Construindo o Apartheid no Brasil e deformando a História...

Raramente se tem a oportunidade de constatar uma violação flagrante da verdade histórica tão patente, tão descarada, tão mentirosa quanto a que segue abaixo, nesse texto que me dou ao cuidado de transcrever por inteiro, exemplificativo de como se pode deformar a História de maneira tão vil como poucas vezes se viu nos últimos anos de construção do racismo negro no Brasil.
O texto não é apenas anacrônico, no sentido mais completo da palavra, ao pretender ver em Zumbi -- um personagem envolvido em controvérsias suficientes para desacreditar essa história idílica e totalmente falsa que pretendem criar -- um representante do pensamento e democrático e socialista. Ele é também um exemplo do tipo de mistificação da verdade que estão construindo nessas ONGs de Governo (pois é isso o que são) que se encarregaram de deformar a História e de construir o Apartheid racial no Brasil.
De fato, não se consegue imaginar tamanha mistificação da realidade, apenas comparável ao trabalho conduzido no tristemente famoso "Ministério da Verdade" do justificadamente famoso livro de George Orwell, 1984, um monumento da inteligência sincera, individual, por um socialista democrático, em defesa da verdadeira verdade, se ouso dizer, em face da mentira oficial, difundida coletivamente, pelo aparelho do Estado. Exatamente como ocorre neste caso que segue abaixo, um texto pateticamente orwelliano (pelas más razões, claro).
Lamento que material indecoroso como este esteja sendo divulgado neste meu blog, em todo caso voltado para as ideias, mesmo as más, que merecem nosso repúdio e a lata de lixo da História.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Zumbi, Comandante Guerreiro da Democracia

Oscar Henrique Cardoso (*)

Me chamou a atenção ao verificar a postagem de um internauta falando sobre o que ele sabia ou pensava sobre Zumbi dos Palmares. A referência feita por este brasileiro, usuário da Internet, me fez pensar em um detalhe que pode ainda mais reforçar a importância de Zumbi dos Palmares na construção da história democrática brasileira. O fato citado por ele fez referência a Zumbi como o primeiro "líder socialista de fato que o Brasil já conheceu".

Zumbi dos Palmares não só foi o comandante guerreiro, o líder da resistência dos quilombolas de Palmares. Zumbi dos Palmares implantou na Serra da Barriga um modelo social o qual todos nós perseguimos: um modelo social que proporciona a todos os cidadãos a divisão compartilhada da produção e das riquezas, o debate democrático sobre os destinos de uma comunidade e também a auto-estima dos seus moradores. No caso que falo, os quilombolas que se abrigavam em Palmares tinham orgulho de lutar por um ideal de liberdade, contra a escravidão e o domínio imperialista da coroa portuguesa.

Palmares não está somente viva nos livros históricos e também viva na Serra da Barriga, a qual inúmeros peregrinos e militantes do Movimento Negro subiram no último dia 20 de Novembro. Zumbi foi o líder de uma revolução social a qual todos nós sonhamos. Uma revolução que não queremos que se faça pelas armas, mas sim pela construção de um processo cidadão, o qual dê aos negros brasileiros e aos mestiços, o direito de nascer, crescer, viver e morrer em um país digno. Digno por cada um de nós ver resultados concretos e efetivos nos sistemas públicos de saúde, educação, moradia e trabalho e renda.

A nação que Zumbi construiu em Palmares foi em minha opinião, sem dúvida, um modelo de sociedade democrática e igual. Fugitivos das senzalas encontravam em Palmares um espaço para desenvolver sua formação cidadã. Uma construção democrática coletiva, onde o direito de ser e de viver era plenamente respeitado. Uma antítese aos tempos de escravidão.

O gosto de ver nas ruas deste país a celebração da população negra em razão ao dia 20 de Novembro me faz promover a seguinte leitura. Nós negros queremos ver a sociedade que Zumbi constituiu no Quilombo de Palmares implantada. Nossa população, jovem ou mais velha, ainda deseja assistir a uma partilha de bens iguais dentro de nossa sociedade. Partilhar bens se reflete em dar acesso a negros, pardos e mestiços uma educação de qualidade, a um serviço de saúde que contemple as nossas especificidades raciais e a um pleno desenvolvimento de trabalho e renda para os negros que vivem no campo e nas grandes cidades.

Nosso herói Zumbi dos Palmares não foi só um herói abolicionista. Foi também o herói de toda uma parcela da nação brasileira que não concordava com a escravidão imposta pela coroa portuguesa. O sonho de liberdade que Zumbi implantou na Serra da Barriga era também o sonho de inúmeros abolicionistas, que desfilavam em meio à aristocracia o desejo de ver o fim da chibata. Hoje os negros brasileiros esperam derrubar uma versão moderna da chibata. A versão da invisibilidade.

A luta é árdua, mas estamos conseguindo começar a nos organizar para deixar para as novas gerações os ideais de igualdade e democracia que foram perseguidos por Zumbi dos Palmares. Ele foi um herói de verdade. Ele fez no seu quilombo o Brasil que todos nós sonhamos. Verdadeiramente Zumbi foi o nosso herói, pois deu sua vida pela igualdade racial e social em um Brasil Colônia que era explorado e usurpado de suas riquezas.

Ao voltar a falar sobre este mail que declarava Zumbi como o primeiro líder socialista já conhecido de fato pelo Brasil, me faz acreditar que a importância de Zumbi em nossa história foi muito maior do que simplesmente lembrar dele como mártir. Zumbi foi construtor, mesmo que por um curto espaço de tempo, de um Brasil para o futuro. Um país onde todos sonhamos que um dia existirá. Nosso compromisso é trabalhar para que a imagem de Zumbi dos Palmares não fique configurada apenas nos livros didáticos como mais um herói. Este negro guerreiro deve sim ser lembrado como um cidadão pleno, um empreendedor, construtor de um quilombo que serviu não só de resistência à escravidão. Palmares foi sim o nosso primeiro modelo e exemplo de sociedade democrática, onde todos os fugitivos e não fugitivos exerciam a plenitude da democracia.

(*) Oscar Henrique Cardoso, natural de Porto Alegre/RS é jornalista, radialista e atual assessor de Comunicação Social da Fundação Cultural Palmares/Ministério da Cultura, em Brasília/DF. È responsável pela execução de projetos em Comunicação Social junto ao Governo Federal, voltados para a cultura e a história afro-brasileira. Edita o Portal da FCP/MinC e o blog A CASA DO OSCAR.

Embaixadas: enquanto alguns abrem, outros fecham...

Não se pode dizer que o Reino Unido careça de diplomacia. Ao contrário, se trata de uma das mais antigas diplomacias do mundo moderno, aliás iniciada em plena Idade Média, com Portugal, outro Estado precoce no tratamento de questões diplomáticas.
Pois por razões de economia, o Reino Unido está fechando embaixadas e reduzindo o envio de pessoal a partir da capital, como revela a reportagem abaixo.
O Reino Unido não é um país tão rico quanto o Brasil, que está abrindo embaixadas em ritmo acelerado, nas mais diversas capitais do mundo, e algumas que talvez nem pertençam a este mundo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Reino Unido põe embaixadas à venda
George Parker and Alex Barker | Financial Times
Valor Econômico, 19/11/2010 – p. A11


Novos rumos : Diplomacia britânica vai adotar "mentalidade comercial" e investir em "contratações locais"

O Ministério de Relações Exteriores do Reino Unido deverá demitir 1 em cada 10 de seus funcionários, vender prédios onde estão embaixadas e intensificar "contratações locais" mais baratas para tornar-se um departamento mais enxuto, centrado em desenvolvimento comercial.
Simon Fraser, o funcionário de carreira de cargo mais alto na hierarquia no ministério, qualifica o corte 10% em seu orçamento como uma "medida dura, porém boa", e diz que os recursos devem ser empregados para atender à prioridade do governo: promover o crescimento. Em entrevista ao "FT", Fraser disse desejar que sua equipe desenvolva uma "mentalidade comercial" e insistiu que o novo foco em comércio e investimento estrangeiro "não é uma moda passageira". O secretário permanente, uma espécie de "vice-chanceler" britânico, disse que os diplomatas têm as habilidades necessárias para enfrentar o novo desafio e minimizando as sugestões de que o país esteja prestes a nomear uma série de empresários para altos cargos em embaixadas.
A nomeação de Fraser para "primeiro mandarim", neste ano, foi um sinal claro de David Cameron, o primeiro-ministro, e de William Hague, o ministro de Relações Exteriores, de que cabe à Chancelaria liderar a iniciativa britânica de crescimento nas exportações.
Sua carreira recente esteve imersa em questões comerciais. Fraser comandou o escritório de Peter Mandelson no período em que o colega trabalhista foi comissário de Comércio da União Europeia. Ele foi então trazido de volta a Londres como secretário permanente no Departamento de Economia.
Fraser disse que a política externa exige "um equilíbrio a ser atingido" e que a negociação de acordos comerciais não significa que o país deva ignorar outras prioridades, como os direitos humanos.
O secretário quer manter a presença mundial do Reino Unido com sua rede de missões no exterior - possivelmente expandindo em mercados em crescimento como Brasil, China e Indonésia -, mas disse que ganhos de eficiência são necessários. "Nós temos uma estratégia que produzirá outros 10% de redução "natural" - por exemplo, aposentadorias e demissões voluntárias - na força de trabalho ao longo dos próximos três ou quatro anos", disse ele.
Poderá haver mais contratação local para o preenchimento de postos de trabalho, em vez do envio mais oneroso de diplomatas britânicos ao exterior. Fraser também está buscando "modernizar" os imóveis diplomáticos, mas disse que "os edifícios emblemáticos", como a espetacular embaixada em Paris, serão mantidos.
Segundo ele, os dois premiês anteriores, Gordon Brown e Tony Blair, ambos trabalhistas, centralizaram a condução da política externa. E que agora os diplomatas têm uma chance, com o conservador Cameron, para mostrar sua liderança na política externa.
Especulou-se muito este ano que Cameron queria ver figuras do mundo empresarial alçados a embaixadores. Fraser diz que algumas vagas para cargos devem ser divulgadas amplamente, mas que os diplomatas são preparados para defender as empresas britânicas. "É necessária uma série de habilidades para ser um diplomata num posição importante", disse. "É importante não subestimar as competências profissionais dos diplomatas de carreira."

OTAN: novo conceito estrategico aprovado

A OTAN, num dos mais importantes encontros de cúpula realizados desde o final da Guerra Fria, acaba de aprovar um novo conceito estratégico, cuja íntegra segue abaixo, retirada do site oficial da organização, criada em 1949.

NATO website, 19 Nov. 2010

Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon

Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

• It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
• It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
• It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
• It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
• It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
• It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO’s essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

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Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.
2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.
3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.
4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:
   1. Collective defence. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
   2. Crisis management. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.
   3. Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO’s standards.
5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.
6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.
8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.
9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world’s most volatile regions.
10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.
11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.
12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.
13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.
14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.
15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.
17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:
    • maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
    • maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
    • develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
    • carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
    • ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
    • develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
    • further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
    • develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
    • enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
    • develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
    • ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;
    • sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
    • continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.
21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.
22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.
23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.
24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.
25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:
    • enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;
    • further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
    • form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
    • enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
    • develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
    • identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
    • broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:
    • We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
    • With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.
    • In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.
    • We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.
    • We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.
    • National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

Open Door

27. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.
    • The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Partnerships

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks.
29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO’s operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.
30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:
• We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.
• We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.
• We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
• We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.
31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:
• enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
• more regular political consultation; and
• enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.
32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:
• fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
• enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
• broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
• cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.
33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.
34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:
• enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
• use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.
35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:
    • enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
    • continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
    • facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
    • deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
    • develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.
37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:
    • maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO’s usability targets;
    • ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
    • develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
    • preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
    • engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe’s most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.

Last updated: 19-Nov-2010 20:51

From the event

• 19-20 Nov 2010 - Summit Meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government - Lisbon, Portugal

Venezuela: em direcao da penuria do seculo 21...

A Venezuela atual constitui, provavelmente, o ÚNICO país no mundo que encontra-se ativamente construindo o socialismo, ou pelo menos o que passar por ser socialismo, no caso, uma simples estatização de propriedades, fábricas, companhias, negócios "capitalistas" em geral.
De fato é o  unico, pois os dois outros únicos exemplos de economia socialista ainda existentes -- Cuba e Coréia do Norte -- não parecem estar progredindo na vida da estatização do setor produtivo, da distribuição, do setor financeiro, enfim, de qualquer grande setor econômico da vida nacional, como parece estar ocorrendo na Venezuela.
A Coréia do Norte é apenas uma nação miserável, um Estado pária, que sobrevive apenas graças às "bondades" da China, mas que já fez pelo menos uma tentativa de criar zonas econômicas especiais para abrigar investimentos industriais sul-coreanos, destinados exclusivamente à exportação, como fez a China, no início de sua longa marcha de volta ao capitalismo.
Quanto a Cuba, bem, parece incrível que no momento em que eles estão começando a liberalizar o regime econômico da ilha, permitir negócios privados -- inclusive despedindo meio milhão, eu disse MEIO MILHÃO de empregados estatais -- estivessem ao mesmo tempo formulando recomendações de reforço do socialismo aos venezuelanos. Se o fizeram são hipócritas, ou no mínimo desonesto, pois devem saber que o regime socialista é um impasse total, que só pode levar a mais penúria, mais desabastecimento, mais pobreza geral para a população.
Outros exemplos? Não existem: a China é o país que mais rapidamente se engaja no modo capitalista de produção, seguida pelo Vietnã e outros infelizes do passado socialista. Para eles, tudo o que for capitalista é bom, por definição.
O caso da Venezuela é de fato único na história da humanidade, depois de tudo o que se sabe dos desastres humanos incomensuráveis que representou o socialismo num século 20 que acumulou fracasso sobre fracasso, não apenas em termos econômicos, mas sobretudo nos planos sociais e político. Isso sem falar nas vítimas, reais, do socialismo.
O professor Chávez não vê tudo isso? Seus conselheiros cubanos não o alertam para o desastre, inevitável? Só podemos nos entristecer com a infelicidade previsível sendo criada para o povo venezuelano. Eles certamente não merecem esse desastre, mas é o que terão...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Venezuela's economy

Towards state socialism

A wave of nationalisation promises scarcity and decline

The Economist, Nov 18th 2010 | Caracas

OWNERS of property, large or small, sleep uneasily in Venezuela these days. After the opposition narrowly won a majority of the vote in a legislative election in September, Hugo Chávez, the country’s leftist president, has been on a nationalisation spree, seizing everything from steel companies and bottle makers to housing schemes. When workers have protested, he has deployed the national guard against them. The government has justified the confiscations by saying that it was breaking up monopolies or stopping breaches of labour or environmental rules. But the aim appears to be to move decisively against what Mr Chávez calls “the oligarchy” before the new parliament, which has a sizeable opposition minority, comes into session in January.
On October 25th the Venezuelan subsidiary of Owens-Illinois, an American glass maker, became the 200th business nationalised so far this year. As usual, managers and workers learned of their fate during a live television broadcast by the president. He accused the company of exploiting its workers and laying waste to forests. But the expropriation decree, published the next day, made no mention of these alleged crimes, accusing the company instead of exploiting its dominant market position.
By the government’s own reckoning, it has confiscated some 3m hectares (7.4m acres) of farmland, and plans to seize another 450,000 hectares next year. Although the 1999 constitution guarantees property rights, successive changes to the land law have given the government the right to seize any farm it takes a fancy to, in most cases with little or no compensation.
Industrial and commercial firms have fared no better. According to the employers’ organisation, Fedecamaras, since Mr Chávez became president in 1999 almost 400 companies have been nationalised, the vast majority in the past two years. The Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce says that compensation was paid to the owners of only nine out of the 44 of its member-firms that have been taken over this year. The constitution states that no expropriation can take place without a final verdict from the courts and fair compensation. In practice, a stroke of the president’s pen is all that is required.
Over the years the official rationale for nationalisation has changed. The earliest takeovers were justified on the grounds that the company (or farm) was unproductive. The government then decided that “strategic” areas of the economy should pass into state hands. So in 2007-08 it took over private-sector oil and electricity businesses, as well as telecommunications, the cement industry and Sidor, an iron and steel firm privatised in the 1990s.
The government also now controls a quarter of the banking system. Mr Chávez said recently that any bank which declined to “co-operate with national development” by assigning credit according to government priorities would also be taken over. Nowadays officials openly state that their aim is to implant a socialist economy.
Paradoxically, despite the takeovers, the state’s share of GDP seems still to be around 30%, the same as it was in 1998. That is partly because the private sector expanded rapidly during the 2004-08 oil boom. But it is also because many nationalised companies now produce less than when they were in private hands. Much of the food industry has been confiscated in order to “ensure food sovereignty”. But the result has been a sharp increase in imports. Earlier this year, more than 130,000 tonnes of decomposing food imported by PDVAL, an arm of the state oil company, was found in ports and on wasteland.
There are one or two exceptions. Officials say that output at Enlandes, a nationalised milk firm, has risen by 50% in two years. The science minister said recently that CANTV, the main telecoms firm, had 65% more customers since its nationalisation, though he provided no details. But more typically, once companies are in state hands their staffing levels rise, prices fall and they become dependent on government subsidies, according to Richard Obuchi of IESA, a business school in Caracas. In addition, they tend to make a smaller range of products.
The construction industry has been badly hurt by nationalisation. Cement and steel rods have become scarcer (there is a thriving black market in both). Sidor produced 4.3m tonnes of steel in its last year in private ownership; this year it hopes to make 2m tonnes. Another reason that housing schemes have slowed or halted is that the government has banned developers from adjusting prices in line with inflation, which is running at over 30%. Earlier this month Mr Chávez expropriated six new estates under construction, to the horror of most buyers. Developers, the president says, are “bandits” who will not be compensated for the seizure.
The story is repeated in almost every area the government has moved into. Electricity nationalisation contributed to power shortages that saw severe rationing earlier this year and continuing unscheduled blackouts across the country. The oil industry, the bulk of which was already state-owned, has seen production of both crude and refined products fall (by how much is a matter of dispute).
Polls suggest that most Venezuelans disapprove of the nationalisations and firmly support private property. But Mr Chávez seems to be following the advice of Alan Woods, a Welsh Trotskyist who has become an informal adviser. Mr Woods, who is better known in Caracas than Cardiff, publicly urged the president to respond to his electoral setback by “accelerating the revolutionary process”, expropriating land, banks and the main industries. Venezuelans had better brace themselves for more nationalisation, scarcity and economic decline.

Brasil se abstém em resolução contra apedrejamento e violações no Irã

Faz sentido. Não tem por que sair "apedrejando" o regime iraniano, pelo qual Nosso Guia tem especial carinho, apenas porque ele aplica a sua lei contra uma adúltera, que deve justamente merecer o castigo imposto pela justiça do seu país.
Melhor mesmo é dialogar, se possível "olho no olho", entre amigos...

Brasil se abstém em resolução contra apedrejamento e violações no Irã

País mantém postura de encontrar soluções pelo diálogo; documento foi aprovado na ONU

Jamil Chade, correspondente em Genebra

O Estado de S. Paulo, 19 de novembro de 2010 

GENEBRA - A diplomacia brasileira se absteve de apoiar uma resolução da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) que pede o fim do apedrejamento no Irã e o condena como forma de punição. A resolução ainda condena Teerã por "graves violações de direitos humanos" e por silenciar jornalistas, blogueiros e opositores. A votação da resolução ocorreu na noite da quinta-feira, 17, em Nova York. O governo iraniano acusou a ONU de estar "politizando a questão do apedrejamento".
Nos últimos anos, a estratégia do Itamaraty tem sido a de não usar os órgãos da ONU para condenar outros países. A ideia é de que a cooperação e o diálogo são as melhores formas de garantir que um país caminhe em direção ao respeito dos direitos humanos. A posição brasileira é criticada por ONGs, que insistem que o País, na condição de democracia, deveria pressionar demais governos para que sigam no caminho da abertura política.
Na quinta-feira, porém, o Brasil voltou a demonstrar que não está disposto a criticar o Irã publicamente, nem mesmo no caso do apedrejamento. O Brasil ainda tem esperanças também de ser chamado para fazer parte do grupo que negociaria uma solução para o impasse nuclear no Irã.
O País foi um dos 57 países que optaram pela abstenção na votação da resolução na Terceira Comissão da Assembleia Geral da ONU. Entre os outros países que se abstiveram estão Angola, Benin, Butão, Equador, Guatemala, Marrocos, Nigéria, África do Sul e Zâmbia.
Um dos pontos principais da resolução aprovada é a condenação do apedrejamento como método de execução. O texto pede o fim da prática, assim como a discriminação contra mulheres. O documento foi apresentado pela delegação do Canadá como uma forma de mandar uma mensagem de que não se poderia tolerar atitudes como a de condenar a iraniana Sakineh Ashtiani à morte por apedrejamento.
O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva chegou a oferecer asilo à iraniana, o que foi recusado por Teerã. Há uma semana, a presidente eleita Dilma Rousseff criticou o método iraniano. Mas na ONU o Brasil não deu seu voto a favor da resolução.
Votaram ainda contra a proposta países como Venezuela, Síria, Sudão, Cuba, Bolívia e Líbia. A resolução foi aprovada com o apoio de 80 países, entre eles um dos membros do Mercosul, a Argentina, além de todos os países europeus, EUA, Canadá, Chile e Japão.
'Politização'
Para o governo iraniano, o que está sendo feito é a "politização" do assunto como forma de pressionar Teerã. "Essa resolução não é justa e não contribui com os direitos humanos. Essa resolução é fruto da hostilidade americana em direção ao Irã. É a politização dos direitos humanos", acusou Mohammad-Javad Larijani, representante de Teerã para a reunião.
Para ele, o país tem o direito de usar a ameaça do apedrejamento e insistiu que há anos ela não é usada. Ativistas negam que haja uma moratória na prática. "O apedrejamento significa que você deve fazer alguns atos, jogando um certo número limitado de pedras, de uma forma especial, nos olhos de uma pessoa. Apedrejamento é uma punição menor que a execução porque você a chance de sobreviver. Mais de 50% das pessoas podem não morrer", defendeu Larijani.
O texto ainda condena as violações contra mulheres, assim como a perseguição contra Baha'i. A resolução ainda pede o fim da restrição de liberdade de expressão e de associação, o fim da intimidação contra ativistas, advogados, políticos da oposição, bloggers e jornalistas, além de condenar o desaparecimento de pessoas que tenham participado de demonstrações.
O documento ainda pede o fim de restrições para jornalistas, como as interferências nos sinais de satélite, uma prática comum adotada por Teerã, segundo ONGs. O texto ainda exorta o governo de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a lançar investigações "independentes e imparciais" sobre as violações de direitos humanos e que acabe com a impunidade.
Larijani se defendeu, alegando que não há um silenciamento de advogados e nem jornalistas. "Todos podem falar com a imprensa estrangeira. Mas depende do que querem dizer", disse o iraniano. "Se estão difamando o sistema legal, devem ser responsáveis por isso", acusou.
A resolução condena a alta taxa de casos de pena de morte anunciadas pelo governo iraniano, a execução de pessoas com menos de 18 anos que tenham cometido crimes e a existência de leis que permitem a pena de morte contra pessoas que sejam "inimigas de Deus".
Em uma declaração enviada à imprensa após a votação, a embaixadora dos EUA na ONU, Susan Rice, comemorou a aprovação da resolução. "O governo do Irã continua a assediar, prender de forma arbitrária e reprimir de forma violenta sua própria população", afirmou.
Veja também:
Brasil se abstém de condenar abusos em MianmarAs punições da Sharia, a Lei Islâmica
 As origens do sistema jurídico do Islã
Entenda o caso Sakineh Ashtiani

A OTAN, num encontro "crucial" (segundo dizem)

Análise de um estrategista de Stratfor, possivelmente o melhor think tank de pensamento estratégico do momento:

Senior Eurasia analyst Lauren Goodrich examines the prospects for this weekend’s crucial NATO summit in Lisbon on the alliance’s future.

Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Colin Chapman: NATO is at a crossroads. Friday and Saturday see the most important meeting of the organization since the end of the Cold War. The meeting to be held in the Portuguese capital Lisbon will be attended by the president of Russia for the first time. So does NATO face just a facelift or a transformation?

Welcome to Agenda. And joining me to discuss this is STRATFOR Senior Eurasia Analyst Lauren Goodrich. Lauren, the agenda looks very different at this NATO summit. It’s not going to be about Afghanistan, is it?

Lauren Goodrich: Not at all. This is the most critical NATO summit in over a decade because they’re going to be drafting the Strategic Concept Document. This Strategic Concept Document is pretty much the mission statement of NATO. It’s the third one drafted since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Strategic Concept during the Cold War, of course, was to contain the Soviets. But after the fall of the Soviet Union, the strategic concept changed to pretty much deal with the fall of the Soviet Union at first, and then shifted again in 1999 in order to expand NATO’s ability to intervene outside the Eurasian theatre. This allowed NATO to militarily intervene in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, etc… So now it’s time for the third strategic concept document to actually be drafted. This one is going to set what is NATO’s focus for the next decade. What is the threat for the next decade?

Chapman: So what is the threat in the next decade?

Goodrich: Well that’s the problem. You have 28 members now of NATO all with differing interests and different definitions of what a threat is. This is where we go into pretty much how NATO is divided into three camps.

The first camp is what I would call the Atlanticists – the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark. The Atlanticists are interested in the non-Eurasian theatre. They want NATO to focus on the threats that we’ve seen recently such as the war in Afghanistan and nontraditional threats such as terrorism.

The second camp is actually the core Europeans led by the French and Germans. They are interested in limiting NATO, a leaner NATO, having the members not be as committed and limiting their ability to commit. And also having NATO work with other organizations such as the United Nations.

The third group within NATO which is the Intermarium states. This is the more interesting group because it’s newer NATO members - mainly the ones from Central Europe. What they see as a threat is what the core and the root level NATO theat was going back to the beginning of NATO - the Soviets. And the Central Europeans want NATO to focus back on the Russians.

Chapman: It’s called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but after this is it going to emerge as something completely different?

Goodrich: Well that depends on the Strategic Concept Document that’s drafted this weekend. But how do you draft a common document when you have so many diverging interests in NATO at this moment? The Strategic Concept Document looks like it’s only going to show how divided the alliance is now.

Chapman: Let me throw that question back to you. Could this all really be resolved in just two days?

Goodrich: Well the negotiations over this concept document have been going on for quite a while now. But we are not seeing any ability for them to come together. Even in the past week we’ve seen statements out of France and the Poles, the United States, United Kingdom, the Germans - everyone’s on a different page.

Chapman: Lauren – why did the Russians accept an invitation to attend – what do they expect to get out of it?

Goodrich: Well the NATO summit is actually in two parts. The first part is the NATO summit in which they will be discussing the Strategic Concept Document. The second part is actually the Russian-NATO summit, which is why Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was invited. Medvedev is going with two goals. The first goal is to see what comes out of the first part of the summit. The more divided NATO is especially over the Strategic Concept Document, the better it is for the Russians. The Russians know that as long as NATO is divided, it can never agree on things like expansion – especially into the former Soviet states. Or declaring Russia as the target of their focus.

The second is for Medvedev to sit down with U.S. President Barack Obama. This is the very first one-on-one since the U.S. elections. The Russians were very wary going into these elections because they know the Republicans tend to have a firmer, more aggressive take on Russia. Since the elections, which did not go in Obama’s favor occurred, Russia has grown wary as to whether Obama would stick to his previous commitments on having warmer relations with Russia.

Chapman: I suppose one of the ironies of all this is just as things look as if they could change, they might not change because of the state of America’s politics.

Goodrich: Very much so. The United States and Russia seemed as if they were on a warming period under Barack Obama – starting in about April – but really fleshing out over the summer. The United States and Russia decided that it was better to have a temporary detente between their two countries in order to focus on more important issues of the moment.

For the United States this meant that they needed Russia to agree to sanctions on Iran and logistical support for Afghanistan. For Russia, this meant that they needed the U.S. to cease support for Georgia and Ukraine, freeze ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe, as well as aiding Russia in its modernization and privatization programs. Both sides actually agreed to all of this until the elections.

The START Treaty ended up being the bellwether of whether this temporary detente was being successful or not. It looked like it was going to slide through both legislatures in both Russia and the United States easily - until the elections. So now we have a stall on START.

Chapman: So summing up, its’t NATO really just playing into Russia’s hands? As these groups in NATO argue about the future, the Russians just get on about their own business.

Goodrich: Very much so. They’re counting on the divisions within NATO. As long as it’s divided Russia will have a much easier time in order to clamp down on its resurgence especially in its former Soviet states and be able to start even pushing on the NATO members themselves.

Chapman: Thanks very much Lauren. Lauren Goodrich there, and that’s Agenda for this week. I’m Colin Chapman. See you next time.

Curiosidades... cubanas: seria tudo o que se deve lembrar?

Eu por vezes me pergunto: para que serve, exatamente, uma universidade?
Ora, para transmitir o saber, me responderiam, na lata, como se diz...
Bem, se é para transmitir o saber, eu me pergunto por que, exatamente, um centro, supostamente dedicado a "Estudos Avançados Multidisciplinares", precisa aproveitar o 15. aniversário de criação de um "Núcleo de Estudos Cubanos" -- que se imagina voltado não tanto para estudos realmente cubanos, e sim mais para a defesa de uma ditadura hoje indefensável -- para realizar uma exposição como a que vai relatado abaixo, sobre a "Solidariedade Internacionalista" e em torno da figura de Ché Guevara?
Não é preciso lembrar aos mais jovens -- que devem eventualmente se enternecer romanticamente com aquela famosa foto do personagem de boina preta e cabelos desgrenhados, numa simbologia próxima a desses Cristos medievais de semblante torturado, encimando a famosa frase ensinando que "hay que endurecerse..." (ops!) "... sin perder la ternura jamás" -- que o guerrilheiro heróico morreu na Bolívia em 1967, numa infeliz tentativa de produzir "quatro, cinco Vietnãs na América Latina", e que desde então, a única coisa que se tem, do personagem, é a sua exploração política pela ditadura cubana e sua exploração mercantil por milhares de fabricantes de camisetas e de buttons em volta do mundo.
Tampouco seria preciso lembrar que essa coisa de "Solidariedade Internacionalista" é uma invenção do stalinismo, para a III Internacional, que na prática significava que todos os partidos comunistas nacionais deveriam se colocar obrigatoriamente a serviço do PCUS, ou melhor dito, dos interesses nacionais da União Soviética, mais especificamente da ditadura stalinista e da figura do ditador supremo, ele sim o "Guia Genial dos Povos".
Talvez o mesmo ocorra com o "NESCUBA", servilmente colocado à disposição dos interesses da ditadura cubana na UnB.
Alguém ainda acredita na tal de "revolução cubana" e na "solidariedade internacionalista" com esse personagem que tem mais fama do que resultados?
Talvez meia dúzia de true believers, e mais os curiosos que passarem pela Biblioteca da UnB, que vão continuar sendo enganados por uma das mais eficientes máquinas de propaganda -- política e mercantil, volto a dizer -- de que já se teve notícia em toda a história.
Voltando à pergunta inicial, e sua resposta tentativa, a universidade deveria transmitir um saber real, não uma propaganda política e comercial mistificadora, enganosa, simplesmente patética.
Os jovens sabem que o personagem em questão foi, sucessivamente, presidente do Banco Central de Cuba e ministro da Indústria, e que nas duas funções foi de uma tal incompetência gerencial e administrativa -- ele sabia mais manejar armas do que um órgão de Estado -- que a única coisa que restou a Fidel foi dispensá-lo dessas funções?
Os jovens sabem que, como resultado de suas gestões incompetentes à frente dessas instituições, a situação econômica de Cuba se tornou tão grave que a ilha e seu ditador não tiveram outra via de escape do que se colocar servilmente a serviço da União Soviética, para dela receber um "mensalão" periódico -- avaliado em bilhões de dólares, pagos em troca de açúcar superfaturado -- que durou enquanto a URSS existiu?
Os jovens que estudam no NESCUBA sabem o desastre econômico e material que é a ilha de Fidel, que tinha a segunda ou terceira renda per capita da América Latina em 1959, e que hoje está relegada às últimas posições?
Esse Núcleo de Estudos Cubanos estuda de fato a situação política e econômica de Cuba, sua miséria moral no plano dos direitos elementares da população, a violação constante dos direitos humanos, a falta completa de liberdade que ali existe?
Enfim, o núcleo estuda Cuba ou serve apenas de instrumento de propaganda do regime atual?
A UnB confirma o que se pode esperar dela...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O Núcleo de Estudos Cubanos/NESCUBA, vinculado ao Centro de Estudos Avançados Multidisciplinares/Ceam, tem a honra de convidar toda a comunidade Acadêmica
para a exposição CHE VIVE - A Solidariedade Internacionalista, em comemoração aos 15 anos de criação do NESCUBA/CEAM.
Período: 22 de novembro a 02 de dezembro
Local: Biblioteca Central - BCE da Universidade de Brasília/UnB 
Atenciosamente,
Centro de Estudos Avançados Multidisciplinares/Ceam
Universidade de Brasília/UnB

Divida publica em ascensao, e como!: governo faz maquiagem para enganar...

A dívida pública aumenta com os juros não pagos

Editorial - O Estado de S.Paulo

18 de novembro de 2010 

Fala-se que o programa da presidente eleita, Dilma Rousseff, ainda muito indefinido, prevê uma redução da dívida pública e a decorrente redução dos juros a pagar. É difícil imaginar como se conseguiria este milagre, mas isso não nos impede de examinar o peso dos juros para o governo federal (Tesouro e INSS).
Segundo os dados publicados pelo Banco Central relativos às contas públicas nos nove primeiros meses do ano, os juros nominais pagos pelo governo federal somaram R$ 105,60 bilhões, enquanto o superávit primário, que deveria cobrir esses juros (inclusive o INSS), somou apenas R$ 54,835 bilhões.
Os juros nominais representam 4,06% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB); o superávit primário, 2,1% do PIB. Sabe-se, no entanto, que esse resultado foi conseguido por meio de um truque contábil vinculado ao aumento de capital da Petrobrás.
O que se leva menos em conta é que, para pagar os juros sobre a dívida pública do governo federal, o Tesouro tem um recurso muito curioso: emite títulos da dívida para amenizar o custo dos juros. Nos nove primeiros meses do ano, o que o Tesouro chama de "apropriação positiva de juros" somou R$ 114,74 bilhões, mais do que os juros nominais de R$ 105,6 bilhões.
Isso representa 7,05% da dívida pública e explica 89% do aumento da dívida em relação a dezembro de 2009!
Essa análise nos leva a considerar alguns pontos da política da dívida pública. Com os juros nominais equivalendo a 4% do PIB, pode-se imaginar que o nosso crescimento econômico, sem uma dívida tão alta, seria, em tese, o dobro do que é. Um aspecto importante a considerar é que o custo elevado da dívida tem origem, em grande parte, na taxa Selic, fixada pelas autoridades monetárias (em razão do déficit nominal do governo), que serve de indexador para uma parte importante da dívida.
No entanto, se houvesse um superávit primário suficiente para pagar os juros, nossa dívida pública seria muito menor, pois no sistema atual aumentamos a dívida, sobre a qual incidem juros, para pagar juros...!
O próximo governo precisará examinar com realismo a política de endividamento do setor público. Não há dúvida de que uma reforma, das mais urgentes, seria da política do INSS, uma vez que esse organismo tem um déficit primário, e não um superávit. Caberia reduzir as despesas de custeio no financiamento de investimentos, para os quais podemos obter recursos externos mais baratos. São reformas prioritárias para melhorar a posição do Brasil no mundo.

Governo em ascensao, pelo menos na presidencia...

A notícia é antiga, mas é sempre bom refrescar a memória, para termos uma ideia do exército (literalmente) que a nova presidenta vai comandar na Presidência da República.
Atenção: os números, e os gastos, podem ter inflado desde que a matéria foi escrita.
Você está pagando tudo isso, caro leitor (e "contribuinte" compulsório).

Com Lula, Presidência emprega 67 diretores e centenas de chefes
Tânia Monteiro e Leonencio Nossa
O Estadao de S.Paulo,  31 de março de 2009

Ao todo, são 1.750 servidores, volume tão grande que foi preciso ampliar restaurante e estacionamento

À semelhança do Congresso, o Palácio do Planalto é uma Casa com organograma inchado. Os salários podem não chegar às cifras do Legislativo, mas a Presidência criou no governo Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva uma série de funções para encaixar a militância. Na teia administrativa, há 67 diretores e uma centena de chefes. Só a Casa Civil, pasta comandada pela ministra Dilma Rousseff, conta com sete diretores, mesmo número da multinacional Vale do Rio Doce.

O setor que mais ganhou diretores foi o da Comunicação Social, do ministro Franklin Martins. Desde 2003, passou de 2 para 12 diretores, o dobro da Petrobrás. Há diretores de Patrocínios, Normas, Controle, Internet e Eventos, Comunicação da Área de Desenvolvimento, Mídia, Imprensa Internacional, Imprensa Nacional, Imprensa Regional, Produção e Divulgação de Imagens, Apoio Operacional e Administrativo e Comunicação da Área Social.

Foram criadas, ainda, mais oito Diretorias de Programa para as pastas de Relações Institucionais e Assuntos Estratégicos. Um diretor geralmente ocupa cargo comissionado com salário de R$ 8.988, o DAS-5, mas há variações, caso seja servidor ou não (ver quadro ao lado).

Ao todo, entre cargos de chefia ou postos subalternos, cerca de 1.750 pessoas trabalham na estrutura da Presidência. Os "chefes" estão em todos os departamentos, secretarias e escalões de poder.

O gabinete de Lula tem 13 deles, com salários de R$ 6.843,76 a R$ 11.179,36. Trabalham ali também chefes adjuntos de Agenda, Informações em Apoio à Decisão, Gestão e Atendimento, sem contar os tradicionais chefes de Cerimonial e Ajudância de Ordens. O mais poderoso de todos, porém, é Gilberto Carvalho, chefe do gabinete.

Já o organograma da Vice-Presidência, mais enxuto, lembra o de uma empresa. O vice José Alencar trabalha com sete chefes, que comandam as assessorias de Comunicação, Administração, Parlamentar, Técnica, Diplomática, Militar, além do Gabinete. Não há correligionários mineiros ou amigos.

GASTOS
O gasto anual com funcionários em toda a estrutura da Presidência deve passar de R$ 2,9 bilhões, em 2008, para R$ 3,4 bilhões, neste ano. Está incluído o gasto com pessoal das secretarias especiais de Direitos Humanos, Mulheres, Promoção Racial, Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin), Advocacia-Geral da União (AGU) e Empresa Brasileira de Comunicação.

Os gastos com pessoal do gabinete de Lula, incluindo a Casa Civil, também devem aumentar. No ano passado, o valor gasto com os assessores mais diretos chegou a R$ 141 milhões. A previsão é gastar R$ 149 milhões neste ano. Desde janeiro, o pessoal do gabinete gerou uma despesa de R$ 25 milhões.

É tanta gente na Presidência que o próprio Lula chegou a se queixar que o Planalto ficou apertado demais. Foi preciso dobrar as instalações do restaurante e ampliar o número de vagas no estacionamento.

Procurados desde o dia 20 para esclarecimentos, os assessores da Casa Civil se limitaram a confirmar o total de diretores. Os assessores não informaram o que fazem nem quanto ganham. Apenas repassaram leis e decretos que regulamentam as funções e gratificações. Desde 2003, essas normas sofreram alterações para garantir a acomodação dos aliados.

Uma leitura parcial mostra que há mais de 50 chefes na Presidência. Técnicos estimam que o número passe de cem. Há ainda os subchefes, os subsecretários, os subcoordenadores e os secretários adjuntos.

Brazil on the rise... pelo menos na RBPI

Todo mundo adora um sucesso, e não é o governo que iria desmentir essa premissa. Tudo o que ele fez foi bem sucedido, inclusive na área externa, ou seja, na diplomacia. Não são os acadêmicos que vão discordar,...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

O Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais – IBRI tem a satisfação de anunciar o lançamento da edição especial da Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional – RBPI intitulada “Emerging Brazil under Lula: an assessment on International Relations (2003-2010)”.

O objetivo central deste número é apresentar um grande painel da ação internacional do Brasil ao longo dos últimos oito anos. Compõem a edição especial os seguintes artigos:

Editorial: An Assessment of the Lula Era, por Amado Luiz Cervo & Antônio Carlos Lessa
Brazil’s Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World, por Amado Luiz Cervo
Brazilian External Sector so far in the 21st century, por Renato Baumann
Brazil and the Economic, Political, and Environmental Multilateralism: the Lula years, por Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini & André Luiz Reis da Silva
When emergent countries reform global governance of climate change: Brazil under Lula, por Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau
Security issues during Lula’s administration: from the reactive to the assertive approach, por Rafael Antonio Duarte Villa & Manuela Trindade Viana
Brazil’s strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010), por Antônio Carlos Lessa
A New Strategic Dialogue:  Brazil-US Relations in Lula’s Presidency (2003-2010), por Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo
Brazilian foreign policy towards South America during the Lula Administration: caught between South America and Mercosur, por Miriam Gomes Saraiva
The new Africa and Brazil in the Lula era: The rebirth of Brazilian Atlantic Policy, por José Flávio Sombra Saraiva
Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China, por Niu Haibin
International Thought in the Lula Era, por Raúl Bernal-Meza
Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003-2010): an overview, por Celso Amorim

O número especial pode ser adquirido na Loja do IBRI.

Editorial da Edição Especial da RBPI – Emerging Brazil under Lula: an assessment on International Relations (2003-2010), por Amado Luiz Cervo & Antônio Carlos Lessa

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) has kept Brazil open to the international economy and promoted internal economic development and social inclusion. He has worked toward the overcoming of the inequalities among nations and the elimination of hunger in the world; and has intensified the harmony between the State and social leaders to whom he has delegated power and responsibilities regarding development. He endured the criticism of the opposition, used for decades to lambasting foreign policy and, in Lula’s case, some concessions made to the Workers Party as mere allegories. As a matter of fact, Lula has achieved significant external results in important sectors for national life and failed in others. South America, his priority project, occupies a middle ground.

To make South America into a power pole supported by a solid economic base, political unity, and security autonomy is a Brazilian project that dates back to previous governments but which has been assigned priority by Lula. A series of circumstances turned this project from a high priority into a low priority in the 21th century. The South American countries have promoted institutionalization, with the establishment of UNASUR in 2008. In general, they have preserved the political intent but have created different national arrangements and became dispersed among different models of participation in the international scene. Major energy and infrastructure projects have not materialized. With the passing of time, Lula has let know that Brazil’s locus is the world, without however allowing this global dimension of external action to result in a distancing from South America.

Lula’s diplomacy has met with two failures. At the WTO it failed to achieve the desired global agreement on free trade that would favor our national interests, given Brazil’s higher competitiveness at a systemic level. In addition, the effort to make part of the global power club, especially of the Security Council, was an attempt that earned some rhetoric support but yielded no actual result. It will be up to the next government to rethink these two lines of external action – foreign trade policy and admission to the power club.

On three other fronts – the most relevant for the promotion of national interests –  Lula has achieved remarkable success, which makes it advisable for the next government not only to maintain but also to reinforce these lines of external action.

First, the internationalization of the Brazilian economy. Of the BRIC countries, Lula’s Brazil has stood out as the most internationalized economy, either as a recipient of foreign enterprises or direct foreign investments or owing to the outward expansion of Brazilian companies and investments. This represents a jump in historic quality toward a mature process of development and of the country’s participation in the international scene.

Secondly, with conviction and even with bold initiatives, Lula has promoted the negotiation of international conflicts. This conflict solution strategy is a novelty, given the intensity with which it is conducted by Brazilian and Chinese diplomacy, not to mention UNASUR. It is the opposite of NATO’s strategy of dealing with conflicts through the violence of sanctions or intervention, which has governed international relations since World War II and should be replaced for the sake of peace.

Thirdly, Lula has promoted coalitions among emerging countries that have demanded and achieved the shifting of the axis of the international system characterized by the old North-South asymmetry toward a new North-Emerging Countries symmetry. The time is past when the decision-making power in international relations was restricted to the understanding among a few developed powers, which was then proposed to the others as a possible consensus.

This special issue we offer our readers examines and looks deeper into these and other aspects of Brazil’s international relations in the 21th century.

Um IDH "estadualizado": o caso dos estados americanos

No caso do Brasil, ocorreria mais ou menos o mesmo: estados como Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo ou Santa Catarina se alçariam na escala global, se equiparando, provavelmente, a países como Itália ou Espanha.

Nation states

How selected American states compare to various countries
The Economist online, Nov 16th 2010, 16:30

THE human development index (HDI) is an attempt to give a snapshot of a country's success by combining three important indicators: health, education and wealth. The most recent global HDI ranking from the United Nations' Development Programme places Norway top, with the United States fourth (out of 169 countries). But with over 300m people living in 50 states, America varies greatly, so the American Human Development Project releases a state-based version of the HDI. We have put the two indices together to see where America's states would rank if they were countries. Because the indicators used in the two indices were slightly different, we calculated our index from scratch using comparable data (though we used a proxy for educational attainment). Our index still has Norway as number one but America drops to eighth.

O BRIC sem o "B"; uma reuniao exclusivamente entre Russia, India e China

Calma, pessoal, não se trata do desmantelamento precoce do BRIC ou de uma exclusão deliberada do Brasil. Existe um grupo RIC, formado exclusivamente pelos três paises, para cuidar de questoes regionais e outros temas da agenda internacional que interessam aos três.
Se trata de uma reunião formal, oficial, do grupo RIC, como informa este comunicado final, publicado no Facebook do próprio Primeiro-Ministro indiano que participou do encontro, tal como retirado do site da chancelaria indiana
Nada de alarmismo, portanto, como faz maldosamente o título deste post.
Honni soit qui mal y pense...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Joint Communiqué at 10th Russia-India-China (RIC) Ministerial Meeting at Wuhan

by Dr. Manmohan Singh 

Monday, November 15, 2010 at 2:52pm

1. The Foreign Ministers of the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation and the Republic of India held their 10th meeting in Wuhan, China on 15 November 2010.
2. The Ministers expressed conviction that the trilateral meeting mechanism had deepened coordination and cooperation among the three countries on international and regional issues and helped promote multilateralism and democracy in international relations. The Foreign Ministers reiterated that the cooperation between China, Russia and India does not target any other country.
3. The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the follow-up efforts made by the three parties on the decisions arrived at during the Bangalore meeting on 27 October 2009. The Ministers reviewed the progress of trilateral cooperation in various fields and agreed that the cooperation between think-tanks and businesses and in the fields of agriculture, disaster mitigation and relief, and medical and health services furthered their trilateral relations. They renewed their solid commitment to advancing existing cooperation, further exploring cooperation potential and reinforcing cooperation in, inter alia, energy, high-tech sectors, innovation and modernization, aerospace, people-to-people and cultural exchanges.
4. The Ministers noted that the three countries have suffered loss of life and property due to natural disasters during the current year. The Ministers appreciated the outcome of the China-Russia-India trilateral expert meeting on disaster mitigation and relief held on 12-13 November in New Delhi and looked forward to the next meeting scheduled for the second half of 2011 in Russia.
5. The Ministers noted the large potential for mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of healthcare and medicine. They looked forward to the report of the next Expert-Level Meeting on Cooperation in the field of Healthcare and Medicine to be convened in Russia in the first half of 2011. They also noted that further interaction would include shaping effective mechanisms for combating infectious diseases and for food safety.
6. The Ministers underlined the importance of exchanging experiences in the agricultural sector, and looked forward to the recommendations of the Trilateral Expert-Level Meeting on Agricultural Cooperation to be held in New Delhi in 2011.
7. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the growth in trade and investment relations among the three countries. They hoped that the business chambers in their meeting in New Delhi on 30 November, preparatory to the 2011 Trilateral Business Forum in Russia, would be able to chart out innovative mechanisms for true, meaningful trilateral business alliances in identified priority sectors.
8. The Ministers commended the trilateral meetings of scholars for their significant contribution in stimulating scholarly discourse on political and strategic issues of policy relevance to the three countries. They welcomed the outcomes of the tenth meeting of scholars from China, Russia and India held in September 2010 in Moscow, and looked forward to the eleventh meeting to be held in 2011 in China.
9. The Ministers welcomed the proposals by Russia on sectoral cooperation in the field of energy and innovation and agreed to hold expert-level consultations in these areas.
10. The Ministers exchanged views on the current international situation and agreed that they share close or similar views on various international and regional issues and their cooperation is solidly grounded. The Ministers shared the perception that the world is undergoing major and swift changes. They expressed their support for a multi-polar, equitable and democratic world order, based on principles of international law, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making by all states. The Ministers expressed their strong commitment to the use of multilateral instruments for finding common solutions to global and regional problems.
11. The Ministers noted that this year marks the 65th Anniversary of the end of the Second World War and paid tribute to all those who fought against fascism and for freedom . The Ministers reiterated that the three countries would continue to work with all peace-loving countries and peoples to establish a fair international order and prevent war and conflict.
12. The Ministers noted that the global economic recovery remains uneven, fragile, unbalanced. They agreed that major economies shall work together and step up macro-economic policy coordination. They called for global coordinated efforts to promote strong, sustainable and balanced world growth.
13. The Ministers reiterated their support for the G20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation, and welcomed the decisions of the G20 summit in Seoul including on IMF quota reform. They reiterated that the goal of the reform of international financial institutions was to achieve, step by step, equitable distribution of voting power between developed and developing countries.
14. The Ministers urged all parties to take concrete actions to oppose all forms of protectionism and work for early, comprehensive and balanced outcomes from the Doha Development Agenda, consistent with its mandate, based on the progress already made, including with regard to modalities. The Ministers emphasized that international trade frictions should be handled in the spirit of equality, consultation, mutual benefit and within the framework of WTO. The Ministers of China and India supported Russia’s accession to the WTO in 2011.
15. The Ministers called for continued international adherence to the principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol including that of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. The Ministers of Russia and India appreciated China’s hosting of the 12th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperation under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the 14th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) in October this year. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to step up their cooperation to enable positive outcomes at the Cancun conference.
16. The Ministers expressed the view that global energy security is of great significance to advancing world economic recovery and development, and such security can be achieved through greater dialogue and cooperation between producing and consuming countries. The international community should work together to ensure stable energy supply, the security of international energy transportation and stable energy prices so that the energy demand of all countries, especially developing ones, are met. Efforts should be made to build an open and transparent energy market system and an advanced energy technology R&D and dissemination system for enhanced technological transfer and financial support to developing countries consistent with existing international non proliferation obligations and relevant national policy. The Ministers agreed to step up cooperation in the field of energy security, taking into account, inter alia, the initiative of President Medvedev to negotiate an international legal instrument in this area.
17. The Ministers reiterated the importance of the UN Millennium Declaration and the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, welcomed the outcomes of the UN high-level meeting on the MDGs held in September 2010 and urged members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee to honor their commitment of devoting 0.7% of their Gross National Income to official development assistance as early as possible.
18. The Ministers commended the indispensible role played by the United Nations in international affairs. The Ministers reiterated the need for a comprehensive reform of the United Nations to make it more democratic, representative and efficient so that it can deal with today’s global challenges more effectively. The Ministers of China and Russia appreciated the role played by India in international affairs and welcomed India’s election to the UN Security Council for the 2011-2012 term, and looked forward to deepening cooperation with India within the Council.
19. The Ministers stressed that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as its association with international terrorism poses a grave threat to international peace and security and represents a cause for deep concern. The Ministers proceed from the understanding that dialogue over the problems of preventing risks and threats to the global non-proliferation regime must be built on the basis stipulated by the international obligations of states. The prospects for the non-proliferation regime to a large extent depend on ensuring the security of all states, as well as states’ ability to establish an effective export control system and to secure sensitive materials.
20. The Ministers reiterated their strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stressed that there could be no justification for any act of terrorism anywhere. They emphasized the need for full international cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts, particularly within the framework of the United Nations, to prevent terrorist attacks and to prosecute terrorists and their supporters. In this context, the Ministers urged all UN member states to urgently conclude and adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The Ministers exhorted the UN Member States to implement relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, particularly UNSC Resolution 1267, 1373, 1540 and 1624 and international conventions and protocols against terrorism as well as to contribute to implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The Ministers emphasized the importance of joint efforts to counter the use of information and communication technologies for terrorist and criminal purposes. They also underscored the importance of joint efforts in countering the financing of terrorism.
21. The Ministers emphasized the imperative for the international community to maintain its commitment to render assistance to the Government and people of Afghanistan in ensuring security and development and to make concerted efforts to restore peace and stability in Afghanistan. They expressed concern at the deteriorating security situation and underlined the need for adequate development of the Afghan National Security Forces to enable Afghanistan to defend its sovereignty and independence. The Ministers reaffirmed their long term commitment to a peaceful, stable and prosperous Afghanistan. The Ministers expressed their support to the transition to increasing Afghan responsibility on national security, and to the Afghan Government’s Peace and Reintegration Program. The Ministers stressed the importance of cooperation among three countries on the issue of Afghanistan within current mechanisms. The Ministers considered the SCO as an important platform for regional cooperation on this issue. The Ministers underlined the need to step up the coordinated fight of the international community against illegal trafficking of Afghan drugs.
22. The Ministers recognized that Iran is entitled to the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and should at the same time restore international confidence to the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activites. The Ministers emphasized that there is no alternative to the intensification of efforts to address the Iranian nuclear issue by peaceful means through dialogue and negotiation.
23. The Ministers reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region through dialogue, and called on the parties concerned to return to the Six-Party Talks at the earliest date and to fully implement the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005.
24. The Ministers of China and India expressed support to Russia’s policy to protect its core interests, and to contribute to regional peace and stability in the Caucasus region.
25. The Ministers stressed the need to develop an open transparent inclusive and balanced security and cooperation architecture in the Asia Pacific region based upon universally agreed principles of international law and giving due consideration to the legitimate interests of all states. The Ministers agreed that experts from three countries should study this issue.
26. The Ministers expressed their determination to work toward strengthening cooperation within BRIC which is acquiring growing importance in the modern world. The Foreign Ministers of Russia and India reiterated their readiness to coordinate with China as it prepares for the third BRIC Summit and other related events in 2011.
27. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of China and India welcomed Russia to the East Asia Summit process and looked forward to Russia’s positive contribution to the emerging economic and security architecture in the region.
28. The Ministers of China and India welcomed Russia’s membership in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).
29. The Foreign Ministers of China and Russia welcomed India’s constructive participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an Observer Country and attached importance to India’s intention to play a larger role in the SCO.
30. The Ministers expressed their gratitude to the Government and people of Hubei Province for their hospitality and arrangements for the 10th meeting of the Foreign Ministers.
31. The Ministers tasked the Heads of relevant Departments of the MFAs of China, Russia and India to hold close consultations on issues related to trilateral cooperation.
32. The Ministers decided to hold their next meeting in Russia in 2011.