrobras, o que provocou a enorme queda revelada naquele editorial do Estadão.
Infelizmente, o Brasil tem primários conduzindo a sua economia e influenciando decisões importantes para o dia-a-dia dos contribuintes. Infelizmente somos reféns de ignaros em economia, se não formos objetos de chantagem de gente sem escrúpulos na gestão macroeconômica.
Infelizmente o Brasil não tem administradores nacionais à altura de suas responsabilidades, infelizmente não temos estadistas no comando da nação.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
(10.10.2010)
Paulo Roberto de Almeida (10.10.2010)
Meu post anterior, que deveria ser uma simples transcrição do sério editorial do Estadão sobre a perda de valor patrimonial da Petrobras em função de sua manipulação pelo presidente da república,acabou se estendendo nos comentários condenatórios da ação do dito cujo, mais pelo lado das invectivas do que pelo lado das explicações.
Muitos leitores poderão, portanto, ter pensado assim: "ah, esse gajo [eu] é contra a Petrobras estatal, ele pretende vê-la privatizada, por isso diz essas coisas; ele é contra estatais em geral e a Petrobras em particular; pior, é contra o presidente da república, que quer preservar uma estatal num setor estratégico como o petróleo".
Certo? É o que pensaram vários de vocês?
Errado, eu digo, e me disponho aqui a dar algumas explicações sobre como eu vejo a (má) utilização da Petrobras pelo presidente da república, um ignorante em economia, um primário em gestão empresarial e, no entanto, presidente da república (uma coisa não impede a outra; já tivemos outros ignaros na presidência, e países ao lado tem jumentos).
Já escrevi alguma coisa sobre o petróleo, assim que me dispenso de retomar aqui meus argumentos sobre a essencialidade e o caráter estratégico dessa commodity. Ponto.
Desde 1997, a Petrobras foi levada a atuar como empresa, o que ela deveria ter feito desde a origem, e não fez, pois foi utilizada politicamente -- e para fins de política econômica -- por vários governos. Pois bem: desde que ganhou uma gestão isenta, profissional, isolada da política, a Petrobras cresceu, tremendamente, e se tornou a grande companhia que é hoje, isso num ambiente em que, pesem as mudanças no sentido da liberalização, as regras do jogo ainda são distorcidas, em função do enorme poder oligopolista dessa companhia, que de certa forma consegue "fixar" os preços de mercado, mesmo o mercado sendo teoricamente livre. Mas, sabemos que de fato não existe concorrência e que mesmo as distribuidoras privadas são obrigadas a seguir a Petrobras em seus preços.
Pois bem: todo mundo deve se lembrar - e se não se lembrarem eu me encarrego disso -- que depois de se ter convertido em companhia "comercial" -- parece óbvio mas não é -- a Petrobras disse que seguiria os preços do mercado internacional como referência para sua contabilidade interna, refletindo, portanto, no preço da gasolina ofertada internamente os altos e baixos dos mercados internacionais.
Isso de fato ocorreu, mas com algumas distorções, pois num mercado ainda oligopolista como esse, o preço dos combustíveis tem grande impacto nos índices de inflação.
Todo mundo também deve se lembrar que nas eleições de 2006, o governo fez pressão para que a Petrobras não aumentasse os preços internos, isso a despeito do enorme aumento do preço do barril nos mercados internacionais. Ele foi de 25 dólares em 2002 a mais de 140 dólares em 2006-2007, descendo um pouco depois disso. Todo mundo deve estar lembrado disso, mas aqui não houve alteração no preço da gasolina, durante a campanha eleitoral, o que deve ter gerado perdas para a Petrobras, ou pelo menos uma contabilidade distorcida.
Depois das eleições o preço subiu, subiu muito, e quando o petróleo despencou para menos de 60 dólares o barris, o preço interno não se moveu.
Conclusão: o brasileiro paga hoje uma das gasolinas mais caras do mundo, porque o governo resolveu "capitalizar" a Petrobras, que retem assim o dinheiro que deveria estar sendo "devolvido" aos consumidores.
Em qualquer hipótese, os preços no Brasil há muito deixaram de refletir as flutuações dos mercados internacionais (como aliás ocorre em países surrealistas no plano econômico como Venezuela e Irã).
Preços alinhados com os mercados internacionais são essenciais para refletir as verdadeiras condições econômicas em curso, para sinalizar aos investidores onde colocar o seu dinheiro, para estimular o uso de energias alternativas, enfim, por simples racionalidade econômica.
Se o governo mantem preços artificialmente baixos durante muito tempo, dá prejuizos à companhia, subsidia indevidamente a classe média que usa carro e estimula além da conta o consumo de um bem relativamente raro.
Se o governo por outro lado mantém preços absurdamente elevados, como faz agora, ele está extorquindo os consumidores, encarecendo o processo produtivo das empresas nacionais, fazendo-as menos competitivas no plano internacional.
Enfim, num ou noutro caso, ele deforma completamente as regras do jogo econômico e distorce as condições sob as quais uma empresa faz seus cálculos microeconômicos.
Existem muitas outras razões para a manipulação da Petrobras, algumas até de natureza mafiosa -- como o financiamento de sindicatos e de ONGs partidárias -- todas elas lamentáveis no plano da ética, da racionalidade econômica, da simples gestão administrativa.
Por essas e outras razões, os investidores internacionais -- que não são bobos ou mal informados como a média dos brasileiros (e isso não é preconceito, mas a simples realidade) -- tem desinvestido de ações da Petrobras, o que provocou a enorme queda revelada naquele editorial do Estadão.
Infelizmente, o Brasil tem primários conduzindo a sua economia e influenciando decisões importantes para o dia-a-dia dos contribuintes. Infelizmente somos reféns de ignaros em economia, se não formos objetos de chantagem de gente sem escrúpulos na gestão macroeconômica.
Infelizmente o Brasil não tem administradores nacionais à altura de suas responsabilidades, infelizmente não temos estadistas no comando da nação.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
(10.10.2010)
O desmantelamento do Estado e a destruicao da Petrobras
Eu poderia começar este comentário por uma frase de efeito, do tipo:
"Eu acuso o presidente da República de desmantelar as instituições brasileiras!"
ou
"Eu acuso o presidente da República de destruir a Petrobras!"
Poderia, mas não vou fazê-lo. Inclusive porque já o fiz, venho fazendo, desde sempre.
Não porque me considere seu inimigo pessoal, ou ideológico. Não, longe disso.
Não me considero nada do presidente da República (que deveria ser escrita com r minúsculo, tanto ela vem sendo diminuída).
Sou apenas um cidadão observador da realidade.
E nem acionista da Petrobras eu sou, para vir aqui em defesa de seus interesses enquanto companhia, ou em defesa dos interesses de seus acionistas, que são milhões, brasileiros e estrangeiros, espalhados pelo mundo, ricos e pobres, geralmente classe média, alguns especuladores pelo meio (como é normal no mercado acionário), mas no cômputo global pessoas normais, como eu e você, que simplesmente acham que investir em ações de uma grande e prometedora companhia é um bom negócio pessoal, para rentabilizar seus ativos e transformar uma pequena poupança num bom redimento para o futuro. Sim, a maior parte dos acionistas quer apenas ganhar algum dinheiro.
Se depender do presidente da República vão perder, pelo menos por agora.
Sim, eu acuso o presidente da República de ser um desmantelador sistemático de instituições, do Estado em particular -- o que vem fazendo desde o primeiro dia que assumiu a presidência do brasil (tudo em minúsculas) -- e da Petrobras, nesta caso específico, ao lado de várias outras empresas, públicas e privadas.
Ele as vem destruindo em primeiro lugar pelo seu poder corruptor, em segundo lugar por se pretender administrador e gestor, na verdade dono das estatais, dando ordens às companhias como se elas estivesse a seu serviço e da sua máfia particular.
Eu acuso o presidente da república -- pronto: me entusiasmei com o mote, dito por um professor de harvard (sinto Harvard) que o acusou de ser o mais corrupto da história do brasil, e que depois se colocou sabujamente a seu serviço -- de simplesmente destruir a petrobras (e outras companhias) pelas suas intervenções sistemáticas em decisões que deveriam ser puramente empresarias, mercantis, econômicas, pautadas unicamente pela lógica de mercado e das regras da boa microeconomia.
Eu acuso o presidente da república de solapar a soberania do brasil, ao determinar que a petrobras construisse uma refinaria no estado de pernambuco (sorry Pernambuco) em cooperação com a PDVSA da Venezuela, apenas porque o chávez, esse coronel de opereta fascista, decidiu que a refinaria tinha de ser feita ali, e em nenhum outro lugar mais. Essa decisão foi aliás tomada, servilmente, pela então ministra de minas e energia, que hoje é candidata à infeliz presidência do brasil.
Esse presidente dessa república que aí está pretende ser dono da petrobras, e a conduz a tomar decisões políticas, e de má qualidade, o que ela não faria se tivesse pleno domínio sobre sua gestão, como deve ocorrer com qualquer companhia.
Eu acuso o presidente da república de ser nefasto aos interesses nacionais.
Pronto, acho que já disse o que tinha a dizer, hoje.
Deixo vocês agora com esse editorial impecável do Estadão, que dá as razões do meu desabafo.
Desabafo que, como já disse, não tem nada a ver com o valor de mercado das ações da Petrobras. Trata-se apenas de um desabafo moral, em face de uma situação absurda que estamos vivendo, e que a maioria dos brasileiros, mesmo os políticos, não percebem como essencialmente negativa para o Brasil. Pobre Brasil!
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
A politização da Petrobrás
Editorial - Estado de S.Paulo
Domingo, 10 de outubro de 2010
Depois da “maior capitalização da história”, a maior empresa do Brasil, a Petrobrás, perdeu R$ 28,4 bilhões de valor de mercado em apenas três dias, encolhendo 7,5% nesse período. Na sexta-feira, suas ações ganharam algum impulso, depois de bater no nível mais baixo em um ano e meio. A onda de vendas foi apenas um “ajuste de carteira”, segundo seu presidente, José Sérgio Gabrielli. “É normal as ações subirem e descerem”, ponderou o ministro da Fazenda e presidente do conselho da estatal, Guido Mantega. A empresa, acrescentou, está mais forte do que nunca e sua capitalização foi “reconhecida mundialmente como importante”. Nenhuma das duas explicações é para ser levada a sério. Oscilações dessa amplitude não são normais no dia a dia nem são meros ajustes de carteira. O problema da Petrobrás é o mesmo de antes da capitalização: uma perigosa subordinação aos interesses políticos de um governo centralizador e voluntarista.
Os investidores foram confrontados durante a semana com duas novidades importantes. Uma delas foi a avaliação negativa divulgada por seis bancos. Diluição de lucros e perspectiva de baixo retorno foram os problemas apontados. A outra foi o rumor sobre irregularidades na administração da empresa.
Este segundo fator seria muito menos importante, se o mercado reconhecesse a gestão da Petrobrás como essencialmente profissional e voltada para objetivos empresariais. Mas esse não é o caso. Há meses, o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declarou publicamente haver mandado a estatal investir em refinarias no Nordeste. Esses investimentos, segundo ele, não teriam ocorrido, se a decisão dependesse da avaliação dos diretores da companhia. Nos últimos dias, o presidente da República voltou a alardear sua intervenção.
A Petrobrás, disse ele na quinta-feira, deixou de ser uma caixa-preta e converteu-se numa caixa branca, ou quase, durante seu governo. Ele teria apontado um fato positivo, se mencionasse apenas o aumento da transparência - discutível, na verdade. Mas foi além disso e se vangloriou, mais uma vez, de mandar na empresa: “A gente sabe o que acontece lá dentro e a gente decide muitas das coisas que ela vai fazer.”
“A gente decide” é mais que uma expressão singela. É uma confirmação - mais uma - do estilo centralizador e voluntarista do presidente da República. Não só de um estilo, mas de uma mentalidade. Ele age e fala como se as diretorias das estatais fossem apenas extensões de seu gabinete e não tivessem compromissos com milhões de acionistas. “A gente sabe” e “a gente decide”. Ele, de fato, foi além disso. Tentou interferir também na gestão de grandes empresas privatizadas, como a Embraer e a Vale, como se coubesse ao presidente da República orientar as políticas de pessoal e de investimentos dessas companhias.
Esse jogo de interferências não tem sido apenas econômico e administrativo. O envolvimento do presidente da República tem sido sobretudo político e, muitas vezes, político-eleitoral. “A Petrobrás também está no segundo turno”, disse Adriano Pires, diretor do Centro Brasileiro de Infraestrutura, ao comentar a inauguração antecipada, na quinta-feira, da Plataforma P-57. Antes da votação de domingo, o evento estava previsto para dezembro.
Também a capitalização da Petrobrás foi politizada, o que complicou o processo. O leilão ocorreu quase no fim do prazo previsto, porque o governo foi incapaz de cuidar do problema com critérios essencialmente econômicos e administrativos. Sua insistência em ampliar a participação do Estado na Petrobrás dificultou a fixação do preço dos 5 bilhões de barris cedidos à empresa pela União. O preço médio foi estabelecido, afinal, por um processo nunca explicado de forma satisfatória, até porque não passa de suposição o volume das jazidas envolvidas no negócio.
A confusão e a insegurança criadas por esse processo politizado afetaram duramente o mercado. O valor da Petrobrás encolheu cerca de 30%, enquanto a empresa, o governo e a Agência Nacional do Petróleo se enrolavam nas dificuldades políticas da capitalização. A empresa continua sob os efeitos de uma gestão politizada e, por isso, vulnerável a rumores e escândalos. O mercado refletiu, nos últimos dias, essa vulnerabilidade.
"Eu acuso o presidente da República de desmantelar as instituições brasileiras!"
ou
"Eu acuso o presidente da República de destruir a Petrobras!"
Poderia, mas não vou fazê-lo. Inclusive porque já o fiz, venho fazendo, desde sempre.
Não porque me considere seu inimigo pessoal, ou ideológico. Não, longe disso.
Não me considero nada do presidente da República (que deveria ser escrita com r minúsculo, tanto ela vem sendo diminuída).
Sou apenas um cidadão observador da realidade.
E nem acionista da Petrobras eu sou, para vir aqui em defesa de seus interesses enquanto companhia, ou em defesa dos interesses de seus acionistas, que são milhões, brasileiros e estrangeiros, espalhados pelo mundo, ricos e pobres, geralmente classe média, alguns especuladores pelo meio (como é normal no mercado acionário), mas no cômputo global pessoas normais, como eu e você, que simplesmente acham que investir em ações de uma grande e prometedora companhia é um bom negócio pessoal, para rentabilizar seus ativos e transformar uma pequena poupança num bom redimento para o futuro. Sim, a maior parte dos acionistas quer apenas ganhar algum dinheiro.
Se depender do presidente da República vão perder, pelo menos por agora.
Sim, eu acuso o presidente da República de ser um desmantelador sistemático de instituições, do Estado em particular -- o que vem fazendo desde o primeiro dia que assumiu a presidência do brasil (tudo em minúsculas) -- e da Petrobras, nesta caso específico, ao lado de várias outras empresas, públicas e privadas.
Ele as vem destruindo em primeiro lugar pelo seu poder corruptor, em segundo lugar por se pretender administrador e gestor, na verdade dono das estatais, dando ordens às companhias como se elas estivesse a seu serviço e da sua máfia particular.
Eu acuso o presidente da república -- pronto: me entusiasmei com o mote, dito por um professor de harvard (sinto Harvard) que o acusou de ser o mais corrupto da história do brasil, e que depois se colocou sabujamente a seu serviço -- de simplesmente destruir a petrobras (e outras companhias) pelas suas intervenções sistemáticas em decisões que deveriam ser puramente empresarias, mercantis, econômicas, pautadas unicamente pela lógica de mercado e das regras da boa microeconomia.
Eu acuso o presidente da república de solapar a soberania do brasil, ao determinar que a petrobras construisse uma refinaria no estado de pernambuco (sorry Pernambuco) em cooperação com a PDVSA da Venezuela, apenas porque o chávez, esse coronel de opereta fascista, decidiu que a refinaria tinha de ser feita ali, e em nenhum outro lugar mais. Essa decisão foi aliás tomada, servilmente, pela então ministra de minas e energia, que hoje é candidata à infeliz presidência do brasil.
Esse presidente dessa república que aí está pretende ser dono da petrobras, e a conduz a tomar decisões políticas, e de má qualidade, o que ela não faria se tivesse pleno domínio sobre sua gestão, como deve ocorrer com qualquer companhia.
Eu acuso o presidente da república de ser nefasto aos interesses nacionais.
Pronto, acho que já disse o que tinha a dizer, hoje.
Deixo vocês agora com esse editorial impecável do Estadão, que dá as razões do meu desabafo.
Desabafo que, como já disse, não tem nada a ver com o valor de mercado das ações da Petrobras. Trata-se apenas de um desabafo moral, em face de uma situação absurda que estamos vivendo, e que a maioria dos brasileiros, mesmo os políticos, não percebem como essencialmente negativa para o Brasil. Pobre Brasil!
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
A politização da Petrobrás
Editorial - Estado de S.Paulo
Domingo, 10 de outubro de 2010
Depois da “maior capitalização da história”, a maior empresa do Brasil, a Petrobrás, perdeu R$ 28,4 bilhões de valor de mercado em apenas três dias, encolhendo 7,5% nesse período. Na sexta-feira, suas ações ganharam algum impulso, depois de bater no nível mais baixo em um ano e meio. A onda de vendas foi apenas um “ajuste de carteira”, segundo seu presidente, José Sérgio Gabrielli. “É normal as ações subirem e descerem”, ponderou o ministro da Fazenda e presidente do conselho da estatal, Guido Mantega. A empresa, acrescentou, está mais forte do que nunca e sua capitalização foi “reconhecida mundialmente como importante”. Nenhuma das duas explicações é para ser levada a sério. Oscilações dessa amplitude não são normais no dia a dia nem são meros ajustes de carteira. O problema da Petrobrás é o mesmo de antes da capitalização: uma perigosa subordinação aos interesses políticos de um governo centralizador e voluntarista.
Os investidores foram confrontados durante a semana com duas novidades importantes. Uma delas foi a avaliação negativa divulgada por seis bancos. Diluição de lucros e perspectiva de baixo retorno foram os problemas apontados. A outra foi o rumor sobre irregularidades na administração da empresa.
Este segundo fator seria muito menos importante, se o mercado reconhecesse a gestão da Petrobrás como essencialmente profissional e voltada para objetivos empresariais. Mas esse não é o caso. Há meses, o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva declarou publicamente haver mandado a estatal investir em refinarias no Nordeste. Esses investimentos, segundo ele, não teriam ocorrido, se a decisão dependesse da avaliação dos diretores da companhia. Nos últimos dias, o presidente da República voltou a alardear sua intervenção.
A Petrobrás, disse ele na quinta-feira, deixou de ser uma caixa-preta e converteu-se numa caixa branca, ou quase, durante seu governo. Ele teria apontado um fato positivo, se mencionasse apenas o aumento da transparência - discutível, na verdade. Mas foi além disso e se vangloriou, mais uma vez, de mandar na empresa: “A gente sabe o que acontece lá dentro e a gente decide muitas das coisas que ela vai fazer.”
“A gente decide” é mais que uma expressão singela. É uma confirmação - mais uma - do estilo centralizador e voluntarista do presidente da República. Não só de um estilo, mas de uma mentalidade. Ele age e fala como se as diretorias das estatais fossem apenas extensões de seu gabinete e não tivessem compromissos com milhões de acionistas. “A gente sabe” e “a gente decide”. Ele, de fato, foi além disso. Tentou interferir também na gestão de grandes empresas privatizadas, como a Embraer e a Vale, como se coubesse ao presidente da República orientar as políticas de pessoal e de investimentos dessas companhias.
Esse jogo de interferências não tem sido apenas econômico e administrativo. O envolvimento do presidente da República tem sido sobretudo político e, muitas vezes, político-eleitoral. “A Petrobrás também está no segundo turno”, disse Adriano Pires, diretor do Centro Brasileiro de Infraestrutura, ao comentar a inauguração antecipada, na quinta-feira, da Plataforma P-57. Antes da votação de domingo, o evento estava previsto para dezembro.
Também a capitalização da Petrobrás foi politizada, o que complicou o processo. O leilão ocorreu quase no fim do prazo previsto, porque o governo foi incapaz de cuidar do problema com critérios essencialmente econômicos e administrativos. Sua insistência em ampliar a participação do Estado na Petrobrás dificultou a fixação do preço dos 5 bilhões de barris cedidos à empresa pela União. O preço médio foi estabelecido, afinal, por um processo nunca explicado de forma satisfatória, até porque não passa de suposição o volume das jazidas envolvidas no negócio.
A confusão e a insegurança criadas por esse processo politizado afetaram duramente o mercado. O valor da Petrobrás encolheu cerca de 30%, enquanto a empresa, o governo e a Agência Nacional do Petróleo se enrolavam nas dificuldades políticas da capitalização. A empresa continua sob os efeitos de uma gestão politizada e, por isso, vulnerável a rumores e escândalos. O mercado refletiu, nos últimos dias, essa vulnerabilidade.
sábado, 9 de outubro de 2010
A frase do dia, na verdade de uma vida inteira...
Nem um só dia sem ler, pelo menos uma linha, geralmente mais do que isso.
Nem um só dia sem escrever, pelo menos uma linha, geralmente mais do que isso.
(Bem, contando, são duas frases, mas o sentido é um só...)
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Nem um só dia sem escrever, pelo menos uma linha, geralmente mais do que isso.
(Bem, contando, são duas frases, mas o sentido é um só...)
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Big Brother vs CNN: continua o jogo de gato e rato...
Bem: já é um hábito. Não sou necessariamente fã da CNN, e não me informo prioritariamente pela TV, mas tenho deixado a TV ligada na CNN para ver até onde vai o ridículo espetáculo censório atualmente em curso.
Assim que a CNN passa a mencionar o caso do laureado chinês, hóspede temporário das prisões chinesas por ter colaborado na redação e divulgação de um manifesto democrático, os funcionários do Big Brother apertam o botão e a tela fica preta.
No meio da escuridão, para não ficar muito ridículo -- como se já não fosse -- aparecem algumas propagandas genéricas, reproduzidas da própria CNN, ou informações meteorológicas interrompidas, visivelmente improvisadas rapidamente, ou então um ou dois avisos na tela:
"Poor Quality Signal", ou "No Signal".
Sei...
Mais um pouco, tudo volta ao normal.
Assim é, se lhes parecem.
Big Brother misturado com Franz Kafka...
Assim que a CNN passa a mencionar o caso do laureado chinês, hóspede temporário das prisões chinesas por ter colaborado na redação e divulgação de um manifesto democrático, os funcionários do Big Brother apertam o botão e a tela fica preta.
No meio da escuridão, para não ficar muito ridículo -- como se já não fosse -- aparecem algumas propagandas genéricas, reproduzidas da própria CNN, ou informações meteorológicas interrompidas, visivelmente improvisadas rapidamente, ou então um ou dois avisos na tela:
"Poor Quality Signal", ou "No Signal".
Sei...
Mais um pouco, tudo volta ao normal.
Assim é, se lhes parecem.
Big Brother misturado com Franz Kafka...
sexta-feira, 8 de outubro de 2010
China censura noticias sobre o ativista Premio Nobel
Não só nos sites da China: todas as redes estrangeiras que começavam a falar do assunto eram ridiculamente tiradas do ar.
Os chineses, os governamentais, quero dizer, vão conseguir se desmoralizar...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Nobel para Liu Xiaobo é censurado nos sites da China
Yahoo Notícias, Sex, 08 Out, 01h45
PEQUIM (AFP) - A notícia da entrega nesta sexta-feira do Prêmio Nobel da Paz ao dissidente chinês Liu Xiaobo rodou o mundo, mas, como era esperado, foi censurada nos principais sites da China, assim como nas redes de telefonia móvel.
Uma simples busca com as palavras-chave "prêmio Nobel, paz, Liu Xiaobo" não indicava resultado algum nos grandes portais de notícias e ferramentas de busca, como Sina, Sohu e Baidu.
A censura também estava ativada no Weibo, um site de relacionamento semelhante ao Twitter.
As mensagens de SMS contendo o nome de Liu Xiaobo estavam bloqueadas, e não chegavam ao seu destinatário.
O noticiário da noite da televisão estatal CCTV foi aberto com notícias sobre as inundações na ilha chinesa de Hainan.
O Prêmio Nobel da Paz 2010 foi atribuído nesta sexta-feira pelo Comitê Nobel norueguês ao dissidente chinês na prisão "por seus esforços duradouros e não violentos em favor dos Direitos Humanos na China".
A censura é forte na China a posições críticas em relação ao governo ou a questões referentes aos Direitos Humanos. As notícias sobre dissidentes são retiradas dos sites politicamente sensíveis e Pequim controla rigidamente a internet para evitar que os opositores se organizem.
Os chineses, os governamentais, quero dizer, vão conseguir se desmoralizar...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Nobel para Liu Xiaobo é censurado nos sites da China
Yahoo Notícias, Sex, 08 Out, 01h45
PEQUIM (AFP) - A notícia da entrega nesta sexta-feira do Prêmio Nobel da Paz ao dissidente chinês Liu Xiaobo rodou o mundo, mas, como era esperado, foi censurada nos principais sites da China, assim como nas redes de telefonia móvel.
Uma simples busca com as palavras-chave "prêmio Nobel, paz, Liu Xiaobo" não indicava resultado algum nos grandes portais de notícias e ferramentas de busca, como Sina, Sohu e Baidu.
A censura também estava ativada no Weibo, um site de relacionamento semelhante ao Twitter.
As mensagens de SMS contendo o nome de Liu Xiaobo estavam bloqueadas, e não chegavam ao seu destinatário.
O noticiário da noite da televisão estatal CCTV foi aberto com notícias sobre as inundações na ilha chinesa de Hainan.
O Prêmio Nobel da Paz 2010 foi atribuído nesta sexta-feira pelo Comitê Nobel norueguês ao dissidente chinês na prisão "por seus esforços duradouros e não violentos em favor dos Direitos Humanos na China".
A censura é forte na China a posições críticas em relação ao governo ou a questões referentes aos Direitos Humanos. As notícias sobre dissidentes são retiradas dos sites politicamente sensíveis e Pequim controla rigidamente a internet para evitar que os opositores se organizem.
Cristina K salvando a America Latina (aqui sim, de si propria)
Bem, não sei exatamente como ela pretende fazer, mas parece que agora somos novos, ou modernos...
Finalmente, já não era sem tempo...
Ainda bem que temos dirigentes tão preclaros e instruídos.
Imaginem se fossemos depender de certos coronéis que andam por ai, alguns mafiosos em outras partes, aventureiros um pouco em todos os lugares. A "velha" AL deveria ser um lugar insuportável.
Sejamos gratos à presidenta K. Ela também aderiu à tese do "novo olhar", aquela coisa que significa um pouco de tudo, e que já vinha sendo usada aqui e ali. Olhar lânguido, langoroso, lamurioso, talvez...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Na Alemanha, presidente argentina defende “uma nova América Latina”
EFE, 07 Oct 2010 08:18 PM PDT
Hannover (Alemanha), 7 outubro 2010. A presidente da Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, afirmou hoje na cerimônia de encerramento da 61ª conferência latino-americana, em Hannover, que a reunião entre empresários latino-americanos e germânicos é o exemplo de “uma nova Argentina e de uma nova América Latina”
Cristina deu como exemplo dessa “nova Argentina” o contrato de cooperação assinado, hoje, com a Volkswagen.
O acordo em formação, pesquisa e desenvolvimento permitirá criar as carreiras de Engenharia e Técnica na Universidade Tecnológica Nacional do país, e desenvolver um centro de pesquisa com questões de mobilidade.
A Volkswagen põe à disposição da Universidade US$ 2,5 milhões para infraestrutura e equipamento.
De acordo com Cristina, o acordo com a multinacional alemã se soma à inauguração, em dezembro, da primeira sede na América Latina do Instituto Max Planck de pesquisa científica.
A governante defendeu a necessidade de “um novo olhar em direção a América Latina”, região que reúne “15% do petróleo do planeta, 43% do cobre e 46% da água potável”.
“Devemos deixar de nos ver como clientes para nos enxergar como parceiros”, propôs a presidente como nova regra nas relações entre nações perante as mais de 400 pessoas no jantar de encerramento da conferência.
Também deu como exemplo da “Nova América Latina” a reação dos 12 países da União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul) ao recente levante policial no Equador e a “defesa da democracia e do presidente Rafael Correa”.
O encerramento da 61ª conferência latino-americana, reunião eminentemente econômica, encerra uma viagem da presidente argentina, iniciada na terça-feira, em Frankfurt, com a inauguração da Feira do Livro, na qual, este ano, o país sul-americano foi o convidado de honra.
Finalmente, já não era sem tempo...
Ainda bem que temos dirigentes tão preclaros e instruídos.
Imaginem se fossemos depender de certos coronéis que andam por ai, alguns mafiosos em outras partes, aventureiros um pouco em todos os lugares. A "velha" AL deveria ser um lugar insuportável.
Sejamos gratos à presidenta K. Ela também aderiu à tese do "novo olhar", aquela coisa que significa um pouco de tudo, e que já vinha sendo usada aqui e ali. Olhar lânguido, langoroso, lamurioso, talvez...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Na Alemanha, presidente argentina defende “uma nova América Latina”
EFE, 07 Oct 2010 08:18 PM PDT
Hannover (Alemanha), 7 outubro 2010. A presidente da Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, afirmou hoje na cerimônia de encerramento da 61ª conferência latino-americana, em Hannover, que a reunião entre empresários latino-americanos e germânicos é o exemplo de “uma nova Argentina e de uma nova América Latina”
Cristina deu como exemplo dessa “nova Argentina” o contrato de cooperação assinado, hoje, com a Volkswagen.
O acordo em formação, pesquisa e desenvolvimento permitirá criar as carreiras de Engenharia e Técnica na Universidade Tecnológica Nacional do país, e desenvolver um centro de pesquisa com questões de mobilidade.
A Volkswagen põe à disposição da Universidade US$ 2,5 milhões para infraestrutura e equipamento.
De acordo com Cristina, o acordo com a multinacional alemã se soma à inauguração, em dezembro, da primeira sede na América Latina do Instituto Max Planck de pesquisa científica.
A governante defendeu a necessidade de “um novo olhar em direção a América Latina”, região que reúne “15% do petróleo do planeta, 43% do cobre e 46% da água potável”.
“Devemos deixar de nos ver como clientes para nos enxergar como parceiros”, propôs a presidente como nova regra nas relações entre nações perante as mais de 400 pessoas no jantar de encerramento da conferência.
Também deu como exemplo da “Nova América Latina” a reação dos 12 países da União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul) ao recente levante policial no Equador e a “defesa da democracia e do presidente Rafael Correa”.
O encerramento da 61ª conferência latino-americana, reunião eminentemente econômica, encerra uma viagem da presidente argentina, iniciada na terça-feira, em Frankfurt, com a inauguração da Feira do Livro, na qual, este ano, o país sul-americano foi o convidado de honra.
IMF to the rescue of the world (bem, acho que ele nao consegue salvar-se nem a si proprio)
O título é meu, e não traduz, obviamente, o espírito e sequer a letra da apresentação do mais recente relatório de conjuntura econômica, que sempre precede as reuniões semestrais da veneranda instituição.
O FMI é sempre politicamente correto, o que não o impede, por vezes, de acertar umas e errar outras. Nesta entrevista, houve inclusive perguntas sobre a tal de "guerra cambial" que o mundo estaria vivendo, segundo o ministro Guido Mantega. Parece que os rumores a respeito são amplamente exagerados...
Transcript of a Press Briefing on the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook
8/10/2010
Olivier Blanchard, Economic Counsellor and Director of the IMF Research Department
Jörg Decressin, Assistant Director of the IMF research Department
Petya Koeva Brooks, Division Chief of World Economic Studies
Rupa Duttagupta, Deputy Division Chief of the World Economic Studies
William Murray, Division Chief of Media Relations
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Washington, DC
MR. MURRAY: Good day. William Murray, Chief of Media Relations of the IMF. This is the latest WEO press conference. We are covering Chapters 1 and 2 of the WEO.
The briefing today is Mr. Blanchard, Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department, which produces the WEO. Joining Mr. Blanchard is Mr. Decressin, Ms. Koeva Brooks, and Ms. Duttagupta. They are all members of the World Economic studies team and they will be happy to take your questions once Olivier has some brief opening remarks.
MR. BLANCHARD: Thank you, Bill. Good morning, and sorry to be a bit late.
The world economic recovery is proceeding, but it is an unbalanced recovery. It is sluggish in advanced countries and it is much stronger in emerging and developing economies.
To understand what is going on, one has to look at the factors behind this recovery. Over the last year or so, the main drivers of the recovery were inventory accumulation and fiscal stimulus. The first one is coming to a natural end and the second one is being slowly phased out. So, what has to happen is that consumption and investment must now take the lead.
Now, in most advanced countries, however, consumption and parts of investment are still weak and will remain so for some time. By contrast, in most emerging and developing economies, consumption investment is strong and, therefore, sustaining growth. So, what I want to do first is develop a bit these two points and then turn to policy implications.
The weakness of consumption and parts of investment in most advanced economies reflects both a correction of pre-crisis excesses which have to be corrected and the scars of the crisis. So, U.S. consumers who had ever borrowed before the crisis are now saving more and consuming less. This is good for the long run but it is a drag on demand in the short run. Housing booms have given way to housing slumps. Housing investment in many countries will remain depressed for some time to come.
Weaknesses in the financial system are still constraining credit, a theme which was developed by the GFSR yesterday. Bottom line, this is what leads us to predict low growth for advanced countries. The relevant numbers are 2.7 percent for 2010 and 2.2 percent for 2011. With such low growth, we forecast that the unemployment rate will remain very high. The numbers here again are 9.6 percent for the US in 2010 and 10 percent for the euro also in 2011.
By contrast, in many emerging economies where excesses were limited and the scars of the crisis are few, consumption investments are contributing to strong growth. In many of these countries, output is nearly back or already at potential. Our forecasts for emerging and developing countries as a whole are for 7.1 percent for 2010 and 6.4 percent for 2011. If you turn to emerging Asia, we forecast growth in emerging Asia to reach 9.4 percent this year and 8.4 percent next year.
The question is whether a more balanced recovery can be achieved. The answer is yes, but it requires two complex global rebalancing acts. Indeed, rebalancing is one of the main themes of our report and of the way we think about the world at this point, the major challenges. So, let me talk about these two rebalancing dimensions.
First, internal rebalancing: when private demand collapsed, fiscal stimulus helped reduce the fall in output, and that was very much needed and right. This helped avoid the worst. But private demand must now become strong enough to take the lead and sustain growth while fiscal stimulus gives way to fiscal consolidation. This is internal rebalancing. It has to be done in each country.
Then we have external rebalancing, the second aspect of rebalancing. Many advanced countries, most notably the U.S., had to rely excessively on domestic demand before the crisis and they must now rely more on net exports. It is a question of sustaining growth for them. Many emerging countries, here most notably China, had relied excessively on net exports before the crisis and must now turn more to domestic demand. These readjustments are essential to maintaining a strong and balanced recovery.
Let me turn to policy implications, how can these rebalancing acts be achieved. I am going to make four points. First, where private demand is weak, central banks should continue with accommodating monetary policy. One should be realistic, however. Not much more can be done and one should not expect too much from further quantitative or credit easing. It should be done but the implications for the economy will be limited.
While there is no evidence yet that sustained low interest rates are leading to excessive risk-taking or bubbles, were such risks to materialize, they should be addressed through macro-prudential measures, not through increases in the policy rate. That was the first point.
Second point: wherever needed, governments must continue both financial repairs and financial reforms. Many banks do not yet have enough capital to sustain strong credit growth. Securitization, which has to play an important role in any financial system in the future, is still moribund. Financial reforms are proceeding but, again, as was discussed in the GFSR presentation yesterday, questions remain about too-big-to-fail institutions, about the perimeter of regulation, and about cross-border issues. The faster reform uncertainty is reduced, the more the financial system will be able to support demand and growth. That is an essential element needed for a strong recovery.
Third, and again, wherever needed, governments must address fiscal consolidation. What is essential here is not so much to phase out fiscal stimulus now but to offer a credible medium-term plan for debt stabilization and eventually for debt reduction. Such credible plans may involve fiscal rules, the creation of independent fiscal agencies, phased-in entitlement reforms.
These have not yet been offered in most countries, but they are essential because, when they are in place, they give more fiscal room for governments to use fiscal policy today. How much fiscal space each country has will depend from country to country, but this first step, which is a credible, medium-term consolidation plan, is essential.
Fourth, and last, those emerging market countries with large current account surpluses must accelerate rebalancing. This is not only in the world economy's interest but also mainly in their own. In many countries, many of those countries, we see distortions which have led to too low a level of consumption or too low a level of investment and are decreasing wealth there. Removing these distortions and thus allowing consumption and investment to increase is highly desirable from the point of the country. To a large extent, market forces in the form of large capital inflows are pushing these countries in the right direction. Unless offset by reserve accumulation, they will lead to exchange rate appreciation. With the help of macro-prudential measures, these flows can help in reallocating production toward domestic goods. These were the four dimensions of policy which I see as most relevant.
The important point, to end, is that all these pieces are very much interconnected. Unless advanced countries can count on stronger private demand, they will be very reluctant to achieve fiscal consolidation. If fiscal consolidation is in question, then worries about sovereign risks can easily derail growth. If growth were to slow or even stop in advanced countries, emerging market countries would have a hard time decoupling. Its downside risks, which were described again in the GFSR presentation yesterday, should definitely not be ignored.
Final point: the need for a careful design at the national level and collaborative action at the global level may be even more important today than they were in the peak of the crisis a year and a half ago. Thank you very much.
QUESTIONER: Two questions, if I may. What are the risks of a double-dip recession in the advanced economies? Secondly, what mechanisms are there to persuade the surplus countries to run down those surpluses? Has this not been the problem all long that there is no mechanism for persuading countries like China or Germany, the Eurozone, to actually increase their domestic demand? What is a way of doing that?
MR. BLANCHARD: Let me take all the questions. We do not, as you see from our baseline, expect a double-dip recession. We have a fan chart in the World Economic Report document which gives a probability distribution. According to that fan chart, which is our best assessment of risk, the probability that for the world as a whole growth would be less than 2 percent is under 5 percent. Of the U.S., we do not have a number in the document, but we think that the probability is low. Although the probability of negative growth in this case is low, it is probably a bit higher than the first number I gave you.
On the issue of how we achieve this rebalancing, I think the important point to make is that this is a win-win game. Clearly, these rebalancing operations or acts require a lot of structural change adjustment, and so on, but it is beneficial to each country on its own and it is essential to the world recovery. So, we think there that the best way to proceed is clearly through cooperation and we think that the G-20 process and the G-20 members are in a unique position to achieve this cooperation. This is an urgent issue to take up and we hope that they take it at their next meeting.
QUESTIONER: In the report, you mentioned strong and coordinated policy responses from different economies are quite essential to limit the fallout of the recession. In your view, how can different economies better take coordinated multilateral cooperation instead of a unilateral action to guarantee a balanced and sustained global recovery?
My second question is that I do think it is necessary and pressing for emerging markets to have a bigger and larger say in the IMF and other leading international institutions. Thank you.
MR. BLANCHARD: I will take the first question. I think the second question is out of bounds for this particular press conference.
MR. MURRAY: The Managing Director has a press conference tomorrow morning and that would be a good question to raise.
MR. BLANCHARD: What is needed in terms of coordination or cooperation should be clear from my introductory remarks. The main challenge of advanced countries is fiscal consolidation. They are going to be reluctant, and maybe in some cases hardly able to achieve it, if growth is weak, and they basically need to rely more on net exports, for example, in the case of the U.S. But fiscal consolidation is the main task of advanced countries.
The main task of most emerging market countries, at least all the emerging market surplus countries, is to rebalance. Here, again, there are issues of cooperation. What is needed for external rebalancing is a fairly general appreciation of emerging market country currencies relative to advanced country currencies. If one country decides to peg its currency or prevent the adjustment, this makes it much harder for the other countries to adjust and that is where cooperation or coordination is probably of the essence for emerging market countries so that they can all appreciate in the proper way and not get into fights or, as it has been called, currency wars.
QUESTIONER: You recently gave a glowing endorsement of the UK's plans for fiscal consolidation and yet in this World Economic Outlook you suggest there may be scope for easing off on a deficit reduction in some countries. My question is, if growth disappoints, would you expect the UK and other advanced economies to ease off on deficit reduction plans?
MR. BLANCHARD: Fiscal consolidation in the UK has been very ambitious, although sometimes people tend to exaggerate how much stronger it is than in other countries. To give you numbers, we estimate that the measures announced lead to fiscal consolidation from this year to next year of the structural primary balance of about 1.7 percent of GDP. This compares to 1.3 percent in France and 1.4 percent in Canada.
Does it make sense for the UK to do more than others? Well, the fiscal deficit in the UK is larger than in the other countries. This being said, I think there should be no question that in the short run this is going to decrease growth. Fiscal consolidation is needed; it is needed for long-term growth. In the short term, typically it decreases growth; it decreases demand.
Now, this being said, our forecasts for the UK which incorporate these fiscal measures are for 2 percent growth in 2011 and, therefore, positive growth. In other words, we do not think that fiscal consolidation comes close to killing growth, as some have said.
What would happen if growth turned out to be much less than is currently predicted? Our generic advice in our fiscal documents as well as in the WEO is that, if growth threatens to be substantially lower than is currently forecast in any country, in the UK or any other country, then the fiscal plan should be revisited.
QUESTIONER: Germany has experienced quite extraordinary growth recently and the labor market looks quite good as well. Do you think that this is an episode or something longer lasting?
MR. DECRESSIN: The growth rate was indeed very strong, 9 percent in the second quarter, but there were a number of special effects at work. For example, the first quarter had disappointed on account of a very harsh winter and second quarter has made up for this. We expect that, going forward, growth in Germany will slow in the third and in the fourth quarter. As global growth is also forecast to slow, Germany’s exports will be affected.
Nonetheless, we have revised up our forecast for Germany for this year. We are now at a growth rate of 3.3 percent, which is 1.9 percentage points more for 2010 than we forecast in July. We have also revised up our forecast for 2011 to 2 percent growth, which is about 0.4 percent more than we had in July. So, there are some permanent factors but also a large temporary element in this very strong growth rate of the second quarter.
QUESTIONER: The WEO report gives a pretty strong endorsement for legislating fiscal targets. I wondered if you could elaborate on why you have come out so strongly in favor of that approach, given what we have seen here in the US, in particular the states that seemed to have struggled in their effort to simulate the economy because their hands were tied by balanced budget laws.
MR. BLANCHARD: Again, it goes back to the way we think fiscal consolidation should be done. The ideal way of adjusting is to do relatively little today but convince markets that debt will be stabilized eventually, and that is very difficult to do because it is hard to establish credibility if you do nothing today. This is the context in which fiscal rules, either as transition devices or permanent devices, can be extremely useful.
The historical experience with fiscal rules is that, when they are well designed, they often work well. They slow down the growth of spending and they typically allow for a deficit reduction.
They nearly never work perfectly in the sense that there is a bit of cheating, a bit of change in the rules over time, but typically the net result is that they work and that is why we are very strongly pushing the idea of fiscal rules in the current context.
QUESTONER: A question on Russia probably for Jörg. You shaved a few percentage points, a few decimals from Russia's growth rate. Was it just because of the drought or are there any other factors at play? In general, why is Russia not growing more rapidly?
MR. MURRAY: This is Petya, actually.
MS. KOEVA BROOKS: We have revised down the growth operate for Russia modestly this year to 4 percent from 4.3 in our previous report. This is entirely due to the temporary factors and the heat wave and its negative impact on the economy, which we saw earlier in the year. Going forward, we expect the economy to grow at about 4.3 percent in 2011 and you will note that that is actually a modest upward revision relative to our previous forecast.
More generally, the recovery that we are seeing in Russia is a moderate one and there are a number of reasons for that. One is that the oil prices that we are seeing now are not as high as they were prior to the crisis. Another factor was that, as a result of the economic crisis, the banking sector was affected in terms of slowing down the supply of credit in the economy. We have seen progress in this dimension, but, again, this is something which is going to be constraining growth going forward.
MR. MURRAY: I am going to take one question from the Online Media Briefing Center and keep in Europe for a second:
Have the new WEO projections taken into account the new measures by the Portuguese government announced a week ago?
MR. DECRESSIN: No, they do not take those into account. The measures taken by the government amount to roughly 3 percent of GDP, so this additional fiscal consolidation will have a substantial effect on the Portuguese economy. In the WEO we are forecasting that growth this year will be about 1 percent in Portugal and next year it will be about zero. If you factor in the measures that have been announced since we finalized our WEO forecast, then this will not affect, of course, our growth forecast for this year, but for next year the economy is likely to contract by about 1.4 percent.
QUESTIONER: In your World Economic Outlook you have projected a positive sign for emerging economies of Asia, but you also projected a downward revision in the case of Pakistan because of the severe floods. Do you think that it is only the floods or are there any other reasons which are impacting growth negatively?
MS. DUTTAGUPTA: I can take that question. Most of the revision reflects the adverse effects of the floods faced by Pakistan. As you know, the IMF has acted very fast. At the same time, this will affect the vulnerable segments of the population. We expect growth to slow down from about 4.8 percent this year to 2.8 percent next year.
While policy response to the flood is needed, it is also important to keep in mind that fiscal sustainability should be maintained over the long run. Taking all that into consideration, the outlook has obviously weakened.
QUESTIONER: Following what you said about the Portuguese economy and the effects of austerity measures, do you think this would be a case to revisit the fiscal consolidation plan, bearing in mind it would put recession in the economy?
MR. DECRESSIN: No. Portugal is under significant pressure to adjust. In fact, we welcome the package and we encourage the government to follow through with it rigorously.
QUESTIONER: I wonder, Mr. Blanchard, what is your assessment on the Brazilian currency? Finance Minister Mantega has talked about a currency war, and in the report it says that Brazilian economy is now showing signs of overheating. If there would be an increase in interest rates, it would worsen the problem of the valuation of the real against the dollar. In the past 12 months, the real has risen over 5 percent and the government has just doubled the tax on foreign bonds invested. So, what would you suggest for the government to do in this case?
MR. BLANCHARD: Let me give a general answer and then let somebody talk about the specifics of Brazil. Let me go back again to the bigger picture, which is that we think that external rebalancing will imply an appreciation of a large number of emerging market currencies, to a different extent, but this will still be relevant for countries like Brazil.
Capital outflows from advanced countries are increasing, given that returns are not very appealing in advanced countries and more appealing in emerging countries. Then the danger is that some countries close their doors, leading capital to other countries and making things very difficult for these countries to handle. So, this is an example of potential currency tensions that we talked about earlier.
Faced with this, I think that the multilateral answer is to make sure that all the countries which have to appreciate, appreciate. In the case of Brazil, given the current circumstances, these flows are likely to be rather permanent so that e trying to fight them through reserve accumulation is probably self-defeating.
Is there a case for controls? Our position again for Brazil but more generally is that controls can possibly be used to try to direct the capital flows to where they are most useful, not so much to affect the general level of the inflows but to make sure that capital flows do not lead to bubbles, credit booms, and such things that we have seen in the past.
MS. KOEVA BROOKS: If I may just add a little bit more on Brazil. As you know, the economy has been growing extremely strongly. In the first half of this year it was growing at over 8 percent. For the year as a whole we are seeing growth at about 7½ percent. So, any amount of economic slack that was there seems to have been exhausted. Also in response to building inflationary pressures, the central bank raised interest rates by about 200 basis points, which we think was the appropriate response.
Again, on the policy responses there, we are still seeing very fast growth of primary spending. The 12-month primary surplus which we have seen so far as the end of August was about 2 percent, which was way lower than the NDF target of 3.3 percent. So, in this context, we think that a slowdown in spending growth will help, first of all, meet the target and, second of all, take off some of the pressure and the burden on monetary policy to increase interest rates which will also help contain pressures on the currency.
QUESTIONER: Can you tell me how big an obstacle you think the problems in the American real estate or housing market and the UK housing market are to the respective recoveries in both countries and to the global recovery generally?
MR. DECRESSIN: There are significant obstacles but of a somewhat different nature. In terms of construction, the boom has been much bigger in the United States while perhaps in terms of prices it has been bigger in the UK. The issue here is that the UK is already a more built up economy.
So, if you are looking forward, construction in the United States will make a very low contribution to growth, if any, over the near term and that will hold back the recovery. In the UK, it is more that lower house prices will be weighing on consumer confidence and could, as they do in the United States, also lead to further impairments on loans as households are struggling to repay, especially when the houses are worth less than the mortgages they have.
Again, there are differences between the US and the UK that are important to take into account. Overall, the real estate sector is probably going to be a bigger burden in terms of getting strong recovery in the United States than it is in the UK.
QUESTIONER: (In FRENCH)
MR. BLANCHARD: Rupa is the person who knows everything about Africa, I am not sure she speaks French. Rupa, can you say something about the prospects for Africa?
MS. DUTTAGUPTA: Africa was also hit because of the global slowdown, but thanks to good macroeconomic policies in the run up to the crisis, most of the countries had built enough fiscal space to respond to the crisis, which is an important reason why the slowdown was short-lived and in general Africa was very resilient.
But going forward, the shock would affect Africa's ability to meet some of its longer-term goals, for example its Millennium Development Goals. So, it is very important now to take advantage of the good times and rebuild the fiscal space that is needed in order to protect the most necessary elements of Africa's needs, for example, investment in health, education, and social services.
QUESTIONER: Two questions. In the WEO you mentioned a challenge in emerging countries is to handle capital inflows. What will be the impact of the recent Bank Central of Japan drop in interest rate and more quantitative easing in the US on Indonesia, and how a country like Indonesia should cope with the volatile flows?
The second question is still on the currency wars. Do you think the G-20 has failed dealing with the currency issues and whether you think that there is a need to form a smaller group of countries to cope with these issues, and whether the IMF will coordinate a new global currency agreement and whether it will lead to a new monetary system?
MR. BLANCHARD: I will make a general remark and then ask Rupa to talk about Japan and Indonesia maybe. It is much too early to talk of failure. Clearly, the issue of external balancing is becoming a more and more important one. As a result, the issue of exchange rate adjustment is becoming more and more important as well. We are just starting to see the forces, which force these adjustments and the reactions of countries. I am optimistic that the G-20 can actually work out a solution, but we are just at the beginning of the process so it is much too early to declare it a failure.
Let me turn to Rupa.
MS. DUTTAGUPTA: In general, very easy monetary conditions have been one of the factors resulting in large capital flows to emerging markets, including Indonesia. Another big factor is the overall much stronger growth prospects of these countries.
Now, in terms of Indonesia itself, the authorities have currently kept monetary policy on hold. We think that is appropriate because inflation is very much within the inflation target band, but we do support a gradual tightening as inflation expectations start moving up.
QUESTIONER: Mr. Blanchard, in light of the Irish announcement last week that the (Bank Anglo Irish) would cost 50 billion euro, and in the run-up to the four-year plan that is going to be announced next month, what do you think the prospects are for the Irish economy? Is there not a danger that these very draconian cutbacks to be announced next month will inhibit all growth? Finally, does IMF recommend that Ireland increase its corporate tax rate?
MR. DECRESSIN: The Irish economy is currently still struggling. It is reeling from a real estate boom that is unwinding and a banking crisis that is leading to market pressures on interest rates. In such circumstances, a strong and very credible fiscal adjustment is absolutely essential. So, what is needed is a very strong medium-term fiscal plan, but markets are also demanding a downpayment. That this is why we actually support the tough fiscal consolidation measures that the government is taking.
We believe that the economy, after contracting by about 0.3 percent this year, will again grow next year and reach around 2.3 growth, which is broadly unchanged from the forecast that we made in July. In the end, it will be helped along by stronger net exports because the global recovery is gathering steam even if there will be a temporary slowdown during the second half of this year and the first half of next year. This will help pull the Irish economy along.
MR. BLANCHARD: I would like to add something, again more general, about fiscal policy. When we go country-by-country our advice differs, but the principles are the same. We basically think that all countries have to have medium-term, credible fiscal stabilization. How much room they have in the short run depends very much on the initial position.
So, in countries such as Ireland or some of the Southern European countries, Greece for example, there is really no choice than to do fairly dramatic things in as clear a manner as possible, and Ireland is one of these cases. In countries in which there is more room to play, then clearly fiscal consolidation can proceed much more slowly. So, what I want to insist on is that principles are the same. The application to each country has to take into account the specific features of that country, the amount of fiscal space that the country has.
QUESTIONER: Two quick questions for Mr. Blanchard. You have repeatedly talked of the need for emerging economies to collectively appreciate their economies, but is not the continuing depreciation of the US dollar at the root of the problem which is forcing these countries to try to stay under the bar?
Secondly, you used the phrase "if growth stops in advanced economies," not slows but stops. That is fairly strong language. Under what circumstances do you think that could happen and how do you rate the danger of that possibly happening?
MR. BLANCHARD: On the second, we discussed the double dip earlier and I gave you what we think the probability distribution is and the probability that world growth literally stops is zero. The probability that growth is less than 2 percent at the world level is, as I said, around 5 percent or so.
On the first, it takes two to tango. The appreciation of one currency is by implication the depreciation of another one or some other ones, so there is no question. The general statement is that external rebalancing requires the appreciation of many emerging market currencies vis-à-vis many advanced country currencies.
Now, in the first category you clearly have the yuan and a number of other Asian currencies in the second category you clearly have the US dollar. So, it is clear when we talk about the exchange rate adjustment, this requires an adjustment of the yuan vis-à-vis the dollar. Whether it happens formally through the depreciation of the dollar and of advanced country currencies or by an appreciation of emerging market country currencies is irrelevant. The important thing is that the adjustment takes place.
MR. MURRAY: Thank you all for joining us today. If you do have follow-up questions, send an e-mail to media@imf.org and we will follow up for you. Again, thanks for joining us for the WEO press conference. Tomorrow the Managing Director will be here at 9:00 a.m. Washington time. Thank you.
Agora relatório do Fall semester de 2010 do World Economic Outlook
World Economic Outlook (WEO)
Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing
October 2010
O FMI é sempre politicamente correto, o que não o impede, por vezes, de acertar umas e errar outras. Nesta entrevista, houve inclusive perguntas sobre a tal de "guerra cambial" que o mundo estaria vivendo, segundo o ministro Guido Mantega. Parece que os rumores a respeito são amplamente exagerados...
Transcript of a Press Briefing on the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook
8/10/2010
Olivier Blanchard, Economic Counsellor and Director of the IMF Research Department
Jörg Decressin, Assistant Director of the IMF research Department
Petya Koeva Brooks, Division Chief of World Economic Studies
Rupa Duttagupta, Deputy Division Chief of the World Economic Studies
William Murray, Division Chief of Media Relations
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Washington, DC
MR. MURRAY: Good day. William Murray, Chief of Media Relations of the IMF. This is the latest WEO press conference. We are covering Chapters 1 and 2 of the WEO.
The briefing today is Mr. Blanchard, Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department, which produces the WEO. Joining Mr. Blanchard is Mr. Decressin, Ms. Koeva Brooks, and Ms. Duttagupta. They are all members of the World Economic studies team and they will be happy to take your questions once Olivier has some brief opening remarks.
MR. BLANCHARD: Thank you, Bill. Good morning, and sorry to be a bit late.
The world economic recovery is proceeding, but it is an unbalanced recovery. It is sluggish in advanced countries and it is much stronger in emerging and developing economies.
To understand what is going on, one has to look at the factors behind this recovery. Over the last year or so, the main drivers of the recovery were inventory accumulation and fiscal stimulus. The first one is coming to a natural end and the second one is being slowly phased out. So, what has to happen is that consumption and investment must now take the lead.
Now, in most advanced countries, however, consumption and parts of investment are still weak and will remain so for some time. By contrast, in most emerging and developing economies, consumption investment is strong and, therefore, sustaining growth. So, what I want to do first is develop a bit these two points and then turn to policy implications.
The weakness of consumption and parts of investment in most advanced economies reflects both a correction of pre-crisis excesses which have to be corrected and the scars of the crisis. So, U.S. consumers who had ever borrowed before the crisis are now saving more and consuming less. This is good for the long run but it is a drag on demand in the short run. Housing booms have given way to housing slumps. Housing investment in many countries will remain depressed for some time to come.
Weaknesses in the financial system are still constraining credit, a theme which was developed by the GFSR yesterday. Bottom line, this is what leads us to predict low growth for advanced countries. The relevant numbers are 2.7 percent for 2010 and 2.2 percent for 2011. With such low growth, we forecast that the unemployment rate will remain very high. The numbers here again are 9.6 percent for the US in 2010 and 10 percent for the euro also in 2011.
By contrast, in many emerging economies where excesses were limited and the scars of the crisis are few, consumption investments are contributing to strong growth. In many of these countries, output is nearly back or already at potential. Our forecasts for emerging and developing countries as a whole are for 7.1 percent for 2010 and 6.4 percent for 2011. If you turn to emerging Asia, we forecast growth in emerging Asia to reach 9.4 percent this year and 8.4 percent next year.
The question is whether a more balanced recovery can be achieved. The answer is yes, but it requires two complex global rebalancing acts. Indeed, rebalancing is one of the main themes of our report and of the way we think about the world at this point, the major challenges. So, let me talk about these two rebalancing dimensions.
First, internal rebalancing: when private demand collapsed, fiscal stimulus helped reduce the fall in output, and that was very much needed and right. This helped avoid the worst. But private demand must now become strong enough to take the lead and sustain growth while fiscal stimulus gives way to fiscal consolidation. This is internal rebalancing. It has to be done in each country.
Then we have external rebalancing, the second aspect of rebalancing. Many advanced countries, most notably the U.S., had to rely excessively on domestic demand before the crisis and they must now rely more on net exports. It is a question of sustaining growth for them. Many emerging countries, here most notably China, had relied excessively on net exports before the crisis and must now turn more to domestic demand. These readjustments are essential to maintaining a strong and balanced recovery.
Let me turn to policy implications, how can these rebalancing acts be achieved. I am going to make four points. First, where private demand is weak, central banks should continue with accommodating monetary policy. One should be realistic, however. Not much more can be done and one should not expect too much from further quantitative or credit easing. It should be done but the implications for the economy will be limited.
While there is no evidence yet that sustained low interest rates are leading to excessive risk-taking or bubbles, were such risks to materialize, they should be addressed through macro-prudential measures, not through increases in the policy rate. That was the first point.
Second point: wherever needed, governments must continue both financial repairs and financial reforms. Many banks do not yet have enough capital to sustain strong credit growth. Securitization, which has to play an important role in any financial system in the future, is still moribund. Financial reforms are proceeding but, again, as was discussed in the GFSR presentation yesterday, questions remain about too-big-to-fail institutions, about the perimeter of regulation, and about cross-border issues. The faster reform uncertainty is reduced, the more the financial system will be able to support demand and growth. That is an essential element needed for a strong recovery.
Third, and again, wherever needed, governments must address fiscal consolidation. What is essential here is not so much to phase out fiscal stimulus now but to offer a credible medium-term plan for debt stabilization and eventually for debt reduction. Such credible plans may involve fiscal rules, the creation of independent fiscal agencies, phased-in entitlement reforms.
These have not yet been offered in most countries, but they are essential because, when they are in place, they give more fiscal room for governments to use fiscal policy today. How much fiscal space each country has will depend from country to country, but this first step, which is a credible, medium-term consolidation plan, is essential.
Fourth, and last, those emerging market countries with large current account surpluses must accelerate rebalancing. This is not only in the world economy's interest but also mainly in their own. In many countries, many of those countries, we see distortions which have led to too low a level of consumption or too low a level of investment and are decreasing wealth there. Removing these distortions and thus allowing consumption and investment to increase is highly desirable from the point of the country. To a large extent, market forces in the form of large capital inflows are pushing these countries in the right direction. Unless offset by reserve accumulation, they will lead to exchange rate appreciation. With the help of macro-prudential measures, these flows can help in reallocating production toward domestic goods. These were the four dimensions of policy which I see as most relevant.
The important point, to end, is that all these pieces are very much interconnected. Unless advanced countries can count on stronger private demand, they will be very reluctant to achieve fiscal consolidation. If fiscal consolidation is in question, then worries about sovereign risks can easily derail growth. If growth were to slow or even stop in advanced countries, emerging market countries would have a hard time decoupling. Its downside risks, which were described again in the GFSR presentation yesterday, should definitely not be ignored.
Final point: the need for a careful design at the national level and collaborative action at the global level may be even more important today than they were in the peak of the crisis a year and a half ago. Thank you very much.
QUESTIONER: Two questions, if I may. What are the risks of a double-dip recession in the advanced economies? Secondly, what mechanisms are there to persuade the surplus countries to run down those surpluses? Has this not been the problem all long that there is no mechanism for persuading countries like China or Germany, the Eurozone, to actually increase their domestic demand? What is a way of doing that?
MR. BLANCHARD: Let me take all the questions. We do not, as you see from our baseline, expect a double-dip recession. We have a fan chart in the World Economic Report document which gives a probability distribution. According to that fan chart, which is our best assessment of risk, the probability that for the world as a whole growth would be less than 2 percent is under 5 percent. Of the U.S., we do not have a number in the document, but we think that the probability is low. Although the probability of negative growth in this case is low, it is probably a bit higher than the first number I gave you.
On the issue of how we achieve this rebalancing, I think the important point to make is that this is a win-win game. Clearly, these rebalancing operations or acts require a lot of structural change adjustment, and so on, but it is beneficial to each country on its own and it is essential to the world recovery. So, we think there that the best way to proceed is clearly through cooperation and we think that the G-20 process and the G-20 members are in a unique position to achieve this cooperation. This is an urgent issue to take up and we hope that they take it at their next meeting.
QUESTIONER: In the report, you mentioned strong and coordinated policy responses from different economies are quite essential to limit the fallout of the recession. In your view, how can different economies better take coordinated multilateral cooperation instead of a unilateral action to guarantee a balanced and sustained global recovery?
My second question is that I do think it is necessary and pressing for emerging markets to have a bigger and larger say in the IMF and other leading international institutions. Thank you.
MR. BLANCHARD: I will take the first question. I think the second question is out of bounds for this particular press conference.
MR. MURRAY: The Managing Director has a press conference tomorrow morning and that would be a good question to raise.
MR. BLANCHARD: What is needed in terms of coordination or cooperation should be clear from my introductory remarks. The main challenge of advanced countries is fiscal consolidation. They are going to be reluctant, and maybe in some cases hardly able to achieve it, if growth is weak, and they basically need to rely more on net exports, for example, in the case of the U.S. But fiscal consolidation is the main task of advanced countries.
The main task of most emerging market countries, at least all the emerging market surplus countries, is to rebalance. Here, again, there are issues of cooperation. What is needed for external rebalancing is a fairly general appreciation of emerging market country currencies relative to advanced country currencies. If one country decides to peg its currency or prevent the adjustment, this makes it much harder for the other countries to adjust and that is where cooperation or coordination is probably of the essence for emerging market countries so that they can all appreciate in the proper way and not get into fights or, as it has been called, currency wars.
QUESTIONER: You recently gave a glowing endorsement of the UK's plans for fiscal consolidation and yet in this World Economic Outlook you suggest there may be scope for easing off on a deficit reduction in some countries. My question is, if growth disappoints, would you expect the UK and other advanced economies to ease off on deficit reduction plans?
MR. BLANCHARD: Fiscal consolidation in the UK has been very ambitious, although sometimes people tend to exaggerate how much stronger it is than in other countries. To give you numbers, we estimate that the measures announced lead to fiscal consolidation from this year to next year of the structural primary balance of about 1.7 percent of GDP. This compares to 1.3 percent in France and 1.4 percent in Canada.
Does it make sense for the UK to do more than others? Well, the fiscal deficit in the UK is larger than in the other countries. This being said, I think there should be no question that in the short run this is going to decrease growth. Fiscal consolidation is needed; it is needed for long-term growth. In the short term, typically it decreases growth; it decreases demand.
Now, this being said, our forecasts for the UK which incorporate these fiscal measures are for 2 percent growth in 2011 and, therefore, positive growth. In other words, we do not think that fiscal consolidation comes close to killing growth, as some have said.
What would happen if growth turned out to be much less than is currently predicted? Our generic advice in our fiscal documents as well as in the WEO is that, if growth threatens to be substantially lower than is currently forecast in any country, in the UK or any other country, then the fiscal plan should be revisited.
QUESTIONER: Germany has experienced quite extraordinary growth recently and the labor market looks quite good as well. Do you think that this is an episode or something longer lasting?
MR. DECRESSIN: The growth rate was indeed very strong, 9 percent in the second quarter, but there were a number of special effects at work. For example, the first quarter had disappointed on account of a very harsh winter and second quarter has made up for this. We expect that, going forward, growth in Germany will slow in the third and in the fourth quarter. As global growth is also forecast to slow, Germany’s exports will be affected.
Nonetheless, we have revised up our forecast for Germany for this year. We are now at a growth rate of 3.3 percent, which is 1.9 percentage points more for 2010 than we forecast in July. We have also revised up our forecast for 2011 to 2 percent growth, which is about 0.4 percent more than we had in July. So, there are some permanent factors but also a large temporary element in this very strong growth rate of the second quarter.
QUESTIONER: The WEO report gives a pretty strong endorsement for legislating fiscal targets. I wondered if you could elaborate on why you have come out so strongly in favor of that approach, given what we have seen here in the US, in particular the states that seemed to have struggled in their effort to simulate the economy because their hands were tied by balanced budget laws.
MR. BLANCHARD: Again, it goes back to the way we think fiscal consolidation should be done. The ideal way of adjusting is to do relatively little today but convince markets that debt will be stabilized eventually, and that is very difficult to do because it is hard to establish credibility if you do nothing today. This is the context in which fiscal rules, either as transition devices or permanent devices, can be extremely useful.
The historical experience with fiscal rules is that, when they are well designed, they often work well. They slow down the growth of spending and they typically allow for a deficit reduction.
They nearly never work perfectly in the sense that there is a bit of cheating, a bit of change in the rules over time, but typically the net result is that they work and that is why we are very strongly pushing the idea of fiscal rules in the current context.
QUESTONER: A question on Russia probably for Jörg. You shaved a few percentage points, a few decimals from Russia's growth rate. Was it just because of the drought or are there any other factors at play? In general, why is Russia not growing more rapidly?
MR. MURRAY: This is Petya, actually.
MS. KOEVA BROOKS: We have revised down the growth operate for Russia modestly this year to 4 percent from 4.3 in our previous report. This is entirely due to the temporary factors and the heat wave and its negative impact on the economy, which we saw earlier in the year. Going forward, we expect the economy to grow at about 4.3 percent in 2011 and you will note that that is actually a modest upward revision relative to our previous forecast.
More generally, the recovery that we are seeing in Russia is a moderate one and there are a number of reasons for that. One is that the oil prices that we are seeing now are not as high as they were prior to the crisis. Another factor was that, as a result of the economic crisis, the banking sector was affected in terms of slowing down the supply of credit in the economy. We have seen progress in this dimension, but, again, this is something which is going to be constraining growth going forward.
MR. MURRAY: I am going to take one question from the Online Media Briefing Center and keep in Europe for a second:
Have the new WEO projections taken into account the new measures by the Portuguese government announced a week ago?
MR. DECRESSIN: No, they do not take those into account. The measures taken by the government amount to roughly 3 percent of GDP, so this additional fiscal consolidation will have a substantial effect on the Portuguese economy. In the WEO we are forecasting that growth this year will be about 1 percent in Portugal and next year it will be about zero. If you factor in the measures that have been announced since we finalized our WEO forecast, then this will not affect, of course, our growth forecast for this year, but for next year the economy is likely to contract by about 1.4 percent.
QUESTIONER: In your World Economic Outlook you have projected a positive sign for emerging economies of Asia, but you also projected a downward revision in the case of Pakistan because of the severe floods. Do you think that it is only the floods or are there any other reasons which are impacting growth negatively?
MS. DUTTAGUPTA: I can take that question. Most of the revision reflects the adverse effects of the floods faced by Pakistan. As you know, the IMF has acted very fast. At the same time, this will affect the vulnerable segments of the population. We expect growth to slow down from about 4.8 percent this year to 2.8 percent next year.
While policy response to the flood is needed, it is also important to keep in mind that fiscal sustainability should be maintained over the long run. Taking all that into consideration, the outlook has obviously weakened.
QUESTIONER: Following what you said about the Portuguese economy and the effects of austerity measures, do you think this would be a case to revisit the fiscal consolidation plan, bearing in mind it would put recession in the economy?
MR. DECRESSIN: No. Portugal is under significant pressure to adjust. In fact, we welcome the package and we encourage the government to follow through with it rigorously.
QUESTIONER: I wonder, Mr. Blanchard, what is your assessment on the Brazilian currency? Finance Minister Mantega has talked about a currency war, and in the report it says that Brazilian economy is now showing signs of overheating. If there would be an increase in interest rates, it would worsen the problem of the valuation of the real against the dollar. In the past 12 months, the real has risen over 5 percent and the government has just doubled the tax on foreign bonds invested. So, what would you suggest for the government to do in this case?
MR. BLANCHARD: Let me give a general answer and then let somebody talk about the specifics of Brazil. Let me go back again to the bigger picture, which is that we think that external rebalancing will imply an appreciation of a large number of emerging market currencies, to a different extent, but this will still be relevant for countries like Brazil.
Capital outflows from advanced countries are increasing, given that returns are not very appealing in advanced countries and more appealing in emerging countries. Then the danger is that some countries close their doors, leading capital to other countries and making things very difficult for these countries to handle. So, this is an example of potential currency tensions that we talked about earlier.
Faced with this, I think that the multilateral answer is to make sure that all the countries which have to appreciate, appreciate. In the case of Brazil, given the current circumstances, these flows are likely to be rather permanent so that e trying to fight them through reserve accumulation is probably self-defeating.
Is there a case for controls? Our position again for Brazil but more generally is that controls can possibly be used to try to direct the capital flows to where they are most useful, not so much to affect the general level of the inflows but to make sure that capital flows do not lead to bubbles, credit booms, and such things that we have seen in the past.
MS. KOEVA BROOKS: If I may just add a little bit more on Brazil. As you know, the economy has been growing extremely strongly. In the first half of this year it was growing at over 8 percent. For the year as a whole we are seeing growth at about 7½ percent. So, any amount of economic slack that was there seems to have been exhausted. Also in response to building inflationary pressures, the central bank raised interest rates by about 200 basis points, which we think was the appropriate response.
Again, on the policy responses there, we are still seeing very fast growth of primary spending. The 12-month primary surplus which we have seen so far as the end of August was about 2 percent, which was way lower than the NDF target of 3.3 percent. So, in this context, we think that a slowdown in spending growth will help, first of all, meet the target and, second of all, take off some of the pressure and the burden on monetary policy to increase interest rates which will also help contain pressures on the currency.
QUESTIONER: Can you tell me how big an obstacle you think the problems in the American real estate or housing market and the UK housing market are to the respective recoveries in both countries and to the global recovery generally?
MR. DECRESSIN: There are significant obstacles but of a somewhat different nature. In terms of construction, the boom has been much bigger in the United States while perhaps in terms of prices it has been bigger in the UK. The issue here is that the UK is already a more built up economy.
So, if you are looking forward, construction in the United States will make a very low contribution to growth, if any, over the near term and that will hold back the recovery. In the UK, it is more that lower house prices will be weighing on consumer confidence and could, as they do in the United States, also lead to further impairments on loans as households are struggling to repay, especially when the houses are worth less than the mortgages they have.
Again, there are differences between the US and the UK that are important to take into account. Overall, the real estate sector is probably going to be a bigger burden in terms of getting strong recovery in the United States than it is in the UK.
QUESTIONER: (In FRENCH)
MR. BLANCHARD: Rupa is the person who knows everything about Africa, I am not sure she speaks French. Rupa, can you say something about the prospects for Africa?
MS. DUTTAGUPTA: Africa was also hit because of the global slowdown, but thanks to good macroeconomic policies in the run up to the crisis, most of the countries had built enough fiscal space to respond to the crisis, which is an important reason why the slowdown was short-lived and in general Africa was very resilient.
But going forward, the shock would affect Africa's ability to meet some of its longer-term goals, for example its Millennium Development Goals. So, it is very important now to take advantage of the good times and rebuild the fiscal space that is needed in order to protect the most necessary elements of Africa's needs, for example, investment in health, education, and social services.
QUESTIONER: Two questions. In the WEO you mentioned a challenge in emerging countries is to handle capital inflows. What will be the impact of the recent Bank Central of Japan drop in interest rate and more quantitative easing in the US on Indonesia, and how a country like Indonesia should cope with the volatile flows?
The second question is still on the currency wars. Do you think the G-20 has failed dealing with the currency issues and whether you think that there is a need to form a smaller group of countries to cope with these issues, and whether the IMF will coordinate a new global currency agreement and whether it will lead to a new monetary system?
MR. BLANCHARD: I will make a general remark and then ask Rupa to talk about Japan and Indonesia maybe. It is much too early to talk of failure. Clearly, the issue of external balancing is becoming a more and more important one. As a result, the issue of exchange rate adjustment is becoming more and more important as well. We are just starting to see the forces, which force these adjustments and the reactions of countries. I am optimistic that the G-20 can actually work out a solution, but we are just at the beginning of the process so it is much too early to declare it a failure.
Let me turn to Rupa.
MS. DUTTAGUPTA: In general, very easy monetary conditions have been one of the factors resulting in large capital flows to emerging markets, including Indonesia. Another big factor is the overall much stronger growth prospects of these countries.
Now, in terms of Indonesia itself, the authorities have currently kept monetary policy on hold. We think that is appropriate because inflation is very much within the inflation target band, but we do support a gradual tightening as inflation expectations start moving up.
QUESTIONER: Mr. Blanchard, in light of the Irish announcement last week that the (Bank Anglo Irish) would cost 50 billion euro, and in the run-up to the four-year plan that is going to be announced next month, what do you think the prospects are for the Irish economy? Is there not a danger that these very draconian cutbacks to be announced next month will inhibit all growth? Finally, does IMF recommend that Ireland increase its corporate tax rate?
MR. DECRESSIN: The Irish economy is currently still struggling. It is reeling from a real estate boom that is unwinding and a banking crisis that is leading to market pressures on interest rates. In such circumstances, a strong and very credible fiscal adjustment is absolutely essential. So, what is needed is a very strong medium-term fiscal plan, but markets are also demanding a downpayment. That this is why we actually support the tough fiscal consolidation measures that the government is taking.
We believe that the economy, after contracting by about 0.3 percent this year, will again grow next year and reach around 2.3 growth, which is broadly unchanged from the forecast that we made in July. In the end, it will be helped along by stronger net exports because the global recovery is gathering steam even if there will be a temporary slowdown during the second half of this year and the first half of next year. This will help pull the Irish economy along.
MR. BLANCHARD: I would like to add something, again more general, about fiscal policy. When we go country-by-country our advice differs, but the principles are the same. We basically think that all countries have to have medium-term, credible fiscal stabilization. How much room they have in the short run depends very much on the initial position.
So, in countries such as Ireland or some of the Southern European countries, Greece for example, there is really no choice than to do fairly dramatic things in as clear a manner as possible, and Ireland is one of these cases. In countries in which there is more room to play, then clearly fiscal consolidation can proceed much more slowly. So, what I want to insist on is that principles are the same. The application to each country has to take into account the specific features of that country, the amount of fiscal space that the country has.
QUESTIONER: Two quick questions for Mr. Blanchard. You have repeatedly talked of the need for emerging economies to collectively appreciate their economies, but is not the continuing depreciation of the US dollar at the root of the problem which is forcing these countries to try to stay under the bar?
Secondly, you used the phrase "if growth stops in advanced economies," not slows but stops. That is fairly strong language. Under what circumstances do you think that could happen and how do you rate the danger of that possibly happening?
MR. BLANCHARD: On the second, we discussed the double dip earlier and I gave you what we think the probability distribution is and the probability that world growth literally stops is zero. The probability that growth is less than 2 percent at the world level is, as I said, around 5 percent or so.
On the first, it takes two to tango. The appreciation of one currency is by implication the depreciation of another one or some other ones, so there is no question. The general statement is that external rebalancing requires the appreciation of many emerging market currencies vis-à-vis many advanced country currencies.
Now, in the first category you clearly have the yuan and a number of other Asian currencies in the second category you clearly have the US dollar. So, it is clear when we talk about the exchange rate adjustment, this requires an adjustment of the yuan vis-à-vis the dollar. Whether it happens formally through the depreciation of the dollar and of advanced country currencies or by an appreciation of emerging market country currencies is irrelevant. The important thing is that the adjustment takes place.
MR. MURRAY: Thank you all for joining us today. If you do have follow-up questions, send an e-mail to media@imf.org and we will follow up for you. Again, thanks for joining us for the WEO press conference. Tomorrow the Managing Director will be here at 9:00 a.m. Washington time. Thank you.
Agora relatório do Fall semester de 2010 do World Economic Outlook
World Economic Outlook (WEO)
Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing
October 2010
Chart 08: Democracy and Human Rights in China (new translation)
Eu já tinha postado, e repostado, o documento dos ativistas democráticos chineses chamado "Carta 08", numa tradução para o inglês publicada na New York Review of Books. Esta nova versão deve apresentar diferenças em relação ao texto anteriormente aqui postado.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Read the manifesto that landed 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner and Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in prison
Foreign Policy, October 8, 2010
In December 2008, 303 Chinese activists, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, issued "Charter 08," a petition calling for greater human rights and democratic freedoms in China. An English translation by the Hong Kong-based NGO Human Rights in China is republished here with permission. The translation was first published in China Rights Forum, the organization's quarterly journal.
…………………………………………………
Charter 08
I. Preamble
This year marks 100 years since China’s [first] Constitution, the 60th anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 30th anniversary of the birth of the Democracy Wall, and the 10th year since the Chinese government signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Having experienced a prolonged period of human rights disasters and challenging and tortuous struggles, the awakening Chinese citizens are becoming increasingly aware that freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values shared by all humankind, and that democracy, republicanism, and constitutional government make up the basic institutional framework of modern politics. A “modernization” bereft of these universal values and this basic political framework is a disastrous process that deprives people of their rights, rots away their humanity, and destroys their dignity. Where is China headed in the 21st century? Will it continue with this “modernization” under authoritarian rule, or will it endorse universal values, join the mainstream civilization, and build a democratic form of government? This is an unavoidable decision.
The tremendous historic changes of the mid-19th century exposed the decay of the traditional Chinese autocratic system and set the stage for the greatest transformation China had seen in several thousand years. The Self-Strengthening Movement [1861–1895] sought improvements in China’s technical capability by acquiring manufacturing techniques, scientific knowledge, and military technologies from the West; China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War [1894–1895] once again exposed the obsolescence of its system; the Hundred Days’ Reform [1898] touched upon the area of institutional innovation, but ended in failure due to cruel suppression by the die-hard faction [at the Qing court]. The Xinhai Revolution [1911], on the surface, buried the imperial system that had lasted for more than 2,000 years and established Asia’s first republic. But, because of the particular historical circumstances of internal and external troubles, the republican system of government was short lived, and autocracy made a comeback.
The failure of technical imitation and institutional renewal prompted deep reflection among our countrymen on the root cause of China’s cultural sickness, and the ensuing May Fourth [1919] and New Culture Movements [1915–1921] under the banner of “science and democracy.” But the course of China’s political democratization was forcibly cut short due to frequent civil wars and foreign invasion. The process of a constitutional government began again after China’s victory in the War of Resistance against Japan [1937–1945], but the outcome of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists plunged China into the abyss of modern-day totalitarianism. The “New China” established in 1949 is a “people’s republic” in name, but in reality it is a “party domain.” The ruling party monopolizes all the political, economic, and social resources. It has created a string of human rights disasters, such as the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, June Fourth, and the suppression of unofficial religious activities and the rights defense movement, causing tens of millions of deaths, and exacting a disastrous price from both the people and the country.
The “Reform and Opening Up” of the late 20th century extricated China from the pervasive poverty and absolute totalitarianism of the Mao Zedong era, and substantially increased private wealth and the standard of living of the common people. Individual economic freedom and social privileges were partially restored, a civil society began to grow, and calls for human rights and political freedom among the people increased by the day. Those in power, while implementing economic reforms aimed at marketization and privatization, also began to shift from a position of rejecting human rights to one of gradually recognizing them. In 1997 and 1998, the Chinese government signed two important international human rights treaties.2 In 2004, the National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to add that “[the State] respects and guarantees human rights.” And this year, the government has promised to formulate and implement a “National Human Rights Action Plan.” But so far, this political progress has largely remained on paper: there are laws, but there is no rule of law; there is a constitution, but no constitutional government; this is still the political reality that is obvious to all. The ruling elite continues to insist on its authoritarian grip on power, rejecting political reform. This has caused official corruption, difficulty in establishing rule of law, the absence of of human rights, moral bankruptcy, social polarization, abnormal economic development, destruction of both the natural and cultural environment, no institutionalized protection of citizens’ rights to freedom, property, and the pursuit of happiness, the constant accumulation of all kinds of social conflicts, and the continuous surge of resentment. In particular, the intensification of antagonism between the government and the people, and the dramatic increase in mass incidents, indicate a catastrophic loss of control in the making, suggesting that the backwardness of the current system has reached a point where change must occur.
II. Our Fundamental Concepts
At this historical juncture that will decide the future destiny of China, it is necessary to reflect on the modernization process of the past hundred and some years and reaffirm the following concepts:
Freedom: Freedom is at the core of universal values. The rights of speech, publication, belief, assembly, association, movement, to strike, and to march and demonstrate are all the concrete expressions of freedom. Where freedom does not flourish, there is no modern civilization to speak of.
Human Rights: Human rights are not bestowed by a state; they are inherent rights enjoyed by every person. Guaranteeing human rights is both the most important objective of a government and the foundation of the legitimacy of its public authority; it is also the intrinsic requirement of the policy of “putting people first.” China’s successive political disasters have all been closely related to the disregard for human rights by the ruling establishment. People are the mainstay of a nation; a nation serves its people; government exists for the people.
Equality: The integrity, dignity, and freedom of every individual, regardless of social status, occupation, gender, economic circumstances, ethnicity, skin color, religion, or political belief, are equal. The principles of equality before the law for each and every person and equality in social, economic, cultural, and political rights of all citizens must be implemented.
Republicanism: Republicanism is “joint governing by all, peaceful coexistence,” that is, the separation of powers for checks and balances and the balance of interests; that is, a community comprising many diverse interests, different social groups, and a plurality of cultures and faiths, seeking to peacefully handle public affairs on the basis of equal participation, fair competition, and joint discussion.
Democracy: The most fundamental meaning is that sovereignty resides in the people and the government elected by the people. Democracy has the following basic characteristics:(1) The legitimacy of political power comes from the people; the source of political power is the people. (2) Political control is exercised through choices made by the people. (3) Citizens enjoy the genuine right to vote; officials in key positions at all levels of government must be the product of elections at regular intervals. (4) Respect the decisions of the majority while protecting the basic human rights of the minority. In a word, democracy is the modern public instrument for creating a government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”
Constitutionalism: Constitutionalism is the principle of guaranteeing basic freedoms and rights of citizens as defined by the constitution through legal provisions and the rule of law, restricting and defining the boundaries of government power and conduct, and providing appropriate institutional capability to carry this out. In China, the era of imperial power is long gone, never to return; in the world at large, the authoritarian system is on the wane; citizens ought to become the true masters of their states. The fundamental way out for China lies only in dispelling the subservient notion of reliance on “enlightened rulers” and “upright officials,” promoting public consciousness of rights as fundamental and participation as a duty, and putting into practice freedom, engaging in democracy, and respecting the law.
III. Our Basic Positions
Thus, in the spirit of responsible and constructive citizens, we put forth the following specific positions regarding various aspects of state administration, citizens’ rights and interests, and social development:
1. Constitutional Amendment: Based on the aforementioned values and concepts, amend the Constitution, deleting clauses in the current Constitution that are not in conformity with the principle that sovereignty resides in the people, so that the Constitution can truly become a document that guarantees human rights and allows for the exercise of public power, and become the enforceable supreme law that no individual, group, or party can violate, establishing the foundation of the legal authority for democratizing China.
2. Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances: Construct a modern government that separates powers and maintains checks and balances among them, that guarantees the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Establish the principle of statutory administration and responsible government to prevent excessive expansion of executive power; government should be responsible to taxpayers; establish the system of separation of powers and checks and balances between the central and local governments; the central power must be clearly defined and mandated by the Constitution, and
the localities must exercise full autonomy.
3. Legislative Democracy: Legislative bodies at all levels should be created through direct elections; maintain the principle of fairness and justice in making law; and implement legislative democracy.
4. Judicial Independence: The judiciary should transcend partisanship, be free from any interference, exercise judicial independence, and guarantee judicial fairness; it should establish a constitutional court and a system to investigate violations of the Constitution, and uphold the authority of the Constitution. Abolish as soon as possible the Party’s Committees of Political and Legislative Affairs at all levels that seriously endanger the country’s rule of law. Prevent private use of public instruments.
5. Public Use of Public Instruments: Bring the armed forces under state control. Military personnel should render loyalty to the Constitution and to the country. Political party organizations should withdraw from the armed forces; raise the professional standards of the armed forces. All public employees including the police should maintain political neutrality. Abolish discrimination in hiring of public employees based on party affiliation; there should be equality in hiring regardless of party affiliation.
6. Human Rights Guarantees: Guarantee human rights in earnest; protect human dignity. Set up a Commission on Human Rights, responsible to the highest organ of popular will, to prevent government abuse of public authority and violations of human rights, and, especially, to guarantee the personal freedom of citizens. No one shall suffer illegal arrest, detention, subpoena, interrogation, or punishment. Abolish the Reeducation-Through-Labor system.
7. Election of Public Officials: Fully implement the system of democratic elections to realize equal voting rights based on “one person, one vote.” Systematically and gradually implement direct elections of administrative heads at all levels. Regular elections based on free competition and citizen participation in elections for legal public office are inalienable basic human rights.
8. Urban-Rural Equality: Abolish the current urban-rural two-tier household registration system to realize the constitutional right of equality before the law for all citizens and guarantee the citizens’ right to move freely.
9. Freedom of Association: Guarantee citizens’ right to freedom of association. Change the current system of registration upon approval for community groups to a system of record-keeping. Lift the ban on political parties. Regulate party activities according to the Constitution and law; abolish the privilege of one-party monopoly on power; establish the principles of freedom of activities of political parties and fair competition for political parties; normalize and legally regulate party politics.
10. Freedom of Assembly: Freedoms to peacefully assemble, march, demonstrate, and express [opinions] are citizens’ fundamental freedoms stipulated by the Constitution; they should not be subject to illegal interference and unconstitutional restrictions by the ruling party and the government.
11. Freedom of Expression: Realize the freedom of speech, freedom to publish, and academic freedom; guarantee the citizens’ right to know and right to supervise [public institutions]. Enact a “News Law” and a “Publishing Law,” lift the ban on reporting, repeal the “crime of inciting subversion of state power” clause in the current Criminal Law, and put an end to punishing speech as a crime.
12. Freedom of Religion: Guarantee freedom of religion and freedom of belief, and implement separation of religion and state so that activities involving religion and faith are not subjected to government interference. Examine and repeal administrative statutes, administrative rules, and local statutes that restrict or deprive citizens of religious freedom; ban management of religious activities by administrative legislation. Abolish the system that requires that religious groups (and including places of worship) obtain prior approval of their legal status in order to register, and replace it with a system of record-keeping that requires no scrutiny.
13. Civic Education: Abolish political education and political examinations that are heavy on ideology and serve the one-party rule. Popularize civic education based on universal values and civil rights, establish civic consciousness, and advocate civic virtues that serve society.
14. Property Protection: Establish and protect private property rights, and implement a system based on a free and open market economy; guarantee entrepreneurial freedom, and eliminate administrative monopolies; set up a Committee for the Management of State-Owned Property, responsible to the highest organ of popular will; launch reform of property rights in a legal and orderly fashion, and clarify the ownership of property rights and those responsible; launch a new land movement, advance land privatization, and guarantee in earnest the land property rights of citizens, particularly the farmers.
15. Fiscal Reform: Democratize public finances and guarantee taxpayers’ rights. Set up the structure and operational mechanism of a public finance system with clearly defined authority and responsibilities, and establish a rational and effective system of decentralized financial authority among various levels of government; carry out a major reform of the tax system, so as to reduce tax rates, simplify the tax system, and equalize the tax burden. Administrative departments may not increase taxes or create new taxes at will without sanction by society obtained through a public elective process and resolution by organs of popular will. Pass property rights reform to diversify and introduce competition mechanisms into the market; lower the threshold for entry into the financial field and create conditions for the development of privately-owned financial enterprises, and fully energize the financial system.
16. Social Security: Establish a social security system that covers all citizens and provides them with basic security in education, medical care, care for the elderly, and employment.
17. Environmental Protection: Protect the ecological environment, promote sustainable development, and take responsibility for future generations and all humanity; clarify and impose the appropriate responsibilities that state and government officials at all levels must take to this end; promote participation and oversight by civil society groups in environmental protection.
18. Federal Republic: Take part in maintaining regional peace and development with an attitude of equality and fairness, and create an image of a responsible great power. Protect the free systems of Hong Kong and Macau .On the premise of freedom and democracy, seek a reconciliation plan for the mainland and Taiwan through equal negotiations and cooperative interaction. Wisely explore possible paths and institutional blueprints for the common prosperity of all ethnic groups, and establish the Federal Republic of China under the framework of a democractic and constitutional government.
19. Transitional Justice: Restore the reputation of and give state compensation to individuals, as well as their families, who suffered political persecution during past political movements; release all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience; release all people convicted for their beliefs; establish a Commission for Truth Investigation to find the truth of historical events, determine responsibility, and uphold justice; seek social reconciliation on this foundation.
IV. Conclusion
China, as a great nation of the world, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and a member of the Human Rights Council, ought to make its own contribution to peace for humankind and progress in human rights. Regrettably, however, of all the great nations of the world today, China alone still clings to an authoritarian way of life and has, as a result, created an unbroken nchain of human rights disasters and social crises, held back the development of the Chinese people, and hindered the progress of human civilization. This situation must change! We cannot put off political democratization reforms any longer. Therefore, in the civic spirit of daring to take action, we are issuing Charter 08. We hope that all Chinese citizens who share this sense of crisis, responsibility, and mission, whether officials or common people and regardless of social background, will put aside our differences to seek common ground and come to take an active part in this citizens’ movement, to promote the great transformation of Chinese society together, so that we can soon establish a free, democratic, and constitutional nation, fulfilling the aspirations and dreams that our countrymen have been pursuing tirelessly for more than a hundred years.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Read the manifesto that landed 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner and Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo in prison
Foreign Policy, October 8, 2010
In December 2008, 303 Chinese activists, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, issued "Charter 08," a petition calling for greater human rights and democratic freedoms in China. An English translation by the Hong Kong-based NGO Human Rights in China is republished here with permission. The translation was first published in China Rights Forum, the organization's quarterly journal.
…………………………………………………
Charter 08
I. Preamble
This year marks 100 years since China’s [first] Constitution, the 60th anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 30th anniversary of the birth of the Democracy Wall, and the 10th year since the Chinese government signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Having experienced a prolonged period of human rights disasters and challenging and tortuous struggles, the awakening Chinese citizens are becoming increasingly aware that freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values shared by all humankind, and that democracy, republicanism, and constitutional government make up the basic institutional framework of modern politics. A “modernization” bereft of these universal values and this basic political framework is a disastrous process that deprives people of their rights, rots away their humanity, and destroys their dignity. Where is China headed in the 21st century? Will it continue with this “modernization” under authoritarian rule, or will it endorse universal values, join the mainstream civilization, and build a democratic form of government? This is an unavoidable decision.
The tremendous historic changes of the mid-19th century exposed the decay of the traditional Chinese autocratic system and set the stage for the greatest transformation China had seen in several thousand years. The Self-Strengthening Movement [1861–1895] sought improvements in China’s technical capability by acquiring manufacturing techniques, scientific knowledge, and military technologies from the West; China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War [1894–1895] once again exposed the obsolescence of its system; the Hundred Days’ Reform [1898] touched upon the area of institutional innovation, but ended in failure due to cruel suppression by the die-hard faction [at the Qing court]. The Xinhai Revolution [1911], on the surface, buried the imperial system that had lasted for more than 2,000 years and established Asia’s first republic. But, because of the particular historical circumstances of internal and external troubles, the republican system of government was short lived, and autocracy made a comeback.
The failure of technical imitation and institutional renewal prompted deep reflection among our countrymen on the root cause of China’s cultural sickness, and the ensuing May Fourth [1919] and New Culture Movements [1915–1921] under the banner of “science and democracy.” But the course of China’s political democratization was forcibly cut short due to frequent civil wars and foreign invasion. The process of a constitutional government began again after China’s victory in the War of Resistance against Japan [1937–1945], but the outcome of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists plunged China into the abyss of modern-day totalitarianism. The “New China” established in 1949 is a “people’s republic” in name, but in reality it is a “party domain.” The ruling party monopolizes all the political, economic, and social resources. It has created a string of human rights disasters, such as the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, June Fourth, and the suppression of unofficial religious activities and the rights defense movement, causing tens of millions of deaths, and exacting a disastrous price from both the people and the country.
The “Reform and Opening Up” of the late 20th century extricated China from the pervasive poverty and absolute totalitarianism of the Mao Zedong era, and substantially increased private wealth and the standard of living of the common people. Individual economic freedom and social privileges were partially restored, a civil society began to grow, and calls for human rights and political freedom among the people increased by the day. Those in power, while implementing economic reforms aimed at marketization and privatization, also began to shift from a position of rejecting human rights to one of gradually recognizing them. In 1997 and 1998, the Chinese government signed two important international human rights treaties.2 In 2004, the National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to add that “[the State] respects and guarantees human rights.” And this year, the government has promised to formulate and implement a “National Human Rights Action Plan.” But so far, this political progress has largely remained on paper: there are laws, but there is no rule of law; there is a constitution, but no constitutional government; this is still the political reality that is obvious to all. The ruling elite continues to insist on its authoritarian grip on power, rejecting political reform. This has caused official corruption, difficulty in establishing rule of law, the absence of of human rights, moral bankruptcy, social polarization, abnormal economic development, destruction of both the natural and cultural environment, no institutionalized protection of citizens’ rights to freedom, property, and the pursuit of happiness, the constant accumulation of all kinds of social conflicts, and the continuous surge of resentment. In particular, the intensification of antagonism between the government and the people, and the dramatic increase in mass incidents, indicate a catastrophic loss of control in the making, suggesting that the backwardness of the current system has reached a point where change must occur.
II. Our Fundamental Concepts
At this historical juncture that will decide the future destiny of China, it is necessary to reflect on the modernization process of the past hundred and some years and reaffirm the following concepts:
Freedom: Freedom is at the core of universal values. The rights of speech, publication, belief, assembly, association, movement, to strike, and to march and demonstrate are all the concrete expressions of freedom. Where freedom does not flourish, there is no modern civilization to speak of.
Human Rights: Human rights are not bestowed by a state; they are inherent rights enjoyed by every person. Guaranteeing human rights is both the most important objective of a government and the foundation of the legitimacy of its public authority; it is also the intrinsic requirement of the policy of “putting people first.” China’s successive political disasters have all been closely related to the disregard for human rights by the ruling establishment. People are the mainstay of a nation; a nation serves its people; government exists for the people.
Equality: The integrity, dignity, and freedom of every individual, regardless of social status, occupation, gender, economic circumstances, ethnicity, skin color, religion, or political belief, are equal. The principles of equality before the law for each and every person and equality in social, economic, cultural, and political rights of all citizens must be implemented.
Republicanism: Republicanism is “joint governing by all, peaceful coexistence,” that is, the separation of powers for checks and balances and the balance of interests; that is, a community comprising many diverse interests, different social groups, and a plurality of cultures and faiths, seeking to peacefully handle public affairs on the basis of equal participation, fair competition, and joint discussion.
Democracy: The most fundamental meaning is that sovereignty resides in the people and the government elected by the people. Democracy has the following basic characteristics:(1) The legitimacy of political power comes from the people; the source of political power is the people. (2) Political control is exercised through choices made by the people. (3) Citizens enjoy the genuine right to vote; officials in key positions at all levels of government must be the product of elections at regular intervals. (4) Respect the decisions of the majority while protecting the basic human rights of the minority. In a word, democracy is the modern public instrument for creating a government “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”
Constitutionalism: Constitutionalism is the principle of guaranteeing basic freedoms and rights of citizens as defined by the constitution through legal provisions and the rule of law, restricting and defining the boundaries of government power and conduct, and providing appropriate institutional capability to carry this out. In China, the era of imperial power is long gone, never to return; in the world at large, the authoritarian system is on the wane; citizens ought to become the true masters of their states. The fundamental way out for China lies only in dispelling the subservient notion of reliance on “enlightened rulers” and “upright officials,” promoting public consciousness of rights as fundamental and participation as a duty, and putting into practice freedom, engaging in democracy, and respecting the law.
III. Our Basic Positions
Thus, in the spirit of responsible and constructive citizens, we put forth the following specific positions regarding various aspects of state administration, citizens’ rights and interests, and social development:
1. Constitutional Amendment: Based on the aforementioned values and concepts, amend the Constitution, deleting clauses in the current Constitution that are not in conformity with the principle that sovereignty resides in the people, so that the Constitution can truly become a document that guarantees human rights and allows for the exercise of public power, and become the enforceable supreme law that no individual, group, or party can violate, establishing the foundation of the legal authority for democratizing China.
2. Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances: Construct a modern government that separates powers and maintains checks and balances among them, that guarantees the separation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Establish the principle of statutory administration and responsible government to prevent excessive expansion of executive power; government should be responsible to taxpayers; establish the system of separation of powers and checks and balances between the central and local governments; the central power must be clearly defined and mandated by the Constitution, and
the localities must exercise full autonomy.
3. Legislative Democracy: Legislative bodies at all levels should be created through direct elections; maintain the principle of fairness and justice in making law; and implement legislative democracy.
4. Judicial Independence: The judiciary should transcend partisanship, be free from any interference, exercise judicial independence, and guarantee judicial fairness; it should establish a constitutional court and a system to investigate violations of the Constitution, and uphold the authority of the Constitution. Abolish as soon as possible the Party’s Committees of Political and Legislative Affairs at all levels that seriously endanger the country’s rule of law. Prevent private use of public instruments.
5. Public Use of Public Instruments: Bring the armed forces under state control. Military personnel should render loyalty to the Constitution and to the country. Political party organizations should withdraw from the armed forces; raise the professional standards of the armed forces. All public employees including the police should maintain political neutrality. Abolish discrimination in hiring of public employees based on party affiliation; there should be equality in hiring regardless of party affiliation.
6. Human Rights Guarantees: Guarantee human rights in earnest; protect human dignity. Set up a Commission on Human Rights, responsible to the highest organ of popular will, to prevent government abuse of public authority and violations of human rights, and, especially, to guarantee the personal freedom of citizens. No one shall suffer illegal arrest, detention, subpoena, interrogation, or punishment. Abolish the Reeducation-Through-Labor system.
7. Election of Public Officials: Fully implement the system of democratic elections to realize equal voting rights based on “one person, one vote.” Systematically and gradually implement direct elections of administrative heads at all levels. Regular elections based on free competition and citizen participation in elections for legal public office are inalienable basic human rights.
8. Urban-Rural Equality: Abolish the current urban-rural two-tier household registration system to realize the constitutional right of equality before the law for all citizens and guarantee the citizens’ right to move freely.
9. Freedom of Association: Guarantee citizens’ right to freedom of association. Change the current system of registration upon approval for community groups to a system of record-keeping. Lift the ban on political parties. Regulate party activities according to the Constitution and law; abolish the privilege of one-party monopoly on power; establish the principles of freedom of activities of political parties and fair competition for political parties; normalize and legally regulate party politics.
10. Freedom of Assembly: Freedoms to peacefully assemble, march, demonstrate, and express [opinions] are citizens’ fundamental freedoms stipulated by the Constitution; they should not be subject to illegal interference and unconstitutional restrictions by the ruling party and the government.
11. Freedom of Expression: Realize the freedom of speech, freedom to publish, and academic freedom; guarantee the citizens’ right to know and right to supervise [public institutions]. Enact a “News Law” and a “Publishing Law,” lift the ban on reporting, repeal the “crime of inciting subversion of state power” clause in the current Criminal Law, and put an end to punishing speech as a crime.
12. Freedom of Religion: Guarantee freedom of religion and freedom of belief, and implement separation of religion and state so that activities involving religion and faith are not subjected to government interference. Examine and repeal administrative statutes, administrative rules, and local statutes that restrict or deprive citizens of religious freedom; ban management of religious activities by administrative legislation. Abolish the system that requires that religious groups (and including places of worship) obtain prior approval of their legal status in order to register, and replace it with a system of record-keeping that requires no scrutiny.
13. Civic Education: Abolish political education and political examinations that are heavy on ideology and serve the one-party rule. Popularize civic education based on universal values and civil rights, establish civic consciousness, and advocate civic virtues that serve society.
14. Property Protection: Establish and protect private property rights, and implement a system based on a free and open market economy; guarantee entrepreneurial freedom, and eliminate administrative monopolies; set up a Committee for the Management of State-Owned Property, responsible to the highest organ of popular will; launch reform of property rights in a legal and orderly fashion, and clarify the ownership of property rights and those responsible; launch a new land movement, advance land privatization, and guarantee in earnest the land property rights of citizens, particularly the farmers.
15. Fiscal Reform: Democratize public finances and guarantee taxpayers’ rights. Set up the structure and operational mechanism of a public finance system with clearly defined authority and responsibilities, and establish a rational and effective system of decentralized financial authority among various levels of government; carry out a major reform of the tax system, so as to reduce tax rates, simplify the tax system, and equalize the tax burden. Administrative departments may not increase taxes or create new taxes at will without sanction by society obtained through a public elective process and resolution by organs of popular will. Pass property rights reform to diversify and introduce competition mechanisms into the market; lower the threshold for entry into the financial field and create conditions for the development of privately-owned financial enterprises, and fully energize the financial system.
16. Social Security: Establish a social security system that covers all citizens and provides them with basic security in education, medical care, care for the elderly, and employment.
17. Environmental Protection: Protect the ecological environment, promote sustainable development, and take responsibility for future generations and all humanity; clarify and impose the appropriate responsibilities that state and government officials at all levels must take to this end; promote participation and oversight by civil society groups in environmental protection.
18. Federal Republic: Take part in maintaining regional peace and development with an attitude of equality and fairness, and create an image of a responsible great power. Protect the free systems of Hong Kong and Macau .On the premise of freedom and democracy, seek a reconciliation plan for the mainland and Taiwan through equal negotiations and cooperative interaction. Wisely explore possible paths and institutional blueprints for the common prosperity of all ethnic groups, and establish the Federal Republic of China under the framework of a democractic and constitutional government.
19. Transitional Justice: Restore the reputation of and give state compensation to individuals, as well as their families, who suffered political persecution during past political movements; release all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience; release all people convicted for their beliefs; establish a Commission for Truth Investigation to find the truth of historical events, determine responsibility, and uphold justice; seek social reconciliation on this foundation.
IV. Conclusion
China, as a great nation of the world, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and a member of the Human Rights Council, ought to make its own contribution to peace for humankind and progress in human rights. Regrettably, however, of all the great nations of the world today, China alone still clings to an authoritarian way of life and has, as a result, created an unbroken nchain of human rights disasters and social crises, held back the development of the Chinese people, and hindered the progress of human civilization. This situation must change! We cannot put off political democratization reforms any longer. Therefore, in the civic spirit of daring to take action, we are issuing Charter 08. We hope that all Chinese citizens who share this sense of crisis, responsibility, and mission, whether officials or common people and regardless of social background, will put aside our differences to seek common ground and come to take an active part in this citizens’ movement, to promote the great transformation of Chinese society together, so that we can soon establish a free, democratic, and constitutional nation, fulfilling the aspirations and dreams that our countrymen have been pursuing tirelessly for more than a hundred years.
Obama calls for the release of Chinese activist
Já que a CNN não pode dar a notícia, aqui na China, eu me substituo a ela...
Breaking News Alert:
Obama calls on China to free Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo
The Washington Post, October 8, 2010 11:35:29 AM
-------------------------
President Obama, who was awarded last year's Nobel Peace Prize, called on China to release this year's winner, Liu Xiaobo, who is serving an 11-year prison sentence.
"Last year, I noted that so many others who have received the award had sacrificed so much more than I. That list now includes Mr. Liu, who has sacrificed his freedom for his beliefs. By granting the prize to Mr. Liu, the Nobel Committee has chosen someone who has been an eloquent and courageous spokesman for the advance of universal values through peaceful and non-violent means, including his support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law," Obama said.
"We call on the Chinese government to release Mr. Liu as soon as possible," he said.
Breaking News Alert:
Obama calls on China to free Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo
The Washington Post, October 8, 2010 11:35:29 AM
-------------------------
President Obama, who was awarded last year's Nobel Peace Prize, called on China to release this year's winner, Liu Xiaobo, who is serving an 11-year prison sentence.
"Last year, I noted that so many others who have received the award had sacrificed so much more than I. That list now includes Mr. Liu, who has sacrificed his freedom for his beliefs. By granting the prize to Mr. Liu, the Nobel Committee has chosen someone who has been an eloquent and courageous spokesman for the advance of universal values through peaceful and non-violent means, including his support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law," Obama said.
"We call on the Chinese government to release Mr. Liu as soon as possible," he said.
Dissidentes NAO; Ativistas SIM: usar palavras corretas no caso chines
Os ativistas que lutam por direitos humanos em regimes autoritários são normalmente considerados como "dissidentes" pela imprensa internacional.
Ora, isso é absolutamente inapropriado.
Eles são inteiramente "concordantes" com os mais importantes instrumentos internacionais em favor da democracia e dos direitos humanos, a começar pela Declaração Universal de 1948.
Quem são os verdadeiros dissidentes são os governos, que assinaram esses instrumentos e não os cumprem, tornando-se assim refratários a seu conteúdo.
Enfim, apenas para lembrar alguns desses ativistas, destaco aqui a parte final da matéria sobre a Carta 08 da New York Review of Books, que trouxe ao mundo esse importante documento, que visa, apenas e tão somente, fazer com que a China não mais seja dissidente dos principais instrumentos internacionais em matéria de direitos humanos.
Ver o post integral neste link.
POSTSCRIPT
The planning and drafting of Charter 08 began in the late spring of 2008, but Chinese authorities were apparently unaware of it or unconcerned by it until several days before it was announced on December 10. On December 6, Wen Kejian, a writer who signed the charter, was detained in the city of Hangzhou in eastern China and questioned for about an hour. Police told Wen that Charter 08 was "different" from earlier dissident statements, and "a fairly grave matter." They said there would be a coordinated investigation in all cities and provinces to "root out the organizers," and they advised Wen to remove his name from the charter. Wen declined, telling the authorities that he saw the charter as a fundamental turning point in history.
Meanwhile, on December 8, in Shenzhen in the far south of China, police called on Zhao Dagong, a writer and signer of the charter, for a "chat." They told Zhao that the central authorities were concerned about the charter and asked if he was the organizer in the Shenzhen area.
Later on December 8, at 11 PM in Beijing, about twenty police entered the home of Zhang Zuhua, one of the charter's main drafters. A few of the police took Zhang with them to the local police station while the rest stayed and, as Zhang's wife watched, searched the home and confiscated books, notebooks, Zhang's passport, all four of the family's computers, and all of their cash and credit cards. (Later Zhang learned that his family's bank accounts, including those of both his and his wife's parents, had been emptied.) Meanwhile, at the police station, Zhang was detained for twelve hours, where he was questioned in detail about Charter 08 and the group Chinese Human Rights Defenders in which he is active.
It was also late on December 8 that another of the charter's signers, the literary critic and prominent dissident Liu Xiaobo, was taken away by police. His telephone in Beijing went unanswered, as did e-mail and Skype messages sent to him. As of the present writing, he's believed to be in police custody, although the details of his detention are not known.
On the morning of December 9, Beijing lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was called in for a police "chat," and in the evening the physicist and philosopher Jiang Qisheng was called in as well. Both had signed the charter and were friends of the drafters. On December 10—the day the charter was formally announced—the Hangzhou police returned to the home of Wen Kejian, the writer they had questioned four days earlier. This time they were more threatening. They told Wen he would face severe punishment if he wrote about the charter or about Liu Xiaobo's detention. "Do you want three years in prison?" they asked. "Or four?"
On December 11 the journalist Gao Yu and the writer Liu Di, both well-known in Beijing, were interrogated about their signing of the Charter. The rights lawyer, Teng Biao, was approached by the police but declined, on principle, to meet with them. On December 12 and 13 there were reports of interrogations in many provinces—Shaanxi, Hunan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and others—of people who had seen the charter on the Internet, found that they agreed with it, and signed. With these people the police focused on two questions: "How did you get involved?" and "What do you know about the drafters and organizers?"
The Chinese authorities seem unaware of the irony of their actions. Their efforts to quash Charter 08 only serve to underscore China's failure to uphold the very principles that the charter advances. The charter calls for "free expression" but the regime says, by its actions, that it has once again denied such expression. The charter calls for freedom to form groups, but the nationwide police actions that have accompanied the charter's release have specifically aimed at blocking the formation of a group. The charter says "we should end the practice of viewing words as crimes," and the regime says (literally, to Wen Kejian) "we can send you to prison for these words." The charter calls for the rule of law and the regime sends police in the middle of the night to act outside the law; the charter says "police should serve as nonpartisans," and here the police are plainly partisan.
Charter 08 is signed only by citizens of the People's Republic of China who are living inside China. But Chinese living outside China are signing a letter of strong support for the charter. The eminent historian Yu Ying-shih, the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, writers Ha Jin and Zheng Yi, and more than 160 others have so far signed.
On December 12, the Dalai Lama issued his own letter in support of the charter, writing that "a harmonious society can only come into being when there is trust among the people, freedom from fear, freedom of expression, rule of law, justice, and equality." He called on the Chinese government to release prisoners "who have been detained for exercising their freedom of expression."
—Perry Link, December 18, 2008
Ora, isso é absolutamente inapropriado.
Eles são inteiramente "concordantes" com os mais importantes instrumentos internacionais em favor da democracia e dos direitos humanos, a começar pela Declaração Universal de 1948.
Quem são os verdadeiros dissidentes são os governos, que assinaram esses instrumentos e não os cumprem, tornando-se assim refratários a seu conteúdo.
Enfim, apenas para lembrar alguns desses ativistas, destaco aqui a parte final da matéria sobre a Carta 08 da New York Review of Books, que trouxe ao mundo esse importante documento, que visa, apenas e tão somente, fazer com que a China não mais seja dissidente dos principais instrumentos internacionais em matéria de direitos humanos.
Ver o post integral neste link.
POSTSCRIPT
The planning and drafting of Charter 08 began in the late spring of 2008, but Chinese authorities were apparently unaware of it or unconcerned by it until several days before it was announced on December 10. On December 6, Wen Kejian, a writer who signed the charter, was detained in the city of Hangzhou in eastern China and questioned for about an hour. Police told Wen that Charter 08 was "different" from earlier dissident statements, and "a fairly grave matter." They said there would be a coordinated investigation in all cities and provinces to "root out the organizers," and they advised Wen to remove his name from the charter. Wen declined, telling the authorities that he saw the charter as a fundamental turning point in history.
Meanwhile, on December 8, in Shenzhen in the far south of China, police called on Zhao Dagong, a writer and signer of the charter, for a "chat." They told Zhao that the central authorities were concerned about the charter and asked if he was the organizer in the Shenzhen area.
Later on December 8, at 11 PM in Beijing, about twenty police entered the home of Zhang Zuhua, one of the charter's main drafters. A few of the police took Zhang with them to the local police station while the rest stayed and, as Zhang's wife watched, searched the home and confiscated books, notebooks, Zhang's passport, all four of the family's computers, and all of their cash and credit cards. (Later Zhang learned that his family's bank accounts, including those of both his and his wife's parents, had been emptied.) Meanwhile, at the police station, Zhang was detained for twelve hours, where he was questioned in detail about Charter 08 and the group Chinese Human Rights Defenders in which he is active.
It was also late on December 8 that another of the charter's signers, the literary critic and prominent dissident Liu Xiaobo, was taken away by police. His telephone in Beijing went unanswered, as did e-mail and Skype messages sent to him. As of the present writing, he's believed to be in police custody, although the details of his detention are not known.
On the morning of December 9, Beijing lawyer Pu Zhiqiang was called in for a police "chat," and in the evening the physicist and philosopher Jiang Qisheng was called in as well. Both had signed the charter and were friends of the drafters. On December 10—the day the charter was formally announced—the Hangzhou police returned to the home of Wen Kejian, the writer they had questioned four days earlier. This time they were more threatening. They told Wen he would face severe punishment if he wrote about the charter or about Liu Xiaobo's detention. "Do you want three years in prison?" they asked. "Or four?"
On December 11 the journalist Gao Yu and the writer Liu Di, both well-known in Beijing, were interrogated about their signing of the Charter. The rights lawyer, Teng Biao, was approached by the police but declined, on principle, to meet with them. On December 12 and 13 there were reports of interrogations in many provinces—Shaanxi, Hunan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and others—of people who had seen the charter on the Internet, found that they agreed with it, and signed. With these people the police focused on two questions: "How did you get involved?" and "What do you know about the drafters and organizers?"
The Chinese authorities seem unaware of the irony of their actions. Their efforts to quash Charter 08 only serve to underscore China's failure to uphold the very principles that the charter advances. The charter calls for "free expression" but the regime says, by its actions, that it has once again denied such expression. The charter calls for freedom to form groups, but the nationwide police actions that have accompanied the charter's release have specifically aimed at blocking the formation of a group. The charter says "we should end the practice of viewing words as crimes," and the regime says (literally, to Wen Kejian) "we can send you to prison for these words." The charter calls for the rule of law and the regime sends police in the middle of the night to act outside the law; the charter says "police should serve as nonpartisans," and here the police are plainly partisan.
Charter 08 is signed only by citizens of the People's Republic of China who are living inside China. But Chinese living outside China are signing a letter of strong support for the charter. The eminent historian Yu Ying-shih, the astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, writers Ha Jin and Zheng Yi, and more than 160 others have so far signed.
On December 12, the Dalai Lama issued his own letter in support of the charter, writing that "a harmonious society can only come into being when there is trust among the people, freedom from fear, freedom of expression, rule of law, justice, and equality." He called on the Chinese government to release prisoners "who have been detained for exercising their freedom of expression."
—Perry Link, December 18, 2008
Big Brother vs CNN: seria patetico, se nao fosse ridiculo...
Todo mundo, ou quase, sabe que o Comitê Nobel atribui o prêmio 2010 da Paz ao ativista chinês pelos direitos humanos e pela democracia Liu Xiaobo.
Na China, ainda falta avisar alguns milhões, talvez algumas centenas de milhões.
Claro, todo mundo conectado de alguma forma com o mundo já sabe, menos os milhões de chineses que não dispõem de meios de informação independentes do governo.
Este, de modo absolutamente patético, está tentando impedir os chineses comuns de tomar conhecimento dessa notícia. Os meios oficiais fazem silêncio absoluto sobre o assunto.
Mas o Big Brother chinês também atua de modo absolutamente ridículo ao tentar impedir o acesso a essa informação objetiva pelos canais independentes, estrangeiros.
A CNN, por exemplo, acaba de ficar mais de 2 minutos fora do ar, por causa disso mesmo.
Entretanto, os burocratas e os censores do Great China Firewall foram particularmente vagarosos, e distraídos, neste caso: eles cortaram o sinal depois que a "âncora" da CNN já tinha começado a dar a notícia, inclusive de que o governo chinês estava bloqueando a infor.... (tela apagada).
Dois minutos depois, ou quase, a CNN retoma, desta vez anunciando a renúncia do Conselheiro de Segurança Nacional do presidente Obama, general Jones. Enfim a vida continua.
Esses censores precisam ser mais eficientes, não podem dormir no ponto, afinal de contas eles são pagos para isso.
Já foram mais eficientes de outras vezes...
No dia 1 de junho, por exemplo, eu estava assistindo a um especial na CNN sobre os 30 anos do início das emissões, a partir de Atlanta, daquela rede que se pretendia mundial e que era chamada depreciativamente de "Chicken Noodles Network".
A CNN fazia então um retrospecto das grandes reportagens de seus 30 anos desde 1980, focando a partir de seus arquivos os eventos mundiais de maior impacto no período: desastre da Space Shuttle, guerra Irã-Iraque, catástrofes, tragédias, de repente, isso mesmo: tela preta, chuvisco, ausência de sinal, por alguns segundos, 20 ou 30, depois retomada: invasão do Kwait pelo exército de Saddam Hussein, primeira guerra do golfo, etc, etc, etc.
Curioso, escrevi para correspondentes no Brasil e em outros países, para saber o que eu (e alguns milhões de residentes na China conectados na CNN) tinha perdido: justamente o que eu tinha deduzido imediatamente: o massacre da praça Tian An-Men, ironicamente chamada de Paz Celestial. Sim, também teve a queda do muro de Berlim, enfim, essas coisas incômodas do ponto de vista do Big Brother.
Se alguém perguntar, digamos o próprio escritório da CNN em Beijing, o governo chinês dirá, com a cara mais hipócrita do mundo, que foi um "problema técnico", alguma dificuldade qualquer com a transmissão do sinal, mas que a interrupção tinha sido prontamente resolvida por seus "técnicos".
Acredito que esses técnicos tenham de aumentar o tempo da decalagem entre o sinal da CNN e sua retransmissão na China, digamos para mais de um minuto, para dar tempo de cortar o sinal antes que a notícia entre nos aparelhos, como ocorreu agora, quando pelo menos ficamos sabendo que um chinês havia ganho o Premio Nobel da Paz, e que esse chinês estava preso, por ser um "dissiden..." (...).
Ou eles estavam dormindo, ou comendo miojo, pois se atrasaram vergonhosamente.
Não se pode ser um Big Brother eficiente dessa maneira; desse modo, alguém vai ter de escrever uma nova versão de "1984", criando a figura de um Big Brother trapalhão, distraído, lento, atrasado, ineficiente...
Enfim, acho tudo isso ridículo, pois só contribui para a causa que o governo do Big Brother quer evitar, mas acredito que a burrice seja própria das ditaduras...
Finalmente, sou contra essa caracterização de Liu Xiaobo como "dissidente".
Dissidente do que? De nada, obviamente.
Quem é dissidente é o governo chinês: da democracia, dos direitos humanos, dos princípios mais elementares da transparência e do livre acesso à informação...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
(Shanghai, 8 de Outubro de 2010)
PS: A cena patética, ou ridícula, se repete: assim que os "titulares" da notícia foram novamente anunciados na CNN, as 23hs locais, inclusive de que o governo chinês tinha ficado bravo com a atribuição do Prêmio Nobel da Paz a Liu Xiabo, o sinal voltou a ser cortado. Assim será pelos próximos dias, cada vez que a matéria for abordada pela CNN (e pela BBC e outros canais, que vou continuar tentando).
Enfim, recomendo muito café e estimulantes aos rapazes do Great Firewal: eles vão ter de trabalhar muito nos próximos dias, e sobretudo ficar mais atentos, do contrário vão acabar tomando uma "censura" do censor-mor...
Na China, ainda falta avisar alguns milhões, talvez algumas centenas de milhões.
Claro, todo mundo conectado de alguma forma com o mundo já sabe, menos os milhões de chineses que não dispõem de meios de informação independentes do governo.
Este, de modo absolutamente patético, está tentando impedir os chineses comuns de tomar conhecimento dessa notícia. Os meios oficiais fazem silêncio absoluto sobre o assunto.
Mas o Big Brother chinês também atua de modo absolutamente ridículo ao tentar impedir o acesso a essa informação objetiva pelos canais independentes, estrangeiros.
A CNN, por exemplo, acaba de ficar mais de 2 minutos fora do ar, por causa disso mesmo.
Entretanto, os burocratas e os censores do Great China Firewall foram particularmente vagarosos, e distraídos, neste caso: eles cortaram o sinal depois que a "âncora" da CNN já tinha começado a dar a notícia, inclusive de que o governo chinês estava bloqueando a infor.... (tela apagada).
Dois minutos depois, ou quase, a CNN retoma, desta vez anunciando a renúncia do Conselheiro de Segurança Nacional do presidente Obama, general Jones. Enfim a vida continua.
Esses censores precisam ser mais eficientes, não podem dormir no ponto, afinal de contas eles são pagos para isso.
Já foram mais eficientes de outras vezes...
No dia 1 de junho, por exemplo, eu estava assistindo a um especial na CNN sobre os 30 anos do início das emissões, a partir de Atlanta, daquela rede que se pretendia mundial e que era chamada depreciativamente de "Chicken Noodles Network".
A CNN fazia então um retrospecto das grandes reportagens de seus 30 anos desde 1980, focando a partir de seus arquivos os eventos mundiais de maior impacto no período: desastre da Space Shuttle, guerra Irã-Iraque, catástrofes, tragédias, de repente, isso mesmo: tela preta, chuvisco, ausência de sinal, por alguns segundos, 20 ou 30, depois retomada: invasão do Kwait pelo exército de Saddam Hussein, primeira guerra do golfo, etc, etc, etc.
Curioso, escrevi para correspondentes no Brasil e em outros países, para saber o que eu (e alguns milhões de residentes na China conectados na CNN) tinha perdido: justamente o que eu tinha deduzido imediatamente: o massacre da praça Tian An-Men, ironicamente chamada de Paz Celestial. Sim, também teve a queda do muro de Berlim, enfim, essas coisas incômodas do ponto de vista do Big Brother.
Se alguém perguntar, digamos o próprio escritório da CNN em Beijing, o governo chinês dirá, com a cara mais hipócrita do mundo, que foi um "problema técnico", alguma dificuldade qualquer com a transmissão do sinal, mas que a interrupção tinha sido prontamente resolvida por seus "técnicos".
Acredito que esses técnicos tenham de aumentar o tempo da decalagem entre o sinal da CNN e sua retransmissão na China, digamos para mais de um minuto, para dar tempo de cortar o sinal antes que a notícia entre nos aparelhos, como ocorreu agora, quando pelo menos ficamos sabendo que um chinês havia ganho o Premio Nobel da Paz, e que esse chinês estava preso, por ser um "dissiden..." (...).
Ou eles estavam dormindo, ou comendo miojo, pois se atrasaram vergonhosamente.
Não se pode ser um Big Brother eficiente dessa maneira; desse modo, alguém vai ter de escrever uma nova versão de "1984", criando a figura de um Big Brother trapalhão, distraído, lento, atrasado, ineficiente...
Enfim, acho tudo isso ridículo, pois só contribui para a causa que o governo do Big Brother quer evitar, mas acredito que a burrice seja própria das ditaduras...
Finalmente, sou contra essa caracterização de Liu Xiaobo como "dissidente".
Dissidente do que? De nada, obviamente.
Quem é dissidente é o governo chinês: da democracia, dos direitos humanos, dos princípios mais elementares da transparência e do livre acesso à informação...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
(Shanghai, 8 de Outubro de 2010)
PS: A cena patética, ou ridícula, se repete: assim que os "titulares" da notícia foram novamente anunciados na CNN, as 23hs locais, inclusive de que o governo chinês tinha ficado bravo com a atribuição do Prêmio Nobel da Paz a Liu Xiabo, o sinal voltou a ser cortado. Assim será pelos próximos dias, cada vez que a matéria for abordada pela CNN (e pela BBC e outros canais, que vou continuar tentando).
Enfim, recomendo muito café e estimulantes aos rapazes do Great Firewal: eles vão ter de trabalhar muito nos próximos dias, e sobretudo ficar mais atentos, do contrário vão acabar tomando uma "censura" do censor-mor...
Confusao mental: comportamento cambial erratico do governo...
Bem, falar em governo é um pouco exagerado, neste caso, pois não existe, a rigor, uma política cambial do governo (supondo-se que exista governo, claro).
Existe uma política cambial do Banco Central (com objetivos muito bem definidos, ainda que não explícitos) e existe, ao que parece, uma outra política cambial, esta sim confusa, errática e contraditória, da Fazenda, que parece barata tonta no tiroteio, para usar uma imagem conhecida.
Uma política não bate com a outra, mas a única questão relevante aqui é: a política cambial da Fazenda bate com alguma coisa? Duvido, sinceramente, pois não existe discurso coerente, e sequer existe discurso, apenas frases desconexas, confusas, contraditórias, tropeços verbais no meio da escuridão, gaguejamentos borrachos de quem deveria andar sóbrio (sobretudo numa matéria séria como essa).
Enfim, sem ser especialista, como o citado na matéria abaixo, do sempre competente jornalista do CB, Antonio Machado (nome de poeta espanhol), ouso dizer que o real vai continuar a se valorizar, e que a política cambial (se existe) vai continuar confusa e errática.
O que não se diz, em parte alguma, é o enorme custo fiscal dessa compra sôfrega de dólares, aparentemente até por esse fantasma inacreditável chamado (ao que parece) "Fundo Soberano do Brasil".
Aqui se trata de uma mistificação completa: o Brasil não possui NENHUM dos requerimentos estruturais para ter um Fundo Soberano, que são superávits orçamentários (ou seja, folga fiscal) e superávit em transações correntes. Nada, nadica de pitiribas. E como se constitui esse tal de Fundo que não é fundo? Simplesmente com recursos orçamentários -- ao ARREPIO da LEI, diga-se de passagem -- que depois são usados e abusados pelo governo sem controle parlamentar e sem estar no orçamento. Ou seja, uma fraude completa.
Bem, deixo vocês com o artigo em questão/
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Câmbio atormentado
Antonio Machado - Brasil S/A
Correio Braziliense, 8.10.2010
Afinal, questiona o especialista em mercado cambial Sidnei Moura Nehme, o que pretende o governo: apreciar ou depreciar o real? A questão parece improcedente, pelo menos depois que o ministro Guido Mantega disse que há uma guerra cambial no mundo, tema até então evitado pelos governos em geral, e que o Brasil não ficaria impassível. O Banco Central lhe dá razão, já que há meses passa o rodo no mercado cambial, enxugando os dólares que entram no país.
Por tudo isso é que Nehme explica que “essa, talvez, seja a questão inicial que os gestores de política monetária, cambial e fiscal do país devem procurar responder e, pelo que se observa”, acrescenta, a pergunta continua sem resposta. Sua certeza sobre a incoerência das ações do governo no câmbio sai da análise dos números apurados pelo Banco Central sobre o fluxo de divisas. São dados públicos.
O problema é que poucos como Nehme, economista e sócio-diretor da corretora NGO, se aplicam a estudá-los. A maioria se satisfaz com o que dizem os manuais de economia, segundo os quais a toda oferta restrita corresponde um aumento de preço. Se o BC enxuga os fluxos líquidos de dólares, o preço em relação ao real deveria aumentar.
Mas o BC faz mais: absorve toda a oferta e mais um pouco, isto é, dólares ainda indisponíveis no país. E o que acontece? O real vem ganhando gradativamente valor sobre o dólar, contrariando a lei da oferta e da procura. É a teoria que não se aplica ao país ou haveria algo mais? A resposta está nos dados tabulados pelo BC.
A eles: do início do ano até setembro, o saldo entre os ingressos e saídas de divisas foi positivo em US$ 17,121 bilhões. No mesmo período, o BC retirou do mercado à vista, por meio de leilões, US$ 29,362 bilhões. Comprou a mais que as entradas US$ 12,241 bilhões.
De onde veio esse “excedente”? Das linhas de crédito no exterior dos bancos brasileiros. A operação é rentável, já que a diferença entre os juros internos (10,75% no overnight) e nos EUA, Europa e Japão, da ordem de zero, pende a favor do aplicador estrangeiro.
Se, além disso, o real valorizar-se entre o ato de entrega dos dólares ao BC e o arremate do crédito externo, obtém-se um retorno irrealizável, a curto prazo, em qualquer outro mercado no mundo.
A história é assim: o dólar cai em todo o mundo porque interessa aos EUA para sair da crise, sobretudo em sua queda de braço com o governo chinês, irredutível aos apelos para apreciar o renminbi. E aqui também cai por razões que nada têm a ver com as diretrizes do governo Obama, mas com as do governo Lula, como Nehme reflete.
Bicicleta dólar-real
Essa bicicleta dólar-real só se equilibra pela certeza de que o BC comprará qualquer excedente de divisas que zanzar pelo mercado. E por que o BC faz isso? Nehme, cujos textos costumavam ser lidos na Fazenda — e talvez ainda sejam — responde. “As compras do BC correspondem a um tipo sutil de interferência [no mercado cambial] habilmente mascarada pelo argumento de que a causa é o fluxo, já que poucos vão conferir os números”, diz. “O objetivo é apreciar o real para que funcione como antídoto a pressões inflacionárias.”
Álibi contra inflação
É para pensar. Repita-se: se não fica dólar dando sopa por aí, a taxa cambial, no mínimo, deveria ficar estável. Com o aumento da tributação sobre os fluxos para aplicações financeiras, parece que o câmbio pode reagir. A ver. Mas nem isso deveria ser necessário.
“Não há porque se falar em impacto do fluxo cambial na derrocada do preço do real, já que foi absolutamente neutralizado pelo BC ao adquiri-lo na totalidade”, reforça o especialista. A combinação de política monetária com política cambial, ele explica, desqualifica o sistema de câmbio flutuante e estimula os bancos a constituir as chamadas posições “vendidas” (apostas na apreciação do real).
BC e Fazenda divergem
E aí vem a Fazenda e dobra a alíquota do IOF, amplia o prazo de provisão do Tesouro para pagar dívida pública externa a vencer e prepara o Fundo Soberano do Brasil para “compras ilimitadas”, nas palavras de Mantega, que também sugeriu ao BC reintroduzir o tal “swap cambial reverso”, equivalente à compra futura de dólar.
Tudo isso é para abater o real. Mas só servirá para intensificar a força do real, como se constatou no passado. “Se não conseguimos nem definir o que queremos, como temos pretensão de nos reunir com o G-20 para debater o assunto?”, provoca Nehme. Com juros em desalinho, poupança interna no osso e mercado de derivativos sem amarras, já seria muito se o governo sanasse suas contradições.
Farol para os aflitos
A pressão de entrada dos dólares existe não só por incoerência de objetivos da política econômica. O problema é global. Agrava-se no Brasil pelo conflito entre a meta legal de inflação, nas cercanias de 4,5% de variação anual, e a sua sequela sobre o preço do dólar.
Sem o cenário de guerra cambial, prioridade na agenda de todos os governos, daria até para aguentar. O overnight a 11%, contra zero nas economias avançadas em crise, no entanto, funciona como farol para todos os que têm dólar na mão, e estão avisados pelo Federal Reserve sobre a iminência de um choque cambial, cujo nome técnico, quantitative easing, ou afrouxamento monetário, não disfarça a intenção. O país precisa proteger-se. Ou tranca transitoriamente o mercado cambial ou corta juros. Ambos juntos poderão ser um risco.
Existe uma política cambial do Banco Central (com objetivos muito bem definidos, ainda que não explícitos) e existe, ao que parece, uma outra política cambial, esta sim confusa, errática e contraditória, da Fazenda, que parece barata tonta no tiroteio, para usar uma imagem conhecida.
Uma política não bate com a outra, mas a única questão relevante aqui é: a política cambial da Fazenda bate com alguma coisa? Duvido, sinceramente, pois não existe discurso coerente, e sequer existe discurso, apenas frases desconexas, confusas, contraditórias, tropeços verbais no meio da escuridão, gaguejamentos borrachos de quem deveria andar sóbrio (sobretudo numa matéria séria como essa).
Enfim, sem ser especialista, como o citado na matéria abaixo, do sempre competente jornalista do CB, Antonio Machado (nome de poeta espanhol), ouso dizer que o real vai continuar a se valorizar, e que a política cambial (se existe) vai continuar confusa e errática.
O que não se diz, em parte alguma, é o enorme custo fiscal dessa compra sôfrega de dólares, aparentemente até por esse fantasma inacreditável chamado (ao que parece) "Fundo Soberano do Brasil".
Aqui se trata de uma mistificação completa: o Brasil não possui NENHUM dos requerimentos estruturais para ter um Fundo Soberano, que são superávits orçamentários (ou seja, folga fiscal) e superávit em transações correntes. Nada, nadica de pitiribas. E como se constitui esse tal de Fundo que não é fundo? Simplesmente com recursos orçamentários -- ao ARREPIO da LEI, diga-se de passagem -- que depois são usados e abusados pelo governo sem controle parlamentar e sem estar no orçamento. Ou seja, uma fraude completa.
Bem, deixo vocês com o artigo em questão/
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Câmbio atormentado
Antonio Machado - Brasil S/A
Correio Braziliense, 8.10.2010
Afinal, questiona o especialista em mercado cambial Sidnei Moura Nehme, o que pretende o governo: apreciar ou depreciar o real? A questão parece improcedente, pelo menos depois que o ministro Guido Mantega disse que há uma guerra cambial no mundo, tema até então evitado pelos governos em geral, e que o Brasil não ficaria impassível. O Banco Central lhe dá razão, já que há meses passa o rodo no mercado cambial, enxugando os dólares que entram no país.
Por tudo isso é que Nehme explica que “essa, talvez, seja a questão inicial que os gestores de política monetária, cambial e fiscal do país devem procurar responder e, pelo que se observa”, acrescenta, a pergunta continua sem resposta. Sua certeza sobre a incoerência das ações do governo no câmbio sai da análise dos números apurados pelo Banco Central sobre o fluxo de divisas. São dados públicos.
O problema é que poucos como Nehme, economista e sócio-diretor da corretora NGO, se aplicam a estudá-los. A maioria se satisfaz com o que dizem os manuais de economia, segundo os quais a toda oferta restrita corresponde um aumento de preço. Se o BC enxuga os fluxos líquidos de dólares, o preço em relação ao real deveria aumentar.
Mas o BC faz mais: absorve toda a oferta e mais um pouco, isto é, dólares ainda indisponíveis no país. E o que acontece? O real vem ganhando gradativamente valor sobre o dólar, contrariando a lei da oferta e da procura. É a teoria que não se aplica ao país ou haveria algo mais? A resposta está nos dados tabulados pelo BC.
A eles: do início do ano até setembro, o saldo entre os ingressos e saídas de divisas foi positivo em US$ 17,121 bilhões. No mesmo período, o BC retirou do mercado à vista, por meio de leilões, US$ 29,362 bilhões. Comprou a mais que as entradas US$ 12,241 bilhões.
De onde veio esse “excedente”? Das linhas de crédito no exterior dos bancos brasileiros. A operação é rentável, já que a diferença entre os juros internos (10,75% no overnight) e nos EUA, Europa e Japão, da ordem de zero, pende a favor do aplicador estrangeiro.
Se, além disso, o real valorizar-se entre o ato de entrega dos dólares ao BC e o arremate do crédito externo, obtém-se um retorno irrealizável, a curto prazo, em qualquer outro mercado no mundo.
A história é assim: o dólar cai em todo o mundo porque interessa aos EUA para sair da crise, sobretudo em sua queda de braço com o governo chinês, irredutível aos apelos para apreciar o renminbi. E aqui também cai por razões que nada têm a ver com as diretrizes do governo Obama, mas com as do governo Lula, como Nehme reflete.
Bicicleta dólar-real
Essa bicicleta dólar-real só se equilibra pela certeza de que o BC comprará qualquer excedente de divisas que zanzar pelo mercado. E por que o BC faz isso? Nehme, cujos textos costumavam ser lidos na Fazenda — e talvez ainda sejam — responde. “As compras do BC correspondem a um tipo sutil de interferência [no mercado cambial] habilmente mascarada pelo argumento de que a causa é o fluxo, já que poucos vão conferir os números”, diz. “O objetivo é apreciar o real para que funcione como antídoto a pressões inflacionárias.”
Álibi contra inflação
É para pensar. Repita-se: se não fica dólar dando sopa por aí, a taxa cambial, no mínimo, deveria ficar estável. Com o aumento da tributação sobre os fluxos para aplicações financeiras, parece que o câmbio pode reagir. A ver. Mas nem isso deveria ser necessário.
“Não há porque se falar em impacto do fluxo cambial na derrocada do preço do real, já que foi absolutamente neutralizado pelo BC ao adquiri-lo na totalidade”, reforça o especialista. A combinação de política monetária com política cambial, ele explica, desqualifica o sistema de câmbio flutuante e estimula os bancos a constituir as chamadas posições “vendidas” (apostas na apreciação do real).
BC e Fazenda divergem
E aí vem a Fazenda e dobra a alíquota do IOF, amplia o prazo de provisão do Tesouro para pagar dívida pública externa a vencer e prepara o Fundo Soberano do Brasil para “compras ilimitadas”, nas palavras de Mantega, que também sugeriu ao BC reintroduzir o tal “swap cambial reverso”, equivalente à compra futura de dólar.
Tudo isso é para abater o real. Mas só servirá para intensificar a força do real, como se constatou no passado. “Se não conseguimos nem definir o que queremos, como temos pretensão de nos reunir com o G-20 para debater o assunto?”, provoca Nehme. Com juros em desalinho, poupança interna no osso e mercado de derivativos sem amarras, já seria muito se o governo sanasse suas contradições.
Farol para os aflitos
A pressão de entrada dos dólares existe não só por incoerência de objetivos da política econômica. O problema é global. Agrava-se no Brasil pelo conflito entre a meta legal de inflação, nas cercanias de 4,5% de variação anual, e a sua sequela sobre o preço do dólar.
Sem o cenário de guerra cambial, prioridade na agenda de todos os governos, daria até para aguentar. O overnight a 11%, contra zero nas economias avançadas em crise, no entanto, funciona como farol para todos os que têm dólar na mão, e estão avisados pelo Federal Reserve sobre a iminência de um choque cambial, cujo nome técnico, quantitative easing, ou afrouxamento monetário, não disfarça a intenção. O país precisa proteger-se. Ou tranca transitoriamente o mercado cambial ou corta juros. Ambos juntos poderão ser um risco.
Mario Vargas Llosa sobre o tal de "neoliberalismo"
Já escrevi bastante sobre essa bobagem essencialmente acadêmica -- mas exercitada plenamente por militantes políticos profundamente ignorantes, eu até ousaria dizer completamente idiotas, se não tivesse me comprometido a não mais chamar alguém de idiota (embora alguns mereçam) -- que consiste em acusar alguém ou alguma posição econômica ou política de "neoliberal".
Trata-se, numa expressão benigna, de um reducionismo atroz, no limite uma idiotice completa (perdão, perdão).
Em economia, existem liberais, como existem intervencionistas, ponto. Num caso se pretende a liberdade dos mercados, no outro se pretende a mão visível, e forte, do Estado. São fatos, não são minha opinião.
Em política, existem liberais e existem autoritários, ou mesmo totalitários. Os primeiros defendem um regime amplamente democrático, com total liberdade de expressão e de organização política, com algumas salvaguardas contra aqueles que pretenderiam destruir a democracia (sim, existem, como sabemos). Os segundos gostam de Estados centralizados, partidos únicos (ou quase), liderança da "vanguarda" (autodesignada, cela va de soi) e aquele desejo intenso de "reformar a sociedade", para torná-la mais "justa", mais "igualitária", mais conforme os desejos da "maioria". Enfim, tudo se resume num projeto de "engenharia social": os liberais não admitem essa perspectiva, e acham que os homens devem ser livres, simplesmente. Os autoritários, sim, têm essa vontade obsessiva de reorganizar a sociedade, mesmo contra a vontade dos... liberais, claro.
Bem, chega de papo.
Gostaria apenas de transcrever aqui um texto de Mario Vargas Llosa sobre o neoliberalismo, que fui "roubar" no blog do meu amigo e colega de ideias liberais Orlando Tambosi, que fez o trabalho de tradução (e que fica com todos os copyrights e moral rights pelo esforço). (Neste link.)
Quem quiser ler meus textos sobre neoliberalismo, pode buscar no meu site, na série sobre as "Falácias Acadêmicas".
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Mario Vargas Llosa sobre o "neoliberalismo"
Creio que o termo “neoliberalismo” não tem conteúdo semântico. É uma fórmula fundamentalmente denigritória, utilizada como etiqueta para caricaturar o liberalismo e fazê-lo responsável por todas as calamidades humanas. Uma das grandes vitórias das ideologias totalitárias, todas derrotadas na prática, é que nos deixaram uma sequela ideológica que se traduz em preconceitos e em certos lugares-comuns ideológicos, profundamente arraigados apesar dos desmentidos da realidade.
A ninguém se chama “neoliberal” para definir um sistema de pensamento, de valores, de convicções políticas. Não, neoliberal é algo automaticamente associado a explorador, defensor de instituições anacrônicas, injustas; neoliberal é quem tem uma visão fundamentalista do mercado, alguém que, em última instância, defende o sistema de exploração, de abuso, de expropriação do trabalho.
Há que se rechaçar a própria noção de neoliberal, já que carece de significação e, mais que uma idéia, é uma espécie de imprecação. Tem gente que é liberal e gente que não o é. Mas eu não conheci jamais um “neoliberal”. Assisto a congressos e seminários sobre o liberalismo e nunca ouvi alguém dizer: “Eu sou um neoliberal”. Cada vez que ouvimos a palavra “neoliberal” temos que nos preocupar, porque por trás dessas palavras há preconceitos profundos e ódio ao que o liberalismo representa. E isto, sim, existe, está aí, em muitos casos é um ódio consciente, em outros é instintivo.
Curiosamente, o liberalismo, que para muitos representa algo conservador, anacrônico, algo que já não expressa a realidade, é capaz de provocar hostilidades, manifestações de extraordinária ferocidade. Creio que essas são sequelas das ideologias totalitárias que ainda contaminam profundamente o discurso político do nosso tempo.
Não há neoliberais, há liberais. E os liberais são um espectro bastante amplo, de matizes muito diferentes e, às vezes, distanciados e contrapostos. Algo que é perfeitamente lógico se se pensa que o liberalismo não é uma ideologia, não tem esse caráter fechado de religião, dogmático, que tem as ideologias. É um corpo de ideias, uma doutrina em que se parte de certas convicções básicas que têm a ver especificamente com a liberdade, a idéia de que a liberdade é o valor mais prezado desde o ponto de vista individual e social, e que a presença e operacionalidade da liberdade, entendida de maneira unívoca como totalidade no campo político, no campo econômico, no campo cultural, no campo individual, é o que mais contribui para afastar a violência, para estabelecer a coexistência social e trazer prosperidade. Essas são ideias muito elementares, que são o denominador comum dos liberais.
A partir daí, o que há são diferenças, enormes diferenças. Mas, basicamente, a partir de algumas convicções democráticas e algumas convicções de que a liberdade, tanto no campo político quanto no campo econômico, conjugados, traz progresso, desenvolvimento, civilização: não a sociedade perfeita; o liberalismo não parte da idéia de uma sociedade perfeita, posto que as sociedades são sempre imperfeitas, mas são aperfeiçoáveis, e que para uma sociedade se aperfeiçoar é necessário fundar a Carta da liberdade, permitir a crítica, a diversidade, dentro de uma coexistência só garantida pela lei.
Trata-se, numa expressão benigna, de um reducionismo atroz, no limite uma idiotice completa (perdão, perdão).
Em economia, existem liberais, como existem intervencionistas, ponto. Num caso se pretende a liberdade dos mercados, no outro se pretende a mão visível, e forte, do Estado. São fatos, não são minha opinião.
Em política, existem liberais e existem autoritários, ou mesmo totalitários. Os primeiros defendem um regime amplamente democrático, com total liberdade de expressão e de organização política, com algumas salvaguardas contra aqueles que pretenderiam destruir a democracia (sim, existem, como sabemos). Os segundos gostam de Estados centralizados, partidos únicos (ou quase), liderança da "vanguarda" (autodesignada, cela va de soi) e aquele desejo intenso de "reformar a sociedade", para torná-la mais "justa", mais "igualitária", mais conforme os desejos da "maioria". Enfim, tudo se resume num projeto de "engenharia social": os liberais não admitem essa perspectiva, e acham que os homens devem ser livres, simplesmente. Os autoritários, sim, têm essa vontade obsessiva de reorganizar a sociedade, mesmo contra a vontade dos... liberais, claro.
Bem, chega de papo.
Gostaria apenas de transcrever aqui um texto de Mario Vargas Llosa sobre o neoliberalismo, que fui "roubar" no blog do meu amigo e colega de ideias liberais Orlando Tambosi, que fez o trabalho de tradução (e que fica com todos os copyrights e moral rights pelo esforço). (Neste link.)
Quem quiser ler meus textos sobre neoliberalismo, pode buscar no meu site, na série sobre as "Falácias Acadêmicas".
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Mario Vargas Llosa sobre o "neoliberalismo"
Creio que o termo “neoliberalismo” não tem conteúdo semântico. É uma fórmula fundamentalmente denigritória, utilizada como etiqueta para caricaturar o liberalismo e fazê-lo responsável por todas as calamidades humanas. Uma das grandes vitórias das ideologias totalitárias, todas derrotadas na prática, é que nos deixaram uma sequela ideológica que se traduz em preconceitos e em certos lugares-comuns ideológicos, profundamente arraigados apesar dos desmentidos da realidade.
A ninguém se chama “neoliberal” para definir um sistema de pensamento, de valores, de convicções políticas. Não, neoliberal é algo automaticamente associado a explorador, defensor de instituições anacrônicas, injustas; neoliberal é quem tem uma visão fundamentalista do mercado, alguém que, em última instância, defende o sistema de exploração, de abuso, de expropriação do trabalho.
Há que se rechaçar a própria noção de neoliberal, já que carece de significação e, mais que uma idéia, é uma espécie de imprecação. Tem gente que é liberal e gente que não o é. Mas eu não conheci jamais um “neoliberal”. Assisto a congressos e seminários sobre o liberalismo e nunca ouvi alguém dizer: “Eu sou um neoliberal”. Cada vez que ouvimos a palavra “neoliberal” temos que nos preocupar, porque por trás dessas palavras há preconceitos profundos e ódio ao que o liberalismo representa. E isto, sim, existe, está aí, em muitos casos é um ódio consciente, em outros é instintivo.
Curiosamente, o liberalismo, que para muitos representa algo conservador, anacrônico, algo que já não expressa a realidade, é capaz de provocar hostilidades, manifestações de extraordinária ferocidade. Creio que essas são sequelas das ideologias totalitárias que ainda contaminam profundamente o discurso político do nosso tempo.
Não há neoliberais, há liberais. E os liberais são um espectro bastante amplo, de matizes muito diferentes e, às vezes, distanciados e contrapostos. Algo que é perfeitamente lógico se se pensa que o liberalismo não é uma ideologia, não tem esse caráter fechado de religião, dogmático, que tem as ideologias. É um corpo de ideias, uma doutrina em que se parte de certas convicções básicas que têm a ver especificamente com a liberdade, a idéia de que a liberdade é o valor mais prezado desde o ponto de vista individual e social, e que a presença e operacionalidade da liberdade, entendida de maneira unívoca como totalidade no campo político, no campo econômico, no campo cultural, no campo individual, é o que mais contribui para afastar a violência, para estabelecer a coexistência social e trazer prosperidade. Essas são ideias muito elementares, que são o denominador comum dos liberais.
A partir daí, o que há são diferenças, enormes diferenças. Mas, basicamente, a partir de algumas convicções democráticas e algumas convicções de que a liberdade, tanto no campo político quanto no campo econômico, conjugados, traz progresso, desenvolvimento, civilização: não a sociedade perfeita; o liberalismo não parte da idéia de uma sociedade perfeita, posto que as sociedades são sempre imperfeitas, mas são aperfeiçoáveis, e que para uma sociedade se aperfeiçoar é necessário fundar a Carta da liberdade, permitir a crítica, a diversidade, dentro de uma coexistência só garantida pela lei.
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