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sábado, 17 de dezembro de 2022

War in Ukraine has decimated a once feared Russian brigade - Greg Miller, Mary Ilyushina, Catherine Belton, Isabelle Khurshudyan and Paul Sonne (The Washington Post)

‘Wiped out’: War in Ukraine has decimated a once feared Russian brigade

The bloody fate of the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade is emblematic of Vladimir Putin’s derailed invasion plans 

By Greg MillerMary IlyushinaCatherine BeltonIsabelle Khurshudyan and Paul Sonne

The Washington Post, December 16, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EST 

HELSINKI — Nuclear-armed submarines slip in and out of the frigid waters along the coast of Russia’s Kola Peninsula at the northern edge of Europe. Missiles capable of destroying cities are stored by the dozens in bunkers burrowed into the inland hills.

Since the Cold War, this Arctic arsenal has been protected by a combat unit considered one of Russia’s most formidable — the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade — until it sent its best fighters and weapons to Ukraine this year and was effectively destroyed.

The 200th was among the first units to plunge into Ukraine on Feb. 24, as part of a fearsome assault on the city of Kharkiv. By May, the unit was staggering back across the Russian border desperate to regroup, according to internal brigade documents reviewed by The Washington Post and to previously undisclosed details provided by Ukrainian and Western military and intelligence officials.

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A document detailing a mid-war inventory of its ranks shows that by late May, fewer than 900 soldiers were left in two battalion tactical groups that, according to Western officials, had departed the brigade’s garrison in Russia with more than 1,400. The brigade’s commander was badly wounded. And some of those still being counted as part of the unit were listed as hospitalized, missing or “refuseniks” unwilling to fight, according to the document, part of a trove of internal Russian military files obtained by Ukraine’s security services and provided to The Post.

The brigade’s collapse in part reflects the difficulty of its assignment in the war and the valiant performance of Ukraine’s military. But a closer examination of the 200th shows that its fate was also shaped by many of the same forces that derailed Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion plans — endemic corruption, strategic miscalculations and a Kremlin failure to grasp the true capabilities of its own military or those of its adversary.

After months of ceding territory and losing thousands of troops, Putin is now trying to salvage his grandiose aims with an entire force that resembles the 200th: badly depleted, significantly demoralized, and backfilled with inexperienced conscripts.

This reconstruction of the brigade’s decimation is based on the document trove, interviews with members of the unit and their families, as well as accounts from officers in Ukraine’s military units that faced the 200th in battle. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence or, in the case of Russian soldiers, to maintain their own security. The Russian Defense Ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

The record reveals a brigade in crisis, according to officials and experts who examined the documents at The Post’s request.

An internal personnel document for the 200th shows its depleted strength on May 28 after three months of war in Ukraine. Rows 2 and 3 show that the two battalion tactical groups counted 454 and 439 soldiers "present" in a roll call after their retreat across the Russian border. Western security officials said each had deployed to Ukraine with more than 700 soldiers. The document also shows that the brigade was waiting for 138 reinforcements. 

“They are barely at 60 percent strength, being forced to rely on reinforcements that aren’t near enough,” Pekka Toveri, former director of Finland’s defense intelligence service, said in an interview. “You have guys who are refusing to fight, guys who are missing. It all tells us that for Russia the war has gone terribly wrong.”

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The war continued to get worse for the 200th.

The unit’s commander sustained such severe head injuries in a strike that he was left vomiting, disoriented and unable to remember battlefield events, and would soon have to be hospitalized, the internal brigade documents show. Many of the unit’s most potent weapons, including mobile rocket launchers and tanks, were either destroyed or captured.

In the months since the May inventory, the brigade has sustained further losses in engagements including a July firefight in the northeastern village of Hrakove, and it was among the Russian forces routed in Ukraine’s September offensive to recapture large parts of the Kharkiv region.

All the while, the brigade was being degraded from within. The skilled troops and professional officers sent into battle at the start of the war with state-of-the-art T-80BVM tanks have given way to an assemblage of poorly trained conscripts pressed into service with paltry or outdated gear.

Some of the brigade’s own soldiers described its condition as dire.

“The unit is in a state of decay,” said a soldier now serving in the 200th after being drafted under mobilization orders that Putin issued in September. He and others were initially issued “painted helmets from 1941 and vests without plates,” he said in an interview with The Post this month. “They are not even training us. … They just tell you, ‘You are a shooter now. Here you go, here is a machine gun.’”

In a war that has been disastrous for much of Russia’s military, the dismemberment of the 200th stands out. It entered the conflict with better training, newer equipment and more experience — including prior combat missions in Ukraine — than most other units. Now, given the magnitude of its losses, one European military official said, it “cannot be considered a fighting force.”

‘There will be shooting’

In peacetime, the 200th is garrisoned at spartan bases that lie inside the Arctic Circle, less than 10 miles from Russia’s border with Norway. The location in the municipality of Pechenga, northwest of Murmansk, underscores its mission: to serve as a wedge between the NATO powers to the west and the Barents Sea bases of Russia’s Northern Fleet.

The ports, which served as a point of departure for the fictional submarine in “The Hunt for Red October,” have existential significance in Russian strategic doctrine. The Northern Fleet forms the core of Russia’s “second strike” nuclear capability, meaning that its subs are expected to maneuver into the Atlantic and unleash a final, cataclysmic barrage if the United States manages to knock out Russia’s land-based missile silos.

The 200th is part of an interlocking system of defenses for the fleet and its bases, one that also relies on their remote location, layers of perimeter security and additional units on the Kola Peninsula.

Despite the stakes of this Arctic assignment, the 200th has repeatedly been tapped by the Kremlin for priority missions. Officers were sent to Syria to help President Bashar al-Assad maintain his grip on power and, according to Ukrainian officials and a report by the investigative outlet Bellingcat, the unit was clandestinely involved in Russia’s 2014 attempt to seize territory in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.

In January of this year, two heavily armed battalion tactical groups from the 200th began boarding trains for the Ukraine border. Images online show flatbed rail cars carrying tanks across a snow-swept landscape and soldiers playing cards in packed passenger cabins.

The troops, like others in the invading force, were led to believe they were deploying to take part in drills, according to Ukrainian officials citing accounts of captured 200th soldiers. Only at 3 a.m. on Feb. 24 were they told, “There will be shooting,” an official said.

A convoy of about 100 brigade vehicles began streaming across the border that morning. Photos taken by civilians show one of the unit’s tanks being used to set up a roadblock on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv — an attempt to impose order that soon proved futile.

By day’s end, multiple units of the 200th had been ambushed or attacked, dozens of soldiers killed or wounded, and equipment including tanks and “Grad” mobile rocket launchers destroyed or abandoned on roadsides, according to Ukrainian and Western accounts.

The devastation was due in part to the 200th’s drawing one of the most difficult tasks of the invasion. “The front they were assigned proved to be well defended with very motivated Ukrainians,” a senior European intelligence official said.

The Ukrainian war plan was organized above all around protecting Kyiv, the country’s capital, but it also called for multiple armored units, including the 92nd Mechanized Brigade, to focus their firepower on defending Ukraine’s second-largest city — Kharkiv.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin said Sept. 7 that Russia had gained, not lost, from the conflict in Ukraine because it was embarking on a new sovereign path. 

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The punishment inflicted on the 200th in those early battles and dozens more that followed remain a point of martial pride for senior Ukrainian officers. “What’s there to know about them?” Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrsky, who later commanded the Kharkiv offensive, said recently in an interview when asked about the 200th. “They run away very well.”

The brigade was also hobbled by problems that plagued other Russian units. It was low on food and fuel after consuming or selling critical stores in the weeks leading up to the invasion, officials said. Putin’s decision to keep even senior advisers in the dark left commanders scant time to prepare troops, let alone coordinate attack plans with other units.

Stunned by Ukraine’s resistance, the 200th spent the ensuing weeks fending off further attacks while digging into defensive positions north of Kharkiv, officials said. It was during this stretch that the brigade commander, Col. Denis Kurilo, 44, was severely injured in a strike that Western officials said obliterated his vehicle. Ukrainian officials initially reported that the strike occurred in late March and that Kurilo had been killed. But internal brigade records refer to a “combat injury dated April 22” that ultimately required him to be hospitalized.

Only hints of the carnage were made public back at brigade headquarters. In mid-March, the governor of Russia’s Murmansk region, which encompasses the 200th’s garrison, announced online that three soldiers and one officer had been killed in Ukraine, calling them “real heroes.”

But these were only a small fraction of the true casualties.

The internal brigade records include a detailed count of surviving personnel in May after they had retreated across the Russian border into the Belgorod region. The authenticity of the documents was confirmed by Western security officials.

One page includes a table that lists 892 servicemen still “present” and attached to the two battalion tactical groups that had deployed from Pechenga in the run-up to the war. Officials with European security services that closely monitor the 200th said those two units had started out with a combined 1,400 to 1,600 soldiers.

One official described the damage that such losses would have done to the unit’s effectiveness and morale as “catastrophic.”

Among those remaining, the table lists 21 as hospitalized, six as missing and nine as “refuseniks.” It also shows that the brigade was awaiting 138 reinforcements, though it does not indicate their training or background.

Wording at the top of the document indicates that it was to be approved on May 28 by Kurilo, suggesting that he was still with the unit despite his recent injury. A medical file in the trove, however, indicates that he was suffering severe symptoms from a “craniocerebral injury,” including nausea, vomiting, memory loss and “short-term disorientation.” It says he left the unit on July 11 to be treated at Burdenko military hospital in Moscow and was released in late August. The medical file also says his duties were temporarily assigned to another officer.

Kurilo, whose passport and military résumé also appear in the trove, could not be reached for comment. On Wednesday, a woman identifying herself as his wife answered a number associated with Kurilo. She said he had not served with the 200th for about half a year, a period that would correspond with the start of his hospitalization. She said he has since been transferred to another military unit and is unreachable.

The avatar for Kurilo’s WhatsApp account is a “Z” sign used by Russian forces in Ukraine, along with Russian words meaning “for victory.”

For all the seeming exactitude of the brigade’s roll call record, certain categories are conspicuously missing. It does not say how many soldiers had initially been part of the two battalion tactical groups, and makes no mention of those wounded or killed to that point in combat.

Toveri, the former Finland intelligence chief, said the record appears to represent an effort by commanders to take stock of their force without accounting for the causes of its attrition.

“They just did new bookkeeping,” Toveri said, adding that doing so would be consistent with a Russian military culture seen as more calloused than its Western counterparts about casualties. “They had been at war for three months and don’t mention any killed in action,” Toveri said. “Let bygones be bygones.”

‘They just bled to death’

The losses created a two-front crisis for the 200th: It was scrambling to find reinforcements back in Murmansk, even as the broken battalions in Belgorod were being ordered to return to Ukraine.

In a sign of growing desperation, the brigade in June began forming what it called a “mixed volunteer battalion” including sailors pulled off Northern Fleet ships, logistics specialists from depots and others often coerced into action despite having little or no experience or training in ground combat, according to Western officials.

The battalion remnants in Belgorod tentatively crossed back into Ukraine in late spring and took positions hugging the Russia border.

Ukrainian military officials described the returning 200th force, though degraded, as more professional than the Russian-backed separatists they had previously faced outside Kharkiv.

The 200th soldiers were less prone to talking on open phone lines, brought far greater firepower and proved adept at targeting, said Taras Shevchenko, commander of an artillery and reconnaissance unit in Ukraine’s 127th Separate Territorial Defense Brigade.

In early June, he said, his unit encountered the 200th in the village of Velyki Prokhody, north of Kharkiv. The Ukrainians were caught off guard by a flurry of strikes, including one that tore off the third floor of a building being used as a base of operations, Shevchenko said, leaving him with a concussion.

After a series of inconclusive exchanges, Shevchenko said, he convinced Ukrainian artillery units to hold their fire for several days, hoping to create the impression they were low on ammunition as quadcopter drones were used to get a clearer fix on Russian positions.

Russia and Ukraine are fighting the first full-scale drone war

Amid the lull, surveillance images showed 200th troops letting down their guard.

“Nothing was attacking them, so they could safely sunbathe,” Shevchenko said. “They took outdoor showers. They were running around without body armor, without helmets.”

Ukrainian forces took advantage by unleashing a 40-minute barrage involving mortars, tanks and Soviet-era artillery pieces, then launched a follow-on attack the next day after nightfall.

“They didn’t know where to run,” Shevchenko said. After the village was liberated, he said, he spoke with residents who estimated that about 100 Russian troops had died as a result of the two-day engagement, though there are no official numbers. He said the strikes dismantled vehicles that could have evacuated the wounded. “The locals said that many died during the night,” Shevchenko said. “They just bled to death, because those who were injured — they couldn’t evacuate them.”

‘Unauthorized abandonment of military unit’

In that one sequence, the 200th had shown that it could be both lethally effective and fatally undisciplined. The erratic performance is characteristic of a unit that Western security officials describe as one of Russia’s higher-performing brigades but nevertheless plagued by systemic rot and dysfunction.

Attached to the elite Northern Fleet, 200th troops get special gear and training for Arctic conditions and are often first in line for Russia’s most advanced equipment. In 2017, the brigade was the first in Russia’s armed services to receive new T-80BVM tanks rolling off assembly lines.

And yet Westerners who ventured to Pechenga before Russia restricted travel describe the base as a grim garrison where officers neglected troops’ morale and soldiers could seem clueless about the brigade’s identity and mission.

Thomas Nilsen, editor of the Barents Observer — a Norwegian news site that closely follows the 200th — described an encounter several years ago with soldiers at a bar near the base who were oblivious to their proximity to NATO, until he pulled up a map on his phone to show them.

In 2020, three servicemen died — including one by suicide and another by choking on vomit — and several were injured in incidents that raised concerns about brigade conditions and safety, according to an investigation by the Russian news outlet Sever.Realii. One soldier was blinded and another reportedly lost a hand while training with a miniature drone armed with high-power explosives.

That same year, a warrant officer in the 200th posted videos on social media accusing superiors of neglect and corruption. One showed scenes of squalor in apartments reserved for officers, with rusted appliances, mold creeping up walls, and piles of trash stuffed into unoccupied units.

“This is how ensigns and officers of the Russian army live!” the warrant officer, Mikhail Balenko, said on the video, describing the compound with an expletive. “The brigade commander does not even come here. He doesn’t care how his subordinates live.”

In another video, Balenko accused commanders of stealing supplies, bribing military inspectors and selling fuel meant for brigade vehicles. Balenko did not respond to attempts to reach him for comment.

The war appears to have exacerbated these problems of morale and cohesion.

Dozens of soldiers in Pechenga refused to deploy during the initial months of the invasion, according to officials from Western security services. It’s unclear what happened to them.

Ukrainian commanders described battles in which 200th soldiers wouldn’t fight or defied orders. In mid-July, a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit captured audio of a Russian tank commander in Hrakove screaming at subordinates.

“Should I show you how to kill Ukrainians? I’ll get in the tank myself,” the commander shouted, shortly before the tank was destroyed by a Javelin missile, according to Oleksandr, a reconnaissance scout in Ukraine’s 92nd Mechanized Brigade, who spoke on the condition that his surname not be published to maintain his security.

By the end of that battle, dozens of Russian troops had been killed or wounded and 12 tanks had been destroyed, Oleksandr said, adding that additional intercepts indicated that numerous soldiers had at one point or another refused to use their weapons.

The brigade documents also hint at inner turmoil. One set of files lists criminal referrals made to Russian military prosecutors regarding four 200th soldiers — a senior lieutenant, two corporals and a private.

Two were accused of the “illegal sale of explosives,” and two others of “unauthorized abandonment of military unit.” The documents indicate that prosecutors declined to proceed with charges against the soldiers, though no reasons are cited. The soldiers’ surnames appear in the records, but attempts to reach them were unsuccessful.

Accurate casualty counts for the 200th remain elusive. No figures have been released by the brigade, and only a handful of soldier deaths have been acknowledged in public statements from the Murmansk government.

Still, there have been other clues to the war’s toll on military families in Murmansk. In late August, the regional legislature passed a law providing free meals to schoolchildren whose parents were serving in Ukraine or had been killed or wounded, and announced that 1,274 students qualified.

 

‘It will take years to rebuild’

The 200th’s involvement in the siege of Kharkiv concluded in September when it was routed near Kupiansk in the Ukrainian offensive, said Col. Pavlo Fedosenko, commander of Ukraine’s 92nd Mechanized Brigade, the unit that delivered the blow and has faced off against the 200th more than any other.

Afterward, only fragments of a single battalion were left, composed of a hodgepodge of soldiers that bore little resemblance to the skilled units that had set out for Ukraine seven months earlier, Fedosenko said.

Most of the unit’s officers had been killed or injured, Fedosenko said, and about 70 percent of its equipment — including about 32 tanks and 100 vehicles — had been destroyed or captured.

“Nothing of that brigade is left,” he said in a recent interview with The Post. “It’s completely wiped out.”

Western security officials provided similar assessments. Because so many of its contract soldiers and senior members of its officer cadre were lost, “it will take years to rebuild the 200th,” said a senior European intelligence official.

On Sept. 17, Kurilo left command of the brigade to become deputy chief of another motor rifle division, according to a copy of an order by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that was in the document trove.

Remnants of the 200th later surfaced in the Luhansk region, where intercepted communications provided to The Post by a Ukrainian military official showed Russian officers raging about insubordination. In one exchange, a regimental commander berates a subordinate over soldiers abandoning their positions.

“I am f-----g tired after one and a half months of these people,” the commander said. He goes on to describe platoons melting away and his efforts to drag soldiers back into battle. In one case, “there were 30 people leaving their positions, and now it is f-----g over 60, 75, maybe the entire platoon,” he said. After listing similar problems in other units, he said, “What the f--- are you doing? Are you going to assemble the battalion or not?”

At least 20 of the 200th’s troops were wounded in recent skirmishes in Luhansk, the Ukrainian intelligence official said. A fact sheet provided by the official lists the wounded soldiers’ names and birth dates; their ages range from the low 20s to the early 50s.

 

Contacted by The Post, one of those soldiers acknowledged that he was at home recuperating, but declined to discuss his deployment or injuries in detail. He described himself as “a civilian person. I have a family, kids. I never even had a thought about needing to go fight” before being swept up by Putin’s mobilization.

“When I was in the hospital, there were guys from Moscow, just simple guys, some worked in car repairs or some other places,” he said. “They were just pulled out of their civilian lives and sent to ‘take villages.’” Many were reassured that “we are going to be in the rear, not on the front line,” he said. “But it turned out to be the opposite.”

The soldier, who could face prison if caught speaking about the war, was one of a tattered group of about 500 conscripts who were sent to Ukraine in October as part of yet another attempt to replenish the 200th there, according to Western security officials. The conscripts’ departure from the Kola Peninsula capped a remarkable hollowing out of a unit that is supposed to defend Russia’s border with Norway, a NATO country, and with Finland, now seeking to join the alliance.

In August and September, Russia moved a squadron of bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons to an air base near Finland, according to satellite images and a report in the Israeli press. Western officials said they interpreted that as a sign Russia is likely to rely more than ever on nuclear deterrence in the Kola Peninsula given the reduced state of the 200th and other units.

“In the Murmansk region we now have our borders bare,” the wounded soldier said. “They are all empty now. No one is left there.”

Miller reported from Helsinki, Oslo and London; Ilyushina from Riga, Latvia; Belton from London; Khurshudyan from Kharkiv and Kyiv; and Sonne from Washington. Serhiy Morgunov in Kyiv contributed to this report.

 

 

Lima Barreto torceria pela Argentina? - Maria Salete Magnoni (Outras Palavras)

 

Lima Barreto torceria pela Argentina?

Parte da torcida argentina chama nossos jogadores de macaquitos, ofensa racista que remonta a 1920 – e fator apontado para sempre agourar los hermanos. Mas o escritor negro desconstrói o insulto – e ajuda a destravar o grito: vai Argentina!

Imagem: Arte Revista CULT

Assim que ficou definido que as seleções da Argentina e França disputarão a final da Copa do Mundo 2022, no próximo domingo, teve início, principalmente nas redes sociais, um acalorado debate sobre para qual país os brasileiros devem torcer. Arquirrivais no futebol torcedores brasileiros e argentinos não economizam nas ofensas e insultos mútuos, por isso muitos entre nós vão torcer pela França. Todavia há os que argumentam que torcer pelo país vizinho, nosso parceiro comercial e aliado político, é um gesto de reconhecimento da necessária integração sul-americana, e também de pertencimento à América Latina.

Do outro lado, além da dor de cotovelo de ver a Argentina novamente em uma final de Copa do Mundo, conquista que o Brasil não vive há 20 anos, uma das alegações para que não torçamos pela vitória do time argentino é de que eles são racistas e nos chamam de macaquitos. Sem minorar o comportamento de parte da torcida argentina, temos que nos lembrar que o racismo no futebol, infelizmente, ainda é uma constante, tanto no mundo, como no Brasil e que “incidentes de discriminação racial ainda são comuns nos estádios, assim como restrita presença de negros fora das quatro linhas, nos cargos de treinadores ou nas direções dos principais clubes do Brasil.”[1]

.

O insulto, do qual os brasileiros se ressentem, e com razão, teve origem a partir de uma charge, que representava os nossos jogadores como macacos, publicada em 1920, pelo jornal sensacionalista argentino La crítica, quando o time brasileiro voltando do 4º Campeonato sul-americano de futebol, realizado no Chile, passou pela Argentina para jogar um amistoso com a sua seleção. Os ecos do incidente se fizeram sentir em 1921, pois o torneio que daria origem à Copa América seria realizado no país vizinho; o jornal carioca Correio da Manhã publicou, em setembro daquele ano, que a Confederação Brasileira de Desportos (CBD) estaria discutindo não enviar jogadores negros ao certame. O impasse foi levado ao então presidente da República, Epitácio Pessoa, que decidiu pela exclusão dos atletas negros, o que fez com que craques como Arthur Friendenreich que foi o autor do gol que deu o primeiro título internacional à seleção brasileira, em 1919, ao derrotar o Uruguai no 3º Campeonato sul-americano de futebol, ficasse de fora.

Charge no jornal argentino La Crítica, em 1920.

O escritor Lima Barreto, arguto observador do cotidiano político e social do Brasil do seu tempo, e que muito combateu o racismo, do qual também era alvo, comentou de maneira ácida e irônica o veto de Epitácio Pessoa na crônica Bendito footbal, publicada na Revista Careta em 01/10/1921:

“Foi sua resolução de que gente tão ordinária e comprometedora não deveria figurar nas exportáveis turmas de jogadores; lá fora, acrescentou, não se precisava saber que tínhamos no Brasil semelhante esterco humano […]. A providência, conquanto perspicazmente eugênica e científica, traz no seu bojo ofensa a uma fração muito importante, quase a metade, da população do Brasil […]. P.S – A nossa vingança é que os argentinos não distinguem, em nós, as cores; todos nós, para eles, somos macaquitos.”

Entretanto outra foi sua atitude ao tomar conhecimento, em 1920, da charge publicada no  jornal La crítica, utilizando-se do recurso do humor escreveu a crônica Macaquitos, que pode ser lida como uma refinada provocação aos discursos de superioridade racial vigentes à época, pois ao considerar o macaco, devido à sua inteligência e esperteza, superior aos demais animais, descontruiu a intenção desumanizadora do periódico argentino, combateu a discriminação racial, imprimiu leveza a um tema denso e de quebra, ainda hoje, nos faz rir. Que seja esse o espírito a presidir as torcidas no domingo. E da parte da autora deste breve comentário: #VamosArgentina!

Macaquitos, por Lima Barreto

Um jornal ou semanário de Buenos Aires, quando uma équipe brasileira de football, de volta do Chile, onde fora disputar um campeonato internacional, por lá passou, pintou-a como macacos. A cousa passou desapercebida, devido ao atordoamento das festas do Rei Alberto; mas, se assim não fosse, estou certo de que haveria irritação em todos os ânimos.

Precisamos nos convencer de que não há nenhum insulto em chamar-nos de macacos. O macaco, segundo os zoologistas, é um dos mais adiantados exemplares da série animal; e há mesmo competências que o fazem, senão pai, pelo menos primo do homem. Tão digno “totem” não nos pode causar vergonha. A França, isto é, os franceses são tratados de galos e eles não se zangam com isto; ao contrário: o galo gaulês, o chantecler, é motivo de orgulho para eles.

Entretanto, quão longe está o galo, na escala zoológica, do macaco! Nem mamífero é! Quase todas as nações, segundo lendas e tradições, têm parentesco ou se emblemam com animais. Os russos nunca se zangaram por chamá-los de ursos brancos; e o urso não é um animal tão inteligente e ladino como o macaco. Vários países, como a Prússia e a Áustria, põem nas suas bandeiras águias; entretanto, a águia, desprezando a acepção pejorativa que tomou entre nós, não é lá animal muito simpático.

A Inglaterra tem como insígnias animais o leopardo e o unicórnio. Digam-me agora os senhores: o leopardo é um animal muito digno? A Bélgica tem leões ou leão nas suas armas; entretanto, o leão é um animal sem préstimo e carniceiro. O macaco – é verdade – não tem préstimo; mas é frugívoro, inteligente e parente próximo do homem. Não vejo motivos para zanga, nessa história dos argentinos chamar-nos de macacos, tanto mais que, nas nossas histórias populares, nós demonstramos muita simpatia por esse endiabrado animal.

Crônica publicada na revista Careta, em 23/10/1920.  Disponível em: http://www.letras.ufmg.br/literafro/autores/11-textos-dos-autores/789-lima-barreto-macaquitos. Acesso em: 15 dez.2022.


[1] CARVALHO, Marcelo Medeiros. O negro no futebol Brasileiro: inserção e racismo. Disponível em: http://movimentoar.com.br/o-negro-no-futebol-brasileiro-insercao-e-racismo/. Acesso em: 15.dez.2022.

Russia-Ukraine war Briefing, December 16, 2022 - The New York Times

 Carole Landry, New York Times, December 16, 2022

Welcome to the Russia-Ukraine War Briefing, your guide to the latest news and analysis about the conflict.

  • Russia launched dozens of missiles at Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, knocking out heating systems as temperatures dropped well below freezing.
  • Ukraine’s defense minister, Oleksii Reznikov, told The Guardian that Russia was preparing a major new offensive, possibly in February. 
  • The head of Ukraine’s armed forces, General Valery Zaluzhny, told The Economist that the offensive could come as early as January. “The Russians are preparing some 200,000 fresh troops,” Zaluzhny said. “I have no doubt they will have another go at Kyiv.”
  • The U.S. plans to train one Ukrainian battalion per month — about 600 to 800 troops — at a base in Germany beginning early next year
  • Get the latest updates here.
The city of Bakhmut and outlying areas in eastern Ukraine continue to come under attack from Russia.Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

2022: The year of Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 was a seismic event. The war deeply unsettled security in Europe and around the world, with ricocheting effects on energy, food and the global economy. Nearly 10 months on, the loss of lives has been staggering on the battlefield and the suffering of millions of Ukrainian civilians is still growing. 

For our last newsletter of the year, I reached out to Andrew Kramer, our Kyiv bureau chief, to get his insights on the state of the war and what we might expect in 2023. 

Andrew, let’s talk about the battlefield. Some analysts expect a winter pause in the fighting. Are the front lines stabilizing? 

This is a matter of debate. You’ll hear different commentary from Ukrainian officials and different signaling from the Russians as well. 

Broadly, there’s a crescent-shaped front in southeastern Ukraine from the Dnipro River up to the Luhansk region. (The map below shows the front line as of Nov. 13 after Ukrainian troops reclaimed the city of Kherson.)

Sources: Institute for the Study of War with American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project. Note: Areas controlled by Russia and reclaimed by Ukraine are as of Nov. 13.

Along most of this area, which is fortified trench lines through fields, the Ukrainians are on the offensive: They are pushing forward or threatening to push forward. In one pocket in the east, around the city of Bakhmut, it’s the reverse: The Russians are pressing very hard to capture this city. 

A Ukrainian military commander recently said that once the ground freezes, there will be more opportunities for Ukraine to press a counteroffensive. Ukrainian officials say there will be no pause, they will press this offensive right through the 90 or so days of freezing weather and it’s their intention to continue to attack and not allow Russia time to regroup and rearm. Some analysts say that may be the case, but the winter weather is harder in terms of logistics, and whatever might be said, there will be a slowdown, if not a pause. 

Where do you see the Ukrainians advancing to next?

If there’s an offensive, one possibility would be an advance over the open steppe land to the south of the city of Zaporizhzhia toward the city of Melitopol. There are logistics routes going through Melitopol that are important to the Russians: roads, railroads. If the Ukrainians could seize the city, they could effectively cut the south in half and threaten attacks on supply lines all the way down to Crimea. 

Another option would be a continuation of the September counteroffensive in the northeast, heading toward the ruins of the cities of Lysychansk and Sievierodonetsk, which were captured by the Russians in artillery battles over the summer. There’s very little left of these cities, but it would be symbolically important for Ukraine to recapture them. 

Is there any indication that there’s diplomacy at work, that there will be a shift away from the battleground to negotiations on a peace deal?

The Ukrainians say they definitely don’t want a negotiated settlement that would leave their territory under Russian occupation. Zelensky sees this as the Ukrainian war that will end Ukrainian wars. He wants to liberate the entire territory rather than a half measure that would allow Russia to rearm and regroup and attack again. There have been some signs of pressure from the United States and the Europeans nations to open negotiations. This came up after a visit by Jake Sullivan to Kyiv. From the Russian side, they would like to negotiate a cease-fire to give their army time to reconstitute.

What has life in Kyiv been like lately with the blackouts, missiles strikes, air raid sirens and winter cold?

We just had an air raid siren today. It’s always a harrowing, concerning moment when there are reports that the air raid siren was not a false alarm and that there are missiles inbound for Kyiv, although they are usually aimed at energy infrastructure on the outskirts. 

Every strike has chipped away at Ukraine’s capacity to produce power. Today, colleagues and I were working in the bureau and the electricity went out. So you light candles, turn on battery lights, power up the internet with a backup power source and continue working. 

What’s the impact on Ukrainians? Is it wearing them down?

Bottled water handed out in Mykolaiv in November. Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times

I don’t think so. I think that it is certainly making a lot of people very angry, but people are coping. I’ve been also in cities that have had infrastructure problems that lasted months, like Mykolaiv in the south, where water had been out for six or more months. The most common response if you ask people is that they feel very angry at Russia for causing these problems. There is that defiance. There’s also the sense of coping with the situation, sometimes with humor and with a little bit of innovation. 

There are two wars really, now. There is the war on the front line and the war in the sky in the arena of long-range missiles and Russia’s strategy of destroying infrastructure to demoralize Ukrainian society. On the front lines in the battlefields, Ukraine is winning. In this other contest, it’s still an open question how much damage Russia can do over time. 

What are some of the difficulties that you face in reporting about this war?

It’s an amazing and horrible story, all in one, because there are victims, there are heroes, there are incredibly sad stories but then hopeful ones. From my recent reporting experience when the Ukrainians went into Kherson, this was a largely bloodless reclaiming of the city, even though the battles leading up to it were quite brutal. People were celebrating and several weeks later there was disappointment because electricity hadn’t returned and conditions were still very harsh. Horrendous evidence of atrocities — torture and executions — began to emerge. The challenges are seeing through the fog of war along this long frontline and very complicated and intense combat between two industrialized countries. 

How much longer do you think this war will last?

It’s hard to predict. It couldn’t continue at this intensity for many, many months more. There is an anticipation that it will go to the spring and a spring counteroffensive. But by the one-year anniversary, it seems all but certain that the war will be continuing. 


sexta-feira, 16 de dezembro de 2022

IV Congresso Internacional da Associação de Brasilianistas na Europa (ABRE) - 5 a 8 de setembro de 2023 no Instituto Universitário de Lisboa

 Associação de Brasilianistas na Europa (ABRE) convida para a apresentação de propostas para seu IV Congresso Internacional que ocorrerá de 5 a 8 de setembro de 2023 no ICS - Instituto de Ciências Sociais e no Iscte - Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal.  


A Europa tem uma forte tradição em estudos brasileiros, assim como em pesquisas científicas ou colaborações profissionais que estão de alguma forma conectadas com o Brasil. A ABRE tem como objetivo oferecer um fórum transdisciplinar para o intercâmbio, a difusão e a comunicação entre estudantes e profissionais que atuam na Europa, interessados pelo Brasil. Os congressos que organiza a cada 2 anos procuram juntar pessoas que realizam pesquisas ou algum outro tipo de colaboração relacionada com o Brasil, não se limitando a pesquisadores europeus e vinculados a instituições europeias (http://abre.eu/estatutos/).

O próximo congresso decorrerá ente 5 e 8 de setembro de 2023 em Lisboa, no ICS - Instituto de Ciências Sociais e no ISCTE- Instituto Universitário de Lisboa.

O Congresso contará com painéis acadêmicos, palestrantes convidados e sessões plenárias.

Calendário 

As submissões podem ser feitas até 20 de janeiro de 2023.

As confirmações de aceite serão enviadas até 20 de fevereiro de 2023.

Regras para a submissão de propostas:

ABRE aceita propostas de comunicações individuais e de painéis.

As propostas devem conter:

Título do Painel

Nome dos Organizadores/as e endereço eletrônico

Resumo do painel com 300 palavras

Nome das/dos participantes com o título e resumo da comunicação (250 palavras) 

Em caso de submissão individual deve conter título e resumo da comunicação (250 palavras), o nome das/os autoras/es e co-autoras/es, e endereço eletrônico 

Painéis

Cada pessoa pode submeter uma única proposta e participar apenas em um painel, seja como autor ou co-autor.

Cada painel proposto deverá ser composto por

um mínimo de 3 e um máximo de 5 participantes;

1 responsável/moderador, que também pode apresentar uma comunicação;

participantes de ao menos 3 países diferentes, sendo 2 europeus.

As propostas de painéis completos (5 participantes) serão privilegiadas.

Comunicações Individuais

As propostas de comunicação individual serão incluídas em painéis com temáticas semelhantes e que tenham menos de 5 membros ou reunidas em painéis que incluam várias temáticas. 

O congresso decorrerá preferencialmente de forma presencial embora também aceite painéis/sessões exclusivamente online. Não haverá sessões híbridas e na altura da submissão da proposta deverá ser indicado se a sessão será presencial ou online. Serão privilegiados os painéis presenciais.

Todos os participantes de um painel devem aderir à ABRE antes da submissão da proposta aqui https://www.conftool.pro/abre2023. 

Endereço eletrônico do Congresso: secretariadoabre2023@gmail.com  

As propostas podem ser feitas online pelo site: https://www.conftool.pro/abre2023

Informações atualizadas serão publicadas no site http://abre.eu/congressos/abre-iv/

Vos esperamos em Lisboa em setembro de 2023! 

A Bloomberg sobre a guerra na Ucrânia: o poder da artilharia

 

Russia continues to wreak havoc on Ukraine as temperatures there hover below freezing, with missile strikes today further damaging energy infrastructure and making it harder for people to access power, heating and water.

As the war heads toward its 11th month, it’s also prompting rapid reassessments elsewhere about the way militaries are funded and the equipment they have now and will need in future.

Tony Capaccio and Courtney McBride report how the Pentagon is a case in point. For decades it has struggled to make procurement more agile, able to respond to changing threats and demands. It has also sought to get weapons-makers to commit to longer-term contracts.

Key reading:

The US is among the allies that have sent masses of weaponry to Ukraine — from missile-defense systems to artillery shells — and is staring at dwindling stockpiles with anxiety. Countries in Europe face a similar dilemma: how to keep supplying Ukraine when they are running low on weapons.

That’s especially the case because the conflict has shown that 21st century wars are not just about very high-tech equipment.

Yes, Russian missiles are having an impact and testing Ukraine’s defenses, with the US gearing up potentially to send Patriot batteries to Kyiv. But one of the most efficient weapons so far has been combining old-fashioned artillery with a drone for pinpoint accuracy.

As Marc Champion wrote this week, there has been a heavy use of artillery by both sides — the Royal United Services Institute puts it in excess of 24,000 shells fired per day, at times much more. Ukraine is burning through 100,000 shells per month. The US produces far less than that right now.

The head of Estonia’s defense intelligence center estimates Russia still has about 10 million artillery shells in stock.

That all points to the war dragging on for a while. In the end, who has the advantage in the spring may come down to who has the greater arsenal by then to hand.